roamingchickennugget-blog - Tumblr blog

[roamingchickennugget-blog]

A  look into the parallels between protection networks and gangs in South Africa

Protection networks namely, the ‘Johannesburg bouncer mafia’ (Shaw and Haysom, 2), can be compared to gangs and ‘hammermen’ (Shaw and Skywalker, 378); gang-employed hitmen in Cape Town, in several ways. Protection networks have declined, being replaced by independent bouncers and criminal networks largely from Nigeria (Shaw and Haysom, 3), and consequently do not pose as great a threat to security in Johannesburg. However, the void has been filled by other violent actors which still threaten security. There are important similarities which exist between both gangs, their hitmen and protection networks, enabling these two organized crime units to prosper in their specific eras and areas and indicate an ongoing and possibly growing trend that violence is ‘for hire’ (Shaw and Thomas, 11).

Protection networks and gangs largely provide the same services. Protection networks controlled extortion and trafficking of drugs at the height of their power (Shaw and Haysom, 2). These were also involved in other organized crime activities, such as assassinations (Shaw and Haysom, 2), which continue to be committed by bouncers in the security industry (Shaw and Thomas, 11). Cape gangs are similarly involved in extortion and controlling the drug trade, however, seem to be more active agents of ‘contract killing’ (Shaw and Skywalker, 385). Just as violence and extortion promulgated by protection networks was used to obtain leverage in both legal and illegal markets, presently killing has become ‘contracted’ and ‘commercialised’ and used for the same purposes (Shaw and Skywalker, 378). This indicates that the landscape of violence in South Africa has changed and targeted violence has increased (Shaw and Skywalker, 378) due to politics and corruption (Shaw and Thomas, 12).

The transition to democracy and consequent turbulence was quintessential for the presence of three necessary preconditions for the evolution and role of protection networks (Shaw and Haysom, 28). Disruption caused changes in political, economic and social conditions (Shaw and Haysom, 28) and these networks provided a new service (illegal profit) during a period of great violence, lawlessness and instability (Shaw and Haysom, 6). Likewise, gang-enabled contractual killing is also influenced by its political backdrop and transition to democracy (Shaw and Thomas, 12) and it also provides a new pertinent service – the contracted ‘commercialisation of assassination,’ through elimination of particular individuals, who are obstacles to realisation of certain criminal, economic or political interests (Shaw and Thomas, 1).

 A necessary precondition for organized protection networks was a sudden increase in the drug market unregulated by the state, leading to the need for criminal protection and networks’ increased organisation and influence (Shaw and Haysom, 26). There was a sudden boom in the accessibility, acceptance, variety and proliferation of recreational drugs consequence of the transition into a new democracy (Shaw and Haysom, 6). This resulted in a need to ‘secure’ certain spaces for the trade of these illicit substances and regulate this market (Shaw and Haysom, 26). In turn, this caused the formation of more seemingly ‘legitimate’ private security companies and an escalation of violence and conflict (Shaw and Haysom, 13). This was consequence of not only the drugs’ effect on the clientele, but also turf wars over the control of the drug trade (Shaw and Haysom, 13).

There has similarly been an increase in drug trafficking in the Cape which has resulted in sophistication of gang leadership, their prosperity and amplified power (Shaw and Skywalker, 379). This has been coupled by an increase of the availability and use of drugs by poor communities, resulting in increased drug-related violence and crime (Shaw and Skywalker, 380). Gangs need to demonstrate violence to retain control (Shaw and Skywalker, 385) and this battle for control ultimately results in more targeted contractual killings (Shaw and Skywalker, 385) as a means of influencing economic outcomes (Shaw and Thomas, 9). The hitmen they hire similarly pose as ordinary members of respectable society (Shaw and Skywalker, 388). Therefore, in the same way that the increase in organisation of protective networks, due to the need to control the drug trade, resulted in ‘legitimate’ private companies and increased violence, so has increased need to control drugs resulted in sophistication and the contracting of seemingly ‘legitimate’ gang members who increasingly contract to murder (Shaw and Thomas, 9).

 Secondly, protection networks became organized and abundant because there was a steady supply of actors who could be recruited from boxing and martial arts establishments, sports clubs and the military (Shaw and Haysom, 27). These institutions were important bases of training and self-identification, resulting in a spate of ‘identity-based gangs’ and the amalgamation of a network of connection (Shaw and Haysom, 7). This caused the market to grow, companies to form and become incredibly powerful (Shaw and Haysom, 8).  These were usually poor, young white males who did not have the luxury of further education and thus were of a very similar class and background (Shaw and Haysom, 7). This in turn contributed to the violence as they came from ‘rough and tough’ neighbourhoods centered around fighting and violence (Shaw and Haysom, 7). They used this hardened past to justify future violence as this was part of who they were and what they were specialized in (Shaw and Haysom, 27).

 This is mirrored in gangs and their recruits as gangs are similarly a product of ‘history, identity and necessity’ (Shaw and Skywalker, 378). These were originally recruited from prisons or the streets and thus were usually also products of poverty (Shaw and Skywalker, 380). Likewise, gangs have their own constitutions and mythology which consequently also influences their own self-identity and loyalty (Shaw and Skywalker, 380). Prison and street gangs have become aligned to one another and has caused greater violence and targeted killings (Shaw and Skywalker, 380). Hammermen are often selected due to their environment, prison sentence, involvement with gangs (Shaw and Skywalker, 384) and specialized skills they consequently possess (Shaw and Skywalker, 386). Nevertheless, these hitmen are not strictly fully associated with gangs as part of their success hinges on their ability to dissociate themselves (Shaw and Skywalker, 388), consequently allowing them to be ‘masked’ perpetrators (Shaw and Thomas, 17). Therefore, agents of gangs (as in protection networks) also usually come from similar backgrounds and identify with the gangs (Pinnock, 15). These hitmen are similarly still loyal to their gangs although isolated from formal gang structure (Shaw and Skywalker, 389). Hitmen and gang members also use their pasts to justify their violent dealings and they often view assassinations as necessary to keeping a balance internally within gangs and ‘setting things right’ (Shaw and Skywalker, 386).

 Thirdly, the strength of protection networks meant that state actors struggled to oppose and contain the violence promulgated by these institutions, which resulted in an uneasy collusion with these networks (Shaw and Haysom, 28). Many policemen worked for the police force by day and moonlighted as bouncers by night (Shaw and Haysom, 16). In many instances, these ties were profitable for both the protection network and the police and is an integral aspect of both sides’ success (Shaw and Haysom, 16). This collusion gave protection networks and much of their illicit activity a ‘legitimate front’ (Shaw and Haysom, 16). State actors similarly employed these networks to do their bidding and in return would turn a blind eye and aid illegal business and crimes (Shaw and Haysom, 16). Thus, there were several ties which exist between the state and the protection networks which are both formal and informal (Shaw and Haysom, 28).

This has similarly occurred in gangs and hitmen by extension as the police is too understaffed to mount any real defence against growing gang violence (Shaw and Skywalker, 379). There are consequently ties and an ‘uneasy truce’ between gangs and the police centered around contractual arrangements of profit and protection (Shaw and Skywalker, 385). Police may use informants from gangs to keep tabs on their activities, whilst later sacrificing such informants to gangs themselves (Shaw and Skywalker, 386). Sought after skills of gang hitmen are the ability to form connections with the police yet similarly disrupt police investigations (Shaw and Skywalker, 389). Police may also aid such gangs by destroying evidence and covering up criminal activity (Shaw and Thomas, 16). However, police cannot always be complicit in gang activities and often must exert force to demonstrate power to gangs and in instances when there is mass violence resulting in a public outcry (Shaw and Skywalker, 386). Therefore, the police and gangs will do each other’s’ bidding but within certain limits (Shaw and Thomas, 15).

 Therefore, there are many similarities between the evolution and functions of both protection networks in Johannesburg and Cape Town gangs and their hitmen which indicates that violence is for hire in South Africa and is used widely (Shaw and Thomas, 14). The success of these gangs and networks stems from political instability, transition to democracy and historical poverty which allows individuals to find belonging in these structures and develop certain skill sets. These becomes organized and innovative to control illicit markets like the drug trade and extortion. The success of these organized crime units hinges on their relationships with the police and the fact that police are complicit. There has been a move towards commercialized killing and thus this may be indicative of the changing nature of organized crime, which may prove even more threatening to security in the democratic era. Therefore, to counter this, there needs to be a systematic intervention in police government and police structures to stop collusion and corruption as violence is ultimately ‘symptomatic of the failure of democracy’ (Shaw and Thomas, 16).

[roamingchickennugget-blog]

Why the ‘war on poachers’ and Green Violence fails to remedy the poacher problem

The ‘war on poachers’ is the current phenomenon of ‘green violence’ which surpasses mere ‘green militarization’, due to intense pressure to curb the ever-growing rhino poaching crisis (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 1). This is increased securitization and includes deploying a variety of intensely violent strategies which often have the indirect result of worsening and fostering poaching, instead of combatting it. This is because little attention has been given to social, political and historical underpinnings and ‘drivers of deviance’ have mainly been said to relate to the ‘cooking pot and pocket book’ (Peterson et al., 404). Thus, to be truly successful in stopping and deterring poaching, theoretical, political and moral assumptions which are embedded in these largely unsuccessful strategies must be challenged and refocused.

‘Green violence’ encompasses deploying a variety of violent strategies and instruments (such as military personnel, technology, graining and partnerships) in order to further conservation and protect wildlife (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 10). This includes material violence in the form of a return to the fortification of national parks and hot pursuit of poachers (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 13). This entails harsh punishment and imprisonment of arrested poachers and shoot-on-sight strategies (Peterson et al., 407). Social violence is also employed, which enforces the current status quo and moral order through abuse of social power (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 14). This includes infusing rhino horns with poison and dye, which has largely proven both unsuccessful, impractical and improbable (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 15). Yet, drivers of this initiative have silenced critique of this and nonetheless redirected profits into violent strategies despite claiming otherwise (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 15). Lastly, there is discursive violence which is spurred on by social media, allowing poachers to be stereotyped, dehumanized and feelings of rage to be freely promulgated (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 19). These strategies may be seen as limitedly effective in addressing poaching in the sense that they are actively trying to be responsive to such a problem, in reality they merely legitimize and encourage ongoing violence and are ultimately unsuccessful, causing greater harm than good (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 21).

Green violence strategies are employed by conservationists, namely Peace parks, who aim at providing a solution to historical rifts and aim at peaceful coexistence, harmony and empowerment of local communities whilst protecting nature (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 6). However, these have failed as they have not addressed historical inequalities and current social, racial, structural and political disparities which underpin poaching practices (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 6). The focus of these is too narrow and falls mainly on a limited set of economic and opportunistic motivations and solely on perpetrators (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 10).  Therefore, these moral, political and theoretical assumptions which underpin these strategies must be refocused and reevaluation of the true drivers of poaching must occur. If this is not implemented, the cycle of violence will be pointlessly promulgated and social injustices further embedded.

These strategies are premised on the fact that people become poachers because of the ‘cooking pot’ and the ‘pocket book’; namely because they are poverty ridden and poach due to opportunism (they live close to these protected areas) and because this is lucrative (Hubschle, 427). This holds true because locals are usually poverty ridden and rhino horns are coveted Asian medicinal ingredients and incredibly valuable in Asian markets, resulting in the growth of transnational organized crime (Hubschle, 428). Consequently, economic reasons are regarded as the main drivers of poaching and this underlies strategies employed to counter this (Peterson et al., 404). These strategies focus on the perpetrators as individuals who are ‘rational benefit maximizers’, agents of rational choice, and poach because benefits outweigh costs (Peterson et al., 403). This may be correct in some instances due to profitability and necessity due to poverty, however, this assumption is only a partial account of the true reasons behind such behaviour and does not capture the ongoing tension between local interests and wildlife (Hubschle, 432).

The root cause of poverty is also partly historical and has culminated in the continued systematic social marginalization and exclusion of local people (Hubschle, 427). This occurred initially during Colonialism and Apartheid, in which local people and their rights were exploited, systematically excluded and forcibly removed from their traditional homelands (Hubschle, 431). These rights and land were reallocated to the state as ‘protected areas’ for conservation and served the interests of the white elite (Hubschle, 431).  Local people were consequently forcibly removed, expropriated and lost their land and hunting rights to such areas (Hubschle, 428). This marginalization still occurs currently as under current strategies, local people have been displaced from the parks and relegated to buffer zones (Hubschle, 429). This is consequence of privatization and the subsequent commodification of wildlife as an alienable resource, seen as deserving state protection (Peterson et al., 402). The strategy employed by parks is that these formerly inhabited areas must be a ‘total protection zone’ (Hubschle, 433). Although it is claimed this resettlement is voluntary, these local people have been forced into doing this due to economic necessity (Hubschle, 433).

This displacement is necessary because formerly, hunting practices and collecting medicinal plants were deemed legal and have only recently been rebranded by laws enforcing current strategies as illegal (Hubschle, 430). Likewise, this embeds historical and racial tensions as white wealthy hunters are permitted to partake in such ‘illegal’ practices for a fee which is beyond the reach of the impoverished, who depend on these practices for survival, not sport (Hubschle, 430). Consequently, this ignores age old cultural practices of local people (hunting being a rite of passage for male youths) and has resulted in food insecurity as people struggle to provide for their families (Hubschle, 433). These people are not only geographically isolated by such strategies but are also economically excluded as they have limited means of making ends meet, negligible employment opportunities and are forced into low paying jobs hinged on this industry (Hubschle, 432).

This is linked to structural inequality and lack of service delivery which these strategies fail to consider. There was a failure to meaningfully engage with citizens and lack of consultation during displacement and democratic transition (Hubschle, 433). Likewise, the intensity and severity of these strategies contribute the assumption of locals that conservation matters more to government than black lives (Hubschle, 435). The local people distrust the park officials and conservationists and view them as corrupt (Hubschle, 428). In the same vein, the people who are the figure heads of communities no longer answer to the community’s needs but instead act self-interestedly and are corrupt (Hubschle, 435). Analogously, people use poaching as a form of social rebellion, protest against the state and feel vindicated in breaking the law (Hubschle, 434). These strategies fail to take account of this structural flaw, resulting in legitimation of poaching and it being viewed as being for the good of the community – poachers acting as ‘economic freedom fighters’ against an unjust and unresponsive system (Hubschle, 437). Marginalized communities are consequently more likely to be willing to aid and shield poachers (Hubschle, 428) and this translates into these communities being prime recruitment spaces (Hubschle, 434). Consequently, in order to better prevent poaching, systematic state failures must be rectified and the government must be criticized and scrutinized (Peterson et al., 405).

 These strategies have similarly failed in their goals of harmony and bringing people together not only in relation to wildlife, but also to one another. Although poaching does create a form of social cohesion and may indirectly benefit the community and gain their support, this does not hold true of all members of the community (Hubschle, 438). This causes societal rifts between law abiding citizens and those who support poachers. Likewise, families are further driven apart by the result of displacement and differing views of poaching’s merits (Hubschle, 439). Poaching is innately dangerous and if people are not killed during the act, they are often likely to be killed by park officials in these ‘wars’ (Hubschle, 439). Imprisonment is also common, which likewise fragments communities and deprives families of breadwinners (Hubschle, 439). 

In conclusion, these draconian strategies employed in ‘green violence’ have been largely unsuccessful as they are premised on the fact that poaching occurs doe to poverty and profitability. Although poverty is related to other drivers of such societally deemed ‘deviance’, these strategies are too focused on perpetrators and do not account for or remedy historical inequalities which have been sustained in current policies. Government failures in service delivery and continued systematic exclusion must likewise be evaluated to quell community support for poachers and the fact that poaching is viewed as a legitimate answer to an unjust and unresponsive system, that values the white man’s prerogatives in conservation over the everyday struggles of black people. Therefore, unless other strategies focused on righting inequality and increasingly uplifting communities are opted for instead of violence, these strategies will merely continue to be ineffective and sustain an unjust status quo.

[roamingchickennugget-blog]

Chasing trains through tear stains

It's like running for a train but knowing you'll never catch it - you watch it speed into some distant sunlight, a rosey hue of new love and laughter that will never be 'tainted' by your once adored presence. You still run, faster and faster - clinging onto your ticket with a desperate hope but to no avail - the train quickens and no one notices your feeble frame. All the while tripping over train tracks of mixed messages and stubborn hopes. It forgets the once first class passenger and before you know it, the train is gone. You sink into despair because there isn't another one - you needed to catch that one. Your ankles buckle and break, blinded by pain everything is monochrome. That one was the ticket you purchased, saved for, waited for, invested in. You invested in THAT journey.

You are left in the dust of a lingering conversation, bitter and unrelenting, not focused on mending, only on ending. You trace your steps back to the familiar yet different station -will it ever be the same? You sit on the bench of sympathetic coffee dates with friends, cups of tea from dad and movies in with mom. You wait in that now cold and hopeless station, hoping that you will see the train is coming back. It isn't. It's cruel mechanical monotony would never change course - inflexible as its steel exterior grinding away into the distance. It doesn't know what it is leaving behind.

The stale coffee from the vending machine eventually wakes you from a desturbed sleep laden with leaky mascara sorrow and forced routine. It's acerbic - a blunt realization that the new day has come and it's time to get on your way once more. Are you ready to? Do you even want to? A hollow, caffeinated, seemingly unsustainable positivity at first. This builds into a new found drive and long lost proactivity. Motivation you thought out of grasp. You take out your map and plan your route - all the obstacles do not seem as insurmountable any more and detours not as terrifying. You know where you are going or at least you think you do - that's good enough. Don't second guess yourself.

The intercom starkly and unexpectedly interrupts your nervous excitement as you queue for another ticket - the train is back? You feel a cold sweat coming over you as an indecisive pallor clouds your sight. Dizzy from perhaps too much sleep yet a lack of rest. You get to the front. You buy a ticket. You have made your choice. You keep moving forward.

You watch the sorry-looking, now empty and lonely train stop hesitantly and tentatively in front of you. It opens it's previously crushing doors to you. It's no longer packed full of every other passenger that previously took preference. It now needs you - there is plenty of space, in fact yours has been reserved. Please hop aboard.

But there is more than one train along the tracks. This one is no longer taking you where you want to go - where you are meant to be. Sometimes it takes something you thought would be the journey of your life to show you what the true spirit of adventure is. Bon voyage.