#sensory memory with kendall

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SENSORY MEMORY I: 1989 - TAYLOR SWIFT

2014, 48:41, standouts: clean, i know places, new romantics

in 2014 i experienced what was, at the time, the worst year of my entire life. my mom died, my dad moved my now stepmom into our home weeks after that, i was 19 years old and very directionless but i had one bright spot that kept me going.

ryan.

we met playing world of warcraft in november 2013. our friendship developed quickly and we spent an inordinate amount of time together, exchanging numbers and snapchats finally in january. i was giddy because i liked him so much and those feelings grew until they felt like hunger for months. like was no longer like it became capital L love.

ryan, despite his terrible commitment issues, general lack of emotional availability, mental health issues i wanted to desperately fix despite him never asking that of me, tried. he tried to be there for me but he had his own flaws and issues too, something a younger version of me didn’t understand at the time.

now we weren’t ever officially together. we decided not to define the relationship out of comfort for both of us but as far as i was concerned, he was my boyfriend. i treated him as such and there were a lot of times where i felt like i was his girlfriend in return. the year passed, summer came and went, and fall finally was cast upon the world like a spell.

on october 27, 2014 the album 1989 was released. on october 29, 2014 my heart was so broken i felt i’d never recover.

ryan told me we needed to cool things down because he met a girl in person he liked and wanted to try things with her.

now as a 28 year old woman with a plethora of life experience i can tell you what i was feeling was heartbreak, of course, because i cared about this man. loved him, even. but above all what i was feeling was the insurmountable grief of the year that had nearly fully passed by. everything i refused to acknowledge felt like a wall to scale and so this album became a reprieve for me.

listening to a woman i viewed as wiser than myself sing about heartbreak, returning to yourself, not letting lost love define you felt empowering in a way that only a 19 year old can understand. blasting shake it off in my car on the way to my nannying gig, dreaming of another love to how you get the girl, mentally rewriting my own narrative to this love, wishing to embody the burning wit of blank space while mouthing the words in the shower.

for weeks i listened to nothing but this album in its entirety except for clean.

i pulled the lyrics book out of the cd case the day i bought the album and read the words to clean and decided i needed to save that for when i finally felt it. clean. new. no longer in need of a love that didn’t serve me.

on november 12, 2014 i locked myself in my childhood bedroom and listened to clean by myself for hours on repeat. i sobbed until my throat was raw. i ignored my younger sisters knocking completely, something out of character for me. everyone could see i was miserable but i felt like this is the moment where i was able to let it all go.

i was bound and determined to be done. to clean all remnants of him from my life, to be someone new, to abandon the dust covered shelves in my heart where my memories of him resided.

yes i know this was a span of roughly 3 weeks, have i mentioned i was 19 and everything felt huge back then?

on november 19, 2014, ryan asked me how i felt about him. i told him i liked him more than i thought i would. three days later my period of being “clean” was over. we were back on.

hours spent sobbing to clean became hours listening to this love because the narrative had truly been rewritten. this love came back to me!

well at least for a little while. when the prospect of our relationship moving from long distance to in person became a reality and not just a concept, he ghosted me. by april 2015, we were over. i sent him one final text message wishing him well in june and he never responded.

clean once again became a regularly rotating song for me. screamed while driving to my new job in a new city in a new state. sobbed late night in my bed alone. this time clean had to stay, i was determined.

i did and have ever since.

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Imagination

First published Mon Mar 14, 2011; substantive revision Tue Jan 22, 2019

To imagine is to represent without aiming at things as they actually, presently, and subjectively are. One can use imagination to represent possibilities other than the actual, to represent times other than the present, and to represent perspectives other than one’s own. Unlike perceiving and believing, imagining something does not require one to consider that something to be the case. Unlike desiring or anticipating, imagining something does not require one to wish or expect that something to be the case.

Imagination is involved in a wide variety of human activities, and has been explored from a wide range of philosophical perspectives. Philosophers of mind have examined imagination’s role in mindreading and in pretense. Philosophical aestheticians have examined imagination’s role in creating and in engaging with different types of artworks. Epistemologists have examined imagination’s role in theoretical thought experiments and in practical decision-making. Philosophers of language have examined imagination’s role in irony and metaphor.

Because of the breadth of the topic, this entry focuses exclusively on contemporary discussions of imagination in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. For an overview of historical discussions of imagination, see the sections on pre-twentieth century and early twentieth century accounts of entry on mental imagery; for notable historical accounts of imagination, see corresponding entries on Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Gilbert Ryle; for a more detailed and comprehensive historical survey, see Brann 1991; and for a sophisticated and wide-ranging discussion of imagination in the phenomenological tradition, see Casey 2000.

1. The Nature of Imagination

1.1 Varieties of Imagination

1.2 Taxonomies of Imagination

1.3 Norms of Imagination

2. Imagination in Cognitive Architecture

2.1 Imagination and Belief

2.2 Imagination and Desire

2.3 Imagination, Imagery, and Perception

2.4 Imagination and Memory

2.5 Imagination and Supposition

3. Roles of Imagination

3.1 Mindreading

3.2 Pretense

3.3 Psychopathology

3.4 Engagement with the Arts

Supplement: Puzzles and Paradoxes of Imagination and the Arts

3.5 Creativity

3.6 Knowledge

3.7 Figurative Language

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1. The Nature of Imagination

A variety of roles have been attributed to imagination across various domains of human understanding and activity (section 3). Not surprisingly, it is doubtful that there is one component of the mind that can satisfy all the various roles attributed to imagination (Kind 2013). Nevertheless, perhaps guided by these roles, philosophers have attempted to clarify the nature of imagination in three ways. First, philosophers have tried to disambiguate different senses of the term “imagination” and, in some cases, point to some core commonalities amongst the different disambiguations (section 1.1). Second, philosophers have given partial taxonomies to distinguish different types of imaginings (section 1.2). Third, philosophers have located norms that govern paradigmatic imaginative episodes (section 1.3).

1.1 Varieties of Imagination

There is a general consensus among those who work on the topic that the term “imagination” is used too broadly to permit simple taxonomy. Indeed, it is common for overviews to begin with an invocation of P.F. Strawson’s remarks in “Imagination and Perception”, where he writes:

The uses, and applications, of the terms “image”, “imagine”, “imagination”, and so forth make up a very diverse and scattered family. Even this image of a family seems too definite. It would be a matter of more than difficulty to identify and list the family’s members, let alone their relations of parenthood and cousinhood. (Strawson 1970: 31)

These taxonomic challenges carry over into attempts at characterization. In the opening chapter of Mimesis as Make-Believe—perhaps the most influential contemporary monograph on imagination—Kendall Walton throws up his hands at the prospect of delineating the notion precisely. After enumerating and distinguishing a number of paradigmatic instances of imagining, he asks:

What is it to imagine? We have examined a number of dimensions along which imaginings can vary; shouldn’t we now spell out what they have in common?—Yes, if we can. But I can’t. (Walton 1990: 19)

Leslie Stevenson (2003: 238) makes arguably the only recent attempt at a somewhat comprehensive inventory of the term’s uses, covering twelve of “the most influential conceptions of imagination” that can be found in recent discussions in “philosophy of mind, aesthetics, ethics, poetry and … religion”.

1.2 Taxonomies of Imagination

To describe the varieties of imaginings, philosophers have given partial and overlapping taxonomies.

Some taxonomies are merely descriptive, and they tend to be less controversial. For example, Kendall Walton (1990) distinguishes between spontaneous and deliberate imagining (acts of imagination that occur with or without the one’s conscious direction); between occurrent and nonoccurrent imaginings (acts of imagination that do or do not occupy the one’s explicit attention); and between social and solitary imaginings (episodes of imagining that occur with or without the joint participation of several persons).

One notable descriptive taxonomy concerns imagining from the inside versus from the outside (Williams 1973; Wollheim 1973; see Ninan 2016 for an overview). To imagine from the outside that one is Napoleon involves imagining a scenario in which one is Napoleon. To imagine from the inside that one is Napoleon involves that plus something else: namely, that one is occupying the perspective of Napoleon. Imagining from the inside is essentially first-personal, imagining from the outside is not. This distinction between two modes of imagining is especially notable for its implications for thought experiments about the metaphysics of personal identity (Nichols 2008; Ninan 2009; Williams 1973).

Some taxonomies aim to be more systematic—to carve imaginings at their joints, so to speak—and they, as one might expect, tend to be more controversial.

Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft (2002) distinguishes creative imagination (combining ideas in unexpected and unconventional ways); sensory imagination (perception-like experiences in the absence of appropriate stimuli); and what they call recreative imagination (an ability to experience or think about the world from a perspective different from the one that experience presents). Neil Van Leeuwen (2013, 2014) takes a similar approach to delineate three common uses of “imagination” and cognate terms. First, these terms can be used to refer to constructive imagining, which concerns the process of generating mental representations. Second, these terms can be used to refer to attitude imagining, which concerns the propositional attitude one takes toward mental representations. Third, these terms can be used to refer to imagistic imagining, which concerns the perception-like format of mental representations.

Amy Kind and Peter Kung (2016b) pose the puzzle of imaginative use—on the seeming irreconcilability between the transcendent uses of imagination, which enables one to escape from or look beyond the world as it is, and the instructive uses of imagination, which enables one to learn about the world as it is. Kind and Kung ultimately resolve the puzzle by arguing that the same attitude can be put to these seemingly disparate uses because the two uses differ not in kind, but in degree—specifically, the degree of constraint on imaginings.

Finally, varieties of imagination might be classified in terms of their structure and content. Consider the following three types of imaginings, each illustrated with an example. When one imagines propositionally, one represents to oneself that something is the case. So, for example, Juliet might imagine that Romeo is by her side. To imagine in this sense is to stand in some mental relation to a particular proposition (see the entry on propositional attitude reports). When one imagines objectually, one represents to oneself a real or make-believe entity or situation (Yablo 1993; see also Martin 2002; Noordhof 2002; O’Shaughnessy 2000). So, for example, Prospero might imagine an acorn or a nymph or the city of Naples or a wedding feast. To imagine in this sense is to stand in some mental relation to a representation of an (imaginary or real) entity or state of affairs. When one imagines X-ing, one simulatively represents to oneself some sort of activity or experience (Walton 1990). So, for example, Ophelia might imagine seeing Hamlet or getting herself to a nunnery. To imagine in this sense is to stand in a first-personal mental relation to some (imaginary or real) behavior or perception.

1.3 Norms of Imagination

There are general norms that govern operations of imagination (Gendler 2003).

Mirroring is manifest to the extent that features of the imaginary situation that have not been explicitly stipulated are derivable via features of their real-world analogues, or, more generally, to the extent that imaginative content is taken to be governed by the same sorts of restrictions that govern believed content. For example, in a widely-discussed experiment conducted by Alan Leslie (1994), children are asked to engage in an imaginary tea party. When an experimenter tips and “spills” one of the (empty) teacups, children consider the non-tipped cup to be “full” (in the context of the pretense) and the tipped cup to be “empty” (both within and outside of the context of the pretense). In fact, both make-believe games and more complicated engagements with the arts are governed by principles of generation, according to which prompts or props prescribe particular imaginings (Walton 1990).

Quarantining is manifest to the extent that events within the imagined or pretended episode are taken to have effects only within a relevantly circumscribed domain. So, for example, the child engaging in the make-believe tea party does not expect that “spilling” (imaginary) “tea” will result in the table really being wet, nor does a person who imagines winning the lottery expect that when she visits the ATM, her bank account will contain a million dollars. More generally, quarantining is manifest to the extent that proto-beliefs and proto-attitudes concerning the imagined state of affairs are not treated as beliefs and attitudes relevant to guiding action in the actual world.

Although imaginative episodes are generally governed by mirroring and quarantining, both may be violated in systematic ways.

Mirroring gives way to disparity as a result of the ways in which (the treatment of) imaginary content may differ from (that of) believed content. Imagined content may be incomplete (for example, there may be no fact of the matter (in the pretense) just how much tea has spilled on the table) or incoherent (for example, it might be that the toaster serves (in the pretense) as a logical-truth inverter). And content that is imagined may give rise to discrepant responses, most strikingly in cases of discrepant affect—where, for example, the imminent destruction of all human life is treated as amusing rather than terrifying.

Quarantining gives way to contagion when imagined content ends up playing a direct role in actual attitudes and behavior (see also Gendler 2008a, 2008b). This is common in cases of affective transmission, where an emotional response generated by an imagined situation may constrain subsequent behavior. For example, imagining something fearful (such as a tiger in the kitchen) may give rise to actual hesitation (such as reluctance to enter the room). And it also occurs in cases of cognitive transmission, where imagined content is thereby “primed” and rendered more accessible in ways that go on to shape subsequent perception and experience. For example, imagining some object (such as a sheep) may make one more likely to “perceive” such objects in one’s environment (such as mistaking a rock for a ram).

2. Imagination in Cognitive Architecture

One way to make sense of the nature of imagination is by drawing distinctions, giving taxonomies, and elucidating governing norms (section 1). Another, arguably more prominent, way to make sense of the nature is by figuring out, in a broadly functionalist framework, how it fits in with more well-understood mental entities from folk psychology and scientific psychology (see the entry on functionalism).

There are two related tasks involved. First, philosophers have used other mental entities to define imagination by contradistinction (but see Wiltsher forthcoming for a critique of this approach). To give an oversimplified example, many philosophers hold that imagining is like believing except that it does not directly motivate actions. Second, philosophers have used other mental entities to understand the inputs and outputs of imagination. To give an oversimplified example, many philosophers hold that imagination does not output to action-generating systems.

Amongst the most widely-discussed mental entities in contemporary discussions of imagination are belief (section 2.1), desire (section 2.2), mental imagery (section 2.3), memory (section 2.4), and supposition (section 2.5). The resolution of these debates ultimately rest on the extent to which the imaginative attitude(s) posited can fulfill the roles ascribed to imagination from various domains of human understanding and activity (section 3).

2.1 Imagination and Belief

To believe is to take something to be the case or regard it as true (see the entry on belief). When one says something like “the liar believes that his pants are on fire”, one attributes to the subject (the liar) an attitude (belief) towards a proposition (his pants are on fire). Likewise, when one says something like “the liar imagines that his pants are on fire”, one attributes to the subject (the liar) an attitude (imagination) towards a proposition (his pants are on fire). The similarities and differences between the belief attribution and the imagination attribution point to similarities and differences between imagining and believing.

Imagining and believing are both cognitive attitudes that are representational. They take on the same kind of content: representations that stand in inferential relationship with one another. On the single code hypothesis, it is the sameness of the representational format that grounds functional similarities between imagining and believing (Nichols & Stich 2000, 2003; Nichols 2004a). As for their differences, there are two main options for distinguishing imagining and believing (Sinhababu 2016).

The first option characterizes their difference in normative terms. While belief aims at truth, imagination does not (Humberstone 1992; Shah & Velleman 2005). If the liar did not regard it as true that his pants are on fire, then it seems that he cannot really believe that his pants are on fire. By contrast, even if the liar did not regard it as true that his pants are on fire, he can still imagine that his pants are on fire. While the norm of truth is constitutive of the attitude of belief, it is not constitutive of the attitude of imagination. In dissent, Neil Sinhababu (2013) argues that the norm of truth is neither sufficient nor necessary for distinguishing imagining and believing.

The second option characterizes their difference in functional terms. One purported functional difference between imagination and belief concerns their characteristic connection to actions. If the liar truly believes that his pants are on fire, he will typically attempt to put out the fire by, say, pouring water on himself. By contrast, if the liar merely imagines that his pants are on fire, he will typically do no such thing. While belief outputs to action-generation system, imagination does not (Nichols & Stich 2000, 2003). David Velleman (2000) and Tyler Doggett and Andy Egan (2007) point to particular pretense behaviors to challenge this way of distinguishing imagining and believing. Velleman argues that a belief-desire explanation of children’s pretense behaviors makes children “depressingly unchildlike”. Doggett and Egan argue that during immersive episodes, pretense behaviors can be directly motivated by imagination. In response to these challenges, philosophers typically accept that imagination can have a guidance or stage-setting role in motivating behaviors, but reject that it directly outputs to action-generation system (Van Leeuwen 2009; O’Brien 2005; Funkhouser & Spaulding 2009; Everson 2007; Kind 2011; Currie & Ravenscroft 2002).

Another purported functional difference between imagination and belief concerns their characteristic connection to emotions. If the liar truly believes that his pants are on fire, then he will be genuinely afraid of the fire; but not if he merely imagines so. While belief evokes genuine emotions toward real entities, imagination does not (Walton 1978, 1990, 1997; see also related discussion of the paradox of fictional emotions in Supplement on Puzzles and Paradoxes of Imagination and the Arts). This debate is entangled with the controversy concerning the nature of emotions (see the entry on emotion). In rejecting this purported functional difference, philosophers also typically reject narrow cognitivism about emotions (Nichols 2004a; Meskin & Weinberg 2003; Weinberg & Meskin 2005, 2006; Kind 2011; Spaulding 2015; Carruthers 2003, 2006).

Currently, the consensus is that there exists some important difference between imagining and believing. Yet, there are two distinct departures from this consensus. On the one hand, some philosophers have pointed to novel psychological phenomena in which it is unclear whether imagination or belief is at work—such as delusions (Egan 2008a) and immersed pretense (Schellenberg 2013)—and argued that the best explanation for these phenomena says that imagination and belief exists on a continuum. In responding to the argument from immersed pretense, Shen-yi Liao and Tyler Doggett (2014) argue that a cognitive architecture that collapses distinctive attitudes on the basis of borderline cases is unlikely to be fruitful in explaining psychological phenomena. On the other hand, some philosophers have pointed to familiar psychological phenomena and argued that the best explanation for these phenomena says that imagination is ultimately reducible to belief. Peter Langland-Hassan (2012, 2014) argues that pretense can be explained with only reference to beliefs—specifically, beliefs about counterfactuals. Derek Matravers (2014) argues that engagements with fictions can be explained without references to imaginings.

2.2 Imagination and Desire

To desire is to want something to be the case (see the entry on desire). Standardly, the conative attitude of desire is contrasted with the cognitive attitude of belief in terms of direction of fit: while belief aims to make one’s mental representations match the way the world is, desire aims to make the way the world is match one’s mental representations. Recall that on the single code hypothesis, there exists a cognitive imaginative attitude that is structurally similar to belief. Is there a conative imaginative attitude—call it desire-like imagination (Currie 1997, 2002a, 2002b, 2010; Currie & Ravenscroft 2002), make-desire (Currie 1990; Goldman 2006), or i-desire (Doggett & Egan 2007, 2012)—that is structurally similar to desire?

The debates on the relationship between imagination and desire is, not surprisingly, thoroughly entangled with the debates on the relationship between imagination and belief. One impetus for positing a conative imaginative attitude comes from behavior motivation in imaginative contexts. Tyler Doggett and Andy Egan (2007) argue that cognitive and conative imagination jointly output to action-generation system, in the same way that belief and desire jointly do. Another impetus for positing a conative imaginative attitude comes from emotions in imaginative contexts (see related discussions of the paradox of fictional emotions and the paradoxes of tragedy and horror in Supplement on Puzzles and Paradoxes of Imagination and the Arts). Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft (2002) and Doggett and Egan (2012) argue the best explanation for people’s emotional responses toward non-existent fictional characters call for positing conative imagination. Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), Currie (2010), and Doggett and Egan (2007) argue that the best explanation for people’s apparently conflicting emotional responses toward tragedy and horror too call for positing conative imagination.

Given the entanglement between the debates, competing explanations of the same phenomena also function as arguments against conative imagination (Nichols 2004a, 2006b; Meskin & Weinberg 2003; Weinberg & Meskin 2005, 2006; Spaulding 2015; Kind 2011; Carruthers 2003, 2006; Funkhouser & Spaulding 2009; Van Leeuwen 2011). In addition, another argument against conative imagination is that its different impetuses call for conflicting functional properties. Amy Kind (2016b) notes a tension between the argument from behavior motivation and the argument from fictional emotions: conative imagination must be connected to action-generation in order for it to explain pretense behaviors, but it must be disconnected from action-generation in order for it to explain fictional emotions. Similarly, Shaun Nichols (2004b) notes a tension between Currie and Ravenscroft’s (2002) argument from paradox of fictional emotions and argument from paradoxes of tragedy and horror.

2.3 Imagination, Imagery, and Perception

To have a (merely) mental image is to have a perception-like experience triggered by something other than the appropriate external stimulus; so, for example, one might have “a picture in the mind’s eye or … a tune running through one’s head” (Strawson 1970: 31) in the absence of any corresponding visual or auditory object or event (see the entry on mental imagery). While it is propositional imagination that gets compared to belief and desire, it is sensory or imagistic imagination that get compared to perception (Currie & Ravenscroft 2002). Although it is possible to form mental images in any of the sensory modalities, the bulk of discussion in both philosophical and psychological contexts has focused on visual imagery.

Broadly, there is agreement on the similarity between mental imagery and perception in phenomenology, which can be explicated as a similarity in content (Nanay 2016b; see, for example, Kind 2001; Nanay 2015; Noordhof 2002). Potential candidates for distinguishing mental imagery and perception include intensity (Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature; but see Kind 2017), voluntariness (McGinn 2004; Ichikawa 2009), causal relationship with the relevant object (Noordhof 2002); however, no consensus exists on features that clearly distinguish the two, in part because of ongoing debates about perception (see the entries on contents of perception and epistemological problems of perception).

What is the relationship between imaginings and mental imagery?

Historically, mental imagery is thought to be an essential component of imaginings. Aristotle’s phantasia, which is sometimes translated as imagination, is a faculty that produces images (De Anima; see entry on Aristotle’s conception of imagination; but see Caston 1996). René Descartes (Meditations on First Philosophy) and David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature) both thought that to imagine just is to hold a mental image, or an impression of perception, in one’s mind. However, George Berkeley’s puzzle of visualizing the unseen (Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous) arguably suggests the existence of a non-imagistic hypothetical attitude.

Against the historical orthodoxy, the contemporary tendency is to recognize that there is at least one species of imagination—propositional imagination—that does not require mental imagery. For example, Kendall Walton simply states, “imagining can occur without imagery” (1990: 13). In turn, against this contemporary tendency, Amy Kind (2001) argues that an image-based account can explain three crucial features of imagination—directedness, active nature, and phenomenological character—better than its imageless counterpart. As a partial reconciliation of the two, Peter Langland-Hassan (2015) develops a pluralist position on which there exists a variety of imaginative attitudes, including ones that can take on hybrid contents that are partly propositional and partly sensorily imagistic. (For a nuanced overview of this debate, see Gregory 2016: 103–106.)

Finally, the relationship between mental imagery and perception has potential implications for the connection between imagination and action. The orthodoxy on propositional belief-like imagination holds that imagination does not directly output to action-generation system; rather, the connection between the two is mediated by belief and desire. In contrast, the enactivist program in the philosophy of perception holds that perception can directly output to action-generation system (see, for example, Nanay 2013). Working from the starting point that imagistic imagination is similar to perception in its inclusion of mental imagery, some philosophers have argued for a similar direct connection between imagistic imagination and action-generation system (Langland-Hassan 2015; Nanay 2016a; Van Leeuwen 2011, 2016b). That is, there exist imagery-oriented actions that are analogous to perception-oriented actions. For example, Neil Van Leeuwen (2011) argues that an account of imagination that is imagistically-rich can better explain pretense behaviors than its propositional-imagination-only rivals. Furthermore, Robert Eamon Briscoe (2008, 2018) argues that representations that blend inputs from perception and mental imagery, which he calls “make-perceive”, guide many everyday actions. For example, a sculptor might use a blend of the visual perception of a stone and the mental imagery of different parts of the stone being subtracted to guide their physical manipulation of the stone.

2.4 Imagination and Memory

To remember, roughly, is to represent something that is no longer the case. On the standard taxonomy, there are three types of memory. Nondeclarative memory involves mental content that is not consciously accessible, such as one’s memory of how to ride a bike. Semantic declarative memory involves mental content that are propositional and not first-personal, such as one’s memory that Taipei is the capital of Taiwan. Episodic declarative memory involves mental content about one’s own past, such as one’s memory of the birth of one’s child. (See the entry on memory for a detailed discussion of this taxonomy, and especially the criterion of episodicity.) In situating imagination in cognitive architecture, philosophers have typically focused on similarities and differences between imagination and episodic declarative memory.

There are obvious similarities between imagination and memory: both typically involve imagery, both typically concern what is not presently the case, and both frequently involve perspectival representations. Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan: 2.3) claims that “imagination and memory are but one thing, which for diverse consideration has diverse names”. In making this bold statement, Hobbes represents an extreme version of continuism, a view on which imagination and memory refer to the same psychological mechanisms.

The orthodoxy on imagination and memory in the history of philosophy, however, is discontinuism, a view on which there are significant differences between imagination and memory, even if there are overlaps in their psychological mechanisms. Some philosophers find the distinction in internalist factors, such as the phenomenological difference between imagining and remembering. Most famously, David Hume sought to distinguish the two in terms of vivacity—“the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination” (Treatise of Human Nature: 1.3; but see Kind 2017). Others who have adopted a phenomenological criterion include René Descartes, Bertrand Russell, and William James (De Brigard 2017). Other philosophers find the distinction in externalist factors, such as the causal connection that exists between memories and the past that is absent with imagination. Aristotle uses the causal connection criterion to distinguish between imagination and memory (De Anima 451a2; 451a8–12; see De Brigard 2017). Indeed, nowadays the idea that a causal connection is essential to remembering is accepted as “philosophical common sense” (see the entry on memory; but see also De Brigard 2014 on memory traces). As such, it is unsurprising that discontinuism remains the orthodoxy. As J. O. Urmson (1967: 83) boldly claims, “One of these universally admitted distinctions is that between memory and imagination”.

In recent years, two sets of findings from cognitive science has given philosophers reasons to push back against discontinuism.

The first set of findings concern distortions and confabulations. The traditional conception of memory is that it functions as an archive: past experiences are encapsulated and stored in the archive, and remembering is just passively retrieving the encapsulated mental content from the archive (Robins 2016). Behavioral psychology has found numerous effects that challenge the empirical adequacy of the archival conception of memory. Perhaps the most well-known is the misinformation effect, which occurs when a subject incorporates inaccurate information into their memory of an event—even inaccurate information that they received after the event (Loftus 1979 [1996]).

The second set of findings concern the psychological underpinnings of “mental time travel”, or the similarities between remembering the past and imagining the future, which is also known as mental time travel (see Schacter et al. 2012 for a review). Using fMRI, neuroscientists have found a striking overlap in the brain activities for remembering the past and imagining the future, which suggest that the two psychological processes utilize the same neural network (see, for example, Addis et al. 2007; Buckner & Carroll 2007; Gilbert & Wilson 2007; Schacter et al. 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis 1997, 2007). The neuroscientific research is preceded by and corroborated by works from developmental psychology (Atance & O’Neill 2011) and on neurodivergent individuals: for example, the severely amnesic patient KC exhibits deficits with remembering the past and imagining the future (Tulving 1985), and also exhibits deficits with the generation of non-personal fictional narratives (Rosenbaum et al. 2009). Note that, despite the evocative contrast between “remembering the past” and “imagining the future”, it is questionable whether temporality is the central contrast. Indeed, some philosophers and psychologists contend that temporality is orthogonal to the comparison between imagination and memory (De Brigard & Gessell 2016; Schacter et al. 2012).

These two set of findings have given rise to an alternative conception that sees memory as essentially constructive, in which remembering is actively generating mental content that more or less represent the past. The constructive conception of memory is in a better position to explain why memories can contain distortions and confabulations (but see Robins 2016 for complications), and why remembering makes use of the same neural networks as imagining.

In turn, this constructive turn in the psychology and philosophy of memory has revived philosophers’ interest in continuism concerning imagination and memory. Kourken Michaelian (2016) explicitly rejects the causal connection criterion and defends a theory on which remembering, like imagining, centrally involves simulation. Karen Shanton and Alvin Goldman (2010) characterizes remembering as mindreading one’s past self. Felipe De Brigard (2014) characterizes remembering as a special instance of hypothetical thinking. Robert Hopkins (2018) characterizes remembering as a kind of imagining that is controlled by the past. However, the philosophical interpretation of empirical research remain contested; in dissent, Dorothea Debus (2014, 2016) considers the same sets of findings but ultimately concludes that remembering and imagining remain distinct mental kinds.

2.5 Imagination and Supposition

To suppose is to form a hypothetical mental representation. There exists a highly contentious debate on whether supposition is continuous with imagination, which is also a hypothetical attitude, or whether there are enough differences to make them discontinuous. There are two main options for distinguishing imagination and supposition, by phenomenology and by function.

The phenomenological distinction standardly turns on the notion of vivacity: whereas imaginings are vivid, suppositions are not. Indeed, one often finds in this literature the contrast between “merely supposing” and “vividly imagining”. Although vivacity has been frequently invoked in discussions of imagination, Amy Kind (2017) draws on empirical and theoretical considerations to argue that it is ultimately philosophically untenable. If that is correct, then the attempt to demarcate imagination and supposition by their vivacity is untenable too. More rarely, other phenomenological differences are invoked; for example, Brian Weatherson (2004) contends that “supposing can be coarse in a way that imagining cannot”.

ImaginationSuppositionAffectVariableAtypicalMonitoringTypicalTypicalInferenceTypicalTypicalUpdaterTypicalAtypicalDomain-Specific SystemsTypicalVariableScript ElaboratorVariableAtypicalInputter (punctuate)TypicalTypicalInputter (streaming)TypicalAtypical

Table 1. Architectural similarities and differences between imagination and supposition (Weinberg & Meskin 2006).

There have been diverse functional distinctions attributed to the discontinuity between imagination and supposition, but none has gained universal acceptance. Richard Moran (1994) contends that imagination tends to give rise to a wide range of further mental states, including affective responses, whereas supposition does not (see also Arcangeli 2014, 2017). Tamar Szabó Gendler (2000a) contends that while attempting to imagine something like that female infanticide is morally right seems to generate imaginative resistance, supposing it does not (see the discussion on imaginative resistance in Supplement on Puzzles and Paradoxes of Imagination and the Arts). Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft (2002) contend that supposition involves only cognitive imagination, but imagination involves both cognitive and conative imagination. Alvin Goldman contends that suppositional imagination involves supposing that particular content obtains (for example, supposing that I am elated) but enactment imagination involves “enacting, or trying to enact, elation itself.” (2006: 47–48, italics omitted). Tyler Doggett and Andy Egan (2007) contend that imagination tends to motivate pretense actions, but supposition tends not to. On Jonathan Weinberg and Aaron Meskin (2006)’s synthesis, while there are a few functional similarities, there are many more functional differences between imagination and supposition (Table 1).

There remain ongoing debates about specific alleged functional distinctions, and about whether the functional distinctions are numerous or fundamental enough to warrant discontinuism or not. Indeed, it remains contentious which philosophers count as continuists and which philosophers count as discontinuists (for a few sample taxonomies, see Arcangeli 2017; Balcerak Jackson 2016; Kind 2013).

3. Roles of Imagination

Much of the contemporary discussion of imagination has centered around particular roles that imagination is purported to play in various domains of human understanding and activity. Amongst the most widely-discussed are the role of imagination in understanding other minds (section 3.1), in performing and recognizing pretense (section 3.2), in characterizing psychopathology (section 3.3), in engaging with the arts (section 3.4), in thinking creatively (section 3.5), in acquiring knowledge about possibilities (section 3.6), and in interpreting figurative language (section 3.7).

The variety of roles ascribed to imagination, in turn, provides a guide for discussions on the nature of imagination (section 1) and its place in cognitive architecture (section 2).

3.1 Mindreading

Mindreading is the activity of attributing mental states to oneself and to others, and of predicting and explaining behavior on the basis of those attributions. Discussions of mindreading in the 1990s were often framed as debates between “theory theory”—which holds that the attribution of mental states to others is guided by the application of some (tacit) folk psychological theory—and “simulation theory”—which holds that the attribution of mental states is guided by a process of replicating or emulating the target’s (apparent) mental states, perhaps through mechanisms involving the imagination. (Influential collections of papers on this debate include Carruthers & Smith (eds.) 1996; Davies & Stone (eds.) 1995a, 1995b.) In recent years, proponents of both sides have increasingly converged on common ground, allowing that both theory and simulation play some role in the attribution of mental states to others (see Carruthers 2003; Goldman 2006; Nichols & Stich 2003). Many such hybrid accounts include a role for imagination.

On theory theory views, mindreading involves the application of some (tacit) folk psychological theory that allows the subject to make predictions and offer explanations of the target’s beliefs and behaviors. On pure versions of such accounts, imagination plays no special role in the attribution of mental states to others. (For an overview of theory theory, see entry on folk psychology as a theory).

On simulation theory views, mindreading involves simulating the target’s mental states so as to exploit similarities between the subject’s and target’s processing capacities. It is this simulation that allows the subject to make predictions and offer explanations of the target’s beliefs and behaviors. (For early papers, see Goldman 1989; Gordon 1986; Heal 1986; for recent dissent, see, for example, Carruthers 2009; Gallagher 2007; Saxe 2005, 2009; for an overview of simulation theory, see entry on folk psychology as mental simulation).

Traditional versions of simulation theory typically describe simulation using expressions such as “imaginatively putting oneself in the other’s place”. How this metaphor is understood depends on the specific account. (A collection of papers exploring various versions of simulation theory can be found in Dokic & Proust (eds.) 2002.) On many accounts, the projection is assumed to involve the subject’s imaginatively running mental processes “off-line” that are directly analogous to those being run “on-line” by the target (for example Goldman 1989). Whereas the “on-line” mental processes are genuine, the “off-line” mental processes are merely imagined. For example, a target that is deciding whether to eat sushi for lunch is running their decision-making processes “on-line”; and a subject that is simulating the target’s decision-making is running the analogous processes “off-line”—in part, by imagining the relevant mental states of the target. Recent empirical work in psychology has explored the accuracy of such projections (Markman, Klein, & Suhr (eds.) 2009, section V; Saxe 2005, 2006, 2009.)

Though classic simulationist accounts have tended to assume that the simulation process is at least in-principle accessible to consciousness, a number of recent simulation-style accounts appeal to neuroscientific evidence suggesting that at least some simulative processes take place completely unconsciously. On such accounts of mindreading, no special role is played by conscious imagination (see Goldman 2009; Saxe 2009.)

Many contemporary views of mindreading are hybrid theory views according to which both theorizing and simulation play a role in the understanding of others’ mental states. Alvin Goldman (2006), for example, argues that while mindreading is primarily the product of simulation, theorizing plays a role in certain cases as well. Many recent discussions have endorsed hybrid views of this sort, with more or less weight given to each of the components in particular cases (see Carruthers 2003; Nichols & Stich 2003.)

A number of philosophers have suggested that the mechanisms underlying subjects’ capacity to engage in mindreading are those that enable engagement in pretense behavior (Currie & Ravenscroft 2002; Goldman 2006; Nichols & Stich 2003; for an overview of recent discussions, see Carruthers 2009.) According to such accounts, engaging in pretense involves imaginatively taking up perspectives other than one’s own, and the ability to do so skillfully may rely on—and contribute to—one’s ability to understand those alternate perspectives (see the entry on empathy). Partly in light of these considerations, the relative lack of spontaneous pretense in children with autistic spectrum disorders is taken as evidence for a link between the skills of pretense and empathy.

3.2 Pretense

Pretending is an activity that occurs during diverse circumstances, such as when children make-believe, when criminals deceive, and when thespians act (Langland-Hassan 2014). Although “imagination” and “pretense” have been used interchangeably (Ryle 1949), in this section we will use “imagination” to refer to one’s state of mind, and “pretense” to refer to the one’s actions in the world.

Different theories of pretense disagree fundamentally about what it is to pretend (see Liao & Gendler 2011 for an overview). Consequently, they also disagree about the mental states that enable one to pretend. Metarepresentational theories hold that engaging in pretend play requires the innate mental-state concept pretend (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith 1985; Friedman 2013; Friedman & Leslie 2007; Leslie 1987, 1994). To pretend is to represent one’s own representations under the concept pretend. Behaviorist theories hold that engaging in pretend play requires a process of behaving-as-if (Harris 1994, 2000; Harris & Kavanaugh 1993; Jarrold et al. 1994; Lillard & Flavell 1992; Nichols & Stich 2003; Perner 1991; Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano 2004; Stich & Tarzia 2015). Different behaviorist theories explicate behaving-as-if in different ways, but all aim to provide an account of pretense without recourse to the innate mental-state concept pretend.

Philosophical and psychological theories have sought to explain both the performance of pretense and the recognition of pretense, especially concerning evidence from developmental psychology (see Lillard 2001 for an early overview). On the performance side, children on a standard developmental trajectory exhibit early indicators of pretend play around 15 months; engage in explicit prop-oriented play by 24 months; and engage in sophisticated joint pretend play with props by 36 months (Harris 2000; Perner, Baker, & Hutton 1994; Piaget 1945 [1951]). On the recognition side, children on a standard developmental trajectory distinguish pretense and reality via instinctual behavioral cues around 15–18 months; and start to do so via conventional behavioral cues from 36 months on (Friedman et al. 2010; Lillard & Witherington 2004; Onishi & Baillargeon 2005; Onishi, Baillargeon, & Leslie 2007; Richert and Lillard 2004).

Not surprisingly, the debate between theories of pretense often rest on interpretations of such empirical evidence. For example, Ori Friedman and Alan Leslie (2007) argue that behavioral theories cannot account for the fact that children as young as 15 months old can recognize pretend play and its normativity (Baillargeon, Scott, & He 2010). Specifically, they argue that behavioral theories do not offer straightforward explanations of this early development of pretense recognition, and incorrectly predicts that children systematically mistake other acts of behaving-as-if—such as those that stem from false beliefs—for pretense activities. In response, Stephen Stich and Joshua Tarzia (2015) has acknowledged these problems for earlier behaviorist theories, and developed a new behaviorist theory that purportedly explains the totality of empirical evidence better than metarepresentational rivals. Importantly, Stich and Tarzia argue that their account can better explain Angeline Lillard (1993)’s empirical finding that young children need not attribute a mental concept such as pretend to someone else in order to understand them as pretending.

The debate concerning theories of pretense has implications for the role of imagination in pretense. Behaviorist theories tend to take imagination as essential to explaining pretense performance; metarepresentational theories do not. (However, arguably the innate mental-state concept pretend posited by metarepresentational theories serve similar functions. See Nichols and Stich’s (2000) discussion of the decoupler mechanism, which explicitly draws from Leslie 1987. Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) give a broadly behaviorist theory of pretense that does not require imagination.) Specifically, on most behaviorist theories, imagination is essential for guiding elaborations of pretense episodes, especially via behaviors (Picciuto & Carruthers 2016; Stich & Tarzia 2015).

Most recently, Peter Langland-Hassan (2012, 2014) has developed a theory that aims to explain pretense behavior and pretense recognition without appeal to either metarepresentation or imagination. Langland-Hassan argues that pretense behaviors can be adequately explained by beliefs, desires, and intentions—including beliefs in counterfactuals; and that the difference between pretense and sincerity more generally can be adequately characterized in terms of a person’s beliefs, intentions, and desires. While Langland-Hassan does not deny that pretense is in some sense an imaginative activity, he argues that we do not need to posit a sui generis component of the mind to account for it.

3.3 Psychopathology

Autism and delusions have been—with much controversy—characterized as disorders of imagination. That is, the atypical patterns of cognition and behavior associated with each psychopathology have been argued to result from atypical functions of imagination.

Autism can be characterized in terms of a trio of atypicalities often referred to as “Wing’s triad”: problems in typical social competence, communication, and imagination (Happé 1994; Wing & Gould 1979). The imaginative aspect of autism interacts with other prominent roles of imagination, namely mindreading, pretense, and engagement with the arts (Carruthers 2009). Children with autism do not engage in spontaneous pretend play in the ways that typically-developing children do, engaging instead in repetitive and sometimes obsessional activities; and adults with autism often show little interest in fiction (Carpenter, Tomasello, & Striano 2005; Happé 1994; Rogers, Cook, & Meryl 2005; Wing & Gould 1979). The degree to which an imaginative deficit is implicated in autism remains a matter of considerable debate. Most radically, Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft (2002) have argued that, with respect to Wing’s triad, problems in typical social competence and communication are rooted in an inability to engage in imaginative activities.

Delusions can be characterized as belief-like mental representations that manifest an unusual degree of disconnectedness from reality (Bortolotti & Miyazono 2015). Particularly striking examples would include Capgras and Cotard delusions. In the former, the sufferer takes her friends and family to have been replaced by imposters; in the latter, the sufferer takes himself to be dead. More mundane examples might include ordinary cases of self-deception.

One approach to delusions characterize them as beliefs that are dysfunctional in their content or formation. (For a representative collection of papers that present and criticize this perspective, see Coltheart & Davies (eds.) 2000). However, another approach to delusions characterize them as dysfunctions of imaginings. Currie and Ravenscroft (2002: 170–175) argue that delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by the subject as the result of an inability to keep track of the sources of one’s thoughts. That is, a delusion is an imagined representation that is misidentified by the subject as a belief. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007) argues that in cases of delusions and self-deceptions, imaginings come to play a role in one’s cognitive architecture similar to that typically played by beliefs. Andy Egan (2008a) likewise argues that the mental states involved in delusions are both belief-like (in their connection to behaviors and inferences) and imagination-like (in their circumscription); however, he argues that these functional similarities suggest the need to posit an in-between attitude called “bimagination”.

3.4 Engagement with the Arts

There is an entrenched historical connection between imagination and the arts. David Hume and Immanuel Kant both invoke imagination centrally in their exploration of aesthetic phenomena (albeit in radically different ways; see entries on Hume’s aesthetics and Kant’s aesthetics). R.G. Collingwood (1938) defines art as the imaginative expression of feeling (Wiltsher 2018; see entry on Collingwood’s aesthetics). Roger Scruton (1974) develops a Wittgensteinian account of imagination and accords it a central role in aesthetic experience and aesthetic judgment.

In contemporary philosophy, the most prominent theory of imagination’s role in engagement with the arts is presented in Kendall Walton’s Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990). (Although Walton uses “fictions” as a technical term to refer to artworks, his conception of the arts is broad enough to include both high-brow and low-brow; popular and obscure; a variety of specific arts such as poetry and videogames; and—as Stacie Friend (2008) clarifies—both fictive and non-fictive works.) Walton’s core insight is that engagement with the arts is fundamentally similar to children’s games of make-believe. When one engages with an artwork, one uses it as a prop in a make-believe game. As props, artworks generate prescriptions for imaginings. These prescriptions also determine the representational contents of artworks (that is, “fictionality”, or what is true in a fictional world). When one correctly engages with an artwork, then, one imagines the representational contents as prescribed.

Out of all the arts, it is the engagement with narratives that philosophers have explored most closely in conjunction with imagination (see Stock 2013 for an overview). Gregory Currie (1990) offers an influential account of imagination and fiction, and Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen (1996) discuss literature specifically. Indeed, this research program—despite many criticisms of Walton’s specific theory—remains lively today (see, for example, papers in Nichols (ed.) 2006b). For example, Kathleen Stock (2017) argues that a specific kind of propositional imagination is essential for engagement with fictions. In dissent, Derek Matravers (2014) argues that, contra Walton, imagination is not essential for engagement with fictions.

[sscottstewart]

“J” = Julia “P”= Peter “A” = Anonymous Evil “E” = Evil

Abbreviations and naming conventions are in the Index page.

140509 1903

“A”: you have lost your power Scott (just after they said that I was the cause of a bynch of good ghosts / beings being abducted and made to live in a situation like Zimbabwe

THE last 2 nights I have bought drugs and wanked, but “E” controls the feelings I get. They stop me getting hard, evaporate my mindsets, totally evaporate thoughts and feelings about sex, and as well as stopping me from coming by dissipation of the notion of sex in my mind, they physically obstruct me from (getting hard and) coming.

As per usual, soon as I stop (give up) wanking, they say they are toturing and killing people. They explicitly say it is my fault.

They keep providing commentary of their assaults and mistreatment of good kind people. I offered to do anything at all, whatever evil wanted, if they would please stop hurting people. I offered to walk to Thornleigh 4 times, to sit on the lounge without moving my legs more that once per half hour, to sit on the lounge between 9am and 5.30pm each day, to clean any shelves… anything, anything at all, but please stop hurting people.

Again I hear the voices of people in great distress, agony and pain, telling me that because I have taken drugs, they are being killed and destroyed, because evil uses my taking drugs as an excuse to kill innocent kind people.

Why do I keep failing. Why the fuck can’t I learn this lesson.

Today’s notes should convey my misery, pain, heartache and wishing for death, because I keep causing innocent good people to be hurt and destroyed. I fucking hate myself, and I just wish I could die and dissapear, never to be again. I hate myself, and I hate life.

150509 J & P have been torturing good ghosts again, but after some time an image of a 12 y.o girl became apparent and then they started torturing her as well.

8 August 2013 6.05pm ? : “You’re not that smart are you?” ?m : “what a load of (old) RUBBISH” BEING CHANTED REPEATEDLY IN THE BACKGROUD j: i’M GOING NOW. They thought yo8u had the 5th element in you. (m): “that’s it julia. That’s it julia. ?m : “what a load of (old) RUBBISH” BEING CHANTED REPEATEDLY IN THE BACKGROUD (brad) “: scott; can you win? s:I thought I won in february 1992 ?m : “what a load of (old) RUBBISH” BEING CHANTED REPEATEDLY IN THE BACKGROUD 6.14: now all talk has been muted, and I can only hear the faintest parts of words, way in the background. They continue to use names of homosapiens I know, though earlier they said there were (dead) bodies to be observed. (pear very quiet): what do you think scott stewart? note. Where a name is used to denote the speaker, what this really means is that earlier, a particular ‘voice’ sound was designated (by someone, often other than the voice sound themselves) as being the voice sound of a human. From that point forward, there is the assumption that that voice sound continues to belong to that name. J: they do it… (would not finish) J: why don’t I feel the same way as you do? S: because you don’t have a clue how I feel. YOu are always sampling my sensorial input information rather than the congnitive (et al) processing that transforms it into feelings. This implies to me that you don’t have your own feelings (because you are always steeling mine), so it would be impossible for you to feel anything unless yuou stop taking mine. J: why won’t you heel? Now there’s a fucking question that not many people get to hear. Is that an insult? Damn fucking borgsiouswa squid yeilder (new serius voice print)x: YOu know what scott, something very serious is about to happen in the world of exciting S: really. Are you going to kill me? x:YOu know what scott, that’s exactly what I thought. You have absolutely no idea(3×0 whether I thought I had some bikies with me or not….this will be the last chance i get. I am dead now…I am a female…. x2: i must say julia that scott steweart does not know what is going on x3: julia; why are you doing this.

I can’t write any more notes because they are changing what they say because I am making notes and they can see what I type 2110 hours

13 April 2014, 0951 J: (telling me that I have to go to bed, threatening me) “I’m going to kill them” J(using a male voice): “I just killed Pam, I just killed Pam (alledgeing becauase I won’t go to be as she demands) MP (MichaelParis): doesn’t matter does it J? J: do you know what you are doing (implying criticism of my tired attempt at getting work done) J: I don’t consider it work J: when are you going for a run?

It is now 14 April 2014 at 0436i AM BEING TOLD ABOUT my brother having sex (“gang banging it is called” [[MP}) with Tristan Coleman. The reason I am being told I assume is that I financed it by having my drugs taken off me and being railroaded into spending all my money again over the past three days. Of course, no-one will admit that they have been working on me to force me to spend all my money in three and one half days, I am pursuaded that it ios my own fault.

I can not write fast enough. They are so pressing aND URGENT IN WANTING TO TELL ME ABOUT TtRISTAN AND gLENN “Glenn just came all over Tristan COlemans nose” [J]. As i try to write, they make noises and start to say things because they are urgent in having to tell me what is taking place, I suspect that it is going to be because of me and that is why I must be interrupted to hear the commentary and remarks, because it is due to me.

That won’t be too bad as long as everyone got paid what they agreed they would be paid, and everyone lives through it. J: glenn has come all over tRISTANS FACE (said again, and I don’t think that it is really J as they say.

Julie was laughing at Glenn because he forgot a letter that he was going to post or something. Maybe they are both taking too much of my drugs, AND are both going a bit Ben COusins, whom several weeks ago was maniulating my diaphragm (solar plexis) preventing me from exercising. Shurley not!

0504 I am reading about events and delegates and they ahve started attenuating my cognitive abilities, what I referred to when I was on the train as ‘dislocation of my memory and comprehension’. When I just pointed out that I could sense them doing it, they immediately came back and started telling me that this was the path for the future ‘unless’ (or something), but then they paused because they ‘saw’ me starting to ‘say’ ‘that you are threatening me and also ssaying it is my fault for not capitulating to your demands’, and once they ‘saw’ that coming they stopped for some reason.

Now [MP] is telling me through inuendo and implied things that he is now having sex with Barbera Kendall, and seems to be my fault, or thanks to me, he/they never really say what they mean, but apprently it is because I heard them being tortured through bad taste musi.. ?: “there she goes” [MP]: “There I go, there I go, there I go, there I go, there I go, there I go, there I go, There I go, there I go, there I go, there I go, there I go” ?: what’s he doing (scott?)” [MP]:”there i go, there I go, there I go, there I go, there I go, there I go, there I go, there I go…[he won;t stop – I think his ‘back is up’ so he’s gong to say ‘there I go’ many many times.

a few minutes later and they are urgently telling me that Barbera Kendall has ‘thrown up’…’all over Mr stewart, Mr Stewart, Mr Stewart (I think they are going to repeat that for a while.

?(fm): “Thisis why Al Brims is fucked up” s: (- oh yeh really) “perhaps he’s fucked up because you fucked with his feelings” [now It is implied I think that that was his female voice (fm) above. To that I say that self assessment is at the very best a tool for the express use of 3rd parties and igf it was credible, beliveabl;e and worthwhile Freud would not have freely associate so much and put himself up for simple ridicule by anyone not medicated and institutionalised

?: “what do you think is going on with Barbera?” s: (to Barbera) “are you in distress or danger” bk: “no I’m not” well why is this other person who will not say who they are repeatedly saying “what do you think is going on with Barbera?”

?: “what is barbera kendall doing to my new car?” I do not know why they chickened out of completing the statement / question that they were just about to ask ?: “this is really terrible “(scott, it your fault) ?: J is… ?: now they are implying without saying anything that something else terrible is happening and its my fault again. ?: “she is dead” S: “shit that is serious, what did she die of?” ?: “a broken heart” I am now trying to ask them for advice about how to dispose of a dead body (seeing as they just killed BK), and they are being precious and won;t say and are prewtending that they don’t kill 1 person every 4 hours. s: “you said you just murdered her” ?: “I did not break her heart or murder her, you broke her heart” ?: “what do you think is going on now scott?” S: “what the fuck do you think is going on. Can you hear what I say, can you hear what the fuck I say. What the fuck do you think is going on if you are asking me what is going on and you won’t establish who you are and you know I can’t see which is why you are (sarcastically and fectitiously) asking me what the fuck is going on”

S: on hearing the whiska’s cat commercial song “do I know the girl in the cat ad?” (they started talking about it 2 days ago – freely

After me claiming that I reckon that it is Tristan Col;eman who would have got well paid to appear in the “whiskas” TVC, my assailants will not say anything about the accuracy of that answer other than “its not her”. This is not surprising because it only resembles Tristan in two very minute ways, and neither of them are apparenttly identifyable, except to the confusion of someone who does not merit any answer or reasonable response.

?: “how can you say ‘I bet nothing happens’ when it’s your fault… it’s your fault”

0806 ?: “she heard” I was just trying to explain that every individual and especially every asset or gain in my life is nothing but a potential liability and opportunity for them to take advantage of at my cost. Having alrwady explained that I am busy beating them at beating me up.

I was just talking about murdering S, N’s ex, and this was greeted by a retort about something or or other, ending in “it was your fault”. Other than that, no denial, no comment, no jokes, no speeches, and no hoarse voice from getting awards for mistreating people the best.

23:47 23 september 2012

Julia spends her days telling me to commit suicide, but when I tell her the same thing, she feels insulted. AT the moment, I am being told that she is doing terrible things, but she won’t tell me what she is doing. So does she really want me to believe her, given that many of her words have unfamiliar definitions.

SO now I am told that I am doing the right thing — for a fuckwit. Obviously, there can be no problem in jotting down a couple of facts for later recollection. After all, I am not going to hear anything inmcrimentating or that otherwise anyone can not be happy to have noted down, since we all live by our remarks and utterances

SO here are a few excerts that I am supposed to understand: 23:58 – this is so cruel (ss: what?) – no reply 23:59 we want you to committ suicide 00:05 – I did a cpouple of visualisations and put some razor wire in her asshole, and was told that it did not make any difference (I would note: other than her reacting to the visualisations) 00:06 P : are you going to take take drugs tonight? (Me: “no”) (note: recently she says she needs drugs to be able to see to find people) 00:10 some anonymous people are telling me that she is doing some cruel and appauling things. No one will say what. My response is – “How are we (should I) going to stop her. I reckon, give her what she gives others, and treat her like an intelligent adult”. 12:20 Julia: I just killed michelle young’s baby. SS: what for? J: I just want to be cruel (someone else: J is very very stoned 12:25 (spomeone else) – why don’t you kill yourself scott? Me: why don’t you kill me like you are killing babies (which is whjat J is doing at the moment. (else or J) she can only kill babies

00:50 – me: hey Julia, are you still planning on having babies? J: no me; why not? J: because I can’t get anyone to fertilise me! me: why do you think that is J? (asked twice – no response)

12 March 2014 2100

?: “did you do something wrong” s: “no” ?: “you did do something wrong referring to the fact that after 10 days abstinence I fucked up and purchased $50. I actually ended up taking home $150 but I did not touch the $100 and am returning it when I go to pay, hoping that using less will cause less of a problem.

SOmeone has been implying that ‘good’ ghosts did tonight, and just then someone implied that the hostile voices I hear are good ghosts who have been turned evil by J. There was also an implication that I don’t hear vital information and so my decisions have terrible consequence3s that I am unaware of. Someone is also saying that I am going to be failed from uni, so I have to decide by the end of tomorrow whether to opt out.

In all this familiar abuse and shit trreatment, no one ever considers my position. I am having terrible problems and trouble. I never get to come if I masturbate, and no one ever realises that I suffer gre4at loss and cost when I fail to maintain my abstinence. I have repeatedly asked during the week if there were any ghosts around other than J, and I am told there are not. But occasionally I am shown the image of a ghost on their hands and knees laughing, and J pretends to be other people (ghosts) when I ask after people. I can tell it is J because she always starts the sentance (phrase) with my name. I specifically asked if there was anyone left, and I was never answered, though on a couple of occasions J prete4nded to be other people.

I also specifically asked (in a childish attempted humor way) if I was going to encounter any particular treatment as a result of an acty of will in the event of my giving up for at least the mandatory period of 6 months, and I was specifically told on a number of occasions that I would only experience the predictable amount of improvement and desireable outcomes that would normally stem from sustained abstinence.

I am upset now because it has been repeatedly implied tonight that not only were there consequences for other people, but I have missed out on some (extra-ordinary) benefit because I relapsed and failed to maintain my abstinence.

When I fail to maintain my abstinence, perhaps it is because of the shit I have had to deal with for more than two decades. (Though the last couple of years have been quite OK, other than being very tortured on each of the past six occasions I have relapsed.

FUrthermore, while everyone is blaming me for the alleged assult, torture and death of others, no one else tried to assist these ‘others’ in any way, or tried to tell me what is going on. They simply hack into me with abuse and aggravated blame for my behaviourt impacting other people.

Unable to capture the contempt that I am treated with, I shall record some quotes. No one is identifying themselves lately, so I will just use the usual “?”

?: you know whats happenening scott (how the fuck would I – and they know it before asking)…, you are being groomed (pedophile language) for a big problem (as is I haven’t been tortured or bankrupted in the past for ecample). (talking slwoly so I can record it) YOu are going to realise (how) that. … Does anyone like me? S: you said everyone is dead or evil, soi there is no one who could if they had the opportunity ?: Scott… (long pause). You know what Scott, I think that you are going to realise something. You are the sole person (they must not be people talking!) who realises seomthing. YOu are going to realise that J (heresay) is about to do something to you.What do you think that miight be. S: drop me out of uni. ?: drop you out of uni hey… I don’t think so

A couple of weeks ago, I was having converstions with Prof. Steven Hawking. These turned out to be lies and deceipt.

?: you know what scott stewart (surname used – contempt), I am going to tell you something (they know they are anonymous)… YOu are being groomed (pedo talk about the victim) for a catastrophy (like bankruptcy, the murder of god, turning Michelle evil, repeated torture recently tyo the exctent I had the vacuume hose leasured to gas myself). I am going to tell you something else…you are being groomed for a spe ial problem with your homework (condescending. But I will avoid it if I am told what the problem is going to be). I am going to drop you out of university (like 1994, 1995 + suicide attempt when Ward and Charles et al were vomiting in the bath they were going to put me in and so on…).

?: you know what scott (I obviously can’t) I am going to drop you out of university because you took drugs (unrelated events. The drugs are the excuse for the action, not the cause of the problem).

?: you know what scott – you know what is going ofn woith ghosts don;t you s: no ?: did you do the wrong thing? s: no. ([thoughts] What I did let myslef down. It was a terrible failure, and an extrme disappointment, but I will learn from it and improve. I let myself down terribly, but I will recover. Tima has also been having a problem lately. I said I did not want to get her involved, for exactly that reason. Buyt I [urged] told to line her up, and I did what I was told. No one is blaming Tima for anything).

?: scott, do you think you will get away with what you are doing (name at start of sentance. The problem is my burden – I am not trying to cheat anyone or deceivge or ‘get away’ with anything. It was a terrible thing, but at least I did not use what I had).

?: i’m sorry scott, but I am going to punish you no end (don’t know who is talking, They won;t admit to it or say who they are).

?: SORRY SCOTT

(I wonder if they have been causing Tima problems?)

?: I’m sorry scott, but it is set in stone. You are going to be dropped out of uni.

Now while I am trying to study, I am being shown a pair of eyes, crying. This I always find extremely (very very) upsetting.

?: I am not surprised you find them upsetting (no one else does though). Because they are the eyes of your final resting place. (What is that supposed to mean?). That means, your final ghosts are talking to you (who is letting their communications get throug?). They are saying ‘please help us’ (how do / can I accomplish that?). ‘Please help us’, ‘please help us’ ?: you know what scott – I am beginning to realise that you are not understanding what you are beiong told (I have not been told anything. The only communication to me other than this anonymous voice is the crying eyes, and I don;t know how to help!).

?: I believe you do know how to help. (How I wonder!).

I get so upset I cry. And I could cry right now. Nothing ever works out for me. I live without love, without much undestanding, and with total liability for my actions. Fuck it, if people knoew what happens to me, and what I hear, I would get some sympathy I think. I wish I could have one dance with a girl I like.

?: that’s riught. You are always being picked on. do you know why you are always being picked on? (facetious – how could I know?). You are always being picked on because you are a loser Scotty Stewart

?: (J: – I caould tell it was her) Scott – I’m afraid I have some very bad news. YOu are going to fail your statistics test, because I am going to fail you.

?: I’m afraid scott that you are going to be disappointed in what happens in your future (as if I could know different paths that the future might have taken. I examined this thoroughly when I analysed the existence of luck).]

NOTE THAT EVERYTHING I HAVE HEARD AND TRANSCRIBED HAS HAD THE SENTENCE START OFF WITH A COMTEMPUOUS ASSERTION OF WHY I AM GOING TO SUFFER AND LOSE AT GREAT COST. No encouraging words or suggestions of how to mitigate these catastrophies).

Julia Davis – The name of my hallucinations "J" = Julia "P"= Peter "A" = Anonymous Evil "E" = Evil Abbreviations and naming conventions are in the…

[magravlab-blog]

EFT tapping Dr Maharaj.

https://www.serenityocala.com/resource-content/Differential-Gene-Expression-After-EFT-Treatment.pdf

EFT tapping Dr Maharaj.

Mindful Energy PsychologyEnergy Psychology 8:1 • May 201645Energy Psychology (EP)Energy  psychology  (EP)  is  a  theoretical  and  practice  approach  based  on  facilitating  energy flow through the body-mind. Originally and pre-dominantly, energy psychology techniques involve percussing  or  tapping  on  specific  acupuncture points (acupoints) to treat psychological disorders (Callahan, 1985; Feinstein, 2010, 2012a, 2012b; Gallo, 2004). When applied therapeutically, EP is also often referred to as energy therapy or energy psychotherapy, although approaches of this genre often involve other diagnostic and therapeutic tech-niques, such as muscle testing, bodily positions, eye  movements  and  positions,  holding  specific areas of the body such as chakras and neurovascu-lar reflexes, as well as cognitive components such as  affirmations  and  visualization  (Gallo,  2002; Hover-Kramer,  2002;  Feinstein,  2012b). Though there has been a proliferation of EP approaches, the initial one addressing psychological problems by  tapping  was  developed  by  Roger  Callahan, PhD, in the late 1970s (Callahan, 2001).Although the case can be made that EP has ancient roots in acupuncture and meridian theory, the more recent history dates back to the 1960s, when George Goodheart, DC, developed applied kinesiology  (Goodheart,  1987;  Walther,  1988), an  approach  that  employs  manual  muscle  testing  and holistic concepts to treat physical problems. Goodheart pioneered therapy localization, which involves  the  practitioner  or  patient  touching  spe-cific bodily locations while applying manual mus-cle  testing  for  diagnostic  and  treatment  purposes  (Kendall, Kendall, & Wadsworth, 1971).While Goodheart reported a connection among specific  muscles,  reflexes,  and  meridians,  others explored  aspects  of  applied  kinesiology  to  treat psychological problems. Diamond (1985) explored the  meridian-emotion  connection  and  the  use  of  affirmations,  music,  and  other  media  in  treating psychological issues. Along similar lines, Callahan developed a treatment method, Thought Field Ther-apy (TFT), which involves attuning to or access-ing  psychological  disorders  such  as  phobias  and traumas and then tapping on prescribed acupoints (Callahan, 1985; Callahan & Turbo, 2002; Gallo, 2004). Callahan’s is a three-tiered approach, includ-ing  specific  treatment  algorithms,  diagnosis,  and treatment  via  muscle  testing,  and  treatment  over the telephone through a protocol called voice tech-nology. Eventually, other related approaches were developed by Craig (Craig & Fowlie, 1995; Craig, 2010), Gallo (2000, 2003, 2004, 2007), and oth-ers (Gallo, 2002; Diepold, Britt, & Bender, 2004; Mollon, 2008; Benor, Ledger, Toussaint, Hett, & Zaccaro, 2009). Some of the approaches discarded muscle testing and several other elements of TFT (Craig, 2010; Benor et al., 2009), while others con-tinued to apply muscle testing and other elements to varying degrees (Gallo, 2000; Diepold et al., 2004; Mollon,  2008).  For  example,  energy  diagnostic and treatment methods (EDxTM) is an integrative approach  that  involves  a  wider  array  of  treatment  acupoints, algorithms, and diagnostic approaches; various  ways  of  addressing  self-sabotaging  inter-ferences  (i.e.,  psychological  reversal);  a  focus on thought recognition; protocols for core beliefs and  peak  performance;  and  several  other  aspects (Gallo, 2000, 2002).Energy Psychology ResearchIn  addition  to  studies  suggesting  that  EP  is  effective  in  treating  a  variety  of  conditions,  the efficiency of EP in treating trauma and posttrau-matic stress disorder (PTSD) has been increasingly established over nearly two decades (Carbonell & Figley, 1996, 1999; Figley, Carbonell, Boscarino, & Chang, 1999; Diepold & Goldstein, 2000, 2008; Johnson,  Shala,  Sejdijaj,  Odell,  &  Dabishevci, 2001;  Sakai  et  al.,  2001;  Church,  Geronilla,  & Dinter, 2009; Sakai, Connolly, & Oas, 2010; Burk, 2010; Church, 2010, 2013; Feinstein, 2010, 2012a, 2012b; Church, Piña, Reategui, & Brooks, 2012; Church, Yount, & Brooks, 2012; Church, Hawk, et  al.,  2013;  Church  &  Brooks,  2014).  Studies using EP in treating PTSD are especially notewor-thy, since PTSD has generally been considered a treatment-resistant and refractory condition. Some have argued that it may be incurable and should be regarded as a condition that can only be managed (Johnson et al., 2001; Phelps, 2009).Though it is traditionally proposed in EP that trauma  and  other  psychological  problems  entail blocked energy flow through meridians and other aspects of the bioenergy system, a position that the author finds intriguing, EP also likely eliminates the trauma by activating the implicit memory associated with  amygdala  neurons  and  permanently  altering  their connections or wiring (Hebb, 1949), reducing cortisol levels (Church, Yount, & Brooks, 2012), and also promoting memory reconsolidation by   intro-ducing  significant  novelty  (Moscovitch  &  Nadel, Energy Psychology 8:1 • May 2016Mindful Energy Psychology461997;  Hupbach,  Gomez,  Hardt,  &  Nadel,  2007; Ecker, Ticic, & Hulley, 2012).Diepold and Goldstein (2000, 2008) reported on  evaluation  of  an  EP  trauma  case  study  with  quantitative electroencephalogram (EEG). Statis-tically abnormal brain-wave patterns were evident when  the  client  thought  about  his  trauma  com-pared  to  a  neutral  baseline  event.  Quantitative EEG (QEEG) with the traumatic memory imme-diately after treatment and at 18-month follow-up revealed no abnormalities. This study supports the hypothesis that negative emotion has a measurable effect, and also objectively identified an immedi-ate and lasting neuroenergetic change in the direc-tion of normalcy and health after EP treatment.Church, Yount, and Brooks (2012) examined cortisol levels in 83 subjects randomly assigned to a single session of Emotional Freedom Tech-niques  (EFT;  Craig  &  Fowlie,  1995;  Church, 2013), talk therapy, or rest. Cortisol is the “master hormone” regulating many aspects of the body’s stress  response  mechanisms,  especially  those associated  with  the  autonomic  nervous  system.  Therefore the researchers proposed that successful therapy would result in lower stress as reflected in  reduced  salivary  cortisol.  Their  investigation found  that  cortisol  levels  in  the  rest  and  therapy  groups decreased at approximately the same rate, but that cortisol in the EFT group decreased sig-nificantly more. The decrease in this physiological marker of stress was also significantly correlated with a decrease in anxiety, depression, and other psychological conditions.As  cortisol  levels  of  PTSD  patients  are  ele-vated as well, effective treatment with EFT would likely  lower  cortisol  levels  in  such  patients. The investigators then examined gene expression in 18 veterans with PTSD and found regulation of inflam-mation genes associated with stress after 10 EFT sessions (Church, Yount, Rachlin, Fox, & Nelms, 2016). A pilot study with four participants examin-ing the entire genome before and after an hour of EFT versus a placebo of similar duration found 72 genes to be significantly regulated, including those implicated in immunity, inflammation, and tumor suppression  (Maharaj,  2016).  Effective  psycho-therapy with EP has been proposed as an epigenetic intervention (Feinstein & Church, 2010).Johnson  et  al.,  (2001)  reported  on  uncon-trolled  treatment  of  trauma  victims  in  Kosovo with Thought Field Therapy during five 2-week trips in the year 2000. Treatments were given to 105 Albanian patients with 249 separate violent traumatic  incidents.  The  traumas  included  rape, torture,  and  witnessing  the  massacre  of  loved ones. Total relief of the traumas was reported by 103 of the patients and for 247 of the 249 sepa-rate  traumas  treated.  Follow-up  data  averaging 5 months revealed no relapses. While these data are based on uncontrolled treatments, the absence of relapse ought to pique our attention, since a 98% spontaneous remission from PTSD is unlikely.Sakai  et  al.,  (2001)  reported  on  an  uncon-trolled  study  of  594 applications  of TFT  in  the treatment  of  714  clients  with  PTSD  and  many other  disorders.  Paired  t  tests  of  pre-  and  post-treatment SUD were statistically significant at the 0.01 level in 31 categories.In a 2006 through 2007 study, 50 orphaned adolescents  with  PTSD  symptoms  from  the Rwandan genocide 12 years earlier were treated with a single TFT session, evidencing significant improvement  on  PTSD  checklists  at  a  <0.001 level.  Improvements  were  maintained  at  1-year  follow-up (Sakai, Connolly, & Oas, 2010).Several EP approaches have been subjected to experimental tests. Efficacy in reducing or eliminating symptoms of PTSD, as well as anxiety, depression, and phobias, has been demonstrated in several stud-ies of EFT (Church, 2013, Feinstein, 2012b, Rowe, 2005;  Wells,  Polglase,  Andrews,  Carrington,  & Baker, 2003; Church & Brooks, 2010, 2014).An early EFT study focused on subjects who had been involved in motor vehicle accidents and who experienced PTSD associated with the acci-dent (Swingle & Pulos, 2004). All subjects received two treatment sessions; all reported improvement immediately  following  treatment.  Brain-wave assessments before and after treatment indicated that subjects who sustained the benefit of the treat-ments  had  increased  13–15  Hz  amplitude  over the sensory motor cortex, decreased right frontal cortex arousal, and an increased 3–7 Hz:16–25 Hz ratio in the occipital region.Stone,  Leyden,  and  Fellows  (2009)  found reductions in PTSD symptoms in genocide survi-vors in a different Rwandan orphanage, using two group  sessions  plus  a  single  individual  session  with the most traumatized individuals.Church, Piña, Reategui, and Brooks (2012) performed  a  randomized  controlled  trial  with 16 abused male children aged 12 to 17 in a group home. The experimental group of eight received EFT, while the control group of eight received Mindful Energy PsychologyEnergy Psychology 8:1 • May 201647no  treatment.  A  1-month  follow-up  was  per-formed, which found that the PTSD levels of all eight of the EFT group had normalized, while no member of the control group had improved (p < 0.001).EFT/EP reduced PTSD symptoms in two pilot studies with war veterans (Church, 2010; Church, Geronilla, & Dinter, 2009). In the first study, 11 veterans  and  their  family  members  received  a weeklong  intensive  consisting  of  10  to  15  ses-sions. Their average PTSD scores dropped from clinical  to  subclinical  levels,  as  did  their  other psychological symptoms such as hostility, psycho-sis, phobic anxiety, and depression. Three follow-ups, including at 1 year, found them stable, having maintained  the  gains  they  experienced  in  the weeklong intensive. In the second study, veterans received six sessions of EFT with similar results.These studies led to a full randomized con-trolled trial with a much larger group of subjects (Church, Hawk, Brooks, et al., 2013). The results from  this  study  again  showed  that  symptoms  in  a  wait-list  control  group  did  not  diminish  over  time, while six sessions of EFT produced drops to  subclinical  levels  of  PTSD,  with  the  average subject remaining subclinical at 3- and 6-month follow-up. The veterans were randomized to EFT (n =  30) or standard of care wait list (n =  29). Inter-vention consisted of six hour-long EFT sessions concurrent with standard care. The EFT subjects evidenced  significantly  reduced  psychological distress  (p < 0.0012) and PTSD symptom levels (p < 0.0001) after the intervention. Additionally, 90% of the EFT group no longer met criteria for PTSD, compared with 4% in the control group. After the wait period, the controls received EFT. In  a  within-subjects  longitudinal  analysis,  60% no longer met PTSD criteria after three sessions, which increased to 86% after six sessions for the 49 subjects who received EFT. Benefits remained at  86%  at  3  months  and  at  80%  at  6  months. A  replication  of  this  study  found  similar  results (Geronilla, McWilliams, & Clond, 2014). By com-parison, a similar PTSD study of cognitive behav-ioral therapy showed that only 40% of veterans improved after treatment (Monson et al., 2006).A meta-analysis of 18 randomized controlled trials including 921 subjects revealed a moderate effect size for EP (Gilomen & Lee, 2015). This study  utilized  conservative  statistical  methods, eliminating  studies  with  large  treatment  effects; had  those  been  included,  the  overall  effect  size would  have  been  large.  Later  meta-analyses  of EFT for specific conditions did indeed find large effect sizes: for anxiety (Clond, 2016), depression (Nelms & Castel, 2016), and PTSD (Sebastian & Nelms, 2016). These results point to the effective-ness and efficiency of EP treatments.Reciprocal Synergy: Mindful Energy Psychology (MEP)Mindful  energy  psychology  is  a  theoretical and practice approach that integrates mindfulness and  energy  psychology.  Since  research  supports  the therapeutic effectiveness of both mindfulness practices and EP, an integration of the two is pro-posed to offer significant synergy. It is the author’s observation that when EP techniques are applied most effectively, mindfulness stands as an essen-tial therapeutic active ingredient. A reciprocal syn-ergy also likely occurs, such that the benefits of mindfulness are accelerated and the benefits of EP are deepened when the two are combined.An essential focus of EP has been the treat-ment  and  elimination  of  psychological  problems as efficiently as possible. In many respects, this is consistent with a medical model. The issue being treated, such as depression or PTSD, is understand-ably considered to be problematic both to the cli-ent  and  therapist.  So  the  somatic  stimulation  and  related techniques of EP are ways of “attacking” the problem, “magic bullets” aimed at eliminating the unwanted malady. This does not, however, appear to be in line with mindfulness, which emphasizes nonjudgmental observation and acceptance without intention to eliminate anything. Mindfulness does not involve attempting to change anything; rather it involves a deep level of presence and acceptance.So  how  can  EP  and  mindfulness  be  recon-ciled? By their very nature, they appear to be at opposite ends of the spectrum, with it appearing paradoxical to hold an emphasis on acceptance or simply  nonjudgmental  observation  of  a  state  or condition  within  the  same  space  of  intending  to  eliminate it.Resolving the ParadoxParadoxes  do  not  have  to  be  eliminated  or resolved. It is conceivable to allow for both change and  acceptance.  Recall  the Serenity  Prayer,  a staple  of  12-step  programs  such  as  Alcoholics Anonymous,  which  begins  with  the  statement, Energy Psychology 8:1 • May 2016Mindful Energy Psychology48“God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change; courage to change the things I can; and  wisdom  to  know  the  difference”  (Niebuhr, 1927).  The  paradox  seems  to  arise  when  both acceptance  and  change  are  positioned  simultane-ously, when one tries to change and accept some-thing at the same time. However, it is feasible to integrate acceptance and change.While  EP  and  many  other  approaches  have been focused on eliminating symptoms, acceptance is  another  way  to  transcend  a  state  or  condition.  In this regard, acceptance involves decentering or stepping back from the situation and observing it from a distinct perspective or distance, so to speak. Rather than acceptance, in some respects observa-tion might more accurately describe the position, although  acceptance  is  along  these  lines.  Also note that trying to eliminate a problem can result in  stress  and  struggle  that  serve  to  perpetuate  the  problem, to a large extent because the situation is being perceived as a problem. On the other hand, by relaxing into and observing the emotional state and its physical aspects (rather than bracing against it  and  wanting  to  change  it)  the  issue  is  more  directly  attuned.  This  position  can  more  deeply facilitate healing. Additionally, this helps the thera-pist and client to be less ego-involved, allowing for healing to occur on its own terms. This assumes that  ego-clinging  is  an  integral  aspect  of  the  con-dition and the suffering, even the perpetrator of it (Jigme, 2004).Psychological ReversalIn line with the foregoing and common to any therapeutic approach, resistance or other kinds of interference  can  occur.  Each  therapy  has  its  con-ceptualization of this phenomenon. Resistance can be viewed as a sign of getting into ripe therapeutic territory. Secondary gains can be factors interfer-ing  with  progress,  indicating  that  the  issue  has certain benefits that need to be addressed. Benefits may include counter beliefs such as loyalty to the family, believing that the problem affords some level of safety, the client believing that he or she deserves to have the problem, or any number of other criteria (Gallo, 2004). Also a problem in the therapeutic  relationship  is  a  systemic  interpreta-tion of resistance, perhaps indicating that the ther-apist has provoked resistance. Any of these factors will block direct access to the presenting issue and interfere with disengaging the interference.From  an  EP  perspective,  the  resistance  or interference is often referred to as “psychological reversal” (Callahan & Turbo, 2002; Gallo, 2004). The assumption here is that there exists an energy blockage or reversal of polarity or energetic flow that  prevents  effective  treatment  of  the  present-ing issue (Pasahow, Callahan, Callahan, & Rapp, 2015). This concept entails a number of permu-tations, and each of these can be seen as a non-acceptance  or  rejection  of  oneself  and  one’s circumstance.These phenomena are referred to as reversal partly because of a response to indicator muscle testing,  which  is  akin  to  ideomotor  signaling. For instance, the client attunes to an issue such as  a  phobia. Then  an  indicator  muscle,  such  as the  anterior  deltoid  or  middle  deltoid,  is  physi-cally  challenged.  Generally,  the  muscle  weak-ens (releases) in response to the stress. Then the client states, “I want to resolve this phobia” versus “I want to keep this phobia.” Without a reversal, the muscle will test strong to “wanting” to resolve the  phobia  and  weak  to  “wanting”  to  keep  it. Given a reversal, the muscle response will be in the  opposite  direction,  namely  strong  to  “want-ing” to keep the phobia. Specific EP procedures are  generally  effective  in  correcting  the  reversal  (Gallo, 2000, 2004). For example, the client taps on  the  ulnar  side  of  either  hand  (i.e.,  the  small intestine–3  acupoint)  while  verbalizing  several times, “Even though I have this problem, I deeply and completely accept myself.”Although  standard  corrections  for  psycho-logical  reversal  contain  mindfulness  elements, reversals are more congruently treated from a mind-ful  energy  psychology  perspective. The  therapist maintains an attitude of acceptance congruent with the client engaging in specific tactile stimulation while being mindful and making a self-acceptance statement and possibly also a statement of accept-ance of the issue being addressed in treatment. For example:“I  accept  myself  with  this  [name  condi-tion].”Or “I accept myself with this [name condi-tion] and I accept this [name condition].”In  some  respects,  the  transmuting  of  psy-chological  reversal  is  similar  to  the  theoretical  position  of  Carl  Rogers  (1961)  regarding  self-acceptance leading to change: “The curious para-dox is that when I accept myself just as I am, then