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discipleofthemis · 1 year

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, V. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, respndent.

G.R. No. 221029. April 24, 2018

Civil Law: Family Code, Article 26 (Mixed Marriages)

ISSUE: Does a Filipino citizen have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry? (answers are rulings of the Supreme Court) after the facts

FACTS: On January 10, 2012, Marelyn Tanedo Manalo filed a petition to cancel her marriage entry in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila. She based her petition on a divorce judgment issued by a Japanese court. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, specifically Branch 43, found the petition to be valid both in form and substance. The court scheduled an initial hearing on April 25, 2012, and published the petition and hearing notice in a newspaper for three consecutive weeks.

During the initial hearing, Manalo's counsel presented documentary evidence, including the court's order, an affidavit of publication, and newspaper issues from February and March 2012. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appeared on behalf of the petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, and authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to represent them. The OSG filed a motion challenging the title and caption of the petition, arguing that it should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

In response to this challenge, Manalo requested to amend her petition. The court granted her motion to admit an amended petition.

In the Amended Petition, which now included a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, the following allegations were made:

Manalo was previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named Yoshino Minoru, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract.

Manalo filed for divorce in Japan, and after due proceedings, a divorce decree was issued by the Japanese Court on December 6, 2011.

As a result of the divorce decree, Manalo and her former Japanese husband no longer live together, and she and her daughter are now residing separately from him.

It is necessary to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, where Manalo's marriage to her Japanese husband was registered. This cancellation is sought to avoid any implication that Manalo is still married to him, especially if she decides to remarry in the future.

The petition is primarily filed to request the cancellation of the marriage entry, in accordance with Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, since the marriage has already been dissolved by the divorce decree.

Manalo also prays for the restoration and use of her maiden surname, Manalo, along with the cancellation of the marriage entry.

Due to Manalo's scheduled departure to Japan for employment reasons, she was allowed to testify in advance.

During the proceedings, several documents were presented and admitted as evidence. These documents include:

Court Order dated January 25, 2012, which confirmed that the petition and its attachments were sufficient in both form and substance.

Affidavit of Publication, which served as proof that the petition and the notice of the initial hearing were published in a newspaper of general circulation.

Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012, which were published to fulfill the requirement of publication.

Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband, validating their previous marriage.

Divorce Decree issued by the Japanese court, officially dissolving the marriage.

Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan, confirming the notification of divorce.

Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce, indicating that the divorce was recognized and accepted.

It is worth noting that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) did not present any evidence contradicting or challenging the allegations made by Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court issued a ruling denying the petition of Manalo for lack of merit. The court's decision was based on its interpretation of Article 15 of the New Civil Code. According to the court, Philippine law does not grant Filipinos the right to file for divorce, regardless of whether they are residing in the Philippines or abroad, and regardless of whether they are married to Filipinos or foreigners or where the marriage took place. The court also emphasized that unless Filipinos acquire citizenship in another country, Philippine laws maintain authority over matters related to family rights and obligations, as well as the determination of their legal status and capacity to enter into contracts and civil relationships, including marriages.

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The CA ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable in Manalo's case, even though she was the one who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband. The CA based its decision on the understanding that the divorce decree obtained by Manalo rendered her former husband no longer married to her, thus enabling him to enter into a new marriage.

In line with the ruling in Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al., which emphasizes determining the intent of lawmakers, the CA concluded that considering Manalo as still married to her Japanese ex-husband would be unjust, especially when he is no longer married to her. The fact that Manalo initiated the divorce case was deemed inconsequential by the appellate court. The CA cited the case of Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr., which involved the dissolution of a marriage between a Filipino and a foreigner through a divorce filed by the Filipino spouse abroad, as a similar precedent.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a motion for reconsideration, which was subsequently denied, leading to the filing of this petition.

ANSWER (SUPREME COURT RULING): YES!!!!

The interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code focuses on its plain and clear language, which states that the provision applies to a divorce validly obtained abroad, without specifying whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The purpose of this provision is to avoid the situation where a Filipino spouse remains married to an alien spouse who is no longer married to them due to a foreign divorce decree.

There is no substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the initiative of their alien spouse. Both scenarios involve Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by the operation of the latter's national law. Both individuals are considered Filipinos with the same rights and obligations in a foreign jurisdiction.

A restrictive interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would have negative consequences. It would require Filipinos who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce to first avail of the existing mechanisms under the Family Code, leading to issues of illegitimacy for any subsequent relationships they enter into. This would harm both the parent and any children born out of such relationships.

The Supreme Court acknowledged that a Filipino can initiate divorce against a foreign spouse. However, in Marelyn's case, the court remanded it to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to allow her to present evidence on the relevant Japanese law regarding divorce.

#Philippine Case Digest #Philippine Civil Law #Family Code: Article 26 paragraph 2 #mixed marriages

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solomon104 · 7 months

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CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Garcia v. Recio

G.R. No. 13822 October 2, 2001

Facts: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, Rederick became an Australian citizen. He then married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, on January 12, 1994. In their application for a marriage license, Rederick was declared single and Filipino. On October 22, 1995, Grace and Rederick lived separately even without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.

Grace filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on March 2, 1998, on the grounds of bigamy. She contended that Rederick’s previous marriage was still subsisting at the time she contracted a marriage with him. She claimed that she learned of Rederick’s marriage to Editha Samson only in November 1997. However, Rederick said that he had told Grace about his previous marriage and the dissolution thereof. On July 7, 1998, Rederick was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Australia. In this case, the Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads

A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) bigamy commits the offence of bigamy.

Issue: Did Rederick Garcia commit bigamy?

Ruling: The Court is not sure. The case has been remanded to the Court a quo for the following reasons. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines says that the Filipino spouse can be allowed to remarry only when the alien spouse who initiated the divorce would be capacitated to remarry because of the divorce. Like any other facts, foreign laws must be alleged and proved.

There are two basic types of divorce: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The Court could not determine which type of divorce Rederick had acquired in Australia because of insufficient evidence.

Issue: Did Rederick Garcia commit bigamy?

The Australian law provision stated in the facts led the Court to believe that Rederick’s divorce might have been restricted. Hence, his capacity to remarry has not been proven. Thus, the Court had to remand the case to find conclusive evidence. However, the Court also ordered that if there is no proof shown that Rederick had the capacity to remarry, then the court a quo may declare the nullity of the marriage on the ground of bigamy since there are already two marriages contracted.

Blaze

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paolawdiary · 8 months

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IMPORTANT WORDS DEFINED.

Extrinsic Validity, defined.

The lex loci celebrationis principle is expressed in the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code: “All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country. Extrinsic validity of marriage relates to the conduct of third persons such as public officers in solemnizing the marriage, the issuance of the marriage license or performance of the marriage ceremony; it does not relate to acts attributed to the parties getting married.6 As long as there is compliance with the requirements imposed in the country where the marriage was celebrated, the marriage is considered valid there and everywhere. Reference: FUNDAMENTAL CONFLICT OF LAWS CONCEPTS AS APPLIED TO THE PHILIPPINE LAW ON PERSONAL AND PROPERTY RELATIONS OF COUPLES WITHIN AND WITHOUT MARRIAGE by ELIZABETH AGUILING-PANGALANGAN

Intrinsic Validity, defined.

The new Civil Code of the Philippines provides for the application of the nationality principle on significant issues in family law: “Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.” The municipal laws of each State specify the rules governing marriage and its termination, and the rights and duties of members of the family. For the Philippines, the substantive requirements for a valid marriage are found in Article 2 of the Family Code. These essential elements of marriage are: (1) legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and (2) consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. Legal capacity to marry means that the parties entering into the marriage must be at least 18 years of age, that one party is a female and the other a male, and that neither is barred by any impediment to marry the other. The second substantive requisite is consent freely given by the parties in the presence of an authorized solemnizing officer. Reference: FUNDAMENTAL CONFLICT OF LAWS CONCEPTS AS APPLIED TO THE PHILIPPINE LAW ON PERSONAL AND PROPERTY RELATIONS OF COUPLES WITHIN AND WITHOUT MARRIAGE by ELIZABETH AGUILING-PANGALANGAN

Paraphernal Property, defined.

According to the Civil Code in force in the Philippines, by paraphernal property is meant that which the wife brings to the marriage without including it in the dowry, and that which she later acquires without adding it thereto. The wife retains the ownership over such property; the husband cannot exercise any action of any sort with respect to such property without the intervention or consent of his wife, who has the management of said property, unless she has made it over to him before a notary in order that he may administer it, in which case the husband is bound to give a mortgage for the value of the personal property received by him, or to give security therefor in the manner provided for in dowered estate. The husband's personal obligation shall not be collected from the income of the paraphernal property, unless it be proved that they have been for the benefit of the family. (Arts. 1381, 1382, 1384, and 1386 of the Civil Code.) Reference: GASPI VS. HONORABLE JUDGE MARIA CLARISSA L. PACIS-TRINIDAD - G.R. No. 229010. November 23, 2020

Presumptive Legitime, defined.

It is not defined in the law. Its definition must have been taken from Act 2710, the Old Divorce Law, which required the delivery to the legitimate children of "the equivalent of what would have been due to them as their legal portion if said spouse had died intestate immediately after the dissolution of the community of property." As used in the Family Code, presumptive legitime is understood as the equivalent of the legitimate children's legitimes assuming that the spouses had died immediately after the dissolution of the community of property. Presumptive legitime is required to be delivered to the common children of the spouses when the marriage is annulled or declared void ab initio and possibly, when the conjugal partnership or absolute community is dissolved as in the case of legal separation. Failure of the parents to deliver the presumptive legitime will make their subsequent marriage null and void under Article 53 of the Family Code. Reference: BAR 1999

Source:

Family Code of the Philippines (2022); Judge Ed Vincent S. Albano , Ed Vincent A. Albano, Jr.

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digestsbymarianpurpleink · 8 months

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Bayot v. Court of Appeals and Vicente Bayot, G.R. Nos. 155635/163979, November 07, 2008

Topic: Foreign Divorce Obtained by a Foreigner Married to a Filipino

Doctrine

In determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

Doctrinal concept mentioned in the Decision:

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

SUPER SUMMARY

Vicente Bayot and Rebecca, an American citizen, got married in the Philippines in 1979. After the birth of their child in 1982, their relationship turned sour. Sometime in 1996, Rebecca obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Five years thereafter, Rebecca filed a case for nullity of marriage against Vicente before Muntinlupa RTC and sought support pendente lite against the latter. According to Rebecca, the divorce decree obtained in Dominican Republic is not binding, her being a Filino citizen by virtue of the order of recognition issued in 1995. Is the divorce decree obtained in the Dominican valid in the Philippines and binding against the petitioner?

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. In determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained. Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to be one. Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Moreover, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000, affirmation by the DOJ Secretary of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition, it will not stand alone and work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. Furthermore, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code, Vicente Bayot shall likewise have capacity to remarry under PH laws.

FACTS

[Some of the details in this case are confusing. It was not stated in the decision as to why she filed the petition for Divorce in Dominican Republic. Based on the website of the US Embassy in the Dominican Republic, US citizens may validly obtain divorce decrees there either through mutual consent or divorce for cause. See Divorce in the Dominican Republic - U.S. Embassy in the Dominican Republic (usembassy.gov) for more info.

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen. Not long after, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix, in California. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96, ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix.

Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97, settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the “conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa.”

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved and secured approval of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained in Dominican Republic is valid and can be recognized under Philippine laws.

Whether or not Vicente is still subject to the obligation under the Civil Code as Rebecca’s husband.

RULING

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of jus soli granting American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder of American passport.

She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an American citizen, as shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix's birth certificate, when she secured divorce in Dominican Republic. Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce.

In order that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, the divorce decree must be proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient. Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid, and consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Furthermore, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000, affirmation by the DOJ Secretary of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, stand alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

Lastly, on the issue of their conjugal property, the Court held that the Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued by the Dominican Republic court properly adjudicated the ex-couple's property relations.

The Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other.

As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after completing the legal requirements."

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.[Side Note: You may wonder “What about Alix?”. Is she not entitled to support from Vicente? The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education.]

#Civil Law #Persons and Family Relations

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orfealfonso · 10 months

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CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Garcia v. Recio

G.R. No. 13822 October 2, 2001

A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) bigamy commits the offence of bigamy.

Issue: Did Rederick Garcia commit bigamy?

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hildagarcia · 10 months

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Garcia v. Recio G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) bigamy commits the offence of bigamy.

ssue: Did Rederick Garcia commit bigamy?

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blahblahnezz · 10 months

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Garcia v. Recio G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent

A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) bigamy commits the offence of bigamy.

Issue: Did Rederick Garcia commit bigamy?

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ronaldbustillo · 10 months

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Garcia v. Recio G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent

A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) bigamy commits the offence of bigamy.

Issue: Did Rederick Garcia commit bigamy?

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marisatuito · 11 months

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Case Digest: Garcia v Recio G.R No. 138322

Facts:

Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. In 1992, Rederick became an Australian citizen. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, in Cabanatuan City.

In 1998, Grace Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Rederick on the ground of bigamy. She alleged that Rederick had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her which she learned in 1997 only. He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry Grace in 1994.

Issues:

1. Was the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson proven?2. Was respondent proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner?

Held:

The Court is not sure. The case has been remanded to the Court a quo for the following reasons. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines says that the Filipino spouse can be allowed to remarry only when the alien spouse who initiated the divorce would be capacitated to remarry because of the divorce. Like any other facts, foreign laws must be alleged and proved.

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celestial-law · 2 years

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Republic v. Manalo

Facts

Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law

Issue

Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead of the foreign spouse?

Ruling Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate as to who should file the divorce.

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rdpunzalan · 2 years

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Article 95 of the Family Code

Art. 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the community property. (164a)

CASE DIGEST:

G.R. No. 125172 June 26, 1998

Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA COPUZ, respondents.

FACTS: Judie Corpuz, the private respondent's husband, sold to Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang one-half of their conjugal property, which included their home and the lot on which it was situated, notwithstanding Gilda Corpuz's objections and while she was in Manila looking for work.

On March 11, 1990, private responder returned home. Petitioners filed a complaint with the Barangay authorities against private respondent for continuing to reside in the home her husband had sold.

The parties thereto executed an agreement known as a "amicable settlement" on March 16, 1990. The settlement fully provides for the following, namely:

"That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three children, namely: Junie, Hariet and Judie to leave voluntarily the house of Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Guiang, where they are presently boarding without any fee, on or before April 7, 1990."

Private respondent proceeded to the Barangay to have her signature on the peaceful settlement questioned because she felt she had been given the short end of the stick.

On May 28, 1990, Private Respondent filed an Amended Complainant against her husband and Petitioner-Spouses. In the aforementioned complaint, it was requested that a specific contract of sale involving the marital property of the private respondent and her spouse be declared void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed.

Whether or not the "amicable settlement" validly ratified the Deed of Transfer of Rights.

HELD:

On the First Issue: Petitioners maintain that the parties to the lawsuit properly completed the contested Deed of Transfer of Rights in good faith and in exchange for a valuable value.

The Deed was only voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code because the private respondent's lack of consent:

"Article 1390. Even if there may have been no harm to the contractual parties, the following contracts are voidable or annullable:

x x x x x x x x x

(2) Those in which the consent has been tainted by error, aggression, intimidation, improper influence, or fraud.

These agreements are capable of ratification and are enforceable, unless properly challenged in court.

Article 1390, paragraph 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, which are contracts entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated through error, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud. In this case, the private respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally nonexistent or absent.

Given such, the aforementioned contract appropriately falls under the purview of Article 124 of the Family Code, which the lower court rightly applied:

"Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership properly shall belong to both spouses jointly; in case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail; provided, however, that the wife may seek appropriate relief from the court within five years of the date on which the contract implementing such decision was executed."

The other spouse may exercise exclusive powers of administration in the event that one spouse is incapable of managing the conjugal possessions or is otherwise unable to do so. These powers do not include the ability to dispose of property or encumber real estate, either of which requires court approval or the other's spouse's written agreement.

The disposition or encumbrance is void if such authority or permission is not present. The transaction, however, shall be deemed to be a continuing offer by the consenting spouse and the third party, and may be consummated as a binding agreement upon acceptance by the other spouse or approval by the court prior to the withdrawal of the offer by either or both offerors.

In conclusion, the lack of the private respondent's consent forms the basis for the sale contract's nullity. According to the Civil Code, a contract must have all three of the following elements—cause, object, and consent—all of which are unquestionably lacking in the current situation.

On the Second Issue: Petitioners assert that the contract of sale was properly approved by the disputing parties through the "amicable settlement" they signed on March 16, 1990, insisting that it was only voidable.

The argument is not well made. This matter has been decided in favor of the private respondent by both the trial and appeal courts.

It is axiomatically true that a void contract cannot be approved.

Therefore, the petition is hereby denied and the challenged decision and resolution are upheld. Petitioners will be responsible for their costs.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

#judgeprincess

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noelmendozasblog · 2 years

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner v. CRASUS L. IYOY, respondent.

G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005

FACTS:

Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They begot five children. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on March 25, 1997.

On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab ignition on the ground of psychological incapacity. One factor considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has established another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological incapacity.

2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.

RULING:

1st issue:

The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely. Using the guidelines established by the cases of Santos, Molina and Marcos, this Court found that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.

2nd issue:

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

#judgeprincess

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mj-blog-spot · 2 years

Text

Republic v. Obrecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981. They were blessed with a with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 and then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California. He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

RULLING: No, Orbecido cannot remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code because Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien and since he failed to prove that his wife was already naturalized as an American citizen and obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 therefore he was still barred from remarrying.

#@judgeprincess

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digestsbymarianpurpleink · 8 months

Text

Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, [September 21, 2005], 507 PHIL 485-508

Doctrine

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

In relation to Art. 26(2) FCP Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Note: The concept of psychological incapacity was heavily discussed in the decision, however I do not think that it should be included in this digest. That’ll be quite advanced. Let’s cross the bridge when we get there.

SUPER SUMMARY

Crasus and Fely got married in Cebu City. What started with a blissful marriage blessed with 5 kids ended with Fely leaving the marital home and eventually left for the United States of America. 13 years thereafter, Crasus filed for annulment. Fely, on the other hand, contends that such proceedings are no longer necessary as she had filed a divorce against Crasus in 1984 and became an American citizen in 1988, therefore PH laws should not bind her anymore. Is the contention of Fely correct?

HELD: Negative. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.

FACTS

Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Cebu City. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child.

At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not Fely is still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties despite acquiring American citizenship.

RULING

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines - Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law - is not applicable to the case at bar.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the married couple is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

#Civil Law #Persons and Family Relations

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ethicalpraxis · 3 years

Text

Article 23 of the Family Code

It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the

duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized.

Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall

retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the

marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8. (68a)

Case: Republic vs. Orbecido III, October 5, 2005

Facts: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE

Held: Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,one of them became naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree.

The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed, she remarried an American citizen while residing in the US. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he was still barred from remarrying.

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seehonduras · 3 years

Text

seehonduras_history_onthisdate

TUESDAY, AUGUST 11, 2015, AGREEMENT NO.450-2015 IS APPROVED

SEDIS- DIRECTORATE OF CHILDHOOD, ADOLESCENCE AND FAMILY DINAF Agreement No. 450-2015

Internal Public Service Regulations of the Directorate for Children, Adolescents and the Family

LEGISLATIVE POWER

ERRATUM

AGREEMENT No. 450-2015

Tegucigalpa, M.D.C., July 24, 2015 THE DIRECTORATE OF CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS AND FAMILY,

CONSIDERING (1): That the Directorate for Children, Adolescents and the Family (DINAF) has been created by Executive Decree PCM 27-2014 of June 4, 2014 as a decentralized entity, attached to the Secretariat of State in the Offices of Development and Social Inclusion, with technical, functional and administrative independence for the best fulfillment of its purposes.

CONSIDERING (2): That in accordance with the provisions of Article 16 of the aforementioned Executive Decree, public servants working in the DINAF will be governed by the Civil Service Law.

CONSIDERING (3): That Article 17 of Executive Decree PCM 27-2014 establishes that dinaf is empowered to issue regulations and provisions for its operation, as well as general regulations for the best fulfillment of its purposes.

CONSIDERING (4): That for the normal and adequate service that the DINAF is called to provide to the Company, and necessary the establishment of the appropriate public service conditions and governed by the highest standards of ethics and mutual respect among the personnel who work in it, so it is pertinent an Internal Regulation that norme such conditions.

CONSIDERING (5): That the Internal Regulations of the DINAF cannot ignore the fact that its functionality is subject to the best interests of the child and the Legal Guardianship of children in a situation of vulnerability is required of the State, so that the services provided to it must be carried out in accordance with these principles.

WHEREAS (6): That by means of Opinion No. DLRI-DGSC-148-2015, issued by the Legal Department of the General Directorate of Civil Service, on July 16, 2015 based on Articles 80, 256 and 257 of the Constitution of the Republic; 7 paragraphs 10), 11) and 14, 58 and 59 of the Civil Service Act and 206, 207 and 210 of its Implementing Regulations, the Preliminary Draft Internal Regulations of the Directorate for Children, Adolescents and the Family (DINAF) were approved for having complied with the process for issuing the Internal Labour Regulations, and declares their application to be appropriate.

therefore:

Pursuant to Articles 1, 82, 89 and 321 of the Constitution of the Republic; 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; 43, second paragraph; 46, 116, 118 and 122 of the General Law on Public Administration; 5, second paragraph, 10, 32, 84 and the Children and Adolescents Code; 5, paragraphs 1), 26 and 33 of the Code of Ethics of the Public Servant; 72, 80, 85 and 97 of the Organic Law of the High Court of Accounts; 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act; 7, paragraphs 14, 33, 38, 39, 40, 45, 46, second paragraph, and 59 of the Civil Service Act; 92(9) and 94 of the Labour Code; 16 and 17 of Executive Decree PCM 27-2014 of June 4, 2014; 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51 and 53 of the General Regulations of the Organic Law of the High Court of Accounts; and, 210 of the Regulations of the Civil Service Act.

A G R E E S:

Adopt the following: Internal Public Service Regulations of the Directorate for Children, Adolescents and the Family

Article 1.- Purpose. These Rules of Procedure constitute the set of minimum legal standards that determine and regulate the conditions and relationships to which, in the exercise of their functions and positions, public servants of the Directorate for Children, Adolescents and the Family, hereinafter referred to as DINAF, must be subject.

Article 2.- Scope of Application. This Regulation shall apply to dinaf public servants in the exercise of their duties. Article 3.- Objectives. The objectives of this Regulation are: (a) to manage dinaf's human resources with fairness and transparency; b) Define the specific functions of the Human Resources Management of DINAF; (c) Establish procedures for the management of DINAF's human resources; (d) To establish the human resources sanctioning framework of DINAF;

Article 4.- The organization, functions and competences of the DINAF will be determined in accordance with Article 4 of Executive Decree PCM 27-2014 of June 4, 2014.

Article 5.- Work Centers. Work centres are defined as the central, regional, sectoral, management, headquarters, units, sections, warehouses and other sites included in the institutional establishment and its dependencies, as well as the vehicles of dinaf or those that serve it in any form, in which public servants perform their functions in accordance with their form of recruitment, category of work, wages and salaries.

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