#ahmet davutoglu

[ucusmode]

@kimilkimilim hiç burada romance yapmayin pcyi bi açtım babala ahmet davutoglu var. Birlikte babala mi izliyosunuz abi jxhdndjc. Sizin yüzünüzden basladim izliyorum deminden beri. Kafam folloş oldu

[jerryanglerivers-13]

“Netanyahu es igual de criminal que los terroristas de París” Ahmet Davutoglu, ex primer ministro de Turquía.

[birdzflycom]

Turkey Election 2023: Erdogan Leads Early Results, Challengers

Img Source: https://media.npr.org/assets/img/2023/05/14/ap23134206482148-5c731c48dc8232f07bde711331154356ae7e8b3f-s800-c85.webp

Turkish President Erdogan Takes the Lead in Elections as Opposition Fights Back

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey has been leading the polls after nearly 20% of ballot boxes were counted, with 55% of the votes, compared to 39% for the opposition leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, according to Anadolu Agency. Erdogan, who has been in power since 2003, is seeking another five-year term but faces the toughest reelection battle of his two-decade tenure, according to pre-election polling. If Erdogan's political alliance wins, he could continue governing without many restrictions. The opposition has promised to return Turkey's governance system to a parliamentary democracy if it wins both the presidential and parliamentary ballots. Erdogan's government has been accused of suppressing freedom of expression and assembly, as well as mishandling the economy, resulting in a steep cost-of-living crisis. His belief that low interest rates tame inflation contrasts with orthodox economic theory, and he has pressured the central bank to reflect his view. Independent experts believe that costs continue to rise at a much higher rate. Erdogan has used state resources and his dominant position over the media to woo voters, accusing the opposition of colluding with "terrorists" and being "drunkards." In contrast, Kilicdaroglu's six-party Nation Alliance pledged to dismantle an executive presidential system that was narrowly voted in by a 2017 referendum. The opposition alliance also promised to restore the independence of the judiciary and the central bank and to reverse crackdowns on free speech and other forms of democratic backsliding under Erdogan. The alliance includes the nationalist Good Party led by former Interior Minister Meral Aksener, a small Islamist party, and two parties that splintered from the AKP, one led by a former prime minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, and the other by a former finance minister, Ali Babacan. More than 64 million people, including 3.4 million overseas voters, were eligible to vote in the elections, which come in the year the country marks the centenary of its establishment as a republic. Turkey traditionally has strong voter turnout, reflecting citizens' continued belief in democratic balloting. Despite criticisms of Erdogan's government, the election was being watched closely internationally as a test of a united opposition's ability to dislodge a leader who has concentrated nearly all state powers in his hands. Read the full article

[mariacallous]

During Turkey’s 2018 presidential election campaign, the New York Times ran an editorial expressing support for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s opponent at the time, Muharrem Ince. After a few paragraphs, it was clear that the Times editorial board knew that it disliked Erdogan more than it knew about Ince and his views.

And so it goes with Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and a six-party coalition’s pick to challenge Erdogan for the presidency on May 14. With just a month to go before the election, Kilicdaroglu is up by between 7 and 10 points.

Yet even with Kilicdaroglu’s commanding lead, it seems hard to believe that Erdogan will lose. This is perhaps a lack of imagination, but he has been in power—first as prime minister and then as president—since 2003. Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have hollowed out, bent, and fashioned political institutions to ensure their grip on power. The Turkish president has used the apparatus of the state to undermine his opponents, and the vast majority of Turkey’s once boisterous, if not always responsible, media can now be relied on to recite the government line. The judiciary that was once a redoubt of the secular nationalist establishment is now the preserve of AKP supporters. Erdogan has remade the military command, which previously was loyal only to the principles of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey.

Under these circumstances, it seems that only an act of God could dislodge Erdogan. Maybe the earthquake on Feb. 6 was just that.

What would it mean for Turkish politics and foreign policy if Kilicdaroglu won? Some Turkish and Western commentators believe Turkey can once again be democratic, prosperous, ready to pursue membership in the European Union, and better aligned with its NATO allies. Without a doubt, it will be a sigh of relief for millions of Turks if Erdogan is vanquished and relinquishes his office. But it is unlikely that Turkey will revert to a past that never existed.

It is hard to tell what Kilicdaroglu and his partners believe or how they would govern. The Nation Alliance (also known as the “Table of Six”) that Kilicdaroglu leads is an ideologically disparate coalition united in their loathing of Erdogan. In addition to Kilicdaroglu’s CHP, which occupies the left-center/social democrat and nationalist space, the alliance includes an offshoot of Turkey’s hard-right nationalists called the Good Party; two center-right parties led by AKP defectors Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoglu, respectively; and another center-right group, the Democrat Party. The other member is the religious nationalist conservative Felicity Party, which, along with the AKP, was established in 2001 after the government banned another Islamist party.

The Nation Alliance has published a lengthy “Memorandum of Understanding on Common Policies,” which, given the unwieldy nature of the coalition, is an ideological grab bag of initiatives with nine main sections and a variety of subsections that touch on the judiciary, mining, tourism, and much more. Besides the opposition to Erdogan and the AKP, the centerpiece of the alliance’s appeal to Turks is its stated determination to shift away from the “executive presidency” that Erdogan wrought six years ago—and which greatly enhanced his power—in favor of what the Nation Alliance calls the “Strengthened Parliamentary System.” The passages on this issue get A’s for intentions but also seem woefully devoid of reality and, oddly, politics.

Making fundamental changes to Turkey’s political institutions will not be as easy as “urgently implement[ing] … constitutional and legislative amendments,” as Kilicdaroglu and company suggest. The AKP has had 20 years to abuse Turkey’s political institutions for its benefit. Having captured the state, neither the party’s leaders nor their activists throughout the bureaucracy and the judiciary are likely to give it up so quickly. That sets up the country for a titanic struggle in which either the Nation Alliance has raised expectations too high, forcing it to back off and pay a high political price, or Turkey’s new leaders purge AKP activists within the government in order to smooth the transformation the alliance seeks.

These outcomes are not unprecedented in Turkish politics. In recent decades, Turks have had their hopes raised about EU membership and, in particular, the economy, only to have their hopes dashed. The latter especially sowed political instability in the late 1990s. Purges have now become a feature of Turkish politics. In February 1997, the military issued “recommendations” to the government that sought the purge of followers of one of the AKP’s predecessor parties from government positions. And there has been an ongoing purge since 2014, when the AKP began cleansing the bureaucracy of its erstwhile partners in the Gulenist, or Hizmet, movement.

There is some reason to believe that the 74-year-old Kilicdaroglu’s heart is in the right place when it comes to wanting a more just and democratic political system. As noted, it’s hard to know precisely what Kilicdaroglu believes, but during his tenure as leader of the main opposition, he has positioned himself as a responsible politician and democrat against the backdrop of Erdogan’s power grab. He once led a march for justice from Ankara to Istanbul.

At the same time, some party members have been critical of the CHP’s internal workings for its apparent lack of democracy. Also, the way he thrust himself on the Nation Alliance as its presidential candidate, despite the fact that he was the weakest of the realistic competitors to Erdogan, raises questions about his disposition and democratic credentials.

And, of course, institutions—frameworks for social action and political conduct in a society—can do funny things to people when they are in power. How can anyone be sure that, once firmly ensconced in the presidency, Kilicdaroglu will want to give up the powers of the executive presidency? After all, politicians generally like to accumulate power, not cede it. In addition, the new Turkish president would be likely to confront a vicious and vengeful opposition determined to see him fail. The executive presidency would be an advantage in a knife fight with the AKP and its partner, the Nationalist Movement Party.

And even if Kilicdaroglu wants to follow through on the Nation Alliance’s promise to do away with the executive presidency, there is no guarantee that his ambitious vice presidents Ekrem Imamoglu and Mansur Yavas will agree. As Istanbul’s mayor, Imamoglu in particular has at times acted in a highhanded manner similar to his nemesis, Erdogan.

Both Imamoglu and Yavas, who is Ankara’s mayor, are skillful and successful politicians, but are they democrats? Maybe. A lot of people (including me) believed that Erdogan was a reformer and the leading edge of an Islamist Third Way in which parties like the AKP could accumulate power without triggering an authoritarian backlash and resolving the problem of one person, one vote, one time.

On other big issues, the Nation Alliance does not instill a lot of confidence. For example, it promises to “strengthen the freedoms of thought, opinion and expression.” It is unclear, however, whether this new liberal openness would extend to Kurdish nationalists and Gulenists. On this, the alliance is silent. Perhaps that is good politics, but it is striking that Kilicdaroglu cannot straightforwardly say that the legions of academics, lawyers, journalists, and everyday people who have been accused unfairly of being terrorists should be released and rehabilitated.

Like the AKP (which appropriated the issue from the opposition), Kilicdaroglu and co. also want to transfer Syrian refugees back to their home country. Although it is a popular position in Turkey, imagine the poor Syrians who fled for their lives and who have contributed to Turkish society. At Kilicdaroglu’s direction, they would be returned to Syria’s merciless regime.

On the Kurdish issue, which has been a central drama of Turkey’s politics since the republic’s founding a century ago, Kilicdaroglu has led positive change within his party, making it open to cooperation with Kurds. Yet he does not seem to have any creative policy solutions. His proposal for a so-called council of wise men to address and ostensibly offer recommendations is uninspired and may be an effort to kick the can down the road.

When it comes to foreign policy, the Nation Alliance says it will end Turkey’s foreign-policy activism, which is an implicit rebuke of one of its members—Davutoglu, who served as Erdogan’s foreign minister—and declares that “domestic political calculations and ideological approaches” will no longer be factors of foreign policy. It is not clear whom the alliance is trying to fool with these words, but they are nonsense that run counter to the way politics and foreign policy intersect.

The good news is that the Nation Alliance wants to restart the EU accession process and commit Turkey to complying with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, which would include the release from detention of, among others, Osman Kavala, a Turkish philanthropist who has been wrongly imprisoned since 2017. The platform also says it will “take initiatives” to return to the F-35 joint strike fighter program, presumably by returning to Russia the S-400 air defense systems that Turkey purchased—but it does not commit to that. The Turkish government had planned to purchase 100 of the warplanes and was part of an international consortium building the fighter, but with the addition of the Russian system to Turkey’s arsenal, the United States terminated both the sale and Ankara’s participation in the program.

At the same time, Kilicdaroglu wants to normalize relations with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Erdogan has moved toward normalizing ties with Assad as well—but only in response to pressure from the opposition, which throughout the Syrian conflict has been pro-Assad. No one should be surprised if Damascus is one of Kilicdaroglu’s first visits as Turkish head of state if he wins.

Also, in one jarring bullet point, the platform declares that it “will pursue the objectives of protecting the acquired rights of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” which is an international pariah that only Turkey recognizes. This is sure to complicate Ankara’s relations with the EU, as it seems to call for the continued occupation and potential partition of an EU member state.

Interestingly, the Nation Alliance’s platform does not mention the United States. This is likely because Turks have long held demonstrably negative views of U.S. foreign policy. It is a phenomenon that Turkish politicians, including Kilicdaroglu, have reinforced and extended because they derive political benefit from it. In private, they may say all the right things to U.S. interlocutors, but they cannot resist assailing the United States publicly. It is notable that Kilicdaroglu visited Washington twice in the last 10 years. Both times, it was hard not to sense that he was trying to downplay or even hide his trip from the Turkish press and his opponents. These furtive visits reflect the way Kilicdaroglu would be likely to handle Ankara’s most important relationship and do not augur well for bilateral ties.

Turks seem fed up with Erdogan and the AKP, which are overbearing, corrupt, and anti-democratic. They will rejoice if he is defeated, but no one should expect it to be morning in Ankara.

[fethiyehabermanset]

Ahmet Davutoğlu Fethiye Belediyesini Ziyaret Etti

Ahmet Davutoğlu Fethiye Belediyesini Ziyaret Etti

Gelecek Partisi Genel Başkanı, eski Başbakan ve Dışişleri Bakanı, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’nin eski 2. Genel Başkanı Ahmet Davutoğlu, Gelecek Partisi Fethiye İlçe Kongresi için Fethiye’ye geldi. Çiftlik Mahallesi’nde davul zurna ile karşılanan Davutoğlu’na Yörük yağlığı takılıp Beşkaza kasketi hediye edildi. Eşi  Sare Davutoğlu ile birlikte Fethiye Belediyesini ziyaret eden Ahmet Davutoğlu;…

[antoine-roquentin]

However, this falls short of explaining why the operation came in the wake of the local elections earlier this year in which the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) suffered major losses. The economic crisis bruising Turkey proved a major factor in the party’s debacles in big cities in the March 31 polls and the June 23 rerun of the mayoral vote in Istanbul, giving impetus to rupture trends within the AKP.

Also, Ankara is greatly concerned over the prospect of a new refugee influx from Idlib that would further entangle Turkey’s Syrian refugee problem. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had warned in September that Turkey cannot tolerate another refugee wave atop the 3.6 million Syrians it is already hosting.

Besides putting strains on Turkey’s financial resources and social stamina, the Syrian refugee problem has proved increasingly costly for the AKP in terms of domestic politics. It is no coincidence that since the party’s rout in the June 23 rerun in Istanbul, government spokesmen have constantly touted the safe zone plan inside Syria as a way to expedite the return of Syrian refugees. Across Turkey and in big cities in particular, most of the Syrian refugees live in close proximity to AKP voters, either in the same neighborhoods or adjoining ones. Under the impact of the economic crisis, tensions between locals and refugees have grown, contributing to a gradual disenchantment with the government among AKP voters.

n Istanbul — the heartbeat, the spirit and the mirror of the country — 73% of some 479,000 registered Syrians live in districts where local administrations are controlled by the AKP. Out of the 10 districts with the largest refugee numbers, seven are held by the AKP. Similarly, eight of the 10 districts with the biggest refugee populations in proportion to the locals are run by the AKP.

While announcing the launch of Operation Peace Spring, Erdogan said the campaign would “lead to the establishment of a safe zone, facilitating the return of Syrian refugees to their homes.” The political motive underlying this pledge rests on the fact that the Syrian refugee problem is becoming unbearable for the government.

If the campaign progresses as planned, leading the Turkish military and its Syrian allies to take control of a border stretch running 30 kilometers (19 miles) deep to the east of the Euphrates, the Syrians who could be forced to flee Idlib in the near future could perhaps be placed in tent cities in this “security belt” without being let into Turkey at all and instead transferred via Afrin and al-Bab, which are already under Turkish control.

For Erdogan, Operation Peace Spring offers also an opportunity to stop or contain the unraveling within his party. Ali Babacan, the AKP’s former economy czar who has already quit the party, is expected to create a new party and join the opposition ranks by the end of the year. Ahmet Davutoglu — the former premier and foreign minister who, together with Erdogan, designed and implemented the failed policies that spawned the grave “Syria crisis” that Turkey is experiencing today, both domestically and in its foreign policy — is gearing up to get ahead of Babacan and announce his own party in November. These political dynamics have already triggered a spate of resignations from the AKP, and the formal establishment of the new parties could further accelerate the unraveling. Hence, the government will seek to capitalize on Operation Peace Spring to curb the centrifugal forces pressuring the AKP since its defeats in the local polls. The intensive employment of a nationalist narrative, in which the operation is depicted as a struggle of “national survival” against terrorism and quitting the AKP is equated to treason, would not be a surprise.

There are already omens that this state-of-emergency climate, nurtured through the operation, will be used to further suppress the opposition, free speech and media freedoms.

The events of Oct. 10 alone are telling enough. First, the organizers of a big environmentalist rally against a gold mining project in the Kaz mountains along the northern Aegean coast canceled the Oct. 12 event on the grounds of the military operation in Syria. Then, the web editor of the left-leaning BirGun daily, Hakan Demir, and the editor of the Diken news portal, Fatih Gokhan Diler, were detained on the grounds that their coverage of the operation amounted to “inciting hatred and enmity” among the people. The two journalists were released on probation later in the day.

Meanwhile, prosecutors launched an investigation into the co-chairs of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), Pervin Buldan and Sezai Temelli, on charges that their critical comments about the operation constituted “spreading terrorist propaganda” and “openly insulting” the government.

The operation is likely to further alienate Kurdish voters from the AKP and Erdogan. Under the current circumstances, Erdogan already lacks any political ground to try to win over the Kurds, but Kurdish voters are likely to develop resentment against the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) as well over its support for the military campaign. This, of course, could be one of the side objectives the government seeks from the operation, given that the backing of HDP voters was instrumental in CHP victories in big cities such as Ankara, Istanbul and Adana in the local polls after the HDP opted to sit out those races.

Finally, US President Donald Trump's threats to “obliterate” the Turkish economy if Ankara goes “off-limits” in the operation offers Erdogan the chance to blame the economy’s domestic woes on external reasons and portray the ongoing fragility of the Turkish lira as an American conspiracy.

[serhildansemsuri]

Svenska politiker blundar för Turkiets fortsatta förintelse-och förnekelsepolitik

Under hösten har det ekat mycket om ”kurdfrågan” i den annars så tysta svenska utrikespolitiken. Men istället för att diskutera Turkiets brist på demokrati, övergrepp mot de som protesterar, de överfulla fängelserna där kurdiska politiker, journalister och oppositionella låses in för att tystas, så kommer nu en debatt om hur de utsattas protester ska se ut. Är kurderna inte lite väl aggressiva?…

[korrektheiten]

Merkel versprach jährliche Aufnahme von bis zu 250.000 Einwanderern

JF: Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel hat der Türkei 2016 in einem Geheimtreffen versprochen, jährlich bis zu 250.000 Asylsuchende aufzunehmen. Bis auf den niederländischen Ministerpräsident Mark Rutte war kein europäischer Regierungschef in das genaue Abkommen mit der Türkei eingeweiht. http://dlvr.it/NcTVV7

[effemerideitalia]

Armenia disposta a normalizzare i rapporti con la Turchia

Armenia disposta a normalizzare i rapporti con la Turchia

L’Armenia è pronta a normalizzare le relazioni con la Turchia senza precondizioni, ha dichiarato oggi il ministro degli Esteri Eduard Nalbandian

“Sapete che il presidente dell’Armenia ha avviato il processo di normalizzazione dei rapporti armeno-turchi, ma Ankara ha rifiutato l’accordo,” — ha detto Nalbandian durante la conferenza stampa congiunta con il capo della diplomazia greca Nikos Kotzias.

[viaquotesapp-blog]

15 Great Business Motivational Quotes for Entrepreneurs

Starting a business is not an easy task at all!! It requires a lot of inspiration, encouragement, and motivation. Once in a while, you just need a push to get started over.

So here is a list of powerful short business quotes to boost your energy!! Don’t just read but also try to think about how each one applies to your business.

Let’s get to it…

“If you can serve everyone who visits you, you must be doing well in business.” ~ Ahmet Davutoglu

“I have been blessed with working with the best in the business.” ~ Al Roker

“Great things in business are never done by one person. They’re done by a team of people.” ~ Steve Jobs

“In the business world, the rearview mirror is always clearer than the windshield.” ~ Warren Buffett

“I believe fundamental honesty is the keystone of business.” ~ Harvey S. Firestone

“The greatest ability in business is to get along with others and to influence their actions.” ~ John Hancock

“A satisfied customer is the best business strategy of all.” ~ Michael LeBoeuf

“Punctuality is the soul of business.” ~ Thomas Chandler Haliburton

“Business has only two functions — marketing and innovation.” ~ Milan Kundera

“The secret of business is to know something that nobody else knows.” ~ Aristotle Onassis

“Prophesy is a good line of business, but it is full of risks.” ~ Mark Twain

“The keystone of successful business is cooperation. Friction retards progress.” ~ James Cash Penney

“The way to write is well, and how is your own business.” ~ A. J. Liebling

“You can’t be successful in business without taking risks. It’s really that simple.” ~ Adena Friedman

“The best defence against mafia business is full declaration of assets and incomes.” ~ Milos Zeman

You can choose some of these quotes as part of your approach or strategy. Motivation through quotes will help you in your personal and professional growth. All the best for your journey!!

Check out the best quotes app for Android !! Download the app and get daily motivational and inspirational quotes!!

Have any more ideas?? Please feel free to share in the comment section.

[turkudostu61]

Davutoğlu: AKP’de Zarrab, yolsuzluklarından, imar rantlarından, 5 müteahhitten oluşan bir çark vardı Gelecek Partisi Genel Lideri Ahmet Davutoğlu, katıldığı canlı yayında AK Parti’den ayrıldığı gün Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan ile arasında geçen diyalogu p... https://kronos34.news/tr/davutoglu-akpde-zarrab-yolsuzluklarindan-imar-rantlarindan-5-muteahhitten-olusan-bir-cark-vardi/

[revolutionaryeye]

Defending Afrin

Turkey's war on Afrin is an attack not only on Kurdish self-determination, but on democracy and women's liberation in the Middle East.

Kurdish YPG fighters in Afrin, northern Syria. KurdishStruggle / Flickr

When thousands gathered in Afrin for the funeral procession of Barin Kobani, a woman fighter of the Kurdish Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), whose lifeless body was mutilated by Turkish-backed jihadist mercenaries, olive branches were reaching out of the crowd. Afrin, located at the Syrian-Turkish border and in the center of Mount Kurd, is not only known for its predominantly Kurdish population but also for its olive groves and blooming fields, surrounded by a mountainous landscape. For more than two weeks now Turkish tanks and fighter jets, accompanied by bearded men shouting “God is great” and raising their index finger, have been attacking civilian neighborhoods and positions held by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in what Turkey has cynically named “Operation Olive Branch.”

According to a World Health Organization report, eighty-six civilians — including a whole family of seven — have been killed, along with two hundred wounded. More than ten thousand fled due to the bombings in one week. Kurdish sources such as the Administration of Afrin Canton Council and the head of the Afrin hospital however say the number is even higher. Turkish attacks in Afrin, which have also struck ancient sites, explicitly breach international law. Yet since the beginning of the first attacks on January 20, no outrage against this military aggression has been vocalized by a government or the international community.

“Kurds have no friends but the mountains” has become an easy refrain over the years to respond to the injustices the Kurdish people have been subjected to. But, after more than a century of atrocities, the Afrin assault still feels particular and urgent, an opportunity for meaningful solidarity before all democratic accomplishments in Northern Syria are destroyed by Turkey, her jihadist foot-soldiers, and the imperial powers. The Afrin crisis has emerged as an epitome of the region’s predicament and raises three fundamental questions: What is Turkey’s role in the historical oppression of Kurds in the region? Who today challenges them as the defenders of Afrin? And what are the geopolitics of the conflict?

  Erdoğan’s Targets                                      

Whenever the Turkish government launches an “operation,” especially an “anti-terror operation,” you can be certain that Kurds will be the first ones in the crosshairs. After the June 2015 elections, when Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost the majority it needed to form a government on its own, snap elections were announced for November 1. In the meantime, the peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was terminated and a state of emergency declared in the country’s Kurdish southeast. The government, hand in hand with the military, launched so-called “cleansing operations” against supposed PKK members and targeted strongholds of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), a left-wing alliance with its roots in Kurdish politics and effectively the only challenger of the AKP, in an act of collective punishment. A sizeable death toll and significant displacements were the consequence.

About this time two years ago, on February 5, the AKP government revealed a ten-step action plan to “repair” southeastern Turkey, which had been destroyed in the wake of the siege (or, as then-Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu would have it, was “traumatized by terrorists who started the fire”). This post-operation “master plan” included consultations with village guards that function as pro-government militia and the construction of bulletproof security towers in urban districts. It was, in reality, just another phase of the warfare, an attempt at tearing local residents from their historically inhabited spaces and creating obedience......

Continued:- https://jacobinmag.com/2018/02/afrin-kurdistan-syria-turkey-erdogan-is-war

[malatyabulvar]

Gelecek Partisi Genel Başkanı Ahmet Davutoğlu, BİRKONFED TV'de canlı yayınında konuşuyor..

[hertaraf2023]

Gelecek Partisi Genel Başkanı Ahmet Davutoğlu, Fox TV'de İsmail Küçükkaya'nın sorularını yanıtladı.