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tradeimextrade · 2 years

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OUR "AHA MOMENT" ABOUT IMPORT EXPORT DATA OF TURKEY BIRD EYE VIEW OF IMPORT EXPORT DATA OF TURKEY

BIRD EYE VIEW OF IMPORT EXPORT DATA OF TURKEY

Turkey is a transcontinental country that is having some of its land area in South-eastern Europe and some of its part in western Asia. As per the import export data of Turkey, it imported goods worth USD 219 billion in the year 2020 which was certainly an increase that was observed when it is compared to the year 2019 by almost 9.2%. Due to this upward trend in global imports, turkey was ranked at position 26 in the year 2020.

The import data collected for Turkey is a collection of each company’s business activities. The import data is purely based on shipping and import bills, invoices, and other important documents.

On the other hand, Turkey was ranked the 30th largest exporter of goods across the world as its total exports in the year 2020 were nearly USD 170 billion which was lesser than the year 219 by 0.9%.

Turkey export data always contains information about names of buyers and sellers, country names, HS codes, product descriptions, price, and quantity.

The population of Turkey was close to 84.2 million in the year 2020. If we calculate the per-person demand for Turkey in the year 2020, as per the import-export data of Turkey, there was a per-person demand of USD 2,600 in this country.

WHAT EXPERTS SAY ABOUT TURKEY IMPORT DATA

As per import stats, which is derived from Import export data of Turkey, the country got to 26th position in 2020 in most imports. Country deals in following items for import purpose from other countries.

Mineral Fuels and Oils (13.1%)

Pearls and Precious Stones (12.1%)

Machinery (11.5%)

Electrical Machinery and equipment (7.8%)

Vehicles (6.9%)

Iron and steel (6.8%)

Plastics (5.3%)

As per Turkey import data, the top 10 goods constituted almost 70% of overall imports. It is also noticed that year over year drop is seen in imports of Mineral fuels to the country.

The major countries with whom turkey is involved in importing goods are China (USD 23bn), Germany (USD 21.7bn), Russia (USD 18 bn), the USA (USD 11.5bn), Italy (USD 9.1bn), South Korea (USD 5.7bn) and UAE (USD 5.6bn).

According to Turkey Import export data, the top 10 import partners of Turkey constitute 54% of overall import trade. European countries are more inclined toward exporting their goods to Turkey. Asian partners just serve one-third of import sales. The remaining 6.1% of imports are derived from North American partners.

SCHOLARS’ VIEW ON TURKEY EXPORT DATA

As per export data, which is derived from Import export data of Turkey, the country got to 30th position in 2020 in most exports around the globe. Country deals in following items for export to the purpose from other countries.

Vehicles (13.0%)

Machinery (9.9%)

Iron and steel (5.2%)

Apparels and clothing (4.9%)

Plastics (4.1%)

Pearls and precious stones (3.9%)

Articles of iron and steel (3.7%)

As per Turkey export data, the top 10 goods constituted almost 57% of overall exports. For a few years now, fruits and nuts were the rapidly growing exporting sector. Turkey’s exports showed a considerable jump as compared to 2019 of almost 15.5%.

The major countries with whom turkey is involved in exporting goods are Germany (USD 15.9bn), the UK (USD 11.2 bn), the USA (USD 10.1bn), Italy (USD 8bn), France (USD 7.2bn), and Russia (USD 4.4bn).

According to Turkey Import export data, the top 10 export partners of Turkey constitute 49% of overall export trade. European countries are more inclined toward importing goods from Turkey. Asian partners contribute just 26% of total exports. The remaining 6.9% of imports are derived from North American partners.

JUICE OF ARTICLE, FRESHLY SERVED BEFORE YOU

We thank you if you are reading this article till this point and got some knowledge about current trends related to import export data of Turkey. Currently, Turkey is a rapidly growing country and is growing at a much faster pace. So, if we believe the numbers, then we can conclude that the exports are in a growing stage, but imports are fluctuating. If this trend continues, then the country will witness a trade surplus in some years and which can be used for the betterment of the country’s infrastructure, economy, and in various other ways.

OUR OPINION

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seairexim · 3 months

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Situated at the junction of Europe and Asia, Turkey holds a robust economy and plays a significant role in global trade. Insight into its import-export scene is vital for businesses, unveiling growth prospects and informing strategic decisions. Explore the blog "What growth opportunities are revealed through an analysis of Turkey's import-export dynamics?" Now!

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emmawilliams12 · 3 months

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Navigating Turkey's dynamic commerce landscape demands adeptness. Situated at the crossroads of continents, Turkey is a vital trade hub. To thrive, leverage key resources like the turkey importers list and master trade regulations. Here are ten crucial insights.

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naveenkumarsin32 · 2 years

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Turkey import partners

We differentiate the Turkey top trading partners as per the most trading USD Value we created two sheets of which company or a country exports the most in the Turkey and we add all the precise information which is helpful. For getting more details feel free to click on the link below - https://eximtradedata.com/turkey-import-data

#turkey import data #importer of turkey #import of turkey #turkey import products #turkey importers database #turkey import sample data #Turkey export data #Turkey trade statistics #Turkey export import data #turkey import export data #turkey customs data #turkey shipment data 2021

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zvaigzdelasas · 5 months

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Clean energy contributed a record 11.4tn yuan ($1.6tn [USD]) to China’s economy in 2023, accounting for all of the growth in investment and a larger share of economic growth than any other sector. The new sector-by-sector analysis for Carbon Brief, based on official figures, industry data and analyst reports, illustrates the huge surge in investment in Chinese clean energy last year – in particular, the so-called “new three” industries of solar power, electric vehicles (EVs) and batteries. Solar power, along with manufacturing capacity for solar panels, EVs and batteries, were the main focus of China’s clean-energy investments in 2023, the analysis shows.[...]

Clean-energy investment rose 40% year-on-year to 6.3tn yuan ($890bn), with the growth accounting for all of the investment growth across the Chinese economy in 2023.

China’s $890bn investment in clean-energy sectors is almost as large as total global investments in fossil fuel supply in 2023 – and similar to the GDP of Switzerland or Turkey.

Including the value of production, clean-energy sectors contributed 11.4tn yuan ($1.6tn) to the Chinese economy in 2023, up 30% year-on-year.

Clean-energy sectors, as a result, were the largest driver of China’ economic growth overall, accounting for 40% of the expansion of GDP in 2023.[...]

The surge in clean-energy investment comes as China’s real-estate sector shrank for the second year in a row. This shift positions the clean-energy industry as a key part not only of China’s energy and climate efforts, but also of its broader economic and industrial policy.[...]

The growing importance of these new industries gives China a significant economic stake in the global transition to clean-energy technologies.[...]

In total, clean energy made up 13% of the huge volume of investment in fixed assets in China in 2023, up from 9% a year earlier.[...]

The major role that clean energy played in boosting growth in 2023 means the industry is now a key part of China’s wider economic and industrial development.[...]

Solar was the largest contributor to growth in China’s clean-technology economy in 2023. It recorded growth worth a combined 1tn yuan of new investment, goods and services, as its value grew from 1.5tn yuan in 2022 to 2.5tn yuan in 2023, an increase of 63% year-on-year. While China has dominated the manufacturing and installations of solar panels for years, the growth of the industry in 2023 was unprecedented.[...]

An estimated 200GW was added across the country during 2023 as a whole, more than doubling from the record of 87GW set in 2022[...]

China experienced a significant increase in solar product exports in 2023. It exported 56GW of solar wafers, 32GW of cells and 178GW of modules in the first 10 months of the year, up 90%, 72% and 34% year-on-year respectively [...] However, due to falling costs, the export value of these solar products only increased by 3%.

Within the overall export growth there were notable increases in China’s solar exports to countries along the “belt and road”, to southeast Asian nations and to several African countries.[...]

China installed 41GW of wind power capacity in the first 11 months of 2023, an increase of 84% year-on-year in new additions. Some 60GW of onshore wind alone was due to be added across 2023[...]

In addition, offshore wind capacity increased by 6GW across the whole of 2023.[...]

By the end of 2023, the first batch of “clean-energy bases” were expected to have been connected to the grid, contributing to the growth of onshore wind power, particularly in regions such as Inner Mongolia and other northwestern provinces. The second and third batches of clean-energy bases are set to continue driving the growth in onshore wind installations. The market is also being driven by the “repowering” of older windfarms, supported by central government policies promoting the model of replacing smaller, older turbines with larger ones.[...]

Despite technological advancements reducing costs, increases in raw material prices have resulted in lower profit margins compared to the solar industry[...]

China’s production of electric vehicles grew 36% year-on-year in 2023 to reach 9.6m units, a notable 32% of all vehicles produced in the country. The vast majority of [B]EVs produced in China are sold domestically, with sales growing strongly despite the phase-out of purchase subsidies announced in 2020 and completed at the end of 2022.[...]

Sales of [B]EVs made in China reached 9.5m units in 2023, a 38% year-on-year increase. Of this total, 8.3m were sold domestically, accounting for one-third of Chinese vehicle sales overall, while 1.2m [B]EVs were exported, a 78% year-on-year increase.[...]

China’s EV market is highly competitive, with at least 94 brands offering more than 300 models. Domestic brands account for 81% of the EV market, with BYD, Wuling, Chery, Changan and GAC among the top players.[...]

The analysis assumes that EVs accounted for all of the growth in investment in vehicle manufacturing capacity [...] while investment in conventional vehicles was stable[...]

Meanwhile, EV charging infrastructure is expanding rapidly, enabling the growth of the EV market. In 2022, more than 80% of the downtown areas of “first-tier” cities – megacities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou – had installed charging stations, while 65% of the highway service zones nationwide provided charging points.

More than 3m new charging points were put into service during 2023, including 0.93m public and 2.45m private chargers. The accumulated total by November 2023 reached 8.6m charging points.[...]

China is rapidly scaling up electricity storage capacity. This has the potential to significantly reduce China’s reliance on coal- and gas-fired power plants to meet peaks in electricity demand and to facilitate the integration of larger amounts of variable wind and solar power into the grid. The construction of pumped hydro storage capacity increased dramatically in the last year, with capacity under construction reaching 167GW, up from 120GW a year earlier.[...]

Data from Global Energy Monitor identifies another 250GW in pre-construction stages, indicating that there is potential for the current surge in capacity to continue.

Construction of new battery manufacturing capacity was another major driver of investments, estimated at 0.3tn [yuan].[...]

Investment in electrolysers for “green” hydrogen production almost doubled year-on-year in 2023, reaching approximately 90bn yuan, based on estimates for the first half of the year from SWS Research. [...]

China’s ministry of transportation reported that investment in railway construction increased 7% in January–November 2023, implying investment of 0.8tn for the full year. This includes major investments in both passenger and freight transport. Investment in roads fell slightly, while investment in railways overall grew by 22%. The share of freight volumes transported by rail in China has increased from 7.8% in 2017 to 9.2% in 2021, thanks to the rapid development of the railway network. In 2022, some 155,000km of rail lines were in operation, of which 42,000km were high-speed. This is up from 146,000km of which 38,000km were high-speed in 2020.[...]

In 2023, 10 nuclear power units were approved in China, exceeding the anticipated rate of 6-8 units per year set by the China Nuclear Energy Association in 2020 for the second year in a row. There are 77 nuclear power units that are currently operating or under construction in China, the second-largest total in the world. The total yearly investment in 2023 was estimated for this analysis at 87bn yuan, an increase of 45% year-on-year[...]

State Grid, the government-owned operator that runs the majority of the country’s electricity transmission network, has a target to raise inter-provincial power transmission capacity to 300GW by 2025 and 370GW by 2030, from 230GW in 2021. These plans play a major role in enabling the development of clean energy bases in western China. China Electricity Council reported investments in electricity transmission at 0.5tn yuan in 2023, up 8% on year – just ahead of the level targeted by State Grid.[...]

China’s reliance on the clean-technology sectors to drive growth and achieve key economic targets boosts their economic and political importance. It could also support an accelerated energy transition. The massive investment in clean technology manufacturing capacity and exports last year means that China has a major stake in the success of clean energy in the rest of the world and in building up export markets. For example, China’s lead climate negotiator Su Wei recently highlighted that the goal of tripling renewable energy capacity globally, agreed in the COP28 UN climate summit in December, is a major benefit to China’s new energy industry. This will likely also mean that China’s efforts to finance and develop clean energy projects overseas will intensify.

Globally, China’s unprecedented clean-energy manufacturing boom has pushed down prices, with the cost of solar panels falling 42% year-on-year – a dramatic drop even compared to the historical average of around 17% per year, while battery prices fell by an even steeper 50%. This, in turn, has encouraged much faster take-up of clean-energy technologies.[...]

The clean-technology investment boom has provided a new lease of life to China’s investment-led economic model. There are new clean-energy technologies where there is scope for expansion, such as [Hydrogen] electrolysers.

Mind-blowing is the only word for it rly [25 Jan 24]

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mariacallous · 4 months

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Shortly before noon on Aug. 19, 2023, a Russian cruise missile sliced past the golden onion domes and squat apartment blocks of the Chernihiv skyline in northern Ukraine. The Iskander-K missile slammed into its target: the city’s drama theater, which was hosting a meeting of drone manufacturers at the time of the attack. More than 140 people were injured and seven killed. The youngest, 6-year-old Sofia Golynska, had been playing in a nearby park.

Fragments of the missile recovered by the Ukrainian armed forces and analyzed by Ukrainian researchers found numerous components made by U.S. manufacturers in the missile’s onboard navigation system, which enabled it to reach its target with devastating precision. In December, Ukraine’s state anti-corruption agency released an online database of the thousands of foreign-made components recovered from Russian weapons so far.

Russia’s struggle to produce the advanced semiconductors, electrical components, and machine tools needed to fuel its defense industrial base predates the current war and has left it reliant on imports even amid its estrangement from the West. So when Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, major manufacturing countries from North America, Europe, and East Asia swiftly imposed export controls on a broad swath of items deemed critical for the Russian arms industry.

Russia quickly became the world’s most sanctioned country: Some 16,000 people and companies were subject to a patchwork of international sanctions and export control orders imposed by a coalition of 39 countries. Export restrictions were painted with such a broad brush that sunglasses, contact lenses, and false teeth were also swept up in the prohibitions. Even items manufactured overseas by foreign companies are prohibited from being sold to Russia if they are made with U.S. tools or software, under a regulation known as the foreign direct product rule.

But as the war reaches its two-year anniversary, export controls have failed to stem the flow of advanced electronics and machinery making their way into Russia as new and convoluted supply chains have been forged through third countries such as Kazakhstan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, which are not party to the export control efforts. An investigation by Nikkei Asia found a tenfold increase in the export of semiconductors from China and Hong Kong to Russia in the immediate aftermath of the war—the majority of them from U.S. manufacturers.

“Life finds a way,” said a senior U.S. intelligence official, quoting the movie Jurassic Park. The official spoke on background to discuss Russia’s evasion of export controls.

Some of the weapons and components analyzed by investigators were likely stockpiled before the war. But widely available Russian trade data reveals a brisk business in imports. More than $1 billion worth of advanced semiconductors from U.S. and European manufacturers made their way into the country last year, according to classified Russian customs service data obtained by Bloomberg. A recent report by the Kyiv School of Economics found that imports of components considered critical for the battlefield had dipped by just 10 percent during the first 10 months of 2023, compared with prewar levels.

This has created a Kafkaesque scenario, the report notes, in which the Ukrainian army is doing battle with Western weapons against a Russian arsenal that also runs on Western components.

It is an obvious problem, well documented by numerous think tank and media reports, but one without an easy solution. Tracking illicit trade in items such as semiconductors is an exponentially greater challenge than monitoring shipments of conventional weapons. Around 1 trillion chips are produced every year. Found in credit cards, toasters, tanks, missile systems, and much, much more, they power the global economy as well as the Russian military. Cutting Russia out of the global supply chain for semiconductors is easier said than done.

“Both Russia and China, and basically all militaries, are using a large number of consumer electronic components in their systems,” said Chris Miller, the author of Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology. “All of the world’s militaries rely on the same supply chain, which is the supply chain that primarily services consumer electronics.”

Export controls were once neatly tailored to keep specific items, such as nuclear technology, out of the hands of rogue states and terrorist groups. But as Washington vies for technological supremacy with Beijing while also seeking to contain Russia and Iran, it has increasingly used these trade restrictions to advance broader U.S. strategic objectives. For instance, the Biden administration has placed wide-ranging prohibitions on the export of advanced chips to China.

“At no point in history have export controls been more central to our collective security than right now,” Matthew Axelrod, the assistant secretary for export enforcement at the U.S. Commerce Department, said in a speech last September. U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has described export controls as “a new strategic asset in the U.S. and allied toolkit.”

Russia’s ability to defy these restrictions doesn’t just have implications for the war in Ukraine. It also raises significant questions about the challenge ahead vis-à-vis China.

“The technological question becomes a key part of this story and whether or not we can restrict it from our adversaries,” said James Byrne, the director of open-source intelligence and analysis at the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank.

In the Russian city of Izhevsk, home to the factory that manufactures Kalashnikov rifles, shopping malls are being converted into drone factories amid a surge in defense spending that has helped the country’s economy weather its Western estrangement. Arms manufacturers have been urged to work around the clock to feed the Russian war machine, while defense is set to account for one-third of the state budget this year.

“We have developed a concept to convert shopping centers—which, before the start of the SMO [special military operation], sold mainly the products of Western brands—to factories for assembly lines of types of domestic drones,” Alexander Zakharov, the chief designer of the Zala Aero drone company, said at a closed event in August 2022, according to the Russian business newspaper Vedomosti. “Special military operation” is what the Russian government calls its war on Ukraine. Zala Aero is a subsidiary of the Kalashnikov Concern that, along with Zakharov, was sanctioned by the United States last November.

Defense companies have bought at least three shopping malls in Izhevsk to be repurposed for the manufacture of drones, according to local media, including Lancet attack drones, which the British defense ministry described as one of the most effective new weapons that Russia introduced to the battlefield last year. Lancets, which cost about $35,000 to produce, wreaked havoc during Ukraine’s offensive last year and have been captured on video striking valuable Ukrainian tanks and parked MiG fighter jets.

Like a lot of Russia’s weapons systems, Lancets are filled with Western components. An analysis of images of the drones published in December by the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security found that they contained several parts from U.S., Swiss, and Czech manufacturers, including image processing and analytical components that play a pivotal role in enabling the drones to reach their targets on the battlefield.

“The recurring appearance of these Western products in Russian drone systems shows a keen dependence on them for key capabilities in the drone systems,” the report notes. Lancets are not the only drones found to contain Western components. Almost all of the electronic components in the Iranian Shahed-136 drones, which Russia is now manufacturing with Iranian help to use in Ukraine, are of Western origin, a separate analysis published in November concluded.

Early in the war, the Royal United Services Institute analyzed 27 Russian military systems, including cruise missiles, electronic warfare complexes, and communications systems, and found that they contained at least 450 foreign-made components, revealing Russia’s dependence on imports.

One of the principal ways that Russia has evaded Western export controls has been through transshipment via third countries such as Turkey, the UAE, and neighboring states once part of the Soviet Union. Bloomberg reported last November that amid mounting Western pressure, the UAE had agreed to restrict the export of sensitive goods to Russia and that Turkey was considering a similar move. Kazakh officials announced a ban on the export of certain battlefield goods to Russia in October.

Suspected transshipment is often revealed by striking changes in trade patterns before and after the invasion. The Maldives, an island chain in the Indian Ocean that has no domestic semiconductor industry, shipped almost $54 million worth of U.S.-made semiconductors to Russia in the year after the invasion of Ukraine, Nikkei Asia reported last July.

Semiconductor supply chains often span several countries, with chips designed in one country and manufactured in another before being sold to a series of downstream distributors around the world. That makes it difficult for companies to know the ultimate end user of their products. This may seem odd—until you realize that this is the case for many everyday products that are sold around the world. “When Coca-Cola sells Coca-Cola, it doesn’t know where every bottle goes, and they don’t have systems to track where every bottle goes,” said Kevin Wolf, a former assistant secretary for export administration at the U.S. Commerce Department.

While a coalition of 39 countries, including the world’s major manufacturers of advanced electronics, imposed export restrictions on Russia, much of the rest of the world continues to trade freely with Moscow. Components manufactured in coalition countries will often begin their journey to Moscow’s weapons factories through a series of entirely legal transactions before ending up with a final distributor that takes them across the border into Russia. “It starts off as licit trade and ends up as illicit trade,” said a second senior U.S. intelligence official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The further items move down the supply chain, the less insight governments and companies have into their ultimate destination, although sudden changes in behavior of importers can offer a red flag. In his speech last September, Axelrod, the assistant secretary, used the example of a beauty salon that suddenly starts to import electronic components.

But the Grand Canyon of loopholes is China, which has stood by Moscow since the invasion. In the first days of the war, U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo warned that Washington could shut down Chinese companies that ignored semiconductor export controls placed on Russia. Last October, 42 Chinese companies were added to export control lists—severely undercutting their ability to do business with U.S. companies—for supplying Russian defense manufacturers with U.S. chips.

But as the Biden administration carefully calibrates its China policy in a bid to keep a lid on escalating tensions, it has held off from taking Beijing to task. “I think the biggest issue is that we—the West—have been unwilling to put pressure on China that would get China to start enforcing some of these rules itself,” said Miller, the author of Chip Wars.

A spokesperson for the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) said: “Due to the restrictions imposed by the United States and key allies and partners, Russia has been left with no choice but to spend more, lower its ambitions for high-tech weaponry, build alliances with other international pariah states, and develop nefarious trade networks to covertly obtain the technologies it needs.

“We are deeply concerned regarding [Chinese] support for Russia’s defense industrial base. BIS has acted to add over 100 [China]-based entities to the Entity List for supporting Russia’s military industrial base and related activities.”

Export controls have typically focused on keeping specific U.S.-made goods out of the hands of adversaries, while economic and financial sanctions have served broader foreign-policy objectives of isolating rogue states and cauterizing the financing of terrorist groups and drug cartels. The use of sanctions as a national security tool grew in wake of the 9/11 attacks; in the intervening decades, companies, government agencies, and financial institutions have built up a wealth of experience in sanctions compliance. By contrast, the use of export controls for strategic ends is relatively novel, and compliance expertise is still in its infancy.

“It used to be that people like me could keep export controls and sanctions in one person’s head. The level of complexity for each area of law is so intense. I don’t know anyone who is truly an export control and sanctions expert,” Wolf said.

Export controls, experts say, are at best speed bumps designed to make it harder for Russia’s defense industrial base to procure Western components. They create “extra friction and pressure on the Russian economy,” said Daniel Fried, who as the State Department coordinator for sanctions policy helped craft U.S. sanctions on Russia after its annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia is now paying 80 percent more to import semiconductors than it did before the war, according to forthcoming research by Miller, and the components it is able to acquire are often of dubious quality.

But although it may be more cumbersome and expensive, it’s a cost that Moscow has been willing to bear in its war on Ukraine.

Western components—and lots of them—will continue to be found in the weapons Russia uses on Ukraine’s battlefields for the duration of the war. “This problem is as old as export controls are,” said Jasper Helder, an expert on export controls and sanctions with the law firm Akin Gump. But there are ways to further plug the gaps.

Steeper penalties could incentivize U.S. companies to take a more proactive role in ensuring their products don’t wind up in the hands of the Russian military, said Elina Ribakova, a nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “At the moment, they’re not truly motivated,” she said.

Companies that run afoul of sanctions and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, a U.S. federal law that prohibits the payment of bribes, have been fined billions of dollars. Settlements of export control violations are often an order of magnitude smaller, according to recently published research.

In a speech last month, Axelrod said the United States would begin issuing steeper penalties for export control violations. “Build one case against one of the companies extremely well, put out a multibillion-dollar fine negotiation, and watch everybody else fall in line,” Ribakova said.

And then there’s the question of resources. BIS has an annual budget of just $200 million. “That’s like the cost of a few fighter jets. Come on,” said Raimondo, speaking at the Reagan National Defense Forum last December.

The agency’s core budget for export control has, adjusted for inflation, remained flat since 2010, while its workload has surged. Between 2014 and 2022, the volume of U.S. exports subject to licensing scrutiny increased by 126 percent, according to an agency spokesperson. A 2022 study of export control enforcement by the Center for Strategic and International Studies recommended a budget increase of $45 million annually, describing it as “one of the best opportunities available anywhere in U.S. national security.”

When it comes to enforcement, the bureau has about 150 officers across the country who work with law enforcement and conduct outreach to companies. The Commerce Department has also established a task force with the Justice Department to keep advanced technologies out of the hands of Russia, China, and Iran. “The U.S. has the most robust export enforcement on the planet,” Wolf said.

But compared with other law enforcement and national security agencies, the bureau’s budgets have not kept pace with its expanding mission. The Department of Homeland Security has more investigators in the city of Tampa, Florida, than BIS does across the entire country, Axelrod noted in his January speech.

On the other side, you have Russia, which is extremely motivated to acquire the critical technologies it needs to continue to prosecute its war. The Kremlin has tasked its intelligence agencies with finding ways around sanctions and export controls, U.S. Treasury Undersecretary Brian Nelson said in a speech last year. “We are not talking about a profit-seeking firm looking for efficiencies,” the second senior U.S. intelligence official said. “There will be supply if there is sufficient demand.”

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usafphantom2 · 3 months

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Turkish defense company tests high-tech EFSA radar that improves the country's combat aircraft

MURAD AESA radar of the Turkish ASELSAN completes inaugural flight with F-16 OZGUR warplane

Fernando Valduga By Fernando Valduga 03/28/2024 - 09:00 in Military

Turkey recently tested the nationally developed AESA radar, ASELSAN's MURAD, which recently conducted its first flight with an F-16 ÖZGÜR warplane.

“ASELSAN's AESA National Aircraft Nose Radar made its first flight with the F-16 ÖZGÜR platform. It will provide great capacity gains to our aircraft with simultaneous air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, detection/tracking of multiple targets, missile orientation beyond visual range, high-resolution ground images and electronic warfare functions,” the company confirmed in a social media post.

— ASELSAN (@aselsan) March 26, 2024

This demonstration provided data for additional testing and development of the radar system.

Future plans for MURAD include continuous testing and integration on various platforms, such as Bayraktar AKINCI TIHA, as well as other aerial platforms such as KIZILELMA, KAAN, HÜRJET, ANKA III, AKINCI and F-16.

According to the President of the Presidential Defense Industry, Prof. Haluk GÖRGÜN, the integration of the AESA radar will align the F-16 ÖZGÜR with the standards of generation 4.5 aircraft. In addition, radar integration could improve the capabilities of other platforms such as KAAN and combat UAVs, providing them with additional functionality and low visibility features.

Aselsan CEO Ahmet Akyol highlighted the versatility of AESA technology, emphasizing its application in various domains, including air, land and sea.

He noted that the internal development of Aselsan's EASA radar systems allows Turkey to maintain full control over technology and data, ensuring the highest level of security and capabilities.

The size of the global market for the combat aircraft equipped with AESA radar is estimated at $5 billion annually, with ongoing export negotiations positioning Aselsan radars as key actors in the global aerospace market.

The ÖZGÜR Project aims to modernize F-16 Block 30 warplanes with domestic avionics and software, including the AESA National Radar. This initiative is expected to align the capabilities of the F-16 ÖZGÜR aircraft with those of the F-16 Block 70 fighters, ensuring uniformity and effectiveness throughout the fleet.

The main functions and capabilities of the EFSA National Radar include long-range search, multiple target tracking, detection and tracking of terrestrial targets, weather detection, automatic target detection and electronic attack.

Tags: ASELSANMilitary AviationF-16 Fighting FalconAESA radarsTAF - Turkish Air Force / Turkish Air Force

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Fernando Valduga

Aviation photographer and pilot since 1992, he has participated in several events and air operations, such as Cruzex, AirVenture, Dayton Airshow and FIDAE. He has works published in specialized aviation magazines in Brazil and abroad. He uses Canon equipment during his photographic work in the world of aviation.