#Retrenchment Strategies

[easynotes4u]

Corporate Level Strategies - Growth, Diversification, Stability, Retrenchment

Today in this topic we will discuss about various corporate level Strategies such as Growth or expansion Strategies, Diversification Strategies, Stability strategies, Retrenchment Strategies, Combined Strategies.  Corporate Level Strategies Corporate-level strategies are high-level plans and actions that guide an organization’s overall direction and scope. These strategies are typically developed…

[dostoyevsky-official]

if i had to guess, one of the reasons for trump doing it is the elbridge colby (now a high-ranking figure in trump ii) et al. strategy of US retrenchment from all the conflicts that don't matter to focus on war with china

[mariacallous]

There’s a strange notion going around that U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s foreign-policy picks reveal something about his likely approach to international affairs. Establishment types are reassured that hawkish nominees, like Sen. Marco Rubio as secretary of state and Rep. Mike Waltz as national security advisor, will ultimately counsel the right thing when it comes to staring down Russia and China. Restrainers, MAGAteers, and left-wingers draw comfort that former Reps. Tulsi Gabbard, Trump’s nominee for director of national intelligence, and Matt Gaetz, as attorney general, will shape a policy of retrenchment, persuading the president to withdraw resources from areas where no vital U.S. interests are at stake.

If you’re experiencing déjà vu, that sense is well-founded. For the same genre of think piece was everywhere in 2016 and after, as opinion writers projected their angst, hopes, and dreams into extrapolating meaning from Trump’s waves of appointments and firings. Mike Flynn, Rex Tillerson, James Mattis, H.R. McMaster were the collective tea leaves at the bottom of the cup, read to reveal the future of U.S. foreign policy. The metaphor is apt, as these attempts generally had the same predictive prowess as tea leaves, fortune cookies, and palm reading. All operated on the premise that Trump was susceptible to advice. We should really know better by now.

There was no significant advisory influence on Trump’s last presidency, and it is unlikely that his second term will be any different. Occasionally, his instincts overlapped with his advisors—such as Tillerson on improving relations with Saudia Arabia or with National Security Advisor John Bolton on withdrawing from the Iranian nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration. But these moments of unity were fleeting. If there is one common, mournful thread sewn through the memoirs of Trump’s first-term appointments, it is frustration at being treated disdainfully by a president who simply did not listen.

Tillerson lasted 13 months as secretary of state before Trump fired him in a social media post. The two clashed on North Korea, Russia, China, Iran, and the Paris climate agreement. After firing him, Trump posted on X, then known as Twitter, that Tillerson “didn’t have the mental capacity needed. He was dumb as a rock and I couldn’t get rid of him fast enough. He was lazy as hell.” Tillerson allegedly described Trump as a “fucking moron.” And this was one of Trump’s more productive working relationships.

Trump could not forgive H.R. McMaster for suggesting that Russia interfered in the 2016 election. Aghast at Trump’s imperviousness to advice that challenged his simplistic worldview, McMaster described Oval Office meetings as “exercises in competitive sycophancy” in a book published earlier this year.

“Trump was not following any international grand strategy, or even a consistent trajectory,” Bolton wrote in his 2020 book, “His thinking was like an archipelago of dots (like individual real estate deals) leaving the rest of us to discern—or create—policy.” It’s a sharp critique that overestimates Bolton’s capacity for creation, given that the only substantive thing on which they agreed was withdrawing from the Iranian nuclear deal. Trump responded by describing Bolton in a social media post as “a disgruntled boring fool who only wanted to go to war. Never had a clue, was ostracized & happily dumped. What a dope!”

So what of the Trump class of 2025? Might Rubio, Waltz, Gabbard, and Gaetz succeed in becoming Aristotle to Alexander the Great, where everyone else has failed? It’s no stretch to imagine Trump’s attack line against Bolton being used against Rubio after an acrimonious firing. Rubio subscribes to Madeleine Albright’s notion that the United States is an “indispensable nation” and has been a steadfast interventionist since his arrival in national politics. Trump lambasted those hawkish instincts when he crushed “little Marco” in his 2016 campaign. They agree on a more confrontational approach to Beijing, but substantively and temperamentally, they are as well matched as Trump and McMaster. Waltz falls into a similar category.

Gabbard, Gaetz, and Pete Hegseth (Trump’s pick for defense secretary) possess more Trumpian “America First” instincts than Rubio or Waltz. Gabbard has said generous things about Russian President Vladimir Putin in the past, and Gaetz and Hegseth want to wind down the war in Ukraine. Hegseth, who describes himself as a “recovering neocon,” is a culture warrior who will ban transgender people from serving in the military and gut diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives. All of that is so far so good in Trump world. But beyond a shared hostility to China and support for slowly closing the taps that supply Ukraine, these relationships could blow up in any number of ways. Gabbard, Gaetz, and Hegseth are high-profile, headline-grabbing individuals, who will drain attention from the president. Trump prefers to stand alone on the stage, illuminated by a single spotlight.

No matter which individuals end up in the roles, Trump’s ultimate pick as national security advisor, secretary of defense, and secretary of state will be himself. There will be no éminence grise, no Dean Acheson or Henry Kissinger guiding his hand and restraining his worst instincts. Everything that transpired during his first term in office suggests this will be the case.

But this situation is hardly unique. Other U.S. presidents have also served as their own secretary of state. After a shaky start, involving a hugely volatile meeting with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961, President John F. Kennedy followed his judgment, declined dangerous advice, and demonstrated leadership during the Cuban missile crisis. President Ronald Reagan’s second-term conciliation toward Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev disappointed bellicose members of his administration and helped create conditions that allowed Gorbachev to end the Cold War. President Barack Obama’s administration was more focused on what it was not (President George W. Bush’s “war on terror”) than what it was for. But there is little doubt that Obama’s pragmatic voice was the dominant one in foreign policy. In memoirs and interviews, his former advisors have expressed more than enough frustration to back this up.

Trump’s operating style and personality attributes are far removed from those of Kennedy, Reagan, and Obama. His first-term shift from lambasting Kim Jong Il as “rocket man” to desperately seeking rapprochement with North Korea gestures at an aspect of his personality—the dealmaking part—that might potentially translate into something meaningful in foreign policy. Just as President Richard Nixon went to China, one cannot entirely discount the possibility that Trump might achieve a substantive breakthrough that takes all observers by surprise—such as a deal with Iran. For all his bluster, Trump appears to understand that war, particularly the type of conflict currently raging in economically sensitive locales, is bad for the U.S. economy.

But we should be careful not to draw comfort from even a fistful of grasped straws. Trump’s narrow transactional style, the absence of empathy, and his short-termism all make it hard to make the case that, even if he does have a longer-term vision for U.S. foreign policy, he has the patience or resilience to implement it.

Regardless of what comes next, we certainly need to reckon with Trump, not his unorthodox array of proposed appointments. Bolton recently remarked that Trump demands “fealty” and not “loyalty” from those who work for him. This useful distinction reminds us to remove our analytical gaze from the vassals and train it directly at the lord.

[tanadrin]

Listening to the latest episode of Know Your Enemy on Project 2025, and thinking about the argument I’ve seen from @drethelin and others that we should judge the likely badness of a second Trump administration only or primarily on the badness of the first. This seems like the result of an understandable but incorrect affective treatment of politics. It seems like idea that the far group is essentially without agency or internal features (which also contributed to the idea it is more monolithic and thus more unified than it really is)—is essentially a force of nature to be treated as outside and irrelevant to more proximate ideological battles—contributes in this case to people assuming that a second Trump administration simply cannot be different in important features from the first. Seems like not just an error borne from lack of attentiveness to how political agents have openly stated they want and are trying to make it different, but a deliberate lack of engagement with actual political reality.

When political movements don’t get what they want, they frequently retrench and try again. If a faction contests the peaceful transfer of power and that contest fails, it seems very likely that they will try to do so again, try much harder, and in new ways. It’s not hysterical to find that worrying. Indeed, it comes off as really politically naive and detached from reality to say that that doesn’t matter, and that a political faction couldn’t possibly be serious about something it has repeatedly said it is very serious about.

It also sucks that when people did want to organize and motivate each other to oppose the Trump administration after the 2016 election, they got derided and mocked by extremely online leftists as “resistance libs.” If you don’t have faith in electoral idk as a strategy to oppose unusually lawless and corrupt administrations, surely you should support other tactics—but the favored attitude seemed to be that engaging with the far group at all was politically unserious and worthy of scorn, and, I suppose, only by defeating the liberal enemy could a wider leftist victory be won.

I dunno, though. Seems unlikely to me!

[darkmaga-returns]

Daniel Larison

Nov 25, 2024

The U.S. must retrench for the sake of its own security, but there are many domestic political obstacles that make retrenchment practically impossible under current conditions. The status quo strategy of military primacy is too deeply entrenched and there are too many established interests committed to its preservation.

To change that, there needs to be a major overhaul of America’s domestic political system and its foreign policy, and neither can succeed without the other. That is the heart of Peter Harris’ case for reform in his excellent new book, “Why America Can’t Retrench (And How It Might).”

It is essential reading for advocates of foreign policy restraint.

The first half of the book details how the U.S. adopted a strategy of military primacy and how that strategy transformed the country. Harris defines military primacy as “a grand strategy of maintaining and exploiting America’s military advantages over global and regional competitors, with a view to leveraging these structural advantages in service of favorable political and economic outcomes.”

America’s current strategy of primacy is not only ill-suited to an increasingly multipolar world, but it also represents a serious threat to the security of our country by putting the United States on potential collision course with great power rivals. As Harris puts it, “Even if it is accepted that primacy made some sense during the so-called ‘unipolar moment’…it cannot be argued that the same unilateralist policies are suited to a world that can punch back.”

The U.S. needs a less ambitious and dangerous strategy, and to get to it the U.S. needs retrenchment. Retrenchment is simply “the reduction of overseas forces and security obligations.”

[tsllegalmalaysia]

The Role of Employment Law in Navigating Industrial Relations

At TSL Malaysia, our team of employment law specialists in Malaysia provides expert legal advice and representation for businesses and employees. Whether you need guidance on compliance, contract drafting, dispute resolution, or retrenchment strategies, we are here to help. Contact us today for professional legal support in navigating Malaysia’s employment laws.

[funddecode]

📊 Choosing the Right Corporate Strategy Every business journey calls for a different path— 🔼 Growth when you're scaling ⚖️ Stability when you’re consolidating 🔽 Retrenchment when it's time to realign

Which phase is your business in right now?

[elegantassassinelement]

U.S. Isolationism and "Abandoning Europe": The Restructuring of Global Order Under Hegemonic Logic 

#isolationism #trump’s us isolationism #abandon europe

I. The Century-Old Gene of Isolationism and Its Contemporary Mutation 

Isolationism is not an invention of the Trump era but a strategic tradition deeply embedded in America’s diplomatic DNA. Since George Washington articulated the principle of "avoiding entanglements with European politics" in his 1796 Farewell Address, isolationism has oscillated between imperial expansion and strategic retrenchment. Its core logic lies in preserving strength during relative national decline or excessive intervention costs. The Trump administration’s "America First" policy represents both continuity and mutation of this tradition—superficially withdrawing from international commitments like the Paris Agreement and Iran Nuclear Deal (exemplified by the 2020 WHO withdrawal), while strategically reallocating resources to Indo-Pacific competition with China through transactional diplomacy. 

Unlike classical isolationism, its contemporary iteration exhibits "selective disengagement": militarily demanding NATO allies raise defense spending to 5% of GDP and assume greater responsibilities (evidenced by excluding the EU from the 2025 U.S.-Russia Riyadh talks), economically launching trade wars against Europe (25% tariffs imposed in February 2025), yet intensifying global interventions in tech containment and supply chain restructuring. This "aggressive isolationism" embodies a hegemonic cost-shifting strategy, compelling European self-reliance to alleviate U.S. strategic overextension. 

II. Europe’s Decline: Structural Crisis and Geopolitical Shockwaves 

U.S. strategic contraction has triggered Europe’s "cliff-like" erosion of global influence. Economically, the EU’s share of global GDP shrank from 19.27% in 2022 to 17.3% in 2025, overtaken by China. Technologically, Europe lacks AI giants to rival OpenAI and lags in the green energy revolution. More critically, its security dependency persists: 78% of NATO defense budgets rely on U.S. funding (2024 data), marginalizing the EU in mediating the Ukraine conflict. Europe’s exclusion from the 2025 Riyadh negotiations exposed its role as a pawn in great-power games. 

Three structural contradictions underpin Europe’s crisis: 

1. Welfare-state erosion and industrial hollowing: Manufacturing value-added plummeted from 18% (2000) to 12% (2025). 

2. Fragmented decision-making: Unanimous votes among 27 members delayed gas price caps for 11 months during the Russia sanctions. 

3. Clash between values and interests: Macron’s "strategic autonomy" clashes with German pro-U.S. factions, deepening reliance on China—EU-China trade surged 40% (2022-2025), with Huawei’s 5G market share exceeding 35%. 

III. Global Order Fracturing and Multipolar Acceleration 

The U.S. "abandonment" of Europe accelerates global realignment: 

• Militarily: NATO faces existential crisis as U.S. European Command troop levels drop 40% to 30,000 by 2025, forcing Franco-German "European Army" initiatives despite budget disputes. 

• Economically: RCEP and BRICS expansion (15 members by 2025) challenge dollar hegemony, with RMB reserves in the EU rising to 12%. 

Russia and China emerge as primary beneficiaries: 

• Russia: Energy "eastward pivot" boosts China trade to 35%, while expanding influence via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 

• China: The Digital Silk Road consolidates footholds in Hungary and Serbia, circumventing U.S. tech blockades (7nm chip breakthroughs despite export controls costing $23 billion in 2024). 

IV. Historical Lessons and Future Scenarios 

History shows isolationism never achieves true insulation. The 19th-century high tariffs bred Civil War tensions, while pre-WWII neutrality failed to prevent Pearl Harbor. Today’s U.S. "offshore balancing" struggles to sustain unipolarity as the Global South demands climate justice and BRICS lending surpasses the World Bank. 

Three trajectories may define the next decade: 

1. Europe’s "limited autonomy": Rapid-response forces emerge but remain NATO-dependent. 

2. Indo-Pacific "dual-core rivalry": ASEAN adopts hedging strategies amid U.S.-China competition. 

3. Fragmented multilateralism: WTO stagnation vs. 589 regional trade pacts (2025). 

Ultimately, U.S. isolationism is not retreat but tactical recalibration of hegemony. Its success hinges on rewriting global rules amid decline—a defining challenge of 21st-century power politics. 

Insights: The essence of U.S. isolationism and Europe’s decline lies in a hegemon’s cost-control tactics during relative decline. For China, this presents strategic opportunities to deepen South-South cooperation while guarding against systemic risks in governance vacuums—where "America First" collides with "European autonomy," conflict may find fertile ground.

[kanchankhatanaa]

Corporate Law – A Model for Peaceful Industrial Relations

Tata Steel, headquartered in Jamshedpur, is widely regarded as a pioneer in fostering strong industrial relations in India. The company’s partnership with the Tata Workers' Union (TWU) dates back several decades and has been marked by trust, mutual respect, and a proactive approach to labor welfare. Both parties have consistently engaged in collective bargaining to address wage issues, working conditions, and employee welfare schemes without significant disruptions. Tata Steel emphasizes transparent communication, regular consultations, and institutionalized grievance redressal mechanisms. These efforts have been embedded into their Standing Orders, ensuring compliance with the Industrial Employment Act, 1946. The company also promotes participatory management practices, allowing workers a voice in decision-making forums, especially around productivity and workplace safety. Unlike many companies that face frequent strikes or lockouts, Tata Steel has maintained industrial peace through voluntary wage settlements and long-term collective agreements. These are often reached without third-party intervention, demonstrating a mature labor-management relationship. The strong presence of a recognized trade union and the company's commitment to social dialogue have helped preempt industrial disputes. Employment law principles such as fair wages, equitable treatment, and non-discriminatory practices are upheld through continuous dialogue. Provisions from the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—particularly concerning layoffs, retrenchment, and unfair labor practices—are rarely invoked due to proactive dispute avoidance strategies. Tata Steel’s case is a model for Indian companies aiming to balance business growth and employee satisfaction. It demonstrates that investment in structured labor relations and effective use of collective bargaining and welfare policies leads to sustainable industrial harmony.

[nursingwriter]

Suicide Rates of suicide for adults between 35 and 64 years in the United States According to date from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC&P), suicide rates among adults aged between 35 and 64 years are on the rise. The period from 1999 -- 2010 saw an annual age-adjusted rate of suicide in this age bracket increase by slightly over 28%. The findings also show that the three leading methods of committing suicide are use of firearms, poisoning and suffocation. In suffocation, hanging was the predominant method while in poisoning drug overdose was the most predominant method. Findings from this period show that the greatest increase in suicide methods was in hanging which saw an 81% increase while poisoning and firearms saw a 24% and 14% increase respectively Sullivan, Annest, Luo, Simon, & Dahlberg, 2013() According to the report, men were 2 -- 3 times more likely to commit suicide than women. Rates increased for both men and women in the age bracket of 35 -- 64 years increased considerably. For men, the suicide rate increased from 21.5 to 27.3 per 100,000 people, representing a 27.3% increase while for women, it increased from 6.2 to 8.1 per 100,000 people representing a 31.5% increase. For both men and women, the findings show that the rates of suicide increased with age. Men aged between 50 and 59 years were more likely to commit suicide compared to other age group while for women, the largest increase in suicide rates was in the 60 -- 64 years age group Sullivan et al., 2013() Factors likely to contribute to increasing suicide rates According to Luo, Florence, Quispe-Agnoli, Ouyang, & Crosby, 2011(Sullivan et al. (2013) , the economic downturn that may people have been facing in the period between 1999 and 2010 is likely to cause the rise in suicide rates. Since earlier decades, higher rates of suicide have been seen during periods of poor financial performance and economic setbacks ) . It is thus expected that with the poor economic performance as a result of the recession, more people are likely to suffer financial strain causing them to commit suicide. Unemployment is also a risk factor in suicides. Reeves et al. (2012) show the relationship between increased unemployment and rise in suicide rates by showing that 25% of the excess suicides that happen every year can be attributed to unemployment. The authors state that other factors such as loss of jobs, income losses as a result of retrenchment or redundancy, or foreclosures are modifying factors in suicides. Increased availability of opioid drugs such as hydrocodone (Vicodin), oxycodone, morphine and OxyContin are a major factor in the rise in suicide rates. These drugs have compounds that act on the body and are often deadly when used in large or frequent doses. More people can also access firearms such as guns which create easy access to firearms for committing suicide. Gun control policies have often been relaxed to allow more people to become licensed gun holders and this has caused this problem. Strategies used to prevent suicide Paying attention to mental health needs of persons classified as suicidal is important in preventing suicide. The CDC&P points at the baby boomer generation and states that since this generation had high rates of suicide as adolescents, this explains the increased middle age suicides. Therefore there is need to pay attention to this group and others who are more vulnerable to suicidal effects. These strategies will inform efforts to reduce stigma as a result of attempted suicide and eliminate barriers associated with seeking help Tanskanen et al., 2000. This strategy is often effective since it promotes public awareness of suicide and encourages individuals to commit to social change. There is also need to monitor emotional difficulties in this vulnerable group. Emotions such as stress and depression are precedents of suicide. Therefore there is need to encourage and counsel these individuals in order to prevent suicides. This strategy is often effective since it involves recognizing and reducing the factors that increase risk of suicide. It also fosters positive communication and dialogue and counters shame and prejudice which comes from stressful or depressing events Jr., 1999() Another strategy that is often effective in preventing suicide is promoting policy, systems and environmental changes that facilitate suicide prevention Flavin & Radcliff, 2009. These include increased scrutiny on prescriptions of opioids and increasing gun control policies to reduce access to firearms. These strategies promote public health and reduce access to lethal mechanisms of committing suicide. Alternative strategies that can be used to prevent suicide Increasing surveillance of suicidal behaviors is an important strategy in the prevention of suicides. This is because it ensures that the vulnerable people are identified early and that they receive mental health care and counseling to help prevent suicide. There is also need for the government to integrate prevention of suicide into reforms of the health care system. This will encourage the private sector to adopt similar measures thus helping to create a positive net effect on reduction of suicide rates. This can be done by increasing the proficiency of the health care workers to respond so suicidal people through crisis counseling. There are other specific strategies that are available in prevention of suicide. One is reducing access to mechanisms of suicide to the vulnerable group. This includes keeping away toxic substances, ropes and belts that can be used for hanging and firearms. Reducing domestic violence and abuse of drugs are also effective long-term strategies in preventing suicide since they prevent mental health problems Bearman, 1991() Pharmacies or local drug stores can also play a part in preventing suicide by reducing the amount of drugs supplied in packages of non-prescription medicines that can be used in committing suicide such as aspirin. Health and community education programs regarding suicide and its risk factors can help to identify early warning signs easily and also increase the number of people requesting for help about suicidal tendencies Booth, Briscoe, & Powell, 2000() References Bearman, P.S. (1991). The Social Structure of Suicide. Sociological Forum, 6(3), 501-524. doi: 10.2307/684516 Booth, N., Briscoe, M., & Powell, R. (2000). Suicide in the Farming Community: Methods Used and Contact with Health Services. Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 57(9), 642-644. https://www.paperdue.com/customer/paper/suicide-rates-of-suicide-for-adults-between-126715#:~:text=Logout-,SuicideRatesofsuicideforadultsbetween,-Length3pages Flavin, P., & Radcliff, B. (2009). Public Policies and Suicide Rates in the American States. Social Indicators Research, 90(2), 195-209. Jr, T.E.J. (1999). The Clustering and Contagion of Suicide. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 8(3), 89-92. Luo, F., Florence, C.S., Quispe-Agnoli, M., Ouyang, L., & Crosby, A.E. (2011). Impact of Business Cycles on U.S. Suicide Rates, 1928 -- 2007. American Journal of Public Health, 101(6), 1139-1146. Reeves, A., Stuckler, D., McKee, M., Gunnell, D., Chang, S.-S., & Basu, S. (2012). Increase in state suicide rates in the U.S.A. during economic recession. The Lancet, 380(9856), 1813-1814. Sullivan, E.M., Annest, J.L., Luo, F., Simon, T.R., & Dahlberg, L.L. (2013). Suicide Among Adults Aged 35-64 Years -- United States, 1999-2010. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, May 3(2013). Tanskanen, A., Tuomilehto, J., Viinamaki, H., Vartiainen, E., Lehtonen, J., & Puska, P. (2000). Heavy Coffee Drinking and the Risk of Suicide. European Journal of Epidemiology, 16(9), 789-791. Read the full article

[literaturereviewhelp]

The Enlightenment Era depicted advancement in numerous philosophies that contrasted with those of theMedieval Age. Apparently, Joseph Wright painted different portraits, which embraced scientific instruments while still suggesting other social theories such as rationalism and secularism. For example, enlightenment issues are evident in the portrait called “An Experiment on a Bird in the Air Pump." It is arguable that the oil on canvas painting approach and the determination to develop a knowledge-bound artwork led to the inclusion of love and other relationships in the setting (Conrad 920). Further, the portrait implemented the possibility for the society to learn and embrace science in their households. The attentiveness of the characters in the portrait acknowledges the emphasis that the natural philosophers in the age endeavored in the distribution of knowledge to the society despite the aspect of age. The use of candle light in the setting depicts similarities to Wright’s 1796 portrait, “Dressing the Kitten”. It is realistic that the aspects of freedom and cosmology appear in the two paintings with the use of a candle, the rare cockatoo among other factors. The theme of tolerance and freedom is present in the portrait as the artist depicts the use of an air pump in the creation of an airless vacuum (Schmidt 4). The process leads to the death of the cockatoo with the characters depicted therein failing to show concern or passion. The two factors are shown in the second portrait as the two characters who could be siblings attend to a kitten without any show of emotions towards the kitten’s comfort. Part 2 Fuseli, “The Nightmare,” 1781 The Nightmare portrait is an exemplary artwork that presents Henry Fuseli’s expertise. The painting is available in the American Detroit Institute of Arts with informative records depicting its dimensions as measuring 40 inches by 50 inches (Dow 61).   OR Compensation is one of the vital tools used by the human resource managers in an organization to manage their employees. In the modern day context, it has become imperative for an organization to possess an appropriate compensation system which is closely related with the employees’ performances. It is worth mentioning that effective compensation system helps an organization to motivate and to retain skilled employees which further ensures higher productivity along with greater profitability for the organization. It is not very important that the compensation system of an organization is aligned with the goals and the objectives of the organization but it should mandatorily be designed according to the human resource strategy of an organization. It is often expensive for an organization to hire new and skilled employees. Moreover, the frequent recruitment and retrenchment of employees may also have a significant impact on the current employees and on the organizational energy and motivational level. Additionally, by ignoring the issue of compensation, it does not go away or get better with the passage of time but will require valuable time and money to fix the system (Salanova & Kirmanen, 2010). In the highly dynamic business environment, successful organizations are constantly engaged in regular planning and evaluation of their compensation and performance appraisal systems. Thus, compensation system is a critical factor that directly influences the performance of the employees and the organization. Accordingly, an organization should ensure that it has clear and visible compensation system that is being regularly communicated to its employees which further acts as a motivational factor for the organization (Salanova & Kirmanen, 2010). Intrinsic Compensation According to Hamel (2008), “intrinsic compensations are derived from the workplace itself and are valued internally by the employee. These include opportunities for personal growth, quality of work life, job satisfaction, challenges, personal and professional development opportunities, a sense of belongingness, freedom to act visionary leadership” (Hamel, 2008, pp. 3). In other words, intrinsic compensation can be defined as those activities which have an influence on the intellectual, emotional and physical wellbeing of organizational employees. In the present highly dynamic business environment, intrinsic compensation plays a crucial role in motivating and retaining skilled employees in an organization.   Read the full article

[mariacallous]

Over the past three and a half years, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris has faithfully echoed her boss, U.S. President Joe Biden, by invoking pretty much the same hegemonic worldview that every American president has embraced since World War II. As Harris put it in a 2023 speech—quoting a favorite phrase of Biden’s—“a strong America remains indispensable to the world.”

But the United States may be downgraded to a humbler status if Harris is elected president in November, based on the thinking of her chief advisors.

In their written work, Harris’s national security advisor, Philip Gordon, and deputy national security advisor, Rebecca Lissner, have sketched the outlines of a new worldview in which Washington frankly acknowledges its past excesses and dramatically lowers its ambitions. Or as Lissner put it in An Open World: How America Can Win the Contest for 21st Century Order, the 2020 book she coauthored with another Biden administration official: The United States should give up on strategic primacy and the “increasingly obsolete post-Cold War ‘liberal international order.’”

Instead of seeking to remain the unquestioned hegemon, the United States should seriously downsize its global role, wrote Lissner and her co-author, Mira Rapp-Hooper, who is currently Biden’s National Security Council director for East Asia and Oceania. It’s past time for Washington to discard the “messianic” goal of transforming the world in its image—the United States’ basic policy approach going back to Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Harry Truman. Instead, it should ratchet down to a much narrower role: merely preserving an open global system in which the United States can prosper.

“As the unipolar moment wanes, so too must any illusions of the United States’ ability to craft order unilaterally and universally according to its own liberal preferences,” Lissner and Rapp-Hooper wrote. “Insisting upon the United States’ international leadership role but departing from reliance on primacy as the cornerstone of a messianic liberal mission, a strategy of openness departs from post-Cold War liberal universalism, Cold War-style containment, and the traditional alternative of retrenchment.”

This new approach would mean a lot of accommodation of autocratic and illiberal regimes and a discarding of ideological crusades or containment strategies—all in the pragmatic interest of keeping trade open and bolstering cooperation on critical issues such as climate change, future pandemics, and artificial intelligence regulation. To put it simply, Lissner and Rapp-Hooper argued that policies of containment and hegemony should be supplanted by the far more modest goal of ensuring an “accessible global commons.” The United States has one critical task left as the “indispensable” superpower, they wrote: It is “the only country that can guarantee an open system.”

Gordon would likely agree—at least about leaving behind, at long last, the messianic strain in U.S. foreign policy. His own 2020 book, Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East, is a fierce dissection of various failed U.S. efforts in the region dating back 70 years to the CIA-orchestrated ouster of Iranian President Mohammad Mossadegh.

Though he lumped in Afghanistan—which is technically in central Asia—with the failed U.S. interventions in Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria, Gordon was right to see a common theme: regime change almost never works. And like the proverbial lunatic who tries the same thing over and over thinking he might get a different result, U.S. policymakers never seem to learn the right lessons, he argued.

In every case, from 1953 (Mossadegh), to two disastrous episodes in Afghanistan (the 1980s and post-9/11), to the catastrophic invasion of Iraq in 2003, and to fitful efforts in Egypt, Libya, and Syria after the 2011 Arab Spring, Gordon identified a pattern.

“As different as each episode was, and as varied as were the methods used, the history of regime change in the post-World War II Middle East is a history of repeated patterns,” he wrote, “in which policymakers underestimated the challenges of ousting a regime, overstated the threat faced by the United States, embraced the optimistic narratives of exiles or local actors with little power and vested interests, prematurely declared victory, failed to anticipate the chaos that would inevitably ensue after regime collapse, and ultimately found themselves bearing the costs—in some cases more than a trillion dollars and thousands of American lives—for many years or even decades to come.”

Gordon noted that critics, especially the few remaining neoconservatives in Washington, would argue that in some cases regime change had worked very well. This is most notably true in the case of postwar Germany and Japan. But he argued persuasively that these were unique circumstances: two highly advanced countries after a devastating world war. And had it not been for the strange annealing effect of the subsequent 40-year-long Cold War, even the successful transformations of Germany and Japan might not have worked as completely as they did because U.S. patience would have grown thin very quickly—as it has in subsequent cases. A faster U.S. withdrawal from Europe and Japan might well have undercut the effort to fundamentally change Berlin and Tokyo.

Grim and exhaustive as Gordon’s assessment is, it actually understates the case for change. That’s because, added all together, these failed U.S. attempts at transformation contributed mightily to the growing obsolescence of the current liberal international order that so concerns Lissner and Rapp-Hooper.

The history that Gordon recounts is a history that keeps on giving. Today the number-one menace keeping the United States tied down in the Middle East is the very same Islamic Republic of Iran that rose to power fueled by its opposition to the American “Great Satan,” produced by the 1953 coup and empowered by the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In fact, a U.S. Army study completed in 2018 found that “an emboldened and expansionist Iran appears to be the only victor” in George W. Bush’s Iraq war—the exact opposite of what Bush and his neoconservatives sought.

The vicious spiral set in motion by these misguided policy choices undermined U.S. legitimacy—or its primacy, to use Lissner’s and Rapp-Hooper’s term—as global overseer. The unnecessary and fraudulently justified invasion of Iraq, and the drain on U.S. resources and attention that resulted, laid the groundwork for Washington’s 20-year failure in Afghanistan (which led to Biden’s declaration in August 2021 that he was putting an end to “major military operations to remake other countries,” which of course put the president in accord with Gordon’s advice). The Iraq catastrophe also exposed U.S. military vulnerabilities on the ground in the worst way, tutoring Russia, China, and the rest of the world in how to outmaneuver and fight what was once considered an unassailable superpower. Moreover, the Iraq and Afghanistan debacles projected an image of panicky U.S. retreat, from which Russian President Vladimir Putin may have drawn encouragement to invade Ukraine. (Putin also invoked the unilateral U.S. invasion of Iraq to justify his own aggression in Ukraine.)

As counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen wrote in his book, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West, also released in 2020, the rising challenge to U.S. hegemony from countries such as China and Russia is linked to the United States’ “repeated failure to convert battlefield victory into strategic success or to translate that success into a better peace.” Over the past two decades, the lone superpower has allowed itself to get bogged down in a “seemingly endless string of continuous, inconclusive wars that have sapped [its] energy while [its] rivals prospered,” Kilcullen wrote.

And so the postwar international system, at least as once conceived, went down the tube as Beijing and Moscow began to declare that U.S. hegemony was no longer acceptable to them.

Beyond that, these failures helped to create the deep divisions in the American polity that led Lissner and Rapp-Hooper to conclude that traditional U.S. leadership is no longer tenable. Together these titanic errors of policy also helped to discredit the political establishment in Washington and open the way for former U.S. President Donald Trump and his “America First” neo-isolationism.

There were, to be sure, other U.S. failures that undermined U.S. legitimacy as global leader, Lissner and Rapp-Hooper wrote—especially the 2008 financial disaster generated by Wall Street greed and the fecklessness of Washington regulators. But it’s clear that—far more than any fundamental flaws within the international system itself—it was largely the excesses of America’s postwar agenda and the arrogance with which it was pursued that squandered the world’s trust.

Gordon didn’t go quite as far as Lissner and Rapp-Hooper in his conclusions. Known as a passionate trans-Atlanticist—he served as assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs in the Obama administration—Gordon acknowledged that “the regime change temptation will never go away.” He wrote: “The bias of American political culture, resulting from the country’s record of achievement and belief in its own exceptionalism, is to believe every problem has a solution.” Rather than reconfiguring U.S. policy entirely, he suggested that in most cases when it comes to rogue regimes “the best alternative to regime change looks a lot like the Containment strategy that won the Cold War.”

So where does this all leave us? There’s no use trying to unwind history and restore the old system. In many ways, despite their different conclusions, Gordon’s and Lissner’s books fit together like two big pieces of a puzzle: Thanks to the policy disasters detailed by Gordon (in which he took part, as a National Security Council official under then-President Barack Obama), some sort of humbler approach, along the lines proposed by Lissner and Rapp-Hooper, may be needed. And this strategy will likely be bipartisan to some degree.

Indeed, in their writings there is little doubt that Gordon and Lissner—the two chief foreign policy advisors to the woman who could soon be the next U.S. president—are in the process of codifying, perhaps for decades to come, the anti-interventionist impulse becoming ingrained in both political parties.

If Trump is elected instead of Harris, of course, he’s unlikely to embrace Lissner’s strategy of openness—at least not openly. (Trump continues to rhetorically demean U.S. allies and tout new tariffs as his main foreign-policy instrument.) What Trump is likely to do, however, is to continue to downgrade the United States’ global policeman role. Trump was instrumental in setting in motion the withdrawal from Afghanistan and, as Gordon wrote, also eager to pull out of Syria. Indeed, it is striking that after five years of dithering by Obama over whether to help the Syrian rebels, it was Trump who best put his finger on the problem. He questioned why the United States was helping to topple Syria’s dictatorial leader, Bashar al-Assad, when, as Gordon quoted Trump as saying, “Syria was fighting ISIS, and you have to get rid of ISIS. … Now we’re backing rebels against Syria, and we have no idea who these people are.”

Lissner and Rapp-Hooper’s prescriptions may be ambitious, but at the same time they are refreshingly modest in scope. Nothing has gotten Washington into more trouble over the decades than its continuing eruptions of hubristic policy. These extended from Wilson’s quixotic desire to make the world “safe for democracy” after World War I to then-Defense Department official Paul Wolfowitz’s uber-hawkish defense policy guidance from 1992, which embraced a frank post-Cold War policy of preventing the rise of rival military powers. It was this sort of thinking by Wolfowitz and his fellow neoconservatives that later helped justify the Iraq War.

Lissner and Rapp-Hooper’s open world concept also jibes with the changing calculus of our times: In economic terms, the divide between left and right wing is all but gone; instead, as Fareed Zakaria wrote in his 2024 book, Age of Revolutions, for the two political parties the old left versus right divide has been replaced by a struggle between those who want to keep the United States open to the world versus those who want to close it down more than ever. It is no accident that trade skeptics on the progressive left in the United States have come to lionize Trump’s former trade representative, Robert Lighthizer, for his tariff policies. (In his 2023 book, No Trade is Free, Lighthizer makes a point of thanking U.S. union leaders and acknowledging Lori Wallach—a progressive trade expert—as “a longtime friend and co-conspirator.”)

So Lissner and Rapp-Hooper may have chosen just the right battlefield to die on—or not. If we can salvage some degree of openness, we can save something of the old system. As they wrote: “Openness does not, of course, incorporate the totality of American strategic objectives. Other threats, like nuclear proliferation, disease, or terrorism, may menace vital U.S. interests. Yet closed spheres of influence—whether exercised regionally or in particular domains—present the greatest danger to the United States’ security and prosperity” because they preclude necessary international cooperation.

Another fundamental problem that Lissner and Rapp-Hooper hint at is that the United States may no longer be up to the task of fully managing the international system it created. There is a growing mismatch between the complexity of this world system and the level of knowledge in the U.S. populace because of laggard education and dysfunctional political systems. Americans may simply no longer understand the system—how global free trade works, how military alliances keep them safe—well enough to maintain it. At the very least, Americans now have very little sympathy for that system.

The United States’ domestic polarization may also wreak havoc on some of the solutions Lissner and Rapp-Hooper propose. The authors propose a plan to “harness the private sector for national advantage” and bring the tech sector and Washington closer together. “The next administration should consider elevating the Office of Science and Technology Policy to a National Emerging Technology Council (NETC) on par with the National Security Council and National Economic Council,” they write. Yet the leaders of the United States’ tech sector have long tried to keep their distance from Washington—especially on defense policy–except for a few oddball pairings such as Elon Musk and Donald Trump.

Perhaps the most fundamental question is whether the international system is really as obsolete as Lissner and Rapp-Hooper suggested. Yes, many problems the duo analyzed four years ago remain, including the increasing irrelevance of the World Trade Organization. But some of their views are dated. Lissner and Rapp-Hooper tended to echo the fears of Biden’s national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, and Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, who warned in a 2019 essay in Foreign Affairs, “Competition Without Catastrophe,” of the menace of “China’s fusion of authoritarian capitalism and digital surveillance.” Similarly, Lissner and Rapp-Hooper wrote that “China is at the forefront of a new model of ‘techno-authoritarianism’ that could confer considerable competitive advantages.” Yet in the four years since the book’s publication, it’s become far clearer that China under President Xi Jinping has only fallen behind thanks to this new model, with its economy seriously stagnating and Xi pleading for more foreign investment.

Moreover, in the wake of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Washington has been forced to revert, to some extent, to its old role of global enforcer. This has proved especially true as the European Union has fallen behind the U.S. economically. As the Carnegie Endowment concludes in a new report that highlights how difficult it is to bring about strategic change in U.S. foreign policy, “the administration’s response to that crisis has been to expand America’s security role in Europe and thereby create a new status quo.” Much the same can be said of the United States’ role in the Middle East following Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel, as Biden found himself sending carriers and submarines to the Mediterranean and forced to defend Israel from the air.

Yet we are also clearly moving into some kind of a new anti-interventionist era wherein Washington’s default mode—regardless of who occupies the White House—will be to stay out of global conflicts wherever and however possible. And it seems likely that if Harris wins, Gordon and Lissner will be major players. Gordon, to be sure, is more of a traditionalist who would be reluctant to tamper too much with the United States’ global security role. But it’s noteworthy that Lissner had a significant role drafting Biden’s national security strategy—and yet she chose to join the vice president’s staff in 2022 to influence policy for the next generation.

Asked whether Harris embraces Gordon’s and Lissner’s views, an aide to the vice president said only that Harris “is advised by a range of people with diverse views, and their previous writings reflect their personal views. Anyone looking to understand the vice president’s worldview should look at what she has said and done on the world stage.”

As for Harris’s current superior, perhaps Biden’s most enduring legacy—one that a President Harris would surely continue—will be that he sought to conduct a sort of halfway-house foreign policy that bridges the global policeman era and this new era of restraint. Biden has also attempted to find a workable compromise between the old consensus on globalization and the emerging cross-party consensus in favor of protectionism and industrial policy. As foreign-policy expert Jessica T. Mathews argued in Foreign Affairs, Biden has “unambiguously left behind the hubris of the ‘unipolar moment’ that followed the Cold War, proving that the United States can be deeply engaged in the world without military action or the taint of hegemony.”

At the same time, however, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Hamas’s attack on Israel, Biden has often gone back to invoking the old postwar view of the United States’ role, calling the United States the “arsenal of democracy” (FDR’s phrase) and declaring that “American leadership is what holds the world together.”

And given the ongoing crises around the world—especially in Europe, the Middle East, and possibly East Asia if the Taiwan issue heats up—it’s highly questionable whether the United States can adjust downward when there is no other major power that even comes close to approaching Washington’s global sway. If it can, then maintaining global openness may be a worthy—and perhaps achievable—goal.

[capitalism-is-a-psychopathy]

The Apparatchik of Austerity: A Critique of Economic Retrenchment

Austerity is a siren song for economic policymakers. It promises fiscal discipline and economic stability. Yet, the reality is often starkly different.

The Allure of Austerity

Austerity measures are designed to reduce government deficits through spending cuts and tax increases. Proponents argue that these measures restore confidence in financial markets and encourage investment. The logic is simple: a leaner government leads to a more robust economy.

The Apparatchik’s Role

The term “apparatchik” refers to a loyal functionary within a political organization. In the context of austerity, it symbolizes the bureaucratic enforcement of these policies. These individuals implement austerity with unwavering dedication, often ignoring the socio-economic consequences.

Evidence of Failure

Historical evidence suggests that austerity often fails to achieve its intended outcomes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has acknowledged that austerity can lead to economic contraction rather than growth. Countries like Greece and Spain, which adopted stringent austerity measures during the Eurozone crisis, experienced prolonged recessions and skyrocketing unemployment rates.

Criticisms and Consequences

Critics argue that austerity disproportionately affects the most vulnerable. Cuts to public services, healthcare, and education exacerbate inequality and social unrest. The reduction in government spending can lead to a vicious cycle of reduced demand, lower growth, and increased debt burdens.

Pre-bunking Common Defenses

Defenders of austerity claim it is necessary for long-term stability. However, evidence shows that growth-oriented policies, such as investment in infrastructure and education, are more effective in reducing deficits. Austerity often delays recovery and increases the social cost of economic adjustment.

Calls to Action

Policymakers should consider alternative strategies. Emphasizing growth through strategic investments can lead to sustainable economic recovery. Engaging in dialogue with affected communities ensures that policies are equitable and effective.

Conclusion

Austerity, while appealing in theory, often fails in practice. The apparatchik’s unwavering commitment to these policies can lead to significant harm. A shift towards growth-oriented strategies is essential for fostering economic resilience and social equity.

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The HR Guide to Labour Law Complaince & Success

Navigating labour laws is essential for effective human resource management. Ensuring compliance promotes fair treatment of employees, minimizes legal risks, and fosters a positive workplace culture. This guide covers key labour law concepts, compliance strategies, and best practices to help HR professionals succeed.

Understanding Labour Laws

Labour laws regulate the relationship between employers and employees, covering wages, working hours, workplace safety, benefits, and employee rights. Adhering to these laws ensures compliance and promotes a fair, safe work environment. Non-compliance may result in legal actions, financial liabilities, and harm to the organization’s reputation. HR professionals must stay informed about evolving regulations to protect both employees and the organization.

Key Areas of Labour Law

1. Wages & Compensation

Minimum Wage: Sets the lowest legal pay rate, varying by industry and region.

Overtime Pay: Ensures fair compensation for hours worked beyond the standard workweek, typically at a higher rate.

Equal Pay: Prohibits wage discrimination based on gender, race, or other protected factors.

Bonuses & Incentives: Must align with labour regulations to ensure fairness and transparency.

2. Working Hours & Leave Policies

Standard Working Hours: Labour laws define limits on working hours to prevent employee burnout and ensure work-life balance.

Leave Entitlements: Employees are entitled to various types of leave, such as sick leave, maternity/paternity leave, and paid vacation, which vary by region and industry.

Rest & Breaks: Regulations mandate rest periods and lunch breaks to enhance employee well-being.

Holiday Leave: Paid holidays and special leave must be clearly outlined in employment contracts.

3. Workplace Safety & Health Regulations

Occupational Safety: Employers must ensure a safe work environment to reduce workplace injuries and health risks.

Safety Training: Employers must provide regular safety training, protective equipment, and establish emergency procedures.

Mental Health: Workplace safety laws increasingly include provisions for mental health awareness and ergonomic working conditions.

4. Employee Rights & Anti-Discrimination Laws

Anti-Discrimination: Employees are protected from discrimination based on race, gender, age, religion, or disability.

Harassment Prevention: Employers must establish anti-harassment policies and provide training to ensure a respectful work environment.

Fair Treatment: Employees have the right to privacy, fair treatment, and equal opportunities in hiring, promotions, and workplace accommodations.

5. Termination & Severance Policies

Wrongful Termination: Laws prevent unjust dismissal and require employers to follow due process in firing employees.

Notice Period & Severance Pay: Guidelines vary based on industry, contract type, and jurisdiction, but employers must comply with relevant rules.

Layoffs & Retrenchment: Legal procedures must be followed, ensuring employees receive fair compensation and support.

Exit Interviews: Documenting the termination process helps protect both parties and reduces legal risks.

Compliance Strategies for HR Professionals

1. Stay Updated with Legal Changes

Labour laws can change frequently; HR professionals must stay informed about new regulations.

Subscribe to legal newsletters, participate in HR forums, and consult legal experts to ensure compliance.

2. Develop Clear Company Policies

Employee handbooks should clearly outline company policies on wages, leave, safety, and grievance procedures.

Policies must align with local labour laws and be communicated effectively during onboarding and training.

3. Conduct Regular Audits & Training

HR audits ensure company policies align with labour laws.

Regular training for employees and management raises awareness of compliance requirements and ethical practices.

External audits by third-party professionals provide a comprehensive review of compliance practices.

4. Maintain Accurate Employee Records

Document employee work hours, wages, leave records, and performance evaluations for legal compliance.

Digital HR systems and payroll software streamline processes and maintain accurate, accessible records.

Proper documentation is essential in case of disputes or labour inspections.

5. Encourage Open Communication

Employees should feel comfortable discussing concerns or violations of labour laws without fear of retaliation.

Implement grievance redressal mechanisms, such as anonymous reporting channels, to address issues early on.

Regular feedback sessions between HR and employees help identify potential problems before they escalate.

Benefits of Labour Law Compliance

Reduced Legal Risks: Avoid lawsuits, fines, and reputational damage.

Improved Employee Satisfaction: Fair wages and safe conditions boost morale and retention.

Enhanced Employer Reputation: Ethical business practices attract top talent.

Increased Productivity: A compliant workplace fosters efficiency and success.

Financial Stability: Avoiding penalties and claims helps maintain financial health.

Conclusion

Compliance with labour laws is a fundamental aspect of effective human resource management. Businesses that adhere to labour regulations not only reduce legal risks but also create a positive workplace that improves employee well-being. A strong foundation in labour law compliance leads to sustainable growth, improved workforce engagement, and long-term success.

For businesses seeking expert guidance, professional Labour Law Advisory services can be invaluable. Transient HR offers Labour Law Compliance Services, delivering tailored solutions to help organizations stay updated with evolving labour laws while fostering a culture of fairness and transparency. Investing in legal compliance strengthens HR frameworks, enhances operational efficiency, and boosts employee satisfaction.

Looking for expert guidance on labour law compliance? Transient HR offers tailored Labour Law Compliance Services to help businesses stay legally compliant while fostering a fair and transparent work culture. https://www.transienthr.com/the-hr-guide-to-labor-law-compliance-success/

[aivolut]

Types of Corporate Strategies to Drive Growth

In today’s fast-paced business world, mastering the maze of corporate strategies is essential for success. Effective corporate strategies can propel a company forward, ensuring long-term growth and stability in a competitive landscape. Utilizing the best AI tools directory can assist businesses in identifying innovative solutions to enhance strategic decision-making.

There are various types of corporate strategies that businesses can adopt, each tailored to meet specific goals. From growth to stability and even retrenchment, understanding these strategies can help leaders navigate their organizations toward success. 

This article will explore corporate strategy examples, offering practical insights into how to effectively implement these strategies in your own business. Learn More- https://aivolut.com/types-of-corporate-strategies-to-drive-growth/