#21jun22 | Explore Tumblr Posts and Blogs

louistomlinsoncouk · 2 years

Video

undefined

tumblr

@BBCR1 we love the @TheSnuts and @Louis_Tomlinson relationship listen to @jackxsaunders' hottest record from 6pm on @BBCSounds

#louis tomlinson #the snuts #video #21jun22

198 notes · View notes

germ-t-ripper · 2 years

Text

21JUN22 Post therapy self portrait.

#selfie #self portrait #mental health #therapy #gay bear #handsome bear #daddy bear #muscle bear #daddy #chubby chaser

2 notes · View notes

masterofd1saster · 2 years

Text

CJ court watch 21jun22

SCt decided three cases of interest today.

Carson v. Makin, 596 U. S. __ (2022) is a Free Exercise case. Vote was 6-3 along familiar lines. Maine provided a tuition reimbursement for parents of children who did not live in a school district with a public high school. The reimbursement could be used anywhere other than a sectarian school. SCt struck down that limitation as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.

In Trinity Lutheran, the Missouri Constitution banned the use of public funds in aid of “any church, sect or denomination of religion.” *** We noted that the case involved “express discrimination based on religious identity,” which was sufficient unto the day in deciding it, and that our opinion did “not address religious uses of funding.”***

Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for its otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Regardless of how the benefit and restriction are described, the program operates to identify and exclude otherwise eligible schools on the basis of their religious exercise. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

***

Shoop v. Twyford, 596 U. S. __ (2022) is a habeas case. Decision was 5-4, and J. Gorsuch voted and wrote with the dissenters.

On the evening of September 23, 1992, Raymond Twyford and his co-conspirator lured Richard Franks to a remote location, and shot and killed him. To hide their crime, the pair mutilated Franks’s body and pushed it into a pond.*** Twyford confessed*** A jury convicted Twyford of aggravated murder, kidnapping, robbery, and other charges, and he was sentenced to death. The Ohio appellate courts affirmed his conviction and sentence, State v. Twyford, 94 Ohio St. 3d 340, 763 N. E. 2d 122, and this Court denied certiorari, 537 U. S. 917 (2002).***

At trial Twyford had presented a psychologist to testify that he had acted out of a mental disease or defect. In state habeas proceedings, Twyford aruged that counsel was ineffective in presenting the mental disease or defect when he really had a brain injury. State courts said it made no difference.

When Twyford sued for federal habeas, and most of his claims were dismissed after several years,

Twyford then moved for an order compelling the State “to transport [him] to The Ohio State University Medical Center for medical testing necessary for the investigation, presentation, and development of claims.” Motion to Transport for Medical Testing in No. 2:03–cv–906 (SD Ohio), p. 1 (Motion to Transport). Twyford explained that such testing could not be conducted at the prison, and argued that it was necessary to determine whether he suffers neurological defects due to childhood physical abuse, alcohol and drug use, and the self-inflicted gunshot wound to his head. ***

The district court granted this order and the 6th Cir. affirmed without considering whether any evidence from such testing would even be admissible. SCt reversed.

AEDPA also restricts the ability of a federal habeas court to develop and consider new evidence. Review of factual determinations under §2254(d)(2) is expressly limited to “the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” And in Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170 (2011), we explained that review of legal claims under §2254(d)(1) is also “limited to the record that was before the state court.” Id., at 181. This ensures that the “state trial on the merits” is the “main event, so to speak, rather than a tryout on the road for what will later be the determinative federal habeas hearing.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 90 (1977)***

Twyford never explained how the results of the neurological testing could be admissible in his habeas proceeding, and it is hard to see how they could be. The Ohio courts already adjudicated and rejected most of these claims on the merits, and the District Court’s AEDPA review will therefore be limited to “the record that was before the state court.” Pinholster, 563 U. S., at 181. As for the claims that the state courts did not consider, Twyford never argued that he could clear the bar in §2254(e)(2) for expanding the state court record, or that the bar was somehow inapplicable***

***

United States v. Taylor, 596 U. S. __ (2022) is a Hobbs Act attempted robbery & "crime of violence" case. Decision was 7-2.

Does attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualify as a “crime of violence” under 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(3)(A)? The answer matters because a person convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robbery alone normally faces up to 20 years in prison. But if that offense qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A), the same individual may face a second felony conviction and years or decades of further imprisonment. I After a robbery went awry and his accomplice shot a man, the federal government charged Justin Taylor with violating the Hobbs Act and § 924(c). The Hobbs Act makes it a federal crime to commit, attempt to commit, or conspire to commit a robbery with an interstate component. 18 U. S. C. § 1951(a). Meanwhile, § 924(c) authorizes further punishments for those who use a firearm in connection with a “crime of violence.”***

Whatever one might say about completed Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements clause. Yes, to secure a conviction the government must show an intention to take property by force or threat, along with a substantial step toward achieving that object. But an intention is just that, no more. And whatever a substantial step requires, it does not require the government to prove that the defendant used, attempted to use, or even threatened to use force against another person or his property. As the Model Penal Code explains with respect to the Hobbs Act’s common-law robbery analogue, “there will be cases, appropriately reached by a charge of attempted robbery, where the actor does not actually harm anyone or even threaten harm.” ALI, Model Penal Code § 222.1, p. 114 (1980). “If, for example, the defendant is apprehended before he reaches his robbery victim and thus before he has actually engaged in threatening conduct, proof of his purpose to engage in such conduct” can “justify a conviction of attempted robbery” so long as his intention and some other substantial step are present. ***

An even more fundamental and by now familiar problem lurks here. The government’s theory cannot be squared with the statute’s terms. To determine whether a federal felony qualifies as a crime of violence, § 924(c)(3)(A) doesn’t ask whether the crime is sometimes or even usually associated with communicated threats of force (or, for that matter, with the actual or attempted use of force). It asks whether the government must prove, as an element of its case, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.***

0 notes

berjarakrindu · 2 years

Text

Seringkali rasa ini hadir, tp entah siapa tuannya?

Ku kiraa kmu orangnya, nyatanya hanya sementara saja.

Hati, kuat ya! Berjuang terus!

21jun22 23:19

0 notes

dailylouistomlinson · 2 years

Text