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antifainternational · 2 years

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Why is it impossible that fascism as a system can be used for good?

One enlightened leader who can do what needs to be good for the people - environmental protection, jobs and dismantling countries’ interdependence on globalism and the assets of corporations stripped and handed to the state for the benefit of the collective?

One wise leader who can end corruption and none of the squabbling scraps of progress..

Democracy isn’t worth fighting for.

An interesting question you pose here. So first off, let us point out that some of what you’re proposing isn’t about fascism per se but rather about authoritarian dictatorships in general. You’re making a claim that a “benevolent dictator” might be the best system of governance. There have been a few historical figures described as “benevolent dictators” - leaders who wielded autocratic power to (arguably) benefit their people. Think Atatürk in Turkey; Tito in Yugoslavia; and Yew in Singapore as three examples. None of those, however, were fascists. Atatürk, in fact, expanded voting rights in Turkey and Tito led some of the most effective anti-fascist partisan forces that resisted Nazi occupation in WW2. Aside from those three examples there aren’t many others to point to, but there are a LOT more authoritarian dictators that very plainly did not use their power to improve conditions for the people. Dictators are far more likely to brutally suppress their own people to the benefit of themselves and their cronies. Also: in what world does it make sense for any people to give up their autonomy and control over their own lives and turn all powers over to a single person? What person in the world is so “enlightened” that they have the capacity to make reasoned and wise decisions about literally all aspects of society? Seems to be the stuff of fantasy if we’re being honest. But you don’t want just any run-of-the-mill authoritarian dictatorship, Anon. You’re advocating for a fascist dictatorship. So let’s examine some of the issues you’ve pegged as best being resolved by a fascist dictatorship: -Environmental Protection: we’re unaware of any fascist regime in the past that’s made progress on that front and the countries currently heading into fascism (Brazil, Russia, the United States) have been taking massive strides backwards in the direction of environmental degradation at the behest of their quasi-fascist leaders (Bolsonaro, Putin, Trump & his Supreme Court appointees). Could a fascist leader instead be a champion for the environment? Possibly. But it’s more likely that such a leader would use the environment as an excuse to invade other countries to secure environmental resources “for their people.” Hitler called this lebensraum. -Jobs: historically, fascists have created jobs by starting wars. Wars are always good for job creation - at least at first. But perhaps that’s not the most desirable way to create employment. -Dismantling Countries’ Interdependence on Globalism: We don’t think you’ve thought this through or really understand what “globalism” means. We think you think globalism = international economic/geopolitical/military interconnections between nations, which is called “globalization.” But the term “globalism” originates from the Nazis’ anti-semitic propaganda, which portrayed Jews as “globalists” who were naturally disloyal to the nations they lived in and part of an evil conspiracy to control the world. So, assuming you mean “globalization,” we need to point out some a priori assumptions you’re making that: a) nation states are natural and desirable ways for societies to be structured; b) cooperation or reliance between nation states is the thing that is undesirable, and; c) the best way to cease international cooperation/interdependence is via a fascist dictatorship. We see more evidence to argue that nation states are bad; that international cooperation & integration is good; and that there are a multitude of other ways to stop globalization other than fascists taking power than what you’re trying to postulate, so good luck putting your argument together. (We would also remind you, Anon, that the fascists of WW2 were in a “globalist” alliance called the Axis.)

-Stripping Corporations of Assets Which Are Then Handed to the State to Benefit the Collective: That, Anon, is called a communist or socialist revolution, not a fascist revolution. In fascist takeovers (at least in every fascist takeover we’ve seen so far), corporations work alongside the fascists, helping them to secure power precisely in order to prevent communists/socialists from gaining power and stripping corporations of their resources. What happens after a fascist takeover is that the economy is transformed into what’s called “crony capitalism” - where corporations continue to thrive and even make real gains through things like access to slave labour & seized resources from whatever ethnic group the fascists have been scapegoating. In The Anatomy of Fascism, historian Robert O. Paxton notes that “even at its most radical, however, fascists’ anticapitalist rhetoric was selective. While they denounced speculative international finance (along with all other forms of internationalism, cosmopolitanism, or globalization - capitalist as well as socialist), they respected the property of national producers, who were to form the social base of the reinvigorated nation…Once in power, fascist regimes confiscated property only from political opponents, foreigners, or Jews…none altered the social hierarchy, except to catapult a few adventurers into high places.”(pg. 10-11)

So if you’re in favour of seizing the means of production for nationalization & turning them over to the people, best put down Mein Kampf and pick up a copy of Das Kapital!

-One Wise Leader Who Can End Corruption: Many have tried; all have failed, Anon. We can’t think of any examples of One Great Man single-handedly rooting out corruption in governance but we can think of many, many examples of One Corrupt Man (or One Man Corrupted By Power) that increased corruption or merely turned it to the advantage of himself & his inner circle. This study found that the longer a dictator is in power, the greater the extent of corruption in the country, not the reverse. This seems to happen in any kind of dictatorship, but fascist dictatorships are particularly vulnerable to corruption because of the cult of personality that is endemic in fascism, which produces a leader unaccountable to anyone who will also use violence without any hesitation to eliminate any opponents. Fascist regimes reinforce existing hierarchies and corrupt systems because they rely on key players high up in the existing hierarchy to help them rise to power, rewarding those who help them with assets seized from the outgroups they demonize. It was no accident that Donald Trump replaced key senior diplomats with his completely inexperienced and unqualified daughter and son-in-law, for example. Finally Anon, your assertion that fascism > democracy underlies your willingness to surrender what little power you have presently to a charismatic leader who would operate with zero accountability and no real incentive to rule to anyone's benefit but their own. We’re going to suggest that you would be much unhappier in that situation and that your real dissatisfaction with the present “democratic” system is that it isn’t very democratic at all. What we think would be preferable is not less freedom and more violence but rather more opportunities to increase your autonomy by participating directly in the decisions that affect your life - whether you’d call that direct democracy, democratic confederalism, anarchism, or something else. You’re right that getting to choose between a minute handful of viable leaders/parties every four years who are in lockstep agreement on 90% of things anyway doesn’t feel like democracy at all. There are certainly better alternatives to how we are ruled now. Fascism is certainly not one of those alternatives.

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mariacallous · 6 months

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As NATO prepares to celebrate its 75th anniversary next year, the bloc’s original architects would have been stunned by its broad membership and growing agenda today. In helping design the new alliance for the purpose of containing the Soviet Union in Europe after World War II, the U.S. diplomat George Kennan argued that NATO should take its name literally and include only North Atlantic countries—excluding Mediterranean states such as Greece, Italy, and Turkey. His rationale was that only countries on the Atlantic seaboard could be effectively supplied by ship in the event of war with the Soviets, whereas including others would remove all limits to the bloc’s commitments and be unworkable. To ensure that Article 5 of its founding treaty—the collective defense clause—was ironclad, NATO kept a laser-sharp focus on military preparedness for much of its history.

Today, NATO has 31 members (though when Sweden joins, it will be 32) and more than 30 partner countries across the world. Its agenda has expanded to issues beyond territorial defense, such as cybersecurity and counterterrorism. Last year, the bloc established the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic, a 1-billion-euro (about $1.1-billion) fund for emerging and disruptive technologies.

Yet as the toolbox of statecraft has expanded in response to security challenges, NATO has retained a narrow focus on military objectives. And even in this area, it has been constrained in delivering on its goals. Defense ministers, for example, can make commitments at NATO meetings, but finance ministers may not find the required resources at home. For European countries, dual membership in NATO and the European Union has diffused responsibility and led to significant underinvestment in military preparedness. Too many European leaders still hope that Washington or Brussels will take care of it.

With the return of war to Europe and the Middle East, as well as great-power competition to the world, NATO’s vision and scope need to be broader. The alliance faces not only Russian aggression, but also the challenge from China and other autocratic, revisionist actors seeking to upend the global order. Security today involves a comprehensive toolbox, including economic sanctions and industrial policy, and needs to bring the relevant actors into the fold.

Consider the current state of play. Last month, 31 foreign ministers met at NATO headquarters in Brussels to discuss a range of security issues, from Russia’s war against Ukraine to the long-term challenge of China. Yet the only major decision achieved at the two-day gathering was a brief three-paragraph statement on Ukraine that echoed previously agreed-on language. The Israel-Hamas war and its effects across the Middle East, which was top of mind for many of the participants, was barely addressed at all, even though many European NATO members will be directly affected.

The allies’ ambition should therefore be to make NATO the premier forum not only for trans-Atlantic military cooperation, but also for better coordination among the world’s democracies. Europe and the United States should leverage NATO to buttress international order alongside their Indo-Pacific partners. To that end, the institution should globalize its agenda and find ways to work more closely with its partners outside the Euro-Atlantic region.

Currently, too many issues that are central to the security of NATO allies are dispersed across multiple forums, contact groups, and bilateral channels. NATO is charged with collective security for Europe and North America. The EU also has a mutual defense clause for its members and has moved forward on defense cooperation and funding. Both blocs have intensified their security outreach to countries in the Indo-Pacific. That, in turn, overlaps with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—as well as the Australia-United Kingdom-United States pact. Also involved is the G-7, which has evolved from a talking shop to a forum where the leading democracies deliberate on economic sanctions and technology policy. The U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council has a similar remit—but neither it nor the G-7 can make binding decisions. All this overlap produces confusion and lack of focus, restricting the ability of NATO members to develop an effective strategy, let alone make efficient decisions in times of conflict.

To remove these political detours and bureaucratic obstacles, it would make sense for many of these discussions and decisions to take place in a single forum—or at least, for the various strings to come together in one place. And that would be NATO, which has the strongest record on addressing collective security. Issues to be integrated with military defense would include economic sanctions, export controls, industrial policy, technology policy, foreign investment screening, outbound investment controls, secure supply chains, and trade measures.

For a start, there should not just be regular meetings of NATO defense and foreign ministers. Ministers responsible for finance, trade, commerce, and technology should convene within NATO as well. All these areas are vital for national security.

In addition to globalizing its agenda, NATO should also expand the participants in these discussions to include Indo-Pacific partners, such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. Leaders of these four countries attended NATO’s annual summits in 2022 and 2023, but instead of cooperating on an ad hoc basis, it would be better to establish standing open invitations to NATO summits and ministerial meetings.

The bloc could also establish a council of NATO members and Indo-Pacific states—akin to the NATO-Ukraine Council—where those partners could convene meetings and be on equal footing with the NATO allies. Over time, additional partners could also be invited.

These changes require a shift in mindset within NATO. The bloc is rightly regarded by many as the most successful military alliance in history, but it could also be the most effective international institution for foreign-policy coordination and implementation. However, its primary focus on the Article 5 collective defense guarantee has developed into inherent institutional caution and constraint.

Yet not all security challenges trigger Article 5—and even then, the defense clause does not set off an automatic response. Article 5 states only that if armed attack occurs against a NATO member, each ally commits to assist the attacked country with “such action as it deems necessary.”

On the one hand, NATO’s focus on Article 5 has made the alliance an undisputed success, with every square inch of territory backed by the full weight of the alliance, which includes potential nuclear retaliation. In all of NATO’s long history, the bloc invoked Article 5 only once: after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. On the other hand, the emphasis on Article 5 has also constrained the bloc’s potential for more nimble political action.

NATO would benefit from greater strategic flexibility to address security policy issues. A useful historical analogy is the shift in U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, when Washington moved from the doctrine of massive retaliation to so-called flexible response. In the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration defined its deterrence and containment policy in terms of overwhelming response to any encroachment by the Soviet Union or the communist bloc. But this outsized commitment made foreign policy too rigid and limited: After all, not every nail around the world required a nuclear hammer. Thus, the Kennedy administration devised a more agile approach, including military and nonmilitary options for a particular crisis in proportion to the specific situation.

NATO already has the institutional mechanism for a broader approach to security. Article 4, for example, provides for political consultations whenever a member considers its “territorial integrity, political independence or security” threatened. This is both a broader remit and a lower threshold, allowing security threats short of a military attack to be addressed. It would be the institutional basis for the alliance to incorporate key tools of security policy, such as economic sanctions and export controls.

NATO also has a basis for addressing issues such as industrial and technology policy as means to develop defense and security capabilities. Under Article 3, allies have committed to “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” through “self-help and mutual aid.” NATO should facilitate better coordination on defense investment and ensure that the allies maintain a long-term technological competitive edge over their adversaries.

A broader and more global NATO would help overcome the hobbled, overly complex decision-making processes among the Euro-Atlantic allies and their partners in the Indo-Pacific. That said, there should be no illusion that an institutional setup alone can escape the primacy of politics.

Organizations such as NATO are what their members make of them. Blaming them for failure or inaction is like blaming Madison Square Garden when the New York Knicks play badly, as the late U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke once quipped.

But a simplified and better-designed institutional setup would go a long way in facilitating sounder, more efficient decision-making during unavoidably turbulent times.

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artsyaprilmr · 2 years

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Lemkin Institute Statement on Azerbaijan's breach of the established ceasefire agreement and its unprovoked attack on Armenia

The Lemkin Institute strongly condemns Azerbaijan's ongoing war of aggression against Armenia and its people. Despite the ceasefire agreements, Azerbaijan's overall genocidal rhetoric by its state authorities demonstrates an enduring determination to eliminate the Armenian national identity and its territory. [...] Azerbaijan’s recent provocations date back to the Nagorno-Karabakh war for independence from Azerbaijan in the 1990s. Since then, the Azeri government has been known to attempt to spark renewed fighting with Armenia, notably by moving troops into ceasefire territory and unlawfully bombing Armenian soil, as in the recent provocation. This new aggression, which broke out overnight on September 13th, illustrates how volatile and strained the situation remains. [...] The presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkey have threatened to erase Armenia from the world’s map on multiple occasions. The Republic of Armenia has estimated that it has lost 135 soldiers in this recent attack. Azerbaijan has also taken new prisoners of war which add to the ones illegally detained by Azerbaijan since the 2020 war. There are also indications that Azerbaijan deliberately targeted the civilian population in the above-mentioned cities. [...] Once again, we urge the international community to explicitly condemn this attack on the Republic of Armenia and to take measures against the autocratic government of Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey. International bodies and states cannot continue to ignore Azerbaijan's aggressive behavior towards the Republic of Armenia. If its actions remain ignored and unpunished as they have been so far, the world will soon witness an escalation of the violence and another genocide against the Armenians.

#when even the genocide prevention institute says it's the second genocide in the making and people still try to 'both side' this #armenia #read the full statement please and reblog #the worst thing is to stay silent #q #article

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uboat53 · 2 months

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I had a discussion with a friend of mine in the (US) military recently and it reminded me that most people in the US and, in fact, in the world, are almost entirely unaware that there is a new Cold War taking shape. I think more people should be aware of it, knowledge is power after all, and knowing about something gives you the opportunity to help shape it, particularly if you're a citizen of a country where your voice has an impact in government. I hope this LONG RANT (TM) helps someone better understand.

INTRODUCTION

As I said, there's a new Cold War beginning, and, like the previous Cold War, there's a strong component of ideology to it. Specifically, the world is beginning to fracture between liberal democracy and autocracy.

What makes this conflict particularly complex is that we're at the early stages. When thinking about the Cold War, capitalism vs communism, it wasn't until the 1950s, 1960s, or even the 1970s in some cases that it was really clear which side most consequential nations would end up on. It was pretty obvious that the Soviet Union and the United States would be the major communist and capitalist powers, respectively, but the status of many other nations didn't become clear until long internal political debates and outside interventions had a chance to play out.

So, without further ado, let's get into it.

WHY IS THERE A CONFLICT AT ALL?

This is one of the key questions and, honestly, it all comes down to the interconnectedness of the modern world. You see, modern autocracies that don't rely on the divine right of kings to justify their rule generally justify it by results. In order to make sure the results come out correctly, they control the information available to their people to ensure that their people are told that the autocratic rulers are giving them the best results, whether that's in terms of economics, culture, religion, or whatever else they want to focus on.

As my old boss used to tell me a decade and a half ago, "North Korea can't afford to allow YouTube to get to the average person even if the average person just watches stupid videos because it's going to become really obvious that, yes, this person is an idiot, but that idiot has a fridge, a TV, a car, and has obviously never missed a meal in their life; they can't possibly be poorer than us."

In the olden days that would be fairly easy. Radio signals only travel so far, so as long as you control the TV and radio stations and limit the ability of printed media to spread too widely, you could completely control what information your population receives.

Nowadays, however? Well, that's very different. The internet allows people from all over the world to talk to each other in an instant and it can even go a long way to easing language barriers. The advent of satellite internet means that even efforts to control internet traffic such as the so-called "Great Firewall of China" will be increasingly limited in their effectiveness.

Today, in order for an autocracy to control the information their people receive, they not only have to control the information environment in their own country, they have to control the information available in other countries as well. That's the reason you're seeing things like the Saudi Arabia's murder of dissident Jamal Khashoggi, Russia's poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko and Sergei and Yulia Skripal, a Chinese attempt to kidnap dissidents in the US, India's alleged killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, and it's attempt to kill Gurpatwant Singh Pannun.

All of these were killings or other physical violence that took place in liberal democratic countries (except for Khashoggi who, though American, was lured to the Saudi embassy in Turkey where was killed) where what the individuals were doing was perfectly legal. This is the driver of conflict today, authoritarian nations attempting to maintain their monopoly on the information their citizens receive in a global information environment.

THE EARLY DAYS

We're currently in the early days of this autocracy vs liberal democracy competition and there are numerous nations currently in conflict over which side they're going to be on including, unfortunately, our own. In order to explain that, I need to get a bit technical over the difference between "democracy" and "liberal democracy".

Democracy, basically, can describe any situation where leaders are elected by some kind of popular vote. If you look closely at that for a second, you'll realize that it's such a broad category that even the autocratic Soviet Union technically qualified. Obviously, a category broad enough to include actual autocracies isn't really in opposition to them.

Liberal Democracy, on the other hand, is a Democracy, but with a whole bunch of other things as well. In general, a Liberal Democracy will feature multiple distinct candidates and/or parties in their elections, some sort of separation of powers between branches of government, the rule of law (law that applies equally to all), an open society (one in which individuals make choices rather than being controlled by tribes or other type of collectivism), a market economy with private property, universal suffrage, and the protection of human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, and political freedoms for all people.

(That definition borrowed almost entirely from the Wikipedia article on Liberal Democracy, check it out if you're interested.)

In other words, Liberal Democracy is more than just "do people vote for leaders?", but encompasses just about everything we'd associate with individual rights and liberties and the structure of institutions to ensure them. People in an Illiberal Democracy may technically vote for their leaders but, without all of these other rights and protections, they can hardly be said to have truly chosen them. And, when you define it clearly, you can see that there's a bit of a disagreement about that in American politics right now.

The Republican Party, and particularly its MAGA wing, is increasingly of the mind that not everyone's vote is legitimate and has been putting in place barriers to voting that disproportionately affect disfavored groups. In addition, they're pushing to end much of the separation of powers, putting more unchecked power in the hands of the president at the expense of checks, balances, and sometimes guarantees of individual liberty. Democracy would continue, but Liberal Democracy would end.

To be clear, this isn't just an American problem, but one that is faced by nearly every Liberal Democracy today. As part of autocrat's efforts to control information outside of their own borders, they've been attempting to influence politics within Liberal Democracies and promote internal autocratic movements; usually right-wing nationalists. From the Republican Party's MAGA wing to France's National Front to Germany's Alternativ Fur Deutschland, just about every Liberal Democracy in the world now has a fundamentally autocratic right-wing party that is doing much better than it did just ten or twenty years ago and, if you scratch the surface, you will find support for them, both financial and otherwise, from autocrats around the world.

Of course, it's not just the far-right either, autocrats have been promoting the far-left in Liberal Democratic countries as well. While the far-right has had much more electoral success and is much more politically organized in the west and, thus, has received more attention, we can't ignore the fact that autocracy is largely neutral on the political scale and operates anywhere that conspiratorial thinking can take hold and distract people from the removal of their freedoms or even convince them that those freedoms hold no value in the first place.

WHERE WE GO FROM HERE

Well, that's the trillion dollar question, isn't it?

Conflict will likely continue between autocratic and liberal democratic states, but the complexities are growing. Much like communism vs capitalism, autocracy vs liberal democracy is more of a spectrum than a hard binary and many states are actively sloshing around along that spectrum.

There's also the uncertainty of how different countries react to incidents like the ones we're seeing. Technically, killing a person on the soil of another country is an act of war, but not many people in the modern world are willing to go to war for the killing of one person. Most likely what we'll see is a gradual hardening of blocs as liberal democracies react to provocations by slowly pulling back from cooperation and connection with autocratic nations.

We're also likely to see countries switch sides. Unlike the rapid shift in allegiances that we saw during the Cold War, however, these are likely to be more gradual shifts like what we've seen in Hungary and Turkey where individual rights are stripped away gradually and a governing autocrat is slowly ensconced in power rather than a hard and fast coup. We could, of course, see countries go the other way as well, as in the case of Ukraine which has slowly strengthened individual rights and overthrown its autocrats.

All of this, the solidification of blocs and the shifting of countries within this spectrum, is going to create the opening situations for this particular conflict. Whether it becomes a conflict of more rigidly defined blocs or even sparks proxy wars remains to be seen.

CONCLUSION (TL;DR)

The days of a fairly open world, both in physical travel, the movement of goods, and in communication, is starting to come to an end as that openness begins to threaten the hold of autocrats on power. Those autocrats are attempting to keep both the openness and power by working to control the information available in countries that practice Liberal Democracy and generally guarantee individual liberties.

Over the next several decades, it is likely that we will see increasing separation between a bloc of autocratic nations and a bloc of liberal democracies, much as the Cold War saw separation between pro-capitalist and pro-communist countries. Some of that separation will likely not go smoothly and we will likely see at least some military tension and possibly even armed conflict as leaders react to changes or even try to distract from them with military force.

Just as importantly, we are likely to see tension within countries all over the world as autocratic political parties attempt to take control of liberal democracies and pro-democracy movements attempt to overthrow autocrats.

I'll admit this isn't the most hopeful vision of the future that we'd like to see, but I think it's fairly realistic given the current realities we see. I hope that this gives you some insight into what's going on and allows you to plan accordingly.

As always, let me know if you think I missed something or got something wrong, I'm always up for adjusting my thoughts, and I hope you enjoyed the read.

#politics #international politics #liberal democracy #democracy #individual rights #autocracy #cold war #new cold war #long rant (tm)

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bopinion · 2 months

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2024 / 13

Aperçu of the Week:

"Peace is never made with weapons, but by stretching out our hands and opening our hearts."

(Pope Francis at this year's Easter blessing "Urbi et Orbi" in Rome)

Bad News of the Week:

Turkey has voted. "Only" local elections, but an important test of sentiment in view of the severe economic problems facing the country of two continents, such as inflation of almost 70%. The winner was not the conservative AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi / Justice and Development Party) of ruling President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, but the largest opposition party CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi / Republican People's Party), a social democratic party founded by none other than the father of the country, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

The CHP now holds the office of mayor in the country's five largest cities, including Ankara and Istanbul. The latter in particular will hurt Erdogan, as he himself was once mayor of the metropolis on the Bosporus. A 75% voter turnout proves that the voice of the people has indeed spoken here. This is remarkable in that Erdogan has become more and more of an autocrat in recent years - among other things by restricting freedom of expression and the press, curtailing the independent judiciary, persecuting critics of the regime and transforming the state into a presidential republic.

The election result is therefore much more than just a yellow card to those currently in power, a "midterm effect" so to speak. It is a clearly articulated, unmistakable rejection of an authoritarian style of leadership in general and of wannabe despot Erdogan in particular. This rejection is all the more pleasing as the opposite direction has become increasingly established worldwide in recent years, especially in patriarchal societies. Freedom, pluralism, peace, equality and democracy are finding it increasingly difficult to be seen as fundamental foundations of nation building.

Many states such as Libya, Iraq and Yemen have been unable to emerge from the maelstrom of a failed state for years and decades. And beacons of hope such as Tunisia, which adopted a constitution following the Arab Spring revolution and held the status of the only democratic country in the Arab world from 2014 to 2020, have reverted to autocracies. Others, such as Myanmar, which tried to establish democratic elements from 2011 to 2021, are now even under the rule of military dictatorships. Which makes this actually good news into bad news after all.

Good News of the Week:

I have never understood many things that happen in Israel. For example, why the ultra-Orthodox - 13% of the population - enjoy so many exceptions in a theoretically secular state, such as not being called up for compulsory military service. Or why a people that has suffered so much from radicalism in its history is increasingly voting for far-right parties. Or why anyone who criticizes Israeli policy is immediately and reflexively vilified as an anti-Semite.

Israel could always be sure of one thing, no matter what it was about: the support of the USA. Although the protection of Israel is the official reason of state in Germany, it is primarily the Americans who see themselves as the unwavering protector of the Israeli state. Automatically and unfortunately often without reflection. For example, in all previous military conflicts in the Middle East, in which Israel has violated international law on more than one occasion, or in the oppression of the Palestinian people, which can safely be described as apartheid, the US veto has always ensured that Israel has not been subject to a UN Security Council resolution. Until now.

An abstention by the USA was the first time that a (theoretically legally binding) UN resolution called for a ceasefire, serious peace efforts and protection of the civilian population in Gaza - 14 votes for, 1 abstention, 0 votes against. Side note: historically, most UN resolutions were not prevented by the Soviet Union/Russia or China, but by the USA. And Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reacted like an offended child. Among other things, by canceling the US visit of an Israeli delegation. Which was actually on a mission to ask for more weapons. In soccer, this is called an own goal. The media response was corresponding - even in Israel, whose enlightened population continues to take to the streets in their tens of thousands against the wannabe despot.

You can take whatever view you like on the proportionality of Israel's military response to the Hamas attack. But this behavior proves once again that Netanyahu is not a sovereign politician who serves the interests of his people without thinking of himself. He is a selfish, consultation-resistant, undemocratic power politician who pushes an autocratic agenda regardless of the consequences. In this respect, any behavior that reveals this character is fine with me. Because that makes his re-election less likely. Which would be good for peace in the Middle East. And for the world. Which makes this actually bad news into good news after all.

Personal happy moment of the week:

We rarely treat ourselves with dining out. And there's a work colleague whose company I really appreciate, but rarely see, as he works from the north of Germany. Last week, he was a guest in our little town, of all places, for a three-day training course. And as this is a very beautiful area, he brought the whole family with him. And we met them with our whole family in a long-established inn to spend an evening feasting and exchanging anecdotes. Lovely.

I couldn't care less...

...that once again - and once again completely unnecessarily - summertime has begun. The basic idea dates back to 1784, when Benjamin Franklin (of all people) saw it as a way of saving energy by using less electric lighting. Its complete uselessness has long been proven, and the impact on wildlife is enormous. Which in this case includes me.

It's fine with me...

...that "crypto king" Sam Bankman-Fried was sentenced to 25 years in prison for fraud in the collapse of his cryptocurrency stock exchange FTX. First, because he commited fraud. Secondly, because I reject all forms of speculation and (trading) derivatives in principle. Maybe I'm old-fashioned, but the real economy is probably called that because it's real.

As I write this...

...I listen to the typically melancholy piano music of Frederik Chopin. It goes perfectly with the cold and wet April weather, which started right on time today.

Post Scriptum

Hardly anyone outside Germany has ever heard of the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft (Fraunhofer Society for the Advancement of Applied Research) from Munich. It is named after Joseph von Fraunhofer, a leading inventor in the field of optics, e.g. telescope construction - hence the inscription on his tombstone "Approximavit Sidera" (He brought us closer to the stars). The purpose of the association is applied research for the direct benefit and advantage of society. In other words, less theoretical basic research than concrete usability.

The results of the 30,000 or so people working there are certainly noticeable in everyday life: The MP3 audio format, white LEDs, High Definition Television (HDTV), airbags or RFID technology are just examples of the inventions we are all familiar with. The institution comes up with over 600 inventions every year. These are not - as is the case with an industrial patent - exclusively available to one manufacturer, but to everyone. The Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft is now celebrating its 75th anniversary. Congratulations. And thank you.

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jordanianroyals · 3 months

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BBC: Jordan's free speech boundaries tested with satire

By Yolande Knell, BBC News Middle East correspondent, 5 August 2023

One of the most popular satirical websites in the Arab world has hit back after being banned in Jordan by poking fun at the country's new planned censorship laws.

AlHudood, meaning "the limits" or "the borders", publishes articles and social media posts highlighting the absurdities of Middle Eastern politics and everyday life in a deadpan style. It is in effect the region's answer to the US parody website The Onion or the UK's Private Eye.

Its mocking commentary of the lavish wedding of Jordan's crown prince apparently led to AlHudood being blocked by the authorities last month - just ahead of tighter restrictions on the media being introduced.

Legislation currently going through parliament has been denounced by journalists and human rights groups, who say it will further restrict freedom of expression.

In its response, AlHudood - which was started in Jordan a decade ago - has offered a sardonic guide to publishing content in the country "without being fined, imprisoned, crucified".

Another mock article in a series of reports focuses on a "terrorist" who just started to pose a question on Facebook and was arrested for an "electronic crime".

"I think this will probably create a bigger clash [with officials in Amman] than before, but we feel we have no choice because if we don't do this, the longer-term effect for us and everyone else is going to be so much worse," an AlHudood source tells me from London.

In a region of autocratic leaders where state-run media dominates, AlHudood has thrived against the odds over the past decade and is seen as a breath of fresh air by many of its young followers. It says it reaches a million readers on its website and some 30 million a year on social media, which has become the main forum for voicing criticism of Arab authorities.

"We sort of do the journalism and then repackage it with satire," the London source says. "Satire is really great at working with hypocrisy and corruption."

Dark humour is deployed even on the toughest topics such as civil war, sectarian fighting, immigration and terrorism.

"A lot of the news is so overwhelming and it's difficult to find an angle on it," the AlHudood source adds. "Our approach at least gets people curious about what's happening. It helps create a question in people's heads like: 'What should I think about that?'"

Among the online publication's recent satirical reports was one about the Tunisian president condemning sub-Saharan Africans for stealing places on migrant boats from his own people.

Others drily introduce the two latest candidates "who will not end" Lebanon's long-running presidential vacuum and tell of an agreement between Turkey and Syria "to repatriate 50% of every refugee".

One headline: "Saudi government signs Hajj promotion deal with Cristiano Ronaldo" mocks how widely the superstar footballer has been used in marketing since his lucrative transfer to a Riyadh club.

For AlHudood's writers the opulent celebrations for the Jordanian royal wedding in June seemed ripe for ridicule. While Jordanian law has long criminalised speech deemed critical of the king, from experience its team did not think it was crossing red lines.

A satirical Instagram post depicted Jordanian riot police arresting a man for throwing a party for his baby son on the day of the crown prince's nuptials. There was also a joke threatening fines for citizens who were found not smiling sufficiently. Another gag asked how the costs of the wedding were being covered in the country struggling with rising living costs.

Human rights activists say that in Jordan and the broader Middle East, there has been a recent trend for increased state censorship. There have been many prosecutions of social media influencers and bans on TikTok.

A coalition of civic rights groups led by US-based Human Rights Watch (HRW) has urged Jordan's parliament to scrap its new cybercrimes law, saying it could jeopardise free speech and lead to greater online censorship. They criticise how some offences are described in vague terms which could leave them open for the interpretation of prosecutors.

"It makes very clear that the intention of this is to scare people and make them think twice about posting anything online that could be remotely critical or controversial, or something some official won't like. It's deeply concerning," says Adam Coogle from HRW in Amman.

"When you pair it with the real shrinking space for civil discussion that has taken place in this country otherwise in the last few years, we're looking at a clear slide into more authoritarian governance."

The cybercrime bill - which has just been sent back to Jordan's lower house of parliament by the Senate after it drafted small revisions - is also expected to give greater powers to the authorities to block websites and social media platforms.

Jordan's government maintains that the draft law is not meant to limit freedoms but tackle fake news, online defamation and hate speech. It denies trying to stifle dissent but says it wants to protect people from internet abuse or blackmail.

Nevertheless, there has been criticism from Washington, the country's main donor.

In order to work around regional restrictions, AlHudood has now been formally based in the UK for several years. It does not name its contributors from across the Arab world, reducing the chance of direct conflict with officials.

Despite the Jordan ban - which follows on from one in the United Arab Emirates - its writers say that they will continue touching the sensitive nerves of Middle Eastern powers.

#Jordan #crown prince hussein #Princess Rajwa #wedding

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readingsquotes · 6 months

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....it's very unfortunate that Israel is a model for world governments, and you can see its influence in places like Hungary, Russia, the Brexit UK, the United States, or any other country that has descended into mafia state autocracy, often directly in conjunction with Netanyahu, who's largely been in control of Israel since 2009, with occasional departures. But also, with the backing of a lot of the same donors and plutocrats and supporters. And Israel has, in this time, become a far-right autocratic state. It was always an apartheid state. It was never a true democracy. You cannot be a true democracy when you are colonizing and abusing a population that is living in subjugation, right beside you – which has historically been the case with Palestinians. But even for Israelis themselves, it has become an autocratic state with protests suppressed, with journalists, as you mentioned, threatened. And also, major outlets, like Haaretz, that have done a lot of brave investigative reporting. They are being threatened and the situation is dire. And I think that Israel should be listed when people put together lists of authoritarian states. It should be there. People will mention Russia, China, Turkey, and others, but they'll neglect to list Israel because Americans have always been taught that Israel is the lone democracy in the Middle East. And that is simply not the case.

Authoritarianism, Dehumanization, and the Fight Ahead "It's so important that folks stick together and recognize each other's struggles as a unified struggle," says author Sarah Kendzior. Kelly Hayes Dec 5, 2023

#sarah kendzior #kelly hayes #isreal #apartheid #authoritarianism #free palestine

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edwardian-girl-next-door · 10 months

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Feast Days: St. Bartholomew

Saint Bartholomew, workshop of Simone Martini (c.1317-1319)

Happy St. Bartholomew's Day!

Today marks the feast day of St. Bartholomew the Apostle -- that's right, one of the OG followers of Jesus! Although he has a pretty miniscule role in Biblical narratives, he is one of the twelve apostles, and so has a heavy load when it comes to patronage. He is the patron saint of butchers, Florentine salt and cheese merchants, house painters, book binders, leather workers, neurological diseases, skin diseases, dermatology, shoemakers, glove makers, farmers, curriers, tanners, trappers, and twitching.

A fair warning: this one isnt' so cheerful. Bart's demise, like many of the saints, is pretty gnarly, and it does have something to do with all this skin/leather stuff going on in his patronage. This day is also associated with an infamous example of religious violence, Catholic vs. Protestant. Read on at your own peril.

His Life

Not a lot is known about Bartholomew's life within Biblical canon. He is believed to be same person as the apostle Nathaniel, who appears in John 1:45-51 and 21:2. He is also mentioned in the Book of Acts.

Much of the tradition around Bartholomew details his trips to spread Christianity. This man sure got around! Two ancient texts cite a trip to India, specifically the Bombay region, where he left a copy of the Gospel of Matthew. However, many scholars doubt that this actually happened, and say that he actually went to Ethiopia or modern-day Yemen. Still other traditions hold that he was a missionary in Mesopotamia, northeastern Iran, and/or central Turkey.

Arguably his most eventful missions trip was to the Armenia/Azerbaijan area in the 1st century CE. Along with his fellow apostle Jude (also called Thaddeus), he is credited with bringing Christianity to the region; and as such, both are venerated as the patron saints of the Apostolic Church of Armenia. His luck ran out here, however, and he was martyred in the region in horrific fashion. Legend holds that he converted the king of Albania, Polymius, to Christianity. Polymius's brother was not a fan of this, and fearing a Roman backlash, and ordered Bartholomew's torture and execution. There are three main stories about his manner of death. The most popular says that he was executed in Albonopolis in Armenia by being flayed (skinned) alive and beheaded. The second account says he was crucified upside-down, and the third that he was beaten unconscious and thrown into the sea to drown. The first legend captures the imagination much more vividly, and as such Bartholomew is most frequently depicted holding his skin -- sometimes he has grown a new skin, other times he is still a skin-less meat man. Many times the old skin still has his face. Woof.

Bartholomew has also come to be associated with the field of medicine, for two main reasons. Firstly, artists past and present have taken advantage of Bartholomew's flayed state to execute detailed anatomical studies of the human body. Secondly, a portion of his relics are stored at the basilica of San Bartolomeo all'Isola in Rome. This was the old site of a temple to Asclepius, which was an important Roman medical site (Asclepius is the Greek god of medicine). Thus, over time, Bartholomew and medicine came to be connected.

The St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre

A depiction by Huguenot painter François Dubois, who was possibly an eyewitness (c.1572-1584)

This series mainly focuses on saints' days in the UK, but one does not simply discuss St. Bartholomew's Day without discussing the massacre. This outbreak of bloodletting was part of the decades-long French Wars of Religion, which was fought on and off between Catholics and Huguenots (French Calvinist Protestants). As religion held such an essential role in society and in the machinations of power, the 'type' of Christianity embraced by the state was literally and frequently a matter of life and death. With autocratic governments, unity of church and state, and much less effective means of communication and law enforcement, it was only too easy for hate and violence to take over, and for those in power to turn a blind eye or even participate. There are many contemporary examples we can look to as parallels to this event, and I think with the same conditions, it could happen a lot more often.

The massacre took place in Paris on the night of August 23rd-24th, 1572. Although the causes for the riots are complex and deep-rooted, the main inciting factor was the marriage of Henry III of Navarre, a Catholic, to Margaret of Valois, a Huguenot. They were married on August 18th, and many rich and famous Huguenots gathered in largely-Catholic Paris to attend the wedding. Tensions erupted in scenes of horrific violence, with Catholic mobs attacking, trapping, and hunting down Huguenots in the streets. The violence lasted for several weeks, spreading out through the provinces and other urban areas. Sir Francis Walsingham, Elizabeth I's ambassador to France at the time, was in Paris during the violence and barely managed to escape with his life. Modern estimates cite the casualties from anywhere between 5,000 and 30,000 people. Although the Catholic reaction to the slaughter ranged from outward glee to sickened horror, Protestant countries obviously panicked, and the massacre was used as anti-Catholic propaganda for centuries, 'justifying' Protestant reprisals against uninvolved Catholics. It was yet another terrible event in the brutal European Wars of Religion.

St. Bartholomew's Day and its Traditions

On to more cheerful things!

This day is also called Bartlemas or Bartelmytide.

Emma, the wife of King Canute, supposedly brought one of Bartholomew's arms to England in the 11th century, and it was venerated in Canterbury Cathedral for many years. Most of the information on this is in the past tense, so I assume it is no longer there.

Depiction of Bartholomew Fair, Rowlandson et. al., c.1808

August and the time around St. Bartholomew's Day is the traditional time for markets and fairs. One of the most famous was Bartholomew Fair in West Smithfield, London. A massive spectacle, it served as a place for serious trade, becoming the main cloth trading event in the country; but it also offered entertainment like dances, tournaments, musicians, international curiosities, food vendors, conjurers, wild animals, circus acts, and an all-around good time. It began in 1133 by a charter from Henry I, and originally lasted three days, but during the 1600s it could go for two full weeks! With the change in the calendar in 1753, the fair was moved to September 3rd, and in 1791 they decided four days was quite enough time. It was ended in 1855 for causing public disturbance and the criminal activity it attracted. A less rowdy street fair is still held in Crewkerne, Somerset, at the beginning of September. It dates back to Saxon times and is even recorded in the Doomesday Book of 1086!

There is also some delightful weather wisdom about St. Bartholomew's Day. One rhyme says, "If St. Bartholomew's be fair and clear / Then a prosperous autumn comes that year". Another is connected to St. Swithin's Day (July 15th), and claims "All the tears St. Swithin can cry / St Bartelmy's mantle wipes them dry". Traditional wisdom holds that rain on St. Swithin's Day means rain for the next 40 days, or until August 24th.

Many areas have their own unique ways of celebrating the holiday, such as blessing mead or baking special bread. It's nice to know that a holiday associated with such terrible things can be made into a nice occasion!

If You're Still Interested

There are a few famous depictions of the saint, including Michelangelo's rendering in "The Last Judgement". However, the whole flayed skin thing makes it pretty gruesome, and I didn't want to spring that on y'all without warning. If you'd like to see it, feel free to Google!

History Today's article that details some specific exhibitions from Bartholomew's Fair, including ventriloquists and a pig that could tell time!

Sources

Please forgive the excess of Wikipedia! It's hard to find info on the internet about this holiday, and Wikipedia has been the most forthcoming. It really can be helpful sometimes.

Wikipedia (Bartholomew the Apostle)

Wikipedia (Bartholomew Fair)

Wikipedia (St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre)

My AP European History class (woot)

aclerkofoxford

The Country Diary of an Edwardian Lady by Edith Holden

The Encyclopedia of Saints by Rosemary Ellen Guiley

#feast day series #st bartholomew #history #english history #british history #folk history #cultural history #feast day #saints day

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warningsine · 1 year

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As Turkey approaches presidential and parliamentary elections on May 14, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is fighting an uphill battle for survival. He is behind in the polls, which can be attributed to three main reasons.

First, Erdogan can no longer rely on his autocratic bargain predicated on delivering economic growth and upward mobility in return for political support or quiescence. This served him well during most of his 20 years in power but now is irreparably broken.

His stubborn and uninformed monetary policy has left the economy fragile and suffering from high inflation. A major erosion of purchasing power generating growing poverty and income disparity ensued in the last couple of years. But the bad news for Erdogan does not end with the economy.

Second, and perhaps most important, a traditionally weak and divided opposition is now united against him. An eclectic coalition of six parties, boosted with the support of a kingmaker Kurdish political movement, stands firmly behind Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the social-democratic Republican People’s Party and the candidate of what is known as the Nation Alliance.

Kilicdaroglu is ahead of Erdogan in the polls, but his margin is slim.

Finally, a third factor also works against Erdogan: the massive earthquake that shook Turkey on February 6 and killed more than 50,000 people. The disaster blatantly exposed the inefficiency and institutional decay under Erdogan’s one-man rule.

To the massive frustration of millions affected, the state was quasi-absent in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. Under the corrupt management of incompetent cronies, governmental agencies not only failed in search and rescue efforts but also mismanaged post-disaster relief.

Under normal circumstances these factors should translate into a major defeat for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Yet elections are no longer free and fair in Erdogan’s Turkey. The government controls most of the media and the judicial system.

In the absence of a strong margin of victory for the opposition, Erdogan may refuse to concede and take the result to the courts or worse – to the streets.

Lacking charisma and oratory skills but with a strong reputation for integrity, Kilicdaroglu, 74, is the architect of the opposition’s newly acquired unity. But he has a losing streak against Erdogan.

In a two-round presidential election system that is bound to be tightly contested, whether Kilicdaroglu can win in the first round with more than 50% of the vote will end up depending on an unknown: the resurgent candidacy of Muharrem Ince, who has emerged as a populist disrupter, to the delight of Erdogan. Ince, who polls between 5% and 7%, attracts younger voters unhappy with both the AKP and the opposition.

Given the stakes, the whole country is on edge. A large part of the population is ready for change. But the same societal segment is anxious and incredulous about the prospect of Erdogan losing power.

Aura of invincibility

Like many observers in the West who lack confidence in Turkey’s democratic maturity, many in Turkey find it hard to believe that Erdogan will quietly disappear after losing an election. This brings us to a critically important yet often misunderstood dimension of the drama about to unfold in Turkey: Erdogan’s biggest advantage is his aura of political invincibility.

There seems to be a fatalistic resignation that Erdogan will find a way to stay in power and that a peaceful transition will prove elusive. The same alarmism sees this election as the last chance before Turkey slides into dictatorship.

Such apprehension may serve to galvanize the opposition. But it is misplaced and ignores reality. Erdogan is not as strong as he seems and Turkey is not an autocracy like Russia or China where polls are cosmetic.

Despite the illiberal nature of strongman rule, elections will continue to matter if Turkish people are not intimidated by Erdogan. Even if he manages to win, the people and the opposition should remain vigilant, make sure the result is not manipulated before conceding, and prepare for the next fight instead of losing hope and faith in elections.

Turkish democracy will outlast Erdogan even if he scores a pyrrhic short-term victory. He is bound to lose even if he wins.

Finally, let’s not forget that Erdogan lost local elections in all major cities in 2019 when the opposition was united and received Kurdish support. In Istanbul, a 16-million-strong megapolis and a microcosm of Turkey, Erdogan refused the result after a very narrow loss and bullied his way to a rerun.

He lost in a landslide.

And all this was before the economic meltdown and the hyperinflation of the last two years. Behind the facade of his massive presidential palace, Erdogan is a lonely man, detached from reality, and surrounded by sycophants.

Yes, he has gained a well-deserved reputation as a Machiavellian survivor after 20 years in power. But centralization of decision-making, personalization of authority, and the hollowing out of state institutions have not made him stronger.

Instead, Turkey’s strongman is now at his weakest. If Erdogan wins on May 14, it will not be because of his capacity to govern or his populist policies raising the minimum wage or lowering the retirement age. It will be because too many Turks still believe he is invincible.

#Recep Tayyip Erdogan #turkey #politics #Omer Taspinar #Kemal Kilicdaroglu

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lewepstein · 6 months

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Why Political Strongmen?...Why Now?

It’s hard to look around, read an article or watch the news and not be struck by what is going on politically in the United States and in many countries around the world today. So much of what is disturbing to me has to do with so-called “strongman” regimes, autocrats who were once elected and have since consolidated their power by weakening the institutions that might have once held them in check. As I’ve watched this process unfold, a number of questions come to mind. One is, “Why is this happening? The second is, “Why is it happening now? From an historical perspective it would be helpful to know when and under what conditions this has occurred before. As a therapist, I would like to better understand the psychological underpinnings of this global trend and examine the ways that fear and the search for safety may contribute to a rise in authoritarianism.

If this were just an American phenomenon we could examine Donald Trump’s continued popularity and front-runner status in the Republican Party and try to analyze the currents in our society that have contributed to his rise to prominence and power. But Vladmir Putin has also consolidated dictatorial power with early popular support along with Xi Jinping in China, Victor Orban in Hungary, Recep Erdogan in Turkey and Narendra Modi, in India. The people of Brazil, defying that trend, voted out Jair Bolsinaro, a Trump clone, and voted in a left-leaning progressive and former president, Lula DeSilva. But recent elections in Italy, Argentina and even Holland have empowered illiberal parties and right wing leaders, each of them fiercely nationalistic, conservative regarding women’s and LGBTQ rights, favoring one dominant religion and hostile toward immigration and those who are ethnically different from the majority population. When the political right makes gains over the years even in traditionally liberal bastions such as Israel, England, Germany, France and Scandinavia, it raises questions for me about what is going on in the “global mind.”

Even as I refer to “the political right,” I realize that it cannot be reduced to one monolithic world-wide movement. In the United States during the Reagan era, Republican Party constituents were mainly social conservatives, anti-communists (later “War on Terror” hawks) and free marketeers. What is different today is that many former conservatives seem ready to use the state to advance a radical agenda and are willing to concentrate enormous power in a strongman like Donald Trump.

But why? Why are people who not that long ago sanctified individual freedom, were in favor of “small government” and supported a muscular foreign policy designed to challenge international violators of human rights now lining up behind a “strongman?” Why is the Republican Party unwilling to fully support a war of liberation against a dictatorial Putin and instead deify a demagogue who has professed an admiration for dictators, made it clear that if elected again he would use the levers of government to reduce press freedom and other forms of dissent and openly stated that he would use “his” Justice Department to exact revenge on those who refuse to do his bidding? Why have there been similar shifts in ideology and popular sentiment in other countries?

If the proposition that fear and the manipulation of people’s fears play a role in “strongmen” coming to power, then destabilizing global trends may also be important to consider in trying to understand why this is occurring now. During the past twenty five years and more the world has experienced greater than ever displacement of people from the global south to the global north. Much of this mass migration is happening as a result of the climate crisis along with political and economic instability in countries in Africa, Latin America and in Syria. The September 11th attacks on the United States along with Jihadi terrorism in Europe, India and in majority Muslim countries has been the backdrop for right wing political parties to rail against the new immigrants while millions of desperate refugees try to find safe havens in Europe and the United States. This is not to say that the political Left has never used fear to manipulate public opinion or tried to impose its thinking on others through control. It is more that the contemporary move toward more autocratic, strongman regimes at this time is comprised of almost exclusively nationalistic and even Neo-fascist rhetoric.

The broad, destabilizing trends that I have been describing along with the ways that the news about them is being disseminated may be impacting our core psychology. The twenty four hour news cycle can magnify and intensify whatever is going on in what Marshall McLuhan has called our “global village,” and the dissemination of mis-information and inflammatory rhetoric on social media has served as an organizing platform and recruitment tool for violence in ways that were not possible before. In short, it may be our easy access to information that is contributing to our fears and to varying degrees, making us feel unsafe. I also propose that this is occurring in ways that did not happen as much when what was once packaged as “the news” came to us in a few major newspapers and on three or four T.V channels with news “anchors” who, for better and for worse, we came to know and trust.

I not only believe that a proliferation of information and mis-information can make us feel less safe, it also lays bare how vulnerable our nervous systems are to signals that indicate danger. Although most of us like to think of ourselves as the masters of our fates - and in some ways I believe we are - our search for safety may be the underlying factor governing many of our choices. The “fight or flight” response is now commonly understood to be part of our hard wiring, but recent studies having to do with the autonomic nervous system and more specifically the vagal nerve have increased our understanding of just how tied we are to underlying responses that are part of our biology: The Following quotes are from “Our Polyvagal World” by Steven Porges, a long time researcher on how our nervous system processes and produces feelings of safety and fear:

“ …the search for safety can be viewed as the primary organizing principle behind human evolution and human society. The need for safety is so central to our survival that virtually everything we are drawn to or enjoy is, in some way, a reflection of this need.”

We have to remember that this is still a theory, but the more I learn about our automatic and often subliminal reactions to what we experience as either threatening or safe, the more I can understand how easily we can be manipulated by political actors with malevolent intent. This theory also poses the following idea:

“the more threatened our nervous system feels, the more primitive the response. As we get more defensive and fearful, the higher thinking that is unique to humans is bypassed in favor of reactionary gut instincts.”

So how might this theory at least partially explain the rise of autocracy in the world today?

“For an authoritarian or would-be strongman, convincing a large number of people that they are under threat is basically required to maintain power. We see this when political actors don’t just civilly disagree with their opponents or with entire groups of people but cast them as outsiders and subhuman bogeymen. If your constituents are made to fear that somebody or some group is an existential threat to their way of life or might replace them then these constituents may let you get away with nearly anything. It becomes “us versus them.” It is through this playbook that tyranny, extreme nationalism and political violence thrive.”

If this scenario is beginning to sound familiar it is probably because it has both historical implications and present day manifestations. When a politician like Donald Trump takes the stage, feelings of danger, anger and outrage are what he evokes in his base. The feared others - “Mexican rapists," and immigrants from "shit-hole countries," are merely props designed to unsettle the nervous systems of his followers which he can then refocus as hatred toward the “enemies” whom “only he can protect you from.”

Each would-be “strongman” has his own list of enemies, usually disempowered groups or “outsiders” whom he characterizes as victimizers and as a threat to the nation.

For Adolph Hitler and the Nazi party in the 1930s the targeted groups were Jews, the Romani people - once known as “Gypsies,” homosexuals, people with disabilities, socialists and trade unionists.

For Donald Trump the feared and hated others are Muslims, immigrants from Third World countries who are “poisoning our bloodstream,” Trans people, Mexicans, journalists who criticize him, Black people in cities who vote against him and those who oppose him on the political left who he refers to as “vermin.”

The underlying fear factor played upon by Donald Trump seems to have to do with being “replaced” in some way: Whites by a soon to be majority non-white population that would comprise a multi-racial democracy; rural, working class whites by metropolitan elites who they feel marginalized by; Christians who have been told and believe that their dominance in American society is somehow under threat. Republican politicians by a Trump supported primary challenger. Proud Boys and other proto-fascist groups by Trans People who they see as posing a threat to binary gender norms and of course American Nazis who have openly chanted, “Jews will not replace us.” in marches in Charlottesville, Wisconsin and more recently Florida.

To Trump, himself, the so-called “Deep State” poses a threat because it encompasses a separation of powers by government agencies and branches of government not under his direct control.

Looking back over a broader sweep of history, the periods when “strongman '' and repressive, monarchical regimes became the norm were never eras of expansiveness such as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and during my lifetime the 1960s. when a burst of creativity and a new consciousness briefly became a youth revolt against an old and more repressive order. Autocratic reigns of terror have always included attacks on science, reason and openness, a dominant theme of The Dark Ages, and in more recent history, the 1930s when international fascism, strongman rule and mass extermination of the feared and hated others became a central organizing principle for dictators in Spain, Germany, Italy and Japan.

If we humans are hardwired to process fear and search for safety in ways that at times makes us vulnerable to the irrational appeals of demagogues and would-be dictators, is there still hope for a brighter future? Are there ways that we can avoid the consequences of our deep, biologically rooted fears that have contributed to the creation of fascist and totalitarian regimes? In Part II of “Why Political Strongmen” Why Now? I will examine the ways that this trend has been challenged before, explore alternative political responses and discuss ways to manage our own fear-based responses to this disturbing world trend.

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xtruss · 1 year

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The Battle For Eurasia! China, Russia, And Their Autocratic Friends Are Leading Another Epic Clash Over The world’s Largest Landmass.

— June 4, 2023 | By Hal Brands | Foreign Policy

Joan Wong Illustration For Foreign Policy /Getty Images

The war in Ukraine may have many positive outcomes: A Russia bled white by its own aggression, a United States that has rediscovered the centrality of its power and leadership, a democratic community that has been unified and energized for the dangerous years ahead. There will also be one very ominous outcome: the rise of a coalition of Eurasian autocracies linked by geographic proximity to one another and geopolitical hostility to the West. As Russian President Vladimir Putin’s folly rallies the advanced democracies, it hastens the construction of a Fortress Eurasia, manned by the free world’s enemies.

Revisionist autocracies—China, Russia, Iran, and, to a lesser degree, North Korea—aren’t simply pushing for power in their respective regions. They are forming interlocking strategic partnerships across the world’s largest landmass, and they are fostering trade and transportation networks beyond the reach of the U.S. dollar and the U.S. Navy. This isn’t, yet, a full-blown alliance of autocracies. It is, however, a bloc of adversaries more cohesive and dangerous than anything the United States has faced in decades.

All the great conflicts of the modern era have been contests over Eurasia, where dueling coalitions have clashed for dominance of that supercontinent and its surrounding oceans. Indeed, the American Century has been the Eurasian Century: Washington’s vital task as a superpower has been keeping the world in balance by keeping Eurasia divided. Now the United States is again leading a coalition of democratic allies on Eurasia’s margins against a group of centrally located rivals—while crucial swing states maneuver for advantage.

Countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and India have a critical role in this era of rivalry, thanks to the geography they occupy and the clout they wield. In many cases, these powers are determined to play both sides. Containing the Eurasian challenge will involve strengthening the bonds within and between the United States’ alliance networks. Yet what makes the current moment so daunting is that opportunistic swing states will also shape the fight between Fortress Eurasia and the free world.

Eurasia has long been the world’s key strategic shatter zone because it is where the richest and most powerful countries—the United States excepted—are located. And since the early 20th century, this sprawling supercontinent has seen vicious brawls for geopolitical primacy.

In World War I, Germany sought an empire from the English Channel to the Caucasus; it took a trans-Atlantic coalition of democracies to beat the challenge back. In World War II, Germany and Japan conquered Eurasia’s vibrant rimlands and drove deep into its heartland; an even grander, more ideologically diverse coalition rallied to restore the balance. In the Cold War, a centrally located superpower, the Soviet Union, tried to overawe a free-world coalition on Eurasia’s margins. The specifics change, but the basic clash—between those who seek to rule Eurasia and those, including the overseas superpower, who oppose them—endures.

After their Cold War victory, Washington and its friends were preeminent in all of Eurasia’s key subregions: Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Yet challenges have since reemerged from rivals that have increasingly coalesced around their shared hostility to the status quo. And just as major crises often speed up history, the Russia-Ukraine war is accelerating the rise of a new Eurasian bloc.

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was a bid to remake Eurasia by force. If Russia had conquered Ukraine, it could have restored the European core of the old Soviet Union. Moscow would have had a commanding position from Central Asia to NATO’s eastern front. The Sino-Russian strategic partnership would have seemed ascendant, while the democracies suffered another demoralizing defeat. That scenario unraveled with Putin’s shambolic offensive. Yet the war has still had profoundly polarizing effects.

“Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea all seek to overturn the balance of power and view the United States as the main obstacle.”

It has undoubtedly galvanized the advanced democracies. NATO is rearming and expanding. Democracies in Asia have supported Ukraine and sanctioned Russia for fear that successful aggression in one region may encourage deadly adventures in others. Countries linked by liberal values and support for the U.S.-led international order are strengthening their defenses from Eastern Europe to the Western Pacific, and they are rethinking economic and technological ties to the tyrannies in Moscow and Beijing. What U.S. President Joe Biden calls the “free world” is again taking shape. So, unfortunately, is an autocratic coalition.

Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang all seek to overturn the balance of power in their regions and view Washington as the primary obstacle. All worry about their vulnerability to sanctions and other punishments the United States and its global posse can impose. All need the others to survive because if the United States and its allies destroy any one of them, the remainder become more isolated and vulnerable. Finally, all are located within Eurasia and enjoy proximity, if not contiguity, with at least one other revisionist state. As the Russia-Ukraine war heightens global tensions, these autocracies are drawing together, for self-protection and strategic profit.

Soldiers from Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea pose for a photo before a display during a flower exhibition celebrating late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang on February 14, 2019. Ed Jones/AFP Via Getty Images

This trend isn’t new, of course. Iran and North Korea have long shared missile technology and other means of mischief; the Sino-Russian strategic partnership has been developing for decades. But if the war has strained that partnership, it has also underscored the convergent aims and anxieties of the revisionists. It has thus accelerated integration at the world’s Eurasian core.

A Eurasian bloc is cohering militarily, as the war fosters overlapping and increasingly ambitious defense ties. Russia’s military relationship with North Korea has become a two-way street, as Pyongyang sells Moscow badly needed artillery ammunition. Russia and Iran, meanwhile, are building what CIA Director William Burns calls a “full-fledged defense partnership.” That partnership involves transfers of drones, artillery, and, reportedly, missiles that have strengthened Russia on battlefields in Ukraine; it may presage the transfer of advanced Su-35 fighter aircraft, air defense systems, or ballistic missile technology, which would make Tehran a tougher enemy for the United States and Israel.

China, for its part, hasn’t openly supported Putin’s war with lethal military aid, for fear of U.S. and European sanctions. It has, however, provided so-called nonlethal assistance—from drones to computer chips—that helps Putin protract his fight, and Beijing would probably go further if its most important ally were facing defeat. For now, the conspicuous presence of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s defense experts during his recent summit with Putin in Moscow signaled that the larger military relationship—which already features joint exercises, arms sales, and significant technological cooperation—continues to race past the limits many Western observers expected a decade ago.

It wouldn’t take a formal Sino-Russian alliance to upend the military balance. If Russia provides China with sensitive submarine-quieting technology or surface-to-air missiles, it could profoundly change the complexion of a Sino-American war in the Western Pacific. In today’s Eurasia, well-armed revisionists are making common cause.

They are also restructuring international trade. Commerce, or weapons shipments, that traverses Eurasia’s marginal seas can be seized by globe-ranging navies. Dollar-dependent economies are vulnerable to U.S. sanctions. A second aspect of Fortress Eurasia, then, involves building trade and transportation networks safe from democratic interdiction.

For years, China has invested in overland pipelines and railroads meant to ensure access to Middle Eastern oil and other crucial resources. Beijing is now seeking to sanction-proof its economy by reducing reliance on foreign inputs, a project that has gained urgency thanks to the Western economic war on Moscow. Russia and Iran are energizing the International North-South Transport Corridor, which connects the two countries via the land-locked Caspian Sea, as Tehran instructs Moscow in sanctions evasion. Likewise, Russia and China are deepening cooperation to develop the Northern Sea Route, the least vulnerable maritime path between China’s Pacific ports and European Russia. When “international trade is in crisis,” as Putin said euphemistically last November, Eurasian integration is essential.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (second from left) meets with his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif (second from right), in Moscow on January 10, 2018. Alexander Zemlianichenko/AFP Via Getty Images

Indeed, Russia-Iran trade has spiked since February 2022, while China has become Moscow’s key commercial partner “by a wide margin,” as the Free Russia Foundation reports. Bilateral trade in Russian oil and Chinese computer chips is surging; Russian firms are turning to Hong Kong to raise capital while skirting sanctions. And as Chinese technology spreads throughout Eurasia, its currency proliferates, too.

This February, the yuan overtook the dollar as the most traded currency on the Moscow Exchange. China and Iran are also experimenting with cutting the dollar out of bilateral trade. “Geopolitics will not, of course, lead to the global dethronement of the dollar” anytime soon, Alexander Gabuev, the director of the new Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin, wrote in Bloomberg in March. But it could promote a Sino-centric economic and technological bloc at the heart of the Old World.

“Eurasian integration will make Washington’s antagonists less vulnerable to sanctions and strengthen them militarily.”

Finally, this Eurasian bloc is cohering intellectually and ideologically. The Sino-Russian joint statement in February 2022 portrayed the two countries as defending their autocratic political systems while resisting the United States’ Cold War-style alliance blocs. Iranian officials describe Eurasian cooperation as the antidote to U.S. “unilateralism”; Putin deems Eurasia a haven for “traditional values” besieged by Western “neoliberal elites.” Because the current war has severed Putin from the West, it has also resolved Russia’s perennial debate about which direction to face. For the time being, Russia’s destiny is Eurasian.

To be sure, there are limits. Whatever Putin says, the North-South corridor will never put the Suez Canal to shame. A globally integrated China won’t have to go all-in on Eurasia as a more isolated Russia must. Tensions lurk within the league of autocracies: Some Russian nationalists, if not Putin himself, must worry that a Eurasian orientation ultimately means economic vassalage to Beijing. In the meantime, however, Fortress Eurasia will make life much harder for Washington and its friends.

Eurasian integration will also make the United States’ antagonists less vulnerable to sanctions. It will strengthen them militarily against their foes. It will lead to wide-ranging diplomatic cooperation—such as stronger Russian support for China’s position on Taiwan—or perhaps even material assistance to one another in a war against the United States. If Russia had the opportunity to help China bleed the United States in a fight in East Asia, does anyone doubt it would have the motivation?

Even short of that, Fortress Eurasia will make the world safer for violent revisionism. The more secure these countries feel in their Eurasian stronghold, the more support they have from one another, the more emboldened they will be to project power into peripheral regions—the Western Pacific, Europe, the Middle East—and beyond.

Biden isn’t wrong, then, in describing a great struggle “between democracy and autocracy, between liberty and repression, between a rules-based order and one governed by brute force.” Yet this binary doesn’t fully capture the Eurasian landscape. The Russia-Ukraine war has also underscored the importance of strategically located swing states, which seek advantage from both Fortress Eurasia and the free world and affect the balance between the two.

In the Persian Gulf, a resource-rich region at the crossroads of three continents, longtime U.S. security partners now deem monogamy less rewarding than polyamory. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are shifting, economically and technologically, toward China. Both keep strong ties with Russia, even amid its war in Ukraine. Anti-communism once provided ideological glue in these monarchies’ relations with Washington. Today, however, modernizing autocracies have more in common politically with the United States’ rivals than with the United States itself.

To the West, Turkey occupies the intersection of two seas and two continents, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is, likewise, playing a double game. Ankara enjoys NATO’s protection while importing Russian air defenses; it supports Ukraine while helping Moscow to evade sanctions; and it has become a key player in conflicts from the Caucasus to the Horn of Africa, often in opposition to U.S. interests. How Turkey aligns, in other words, varies from issue to issue. And so long as an ambitious, increasingly illiberal Erdogan rules, it will aim, as Turkish analyst Asli Aydintasbas wrote in Foreign Affairs in 2021, “to keep a foot in each camp.”

Then there is South Asia. Pakistan, once a critical U.S. partner, now leans toward Beijing, which sees it as a conduit to the Indian Ocean. India, conversely, is tilting toward Washington for protection against China. But it still relies on Russia for arms and energy, and ideology and self-interest make India more comfortable navigating between the great powers than tying itself to any of them. It is a mistake to think New Delhi has irrevocably made its choice: At some point, Prime Minister Narendra Modi might welcome détente with China were Beijing to relax the pressure along the countries’ shared frontier. And in other countries around the Eurasian periphery, from Indonesia to Egypt, alignments are more fluid still.

“The competition for the swing states isn’t merely a global popularity contest.”

The swing states are diverse, but the commonalities are striking. None are among the rich, economically advanced democracies. All prefer to maneuver between rival coalitions, in hopes of keeping options open and eliciting the best possible deals from each. All have been ambivalent, at best, in responding to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine because they value their relationships with Moscow and worry that polarized geopolitics will preclude diplomatic flexibility. And all can meaningfully affect the configuration of power around the world’s central landmass.

Each of these swing states has already bolstered Putin’s war in Ukraine, by helping him to reduce the impact of sanctions. Saudi Arabia did so most spectacularly in late 2022, via oil production cuts that sent prices—and Moscow’s revenues—higher. Their choices have other critical implications, as well.

The UAE may be moving toward hosting a Chinese base on its territory—and thereby helping Beijing to insert its military power in a sensitive region. Saudi Arabia has already welcomed Chinese diplomatic power into the Persian Gulf, relying on Beijing to broker a mini-détente with Tehran. In South Asia, a Pakistan closely bound to Beijing will make it far easier for China to escape its “Malacca dilemma”—the fact that much of its westward trade must pass through a narrow strait it does not control. India’s decisions will influence the global distribution of technological influence and manufacturing capacity—the latter being particularly essential as the threat of great-power war grows—as well as how much trouble China faces on land as it pushes outward at sea. Turkey’s choices will affect the level of economic pressure Putin faces, the strength and solidarity of NATO, and the geopolitical landscape from Central Asia to the Middle East.

The competition for the swing states isn’t merely some global popularity contest. It will help determine whether the defenses Washington must erect around Fortress Eurasia are strong or full of holes.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin leave a reception at the Kremlin in Moscow on March 21. Pavel Byrkin/Sputnik/AFP VIA Getty Images

In 1944, Japan dispatched a submarine carrying gold, tungsten, and other materials to Nazi-occupied Europe. It was a suicide mission: After traveling thousands of miles around Asia and Africa, the submarine was sunk by U.S. aircraft near the Bay of Biscay. Berlin and Tokyo were fighting to remake the world, but the cruelties of geography made cooperation impossible.

Today’s revisionists don’t have this problem. The location of the Eurasian autocracies doesn’t simply make the new red blob look scary on a map. It helps them reduce asymmetric U.S. strengths and fight back-to-back against the outside world. As during the Cold War, a geographically dispersed free world confronts a geographically coherent coalition. Now as then, there is also a third group that can cast a swing vote in global affairs.

The United States can’t easily reverse the formation of Fortress Eurasia because that process is the result of strong shared interests and sharpening global tensions produced by the war in Ukraine. In theory, perhaps, Washington could split the coalition by reconciling with one or more of its members. In practice, if such reconciliation were possible, it would require concessions—abandoning Ukraine and parts of Eastern Europe to Moscow, for instance—that would worsen Washington’s global problems. What remains, then, is a twofold response.

The United States has alliance blocs that give it tremendous leverage in East Asia and Europe. In the aggregate, the United States and its treaty allies are mightier—economically, diplomatically, militarily—than their adversaries. So the first imperative is to strengthen the alliances that anchor Eurasia’s endangered margins while strengthening the bonds between them so aggression anywhere meets an increasingly global response.

To its credit, Washington is pursuing elements of this strategy—by tightening alliances with Japan and the Philippines, bolstering NATO’s eastern front, and crafting partnerships, such as AUKUS, that bind like-minded democracies across multiple regions. The next steps would be to further integrate free-world defenses where threats are most severe, perhaps by pursuing a trilateral U.S.-Japan-Australia commitment to resist Chinese aggression or by laying out serious plans for how European powers might respond, militarily or economically, to conflict in the Western Pacific. The difficulties here are hardly trivial, and a U.S. presidential election outcome in 2024 or after that would restore a unilateralist, America First administration could complicate matters further still. But, for the moment, the task is a familiar one of alliance management and fits comfortably within Biden’s free-world frame.

More conceptually challenging is the second imperative: maximizing strategic convergence with the swing states while minimizing divergence where it would hurt the most. Because these countries have good reasons for their ambivalence, this will be an arduous, often unsatisfying task.

“For the fourth time in little more than a century, an epic clash over Eurasia is underway.”

It will require separating the essential from the important—namely, identifying those issues, such as keeping Chinese military bases out of the Persian Gulf, where the United States should aggressively employ its leverage to avert a meaningful change in the Eurasian equilibrium. The corollary involves accepting that moral compromises—and trade-offs between the short term and the long term—will be starker in dealing with swing states than in dealing with advanced democracies. The United States can make Saudi Arabia a pariah or directly challenge India on issues of domestic governance but not without jeopardizing cooperation on issues of strategic importance. This suggests that Washington should also tailor its message to its audience: Outside the global West, appeals to democratic norms will be less effective than an emphasis on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and other norms that are threatened by the behavior, as opposed to the regime type, of the revisionist quartet.

These points, in turn, underscore the frankly transactional nature of diplomacy with swing states. The U.S.-Saudi special relationship is history, and appeals to democratic solidarity won’t get Washington very far in New Delhi. The United States will have to buy cooperation from Saudi Arabia, India, and other players by offering benefits of real value while also withholding those benefits when swing states consistently conduct foreign policies contrary to important U.S. interests. If the United States regularly punishes swing states for their diplomatic choices, it risks turning ambivalence into hostility; if it never does so, it risks losing all leverage. Yet, because this is such a tricky balancing act, it is important, finally, to shift the underlying incentives over time.

By depleting the Russian defense industry, Putin’s war has created an opportunity to help Turkey, India, Vietnam, and other states move away from Moscow’s military gear—and thereby change their calculus on discrete geopolitical issues. Encouraging Indian economic ties with the Persian Gulf can, similarly, reduce reliance on Chinese trade and money in two important regions.

For the fourth time in little more than a century, an epic clash over Eurasia is underway. Winning it will require the United States to rally its free-world allies while also competing, imperfectly, to influence countries that won’t commit either way.

— Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

#Russia 🇷🇺#China 🇨🇳#Unites States 🇺🇸

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englishchinesetranslations · 1 year

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A Cold Winter for Europe: Blame Strategic Blindness by Burak Bekdil

November 12, 2022 at 5:00 am

In 2008, the "flawless democrat" Putin invaded Georgia. The West was shocked. Putin critics... were shocked that the West was shocked. In 2014, Putin invaded the Crimean Peninsula, sovereign Ukrainian territory. The West remained shocked. In February 2022, Putin invaded Ukraine and annexed parts of the sovereign state. Was the West still shocked? It should not have been.

Apparently the "flawless democrat" Putin is hoping to weaponize winter and force Europe to surrender, but giving in to the Kremlin would be disastrous.

The EastMed pipeline project was designed to improve Europe's energy security by diversifying its routes and sources and providing direct interconnection to the production fields while reducing dependence on Russian gas supplies.... U.S. President Joe Biden stepped in with a historic strategic miscalculation that came with a strategic cost: appeasing NATO's pro-Putin, part-time ally Turkey and jeopardizing Europe's energy security.

Only a few weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine in February, Biden surprised the EastMed partners by abruptly withdrawing U.S. support for the pipeline, thereby effectively killing the project, preventing a diversified energy supply to Europe, and further assuring Putin's energy blackmail against Europe.

The White House said the $6.7 billion project was antithetical to its "climate goals." Biden presumably hopes no one will actually still be using fossil fuels by 2025, the date for the planned completion of the EastMed pipeline. The Biden administration also cited a supposed lack of economic and commercial viability, even though a 2019 study financed by the EU confirmed that "the EastMed Project is technically feasible, economically viable and commercially competitive."

If the Europeans freeze this winter or must pay sky-high bills, they should drink a toast to the likes of Schroeder and Biden.(Image source: iStock)

The story goes back to early 2000's when German's then Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder decided to develop strategic relations between Berlin and Moscow. He went so far as to offer partnership to Russia in EADS, a multinational European defense and aerospace powerhouse. In November 2004, Schroeder called Russian President Vladimir Putin a "flawless democrat." Unsurprisingly, in 2004, Schroeder hailed Turkey's Islamist autocrat, then prime minister (now president) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a "great reformer."

On the evening of December 9, 2005, seventeen days after Schroeder left office as chancellor, he got a call from his friend Putin. Since leaving public office, Schroeder has worked for Russian state-owned energy companies, including Nord Stream AG, Rosneft, and Gazprom, for a salary of $1 million a year. On March 8, 2022, German's Public Prosecutor General initiated proceedings related to accusations against Schroeder of complicity in crimes against humanity due to his role in Russian state-owned corporations.In 2008, the "flawless democrat" Putin invaded Georgia. The West was shocked. Putin critics, including this author, were shocked that the West was shocked. In 2014, Putin invaded the Crimean Peninsula, sovereign Ukrainian territory. The West remained shocked.

In February 2022, Putin invaded Ukraine and annexed parts of the sovereign state. Was the West still shocked? It should not have been.

In 1972, natural gas exports from the Soviet Union accounted for around 4% of European gas consumption. By 2021, Russia was providing almost 40% of Europe's gas. As Moscow's market share has gradually increased, so has its ability to manipulate prices and trigger crises. Most Europeans now acknowledge that this reliance on Russia represents a major strategic blunder. Too late. Europe's "green energy transition" features one major flaw: it relies on Russian gas imports.

Back to the future. This will be an extremely difficult winter for all Europeans, whether they face blackouts or heating issues and sky-high energy bills. Apparently the "flawless democrat" Putin is hoping to weaponize winter and force Europe to surrender, but giving in to the Kremlin would be disastrous.

Back to the past. In 2017, the governments of Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Israel signed a declaration to confirm their support for the development of the East Mediterranean Pipeline (EastMed), a $6.7 billion, 1,900-km natural gas pipeline project to connect the gas reserves of Israel and Cyprus to Greece and onward to Europe. The pipeline would have an initial capacity to transport 10 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) of gas to Greece, Italy and other southeast European countries. The capacity would then be increased to a maximum of 20 bcm/y in the second phase. The project was confirmed as a "Project of Common Interest" (PCI) by the European governments.

The EastMed pipeline project was designed to improve Europe's energy security by diversifying its routes and sources and providing direct interconnection to the production fields while reducing dependence on Russian gas supplies. It would provide an opportunity for European Union member state Cyprus to connect to the European gas network, which would further enhance gas trading in southeast Europe.

Turkey, after a punishing international isolation following several diplomatic crises with Israel, threatened militarily to challenge EastMed. In contrast, other countries in the region such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Gulf states supported what later became the EastMed group, also favored by the EU and United States. So far so good. But wait.

As the past several years saw the East Mediterranean turning into a slow-fuse time bomb sitting over rich hydrocarbons that are claimed questionably by Turkey as a stand-alone regional force, versus an alliance of Greece, Cyprus and Israel, U.S. President Joe Biden stepped in with a historic strategic miscalculation that came with a strategic cost: appeasing NATO's pro-Putin, part-time ally Turkey and jeopardizing Europe's energy security.

Biden's miscalculation must have caused much laughter and substantial champagne consumption in the Kremlin. "Welcome to the brave new world where Europeans are very soon going to pay €2.000 for 1.000 cubic meters of natural gas!" tweeted Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council, and the country's former president and prime minister, on February 22, 2022.

Even if Putin was hesitant about making Ukraine his new war theater in January, Biden's mistake assured him that he was on the right track. If the Europeans freeze this winter or must pay sky-high bills, they should drink a toast to the likes of Schroeder and Biden.

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mariacallous · 2 years

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The pantheon of autocratic leaders includes a great many sexists, from Napoléon Bonaparte, who decriminalized the murder of unfaithful wives, to Benito Mussolini, who claimed that women “never created anything.” And while the twentieth century saw improvements in women’s equality in most parts of the world, the twenty-first is demonstrating that misogyny and authoritarianism are not just common comorbidities but mutually reinforcing ills. Throughout the last century, women’s movements won the right to vote for women; expanded women’s access to reproductive health care, education, and economic opportunity; and began to enshrine gender equality in domestic and international law—victories that corresponded with unprecedented waves of democratization in the postwar period. Yet in recent years, authoritarian leaders have launched a simultaneous assault on women’s rights and democracy that threatens to roll back decades of progress on both fronts.

The patriarchal backlash has played out across the full spectrum of authoritarian regimes, from totalitarian dictatorships to party-led autocracies to illiberal democracies headed by aspiring strongmen. In China, Xi Jinping has crushed feminist movements, silenced women who have accused powerful men of sexual assault, and excluded women from the Politburo’s powerful Standing Committee. In Russia, Vladimir Putin is rolling back reproductive rights and promoting traditional gender roles that limit women’s participation in public life. In North Korea, Kim Jong Un has spurred women to seek refuge abroad at roughly three times the rate of men, and in Egypt, President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi recently introduced a bill reasserting men’s paternity rights, their right to practice polygamy, and their right to influence whom their female relatives marry. In Saudi Arabia, women still cannot marry or obtain health care without a man’s approval. And in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s victory has erased 20 years of progress on women’s access to education and representation in public office and the workforce.

The wave of patriarchal authoritarianism is also pushing some established democracies in an illiberal direction. Countries with authoritarian-leaning leaders, such as Brazil, Hungary, and Poland, have seen the rise of far-right movements that promote traditional gender roles as patriotic while railing against “gender ideology”—a boogeyman term that Human Rights Watch describes as meaning “nothing and everything.” Even the United States has experienced a slowdown in progress toward gender equity and a rollback of reproductive rights, which had been improving since the 1970s. During his presidency, Donald Trump worked with antifeminist stalwarts, including Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, to halt the expansion of women’s rights around the world. And despite the Biden administration’s commitment to gender equity at the national level, Republican-controlled states are attempting to reverse the constitutional right to abortion, which is now more vulnerable than it has been in decades.

Not surprisingly, women’s political and economic empowerment is now stalling or declining around the world. According to Georgetown University’s Women, Peace, and Security Index, the implementation of gender equality laws has slowed in recent years, as have gains in women’s educational attainment and representation in national parliaments. At the same time, intimate partner violence has increased, and Honduras, Mexico, and Turkey have seen significant increases in femicide. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated these trends worldwide, forcing millions of women to leave the workforce and take on additional unpaid care, restricting their access to health care and education, and limiting their options for escaping abuse.

The assault on women’s rights has coincided with a broader assault on democracy. According to Freedom House and the Varieties of Democracy Project at the University of Gothenburg, the last 15 years have seen a sustained authoritarian resurgence. Relatively new democracies, such as Brazil, Hungary, India, Poland, and Turkey, have slid back into autocracy or are trending in that direction. Countries that were considered partially authoritarian a decade ago, such as Russia, have become full-fledged autocracies. And in some of the world’s oldest democracies—France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States—antidemocratic sentiment is rising in established political parties.

It is not a coincidence that women’s equality is being rolled back at the same time that authoritarianism is on the rise. Political scientists have long noted that women’s civil rights and democracy go hand in hand, but they have been slower to recognize that the former is a precondition for the latter. Aspiring autocrats and patriarchal authoritarians have good reason to fear women’s political participation: when women participate in mass movements, those movements are both more likely to succeed and more likely to lead to more egalitarian democracy. In other words, fully free, politically active women are a threat to authoritarian and authoritarian-leaning leaders—and so those leaders have a strategic reason to be sexist.

Understanding the relationship between sexism and democratic backsliding is vital for those who wish to fight back against both. Established autocrats and right-wing nationalist leaders in contested democracies are united in their use of hierarchical gender relations to shore up nationalist, top-down, male-dominated rule. Having long fought against social hierarchies that consolidate power in the hands of the few, feminist movements are a powerful weapon against authoritarianism. Those who wish to reverse the global democratic decline cannot afford to ignore them.

WOMEN ON THE FRONTLINES

Scholars of democracy have often framed women’s empowerment as an outcome of democratization or even a function of modernization and economic development. Yet women demanded inclusion and fought for their own representation and interests through contentious suffrage movements and rights campaigns that ultimately strengthened democracy in general. The feminist project remains unfinished, and the expansion of women’s rights that occurred over the last hundred-plus years has not been shared equally among women. As intersectional and anticolonial feminists have long argued, the greatest feminist gains have accrued to elite women, often white and Western ones. Yet women’s political activism has clearly expanded and fortified democracy—a fact that autocrats and illiberal democrats intuitively understand and that explains their fear of women’s empowerment.

In the past seven decades, women’s demands for political and economic inclusion have helped catalyze democratic transitions, especially when those women were on the frontlines of mass movements. Democratic transitions in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia during the 1980s and 1990s were driven in part by mass popular movements in which women played key roles. Our research shows that all the major resistance movements during the postwar period—those seeking to topple national governments or to win national independence—featured women in support roles, such as providing food, shelter, intelligence, funds, or other supplies. But these movements differed in the degree to which they had women as frontline participants—those who took part directly in demonstrations, confrontations with authorities, strikes, boycotts, and other forms of noncooperation. Some, such as Brazil’s pro-democracy movement in the mid-1980s, featured extensive women’s participation: at least half of the frontline participants were women. Others, such as the 2006 uprising against the Nepalese monarchy, featured more modest frontline participation of women. Only one nonviolent campaign during this period seems to have excluded women altogether: the civilian uprising that ousted Mahendra Chaudhry from power in Fiji in 2000.

Misogyny and authoritarianism are not just common comorbidities but mutually reinforcing ills.

In the first half of the twentieth century, women played active roles in anticolonial liberation struggles across Africa and in leftist revolutions in Europe and Latin America. Later, pro-democracy movements in Myanmar and the Philippines saw nuns positioning their bodies between members of the security forces and civilian activists. During the first intifada, Palestinian women played a key role in the nonviolent resistance against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, organizing strikes, protests, and dialogues alongside Israeli women. In the United States, Black women have launched and continue to lead the Black Lives Matter movement, which is now a global phenomenon. Their organizing echoes the activism of forebears such as Ella Baker, Rosa Parks, Fannie Lou Hamer, and other Black American women who planned, mobilized, and coordinated key aspects of the U.S. civil rights movement. Two women revolutionaries, Wided Bouchamaoui and Tawakkol Karman, helped lead the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia and Yemen, respectively, later winning the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts to bring about peaceful democratic transitions through nonviolent resistance, coalition building, and negotiation. Millions more like them have worked to sustain movements against some of the world’s most repressive dictatorships, from tea sellers and singers in Sudan to grandmothers in Algeria to sisters and wives in Chile demanding the return of their disappeared loved ones outside Augusto Pinochet’s presidential palace.

It turns out that frontline participation by women is a significant advantage, both in terms of a movement’s immediate success and in terms of securing longer-term democratic change. Mass movements in which women participated extensively on the frontlines have been much more likely to succeed than campaigns that marginalized or excluded women. Women have been much more likely to participate in nonviolent mass movements than in violent ones, and they have participated in much greater numbers in nonviolent than in violent campaigns. To explain why women’s frontline participation increases the chances that a movement will succeed, therefore, one must first understand what makes nonviolent movements fail or succeed.

Generally, movements seeking to topple autocratic regimes or win national independence are more likely to prevail when they mobilize large numbers of people; shift the loyalties of at least some the regime’s pillars of support; use creative tactics, such as rolling strikes, in addition to street protests; and maintain discipline and resilience in the face of state repression and countermobilization by the regime’s supporters. Large-scale participation by women helps movements achieve all these things.

On the first point, power in numbers, the advantage of women’s participation is obvious. Movements that exclude or sideline women reduce their potential pool of participants by at least half. Resistance movements must achieve broad-based support to be perceived as legitimate. And the larger the mobilization, the more likely the movement is to disrupt the status quo. General strikes and other mass actions can bring a city, state, or country to a standstill, imposing immediate economic and political costs on a regime. Mass mobilization can also generate a sense of inevitability that persuades holdouts and fence sitters to join the resistance. People want to join the winning team, and when there are large numbers of diverse participants, that can help encourage tacit or overt support from political and business elites and members of security forces.

Frontline participation by women is a significant advantage for mass movements.

Second, popular movements improve their chances of success when they persuade or coerce their opponents to defect. In research on public attitudes toward armed groups, scholars have found that female fighters increase the legitimacy of their movements in the eyes of observers. The same is likely true for nonviolent mass uprisings. Significant participation by women and other diverse actors also increases the social, moral, and financial capital that a movement can use to erode its opponent’s support system. When security forces, business elites, civil servants, state media, organized labor, foreign donors, or other supporters or enablers of a regime begin to question the status quo, they signal to others that it may be possible to defy that regime. For example, during the People Power Revolution in the Philippines in 1986, President Ferdinand Marcos ordered the security forces to attack large crowds of demonstrators who were demanding his ouster. But nuns who were participating in the protests put themselves between the tanks and other demonstrators. The security forces could not bring themselves to follow through with the assault, averting a massacre that could have altered the course of the revolution. High-level defections followed, and Marcos eventually fled the country, leading to a democratic transition.

A third way women’s participation makes mass movements more effective is by expanding the range of tactics and modes of protest available to them. Everywhere it has been studied, diversity has been found to improve teamwork, innovation, and performance, and mass movements are no exception. In particular, diversity enhances creativity and collaboration, both of which help movements tap into broader information networks and maintain momentum in the face of state crackdowns. Women’s participation also makes possible culturally gendered tactics, such as marching in full beauty queen regalia, as women did in Myanmar’s pro-democracy protests in 2021; cooking food at the frontlines of demonstrations, as women did during an uprising of farmers in 2020 and 2021 in India; or protesting naked, as women in Kenya, Nigeria, and many other countries have done in order to stigmatize or disarm their opponents. Some protest movements have relied on social shaming. For example, during antigovernment protests in Algeria in 2019, grandmothers told riot police to go home, threatening to report the officers’ bad behavior to their mothers. In Sudan that same year, a women’s Facebook group named and shamed plainclothes policemen: its members outed their own brothers, cousins, and sons as members of the shadowy militias that were trying to terrorize the opposition into submission.

Women have also developed other forms of gendered noncooperation that can benefit mass movements. Consider the origins of the term “boycott.” In the late nineteenth century, women cooks, maids, and laundresses in County Mayo, Ireland, refused to provide services and labor to an absentee British landlord named Captain Charles Boycott. They encouraged others to join them, making it impossible for Boycott to remain in Ireland and inspiring a new name for their tactic. Women have pioneered other forms of social noncooperation, as well. Although the antiwar sex strike in Lysistrata was fictional, it is likely that Aristophanes had some historical precedent in mind when he wrote the comedic play. Women activists have organized sex strikes over the millennia: Iroquois women used this method, among others, to secure a veto over war-making decisions in the seventeenth century; Liberian women used it to demand an end to civil war in the early years of this century; Colombian women used it to urge an end to gang violence; and on and on.

Power in numbers, the persuasion of opponents, and tactical innovation all help facilitate a fourth key factor in the success of nonviolent people power movements: discipline. When movements maintain nonviolent resistance in the face of violence or other provocations by security forces, they are more likely to mobilize additional support and, ultimately, to succeed. And movements with women on the frontlines, it turns out, are less likely to fully embrace violence or develop violent flanks in response to regime crackdowns. At least in part, that is likely because having large numbers of women on the frontlines moderates the behavior of other protesters, as well as the police. Gendered taboos against public violence against women and against violent confrontations in the presence of women and girls may explain part of this phenomenon. So might the higher political costs of violently repressing women who are participating in sit-ins and strikes.

Women from different backgrounds face different risks of violent repression, however. The women on the frontlines of movements demanding and expanding democracy often come from oppressed castes, classes, and minority groups. They are students and young people, widows and grandmothers. Women from marginalized backgrounds have often been ignored or subjected to greater violence during mass mobilizations than have wealthy or otherwise privileged women who benefit from patriarchal authoritarianism. This is why, for example, “Aryan” German women succeeded in securing the release of their Jewish husbands during the Rosenstrasse protest in Berlin in 1943, whereas Jewish women would have been arrested or executed for such a protest. Black Americans who powered the U.S. civil rights movement similarly faced much greater risks than did the white people who participated as allies. Only sustained cross-class, multiracial, or multiethnic coalitions can overcome these dynamics of privilege and power, which is why such coalitions are crucial for facing down violent authoritarian repression and pushing societies toward egalitarianism and democracy for all.

A RISING TIDE

Women who participate on the frontlines of mass movements don’t just make those movements more likely to achieve their short-term objectives—for instance, removing an oppressive dictator. They also make those movements more likely to secure lasting democratic change. Controlling for a variety of other factors that might make a democratic transition more likely—such as a country’s previous experience with democracy—our analysis shows that extensive frontline participation by women is positively associated with increases in egalitarian democracy, as defined by the Varieties of Democracy Project.

In other words, women’s participation in mass movements is like a rising tide, lifting all boats. Researchers have found that inclusive transition processes lead to more sustainable negotiated settlements and more durable democracy after civil wars. Although there is little research on settlements that come out of nonviolent mobilizations, the presence of women likely translates into increased demands for electoral participation, economic opportunity, and access to education and health care—all of which make democratic transitions more likely to endure.

Women’s participation in mass movements is like a rising tide, lifting all boats.

What happens when inclusive popular mobilizations are defeated and no transitions take place? Incumbent regimes that stamp out inclusive mass movements tend to indulge in a state-sponsored patriarchal backlash. The greater the proportion of women in the defeated movement, the higher the degree of a patriarchal backlash—a dynamic that has ominous implications for Afghanistan, Belarus, Colombia, Hong Kong, Lebanon, Myanmar, Russia, Sudan, and Venezuela, all of which currently have inclusive people power movements whose outcomes are uncertain. Our research shows that countries with failed popular movements tend to experience major backsliding in both egalitarian democracy and gender equality, making them worse off than before the movements began. In other words, the impressive impact of women’s frontline participation on the probability of democratization is contingent on the movement’s victory; women’s participation leads to democratic change and women’s empowerment only when the broader movement succeeds.

THE AUTOCRAT’S PLAYBOOK

Authoritarian leaders and illiberal democrats have responded to the threat of women’s political mobilization by reversing progress on gender equality and women’s rights. Their motivation is not all strategic—many probably believe in sexist ideas—but their worldview is self-serving.

In fully authoritarian states, the mechanisms of sexist repression can be uncompromising and brutal. Often, they take the form of policies that exert direct state control over women’s reproduction, including through forced pregnancies or forced abortions, misogynistic rhetoric that normalizes or even encourages violence against women, and laws and practices that reduce or eliminate women’s representation in government and discourage women from entering or advancing in the workforce.

In China, for instance, Xi has launched a population suppression campaign against the Uyghurs and other ethnic and rural minorities, forcing birth control, abortions, and even sterilization on many women. Women from ethnic minorities now face the threat of fines or imprisonment for having what Beijing considers too many children. In Egypt, state control over women’s reproduction is harnessed to the opposite effect: abortion is illegal in any and all circumstances, and women must seek a judge’s permission to divorce, whereas men have no such requirement. In Russia, where abortion has been legal under any circumstance since 1920, Putin’s government has attempted to reverse the country’s declining population by discouraging abortions and reinforcing “traditional” values. In all three countries, despite nominal constitutional commitments to protect women against gender discrimination, women are dismally underrepresented in the workforce and in powerful official roles.

In less autocratic settings, where overtly sexist policies cannot simply be decreed, authoritarian-leaning leaders and their political parties use sexist rhetoric to whip up popular support for their regressive agendas, often cloaking them in the garb of populism. In doing so, they promote misogynistic narratives of traditionalist “patriotic femininity.” The scholar Nitasha Kaul has described these leaders as pushing “anxious and insecure nationalisms” that punish and dehumanize feminists. Where they can, they pursue policies that assert greater state control over women’s bodies, while reducing support for political and economic gender equality. They encourage—and often legislate—the subjugation of women, demanding that men and women conform to traditional gender roles out of patriotic duty. They also co-opt and distort concepts such as equity and empowerment to their own ends. Although such efforts to reassert a gender hierarchy look different in different right-wing settings and cultures, they share a common tactic: to make the subjugation of women look desirable, even aspirational, not only for men but also for conservative women.

One way that autocratic and illiberal leaders make a gender hierarchy palatable to women is by politicizing the “traditional family,” which becomes a euphemism for tying women’s value and worth to childbearing, parenting, and homemaking in a nuclear household—and rolling back their claims to public power. Female bodies become targets of social control for male lawmakers, who invoke the ideal of feminine purity and call on mothers, daughters, and wives to reproduce an idealized version of the nation. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has argued that women are not equal to men and that their prescribed role in society is motherhood and housekeeping. He has called women who pursue careers over motherhood “half persons.” Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s government has similarly encouraged women to stop trying to close the pay gap and focus instead on producing Hungarian children.

Across the full range of authoritarian and semiauthoritarian regimes, sexual and gender minorities are often targeted for abuse, as well. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer people are seen as undermining the binary gender hierarchy celebrated by many authoritarians. As a result, they are frequently marginalized and stigmatized through homophobic policies: Poland’s “LGBT-free zones,” for instance, or Russia’s bans on “LGBTQ propaganda” and same-sex marriage. Beijing recently went as far as banning men from appearing “too effeminate” on television and social media in a campaign to enforce China’s “revolutionary culture.”

Despite their flagrant misogyny—and, in some cases, because of it—some authoritarians and would-be authoritarians succeed in enlisting women as key players in their political movements. They display their wives and daughters prominently in the domestic sphere and sometimes in official positions to obscure gender unequal policies. Valorizing traditional motherhood, conservative women often play supporting roles to the masculine stars of the show. There is perhaps no better illustration of this dynamic than the dueling women’s movements that supported and opposed Jair Bolsonaro’s 2018 presidential campaign in Brazil. Bolsonaro’s opponents organized one of the largest women-led protests in the country’s history under the banner of Ele Não, or “Not Him.” His female supporters swathed themselves in the Brazilian flag and derided feminism as “sexist.”

In the patriarchal authoritarian’s view, men are not real men unless they have control over the women in their lives. Trump’s masculine authority was therefore heightened when his wife, Melania Trump, walked behind him onto Air Force One, and it was challenged when she refused to appear with him in public. Sara Duterte-Carpio, the mayor of Davao City, in the Philippines, and a daughter of President Rodrigo Duterte, was a front-runner to succeed her father until he announced that women are “not fit” to be president. Despite the country’s history of female heads of state and Duterte-Carpio’s leading poll numbers, she dutifully filed her candidacy for vice president instead.

Fully free, politically active women are a threat to authoritarian leaders.

While women are pigeonholed into traditionally feminized roles, patriarchal authoritarian leaders trumpet their power with gratuitous displays of masculinity. Putin posing topless is the viral version of this public peacocking, but casual misogyny, carefully staged photo ops, and boastful, hypermasculine rhetoric also fit the bill. Think of Trump’s oversize red tie, aggressive handshake, and claims that his nuclear button was bigger than Kim’s—or Bolsonaro’s call for Brazilians to face COVID-19 “like a man.” This kind of talk may seem ridiculous, but it is part of a more insidious rhetorical repertoire that feminizes opponents, then projects hypermasculinity by criticizing women’s appearance, joking about rape, threatening sexual violence, and seeking to control women’s bodies, all in order to silence critics of patriarchal authoritarianism.

The counterpart to this violent rhetoric is paternalistic misogyny. As Kaul writes, “While Trump, Bolsonaro, and Duterte have most explicitly sexualized and objectified women, projecting themselves as profusely virile and predatory, [Indian Prime Minister Narendra] Modi and Erdogan have promoted themselves as protective, and occasionally, even renunciatory, father figures . . . to keep women and minorities in their place. . . . [They] are at times deeply and overtly misogynist, and yet at other times use progressive gender talk to promote regressive gender agendas.”

As tolerance for misogyny in general increases, other shifts in the political and legal landscape occur: protections for survivors of rape and domestic violence are rolled back, sentences for such crimes are loosened, evidentiary requirements for charging perpetrators are made more stringent, and women are left with fewer tools with which to defend their bodily and political autonomy. For instance, in 2017, Putin signed a law that decriminalized some forms of domestic abuse, despite concerns that Russia has long faced an epidemic of domestic violence. On the campaign trail in 2016, Trump famously minimized a video that surfaced of him bragging about sexual assault, dismissing it as “locker room talk,” despite the fact that numerous women had accused him of sexual assault and misconduct. Once Trump became president, his administration directed the Department of Education to reform Title IX regulations to give more rights to those accused of sexual assault on college campuses.

Finally, many autocrats and would-be autocrats promote a narrative of masculine victimhood designed to gin up popular concern about how men and boys are faring. Invariably, men are portrayed as “losing out” to women and other groups championed by progressives, despite their continued advantages in a male-dominated gender hierarchy. In 2019, for instance, Russia’s Ministry of Justice claimed that reports of domestic violence were overstated in the country and that Russian men faced greater “discrimination” than women in abuse claims. In a similar vein, aspiring autocrats often maintain that masculinity is under threat. Among Trump supporters in the United States, such claims have become commonplace. For instance, Senator Josh Hawley, a Republican from Missouri, recently blamed leftist movements for redefining traditional masculinity as toxic and called for reviving “a strong and healthy manhood in America.” Representative Madison Cawthorn, a Republican from North Carolina, echoed Hawley’s sentiments in a viral speech in which he complained that American society aims to “de-masculate” men and encourages parents to raise “monsters.”

fight on

As an engine of genuine democratic progress, activism by women and gender minorities threatens authoritarian leaders. Although many autocrats and aspiring autocrats no doubt believe the sexist and misogynistic things they say, their campaigns to restrict women’s empowerment and human rights also seek to undermine potential popular democratic movements that would oust them.

Those who wish to combat the rising tide of authoritarianism will need to make promoting women’s political participation central to their work. Domestically, democratic governments and their supporters should model and protect the equal inclusion of women, especially from diverse backgrounds, in all places where decisions are being made—from community groups to corporate boards to local, state, and national governments. Democratic governments should also prioritize issues that directly affect women’s ability to play an equal role in public life, such as reproductive autonomy, domestic violence, economic opportunity, and access to health care and childcare. All these issues are central to the broader battle over the future of democracy in the United States and around the world, and they should be treated as such.

Democratic governments and international institutions must also put defending women’s empowerment and human rights at the center of their fight against authoritarianism worldwide. Violent, misogynistic threats and attacks against women—whether in the home or in public—should be denounced as assaults on both women and democracy, and the perpetrators of such attacks should be held accountable. The “Year of Action” promoted by the Biden administration to renew and bolster democracy should include an uncompromising commitment to stand up for gender equity at home and abroad. Efforts by the U.S. Agency for International Development to support human rights activists and civil society groups could likewise make explicit that women’s empowerment and political participation need to be integrated throughout all democracy renewal efforts.

If history is any guide, authoritarian strategies will fail in the long run.

Internationally, a multinational coalition is needed to explicitly reject patriarchal authoritarianism and share knowledge and technical skills in the fight against it. Those who are best equipped to build and sustain such a coalition are feminist grassroots and civil society leaders, as they are often the most aware of acute needs in their communities. An ambitious summit or conference convened by a multilateral group of countries or a regional or global organization could help jump-start such an effort by bringing women and their champions from around the world in contact with one another to share their experiences and strategies. One step in the right direction would be to dramatically increase the support and visibility given to the annual meeting of the UN Commission on the Status of Women.

Finally, organizers and supporters of mass movements for democratic change need a gender-inclusive agenda in order to attract women to the frontlines and to leadership roles. Supporters of democracy at home and abroad should focus on assisting, amplifying, and protecting civil society groups and movements that are pushing for gender equity and work to make sure they are included in any negotiations or transitions that follow mass uprisings or democratic movements. Pro-democracy groups and organizations must understand that truly inclusive movements—those that transcend class, race, gender, and sexual identity—are the most likely to achieve lasting change.

If history is any guide, authoritarian strategies will fail in the long run. Feminists have always found ways to demand and expand women’s rights and freedoms, powering democratic advancement in the process. But unchecked, patriarchal authoritarians can do great damage in the short run, erasing hard-won gains that have taken generations to achieve.

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