#Many random Google Docs with ambiguous names

[readerattheend]

Because I like organizing things, here's the cache where I keep track of what I've read/watched ^^

Does anyone else organize their entertainment like this?

I find that, since I have a pretty quick reading speed, I'll lose track of what I've read or watched if I don't do things like this to remember.

Maybe this is excessive, but I have to admit that it's satisfying to see the "Completed" sections grow.

Feel free to see this as my list of recommendations, too, if you're looking for any.

**I made the amazing mistake of posting this to an Alien Stage community rather than my personal blog earlier today, so that's a little embarrassing ^^

[gilbertineonfr2]

Botconf 2017 Wrap-Up Day #3

And this is already the end of Botconf. Time for my last wrap-up. The day started a little bit later to allow some people to recover from the social event. It started at 09:40 with a talk presented by Anthony Kasza, from PaloAlto Networks: “Formatting for Justice: Crime Doesn’t Pay, Neither Does Rich Text“. Everybody knows the RTF format… even more since the famous CVE-2017-0199. But what’s inside an RTF document? As the name says, it is used to format text. It was created by Microsoft in 1987. It has similarities with HTML:

Entities are represented with ‘{‘ and ‘}’. Example:

{\iThis is some italic text}

There are control words like “\rtf”, “\info”, “\author”, “\company”, “\i”, “\AK”, …. It is easy to obfuscate such document with extra whitespaces, headers or with nested elements:

{\rtf [\info]] == {\rtf }}

This means that writing signature is complex. Also, just rename the document with a .doc extension and it will be opened by Word. How to generate RTF documents? They are the official “tools” like Microsoft or Wordpad but they are, of course, plenty of malicious tools:

2017-0199 builder

wingd/stone/ooo

Sofacy, Monsoon, MWI

Ancalog, AK builder

What about analysis tools? Here also, it is easy to build a toolbox with nice tools: rtfdump, rtfobj, pyRTF, YARA are some of them. To write good signatures, Anthony suggested focussing on suspicious words:

 \info

\object

DDEAUTO

\pict

\insrsid or \rsidtbl

DDEAUTO is a good candidate for a while and is seen as the “most annoying bug of the year” for its inclusion in everything (RTF & other documents, e-mail, calendar entries…). Anthony finished his talk by providing a challenge based on an RTF file.

The next talk was presented byPaul Jung: “PWS, Common, Ugly but Effective“. PWS also know as “info stealer” are a very common piece of malware. They steal credentials from many sources (browsers, files, registries, wallets, etc).

They also offer “bonus” features like screenshot grabbers or keylogger. How to find them? Buy them, find a cracked one or open sources. Some of them have also promotional videos on Youtube! A PWS is based on a builder that generates a specific binary based on the config file, it is delivered via protocols like email, HTTP and data are managed via a control panel. Paul reviewed some well-known PWS like JPro Crack Stealer, Pony (the most famous), Predator Pain or Agent Tesla. The last one promotes itself as “not being a malware”. Some of them support more than 130 different applications to steal passwords from. Some do not reinvent the wheel and just use external tools (ex: the Nirsoft suite). If it is difficult to detect them before the infection, it’s quite easy to spot them based on the noise they generate in log files. They use specific queries:

“POST /fre.php” for Lokibot

“POST /gate.php” for Pony or Zeus

Very nice presentation!

After the first coffee refill break, Paul Rascagnères presented “Nyetya Malware & MeDoc Connection“. The presentation was a recap of the bad story that affected Ukraine a few months ago. It started with a phone call saying “We need help“. They received some info to start the investigation but their telemetry did not return anything juicy (Talos collects a huge amount of data to build their telemetry). Paul explained the case of M.E. Doc, a company providing a Windows application for tax processing. The company servers were compromised and the software was modified. Then, Paul reviewed the Nytia malware. It used WMI, PsExec, EternalBlue, EternalRomance and scanned ranges of IP to infect more computers. It also used a modified version of Mimikatz. Note that Nyetya cleared the infected host logs. This is a good reminder to always push logs on an external system to prevent losing pieces of evidence.

The next talk was about a system to track the Locky ransomware based on its DGA: “Math + GPU + DNS = Cracking Locky Seeds in Real Time without Analyzing Samples“. Yohai Einav Alexey Sarychev explained how they solved the problem to detect as fast as possible new variation of domain names used by the Locky ransomware. The challenges were:

To get the DGA  (it’s public now)

To be able to process a vast search space. The namespace could be enormous (from 3 digit seed to 4 then 5, 6). There is a scalability problem.

Mapping the ambiguity (and avoid collisions with other DGA’s)

So solution they developed is based on GPU (for maximum speed). If you’re interested in the Locky DGA, you can have a look at their dataset.

The next talk was, for me, the best of the day because it contained a lot of useful information that many people can immediately reuse in their environment to improve the detection of malicious behaviour or to improve their DFIR process. It was titled “Hunting Attacker Activities – Methods for Discovering, Detecting Lateral Movements” and presented by Keisuke Muda and Shusei Tomonaga. Based on their investigations, they explained how attackers can perform lateral movement inside a network just be using standard Windows tools (that, by default, are not flagged as malicious by the antivirus).

They presented multiple examples of commands or small scripts used to scan, pivot, cover tracks, etc. Then they explained how to detect this kind of activity. They made a good comparison of the standard Windows audit log versus the well-known Sysmon tool. They presented pro & con of each solution and the conclusion could be that, for maximum detection, you need both. There were so many examples that it’s not possible to list them here. I just recommend you to have a look at the documents available online:

https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/

https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/20170612ac-ir_research_en.pdf

It was an amazing presentation!

After the lunch, Jaeson Schultz, also from Talos, presented “Malware, Penny Stocks, Pharma Spam – Necurs Delivers“. The talk was a good review of the biggest spam botnet active. Just some numbers collected from multiple campaigns; 2.1 messages, 1M unique sender IP addresses from 216 countries/territories. The top countries are India, Vietnam, Iran and Pakistan. Jaeson explained that the re-use of IP address is so low that it’s difficult to maintain blacklists.

How do the bad guys send emails? They use harvested accounts (of course) but also auto-generated addresses and common / role-based accounts. That’s why the use of catch-all mailboxes is useful. Usually, big campaigns are launched from Monday to Friday and regular campaigns are constantly running at a low speed. Jaeson presented many examples of spam, attachments. Good review with entertaining slides.

Then, Łukasz Siewierski presented “Thinking Outside of the (Sand)box“. Łukasz is working for Google (Play Store) and analyze applications. He said that all applications submitted to Google are reviewed from a security point of view. Android has many security features: SE linux, application sandbox, permission model, verified boot, (K)ASLR, Seccomp but the presentation focused on the sandbox. First, why is there a sandboxing system? To prevent spyware to access other applications data, to prevent applications to pose as other ones, make easy to attribute action to specific apps and to allow strict policy enforcement.  But how to break the sandbox? First, the malware can ask users for a number of really excessive permissions. In this case, you just have to wait and cross your fingers that he will click “Allow”. Another method is to use Xposed. I already heard about this framework at Hack in the Box. It can prevent apps to be displayed in the list of installed applications. It gives any application every permission but there is one big drawback: the victim MUST install Xposed! The other method is to root the phone, inject code into other processes and profit. Łukasz explained different techniques to perform injection on Android but it’s not easy. Even more since the release of “Nougat” which introduced now mitigations techniques.

The last slot was assigned to Robert Simmons who presented “Advanced Threat Hunting“. It was very interesting because Robert gave nice tips to improve the process of threat hunting. It can require a lot of resources that are … limited! We have small teams with limited resources and limited time. He also gave tips to better share information. A good example is YARA rules. Everybody has a set of YARA rules in private directories, on laptops, etc. Why not store them in a central repository like a gitlab server? Many other tips were given that are worth a read if you are performing threat hunting.

The event was close to the classic kind word of the team. You can already book your agenda for the 6th edition that will be held in Toulouse!

  [The post Botconf 2017 Wrap-Up Day #3 has been first published on /dev/random]

from Xavier

[tragicbooks]

How to protect yourself from phishing, from experts who deal with it every day.

Ever wonder what it's like to be hacked? Sarah Jeong did. So naturally, she decided to ask someone to hack her.

Jeong isn't just a random thrill-seeker — she's a respected technology journalist and lawyer, and she knew exactly what she was getting into when she recruited her friend Cooper Quintin of the Electronic Frontier Foundation to help her out. She wrote about her experience in GQ.

All it took was a couple of hours and some readily available tools, and Jeong joined the approximately 12% of the population who have fallen for a hack.

But even before she was successfully hacked — and don't worry, we'll get to that! — both Jeong and Quintin discovered some important truths about the world of online safety and what it takes to infiltrate it.

Here are just a few lessons from experts that we can all benefit from:

Photo by Blogtrepreneur/Flickr.

1. Most hacking isn't done by master "Matrix" coders.

For most people, "hacking" tends to evoke one of two images: a stereotypically out-of-shape nerd in their parents' basement or a sleek, leather-clad cyberpunk in a Guy Fawkes mask who moonlights as an extra on a Wachowski movie.

But in reality, most of what we call "hacking" is actually "phishing."  In fact, last year, then-Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson said that phishing is the threat his department fears most.

THIS IS NOT WHAT HACKERS LOOK LIKE. Except when they do, which is sometimes. Photo by Vincent Diamonte/Flickr.

2. Phishing is a type of scam that disguises itself as something trustworthy.

It can be an email, phone call, or text message, and it then tricks you into giving up your passwords, credit card numbers, and more. All it takes are some clever social skills plus some free online tools used by information security professionals that, technically, anyone can use. (A little coding knowledge doesn't hurt, though.)

3. Many hackers are savvier than you might think.

It doesn't matter if you have the best anti-virus software installed on your computer and run daily checks for malware along with Ghostery and ad block to keep your online browsing extra-safe. Don't get me wrong — viruses and malware are still dangerous. But phishing isn't about computers. It's about people. And that's a lot harder to protect against.

"Phishing isn’t (just) about finding a person who is technically naive," Cory Doctorow, a sci-fi author, journalist, and technology activist told Locus magazine.  As savvy as he is, even he fell for a phishing hack back in 2010. "It’s about attacking the seemingly impregnable defenses of the technically sophisticated until you find a single, incredibly unlikely, short-lived crack in the wall."

"It’s a matter of being caught out in a moment of distraction and of unlikely circumstance." In other words, it can happen to anyone.

Smile! I'm stealing your identity! Image via Pixnio.

4. The terrible typos and grammar in some phishing schemes are intentional.

You're probably familiar with the classic "Nigerian prince" phishing scheme, where some kind of foreign dignitary emails you and offers you a ton of money to help facilitate the transfer of their new bajillion-dollar inheritance. You also probably know that these emails are famously riddled with grammatical errors and totally implausible premises.

What you might not know, however, is that these "mistakes" are done on purpose in order to target the most gullible people. That way, reports Business Insider, the scammers don't have to waste their time trying to persuade rational skeptics to give up their bank account information.

Photo by Nate Grigg/Flickr.

5. To hack a specific person, all a hacker needs is social media.

You know those silly memes where you find your "porn star name" (or whatever) by using the name of your first pet and the street you grew up on?

Now think about those security questions you had to answer for your online bank account — things like, oh, the name of your first pet, the street you grew up on, or your mom's maiden name.

Yeah. See the connection there? If a hacker wants to social-engineer their way into your bank account, all they need to do is poke around your public accounts to find those little bits of information. These targeted attacks are called "spearphishing," and they're why Doctorow recommends that people "only use Facebook to convince your friends to communicate with you somewhere other than Facebook."

Image from Pixabay.

6. Be careful what you open — even when it's sent by someone you know.

Jeong was hacked after she clicked on a malicious link made to look like it was sent from someone she knew.

To hack her, Quintin just had to scour Jeong's online presence until he found an acquaintance who could plausibly email her. He made a fake email address — using that person's real-life profile picture and everything — and that was all it took to get Jeong to give up her information.

Fake Google Docs scams, like the one she fell for, are increasingly common. In these cases, the target receives a phishing email that looks like a standard invitation to Google Docs sent from a trustworthy source — except that both the sender and the link are actually malicious frauds. This link will bring you to a landing page that resembles the standard Google password screen or bank login page you thought you were clicking on, and the hacker can use that to capture whatever password or personal information you enter into the false form.

7. Double-check your URLs.

Always make sure you're really on the website that you think you are before you enter any sensitive information.

How do you tell the difference? Generally speaking, the domain name should look like "[blank].google.com" or "http://ift.tt/2tkU3Bs]." If it's something hyphenated like "accounts-drive-google.com" or "boa-accounts-login.com," well, you should probably think twice about it.

(Another helpful tip is to look for SSL certificates, which usually appear as a lock or green text in your browser bar — but even that's not totally reliable.)

What is real? What is fake? Image from Pixabay.

8. You should definitely use two-step authentication.

I hate to break it to you, but your p@$$w0rd probably isn't very safe. The least you can do, according to CNET, is turn on two-step authentication. That way, every time you log in to an unfamiliar device, you'll get a text message with a secret code just to make sure it's you — because even if someone gets your password, they probably don't have your phone, too.

Unless they, um, literally walked into the AT&T store and charmed a sales rep into changing your phone number over to their phone. Which happens.

9. And use a password manager.

If you want to be extra extra safe, use a password manager such as LastPass, then set up a DiceWare password like "correct horse battery staple" (or some of these other great ones recommended by the Intercept) that are incredibly easy to remember but next-to-impossible for hackers or computers to crack.

Image from Pixabay.

10. Remember the greatest flaw in your internet security is the trusting nature of other people.

A trusting customer service rep can easily compromise you without realizing it. Your friend who mentions you on Facebook can do the same.

Heck, my wife has a fairly gender-ambiguous name, and I can tell you from personal experience how easy it is to call up the bank and pretend I'm her — even when I have to charm my way around a security question about her high school mascot. Which, yes, I've done.

As Jeong wrote, "Successful social engineers are not just perfectly capable of interacting with human beings — they are talented manipulators who take advantage of our willingness to trust our colleagues, friends, and family."

"You can turn your digital life into Fort Knox and still be undone by an overly trusting salesperson behind a desk."

Basic rule: Always look over your shoulder. Photo by Arthur Harry Chaudary/Wikimedia Commons.

There's no way to protect yourself from every possible online vulnerability. But that doesn't mean you shouldn't try!

As we've seen, the power of the internet can used for good or evil. All it takes is one trusting click, and even the savviest security professionals can find themselves compromised.

The best you can do is be smart and pay attention. A tiny bit of paranoid skepticism will save you a lot of time, stress, and energy in the long run, and that'll free you up to enjoy all the wonderful things that the internet has to offer. Trust me.