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On The Possibility of a Future Without Science

In the face of world doom at the hands of the climate crisis, many have debated what the future of the human race holds; or if there even is a future involving humans, how long that will last. To abandon the socioeconomic systems that govern modern human civilization in the hopes of discovering a more sustainable alternative is a seemingly unfeasible and impractical feat. Reform then seems to be the only likely solution. What form such reform should take, however, has been heavily debated. Is the answer to impending ecological disaster political, social, economic, or scientific in nature? Holmes Rolston III proposes a blueprint for an environmentally conscious future for the human species in his piece “The Future of Environmental Ethics,” and while many of his ideas may be contested, one truth remains untouchable. A future without science is no future at all.

Scientific research and understanding of the biosphere are essential to the sustainable development of human society. If it is deemed impossible to completely restructure the societies in which the entire human species is organized, then it seems common sense that our only choice is to keep developing and advancing ourselves but in a manner that poses the least harm to the biosphere. Rolston explains that the future will “involve resource use, sustainable development, managed landscapes, the urban and rural environments” (Rolston 564). There is no way of human life that does not involve the use and management of resources; without natural resources, there would be no living organisms. By our biological definition, humans need certain molecules and nutrients to survive and a particular environment to be best suited for reproduction. As such, Rolston contends that “sustainable development is impossible without a sustainable biosphere” (Rolston 568). Without materials to support development in the first place, there cannot be such a thing as “sustainable development.” And in order to maintain a biosphere that will continue to exist and be able to support human life generation after generation, we must first identify what it is that sustains life on Earth. Rolston quotes biological scientist Daniel Botkin when he claims that “the guide to action is our knowledge of living systems and our willingness to observe them for what they are” and “to recognize the limits of our actions” (Rolston 563). The scientific study of ecosystems will provide us with the information that we need to properly manage the environment and its resources as to best support the advancement of the human species. 

It is important to note that study alone is not enough to save planet Earth from ecological doom; regulations must be in place to mandate the eager cooperation of all individuals. Indeed, Rolston cites that “The Ecological Society of America advocates research and policy that will result in a ‘sustainable biosphere’” (Rolston 567). A combination of scientific investigation and policy is the best and most practical way to ensure a future for the human race. Nevertheless, there must first be solid information and advice to base policy on and guide the decisions of lawmakers, which science will undoubtedly provide. 

The future of the human race relies on the possibility of sustainable development, and there is no sustainable development without a sustainable biosphere supported by ecological studies and efforts. Funding for ecological research is likewise essential for the continuance of human life on planet Earth. Moreover, young scientists should be encouraged to enter the field of ecology despite the more lucrative roles available in biochemical or genetic engineering because, without plans for a sustainable future, immediate capital gain will cease to hold any real significance. Ecology and scientific research at large are responsible for the future of planet Earth and the humans who inhabit it.

Word count: 616

Citations:

Rolston III, Holmes. “The Future of Environmental Ethics.” Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 561-574.

[environmentalethicsinscience]

How Natural is Nature? And What Does This Mean for Science?

Image courtesy of the United States Geological Survey depicting planet Earth, of which there is arguably no region or corner free from human influence.

The word biology is derived from the Greek word ‘bios’ meaning ‘life’ and ‘logos’ meaning ‘study’ and is defined as the study of life or living organisms. As biology is the study of life, there is likewise not much discussion of society or human invention in the field. Ecology comes from the Greek words ‘logos’ meaning ‘study’ and eco or ‘oikos’ meaning ‘habitation’ and is defined as the branch of biology concerned with the relationship between organisms and their physical surroundings. While ecology traditionally limits its discussions of nonliving components of the environment to rocks, soil, water, and the like, there is arguably room for the inclusion of human-built structures and activity in the study. Continental philosophers such as Steven Vogel argue that human practices are what shape “nature” into what we see it as. Continental thought encourages scientists to broaden their understanding of the environment to include the products of human action and likewise bestows upon them a responsibility to protect and save the environment that humans have created.

Continental thought calls upon scientists to reconstruct their understanding of nature. In “On Environmental Philosophy and Continental Thought,” Vogel denies the separation of the physical environment from the so-called ‘artificial’ social world and contends that “the social world is perfectly real and physical; social institutions are produced and reproduced through concrete activities, and are instantiated in concrete objects every one of which has to be built, while on the other hand the practical process of building through which those institutions and objects come to be are themselves always socially organized ones” (Vogel 263). If the products of society are indeed tangible and real, then they must be considered in discussions of the physical world that we inhabit, such as scientific research on the environment. As Vogel articulates, “a philosophy of practice, then, directs our attention to the built environment, which for most of us is the environment…” (Vogel 263). We cannot separate ourselves from the communities that we have built; civilization is what supports most of human life by providing sources of income, infrastructure, ease of access to resources through marketplaces, etc. Such aspects of the regions we inhabit must then be included in ecological discussions about human interaction with the physical environment for they govern our daily lives.

Such reconstruction of the concept of nature then gives scientists, and all humans alike, a clear role in the protection of the environment. Vogel explains that “the deconstructive critiques that show the ‘constructed’ character of what we call nature have a liberatory function; they are supposed to call us to acknowledge our own entanglement in and indeed responsibility for the world we inhabit” (Vogel 264). By viewing nature as a product of human creation, scientists are forced to acknowledge how interconnected the human species is with the environment and their responsibility in protecting it. It is not enough to try to cure the ailments of our ecosystem “by asking nature or studying nature or in some other way coming to know what nature really is… because there is no way nature really is, and so naturalistic attempts to find the solution to environmental problems by reading them off from nature are doomed to fail” (Vogel 264). Scientific research without impactful action cannot be the key to solving the climate crisis that currently threatens the planet. Ecology tends to encourage a natural equilibrium whereby ecosystems run themselves without any interference from powers other than those that are organic and independent of human activity. Continental thought, however, pushes scientists to recognize that the natural world cannot regulate an environment that it did not create. Human innovation is thus the answer to environmental problems. 

Contrary to conventional ecological principles, continental philosophy contends the responsibility to find a resolution for environmental ills falls on human innovation, as the environment itself is a product of human behavior and creation. Such a notion has major implications for future scientific research. As opposed to attempting to study the “wild”  biosphere we inhabit and learn the “natural” processes that control it, scientists should focus on inventing technologies and tools to manipulate the environment which humans have produced in order to cure the symptoms of the havoc we have wreaked upon it. Researchers likewise need not worry about finding less invasive ways to study living organisms and their physical surroundings, as there is no part of nature that humans have not already had involvement in constructing. All elements of our surroundings are to be considered the environment and are likewise subject to protection via scientific invention. Continental thought has the potential to revolutionize the way we do environmental science moving forward by doing away with more passive research methodologies and encouraging more efficient and impactful technological inventions.

Word count: 787

Citations:

Vogel, Steven. “On Environmental Philosophy and Continental Thought.” Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 257-267.

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The Role of Science in the Environmental Justice Movement

In the last 30 years, the general public has started to grow a greater concern for the disproportionate distribution of environmental harms, particularly unto marginalized communities. Out of this concern grew the environmental justice movement, a social movement focused on creating and maintaining a clean and healthy environment for all. In “Environmental Justice for All” and “Environmental Justice: A National Priority,” Robert D. Bullard, Clarice E. Gaylord, and Elizabeth Bell explain the damage of environmental injustice and urge for combined efforts from multiple disciplines to find a solution to these social and environmental ills. Science has a place in the fight for environmental justice alongside many other professional fields, but scientists must actively make the decision to fight for those who have not been given a platform to speak. For scientists to make a difference in the pattern of environmental injustice, there must be a redefining of what is considered environment, a reevaluation of sources of bias in scientific research, and a greater sense of urgency from researchers themselves.

Scientists must redefine what is understood as “the environment” in the face of environmental injustice. Traditionally, science recognizes that there are biotic (i.e. living) as well as abiotic (i.e. non-living) factors that make up an ecosystem; however, manmade buildings and structures are not typically regarded as part of the environment. In order to address the issues contained within the environmental justice movement, it is crucial that the scientific community begins to move away from conventional notions of environment and “defines environment in very broad terms, as the places where people live, work, and play” (Bullard 495). If surroundings such as the places where humans inhabit and work are not considered part of the environment, then any research or efforts focused on the protection and conservation of the environment need not address the harms present in these spaces. It is likewise necessary to redefine the environment to include the surroundings that humans frequent every day so that science may address and research the issues present in these communities and work towards finding a solution.

Moreover, current studies regarding environmental injustices are often inadequate as they are subject to the biases of the researchers undertaking said studies. Very little scientific research has been done on the health effects of the environmental harms that minority communities face, and subsequently much is still unknown. A possible explanation for the lack of significant research in this area is that governments are requiring “environmental justice initiatives without authorizing specific funding to carry out these programs” (Gaylord and Bell 35). If there is a lack of government funding for research, then the work that scientists undertake to investigate environmental harms posed to certain communities will face great economic limitations. The alternative to this problem is to receive funding from private institutions, but this introduces the possibility of bias – researchers will be influenced to reach conclusions that benefit the corporations that provide monetary support for the project. Bullard underscores “the assignment of ‘acceptable’ risk, use of averages, and sitting of risky technologies (i.e. incinerators, landfills, chemical plants, smelters, etc.) often result from value judgments that serve to legitimate the imposition of inequitable social policies” due to influence from corporations (Bullard 495). It is the responsibility of individual researchers to exercise his or her moral compass and join the right side of the fight, regardless of the possible profit that is to be made. Science also has a tendency to be reductionist in that it focuses on individual data and numbers, ignoring the larger problem. In the case of environmental harms, some have highlighted that “previous risk assessments have been chemical specific and media specific and have not dealt with cumulative, synergistic effects of combined exposure. Thus risk analysis as it is currently being done has not been helpful in verifying specific risks to high-impact communities” (Gaylord and Bell 35). Scientists must abandon the disposition to focus on quantitative, measurable markers and learn to design studies that are more inclusive and encompassing. But current methodologies in scientific research have been around for centuries, and finding new experimental models will likely take years of additional trial and error that we do not have. 

Due to the fatal nature of many of the environmental harms posed to affected communities, the environmental justice movement requires that science adopts a greater sense of urgency in environmental studies. As of current, “Environmental scientists have not refined their research methodologies to assess the cumulative and synergistic effects of all of society’s poisons on the human body,” but according to Bullard, “some health problems cannot wait for the tools to catch up” (Bullard 498). Though environmental research may not be the most lucrative field to go into, lives depend on the advancement of technology in this area to better our understanding of the threat that environmental racism poses to the health of minority communities. Any delay in the investigation into environmental issues comes at the cost of human lives, and the speed of progress should reflect such severity through its urgency.

Science has the potential to play a crucial role in the environmental justice movement with the proper adjustments. Future scientific endeavors should involve a reconception of “the environment,” an analysis of the origins of bias in research, and an increase in speed to alleviate the environmental harms threatening disadvantaged demographics.

Word count: 887

Citations:

Bullard, Robert D. “Environmental Justice for All.” Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 491-501.

Gaylord, Clarice E., and Bell, Elizabeth. "Environmental Justice: A National Priority.” Faces of Environmental Racism, edited by Laura Westra and Bill E. Lawson, Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, 29-40.

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The Classic Debate: Nurture vs. Nature

Image courtesy of thescienceofpersuasion.com, depicting the classic nurture vs. nature debate.

The nurture vs. nature debate has gone on for many years between scientists and sociologists; which of our traits do we directly inherit, and which characteristics are shaped by our environment? Social ecologists like Murray Bookchin and James O’Connor lay out the foundation for both sides of the discourse through the notions they discuss in their pieces “What Is Social Ecology?” and “Socialism and Ecology” respectively. The reason for which society cannot be viewed as a product of natural evolution is two-fold: (1) it does not meet the scientific definition of evolution, and (2) social organization and capitalism are (self-)destructive and therefore not an adaptation.  

Civilization is not a result of organic evolution because it cannot be explained by the scientific mechanisms behind evolution. Some social theorists, like Bookchin, would argue that nature and society are joined together by evolution into one nature consisting of two different forms, namely a first or biotic nature and second or human nature (Bookchin 270). According to Bookchin, this second nature is the way in which we humans inhabit the world; it is the actions we take or the behaviors we exhibit (Bookchin 270). In this explanation, “human beings, emerging from an organic evolutionary process, initiate, by the sheer force of their biology and survival needs, a social evolutionary development that profoundly involves their organic evolutionary process” (Bookchin 270). A person's natural ability to communicate, organize, and act free from their instincts confers upon them the ability to form social institutions and create civilizations in this case. However, a biologist would counter that these are mere unintended byproducts of evolution and not direct makings of the process itself. In science, evolution is understood to be a change in the genetic composition of a population over successive generations as a result of the effect of natural selection on genetic variation already present in the group. Evolution is likewise responsible for changes in an organism’s genotype, or genetic makeup, and because the genotype codes for observable traits (i.e. phenotype), these changes in genotype are visible in the individual’s physical abilities or appearance. When a genetic trait is advantageous to a population and confers upon them a greater degree of fitness (i.e. the ability to reproduce more offspring), that trait is said to be naturally selected for; while individuals with the preferable trait continue to mate and reproduce, spreading their traits throughout the group, those without it die off, and eventually, the advantageous trait is carried by the virtually entire population. The name for such an advantageous trait in science is “adaptation.” Therefore, for civilization to be considered an evolved trait, there must be an inheritable gene that directly confers the ability for civilized behavior, and this is not the case.

Civilization, and consequentially capitalism, furthermore cannot be thought of as a product of evolution because the socioeconomic system actively destroys entire ecosystems. As discussed above, evolution takes place on the level of populations, whereas capitalism devours whole geographic regions consisting of multiple communities. As O’Connor points out, “ecology stresses the site specificity of the interchange between human material activity and nature, hence opposes both the abstract evaluation of nature made by capital and also the idea of central planning of production, and centralist approaches to global issues generally” (O’Connor 276). Ecological analyses emphasize the individual parts of various living and nonliving forms that constitute a larger community. Capitalism, on the contrary, seeks to govern the interactions of and between entire nations, and to assign a singular price to the complex, involved ecosystems of the world. Capitalism and ecology, or biology in a wider sense, are therefore incompatible. Moreover, evolution confers adaptations upon individuals in a population, making them more fit for survival, but capitalism leads to the great destruction of communities and the environment. In the words of O’Connor, “The accumulation of global capital through the modern crisis has produced even more devastating effects not only on wealth and income distribution, norms of social justice, and treatment of minorities, but also on the environment” (O’Connor 277). Capitalism is undeniably responsible for increased poverty and violence and rising misery worldwide, but especially in developing nations (O'Connor 277). Environmentally speaking, capitalism is further responsible for the toxification of large geographic regions, increased drought and natural disasters, the destruction of the ozone layer, the production of greenhouse gases, the devastation of entire rainforests, and the loss and endangerment of wildlife, all in the name of profit (O’Connor 277). A process that actively contributes to the downfall of ecosystems and the individuals inhabiting said ecosystems, such as capitalism, cannot, by scientific convention, be considered an adaptation that has resulted from organic evolution. 

The above discussion makes it clear that we cannot recognize capitalism, a process that is responsible in part for the ecological crisis that we face today, as a naturally evolved adaptation for survival. Indeed, we must acknowledge capitalism as a freak of nature, an unnatural byproduct of human capability, and reform it before it wreaks irreversible havoc on the planet Earth which billions call home.

Word count: 840

Citations:

Bookchin, Murray. “What Is Social Ecology?” Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 268-275.

O'Connor, James. "Socialism and Ecology.” Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 275-281.

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The Biological Stepladder

Charles de Bovelle's "Pyramid of the Living" from The Book of Living (1509).

The field of environmental ethics is home to many diverse voices, speaking to a variety of theories and worldviews, all united by the common purpose of protecting the environment. In more recent years, feminists have made their way into discussions regarding environmental ethics, advancing the idea that the domination of women and nature are fundamentally connected. Supporters of ecological feminist theory argue that the subjugation of women and the environment stems from myriad sources, ranging from philosophical to political and scientific. Ecofeminist philosopher Karen J. Warren in her piece “The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism” and historian Carolyn Merchant in “Feminism and the Philosophy of Nature” likewise point to science as a prime mover in the ecofeminist problem. Ecofeminism reveals a history of the perversion of biology and scientific fact to justify the domination of women and nature. 

Science fuels sexism insofar as scientific research focuses on examining differences between the two sexes, perpetuating the creation of clear dualisms that support sex hierarchies. Physiological or anatomical differences are used to create value dualisms or “disjunctive pairs in which the disjuncts are seen as oppositional (rather than as complementary) and exclusive (rather than as inclusive), and which place higher value (status, prestige) on one disjunct rather than the other” (Warren 282). Such a practice is evident in recent neuroscience studies, wherein scientists “routinely presume a simplistic gender binary in research design and interpretation; ignore large within-sex variation in favour of emphasizing small differences between the sexes; and privilege determinist biogenetic explanations for brain differences over the equally plausible explanation that plastic brains are shaped by systematically different sociocultural experience” (O’Connor). By portraying the different neurological activities of the sexes as polar opposites, rather than as a more nuanced spectrum or involving multiple variables, scientists set the stage for patriarchal oppression. Where there are two conflicting, exclusive groups, value can be attributed to one group without necessitating respect or appreciation for the other. In this way, the justification for the subjugation of women is set based on the claim that the dominant group (i.e. men) possesses an ability or characteristic (i.e. higher brain power) that the subordinate group (i.e. women) does not (Warren 282). Beings with greater brain power are more intelligent, intelligence is a desirable trait, and therefore men are admired while women are ignored and mistreated. A prime example of the scientific community’s denial of female intelligence lies in the story of cytogeneticist and Nobel Prize winner Barbara McClintock. Barbara McClintock is credited amongst scientists as the geneticist who discovered transposable or “jumping” genes and elements, but only 30-some-odd years after her work did she receive the attention and praise she deserved (Walker). At first, it was difficult for her to conduct her research as many research positions come from academia, and women of McClintock’s time were typically not allowed to become professors (Walker). McClintock was amongst the mere 25% of female graduates from her college, the College of Agriculture at Cornell University (Parr). When she went to publish her first report after doing work under Lowell F. Randolph, a fellow agricultural scientist and former Cornell student, Randolph’s name was at the top of the paper (Parr). McClintock’s efforts and findings were essentially stolen by her male coworker, and there are unfortunately hundreds of more stories like hers from women in science. Moreover, instead of celebrating women’s biology and nature as sources of female power, science pits the female makeup against male physiology, uplifting one while degrading the other. While “a feministic ethic… [aims to] be structurally pluralistic” and inclusive of all women’s voices and experiences, scientific experiment is historically “unitary or reductionistic” (Warren 286). Science groups all women into one big cluster on the basis of their possession of two X sex chromosomes, despite their different backgrounds, stories, and strengths, allowing the entire sex to be boxed into one position on the sociopolitical pyramid. 

The subjugation of nature to the desires and needs of humans is due in part to the works of reductionist, rigid science. The tendency towards oversimplification and contradistinction is visible in many scientific discussions. For years scientists have debated the intelligence of plants. Plants have been found to use the same neurotransmitters observed in human neurological pathways, and the chemical and electrical signaling pathways used by plants are scientifically analogous to the nervous systems of animals (Pollan). Yet, on the topic of plant intelligence, the scientific community contends that since plants do not have a central nervous system, or neurons for that matter, plants are not capable of communication, information processing, learning, and memory to the same degree as animals (Pollan). Scientists likewise succeed in categorizing life forms into two varieties: those that possess a central nervous system, and those that do not. Yet again, value dualisms are “used in oppressive conceptual frameworks to establish inferiority and to justify subordination” (Warren 283). Despite the research that has demonstrated the ability of plants to communicate with others via electrical mechanisms, to respond to stimuli such as light, water, gravity, temperature, soil structure, nutrients, toxins, microbes, herbivores, and chemical signals from other plants, plants are continuously belittled and labeled as inferior to animals, and likewise to humans, due to the sole fact that they do not possess a brain. Because plants lack an intelligence comparable to that of humans, they are placed below the entire species on the biological stepladder and have consequently been subjugated to domination and manipulation by humans for centuries. It is for this very reason that Merchant contends that “The new mechanical order [the Scientific Revolution] and its associated values of power and control… mandate the death of nature” (Merchant 298). Science not only justifies the exploitation of the environment, but also creates the technology that makes such destructive behavior possible. The Scientific Revolution thus represents the beginning of a newer, more advanced era in the history of the control of nature. The field of science as a whole plays a central role in the domination of nature.

In light of the information discussed above, it is clear that future scientific research must reject bias based on sex or species. The acceptance of women in the historically male-dominated field of science would require a wider degree of accessibility of education for these roles amongst women. Once women have successfully infiltrated the scientific community, they can begin to correct the wrongs of the male-designed technologies that traditionally neglect their effects on women’s reproductive organs and the ecosystem.

Word count: 1078

Citations:

Merchant, Carolyn. “Feminism and the Philosophy of Nature.” Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 291-300.

O' Connor, Cliodhna. “‘Brain Study Confirms Gender Stereotypes’: How Science Communication Can Fuel Modern Sexism.” Impact of Social Sciences, 2 Mar. 2015, blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2015/02/04/science-communication-gender-stereotypes-sexism/.

Parr, Patrick, et al. “Barbara McClintock (1902-1992): Fighting The Male Establishment.” TheHumanist.com, 21 Mar. 2016, https://thehumanist.com/features/articles/barbara-mcclintock-1902-1992-fighting-male-establishment/.

Pollan, Michael. “The Intelligent Plant.” The New Yorker, 16 Dec. 2013, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/12/23/the-intelligent-plant?verso=true.

Warren, Karen. “The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism” Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 281-291.

Walker, Louise. “Unsung Heroes in Science: Barbara McClintock.” Your Genome, 4 Feb. 2022, https://www.yourgenome.org/stories/unsung-heroes-in-science-barbara-mcclintock/.

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Life Science: Inspiration or Instigator?

Cartoon from @angryearth on Instagram, depicting the practice of harvesting bile from bears held in captivity for use in traditional Asian medicine.

Scientific theory has the potential to serve as the basis for an environmental ethic or work against everything that it stands for.  Ecological concepts are often cited by philosophers, especially those developing a biocentric or ecocentric view. Philosophists of the deep ecology movement, a coalition of ethicists pushing the general public and corporations alike to examine the root causes of environmental issues, particularly praise ecologists for their deep relationship with the environment that they cultivate through their work. Yet, at the same time, researchers who experiment on animals or other life forms and scientists who work for larger corporations in industry are scolded by ethicists for the harm to plants, animals, and the environment that they first handedly bring about. The question then remains: do the life sciences provide inspiration for an environmental ethic or represent all that an environmental ethicist rejects?

Many philosophers claim that ecology gave rise to the deep ecological perspective of environmental ethics. In his piece “The Shallow and the Deep Ecology Movement,” Arne Naess suggests that “those who patiently study the ecosystems, the field researchers in the domain of ecology” are the ones who “have inspired the deep ecology movement” (Naess 230). Naess praises ecological researchers, for “The ecological field-worker cultivates a deep-rooted respect, a real veneration, for the ways and forms of life… To the ecological field-worker, the equal right to live and to blossom constitutes an evident and intuitively clear axiomatic value” (Naess 231). Naess contends that building a relationship with nature is a key part of resolving many of the environmental issues that we face today. Ecologists spend a considerable amount of time outside, observing animals or collecting data on the living organisms that inhabit certain communities, and through this process they learn a particular respect for nature that many other individuals in modern day society lack. Naess further claims that “ecologists serve as irreplaceable sources of information in all societies no matter what the political colour of the society in question” (Naess 234). As already mentioned, having extensive knowledge of a subject also tends towards gaining a degree of respect for said subject. Spreading this knowledge, then, is a plausible mechanism to inspire a sense of respect for nature amongst the general public. Moreover, in order to treat environmental issues via technological measures or policy, we must first be able to recognize what the problem is and how to not only resolve it but also prevent it from recurring in the future. We can only do this with the correct information and mindset, which both currently lay the hands of ecological field workers. While the general public may be ignorant to the importance of all the other living organisms that we share the planet with, according to philosopher and author Andrew McLaughlin in “The Heart of Deep Ecology,” ecologists have learned to appreciate “richness and diversity of life forms,” “appreciat[ing] differences and reject[ing] any single standard of excellence” (McLaughlin 236). The ecologist recognizes that the species that cultures generally claim are most excellent or superior to others can only exist because there are other so-called lesser organisms interacting with them. Without ‘diversity of life’, there would cease to be life as a whole. The information that ecologists have spent years amassing is likewise one of our key tools in solving the current climate crisis. 

However, it is important to note that the life sciences provide a still limited perspective and are flawed in application, especially on the industrial scale. While the information and appreciation of nature that ecologists inspire is important, science seldom ventures beyond the numbers and pure research to understand social or cultural implications of the problems which it studies. As Naess explains, “Ecology is a limited science which makes use of scientific methods. Philosophy is the highest forum for debating fundamental problems, descriptive as well as prescriptive, and political philosophy is one of its subsections” (Naess 234). There is not much room, if any, in ecological research for philosophical dialogue and thorough discussion of the impact of issues outside the field of science. Furthermore, since ecology is a science, ecologists utilize long-established methods and principles to conduct their research, allowing for little innovation and limiting researchers in the types of results that they can obtain from their efforts. There is also the issue of the exploitation of nature by scientists for the sake of the obtainment of knowledge. McLaughlin contends that scientists, or humans altogether, “have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs” (McLaughlin 236). It is clear that not all scientific research is conducted out of vital need, but more often out of curiosity or potential technological or medical development which would qualify as beneficial but not necessary. The research that ecologists undertake, then, may go against the beliefs and principles of the deep ecology movement at its core. 

What role do the life sciences play in the deep ecology movement? Inspiration? or Instigator? The answer is not as black and white as we may hope. Ecology, and life sciences on a larger scale, is a field of study overflowing with information with the potential to motivate individuals to value the biological communities we constitute. But this is not to say that the field is without flaw or exempt to criticism. Future field work in ecology and other life sciences should focus on the development of more environmentally ethical practices and methods that can be implemented in experimental design, as well as the development of more fluid models for projects to allow for scientists to exercise greater artistic license and yield unprecedented and revolutionary conclusions.

Word count: 936

Citations:

McLaughlin, Andrew. “The Heart of Deep Ecology.” Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 235-239.

Naess, Arne. “The Shallow and the Deep Ecology Movement.” Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 230-235.

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The Good Scientist

Image courtesy of Chegg "Learn About Model Organisms," depicting popular model organisms used in scientific research.

Science: a branch of knowledge or study dealing with a body of facts or truths systematically arranged and showing the operation of general laws. Scientists like absolutes – black and white explanations for phenomena based on tangible, observable results.We like rules and laws that govern the otherwise inexplicable natural world, with little to no exception to said rules. Indeed, centuries ago, some of the world’s first physicists, biologists, and chemists developed a sure way to confirm their predictions about the universe and to secure their establishment as scientific law: the scientific method. But the same can not be said for environmental ethicists. Cold, hard rules are not always applicable in the realm of ethics. Philosophers like Ronald Sandler in his piece “Environmental Virtue Ethics” likewise argue that a set of rules or guidelines is not adequate for an environmental ethic; individual persons, the ultimate agents of action, must develop the  characteristics of an environmental ethicist and find inspiration in those virtues. For scientists, then, to conduct research and experiments that are considered environmentally conscious, they themselves must first acquire the virtues of an environmentalist and become a ‘good’ scientist.

Philosophist Ronald Sandler contends that a complete environmental ethic is one that includes consideration and discussion of a person’s character, as the individual, like individual researchers in a laboratory, is the fundamental unit of action. According to Sandler, “an adequate environmental ethic… requires not only an ethic of action… but also an ethic of character – one that provides guidance on what attitudes and dispositions we ought and ought not to have” (Sandler 252). It is ridiculous for environmental ethicists to produce a mere list of rights and wrongs and then hold individuals responsible for following them. Rules are what govern entire populations and countries – they are a generalized formula, personalized to no one person in particular and likewise often oversimplified, constructed with the sole purpose of preventing or discouraging mass anarchy and chaos. Rules fail to educate individuals on the level of the qualities and tendencies they ought to possess. As Sandler articulates, “It is always people - with character traits, attitudes, and dispositions - who perform actions, promote policies, and lobby for laws. So while we decry removing mountaintops, filling wetlands, and poisoning wolves and we make our case against these practices before lawmakers, the courts, and the public, we must also consider the character of persons responsible for them” (Sandler 253). While contemporary societies primarily function on the scale of larger institutions and bureaucracies, each of these greater parts consist of smaller units (i.e. individuals). Governments, courts, councils, corporations, and academic centers all dissolve down to a group of individuals at the most foundational level. It is thus crucial that each individual partaking in the work of a larger group, governed by rules and regulations, adopt the characteristics that align them best with said guidelines, as opposed to blindly following orders that they themselves have little faith in or commitment to. Rules and directives are transient and oftentimes vary, changing with historical context and social condition, but the virtues that each person possesses will follow him or her, informing his or her every decision and consequential behavior. A substantial environmental ethic must likewise include discussion of environmental virtues.

One may ask, then, what virtues prove environmentally ethical, particularly in the context of scientific experiment. Sandler discusses various sources of environmental virtues, some stemming from virtues that humans apply in their interactions with each other, others established by the exemplar behavior of environmentally ethical role models. While this paper does not attempt to discern the origins of environmental virtue, it does make a point to enumerate the attitudes that constitute an environmental virtue ethic, with special regard for those that are relevant to contemporary research in the field of science. Of the many virtues applicable in science and its controversial methodologies, compassion appears to be the most prevalent. Compassion is the disposition of sympathy for the sufferings of others. Traditionally, compassion is confined to concern for the sufferings of other human beings, but psychocentric environmental ethics would argue the need for consideration of the sufferings of all beings with the capacity to feel pain. Scientists have compiled lists of ‘model organisms’ suitable for studying genetics, physiology, and anatomy, but not one of these lists takes into account the ability of an organism to feel pain. Experimenters look at the hard facts, such as the similarity of the organism’s genome to that of a human, or the resemblance between human anatomy and the organisms’ own makeup. A disposition to be concerned with the suffering of other living beings, or in other words compassion, would likewise have implications in the scientific field that would revolutionize the ways we design experiments. Yet another virtue relevant to science is responsibility. As Sandler explains, “a proper naturalistic understanding of human beings will locate them not only socially (as members of the human community) but also ecologically (as members of the broader biotic community)” and therefore, “excellence as a human being would include dispositions to maintain and promote the well-being of the larger ecological community” (Sandler 254). As members of the same biosphere, humans likewise have a responsibility to other species to maintain and protect the habitat that we all share in common – planet Earth. Such a disposition to recognize our obligations to other inhabitants of the planet encourages ecological efforts to conserve and preserve some of the world’s threatened ecosystems and species, an area of environmental activism that could benefit from increased awareness and participation from scientists across the globe.

Moreover, possession of the virtue of prudence would help inform scientists in the many decisions that they make and the moral considerations necessary in their research. Prudence would direct scientists to make the right choices when it comes to experimental design or projects that they decide to undertake as a whole. Science has the ability to save lives and cure disease, but it also has the potential to put other organisms in harm's way and to risk the overall well-being of the biocommunity. To be able to weigh these costs and benefits properly and make the right decision is likewise a crucial ability to possess. Sandler similarly affirms that “The environmentally virtuous person - precisely because of his or her virtue - will be disposed both to recognize the right thing and to do it for the right reasons” (Sandler 255). The ability to make the right decision “may also be indispensable in adjudicating between conflicting demands of morality or resolving moral dilemmas that arise from a plurality of sources of value and justification. Indeed, many moral philosophers have argued that it is implausible and unreasonable to believe that there is some finite set of rules or principles that can be applied by any human moral agent in any situation to determine what the proper course of action is in that situation” (Sandler 255). Therefore, the most practical way to lead environmentally conscious projects in the field of science is to teach individual upcoming researchers environmental virtues and thereby encourage them to adopt and practice them in their various works, so that there need not be worry for areas of experimentation in which traditional rules do not apply.

Environmental virtues are an essential part of a complete environmental ethic. They help us to find the right direction at crossroads where conventional rules are either not applicable or insufficient. Environmental virtue ethics allows for those gray areas that science either discourages or ignores entirely. Adoption of environmental virtues by scientists would allow for more environmentally conscious research and a more thorough understanding of the rights and wrongs of environmentally ethical experimentation, going beyond superficial objective rules that oversimplify complex areas of thought.

Word count: 1283

Citation: Sandler, Ronald. "Environmental Virtue Ethics." Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 252-256.

[environmentalethicsinscience]

Where Science and Ecocentrism Meet

Image courtesy of Khan Academy, "Trophic levels review," depicting the many trophic levels of an ecosystem and the biological pathways connecting them.

Oftentimes, people regard science and environmental ethics as two opposing fields of thought; one seemingly encourages the exploitation of the environment for its resources, while the other is bursting with philosophical and theological theories used to safeguard it. Science and environmental ethics, however, can be used together to support the same agenda: the protection of our biosphere. In “The Land Ethic” and “ The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic,” Aldo Leopold and J. Baird Callicott explain how science can be used not only to educate environmental ethicists about the ecosystem, but also  to lay the foundation for philosophical arguments, and how environmental ethics in turn can place limitations on science and enlighten the scientific community as to its obligation to our home planet. 

Through science, humans learn more about the planet, encouraging them to grow closer to their environment and develop a strong bond with the land around them. In “The Land Ethic,” Leopold criticizes the current education system, claiming that the contents of its teachings regarding the environment and our responsibilities towards the planet as a community are misleading – instructing individuals to partake in superficial and performative changes such as obeying environmental law, voting for environmentalists, and adopting environmentally-friendly behaviors so long as they are profitable for the individual (Leopold, 195). The kind of environmental education that Leopold describes here fails to provide individuals with the resources and information necessary to revolutionize their conception of the land they live on and likewise inspire practical application of these newfound notions about the environment. Politics and government treat the environment only at the surface level according to Leopold. Moreover, In “The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic,” Callicott underscores Leopold’s opinion that because environmental ethics has so far primarily been pioneered by philosophists, the component of environmental ethics that is actually a process of ecological evolution is “not very satisfactorily studied” (Callicott, 202). Once again, philosophy falls short in regards to allowing environmentally conscious individuals and communities to fully realize where our obligations to the environment come from. Indeed, Leopold highlights that “[w]e can be ethical only in relation to something we can see, feel, understand, love, or otherwise have faith in” (Leopold, 197). In order to act ethically in regards to the environment, we first need to understand it well enough to develop a relationship with it. A thorough education in science teaches individuals all of the biological processes and pathways that take place in the enriched ecosystems that we live in, every second of every day, whether we actively take note of these processes or not. In this way, science can help teach us more about the terrene that we call home and prompt us to cultivate a relationship with the plants, animals, and soil that make up planet Earth.

More specifically, science helps to explain the interdependence of organisms in communities and the interconnectedness of biotic and abiotic parts of ecosystems – the central piece to ecocentric environmental ethics that philosophers have been missing. According to Leopold, “the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts,” and he sets  “the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals” (Leopold, 194). In ecology, the interconnectedness of these pieces is justified on the basis that energy and nutrients are cycled through all parts of the ecosystem, each part called a trophic level. Energy, for example, is transferred from the sun to plants in the form of light. Light energy allows plants to photosynthesize, turning the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere into glucose sugars that fuel the plants. Herbivores then consume these plants for energy. Top predators such as carnivores consume these lower level herbivores for energy, and the carcasses of the herbivores and carnivores are decomposed by fungi, worms, and bacteria, which then break apart complex molecules and form water and carbon dioxide for the plants again. Bacteria in the soil also fix essential elements like nitrogen from the atmosphere so that it can be used by plants and then passed along to herbivores and carnivores. Approximately 70% of all nitrogen in the soil comes from biological fixation, and without nitrogen, organisms cannot build molecules such as DNA and amino acids, and there would subsequently be no life. Leopold likewise articulates that “[l]and, then is not merely soil; it is a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals” (Leopold, 197). Each level of an ecosystem is dependent upon another, and if any single piece were absent, the land would cease to be able to support life. Callicottt consequently argues that the land ethic founded by Leopold “rests upon three scientific cornerstones: (1) evolutionary and (2) ecological biology set in a background of (3) Copernician astronomy” (Callicott, 205). Evolution can explain our interconnectedness insofar as all life forms have evolved from prokaryotes thousands of years ago. Genes and biological pathways have been conserved across many domains of life, and we are all made of the same basic molecules. Ecological biology explains how different organisms depend on each other as explained earlier. Callicott even extends the scientific foundation to Copernician astronomy, arguing that “the perception of the earth as a ‘small planet’” in a greater universe “contributes, perhaps subconsciously, but nevertheless very powerfully, to our sense of kinship, community, and interdependence with fellow denizens of the earth household” (Callicott 205). In this way, science builds the conceptual framework for our understanding of our interconnectedness with the animals, plants, and soil that constitute our environment, leading us to feel an ethical obligation to it.

Environmental ethics, in turn, can inform science and set limitations on scientific research and development. In regard to bioengineering, Leopold claims “[m]an’s invention of tools has enabled him to make changes of unprecedented violence, rapidity, and scope” (Leopold, 198). As opposed to leaving evolution up to natural selection, scientists have used recombinant DNA technology to incorporate portions of genetic material from one organism into another, even using genes of entirely different species. Scientists have also used DNA cloning techniques in an attempt to bring back species that have gone extinct, almost as if to turn back the clock against the forces of nature. These experiments have unimaginable consequences and undeniable ethical implications, which experimenters often fail to consider. Leopold also highlights how engineers and architects in certain industries “by polluting waters or obstructing them with dams, may exclude the plants necessary to keep energy in circulation” (Leopold, 198). The creation of infrastructures in the name of science and human advancement unquestionably put at risk the overall integrity and health of our ecosystems. Environmental ethics, in turn, can inform the scientific community of the impacts of its experiment on the environment and suggest methods to mediate such issues.

The works of Aldo Leopold and J. Baird Callicott, “The Land Ethic” and “The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic,” elaborate on the ways in which science can illuminate the founding principles of ecocentric environmental ethics and encourage the human-ecosystem bond, while also noting how environmental ethics can have implications in scientific research in return. Moving forward, environmental ethicists and followers of the scientific method may draw upon each other for knowledge in their respective fields and learn to appreciate the commonalities and overcome differences that the two disciplines share. Only when science and environmental ethics are used in combination can human society grasp its total potential.

Word count: 1227

Citations:

Callicott, J. Baird. "The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic." Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 201-210.

Leopold, Aldo. "The Land Ethic." Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 193-201.

[environmentalethicsinscience]

On The Denial of Human Superiority

Image from Orangutan Foundation International, depicting the phylogenetic tree of the great apes.

The ideology of human supremacy dates back to early Greece, where the idea that humans are the only beings with the ability to use logic was cultivated. Over time, a variety of other arguments for human exceptionalism have arisen. Believers in the story of creation claim that God set humans apart from the very beginning, positioning Homo sapiens at the top of the Judeo-Christian Great Chain of Being (Taylor, 181). Originating in the theories of French philosopher Rene Descartes is an argument for human superiority on the basis that humans have souls while animals do not (Taylor, 181). But science and environmental ethics come together to disprove the notion that humans are entirely disconnected from the animal kingdom and the so-called “wild” and therefore superior as seen in Paul W. Taylor’s “The Ethics of Respect for Nature” and William Cronon’s “The Trouble With Wilderness.”

Both science and environmental ethics recognize that humans are much more similar to nonhuman life forms than many would like to believe; plants and animals are centers of life achieving their own good, running on and consisting of the same biological materials as humans, and thus do not represent inferior life forms. In “The Ethics of Respect for Nature,” Taylor explains that “We can think of the good of an individual nonhuman organism as consisting in the full development of its powers,” meaning that it “possesses whatever capacities it needs for successfully coping with its environment and so preserving its existence throughout the various stages of the normal life cycle of its species” (Taylor, 176). As science would explain, plants support themselves by creating their own fuel using light from the sun and basic organic molecules. Plants take in carbon dioxide and absorb nutrients from the ground that humans cannot metabolize or use, and they protect themselves from herbivores by releasing VOCs (volatile organic chemicals) throughout their tissues. It is for this reason that Cronon points out that “In wilderness, we need no reminder that a tree has its own reasons for being, quite apart from us…” (Cronon, 361). Flora are not dependent on humans for survival because they possess their own tool kit. Scientists well versed in animal behavior would also highlight how animalia realize their own good by hunting prey in the wild, migrating across nations in specific patterns, hibernating through cold winters, and more. And on a molecular level, plants, animals, and humans all utilize key molecules such as carbon, oxygen, water, ATP, amino acids, and DNA to function. In fact, on the basis of many morphological, physiological, and genetic qualifiers, we humans are classified in the kingdom Animalia too, and share about 99% of our DNA with chimpanzees, making them our closest relatives. Taylor likewise notes that “... when our awareness focuses on the individual lives of plants and animals, each is seen to share with us the characteristic of being a teleological center of life striving to realize its own good in its own unique way,” but in the case of plants and animals, “without the need of rationality, although they often make use of capacities that humans lack” (Taylor 181, 180). Science and consideration of environmental ethics prove that nonhuman organisms can achieve their own good just as humans can despite their lack of ability to reason, and humans are therefore similar to other creatures of nature in this way and in no way superior to them.

Humans are, moreover, ultimately one with the biosphere and the wilderness, not isolated from it or superior to it. In “The Trouble with Wilderness,” Cronon criticizes “not wild nature, but the alienated way we often think of ourselves in relation to it” (Cronon, 361). Contrary to popular belief, humans are not entirely detached from nature. Indeed, as Taylor describes, “humans and nonhumans alike” constitute “integral parts of one unified whole in which all living things are functionally interrelated” (Taylor, 181). The flourishing of one organism or abiotic model in an ecosystem correlates with the well-being of another as seen in ecology. Plants and bacteria that are capable of photosynthesis help to convert carbon dioxide in the air into atmospheric oxygen that humans can breathe, while humans release carbon dioxide thereby making it more accessible to plants. Energy is passed from the sun, to primary producers (plants), to herbivores, to carnivores (humans), to decomposers, back to plants, and also released as heat throughout its journey. All parts of nature are interconnected. Furthermore, according to Cronon, not only are humans a part of the wilderness, they created it. He explains: “Far from being the one place on earth that stands apart from humanity, it is quite profoundly a human creation…” (Cronon, 359). Human culture created the notion of ‘pristine nature’ and ‘wilderness’ and one likewise cannot exist without the other. Just as there is no dark without the absence of light, there is no ‘wilderness’ without the absence of civilization. Not only are we biologically connected to nature, but historically. Cronon encourages us to practice “remembrance and gratitude for nature, culture, and history that have come together to make the world as we know it” (Cronon. 361). Human society would not exist today without the presence of the environment and the nature that supported our growth and evolution into a civilized species. In this way, the perception of humans as separate from and superior to nature is nothing but a projection of our own bias towards our species; it is fundamentally inaccurate and must be rejected.

The argument that humans are not worthier than animals, plants, or ecosystems as a whole presented by both Taylor in “The Ethics of Respect for Nature” and Cronon in “The Trouble with Wilderness” has reverberations in the scientific community, especially in the field of research. If humans are not elementally higher-ranking than plants and animals, then who is to say that plants and animals are more deserving of cruelty and experimentation than humans? Why are nonhuman organisms chosen as prime candidates for subjects of scientific research if they are on the same level as humans? Often, scientists consider cold factors such as size, genetic make-up, generation times, and the ability of experimenters to grow and maintain these organisms in a lab setting. Perhaps, scientists would benefit from taking into account the ethical consequences of their choice of model organisms as well.

Word count: 1051

Citations:

Cronon, William. "The Trouble With Wilderness." Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 359-361.

Taylor, Paul W. "The Ethics of Respect for Nature." Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 175-182.

[environmentalethicsinscience]

On the Ethical Implications of the Use of Animals in Science

Image from The New Zealand Anti-Vivisection Society 2020, detailing the extent of animal use in scientific research in New Zealand over a two year period.

For millennia, animals have been used as subjects of biomedical research. In early Greece, physician-scientists like Aristotle conducted experiments using living animals. Early experiments on animals supported developments in areas such as anatomy, physiology, pathology, and pharmacology (Hajar). In the twelfth century, a physician introduced animal testing as a tool for piloting surgeries on organisms with similar anatomy to humans before performing the same operation on actual humans (Hajar). More lately in the twentieth century, scientists began to use animals in drug testing trials to determine the safety of the use of certain medications on the human body (Hajar). In recent years, however, the implementation of animals in biomedical research and testing has faced criticism from various groups concerned with the ethical implications of these practices. Philosophers Tom Regan and Peter Singer both expound unique arguments against the use of animals in experimentation and research in their respective pieces “Animals as Subjects-of-a-Life” and “All Animals Are Equal.” 

In his piece “Animals as Subjects-of-a-Life” Regan advocates for animals rights and dedicates himself to the total eradication of the use of animals in science. Regan argues “that animals are not mere things, that they are subjects of a life that is better or worse for them” and likewise “that they have inherent value” (Regan, 167). Here, Regan challenges those who regard animals as dispensable commodities to dissect, or model organisms for research, or subjects for experimentation and testing. According to Regan, independent of anyone else’s evaluation of an individual animal or how useful the animal proves to be to them, the animal has it’s own life that is must sustain and run the course of, and that quality alone bestows intrinsic value upon the animal. Regan further explains that as such, “what has value in itself must always be treated as an end, never merely as a means. However, this is precisely what we are doing if we harm an individual so that others might gain pleasure or profit; we are treating the individual merely as a means, as valuable only to the extent he/she contributes to collective interest” (Regan, 166). The use of animals in science is thus a fundamental denial of their life and likewise their inherent value. By utilizing animals as a tool of sorts in our experiments, we treat them as expendable resources, as a means to get to our own goals and realize human needs and desires, which suggests that the scientists experimenting on these animals consider them to be devoid of any value other than instrumental. Regan, however, recognizes the inherent value of individual animals as bearers of life and subsequently discourages scientific experimentation on these organisms.

Singer criticizes the use of animals in science by urging for the extension of the same principle of equality experienced by humans to other species in his piece “All Animals Are Equal.” Singer contends that “...our concern for others ought not to depend on what they are like, or what abilities they possess” (Singer, 171). Singer hereby condemns the argument that cruel experimentation on animals is justified because animals are incapable of speech, reason, or other cognitive behaviors and are thus inferior to humans and a better alternative for research subjects. As articulated by Singer, “If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration” (Singer, 172). On the basis that these creatures can experience pain and suffer from physical and physiological manipulation, they therefore should not be subject to experimentation on their bodies. By ignoring the reality that these animals suffer as a result of researchers’ scientific designs and methodologies, “The experimenter then, shows a bias in favor of his own species whenever he carries out an experiment on a nonhuman for a purpose that he would not think justified him in using a human being at a lower level of sentience, awareness, ability to be self-directing, etc.” (Singer, 173).  As Singer explains, experimentation on animals in the name of human development represents speciesism, or the discrimation against other species just on the criteria of whether they are human or not. The use of animals in scientific experiments and the view of them as deserving of such awful treatment is then a manifestation of human society’s prejudice towards the animal community, and the practice must be stopped.

Regan and Singer advance distinct philosophical arguments against the use of animals in science based on the notions that animals are beings that possess a life and that animals are deserving of the same basic decency that is extended to humans. Both the arguments of Regan and Singer push for the total abolition of cruel experimentation and research on animals by the scientific community, but we must also recognize the critical role that these experiments play in universal human health. While ethical concerns about experimentation on animals are valid, the complete cessation of experiments involving drugs and products before release into the commercial market is an impractical endeavor and potentially puts the entire human species at risk. It is, however, reasonable to propose alternatives to contemporary experimental designs. Likewise, movements like the 3Rs campaign have arisen, which “advocates the search (1) for the replacement of animals with non-living models; (2) reduction in the use of animals; and (3) refinement of animal use practices” to cause less harm to the creatures (Hajar). In circumstances where it is absolutely necessary, the future scientific community can continue to experiment on animals while acknowledging the ethical implications of its research and carrying out its responsibility to advance the biomedical technologies of human society.

Word count: 927

Citations:

Hajar, Rachel. “Animal Testing and Medicine.” Heart Views : the Official Journal of the Gulf Heart Association, Medknow Publications Pvt Ltd, Jan. 2011, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3123518/.

Regan, Tom. "Animals as Subjects-of-a-Life." Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 161-168.

Singer, Peter. "All Animals Are Equal." Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 169-175.

[environmentalethicsinscience]

Science: Who Do We Do It For?

Image courtesy of Fordham University, showing the Louis Calder Center for biological and ecological research located in Armonk, NY.

With the threat of the destruction of all life at the hands of climate change growing ever-present in society’s consciousness, scientists race to find answers and solutions to the seemingly inevitable, unfortunate fate of the world. Virologists and epidemiologists tackle the problem of diseases and viruses emergent out of the climate crisis to save all vulnerable populations; ecologists exercise their knowledge of the Earth’s ecosystems to study the relationships between the human, plant, and animal inhabitants of the planet; zoologists study animals across the globe in both the wild and captive environments to better understand how these creatures behave. Yet, with the aforementioned myriad of studies currently underhand, the question of ‘Who do we ultimately do scientific research for?’ remains unanswered and hardly ever discussed by the scientific community. Why exert time, labor, energy, and resources to investigate the many forms of life that call Earth home as well as the relationships between these organisms? What value do these organisms hold, if any, that encourages us to study them? Many philosophers, like Wilfred Beckerman, argue that humans attribute value to other organisms and the value of non-human life forms ends there; where there are no humans to attribute value, there is no value at all. In such a case, it seems that humans conduct scientific research for our own sake to protect what we value. On the contrary, philosophers like Holmes Rolston III contend that subjects other than humans are capable of generating, displaying, or creating value independent of the human. It is then possible that scientists study non-human organisms and ecosystems not for their own benefit of purposes but for the sake of other life forms. 

The philosophical claim made by Wilfred Beckerman in “In Defense of Anthropocentrism” that value is dependent on the human who assigns it supports a subjective argument for scientific research on the environment. Beckerman first contends that the value assigned to organisms involved in scientific research is fundamentally instrumental in nature. He articulates that a forest, for example, is “instrumentally valuable insofar as it contains scientifically valuable information that can be potentially useful for, say, medicinal purposes” (Beckerman, 83). According to Beckerman, because an ecosystem is studied so that the scientific information it holds may be used for other purposes, such as to cure or better human ailments, the value of said ecosystem is thereby instrumental and nothing else. The value that the forest holds as an ecosystem is likewise principally linked to the needs and desires of humans. It can be argued, then, that scientific research is done not because scientists believe that the non-human organisms carry value on their own, but because we attribute value to these organisms for they prove useful to us humans. Beckerman furthermore claims that even if humans are to say that an organism possesses intrinsic value, that this intrinsic value must be subjective because humans are still the beings measuring value. Beckerman underscores that “to whatever view we subscribe about the value of nature, it will always be our human view. There is no other perspective available to us and there is no other perspective that can be adopted in our treatment of the non-human world” (Beckerman and Park, 86). We cannot escape our own skin as humans. We cannot view the world from a perspective that is greater than ourselves. In this way, any value a non-human organism may hold is determined through the human lens. Scientists study non-human organisms because they believe that these creatures and ecosystems have value, but that value is something that the scientist themselves must first generate in their consciousness. The notion that the value of the non-human life forms that we study is entirely reliant on humans suggests that scientific research is driven at the most basic level by human thought and perception.

However, philosophers like Holmes Rolston III in “Value in Nature and the Nature of Value” understand value is not solely dependent on the human and extends further to animals, plants, and entire ecosystems, thus defending the position that scientific research is done because the subjects of research themselves are intrinsically valuable. Rolston argues that “[a]nimals are value-able, able to value things in their world” as “they are experiencing subjects and can take an interest in things” (Rolson, 131). Animals have interests, which is a certain kind of value, so Rolston proposes that we change how we understand the concept of value to be more inclusive of animals. These creatures “seek their own basic needs, food and shelter, and care for their young,” which shows that they have the capacity not only to attribute value to other things but also to assign value to their own lives (Rolston, 131). When scientists study animals, we can then say that we are examining them because they are beings that have their own value. Rolston goes further to explain that plants can also possess value as they are organisms that sustain and defend themselves. He expounds the argument that “the physical state that the [plant] defends is a valued state. A life is defended for what it is itself, without necessary further contributory reference” (Rolston, 132). Yet again, Rolston promotes a reformation of human society’s understanding of value. Individual plants practice a kind of value that is mainly functional, undergoing processes that keep them alive, which in turn shows that they value their own lives. Ecologists who fund projects that work towards the protection and conservation of the organisms thus recognize the value that the plants represent and make efforts to defend that value, but they do not necessarily assign to the plants that value because it is already present in the life of the plant itself. Rolston moreover supports the extension of value to ecosystems as a whole, since “it is the productivity of such ecosystems, bringing into existence these phenomena that, when we arrive, the human consciousness is also able to value” (Rolston 134). Ecosystems, in other words, are the original creators of value. The ecosystem sustains life for all beings, thus allowing for value to exist in these plants and animals. As such, scientists who study plants, animals, and even ecosystems can be said to study these life forms as they possess value within themselves that does not rely on the human entirely. 

Beckerman and Rolston present two contrasting philosophies that subsequently provide two different motives for scientific research: (1) value is derived from the consciousness of humans and all science is thus driven by human needs, desires, and views, or (2) value can be conceptualized as independent of the human and extended to plants, animals, and entire ecosystems, allowing for scientific research to be conducted for the sake of the non-human life form and not for the good of the human. It is important to note, however, that if we choose to believe that value is dependent on the human and that all ecological endeavors are likewise undertaken to explore and protect the values that human beings project onto others, this does not necessitate that the research be violent or exploitative of other organisms for the benefit of humans alone. Value that is derived from the human perspective is anthropogenic, not anthropocentric, and thus need not completely disregard other organisms and the importance that they may hold. But whether or not scientific research is done for the sake of humans or for the sake of the organism, one thing is sure: research must continue. There is yet much to learn from the beautiful planet that we inhabit and much to refine from what we already have learned. We may question who or what drives us to practice the scientific method and apply it in nature and to the environment, but there is no question that there is still more learning to be done.

Word count: 1297

Citations:

Beckerman, Wilfred. "In Defense of Anthropocentrism." Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 83-88.

Rolston III, Holmes. "Value in Nature and the Nature of Value." Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, edited by David R. Keller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 130-137.