#mozyr

[mariacallous]

Public discussions following Vladimir Putin's May visit to China largely focused on exports of obscure tubers and beef cartilage to Beijing. But despite the lack of a public breakthrough in the sphere of military assistance, China remains an essential partner for the Kremlin in its war in Ukraine. Military supplies from other allied authoritarian regimes — North Korea, Iran, and Belarus — sometimes even surpass those Ukraine receives from the West. As Russia’s own reserves of armored vehicles dwindle, support from the Kremlin’s axis of authoritarian allies is only expected to grow.

Belarus: A launchpad for attacks, training of mobilized troops, tanks, and fuel

For the first six years of Russia’s war in Ukraine — i.e. 2014-2020 — Alexander Lukashenko's regime in Minsk managed to maintain a relatively independent policy. There was even limited military-technical cooperation between Belarus and Ukraine, with Belarusian petroleum products refined from Russian oil going to Ukraine for use by its armed forces at a time when they were busily fending off attacks from Russian-backed forces in the Donbas region. However, everything changed in August 2020, when a wave of popular protests swept over Belarus, exposing Lukashenko’s political vulnerability at home. Vladimir Putin responded by allocating a reserve of Russian law enforcement officers to suppress the demonstrations, thereby maintaining the regime in power in Minsk while leaving it almost wholly dependent on Moscow for survival. In February 2022, it was time for Lukashenko to repay his debts by becoming an accomplice, if not an outright ally, in the Kremlin’s full-scale assault on Kyiv.

In the early days of the invasion, forces from Russia's Eastern Military District and Airborne Troops, which had relocated to Belarus under the pretext of conducting training exercises, thus securing a foothold on the right bank of the Dnieper River, launched an offensive on the Ukrainian capital. Kyiv’s main government buildings and other “decision-making centers” are located on the right bank (the western one), an area of Ukraine that became accessible to Russian invaders largely thanks to the fact that they were able to stage their attack from Belarusian territory. Furthermore, Belarus became a reliable rear base for the Russian army, which received fuel and lubricants directly from the Mozyr refinery, had its wounded soldiers treated in Belarusian hospitals, and launched missile attacks and airstrikes from Belarusian soil and airspace.

Notably, Ukraine refrained from striking Belarusian territory, likely to avoid provoking Lukashenko into direct participation in the war. As a result, Russian troops in Belarus felt even safer than in Russia's border regions, which were subjected to Ukrainian strikes from the first days of the full-scale invasion. Without this “immunity,” the losses suffered by the Russian side during its retreat from the Kyiv region in March-April 2022 might have been even greater. Even after the Russian withdrawal, Belarusian airspace was used by Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft, Tu-22M3 strategic bombers, and Su-34 and Su-35 fighters to launch airstrikes.

The next phase of cooperation between Moscow and Minsk began at the end of 2022. The Belaruski Hayun monitoring group reported the dispatch to Russia of trains carrying dozens of tanks (1, 2), trucks, and ammunition from Belarusian warehouses. According to the group’s estimates, in October 2022 alone, 98 T-72 tanks, 60 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles (including 20 without turrets), and 53 Ural trucks were shipped. As of early November 2022, over 65,000 tons of ammunition had been transferred.

With the start of Russia’s mobilization in September 2022, some groups of recruits, primarily reinforcements for the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Taman Division, received training at Belarusian ranges due to overcrowding at Russian sites. Economic aid has also played a crucial role: in recent months, imports of gasoline from Belarus have helped the Kremlin stabilize consumer prices amid drone attacks on its own refineries. Additionally, it was recently disclosed that the Belarusian military-industrial complex produces sights for Russian APCs, and also for its T-72 and T-90 tanks.

Of course, this help comes at a cost. Despite the Russian army’s acute need for military equipment, weapons deliveries to Belarus continue, albeit with significant delays. Additionally, Russian tactical nuclear weapons were recently stationed in Belarus, likely easing Lukashenko's concerns about “threats from NATO.” Furthermore, Russian police and National Guard officers remain ready to assist the Minsk regime in the event of renewed protests.

It should be noted that Belarusian capabilities to provide military aid to Russia are far from exhausted. The country produces “Kaiman“ armored vehicles, MAZ military trucks, and MZKT chassis for heavy equipment. Additionally, the Belarusian military industry complex manufactures reconnaissance drones and multiple launch rocket systems, and it also upgrades tanks. These resources could prove indispensable for the Russian army, which is experiencing a significant shortage of certain equipment (specifics of which can be found in our front-line situation review).

Iran: Drones and artillery ammunition

Russian-Iranian military-technical cooperation dates back to the late Soviet era, when Moscow sent Tehran modest arms and equipment supplies during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). After the Soviet Union’s collapse, military shipments to Iran increased until they were almost completely halted between 2008-2015 due to international sanctions imposed on Iran’s nuclear program. Notable deals include the transfer in 2007 of Tor surface-to-air missile systems, one of which accidentally shot down a Ukrainian International Airlines commercial flight over Tehran in 2020. Additionally, Iran and Russia cooperated militarily in Syria to support the regime of Bashar al-Assad in the country’s civil war.

Almost from the outset of the Russia-Ukraine war, the Kremlin needed military aid. Moscow was particularly interested in Iran's advanced drone industry. Under sanctions and unable to procure full-fledged combat aircraft, the Iranian regime developed an impressive range of drones, from reconnaissance platforms to loitering munitions. While the Russian military industry excelled in reconnaissance UAVs, Russia had almost no kamikaze drones at the beginning of the full-scale war. As pre-war missile stockpiles were gradually depleted, the focus shifted to long-range drones like Shahed-131 and Shahed-136.

Because of these drones, along with cruise and ballistic missiles, it became significantly more challenging for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to fend off attacks on both civilian and military infrastructure behind the front lines. Consequently, production of Shahed drones shifted to Russia itself at sites like the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, often utilizing forced student labor. According to agreements disclosed in 2022 through leaked documents from Alabuga, Iran committed to supplying 6,000 kits for assembling Shaheds over two and a half years.

Russian-made drones underwent significant modifications: Kometa-M antennas were installed to counter electronic warfare, the warhead the aircraft carry was upgraded for greater effectiveness, the body color was changed to black to enhance nocturnal concealment, and LTE modems were integrated to track the drones’ movements. Although Mohajer-6 reconnaissance drones were also supplied in limited quantities, they did not achieve the widespread popularity of the Shahed.

In addition to drones, Iran also provides Russia with artillery ammunition. Initially, Iranian-made artillery shots surfaced in the possession of Ukrainian forces, sourced from intercepted Western shipments intended for Iran-supported armed groups in the Middle East. By summer 2023, reports emerged regarding Russian-Iranian contracts for almost $2 million worth of ammunition and barrels for both tanks and artillery guns. Subsequently, Iranian shells were integrated into service with Russian forces.

It is worth noting that the first captured samples contained Chinese shells, leading to suspicions of direct military aid from China to Russia. However, the gunpowder charges supplied with these shells were of Iranian origin, and the shell production date suggests they reached Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. Subsequently, the range of ammunition expanded to include 203 mm shells of U.S. manufacture, inherited by the Islamic Republic from the pro-Western Shah's regime and suitable for Soviet 2S7 Pion guns. Recently, supplies of 130 mm shells for the M-46 gun were also reported.

In return, Iran has reached an agreement to purchase modern Su-35 fighters and helicopters from Russia and is currently in negotiations for S-400 anti-air missile systems. This equipment will undoubtedly bolster the capabilities of the Islamic Republic amidst escalating tensions in the Middle East, but the current circumstances have also raised doubts about how much hardware Tehran will be willing to part with. More advanced drones such as jet-powered Shahed-238s could be held back (even though a similar drone was once shot down over Ukraine back in January). And although Reuters reported in February that approximately 400 Iranian-made ballistic missiles had already been delivered to Russia, they have yet to be observed on the battlefield.

North Korea: Soviet shells and “Kimskanders”

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow has engaged in very limited military-technical cooperation with North Korea, partly due to the international sanctions imposed against the regime in Pyongyang. In contrast, in the 1990s South Korea received Russian tanks and infantry fighting vehicles as part of debt repayments. Nevertheless, relations between Moscow and Pyongyang have been relatively warm: North Korea was one of the few countries to recognize the 2014 annexation of Crimea and, in 2022, four more regions of Ukraine.

By 2023, Moscow found itself in need of more than just diplomatic aid. Russian production of artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles did not meet the demands of the front. Meanwhile, North Korea appeared to possess significant stocks of Soviet-caliber artillery shells, once presumed to be intended for wiping out Seoul in the event of renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. However, with the advancement of its nuclear program, Pyongyang had acquired more effective means of deterrence, reducing the need for artillery ammunition, if not entirely eliminating it. On the other hand, North Korea actively pursued the development of its missile program, with some ballistic missiles (known in the West as KN-23) demonstrating characteristics matching those of Russia’s Iskanders (at least on paper).

Massive ammunition supplies began following Kim Jong-un's visit to Russia in September 2023. According to OSINT investigators, munitions are transported by container ships from North Korean ports to Russia before being sent by rail to front-line areas. According to the South Korean Defense Ministry, a total of 67,000 containers of ammunition were delivered, a volume that could have contained up to 3 million 152 mm artillery shells, or as many as 500,000 122 mm artillery rockets for the Grad MLRS.

Soon, munitions with a distinctive bluish hue for artillery and MLRS started appearing in Russian frontline videos, and almost immediately, Russian pro-war bloggers began expressing their concerns about the quality and accuracy of the ammunition. Nonetheless, the shells proved sufficient for sustained artillery fire, and when combined with Russian and Iranian ammunition, they provided the Russian army with a significant artillery advantage over the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The status of North Korean missiles presents a murkier picture. In early 2024, there were reports of several KN-23 ballistic missile strikes on Kharkiv, one of which was scrutinized by Conflict Armament Research specialists. Since then, however, reports of the utilization of such missiles, dubbed “Kimskanders” by Russian pro-war bloggers, have dwindled. The reasons for this decline remain unclear: it could be because production and delivery capacities are lacking, or perhaps flaws were revealed during use. According to the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office, approximately half of the missiles veered off course and detonated in mid-air.

Nonetheless, North Korea’s potential to assist Russia remains largely untapped. Kim Jong-un’s arsenal comprises various weapon types, including MLRS equipped with 240 mm guided rockets (though reliable reports of their potential supply have yet to materialize). Furthermore, North Korea possesses a substantial number of tanks, notably T-54/55 and T-62M models, which Russia employs on the front lines. With forecasts indicating the depletion of Soviet-era armored vehicle stocks in Russian warehouses by 2026, the provision of North Korean tanks and other armored vehicles could help sustain Russia’s capacity for offensive operations in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the extent of what the Kremlin can offer in return remains uncertain, especially considering that nearly all modern weapons produced by the Russian military-industrial complex are allocated to the Ukrainian front. Potential offerings could involve technology transfers and the establishment of licensed production facilities in North Korea, although such endeavors risk provoking strong reactions from South Korea and Japan, both of which have thus far refrained from directly aiding Ukraine militarily.

China: machine-tools and help with sanctions evasion

Despite the so-called “friendship without limits” between Beijing and Moscow, the People's Republic of China has not been observed providing direct material-technical support to the Russian Armed Forces in its conflict with Ukraine. However, China remains a critical supplier of military and dual-use products to the Russian defense industry, and there is evidence indicating increased shipments of precision machinery and equipment, with a significant portion of the Western-sanctioned goods that reach Russia getting there via China. The Insider recently conducted its own investigation into the specific methods used to facilitate such imports.

Thanks to Chinese assistance, Russia receives various UAV elements, including FPV drones and critical components for electronic warfare systems designed to counter these very drones. Ukrainian drone production enterprises also heavily rely on the Chinese component base. However, Russia holds a logistical advantage in this regard. Some drones are offered to Russian buyers as ready-made solutions, while others are purchased from AliExpress by Russian startups, which then pass them off as their own products.

Notably, among the ready-made drones, DJI products play an extremely significant role for both sides in the conflict. DJI UAVs serve as tactical reconnaissance tools and bombers for munition drops. DJI is associated with Russia's first direct military purchase of Chinese equipment: in 2023, the Russian Defense Ministry acquired Mavic quadcopters, which Russian servicemen could obtain for free (instructions on how to do so were even published in pro-war channels). Additionally, the Russian Ministry of Defense procured a large batch of Desertcross off-road vehicles (reportedly at an inflated price). These vehicles are increasingly being utilized at the front lines, serving as transportation for assault groups. While their use has garnered some negative feedback, in the face of a shortage of armored vehicles and means of transportation, they remain a necessary option.

It should be noted that the “assistance” from Chinese companies extends beyond equipment and components to include intelligence gathering. AFP reported that in November 2022, the late Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner PMC purchased two Chinese commercial satellites and utilized their imagery to plan operations in Ukraine, Africa, and even during their short-lived June 2023 mutiny in Russia itself.

However, despite Russia's efforts to secure direct Chinese military assistance starting from as early as the beginning of 2022, no such shipments have been confirmed. Based on comments from Chinese officials, Beijing appears intent on maintaining a cautiously pro-Russian stance on the international stage, while paying lip service to Ukraine's territorial integrity and a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

If China's stance were to shift, the Russian army could potentially gain access to a wide range of weaponry, from outdated kit to cutting-edge models. Considering that a potential Chinese conflict with Taiwan (or any other Pacific region adversary) would not be likely to burn through large stocks of armored vehicles and artillery, the potential for the transfer of such systems to Russia remains a real possibility. Furthermore, any Chinese restrictions on component supplies to Ukraine could pose a serious threat to Kyiv, at least until alternative supply routes through third-party countries and shell companies could be established — mirroring the very strategies employed by Russia to keep its military-industrial complex working.

[darkmaga-retard]

The Belarusian military is deploying tank units to the Ukrainian border, the country's Defense Ministry has announced. The move comes after Minsk – Moscow’s main ally in the region – claimed to have shot down several Ukrainian drones that it said violated its airspace.

In a statement on Sunday, the ministry said that parts of its mechanized forces had been placed on alert, and that preparations were being made to send tanks and other vehicles by rail to Gomel and Mozyr Regions on Ukraine’s border.

Officials also released a video showing several Soviet-era main battle tanks driving onto rail platforms. It is not yet clear the extent to which Belarus’ border contingent is being reinforced, or when the new forces will arrive to the deployment areas.

The redeployment comes after Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said the military had destroyed several Ukrainian drones that violated the country’s airspace in the southern part of the country. He added that some of the drones managed to enter Russian territory, and that they had been taken down near Yaroslavl, around 300km northeast of Moscow.

[beardedmrbean]

TALLINN, Estonia -- A human rights activist in Belarus on Thursday began a hunger strike inside prison in the latest protest against the repressive government of Alexander Lukashenko, a rights organization said.

The Belarusian human rights organization Viasna said Aliaksandar Vaitseshyk went on hunger strike in the city of Baranavichy, in western Belarus, after being sentenced to 15 days of administrative arrest.

He was convicted on charges of “distributing extremist materials,” a charge which Belarus authorities have frequently used to detain activists in recent years.

Belarus was rocked by mass protests during Alexander Lukashenko’s disputed election in 2020, which the opposition and the West condemned as fraudulent. Since then Belarusian authorities have detained more than 35,000 people, many of whom have reportedly been tortured while in custody.

Vaitseshyk was detained on Nov. 9 by armed men near his home on the same day 10 opposition activists were also detained, Viasna said. During a search of his home, Vaitseshyk’s laptop and phone were confiscated.

On Thursday, another human rights activist was also detained in the southern city of Mozyr. According to Viasna, Uladzimir Tselyapun was on his way to file a complaint with the city government but was arrested before arriving. He is currently being held in a temporary detention center Viasna said.

There are 1,450 political prisoners currently behind bars in Belarus, including Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and human rights activist Ales Bialiatski.

[st-inky]

(via (1) Postim › Belarus on Twitter: "" / Twitter)

"Summer night" outskirts of Mozyr Photo: Sergey Shlyaga

[eclecticstarlightblogger]

Εμπλοκή της Λευκορωσίας στην Ουκρανια

Σήμερα το πρωί, ο πρόεδρος της Λευκορωσίας Αλεξάντερ Λουκασένκο ανακοίνωσε την κατάρριψη εναέριων στόχων πάνω από την Ουκρανία με εκτόξευση από τη Λευκορωσία και τη Ρωσία. Ο υπουργός Άμυνας δήλωσε ότι ο Λουκασένκο διέταξε αυξημένη παρουσία στρατευμάτων στις περιοχές Gomel και Mozyr που συνορεύουν με την Ουκρανία. Την ίδια στιγμή αυτόπτες μάρτυρες αναφέρουν μεγάλη κινητικότητα […] Εμπλοκή της…

[thoughtfullyblogger]

Εμπλοκή της Λευκορωσίας στην Ουκρανια

Σήμερα το πρωί, ο πρόεδρος της Λευκορωσίας Αλεξάντερ Λουκασένκο ανακοίνωσε την κατάρριψη εναέριων στόχων πάνω από την Ουκρανία με εκτόξευση από τη Λευκορωσία και τη Ρωσία. Ο υπουργός Άμυνας δήλωσε ότι ο Λουκασένκο διέταξε αυξημένη παρουσία στρατευμάτων στις περιοχές Gomel και Mozyr που συνορεύουν με την Ουκρανία. Την ίδια στιγμή αυτόπτες μάρτυρες αναφέρουν μεγάλη κινητικότητα […] Εμπλοκή της…

[greekblogs]

Εμπλοκή της Λευκορωσίας στην Ουκρανια

Σήμερα το πρωί, ο πρόεδρος της Λευκορωσίας Αλεξάντερ Λουκασένκο ανακοίνωσε την κατάρριψη εναέριων στόχων πάνω από την Ουκρανία με εκτόξευση από τη Λευκορωσία και τη Ρωσία. Ο υπουργός Άμυνας δήλωσε ότι ο Λουκασένκο διέταξε αυξημένη παρουσία στρατευμάτων στις περιοχές Gomel και Mozyr που συνορεύουν με την Ουκρανία. Την ίδια στιγμή αυτόπτες μάρτυρες αναφέρουν μεγάλη κινητικότητα […] Εμπλοκή της…

[skandaladiaplokidiafthora]

Εμπλοκή της Λευκορωσίας στην Ουκρανια

Σήμερα το πρωί, ο πρόεδρος της Λευκορωσίας Αλεξάντερ Λουκασένκο ανακοίνωσε την κατάρριψη εναέριων στόχων πάνω από την Ουκρανία με εκτόξευση από τη Λευκορωσία και τη Ρωσία. Ο υπουργός Άμυνας δήλωσε ότι ο Λουκασένκο διέταξε αυξημένη παρουσία στρατευμάτων στις περιοχές Gomel και Mozyr που συνορεύουν με την Ουκρανία. Την ίδια στιγμή αυτόπτες μάρτυρες αναφέρουν μεγάλη κινητικότητα […] Εμπλοκή της…

[kappararu]

28.06.24 12:00 Химки - СКА Хабаровск 2-0 1х и ТМ(4.5) Да 1.43  28.06.24 16:00 Лесото - Сейшельские о-ва 2-0 1х и ТБ(1.5) Да 1.34  28.06.24 16:00 Торпедо Москва - Иртыш Омск 1-0 1х и ТМ(4.5) Да 1.43  28.06.24 19:00 Ангола - Намибия 1-0 Ф1(0) 1.44  28.06.24 19:00 УГЛовые Ангола ИТБ1(3.5) 1.31  28.06.24 19:00 Славия Мозырь - Гомель 1-1 1х и ТМ(4.5) Да 1.4  28.06.24 20:45 Динамо Брест - Витебск 2-1 на 60:00 мин ИТБ1(0.5) 1.5  28.06.24 21:45 Ст. Патрикс - Богемианс Дублин 1-0 Ф1(0) 1.4  28.06.24 21:45 Шелбурн - Голуэй 2-1 Ф1(0) 1.53  28.06.24 21:45 Дерри Сити - Дрохеда Юн 2-0 Дерри Сити ИТБ1(1.5) 1.42  28.06.24 21:45 Слиго Роверс - Шемрок Роверс 2-1 Ф1(+2) 1.34  29.06.24 01:00 Колумбия - Коста-Рика 2-0 Ф2(+2.5) 1.32  29.06.24 02:00 Атлетико Оттава - Фордж 2-1 1X 1.39  29.06.24 02:30 Нью-Йорк Сити - Орландо Сити 1-1 Ф2(+1.5) 1.34  29.06.24 04:00 Парагвай - Бразилия 0-2 х2 и ТБ(1.5) Да 1.33    Статистика прогнозов тут : https://t.me/KapparaLive/1720  Мой канал в телеге : https://t.me/kappara_ru  (здесь прогнозы по ходу дня)  Список Букмекерских сайтов : http://hubu.ru/sportwager  Watsapp группа писать : +380684476012  Зеркало прогнозов на сайте http://kappara.online  (english tips)  Сайт http://kappara.ru  обмениваюсь ссылками , взаимопиар, заказ рекламных статей с вашими ссылками    28.06.24 12:00 Khimki - SKA Khabarovsk Not to lose and Total Under(4.5) - Khimki : Yes 1.43  28.06.24 16:00 Lesotho - Seychelles Not to lose and Total Over(1.5) - Lesotho : Yes 1.34  28.06.24 16:00 Torpedo Moscow - Irtysh Omsk Not to lose and Total Under(4.5) - Torpedo Moscow : Yes 1.43  28.06.24 19:00 Angola - Namibia 1T Handicap(0) 1.44  28.06.24 19:00 Slavia Mozyr - Gomel Not to lose and Total Under(4.5) - Slavia Mozyr : Yes 1.4  28.06.24 19:00 Corners Angola - Corners Namibia Corners Angola 1T Individual Total Over(3.5) 1.31  28.06.24 20:45 Dynamo Brest - Vitebsk Result at 60:00 min. Ind. Total Over1(0.5) 1.5  28.06.24 21:45 St.Patricks Athletic - Bohemians Dublin 1T Handicap(0) 1.4  28.06.24 21:45 Shelbourne - Galway 1T Handicap(0) 1.53  28.06.24 21:45 Derry City - Drogheda United Derry City 1T Individual Total Over(1.5) 1.42  28.06.24 21:45 Sligo Rovers - Shamrock Rovers 1T Handicap(+2) 1.34  29.06.24 01:00 Colombia - Costa Rica 2T Handicap(+2.5) 1.32  29.06.24 02:00 Atletico Ottawa - Forge FC 1X 1.39  29.06.24 02:30 New York City - Orlando City SC 2T Handicap(+1.5) 1.34  29.06.24 04:00 Paraguay - Brazil Not to lose and Total Over(1.5) - Brazil : Yes 1.33    Stats of this predictions here : : https://t.me/KapparaLive/1720  My channel : https://t.me/KapparaVip  Bookmaker top30 : http://hubu.ru/sportwager  Watsapp group : +380684476012  My tips here : http://kappara.online  Site http://kappara.ru  link exgange , paid articles , partners program write to watsapp

[thefree-online]

Antifascist Christina Cherenkova FREED in Belarus after 2 years Jail for Internet posts!

from thefreeonline on April 13, 2024 by Free Derry ← Solidarity with Former Political Prisoner We have received news that yesterday, Friday 12th April, Christina Cherankova has been released. As many of you will already know, after have spent more than two years in captivity, Cristina, an anti-fascist from Mozyr, in Belarus was detained on March 22, 2022 for anti-military and anti-police posts…

[congty-vmex]

Nga tăng nhập khẩu xăng từ Belarus khi nguồn cung trong nước sụt giảm

 Nga đã tăng nhập khẩu xăng từ nước láng giềng Belarus trong tháng 3 để giải quyết nguy cơ thiếu hụt tại thị trường nội địa do việc sửa chữa đột xuất tại các nhà máy lọc dầu của Nga sau các cuộc tấn công bằng máy bay không người lái, bốn nguồn tin công nghiệp và thương mại cho biết hôm thứ Tư.

Thông thường, Nga là nước xuất khẩu ròng nhiên liệu và là nhà cung cấp cho thị trường quốc tế, nhưng sự gián đoạn trong hoạt động lọc dầu của Nga đã buộc các công ty dầu mỏ phải nhập khẩu.

Nga đã cấm xuất khẩu xăng từ ngày 1 tháng 3 để cố gắng đảm bảo đủ nhiên liệu cho thị trường nội địa sau nhiều cuộc tấn công bằng máy bay không người lái của Ukraine vào các nhà máy lọc dầu của Nga kể từ đầu năm.

Nga thường nhập khẩu rất ít nhiên liệu từ Belarus, mặc dù quốc gia này đã chuyển sang nhập khẩu từ tháng 8 đến tháng 10 năm ngoái, khi đối mặt với tình trạng thiếu nhiên liệu và từ đó, khiến Chính phủ Nga thiết lập lệnh cấm xuất khẩu sản phẩm dầu khác.

Năm nay, Nga lại tăng nhập khẩu xăng từ Belarus và trong nửa đầu tháng 3, lượng xăng này đạt gần 3.000 tấn, theo các nguồn tin của Reuters.

Trong tháng 2, Nga nhập khẩu 590 tấn, trong khi tháng 1 không có lô hàng nào từ Belarus.

Một trong số họ cho biết các cuộc đàm phán gặp khó khăn vì Belarus ưu tiên xuất khẩu nhiên liệu của mình sang thị trường quốc tế.

Các nguồn tin trong ngành cho biết các công ty dầu mỏ của Nga có thể tăng nguồn cung dầu cho các nhà máy lọc dầu của Belarus để đổi lấy thêm các sản phẩm dầu mỏ cung cấp cho Nga.

Belarus thường xuất khẩu các sản phẩm dầu của mình qua các cảng Baltic của Nga sang thị trường quốc tế theo các thỏa thuận trung chuyển dài hạn giữa các quốc gia.

Belarus có hai nhà máy lọc dầu - nhà máy lọc dầu Naftan ở Novopolotsk và nhà máy lọc dầu Mozyr.

Mỗi cơ sở có công suất 12 triệu tấn mỗi năm (khoảng 240.000 thùng mỗi ngày), nhưng chúng thường hoạt động với công suất thấp hơn, mỗi cơ sở lọc dầu khoảng 9 triệu tấn mỗi năm (khoảng 180.000 thùng mỗi ngày).

Giao dịch hàng hóa

Đầu tư hóa hóa

Hàng hóa hóa hóa hóa hóa hóa hóa hóa phái sinh

[stealth-skills]

Colonel Vadim Ivanovich Pankov, commander of the 45th VDV, during preparation for the operation at the Hostomel Airport.

Mozyr airfield, Gomel region, Republic of Belarus.

February 24, 2022.

[cyberbenb]

Fire erupts at oil refinery in Belarus after Ukraine warns of Russian 'provocation'

A fire broke out at a gasoline production unit of the Mozyr oil refinery in southeastern Belarus on Aug. 10, the country’s emergency ministry reported.

First responders put out the fire, and the incident is being investigated, the ministry wrote. No casualties were reported.

Earlier, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) said it had gathered intelligence indicating that Russia was preparing a large-scale false flag operation at the refinery.

Under the alleged plan, a Russian sabotage-reconnaissance group would carry out a “provocation” at the refinery, the SBU wrote on Aug. 4. Moscow would then blame the attack on Kyiv in an attempt to drive Belarus into the war against Ukraine.

The sabotage group reportedly comprises Russia’s military personnel and employees of special services who were sent to Belarus under the guise of Wagner mercenaries.

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Tensions rise after Belarusian helicopters cross into Polish territory, the country’s state border service said on Aug. 1. Poland also alleges that around 100 Wagner mercenaries are transferred closer to the Suwalki Corridor, bringing tensions to a new high. Subscribe to the NewsletterBelarus…

The Kyiv IndependentMaria Yeryoma

The Mozyr oil refinery is located in the Belarusian city of Mazyr, some 50 kilometers from the Ukrainian border and over 150 kilometers from Russia’s border.

After the Wagner Group’s failed rebellion against the Russian military leadership, thousands of Wagner troops and heavy equipment were relocated to Belarus from Russia. Minsk has claimed that the mercenaries are training the Belarusian military.

Belarus has been one of Russia’s greatest allies and supporters since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022, having supplied Russia with over 130,000 tons of ammunition over the past year.

Russia has also used Belarus as a strategic launching point for invading Ukraine. Most recently, Moscow claimed to have deployed tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory.

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Late last month, Russian President Vladimir Putin moved ahead with his threat to deploy nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil. Echoing prior condemnation of this planned action, the U.S. State Department’s spokesman added: “we have seen no reason to adjust our strategic nuclear posture or any indicati…

The Kyiv IndependentGeorge E. Bogden

[classyclips]

The Security Service of Ukraine established that Russia wants to use the "Wagnerians" to involve Belarus in a full-scale war against Ukraine.

The Security Service of Ukraine has obtained intelligence that indicates the preparation by the Russians of a large-scale provocation "under a foreign flag" at the strategic object of Belarus - the Mozyr Oil Refinery.

According to available data, the preparation of the terrorist attack is being carried out by a sabotage and intelligence group made up of personnel of the Russian Armed Forces and employees of the Russian special services, who were sent to the territory of Belarus under the guise of "Wagnerians".

This Russian DRG should commit a provocation at the refinery, pretending to be "Ukrainian saboteurs". The Russian Federation plans to blame Ukraine for what has been done, in order to once again try to draw Minsk into a full-scale war against our state.

Security Service employees received information about a planned terrorist attack in Belarus from several sources. In particular, from the testimony of a serviceman of the Soviet Union, who was taken prisoner by Ukrainian defenders in the Zaporozhye direction.

Cyber ​​specialists of the SBU also recovered and analyzed the information on the mobile phone of the captured Rashist.

Among other things, it was established that he had previously participated in hostilities against the Defense Forces in the south of Ukraine, and recently he was instructed to relocate to Belarus as a member of the private military company "Wagner".

Already at the stage of changing the place of service, the Russian military received information about a "special mission" at the Mozyr Oil Refinery. In his phone, cyber specialists of the SBU found deleted correspondence with other performers, pictures of the object and separate information about the operation.

The Security Service warns the Belarusian army against participating in a full-scale war against Ukraine. Every invader who crosses the border of our state will be destroyed by our security and defense forces.

[soccerbettingtips7]

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[ssrublev]

Mozyr-Novyi, Kaliningrad oblast, Russia (2003) https://www.instagram.com/p/CkRSdTorzQf/?igshid=NGJjMDIxMWI=