#Radar & EW Sensor Testing

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Constelli - A Signal Processing Company in Defense and Aerospace

Constelli is a signal processing company solving problems in Defense and Aerospace fields.

[differenttimemachinecrusade]

Signals Intelligence Market Research Report: Industry Insights and Forecast 2032

The Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Market Size was USD 16.37 Billion in 2023 and is expected to Reach USD 26.57 Billion by 2032 and grow at a CAGR of 5.57% over the forecast period of 2024-2032

The Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) market is witnessing rapid expansion due to increasing geopolitical tensions, rising cybersecurity threats, and advancements in communication technologies. Governments and defense organizations are heavily investing in SIGINT solutions to enhance national security and intelligence-gathering capabilities. The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and big data analytics is further revolutionizing the industry.

The Signals Intelligence market continues to grow as global defense strategies increasingly rely on sophisticated surveillance and intelligence systems. With the rise of cyber warfare and electronic threats, SIGINT is becoming an essential tool for military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies worldwide. The demand for real-time data interception, threat analysis, and secure communication systems is driving innovation in the sector.

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Market Keyplayers:

Harris Corporation (Communication Systems, Electronic Warfare)

Northrop Grumman Corporation (Cybersecurity Solutions, Surveillance Systems)

BAE Systems (Electronic Warfare, Cyber Intelligence)

Raytheon Company (Radar Systems, Electronic Warfare Solutions)

Lockheed Martin Corporation (Advanced Communications, Surveillance Technologies)

Mercury Systems Inc. (Sensor Processing Solutions, Electronic Warfare)

Elbit Systems Ltd. (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Solutions)

Thales Group (Cybersecurity, Electronic Warfare Systems)

Rheinmetall AG (Defense Electronics, Surveillance Solutions)

General Dynamics Corporation (Cybersecurity, Communication Systems)

L3Harris Technologies (Communication and Electronic Warfare Solutions)

Cisco Systems Inc. (Network Security, Cyber Intelligence Solutions)

Leonardo S.p.A. (Electronic Warfare, Intelligence Solutions)

Saab AB (Electronic Warfare, Cyber Defense Solutions)

AeroVironment, Inc. (Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Surveillance Technologies)

Kongsberg Gruppen (Defense Systems, Surveillance Solutions)

Cubic Corporation (Training and Simulation Systems)

Rohde & Schwarz GmbH & Co. KG (Radio Communication, Electronic Test and Measurement)

Inmarsat plc (Satellite Communication Solutions)

Viasat Inc. (Satellite Communication, Cybersecurity Solutions)

Market Trends Driving Growth

1. Increasing Cybersecurity and National Security Threats

Governments and intelligence agencies are prioritizing SIGINT investments to combat cyberattacks, espionage, and digital warfare. The growing need for real-time intelligence has led to significant advancements in signal interception and threat detection.

2. AI and Machine Learning in SIGINT

Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning are enhancing SIGINT capabilities by automating data processing, improving signal analysis, and enabling faster threat identification. AI-driven systems are also helping in predicting and mitigating security risks.

3. Growth in Electronic Warfare (EW) Technologies

Modern electronic warfare systems rely on SIGINT to intercept, jam, and analyze enemy communications. Nations are strengthening their EW capabilities to counter emerging threats, boosting the demand for advanced SIGINT solutions.

4. Expansion of Space-Based SIGINT

The deployment of SIGINT satellites is increasing, providing enhanced surveillance capabilities for intelligence agencies. Space-based signal interception is playing a critical role in monitoring global communications and detecting potential threats.

5. Integration with 5G and IoT Networks

The expansion of 5G and IoT networks has created new challenges and opportunities for SIGINT operations. Intelligence agencies are adapting their surveillance methods to monitor encrypted and high-speed communications more effectively.

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Market Segmentation:

By Solutions

Airborne

Ground

Naval

Space

Cyber

By Type

Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)

Communications Intelligence (COMINT)

By Mobility

Fixed

Portable

Market Analysis and Current Landscape

Rising defense budgets: Governments worldwide are increasing spending on intelligence and surveillance capabilities.

Advancements in data analytics: Big data and AI are transforming the way intelligence is gathered and analyzed.

Private sector involvement: Defense contractors and tech firms are actively developing cutting-edge SIGINT solutions.

Growing concerns over cyber espionage: The increasing frequency of cyberattacks is pushing nations to strengthen their intelligence-gathering efforts.

Despite its growth, the market faces challenges such as ethical concerns over mass surveillance, regulatory restrictions, and the complexity of analyzing vast amounts of intercepted data. However, ongoing technological advancements are expected to address these issues.

Future Prospects: What Lies Ahead?

1. Enhanced AI-Driven Intelligence Processing

AI will play a greater role in automating SIGINT operations, making intelligence gathering more efficient and accurate. Predictive analytics and real-time data processing will be crucial for national security efforts.

2. Expansion of Cyber SIGINT Capabilities

As cyber threats evolve, SIGINT solutions will integrate more advanced cybersecurity tools, enabling real-time monitoring and mitigation of digital threats.

3. Strengthening International Intelligence Alliances

Countries are forming alliances to share intelligence data and enhance global security cooperation. Joint SIGINT operations are expected to increase in the coming years.

4. Miniaturization of SIGINT Devices

Portable and compact SIGINT solutions will gain traction, enabling special forces and field operatives to conduct surveillance and intelligence gathering with greater mobility.

5. Ethical and Legal Developments in SIGINT

Governments and organizations will focus on balancing security needs with privacy concerns, leading to the development of legal frameworks that regulate SIGINT operations.

Access Complete Report: https://www.snsinsider.com/reports/signals-intelligence-market-3528 

Conclusion

The Signals Intelligence market is on a strong growth trajectory, driven by global security concerns, advancements in AI, and the increasing reliance on data-driven intelligence. As technology continues to evolve, SIGINT will play a pivotal role in national defense, cybersecurity, and intelligence operations. With continuous innovation and strategic investments, the future of SIGINT is poised to be more efficient, integrated, and responsive to emerging global threats.

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[atomarium]

meow

Technical Analysis of the GUS 77 "The Juggler" Aircraft

Abstract:

The GUS 77 "The Juggler," developed by Lockheed Martin, is a fifth-generation multirole fighter aircraft. This analysis focuses on its technical specifications, including dimensions, propulsion, avionics, stealth features, and combat capabilities, supported by mathematical calculations and numerical data.

1. Dimensions:

- Length: 15.7 meters

- Wingspan: 10.7 meters

- Height: 4.3 meters

- Wing area: 42.7 square meters

2. Propulsion System:

- Engine: Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 turbofan

- Thrust: 28,000 lbf (125 kN) dry thrust, 43,000 lbf (191 kN) with afterburner

- Thrust-to-weight ratio: 0.87 (empty weight), 1.07 (loaded weight)

3. Avionics and Sensors:

- Radar: AN/APG-81 AESA radar

- Range: Over 200 nautical miles (370 km)

- Power: 20 kW

- Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS):

- Sensor range: >50 km

- Field of regard: 360° azimuth, ±110° elevation

- Distributed Aperture System (DAS):

- Coverage: 360° spherical coverage

- Sensors: 6 infrared cameras

- Resolution: >1,000 pixels per frame

- Electronic Warfare (EW) Suite:

- AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda EW suite

4. Stealth Features:

- Radar Cross Section (RCS):

- RCS reduction: Equivalent to the size of a marble

- Coatings: Radar-absorbent materials (RAMs)

- Internal Weapons Bay:

- Dimensions: 5.0 meters x 1.2 meters x 1.2 meters

- Capacity: Up to 18,000 pounds (8,100 kg) of ordnance

5. Combat Capabilities:

- Maximum speed: Mach 1.6 (1,930 km/h)

- Combat radius: Over 1,200 nautical miles (2,200 km)

- Maximum takeoff weight: 70,000 pounds (31,800 kg)

- Maximum G-load: +9/-3 G

6. Mathematical Calculations:

- Range Calculation:

- Assuming a cruise speed of Mach 0.9 (1,093 km/h) and a fuel consumption rate of 0.7 lb/(lbf·h), the GUS 77 "The Juggler's" maximum combat radius can be calculated using the Breguet range equation.

- Range = (Endurance × Speed × ln(W1/W2)) / (SFC × g)

- Endurance = Fuel capacity / Fuel consumption rate

- W1/W2 = Initial to final weight ratio

- SFC = Specific fuel consumption

- g = Acceleration due to gravity

- Stealth Calculation:

- RCS reduction is calculated based on the RCS of the aircraft before and after applying stealth technologies.

- RCS reduction = Initial RCS - Final RCS

7. Conclusion:

- The GUS 77 "The Juggler" boasts impressive technical specifications, including advanced propulsion, avionics, stealth features, and combat capabilities, supported by mathematical calculations and numerical data.

- Further analysis and testing are essential to validate and optimize the aircraft's performance in real-world operational scenarios.

[deblala]

Raytheon EMP weapon tested by Boeing, USAF Research Lab - Military Embedded Systems

https://militaryembedded.com/radar-ew/sensors/raytheon-emp-missile-tested-by-boeing-usaf-research-lab

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BAE obtains $493 million contract to update the F-35 electronic warfare package

Fernando Valduga By Fernando Valduga 12/16/2021 - 12:00 pm in Military

BAE Systems will upgrade the F-35 electronic warfare system (EW) to Block 4 update of the jet under a $493 million contract granted by Lockheed Martin.

“This contract provides funding for the development and maturation of the electronic warfare hardware baseline for the F-35 Block 4,” said Lisa Aucoin, vice president of BAE Systems for F-35 solutions. When completed, the update will bring “discrimination capabilities to overcome emerging and evolving threats,” she added. Lockheed Martin is the main contractor of the F-35.

The EW update was described as the centerpiece of the improvements to Block 4 of the F-35, made possible by new processors installed in the Tech Refresh 3 program.

The contract will provide more powerful core hardware for the EW AN/ASQ-239 system, along with engineering support services and test infrastructure. The update “will improve higher situational awareness and electromagnetic attack capabilities and countermeasures with new sensors and more powerful signal processing,” BAE said in a press release.

The AN/ASQ-239 “collects and processes electromagnetic energy in environments with high signal density and contested,” Aucoin said. “It combines offensive and defensive EW capabilities, including broadband radar alert and radar suppression, targeting support and multispectral countermeasures to provide situational awareness and self-protection.”

The system is designed for continuous capacity development, or CCD, which allows "quick future updates," BAE said, adding that the system has modular architecture for more efficient upgrades "in the entire global F-35 fleet." The system also includes the diagnostic and fault isolation capability of the non-intrusive electronic warfare test solution (NIEWTS), which “allows accurate troubleshooting that further reduces maintenance costs,” BAE said.

The capabilities of the updated AN/ASQ-239 “will be leveraged for other platforms to ensure that all fighters have the most advanced EW capacity available,” Aucoin said in the press release. This will allow friendly forces to “overcome evolving threats”.

In addition to the EW system, BAE also manufactures the rear jet fuselage, "active interceptor control system" and vehicle management computer in factories in Australia, the UK and the USA. The company is also producing the Eagle Passive Active Alert and Survival System (EPAWSS), which will protect the F-15C, F-15E and the new F-15E.

Fernando Valduga

Cavok Brazil - Digital Tchê Web Creation

[xtruss]

Those Pesky Sino-Russians! Russian and Chinese Combat Air Trends: Current Capabilities and Future Threat Outlook

China Has Edged Ahead of Russia in Air vs Air Capabilities (With Russian Help). The Chinese are amazing at tech

— Justin Bronk | Rusi.Org

This Whitehall Report examines Russian and Chinese combat air trends, and looks specifically at fast jets and their weapons systems and capabilities.

1– The Soviet Union, and latterly Russia, have been the source of both aerial and ground-based pacing threats to Western airpower since the end of the Second World War. However, from a position of dependency on Russian aircraft and weapons, China has developed an advanced indigenous combat aircraft, sensor and weapons industry that is outstripping Russia’s. As a result, for the first time since 1945, the likely source of the most significant aerial threats to Western air capabilities is shifting.

2– Modern air combat is primarily decided by the balance of advantage in situational awareness. Given broadly comparable numbers, the force which can provide its aircrew with superior awareness of enemy position, track and identity will have a major advantage in any clash. In scenarios where situational awareness is relatively equal, missile reach and seeker performance, crew experience, aircraft performance, electronic warfare (EW) and countermeasures systems all contribute to the likely outcome.

3– Russia and China currently field superficially similar combat aircraft fleets. Both rely heavily on the Su-27/30 ‘Flanker’ family of combat aircraft and their various derivatives. They have also both pursued a fighter with low-observable (LO) – also known as stealthy – features, alongside increased multirole capability for their main fighter fleets. However, a clear Chinese lead is now emerging over Russia in most technical aspects of combat aircraft development.

4– The Flanker family of combat aircraft share: a large radar, optical and heat signature; potent kinematic performance; a relatively long range on internal fuel; and the ability to carry heavy ordinance loads of air-to-air or air-to-ground weapons. This makes them comparatively easy to detect and, in the case of Russian Flanker types, the lack of a modern active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar restricts them to relatively ‘brute force’ tactics using powerful but easy-to-detect radars and missiles which are outranged by their Western counterparts.

5– China has developed J-11 and J-16 series Flanker derivatives featuring AESA radars, new datalinks, improved EW systems and increased use of composites, which give them a superior level of overall combat capability to the latest Russian Flanker, the Su-35S.

6– This advantage is increased by Chinese advances in both within-visual-range (WVR) and beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air missiles. Unlike the latest Russian R-73M, the PL-10 features an imaging infrared seeker, improving resistance to countermeasures. More significantly, the PL-15 features a miniature AESA seeker head and outranges the US-made AIM-120C/D AMRAAM series. China is also testing a very-long-range air-to-air missile, known as PL-X or PL-17, which has a 400-km class range, multimode seeker and appears to have been designed to attack US big-wing ISTAR and tanker aircraft.

7– China has developed and introduced into service the first credible non-US-made LO, or fifth-generation, fighter in the form of the J-20A ‘Mighty Dragon’. Subsequent developments are likely to increase its LO characteristics and sensor capabilities, as well as engine performance, with construction of the first production prototypes of the J-20B having begun in 2020.

8– Overall, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and People’s Liberation Army Navy are rapidly improving their combat air capabilities, including a focus on the sensors, platforms, network connectivity and weapons needed to compete with the US in cutting-edge, predominantly passive-sensor air combat tactics.

9– The Russian Su-57 Felon is assessed as not yet having matured into a credible frontline weapons system, and as lacking the basic design features required for true LO signature. However, it does offer the potential to correct many of the Flanker family weaknesses with greatly reduced signature and an AESA radar, while improving the already superb agility and performance of the Flanker series.

10– The Russian Air Force (VKS) does not currently field targeting pods for its ground-attack and multirole fleets. This limits the ground-attack aircraft to internal equivalents with inferior field of view and tactical flexibility, and the multirole fighters to reliance on either pre-briefed GPS/GLONASS target coordinates, radar-guided weapons or target acquisition using fixed seekers on the weapons themselves. This limits VKS fixed-wing capabilities against dynamic battlefield targets compared to Western or Chinese equivalents.

11– China is actively pursuing unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) designs with multiple programmes at various stages of development. Detailed assessment is hindered by tight control of information leaks by the Chinese Communist Party. Of those known to be in development, the GJ-11 subsonic attack UCAV appears the most advanced.

12– Russia is also pursuing UCAV-style technologies and has produced the Su-70 ‘Okhotnik-B’ technology demonstrator. However, it is not yet clear what degree of practical operational capability the Russian aircraft industry will be able to develop through the Su-70, especially given the demands for significant levels of in-flight autonomy inherent in UCAVs designed for state-on-state warfare in heavy EW conditions.

13– China’s advanced and efficient Flanker derivatives, as well as lightweight multirole fighters in the shape of the J-10B/C series and potentially a developmental FC-31 LO fighter programme, are likely to provide the leading source of non-Western combat aircraft from the mid-2020s onwards. Likewise, their air-launched munitions will increasingly outcompete Russian equivalents on the export market. As such, the development of Chinese capabilities should be closely monitored even by air forces which do not include the PLAAF in their direct threat assessments.

14– The possibility of technology transfer from China to Russia in the combat air domain could potentially increase the threat level posed to NATO by Russian airpower in the longer term, should such a dynamic emerge.

— Source: The Royal United Services Institute

Russian and Chinese Air Threat Nature and Trajectories in Perspective

RUSSIA AND CHINA currently field combat air fleets that are similar in many ways, at least at face value. Both rely heavily on the Flanker family of combat aircraft and their various derivatives; both have attempted to develop a fighter with LO features; and both have sought increasing multirole capability for their fighter fleets as a whole. However, China has started to build a clear technical lead over Russia in most aspects of combat aircraft development. Moreover, Russian industry is unlikely to be able to regain areas of competitive advantage once lost, due to deep structural industrial and budgetary disadvantages compared to the Chinese sector.

The effects of this trend can be seen in the fact that even in the case of the archetypal Russian fighter line, the Flanker, the most capable variant currently in service is Chinese. Compared to Russian equivalents, the J-16 features a more modern cockpit layout, more advanced use of structural composites, access to more advanced and longer-ranged missiles, an AESA radar and operational targeting pods for more efficient and flexible employment of modern PGMs. The only area where Russia retains a lead in Flanker development terms is in engines, with the AL-41F series powering the Su-35S still providing superior thrust and reliability compared to the WS-10B series. In terms of cheaper and lighter multirole fighter types, the J-10C is significantly more efficient and flexible than the ageing Russian Mig-29/35 series. In contrast to the troubled Russian Su-57, with its limited LO features and production prospects, the Chinese J-20A is an operational LO fighter already in squadron service with the PLAAF. It also continues to rapidly mature and improve with the production of the J-20B variant having reportedly begun in 2020. The J-20 family will be produced in the hundreds over the coming decade, constituting the foremost existing aerial threat to Western air superiority types.

Beyond simple comparisons of individual aircraft categories, there is a noticeable difference between the developmental focus for Russian and Chinese combat air concepts of operation and tactics. In broad terms, Russia continues to try and field more powerful fighter radars and develop longer-range air-to-air missiles to redress its current shortcomings in relation to existing non-VLO opponents, while counting largely on long-range ground-based sensors and missile systems to provide a measure of national defensive capability against VLO threats, including some distance beyond its own borders. By contrast, China is prioritising the development of aerial sensors and networks to allow its combat aircraft to compete directly with the US in engagements beyond its own borders that are dominated by passive-sensor tactics and cooperative engagement capabilities. The PLAAF is being rapidly configured for power-projection capabilities at scale, with ground-based and maritime IADS elements serving as an important but not dominant component in the country’s approach to airpower. Above all else, the pace of iterative improvement visible in PLAAF equipment – from aircraft and weapons systems to increasingly realistic training and exercises – is striking. Aside from the PL-15 (and PL-X/PL-17) very-long-range air-to-air missile, there are few areas of capability where the PLAAF is yet directly able to compete one-to-one with the best that the US and European air forces can field. However, if China can continue the level of investment, production and iteration demonstrated over the last decade, then existing capability gaps will close significantly, and more areas of outright Chinese advantage will emerge during the 2020s.

For the US and its Indo-Pacific allies, this is a serious military challenge, but it also has significant implications for air forces around the world that are unlikely to have to directly confront the PLAAF or PLANAF. As the superiority of Chinese weapons systems and airframe manufacturing capacity over Russian equivalents becomes increasingly obvious, countries with political alignments or budgets that preclude relying on Western aircraft will look increasingly to Beijing rather than Moscow for equipment, especially as Soviet-era fleets continue to age out. In other words, the high-end aerial pacing threats for Western air forces in a near-peer conflict or expeditionary intervention context are likely to be Chinese by the end of the 2020s. Of course, much like Western and Russian types, Chinese combat aircraft and weapons will usually be supplied to most third countries in slightly degraded export configurations, especially with regard to EW, encrypted communications, radar and seeker performance.

In technical terms, PLAAF and PLANAF combat aircraft are also operating alongside an increasingly diverse and capable set of ISTAR enablers, including three different traditional AEW&C platforms, multiple classes of UAVs, maritime and ground-based sensor arrays, and orbital constellations. Modern Link 16-style datalinks are also increasingly standard on Chinese fourth- and fifth-generation combat aircraft and supporting enabler platforms. However, this potential force multiplying advantage is currently limited by a lack of operational experience and inflexible internal structures, but the pace of Chinese improvement is rapid in these areas. If being operated by smaller states, many of these enablers would not be available, or at least would be far less extensive, rendering Chinese fast jets correspondingly less impressive compared to Russian types and less of a threat to well-supported Western fast jets as part of a coalition. They would nonetheless significantly increase the risk profile and capability requirements for an intervention compared to Soviet-era capabilities, especially if operated in conjunction with increasingly widely proliferating Chinese or Russian ground-based air defences and EW systems.

The PLA itself currently struggles to conduct genuinely joint operations, as the PLAAF and broader PLA remain highly stovepiped and procedural organisations compared to their Western counterparts. For example, combat air training is still predominantly conducted according to rigidly pre-briefed manoeuvre sequences under direct control of a ground- or AEW&C aircraft-based commanding officer, with lessons or tactical innovations having to go through a lengthy bureaucratic process to be formally incorporated. The PLA also remains unable to operate joint engagement zones, which are required to enable SAMs and combat aircraft to engage targets in the same airspace simultaneously. Nonetheless, there is significant evidence of rapid improvements to the realism of training, including increasing prevalence of unscripted air combat engagements during the ‘Golden Helmet’ competition and Red Sword and Blue Sword exercises since 2011, as well as recent joint training exercises with other air forces including those of Russia, Pakistan and Thailand. The result is rapidly improving operational competence within each of the Chinese air arms, and a slow but steady improvement in the PLA’s ability to conduct joint warfighting as a whole. Chinese airpower may be less impressive in practical warfighting capacity than its equipment would suggest on paper, but the ingredients for continued rapid capability growth are all in place, and at a scale that few competitors will be able to keep pace with. The implications are serious enough for the US Air Force and US Navy, which have traditionally relied on a significant level of qualitative overmatch to offset Chinese numerical superiority in the Pacific theatre. They have even more significant implications for China’s less militarily capable neighbours looking to maintain an ability to defend their territorial integrity in the face of Chinese pressure.

By contrast, Russia’s combat aircraft development has failed to keep pace with the cutting edge of Western or Chinese capabilities since the end of the Cold War. Annual flying hours for VKS pilots also remain low, with the average of 120 flown by the elite aggressors of the 116 UTsBPr IA representing the highest of any unit by a considerable margin, meaning advanced situational awareness building, sensor and weapon employment skills will be lacking compared to most potential NATO opponents. Despite impressive work to squeeze the maximum performance out of the Su-27 Flanker airframe across multiple mission sets within the bounds of Russia’s financial and technological means, Russian frontline fighters remain likely to be out-detected and outranged by the latest Western and Chinese competitors. The Su-57 is neither sufficiently LO nor sufficiently mature in terms of sensor package to be considered a major threat to the West’s qualitative advantage in the air superiority domain at this point. However, it could still present a serious potential threat to older fourth-generation fighters if introduced into service in significant numbers. Russia’s primary means to defend its own airspace and project contested airspace into its near abroad remains its ground-based IADS. The VKS’s primary tactical missions in the case of a conflict with NATO are likely to be defensive patrols contributing overhead radar information and potentially missile shots to the broader IADS, alongside strike missions against enemy ground and maritime targets within or close to the coverage of mobile ground-based SAMs using standoff munitions wherever possible. In that strike mission, however, the majority of VKS pilots have fairly recent combat experience in a relatively complex semi-permissive environment thanks to regular unit and personnel rotations to Syria since 2015.

Without having first significantly degraded Russia’s IADS, NATO air forces would likely struggle to exploit many of the areas of technical advantage their platforms have against Russian aircraft operating close to their own airspace. As such, the VKS poses a potent threat against any NATO static ground-based assets not protected by layered ground-based air defences or friendly defensive counter-air patrols. Against dynamic battlefield targets such as moving vehicles, however, the lack of operational targeting pods in Russia’s multirole fighter fleets would limit their effectiveness, leaving the VKS to rely on its Su-25, Su-24M and Su-34 fleets alongside rotary wing aviation and substantial ground forces firepower for this task. Despite being outclassed by the latest Western and Chinese types, the Russian Flanker series remains a potent air-to-air threat against any combat aircraft lacking up-to-date active and passive sensor suites and either VLO characteristics or missiles capable of outranging the R-77-1 series.

One contingency worth considering is the possibility that, at some point during the 2020s, Russia begins to import Chinese missile or sensor technology for use by the VKS. For this to occur, the Russian government would have to overcome considerable levels of distrust between Russia and China in military terms, as well as deep-seated Russian pride and attachment to their sovereign aerospace industry. However, the increasing superiority of Chinese radars, AAMs and targeting pods may prove sufficient motivation, especially in the face of a new generation of Western combat aircraft development programmes. Full-scale Russian manufacture of Chinese indigenous designs such as the J-20 or J-10 would likely be too bitter a pill to swallow, but the integration of Chinese sensors and weapons on Russian Flankers or even as part of efforts to mature the Su-57 and/or Su-70 would undoubtedly improve their combat capabilities. Whether China would agree to exports or technology transfer of this level to Russia is another question entirely, and one which is difficult to answer. However, if tensions between China and the West continue to rise and Russia remains confrontational towards NATO in Europe and the Arctic, then the CCP may decide that subsidising Russian military capabilities is in its interests.

[tinyruedyqoo52]

DARPA Develops Next Gen Phased Array System to Support Future Defense R&D

DARPA announced that a first-of-its-kind sensor system developed under the Arrays at Commercial Timescales – Integration and Validation (ACT-IV) program has transitioned to the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) for continued advancement and experimentation. Northrop Grumman, the primary research team on the ACT-IV program, facilitated the transition of the advanced digital active electronically scanned array (AESA) to the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, OH.

ACT-IV is a novel multifunction AESA system that is capable of simultaneously performing different operations, such as radar, electronic warfare (EW), and communications functions, at different modes. At the system’s core is an advanced semiconductor device – or common module – fabricated in commercial silicon that was originally developed by DARPA’s Arrays at Commercial Timescales (ACT) program. Now concluded, the ACT program sought to shorten phased array design cycles and simplify the process of upgrading fielded capabilities. The ACT common module – a digitally interconnected building block from which large systems can be formed – was developed as a more efficient alternative to substantial undertakings with traditional monolithic array systems. In addition to the ACT module, the ACT-IV system employs a computational model capable of efficiently receiving and computing the significant amounts of input data generated by each module.

“With the ACT-IV program, we were able to realize the vision of ACT by developing an advanced sensor system with ACT common modules,” said Tom Rondeau, the program manager leading ACT-IV. “The resulting system went through extensive testing and demonstrations to validate its capabilities, proving out a sixth-generation array with a scalable, customizable core that could work across varied application spaces. Transitioning the ACT-IV system to AFRL will enable continued exploration of digital, multifunctional RF technologies for defense needs.”

Another critical aspect of the ACT-IV program was the creation of a third-party developer community to enable continued use and advancement of the technologies. Teams from government research labs and university-affiliated research centers developed a curriculum and training program that provides developers and researchers with the necessary knowledge and know-how to continue building on the work of the ACT-IV program. The growing community has already generated several tools and applications, including a more agile software development model for RF phased arrays.

At the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, the ACT-IV system will become a Department of Defense (DoD)-a wide asset for testing and experimentation with new modes of radar, communications, sensing, and EW. The software, algorithms, and capabilities developed on the program will also transition to next-generation multifunction RF systems to support advanced defense development programs and a future open-architecture environment.

[phgq]

BRP Jose Rizal's 6th sea trial 'generally satisfactory'

#PHnews: BRP Jose Rizal's 6th sea trial 'generally satisfactory'

MANILA – The sixth sea acceptance trial of the Philippine Navy (PN)'s first-ever missile frigate, BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150), was generally satisfactory.

"The 6th Sea Acceptance Trial (SAT) of BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150) conducted in Ulsan, South Korea on 16-22 February 2020 was generally satisfactory according to the Frigate Acquisition Project, Technical Inspection and Acceptance Committee headed by Rear Admiral Alberto B. Carlos," said PN public affairs office chief Lt. Commander Maria Christina Roxas, in a message late Monday.

Roxas said the sixth sea trials focused on weapons and sensors, vessel performance, and integrated platform management system.

"To be more specific, it demonstrated the warfare and operational capabilities of the frigate," she added.

Roxas declined to give further details on the matter, adding that the data given above is "only releasable information" for the moment.

She added that the delivery date of the BRP Jose Rizal remains unchanged at "tentatively 3rd week of April 2020".

The ship's fifth sea trials, which involved the firing of its Oto Melara Super Rapid 76mm main gun, took place successfully last February 12.

The third and fourth sea trials took place in the third week of January and involved testing the communications and navigational equipment of the BRP Jose Rizal which also went successful.

The ship's first and second sea trials took place last November and December involved the vessel's general seaworthiness and propulsion and associated systems, including its radars, respectively.

BRP Jose Rizal has a maximum designed speed of 25 knots and a cruising speed of 15 knots and a range of 4,500 nautical miles.

The sea trials are the last phase of construction prior to the frigate’s delivery to the Philippines.

BRP Jose Rizal was launched at the Hyundai Heavy Industries shipyard in Ulsan May 23, 2019.

The contract for the BRP Jose Rizal and its sister ship, the BRP Antonio Luna (FF-151), is placed at PHP16 billion with another PHP2 billion for weapon systems and munitions.

These ships are capable of conducting anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and electronic warfare (EW) operations. (PNA)

***

References:

* Philippine News Agency. "BRP Jose Rizal's 6th sea trial 'generally satisfactory'." Philippine News Agency. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1094765 (accessed February 25, 2020 at 08:11PM UTC+14).

* Philippine News Agency. "BRP Jose Rizal's 6th sea trial 'generally satisfactory'." Archive Today. https://archive.ph/?run=1&url=https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1094765 (archived).

[constellisignals]

Scenario Simulators Hyderabad, Modelling & Simulation, Signal Processing comapny in Hyderabad, Radar & EW Sensor Testing, Digital Signal Processing in Hyderabad, Ansys STK AGI

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Shootout: U.S. Air Force F-15 Eagles vs. China J-10 Fighter (Who Wins?)

Along with these weapons upgrades and other modifications, the F-15 is also getting upgrades to the pilot’s digital helmet and some radar signature reducing, or stealthy characteristics.The Air Force is revving up electronic warfare upgrades for its F-15 fighter as a way to better protect against enemy fire and electronic attacks, service officials said.(This first appeared several years ago.)Boeing has secured a $478 million deal to continue work on a new technology called with a system called the Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System, or EPAWSS.Recommended: The 5 Biggest Nuclear Bomb Tests (From All 6 Nuclear Powers).Recommended: How Israel Takes U.S. Weapons and Makes Them Better.Recommended: North Korea’s Most Lethal Weapon Isn’t Nukes.“This allows the aircraft to identify a threat and actively prosecute that threat through avoidance, deception or jamming techniques,” Mike Gibbons, Vice President of the Boeing F-15 program, told Scout Warrior in an interview a few months ago.These updated EW capabilities replace the Tactical Electronic Warfare Suite, which has been used since the 1980s, not long after the F-15 first deployed. The service plans to operate the fleet until the mid-2040’s, so an overhaul of the Eagle’s electronic systems helps maintain U.S. air supremacy, the contract announcement said.(This first appeared back in 2016.)Boeing won the initial contract for the EPAWSS project last year  and hired BAE Systems as the primary subcontractor.Overall, the US Air Force is vigorously upgrading the 1980s-era F-15 fighter by giving new weapons and sensors in the hope of maintaining air-to-air superiority over the Chinese J-10 equivalent.The multi-pronged effort not only includes the current addition of electronic warfare technology but also extends to super-fast high-speed computers, infrared search and track enemy targeting systems, increased networking ability and upgraded weapons-firing capability, Air Force and Boeing officials said.“The Air Force plans to keep the F-15 fleet in service until the mid-2040’s.  Many of the F-15 systems date back to the 1970’s and must be upgraded if the aircraft is to remain operationally effective. Various upgrades will be complete as early as 2021 for the F-15C AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar and as late as 2032 for the various EW (electronic warfare) upgrades,” Air Force spokesman Maj. Rob Leese told Scout Warrior a few months ago.The Air Force currently operates roughly 400 F-15C, D and E variants. A key impetus for the upgrade was well articulate in a Congressional report on the US and China in 2014. (US-China Economic and Security Review Commission --www.uscc.gov). Among other things, the report cited rapid Chinese technological progress and explained that the US margin of superiority has massively decreased since the 1980s.As an example, the report said that in the 1980s, the US F-15 was vastly superior to the Chinese equivalent – the J-10. However, Chinese technical advances in recent years have considerably narrowed that gap to the point where the Chinese J-10 is now roughly comparable to the US F-15, the report explained.Air Force and Boeing developers maintain that ongoing upgrades to the F-15 will ensure that this equivalence is not the case and that, instead, they will ensure the superiority of the F-15.Among the upgrades is an ongoing effort to equip the F-15 with the fastest jet-computer processer in the world, called the Advanced Display Core Processor, or ADCPII.“It is capable of processing 87 billion instructions per second of computing throughput, translating into faster and more reliable mission processing capability for an aircrew,” Boeing spokesman Randy Jackson told Scout Warrior.High tech targeting and tracking technology is also being integrated onto the F-15, Gibbons added. This includes the addition of a passive long-range sensor called Infrared Search and Track, or IRST.The technology is also being engineered into the Navy F-18 Super Hornet. The technology can detect the heat signature, often called infrared emissions, of enemy aircraft.“The system can simultaneously track multiple targets and provide a highly effective air-to-air targeting capability, even when encountering advanced threats equipped with radar-jamming technology,” Navy officials said.IRST also provides an alternate air-to-air targeting system in a high threat electronic attack environment, Navy, Air Force and industry developers said.The F-15 is also being engineered for additional speed and range, along with weapons-firing ability. The weapons-carrying ability is being increased from 8 up to 16 weapons; this includes an ability to fire an AIM-9x or AIM-120 missile. In addition, upgrades to the aircraft include adding an increased ability to integrate or accommodate new emerging weapons systems as they become available. This is being done through both hardware and software-oriented “open standards” IP protocol and architecture.The aircraft is also getting a “fly-by-wire” automated flight control system.“Fly by wire means when the pilot provides the input - straight to a computer than then determines how to have the aircraft perform the way it wants - provides electrical signals for the more quickly and more safely move from point to point as opposed to using a mechanical controls stick,” Gibbons explained.Along with these weapons upgrades and other modifications, the F-15 is also getting upgrades to the pilot’s digital helmet and some radar signature reducing, or stealthy characteristics.However, at the same time, the F-15 is not a stealthy aircraft and is expected to be used in combat environments in what is called “less contested” environments where the Air Force already has a margin of air superiority over advanced enemy air defenses.For this reason, the F-15 will also be increasing networked so as to better support existing 5th-generation platforms such as the F-22 and F-35, Air Force officials said.The intent of these F-15 upgrades is to effectively perform the missions assigned to the F-15 fleet, which are to support the F-22 in providing air superiority and the F-35 in providing precision attack capabilities, Leese said.“While these upgrades will not make these aircraft equivalent to 5th generation fighters, they will allow the F-15 to support 5th generation fighters in performing their missions, and will also allow F-15s to assume missions in more permissive environments where capabilities of 5th generation fighters are not required,” Leese added.Gibbons added that the upgrades to the F-15 will ensure that the fighter aircraft remains superior to its Chinese equivalent.   “The F-15 as a vital platform that still has a capability that cannot be matched in terms of ability to fly high, fly fast, go very far carry a lot. It is an air dominance machine,” Gibbons explained.This first appeared in Scout Warrior here.

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Along with these weapons upgrades and other modifications, the F-15 is also getting upgrades to the pilot’s digital helmet and some radar signature reducing, or stealthy characteristics.The Air Force is revving up electronic warfare upgrades for its F-15 fighter as a way to better protect against enemy fire and electronic attacks, service officials said.(This first appeared several years ago.)Boeing has secured a $478 million deal to continue work on a new technology called with a system called the Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System, or EPAWSS.Recommended: The 5 Biggest Nuclear Bomb Tests (From All 6 Nuclear Powers).Recommended: How Israel Takes U.S. Weapons and Makes Them Better.Recommended: North Korea’s Most Lethal Weapon Isn’t Nukes.“This allows the aircraft to identify a threat and actively prosecute that threat through avoidance, deception or jamming techniques,” Mike Gibbons, Vice President of the Boeing F-15 program, told Scout Warrior in an interview a few months ago.These updated EW capabilities replace the Tactical Electronic Warfare Suite, which has been used since the 1980s, not long after the F-15 first deployed. The service plans to operate the fleet until the mid-2040’s, so an overhaul of the Eagle’s electronic systems helps maintain U.S. air supremacy, the contract announcement said.(This first appeared back in 2016.)Boeing won the initial contract for the EPAWSS project last year  and hired BAE Systems as the primary subcontractor.Overall, the US Air Force is vigorously upgrading the 1980s-era F-15 fighter by giving new weapons and sensors in the hope of maintaining air-to-air superiority over the Chinese J-10 equivalent.The multi-pronged effort not only includes the current addition of electronic warfare technology but also extends to super-fast high-speed computers, infrared search and track enemy targeting systems, increased networking ability and upgraded weapons-firing capability, Air Force and Boeing officials said.“The Air Force plans to keep the F-15 fleet in service until the mid-2040’s.  Many of the F-15 systems date back to the 1970’s and must be upgraded if the aircraft is to remain operationally effective. Various upgrades will be complete as early as 2021 for the F-15C AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar and as late as 2032 for the various EW (electronic warfare) upgrades,” Air Force spokesman Maj. Rob Leese told Scout Warrior a few months ago.The Air Force currently operates roughly 400 F-15C, D and E variants. A key impetus for the upgrade was well articulate in a Congressional report on the US and China in 2014. (US-China Economic and Security Review Commission --www.uscc.gov). Among other things, the report cited rapid Chinese technological progress and explained that the US margin of superiority has massively decreased since the 1980s.As an example, the report said that in the 1980s, the US F-15 was vastly superior to the Chinese equivalent – the J-10. However, Chinese technical advances in recent years have considerably narrowed that gap to the point where the Chinese J-10 is now roughly comparable to the US F-15, the report explained.Air Force and Boeing developers maintain that ongoing upgrades to the F-15 will ensure that this equivalence is not the case and that, instead, they will ensure the superiority of the F-15.Among the upgrades is an ongoing effort to equip the F-15 with the fastest jet-computer processer in the world, called the Advanced Display Core Processor, or ADCPII.“It is capable of processing 87 billion instructions per second of computing throughput, translating into faster and more reliable mission processing capability for an aircrew,” Boeing spokesman Randy Jackson told Scout Warrior.High tech targeting and tracking technology is also being integrated onto the F-15, Gibbons added. This includes the addition of a passive long-range sensor called Infrared Search and Track, or IRST.The technology is also being engineered into the Navy F-18 Super Hornet. The technology can detect the heat signature, often called infrared emissions, of enemy aircraft.“The system can simultaneously track multiple targets and provide a highly effective air-to-air targeting capability, even when encountering advanced threats equipped with radar-jamming technology,” Navy officials said.IRST also provides an alternate air-to-air targeting system in a high threat electronic attack environment, Navy, Air Force and industry developers said.The F-15 is also being engineered for additional speed and range, along with weapons-firing ability. The weapons-carrying ability is being increased from 8 up to 16 weapons; this includes an ability to fire an AIM-9x or AIM-120 missile. In addition, upgrades to the aircraft include adding an increased ability to integrate or accommodate new emerging weapons systems as they become available. This is being done through both hardware and software-oriented “open standards” IP protocol and architecture.The aircraft is also getting a “fly-by-wire” automated flight control system.“Fly by wire means when the pilot provides the input - straight to a computer than then determines how to have the aircraft perform the way it wants - provides electrical signals for the more quickly and more safely move from point to point as opposed to using a mechanical controls stick,” Gibbons explained.Along with these weapons upgrades and other modifications, the F-15 is also getting upgrades to the pilot’s digital helmet and some radar signature reducing, or stealthy characteristics.However, at the same time, the F-15 is not a stealthy aircraft and is expected to be used in combat environments in what is called “less contested” environments where the Air Force already has a margin of air superiority over advanced enemy air defenses.For this reason, the F-15 will also be increasing networked so as to better support existing 5th-generation platforms such as the F-22 and F-35, Air Force officials said.The intent of these F-15 upgrades is to effectively perform the missions assigned to the F-15 fleet, which are to support the F-22 in providing air superiority and the F-35 in providing precision attack capabilities, Leese said.“While these upgrades will not make these aircraft equivalent to 5th generation fighters, they will allow the F-15 to support 5th generation fighters in performing their missions, and will also allow F-15s to assume missions in more permissive environments where capabilities of 5th generation fighters are not required,” Leese added.Gibbons added that the upgrades to the F-15 will ensure that the fighter aircraft remains superior to its Chinese equivalent.   “The F-15 as a vital platform that still has a capability that cannot be matched in terms of ability to fly high, fly fast, go very far carry a lot. It is an air dominance machine,” Gibbons explained.This first appeared in Scout Warrior here.

August 16, 2019 at 08:41AM via IFTTT

[tortuga-aak]

The Israeli Air Force just declared that its F-35Is are operational

Reuters

On Dec. 6, 2017, the Israeli Air Force has declared its first F-35 Lightning II jets, designated “Adir” (“Mighty One”) by the Israeli, operational.

“The declaration of the squadron’s operational capability is occurring at a time in which the IAF is operating on a large scale in a number of fronts, in the constantly changing Middle East”, said Maj. Gen. Amikam Norkin, Commander of the IAF in an official blog.

“The operational challenge, which is becoming more and more complex each day, receives an excellent aerial response. The ‘Adir’ aircraft’s operational status adds a significant layer to the IAF’s capabilities at this time”.

The Israeli Air Force has so far received 9 aircraft that have been assigned to the 140 Sqn (“Golden Eagle”) at Nevatim airbase. The first two aircraft were delivered on Dec. 12, 2016. Five have been chosen for the assessment that has been conducted to declare the fleet IOC.

As a side note, the status of the F-35 was grounded after suffering a birdstrike last month, sparking speculations that it might have been hit by the Syrian Air Defenses during a covert air strike, is unknown.

Anyway, the Israeli F-35 is the first outside of the United States to be declared operational, preceded only by the U.S Marine Corps and U.S Air Force. The Italian Air Force, that has received 8 F-35s so far, has not declared IOC yet (at least officially).

Reuters

“The inspection examined missions and scenarios that include all of the operational elements required to fly the ‘Adir’, from the ground to the air”, shared Lt. Col. Yotam, Commander of the 140th (“Golden Eagle”) Squadron, which operates the “Adir.”

“I am confident in the division’s capability to reach operational preparedness and feel that the pressure is positive and healthy.”

What does IOC mean? Using U.S. Air Force lingo, it means that the IAF has enough operational aircraft, trained pilots, maintainers and support equipment to conduct operational missions using program of record weapons and missions systems. In simple words, it means the aricraft are capable of flying actual combat missions.

Throughout 2018, the “Golden Eagle” Squadron is expected to integrate six more fighters, while the next aircraft are scheduled to land in Israel early in the summer.

Israeli Air Force

“We have yet to complete our acquaintance with the aircraft. We still have tests, development of combat doctrines and extensive learning before us”, concluded Lt. Col. Yotam in the official statement.

“We haven’t stopped learning thinking and developing upon being declared operational. The establishment of the division doesn’t end with this inspection, it just begins. Will the ‘Adir’ participate in the next military campaign? I have no doubt. An aircraft like this brings capabilities to the IAF that it didn’t have before; it is an important strategic asset.”

The IAF has always been enthusiastic and vocal about the fifth generation aircraft: “As the Middle East grows more and more unstable, and as groups that threaten to destroy us race to stockpile weapons, we need to stay a step ahead of the game. The F-35 gives us the edge we need to take on groups and armies with even the most advanced technology,” said the IDF in a blog that preceded the delivery of the new aircraft.

In a farewell interview with Haaretz, Maj. Gen. Amir Eshel, former IAF Commander said: “Not everything is perfect […] There are some things you only learn on your feet. This happens with every plane that we add. But when you take off in this jet from Nevatim [IAF base], you can’t believe it. When you ascend to around 5,000 feet, the entire Middle East is yours at the cockpit. It is unbelievable what you can see. The American pilots that come to us didn’t experience that because they fly there, in Arizona, in Florida. Here they suddenly see the Middle East as a fighting zone. The threats, the various players, are in short range as well as in long range. Only then do you grasp the tremendous potential this machine has. We already see it with our own eyes.”

Israeli Air Force

“This jet brings us everything we’ve dreamed of doing, in one package,” said another senior air force source, speaking on the condition of anonymity to Al-Monitor media outlet earlier this year.

“It’s all concentrated on one table for us. As we all know, the F-35 can reach places in a way that others can’t. But in addition, it integrates high-level operational capabilities as well as the ability to read and analyze a battle map. The earlier, fourth-generation jets are excellent at maneuvering and activating sophisticated weapons systems, but they are not able to collect intelligence and independently analyze battle movement. The F-35 can do all this by itself in real time, with only one pilot sitting in the cockpit. We have never had such an operational capability until today. Until now, attack aircraft were operated independently of air support aircraft. The former waited to receive analysis of the battle picture that came from the latter. But in the F-35, everything is on the same platform, and this is no less than amazing. When you connect that to several aircraft, you receive strategic capability for the State of Israel.”

Indeed, what makes the F-35 one of the world’s most advanced aircraft is its high-end electronic intelligence gathering sensors combined with advanced sensor fusion capabilities to create a single integrated picture of the battlefield.

However, electronic intelligence capabilities similar to those that the Israeli aircraft can put in place to get a pretty detailed view of the Middle East, can be used by neighbouring nations to spy on their fifth generation jet.

According to the same sources who talked to Al-Monitor, the heavy presence of Russian radars and ELINT platforms in Syria cause some concern: the Russians are currently able to identify takeoffs from Israeli bases in real-time and might use collected data to “characterize” the F-35’s signature at specific wavelengths as reportedly done with the U.S. F-22s.

In fact, tactical fighter-sized stealth aircraft are built to defeat radar operating at specific frequencies; usually high-frequency bands as C, X, Ku and S band where the radar accuracy is higher (in fact, the higher the frequency, the better is the accuracy of the radar system).

However, once the frequency wavelength exceeds a certain threshold and causes a resonant effect, LO aircraft become increasingly detectable.

Israeli Air Force

For instance, ATC radars, that operate at lower-frequency bands are theoretically able to detect a tactical fighter-sized stealth plane whose shape features parts that can cause resonance. Radars that operate at bands below 300 MHz (lower UHF, VHF and HF radars), such as the so-called Over The Horizon (OTH) radars, are believed to be particularly dangerous for stealth planes: although they are not much accurate (because lower frequency implies very large antenna and lower angle accuracy and angle resolution) they can spot stealth planes and be used to guide fighters equipped with IRST towards the direction the LO planes might be.

For these reasons, in the same way the U.S. spyplanes do with all the Russian Su-35S, Su-30SM, S-400 in Syria, it’s safe to assume Russian advanced anti-aircraft systems are “targeting” the Israeli F-35s and its valuable emissions, forcing the IAF to adapt its procedures and leverage the presence of other aircraft to “hide” the “Adir” when and where it could theoretically be detected.

“This has created a situation in which the IAF is adapting itself to the F-35 instead of adapting the jet to the air force. The goal, they say at the IAF, is to use the F-35 to upgrade the fourth generation jets that will fly around the F-35,” commented Al-Monitor’s Ben Caspit.

Although it was just declared operational, it will take a few years to “completely” understand and exploit the stealth jet’s capabilities. Even more so, considered that the Israeli F-35s will have some domestic modifications and components provided by Israeli companies, that the IAF has not even begun the process of installing and integrating on the jet. Indeed, the IAF F-35As will be different from the “standard” F-35s, as they will employ national EW (Electronic Warfare) pods, weaponry, C4 systems etc.

Meanwhile the Israeli F-35s will probably see some action, validating the tactical procedures to be used by the new aircraft, fine tuning the ELINT capabilities of the “Adir” to detect, geolocate and classify enemy‘s new/upgraded systems, as well as testing the weapons system (and the various Israeli “customizations”) during real operations as part of “packages” that will likely include other special mission aircraft and EW (Electronic Warfare) support.

The Aviationist

But only if really needed: the Israeli Air Force “legacy” aircraft have often shown their ability to operate freely in the Syrian airspace, using stand-off weaponry, without needing most of the fancy 5th generation features; therefore, it’s safe to assume the Israelis will commit their new aircraft if required by unique operational needs, as already happened in the past (in 1981, the first Israeli F-16s took part in Operation Opera, one of the most famous operations in Israeli Air Force history, one year after the first “Netz” aircraft was delivered and before all the F-16As were taken on charge by the IAF).

As we have already reported, IAF may also purchase some F-35Bs, the STOVL (Short Take Off Vertical Landing) version of the Joint Strike Fighter, that would allow the Israeli to have a squadron or two of multirole aircraft able to take off and land from austere/dispersed landing strips should Iran be able to wipe out IAF airbases with precision weapons.

So, Israel’s “journey” with the F-35 jet has just begun.

NOW WATCH: This is how pilots train to fly the F-35 — America’s most expensive fighter jet

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[rakeshkrishnansimha]

Why the Indian Air Force Should Not Rush Into Stealth

India must buy greater numbers of cheaper, non-stealthy planes until such time Indian industry is able to master stealth technology.

If there’s one area in which China has acquired a massive lead over India it is in the development of stealth fighters. While India’s Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) venture with Russia is far from being combat ready, China claimed in March that its Chengdu J-20 had entered service with the Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). It tallies with an assessment by the US Defence Department that the J-20 could be inducted in 2018. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington DC-based security think tank, concurs the J-20 could enter service in a similar time frame.

China’s stealth programme is unique because it is the only country that has two concurrent programmes. Alongside the J-20, a stripped-down export version, the Shengyang J-31, is also in the final stage of development. Its first customer could well be Pakistan, which is Beijing’s test market.

A scenario in which the Chinese are armed with stealth fighters may look alarming in the backdrop of worsening India-China relations. However, the thing to note is that the initial batches of the J-20 and J-31 are still experimental and years away from being fully battle ready. At best they are at the initial operational capability (IOC) phase. (IOC is the state achieved when a capability is available in its minimum usefully available form.)

A peculiar aspect of the Chinese defence industry is its achievements tend to multiply in March because it coincides with the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress in Beijing. The meeting is often used by the Chinese defence industry as a platform for advertising its military and technological achievements before party bosses.

The available information on the two programmes is both the Chinese stealth fighter concepts remain works in progress. The reality is that only small numbers of the aircraft have been produced to date. These aircraft are therefore technology demonstrators and it could take years before the Chinese military leadership has the confidence to use them against rival air forces.

In this backdrop, there is no need for India to press the panic button although it is imperative that work on the indigenous stealth programme is speeded up. The country should not end up in a wasteful arms race but instead learn from the experiences of the US, Russia, China, Japan and South Korea in developing stealth aircraft as well as anti-stealth missiles and radars.

A short history of stealth

A quick recap of aerial stealth warfare will help illustrate the problems and pitfalls that await countries that deploy stealth technology.

In the 1980s the US built the F-117 Nighthawk that was supposed to be invisible to radar. It was such a closely guarded secret that the F-117 was only flown at night. First used in the 1991 Iraq War, it was an extremely trouble prone aircraft that also lacked the capability to dominate the air. It was quietly retired after a Serbian air defence team used brilliant tactics to identify, isolate and shoot down an F-117 raider over the former Yugoslavia. The weapon used was a Russian made S-125 missile manufactured in the 1960s. The US Air Force (USAF) has kept the first stealth jet’s combat abilities and records classified.

It was the Russians who first conceived the concept of stealth aircraft, but despite their huge achievements in weapons during the Cold War, they never ventured into stealth aircraft. Perhaps they knew stealth wasn’t an invisibility cloak – which the US military has led the world to believe.

In recent years, several American aerospace engineers such as Pierre Sprey have exposed stealth technology as a lie. They say no aircraft can ever be 100 percent stealthy because there is no such thing as one radar in war. “There are lots of radars,” Sprey said in an interview to Dutch television. “And you can’t be nose-on or dead-level to every radar in the theatre. There are always going to be radars that are going to be shining up (from below) or looking from above – they can all see you.”

The Russians went ahead and quietly built a range of VHF radars and surface to air missiles that can detect and bring down stealth fighters.

The Russian strategy of counter stealth measures seems to be winding up the US defence establishment. According to a former US Air Force pilot who flew the latest F-35 stealth jet, just because Russian VHF radars can detect the F-35 doesn't mean they can also target and bring it down. Anti-aircraft defences comprise several links – command, control, communication, ground radar, missiles and airborne radar – in a long “kill chain”. The F-35 will seek to snap one of these links, and thereby disrupt the detection ability.

Meanwhile, Russia and China are upping the ante and building a new generation of anti-aircraft missiles that can be fired from an extremely long range. These new radars can detect stealth aircraft in much better resolution as well. This will seek to nullify the biggest advantage of the American stealth fighters – the ability to detect enemy aircraft from extremely long ranges.

Limitations of stealth aircraft

That the situation in the stealth world wasn’t on cruise control was evident when it was revealed in 2014 that the US Navy planned to buy 22 additional EA-18G Growler electronic warfare (EW) aircraft for $2.14 billion.

The US Navy uses the Growler EW aircraft kitted out with advanced radar jamming equipment to protect its fleet of F/A-18 aircraft during missions. Now, the F-35 is fitted with its own EW capabilities and its supporters say a separate jamming aircraft is not needed because of this technology. But according to others in the US Navy and industry, the F-35's stealth and EW capabilities are simply not enough.

It is a tacit admission that the US Navy is not entirely comfortable with the F-35's capabilities in anti-access/area denial environments.

The purchase of more Growlers is seen as the US Navy's "escape hatch" from the unpopular F-35 programme, which has historically received a lukewarm reception from some sections of the service.

The Russian experience has been similar. After promising to buy hundreds of Sukhoi stealth fighters, recently named as the Su-57, and accepting hundreds of millions of developmental dollars from India, Russia has decided to scale back its plans. Instead of a largely stealthy fleet, the Russian Air Force will rely more on 4+ generation aircraft such as the Su-35 Super Flanker – also known as the stealth killer. Russia will build only a handful of Su-57s while continuing work on the aircraft.

Meanwhile, in China despite the manufacturers’ claims, the PLAAF last year acquired 24 advanced Super Flankers from Russia. This is a tacit admission that the Chinese military is not confident about the capabilities of its stealth jets. Despite the Chinese showing off their stealth jets, the doggedness with which they have pursued the Su-35 and begged and cajoled the Russians to sell them the Super Flanker points to serious shortcomings in their twin programmes. Since both the J-20 and J-31 are based on designs stolen from the US, the flaws in the Americans designs (such as lack of aerodynamic shape, poor manoeuvrability, short range and oxygen supply failures) may have penetrated into the Chinese jets as well.

Lessons for India

With the Su-57 experiencing developmental bottlenecks, there isn’t much India can do other than to push the Russians harder. If the project goes ahead, the IAF should insist on getting stealth aircraft that have protection from new generation anti-stealth missiles. If the Russians don't provide what the IAF wants, India should go in for a limited number of Su-57s and acquire the technology for use in its own fifth generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme.

With the benefit of hindsight, India should ensure the AMCA does not travel the same trajectory as current stealth programmes. Instead of packing everything into one aircraft (as the Americans did in the F-35), India should go for 'honest' aircraft with robust offensive and defensive capabilities, without too many bells and whistles.

While the AMCA’s stealth aspects will allow it to plunge straight into battle without worrying about enemy air defences, the Aeronautical Design Agency’s decision to pick a design layout similar to the F-22 severely underestimates the amount of equipment required to carry out true 5th-generation warfare, say Abhijit Iyer-Mitra and Pushan Das in a report prepared for the Observer Research Foundation.

According to the report, while stealth is just one aspect of a 5th-generation fighter, “the most critical aspects are in fact sensor fusion, man-machine interface and the integration of the aircraft with other land, sea and air forces, and as part of a broader fleet of aircraft comprising a totality of air power. An elaboration of these aspects has been notably absent from the design phases”.

If the AMCA becomes mired in the quicksand of compromise, it could turn out to be India’s F-35. The American jet’s stealth has been significantly compromised, prompting several commentators to reclassify the fighter from very low observable (VLO) to merely the low observable (LO) category.

Failure is not an option for India. With 3300 combat jets in various branches of its military, the US can fall back on older fourth generation aircraft to finish the job. Deep pockets (a defence budget of over $500 billion) and a large industrial base allow America to go back to the drawing board and undo its mistakes or produce a new fighter. Even when it flies inferior fighters, no country in the world will dare attack the US.

India with a $57 billion defence budget and less than 800 combat jets can’t afford to produce a dud FGFA. A wise general once said: “A mistake in strategy cannot be undone in the same war.” With the Chinese and Pakistanis increasingly envious of rising India, a war could be thrust upon us in the near future. India simply cannot let its guard down.

Options for the IAF

The IAF must continue to invest in 4+ generation aircraft such as the Sukhoi Su-30MKI and Rafale as these will be the air dominance fighters that will kick in the door and allow secondary fighters such as the Mirage-2000, MiG-29s, MiG-21 and even the rookie Tejas to enter the battlefield. The US, Russia and China are all buying 4+ generation aircraft or upgrading existing ones to the 4++ generation standard. The American F-15 and the Russian MiG-31 are likely to keep flying well into the 2040s and beyond.

Stealth fighters are not only hard to build but it is a fact that air forces have oversold them to the public. In view of the growing pains being experienced by the industry, the fail safe option or Plan B is to buy greater numbers of cheaper, non-stealthy planes. As the Russians used to say in World War II, quantity is quality.

The huge expense of developing, buying and maintaining stealth jets means they will – at least in the next couple of decades – be used sparingly, perhaps at night and escorted by plenty of non-stealth aircraft. This scenario has completely upended predictions that stealth fighters would play a dominant role in air combat by the early part of the 21st century.

There is no need for India to rush into buying stealth aircraft when the world’s leading powers have chosen the sensible way of falling back on 4th generation jets.

(This article was first published in Geopolitics magazine.)