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Landrieu’s 10,000+ Blight Reductions: A Misleading Success? Blight in New Orleans A Survey and Critical Response

Kayla Lawrence, Juris Doctor Candidate, 2015, Tulane University Law School

INTRODUCTION

The 2010 New Orleans mayoral race was one of the most significant and consequential campaigns in crescent city history. As the first relatively full-population election since Hurricane Katrina, the stakes were high and the problems were vast. Candidates tackled a combination of complicated issues, largely composed of the traditional New Orleanian principle concerns—deep-seated disparity between socioeconomic groups, abundant poverty, sub-par education, economic development, tourism growth, violent crime, city management, the budget, and political corruption.[1] It was the storm of the century, however, that amped up these issues and unmasked historical problems, which instigated new major obstacles to the city’s political stability and economic growth. The candidates had to also offer a feasible solution to the city’s greatest burden on its post-Katrina recovery: blight.

It was Mitchell “Mitch” Landrieu, brother of United States Senator Mary Landrieu and son of former mayor Moon Landrieu, who ultimately won the race. That year, New Orleans had an astonishing number of blighted properties—43,755, nearly one-quarter of the city's residential properties, making New Orleans one of the most blighted cities in the nation.[2] Landrieu had to deliver on the guarantee that he would promulgate an effective policy to fight blight plaguing the city. In September 2010, eight months after taking office, while standing in front of a house deemed in danger of collapse, Landrieu made a promise to New Orleanians.[3] “Our aggressive blight reduction effort will eliminate 10,000 blighted properties over the next three years.”[4] He quickly went on to give media interviews, outlining his strategy and warning citizens that enforcement will be amped into high gear. He then created BlightStat, an organization intended to consolidate the disjointed city agencies combatting blight.

In three years, the Landrieu administration announced it had fulfilled the Mayor’s promise. Indeed, even a drive around the city today confirms that there are fewer blighted properties haunting the city’s historic streets. However, also quite noticeable is a substantial increase in unused and unwanted vacant lots, and, surprisingly, an abundance of properties still blighted, undisturbed by homeowner, citizen, or government intervention.

The administration’s announcement in conjunction with the city’s apparent continued blight problem begs the question: What does it actually mean for a blighted property to be “eliminated”? Furthermore, what properties are included in the 10,000 count? Who cured them? Does the count embrace properties that never made it into the city’s records, but were abated privately through extra-governmental means? Or does the number include only the closed cases recorded through BlightStat? What about properties that have fallen back into disrepair after the city had officially closed the cases? And how many properties remain blighted although considered eliminated according the BlightStat website?

Not only is the 10,000 count unclear in what it includes, the Landrieu policy and procedure show a lack of concern for the quality of those remediated properties. How many historic properties did a bulldozer tear down when the structure was still sound or reparable? How many properties could have been sold and renovated by willing and able buyers? Which properties were demolished because no one had access to purchase them due to administrative hurdles? Finally, what can the city do to improve its policies, to streamline blight reduction, and to get blighted properties to their highest and best use in an expedient and efficient manner?

While the national community has praised and awarded Landrieu’s strategies and other city leaders have emulated his policies, many New Orleanians are troubled by these unanswered questions.[5] City residents are irritated because blight is still a colossal problem in New Orleans.[6] Specifically disturbing are the blighted properties that plague the Central Business and Warehouse Districts, where many historic buildings are neglected and are in danger of collapse. Even the French Quarter suffers from blight, as a building in the prominent 800 block of Royal Street recently collapsed without provocation.[7] Treme, which is adjacent to the economically significant French Quarter, has at least one blighted creole cottage or Victorian house per block.[8] Hollygrove, in a word, is overwhelmed by blight.[9] It is obvious that blight is still an ongoing battle in New Orleans, despite what statisticians and politicians claim.

WHAT IS BLIGHT?

Blight is the house around the corner that has been an eyesore for years. It is the faded blue creole cottage peeking through layers of overgrown grass and weeds, a cluster of flowers blooming from its attic window. It has paint peeling and broken siding. Its one hundred-year-old porch leans to one side and its wrought iron handrail has succumbed to loot. Break-ins or bullets have shattered its windows. Puddles lurk in the front yard gathering mosquitos, pests, and odors. The house may or may not be in danger of collapse, but it looks as though the ragged property is unsalvageable. Squatters live in it. Neighborhood kids play in it. It has been the scene of a few drug transactions. The structure could be historically and architecturally significant, but it decays uninterruptedly and illegally.

Yes, illegally. It is illegal to own a property with these types of conditions. While blight is a personal and local problem, it is also a legal problem. The official term “blight” is defined in Chapter 26 of the New Orleans Municipal Code. The City Code defines blight as any vacant commercial or residential premises or land that “is uninhabitable and hazardous because its physical condition constitutes a threat to public health and safety,” is not up to code standards, and is declared blighted by a hearing officer.[10] The City Code sets forth the minimum standard for the physical condition of properties and details enforcement mechanisms and procedures. Code standards are found in Chapter 28 of the City Code.[11]

Blight is a far larger problem than eyesores and legalities. At its core, blight is a sociological, economic, and political phenomenon. How can one of the most interesting and historical cities in the country be inundated with unused and unproductive properties, especially when the city has been on an upward real estate trend since 2005? Simple economic principles dictate that if there is an over supply, there must be an insufficient demand. This is far from the case. These properties are anything but unwanted; the real estate market in New Orleans moves quickly, and values continue to rise with the city’s Master Plan developments, such as the Lafitte Corridor and billion dollar hospital project opening in Mid-City in 2015. In fact, the average days on market for a renovated property in Orleans Parish is 63.[12] Moreover, according to the New Orleans Office of Community Development, “the most common housing problems can be summarized as a lack of quality, affordable housing in neighborhoods of high opportunity for low income clients.”[13]

Apparently, a supply exists of ready and willing buyers for rehabilitated properties, yet there are 30,000 blighted properties in New Orleans as of 2014.[14] New Orleans has an over-supply of dilapidated houses and a high demand for rehabbed houses. The solution could not be any clearer. Get the properties renovated. The persistence of blight in a city with these economic conditions can only be explained by a combination of significant historical events and inefficient policy.

HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTORS

Many historical factors have contributed to the extensive blight problem in New Orleans.

Among such factors are the political policies enacted under President Theodore Roosevelt. In the New Deal legislation, Roosevelt incentivized homeownership by pushing through Congress the National Housing Act of 1934.[15] This stimulated construction without direct government spending. Furthermore, it established the Federal Housing Administration, which guaranteed loans made by lenders to homebuyers.[16] It also established the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.[17] This legislation led to greater homeowner affordability and more easily acquired mortgages.

The New Deal also established the Federal National Mortgage Association, commonly known as Fannie Mae, which supplied banks with government money to make loans to prospective homeowners. This increased homeownership nationwide.[18] Other significant factors that led to increased homeownership were government incentives following World War II. The GI Bill and federal government guaranteed Veteran’s Administration loans allowed veterans to purchase homes with no money down. Thus, in the 1930s and 40s, New Orleanians along with citizens nationwide who otherwise did not have the opportunity to own a home became able to qualify for mortgages and become first time homeowners.

Homeownership does not always yield positive outcomes, especially when those homeowners are economically unqualified or unable to maintain mortgages, taxes, and the costs of property maintenance. In the mid-1960s, New Orleans, a city of almost 650,000 residents, “was one of the most impoverished, most unequal, most violent, and least educated places in the United States.”[19] Around “one-fourth of the city’s 202,643 housing units were considered to be ‘dilapidated’ or ‘deteriorating.’”[20] Many of the city’s most impoverished homeowners lived in areas that were well below sea level, had inadequate drainage systems, and suffered from inefficient levee protection.[21] These neighborhoods did not fare well when Hurricane Betsy hit in 1965. The storm was so damaging that then Louisiana governor John McKeithan called it “the greatest catastrophe in our State since the Civil War.”[22] Like Hurricane Katrina 40 years later, Betsy left thousands of houses in a state of post-traumatic disrepair, their owners incapable of rehabilitating their homes or putting them back into commerce.

High poverty levels in New Orleans persisted throughout the latter half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. Because of this, many original homeowners who were struggling to afford the true cost of homeownership left their properties to heirs who suffered from the same economic perils. Thus, a vicious cycle of property abandonment and neglect became the norm throughout the crescent city.[23] Even in 2014, a high poverty rate among owner heirs is a main source of blight in the city.

Population depletion is also a historical source of blight. The population in New Orleans has been steadily declining since the 1950s. This has been attributed to suburban movement, high urban poverty levels, and a migration of jobs to other parishes.[24] All of these factors have created a perfect storm for high rates of property abandonment. This coupled with the city’s inefficient tracking of non-compliant owners, lack of a centralized agency, and ill-equipped enforcement capabilities, has led to extensive blight throughout the city.

RECENT CONTRIBUTORS AND PRE-LANDRIEU POLICY

1. Hurricane Katrina

In 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans. The physical destruction to the city was colossal. The storm caused around eighty percent of the city to flood. The number of abandoned and dilapidated properties in New Orleans increased threefold. It caused the city to lose an estimated 110,000 people, according to the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center.[25] The direct result of this dramatic population change was an increase in abandoned and blighted property, both commercial and residential. With 182,000 housing units sustaining serious damage, and over 100,000 properties vacant for an extensive amount of time, Hurricane Katrina rendered New Orleans the most blighted city in the United States.[26]

[27][28]

2. Anti-Kelo Restrictive Legislation

The same year Hurricane Katrina struck, the United States Supreme Court decided a case that would ignite a backlash of legislation restricting the taking of private property for the purpose of economic development. In Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), the Court held that a private entity could invoke the government’s eminent domain power to expropriate the property of private citizens, concluding the taker’s economic development qualifies as “public use” under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In response, the Louisiana Legislature passed two constitutional amendments in 2006 severely restricting government agencies’ power to transfer condemned property to private citizens.

Before these amendments passed, the New Orleans Redevelopment Authority (NORA) enjoyed extensive eminent domain power to condemn individual blighted parcels and land within entire “community improvement areas” and to transfer these properties to private parties. In fact, the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP) charged NORA with five distinct powers related to eminent domain: (1) to acquire properties through its own expropriation of blighted units, but also under the Road Home Program and the city’s tax adjudication program; (2) to work with other agencies to coordinate these efforts; (3) to promote investment in areas “the marketplace has shunned” by cleaning up title issues for properties in such areas; (4) to “design the property transfer mechanisms necessary to implement the neighborhood cluster program” (in order to encourage investment in bulk to recover neighborhoods); and (5) to re-subdivide lots and blocks when necessary to respond to the city’s shifting needs.[29]

On their face, the constitutional amendments strip NORA of these eminent domain powers. The amendments exclude economic development as a public purpose and cripple the government from facilitating private transfers, both between private parties and with the city as an intermediary.[30] The latter restriction is imposed by Section 4(H), which mandates a 30 year right of first refusal in the case of a sale to the original owners of a condemned property. When NORA challenged the provisions, a Louisiana appellate court ruled that the provisions do not prevent NORA from condemning property, but it did not rule whether the city could transfer the condemned property without being subject to the 30 year right of first refusal. In 2010, the matter was finally settled when the Louisiana Legislature passed and voters approved a constitutional amendment that exempts property acquired through blight takings from the burdensome and restrictive right of first refusal and public auction requirements.[31] The effect of this amendment is that NORA officially has the legal authority to expropriate private property and transfer it to third parties freely.

3. Nagin Policy

Ray Nagin, Landrieu’s predecessor, supported a number of policies and even took radical action to curb the problem of blight in the four and a half years following the storm. He first supported a “get-tough” ordinance that would compel homeowners to rehabilitate and clean up by August 2006, only a year after the storm.[32] He then attempted to heighten tax enforcement in 2007. In 2008, he amended and amplified the blight hearings process and increased fines. In the latter part of his term, he even fired all hearing officers during a budget disagreement with City Council.

In late 2006, the Nagin administration and other key players decided NORA was best equipped to become the primary agency in the redevelopment effort.[33] NORA, which was created by the state legislature in 1968, works closely with the city of New Orleans and is composed of a Board appointed by the mayor. It also works with other agencies such as the Louisiana Recovery Authority and the Louisiana Land Trust in order “to manage and promote the redevelopment of residential and commercial properties and neighborhoods.” It has the power to invest, borrow, and issue bonds.

Under the umbrella of NORA, the city implemented a series of programs to encourage rebuilding. The two most famous of these programs were the Lot Next Door and the Clean and Lien Programs. While proactive, both initiatives were only minimally effective. Not only were they inadequately funded, but many of the programs were purely incentive-based, and incentive programs can only go so far. Furthermore, the city did not pair these programs with adequate enforcement mechanisms. Critics of the Nagin administration cite lack of enforcement as the principal roadblock to recovery, charging the city with failing to hold homeowners accountable for not bringing their properties to code or paying their house liens.[34] In fact, during the 2010 campaign, Landrieu and other candidates were passionate about enforcement amplification as the best solution to the problem of blight in the city.

While blight remained a major problem in the city at the end of Nagin’s term, his efforts were not completely futile. One study estimates the blight count was reduced from 65,428 to 53,816 in the period between March 2008 and September 2009. That is a reduction of 11,612 units, or 17.7%, in only 1.5 years. This dramatic decrease was not only a product of the city’s efforts, but also largely due to billions of federal dollars distributed through the Road Home program. This program offered grants to homeowners for the purpose of rebuilding their storm stricken homes. The blight count in this study was not derived from an academic professor’s complex statistical methodology, like Mayor Landrieu’s estimates in 2014. These numbers were derived from the United States Postal Service’s record of “no-stat” properties, a statistic that the Postal service discontinued recording in late 2010.[35]

THE LANDRIEU POLICY

"To the people who own blighted housed in the city of New Orleans I'm putting you on notice now. Today is the day to begin to start bringing your property into compliance. On November 2nd, we will begin strict and aggressive enforcement action. So when everybody asks when is the day?' The day is today." –Mayor Landrieu[36]

1. Policy Strategy and Goals

In 2010, Landrieu maintained that zealous enforcement paired with increased sheriff’s sales was the missing component in the fight against blight.[37] Before the city could enforce the code’s condition requirements, it needed to create an efficient way to track properties falling short of the city property standards. Upon taking office and with the recommendation of advisors, Landrieu created BlightStat, a management program “where city leaders review performance results related to Mayor Landrieu’s blight reduction strategy.”[38] The leaders meet monthly in a public forum at City Hall to review data, identify solutions, make adjustments, and improve strategies.[39] In 2010, the management team partnered with Code for America to create a high-tech relatively user friendly website, blightstatus.nola.gov, to track blight data and make information available to the public.

In order to meet the 10,000 unit reduction goal, the entire blight process was revamped to be repercussion based. Where the previous administration was reward-based, Landrieu kept true to his promise of “aggressive enforcement action,” as he warned homeowners that failure to bring properties to code would result in extensive fines, abatement liens, expropriation with a sheriff’s sale, or demolition.[40] The current policy reflects these repercussions. Landrieu and the City Council together led the reform of Chapters 6 and 26 of the City Code “to strengthen the City’s enforcement powers for residential and commercial blight, including occupied properties, and to streamline procedures for remediating properties.”[41] The Landrieu administration also merged two agencies to improve efficiency: Code Enforcement, which inspected potentially blighted properties, and Environmental Health, which inspected overgrown lots.[42]

The city points to five “pillars” it utilized in its blight fighting strategy: (1) “Data-driven decision making,” which depends on effective coordination of data received from tracking tools; (2) “blight tool alignment and improvement,” which focuses on maintaining up-to-date data tools to track blight at the lowest cost; (3) “organizational architecture and process,” which attempts to streamline management structure and heighten accountability; (4) “strategic deployment of resources,” which focuses on the efficiency and transparency of blight eradication tools; and (5) “place-based revitalization,” which seeks to create economic growth by targeting certain areas.[43] The city also planned to partner with nearly twenty public, private, and non-profit organizations to achieve its goals.[44]

While the city’s goals seem well conceived to improve the eradication procedure, the goals do not reflect a heightened priority to spur recovery in struggling neighborhoods. These goals do not show a strategy that promotes an overall objective to put blighted properties back into the economy as viable sources of housing. This should be the primary goal considering the city’s number one housing problem is a lack of supply of quality housing. Moreover, the goals do not address the incredible importance of the preservation of historic properties. Nor does the review process for historic properties reflect their importance to the city’s history, economic vitality, and culture. Instead, the review process for historical properties is bare at best and lacks checks and balances.

The city’s goals reflect a shortsighted plan to remove a narrowly perceived problem. They show that the city views the solution to the problems associated with blight as simply to remove the blight itself, regardless of consequences. Such goals disregard the aftermath of tearing down structures only to leave unused and unproductive lots, creating sometimes awkwardly small, vacant properties (properties that the city will maintain at the taxpayers’ expense) that no one wants to buy. Instead of remediating blighted properties with such tactlessness, the city’s policy goals should envision a procedure that seeks to capitalize on the city’s opportunity to acquire property from neglectful or incapable owners. The city should make it easier to transfer these properties to investors with the means to revitalize them.

2. Procedure

In order to fully understand the outcomes of the Landrieu blight policy, one must know exactly how the process operates. The procedure under the Landrieu administration is set up to be streamlined, centralized, and transparent. But it is not as clear as the city’s blight diagram shows. And the instructions are scattered among multiple city agency websites. The BlightStat website merely informs the public of the status of cases, but does not inform owners of the many options they have available to them, expected timelines, or detailed instructions. The process can be rather confusing to owners. It took considerable effort and information derived from multiple city websites, city handbooks, articles, and press releases, to determine the extensive process to eliminate a blighted property, which is as follows:

a) Pre-Hearing

The Office of Code Enforcement receives notification of violations when either: (1) citizens notify “NOLA 311” by dialing 311 to file a complaint or to check on the status of a current case; or (2) Code Enforcements inspectors report violations discovered on sweeps. The targeted sweeps are directed to “a five-block radius of the city’s public and private schools, along with parks, playgrounds, and high-traffic commercial corridors,” according to press secretary for Landrieu.[45]

Code Enforcement enters the violation either as a new case in LAMA, a parcel-based case management system, or updates an active case. The status of the case is then made available online via blightstatus.nola.gov. Citizens may also check for updates by calling 311.

Next, Code Enforcement commences the inspection process. Inspectors “follow a dynamic work queue in the LAMA system to perform detailed inspections of building exterior and lot conditions, with digital photography and clear lists of violations of City ordinances,” with a 30 day target for the average time from a complaint and creation of a case to inspection;[46]

A title research team then investigates title to identify who has an interest in the property and researches owner addresses for notification purposes. Once title research has finished, hearing administration sets a hearing date and time at a target date of 30 to 45 days of the completion of title research. When the date of hearing is set, a Notice of Violation packet is sent to each address on record for parties of interest, via regular and certified mail, with the property address and case number. The hearing date and time are also posted on the property front door, in the official journal of the City of New Orleans published in the Times-Picayune newspaper, and in an online calendar of scheduled hearings.[47]

Owners may request a 60-day extension of time to comply if the owner provides a valid reason. The owner must request the extension in writing using an “extension-request form” provided in the Notice of Violation packed within 7 days of the date the notice is mailed. Owners will be notified of whether the request was granted within 7 days of the hearing date.[48]

b) Hearing

The law requires owners to appear on the day of the hearing and to bring printed evidence of improvements to the property that brings the property into compliance with City Code. All costs of the hearing are incurred by the owner, and the hearings are open to the public. “At the hearing, both the city and the property owner testify under oath. The city presents the evidence against the owner and neighbors are allowed to offer testimony. The property owner has the right to be represented by an attorney, present evidence, introduce witnesses, and question city inspectors under oath.”[49]

A hearing officer can either reset the case to a future hearing date when presented with evidence of substantial work in process, or issue a judgment on the case. Within 7 days, the hearing officer will issue a Notice of Compliance when a property is brought into full compliance, which results in a case dismissal. In the alternative, the officer will issue a Notice of Judgment to the owner when the property remains in violation of the City Code. A Notice of Judgment renders an owner guilty, and the property is declared a “public nuisance,” “blight,” or both. The officer will issue a $100-$500 daily fine until the violations are corrected.[50] The officer can also impose fines of up to $1,000 per violation.[51]

PRESUMPTIONS OF PUBLIC NUISANCE

A property can be considered a public nuisance if:

· There is a significant amount of trash or garbage on the lot.

· There are plants or weeds above 18 inches.

· There are abandoned automobiles, building material, discarded appliances, machinery of furnishing.

· It could be a hazard to children because of the condition of its foundation, the condition of the slab, abandoned machinery, unsecured building materials, uncovered holes or uncovered excavation.

· There are conditions that could allow vermin infestation

PRESUMPTIONS OF BLIGHT

A property can be considered a blight if:

· It is chronically vacant.

· There are unresolved code violations for unsafe, unsanitary or unhealthy conditions.

· It has been declared a fire hazard.

· It is lacking in facilities or equipment required by the Housing Code of the City of New Orleans.

· It has been deemed “demolition by neglect” by the Historic Districts Landmarks Commission pursuant to section 84-108 or 84-208 of the City Code.

· It has a substantial negative impact on the health, safety, or economic vitality of a neighborhood.

· It is a vacant lot that is abandoned, does not meet the requirements of the City Code or has been adjudicated.

· There is a vermin infestation.[52]

c) Post-Hearing

If the owner is found in compliance, within 30 days of receiving a Notice of Compliance, the owner must pay fees in full with the recorder of mortgages to avoid additional fees and eventually a property lien.

If the property is declared a Public Nuisance, the owner has 10 days to correct or remove the nuisance(s).[53] The owner uses the form included in the Notice of Violation packet to report the correction. A code inspector will then re-inspect the property. The owner may file a one-time extension if the owner can prove reasonable cause. After 10 days, if the owner has not removed the nuisance, a daily fine will begin accruing. Notice will be given to the owner that the city can enter the property for the purpose of removing the nuisance. The owner will be responsible for all costs incurred by the city to remove the nuisance.

If the property is declared blighted, the filing of the judgment constitutes a lien on the property. The lien gives the city the authority to remediate the violations, seize the property for sheriff’s sale, or schedule demolition. The owner may appeal the decision by contacting the civil district court within 30 days of the final judgment by the hearing officer. As an alternative, the owner may enter into an agreement with the city to either repair or sell the property. During the time the agreement is in effect, the daily fees are suspended. According to the agreement, the owner must do the following within 30 days of receiving a Notice of Judgment:

· submit to code enforcement photos of the front, rear, right side, and left side, showing all violations have been abated;

· submit to code enforcement all applicable permits, Certificate of Completion, and or Certificate of Occupancy from the Department of Safety and Permits;

· call code enforcement to confirm a final payoff amount;

· and pay the recorder of mortgages in the form of cashier’s check of money order for the full payoff amount.

If the owner breaches the agreement, if the appeal is unsuccessful, or if the owner does not enter an agreement, the city may invoke its eminent domain power to seize the property. If the property is seized, the owner will be paid fair market value.

A property owner’s last shot at removing the city’s lien on the property is the Lien Forgiveness Program. To qualify, properties must be fully renovated, in the process of being renovated, demolished, or for sale. Furthermore, owners must submit a completed application, photos, a copy of the property’s tax bill, and permits.[54]

d) Demolition, City Abatement, Sherriff’s Sale, and NORA Auction

When owners do not abate the blight on their own, Code Enforcement decides whether city abatement, sheriff’s sale, NORA auction, or demolition is appropriate. To do this, Code Enforcement engages in an administrative review process to determine the best approach to remediate the blighted property. “Committees decide whether to allow a demolition, based on a property's historic character or its contribution to the neighborhood fabric.”[55] Committees may determine that the city can feasibly abate the conditions causing the blight, in which case the owner would be responsible to pay for such services.

The city’s process of determining whether to demolish a blighted property is largely unmonitored. Where private citizens must apply to the Historic District Landmarks Commission for approval before demolishing a property, nowhere on the city websites does it say that the city has to go through the same process. The final decision of whether to demolish all properties, including historic properties, is made by only one person, the Director of Code Enforcement. The Director takes into consideration the opinion of the hearing officer, opinions of neighborhood residents, and the actions of the owner.[56] This process has only recently become controversial, after over 4,000 properties have already been demolished since 2010. Councilwoman Stacey Head has been a vocal critic of this process and advocates for a tougher demolition review procedure.[57]

In the alternative, a property may go to sheriff’s sale. When the committee decides sheriff’s sale is the best option for a property, an attorney will review the judgment and case history before the city forecloses on the property lien. The city then files a writ with the civil district court, and the clerk of court issues the writ to the sheriff’s office. The sheriff’s office sets the sales date and attempts service. If service is unsuccessful, the sheriff’s office will appoint a curator, set a new sale date, and serve the curator. Together the city and sheriff’s office coordinate for the sale.[58]

The opening bids are two-thirds of the appraised value, unless the debt exceeds that amount, in which case the opening bid will reflect the total debt. Not all properties are appraised. When the property is sold, first the sale proceeds pay off liens, taxes, and sale costs, and the remainder goes to the original owner.[59] If the property does not sell, it is put up for auction a second time. Sherriff’s auctions are held weekly on Fridays.[60]

Perplexingly, it takes the city on average five to ten months to go from judgment to sales date. It would seem that such a process would be relatively simple to coordinate if no appeals or challenges slowed down the process, since the procedure is standardized. Finally, it is important to note that “[u]nlike tax sales and sales of adjudicated properties, sheriff’s sales of blighted property have no redemptive period. A homeowner must pay back taxes and any code enforcement liens before sale at auction to retain ownership.”[61]

Not every blighted property that is sold by the city is sold via sheriff’s auction. NORA occasionally holds mass auctions of blighted property acquired mostly from the Louisiana Land Trust, which holds properties received through the Road Home program. There is no city website which explains why some properties are sold at sheriff’s sale and why some are sold by NORA. It can be assumed NORA acquires, holds, and sells properties that do not sell at sheriff’s auction, and that it partners with other organizations to serve as a platform for auctioning such properties.[62]

CLAIMS OF SUCCESS

Eliminate 10,000 blighted properties in three years: check. Announce our accomplishment to the public: check. Provide a detailed report to the public explaining and categorizing how the blight was eliminated: well . . .

The Landrieu Administration declared it has successfully fulfilled its promise of eliminating 10,000 blighted properties, yet sadly the city does not provide a breakdown of how they derived that number. The city has been criticized for this almost as much as it has been praised.[63] Even Justin Kray, the lead project manager on BlightStat from 2011-2012, charges the city with using “a fuzzy statistical methodology instead of counting hard numbers.” So which is it? Should the city be praised or be criticized? The answer lies somewhere in the middle, but unfortunately the latter may weigh in heavier.

The city released a 2014 Blight Reduction Report, a 24-page pamphlet complete with large colorful pictures of the city and its people, short dispersed paragraphs, large headings, bare-bone graphs, and a letter from the Mayor himself. The pamphlet primarily lays out the strategy it employed to revitalize the blight remediation process. Only on the last three pages does the city provide the public with some statistics.

On a graph that takes up an entire page and uses numbers only in units of 10,000, the pamphlet shows that in 2010, the city had somewhere between 40,000 and 50,000 blighted properties, and in April 2013, the city had under 30,000 blighted properties. Thus, it appears the city is claiming it reduced blight by around 15,000. These numbers are derived from two sources, the 2010 United States Postal Service record of no-stat properties (properties where mail would likely be undeliverable in the future), and a 2013 survey prepared by a University of New Orleans professor, Dr. Peter Yaukey.

While the 2010 Postal Service number is extracted from nonbiased hard data, the professor’s analysis was at the behest of the city, and the entire study is not available to the public, at least not conveniently. A brief PowerPoint presentation is the only available report online of the professor’s study. It states he used three different ways of estimating the 2014 numbers, but the presentation does not explain the three different methods in any way. It only reveals the product of the methods, which is a range between 10,328 reductions and 14,591 reductions. Clearly the city, in its pamphlet indicating a 15,000 reduction of blighted properties, adopted the highest and most favorable number to insert into its press release.

Yaukey’s conclusion is not based on an actual count. According to an article by The Lens reporter, Charles Maldonado, Yaukey’s numbers are derived from surveying a sample of properties over time. “Between 2006 and 2013, Yaukey and a team of researchers conducted an annual curbside survey of 2,400 flood-damaged properties in randomly selected census blocks in New Orleans and St. Bernard Parish. They rated them on a scale of ‘derelict’ to ‘rebuilt’ . . . Every year, Yaukey recorded the percentage that had been fixed up.” This is all the information available on his methods. Maldonado has little faith in the professor’s survey, arguing, “Yaukey has no way of knowing why the properties in his survey were cleaned up.”[64]

BlightStat does not show that 10,000 properties were addressed by the city’s blight process. In fact, BlightStat only indicates that cases exist for 7,192 properties. This number does not mean that 7,192 properties have moved from blighted to non-blighted. Rather, the count is “just a list of properties that the city has taken some kind of action on — a way to measure productivity at City Hall,” according to Maldonado after interviewing Andy Kopplin, Landrieu’s Deputy Mayor and Administrative Chief of Staff. “So a property could be blighted, it could be remediated, and it could become blighted again . . . [t]hat is something that happens from time to time,” Kopplin said.[65] This means that the official count of city-addressed properties does not reflect the true count of blight eliminations. However, the city reports in its pamphlet that it reduced blight in the city by more than double that count.

The city argues that it can take credit for all revitalized blighted properties, even though the city did not take direct action on them. The city claims its other economic policies indirectly assisted in the reduction of blight. “[Yaukey’s] understanding from talking to city officials ‘was that any property that ends up going from blighted to non-blighted is part of what the mayor was figuring when he came up with 10,000—not just things that were accomplished through the direct intervention of city government.”[66] Kray advocates the opposite is true, arguing that when the Postal Service stopped tracking the no-stat properties, the administration had room for “flexibility” in meeting the 10,000 mark. With zero concrete data to back up its claims, “the 10,000 is not something the city can claim ownership over.”

Should it matter whether the city has evidence to support its claims? Yes. It matters for several reasons. (1) Simply, no city should be allowed to lie to its citizens, puff to an unreasonable degree, massage statistics, or inflate numbers. (2) Doing so is not only misleading, but it undermines the democratic process. Citizen perception of political performance influences votes. If that perception is based on faulty data, citizens cannot make informed decisions, and the voting process is defective. (3) Landrieu’s blight policies are being rewarded, praised, and emulated, but there is no way of predicted whether emulating the policies will produce the same results. (4) Accurate accountability ensures that policies are amended to reflect actions that effectively tackle city needs. Accountability allows the city to address which enforcement strategies are the most effective. (5) BlightStat is not always accurate in determining the status of a property. Cases are regularly indicated as closed, yet these properties still remain blighted.

To recap, which properties are counted in Mayor Landrieu’s 10,000? Properties that have in some way been brought up to code standards, but that number is not based on a hard count, only a statistical analysis based on a sample of properties in the city over time. How they were eliminated and by whom remain a mystery. Whether the owner abated the property after receiving citations, the city abated the property itself, the city sold the property at auction, the city demolished the property, or the owner abated the property on his or her own accord, we do not know.

Other significant statistical assumptions are concluded from the 2014 New Orleans Blight Report. Their accuracy, however, is uncertain. Through the report, we learn that the city has filed writs of foreclosure on 1505 delinquent properties.[67] Since 2010, the city has performed over 54,000 code enforcement inspections. 2,000 properties have been brought into compliance at administrative hearings. NORA has sold over 2,000 former Road Home properties. (The report also confusingly contains a 798 figure in reference to NORA sales). In addition, NORA’s Fall 2014 auction made available 130 properties. No record exists on the number of properties sold by sheriff’s sale, yet we do know that the city has collected $3.4 million in lien foreclosures. Additionally, it has 2,500 properties in the city’s lot maintenance program financed by the taxpayer. Finally, the city proclaims it has demolished 4,000 properties. These demolitions were conducted without a well-balanced review of whether the properties were architecturally significant or salvageable.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

There are several options for the city to improve its blight strategy and procedure. In 2010, mayoral candidate and successful businessman, John Georges, took a pro-Kelo position, advocating for the removal of the city from the transfer process. He argued the best way to put the properties immediately back into commerce is by transferring blighted properties from old owners to new owners without the city ever taking title.[68] He explained that this is the best and quickest way to get the properties to their highest and best use.

How would such a scenario work? Instead of foreclosing on liens, the city would take control and possession of the property and ensure that the title was de-clouded, but not ever take title to the property. This is exactly what happened in Kelo. In that case, the city invoked eminent domain to force private property owners to sell their properties to a private entity in the name of economic development. There, the Supreme Court affirmed that the citizens’ constitutional rights were not violated because economic development qualified as public use. If New Orleans could ensure that the taking of private properties was for public use, perhaps by placing limitations on buyers, and that owners were compensated fair market value, then the Supreme Court would agree than no federal constitutional rights are violated. Such limitations on buyers could include presenting a feasible plan to renovate the property or tear it down, supplying proof of resources, mandating contingencies on the sale if the new owner does not accomplish the blight removal within a set time period, and using city resources to track the new owner’s progress. The city would not have to pay the increased costs of maintenance, appraisers (because the market would take care of this on its own), the auction process, demolition, administration, and the list goes on. These savings could be used to increase code enforcement sweeps, get an accurate count of blighted property in the city, and altogether improve tracking. Clearly, this scenario is a cost effective market stimulating solution to the problem.

This entire procedure is prohibited by Section 4(B)(1) of the Louisiana Constitution, which was amended in response to the Kelo decision. The Section prohibits the taking of property when the “predominant use [is] by any private person or entity.” Perhaps now is the time to start talking about amending this Section. The restriction is unreasonable, considering a valid police power of the city is to take property for public use when the owner is compensated fairly. When the owners do not fix blight on their own, the city should be able to do what is best for the city and its people by facilitating transfers of property to competent owners.

A potential procedure that currently complies with the state constitution but would yield similar results to the above strategy would be to implement the above procedure but with the city foreclosing on the properties and taking title. In this scenario, the city acts more like banks that foreclose on delinquent debtors and then quickly put the properties on the market with buyer limitations. Instead of auctioning the property weekly or auctioning them in bulk by season, the city can foreclose on the liens and immediately put the property back in commerce as is. The city would not unnecessarily hold on to properties and maintain them. Instead, the city would make blighted properties available for purchase all the time so that realtors can market them and find buyers. Only properties that do not sell for an extended period of time would be auctioned in bulk, for a very low cost, likely under market value with the city taking the hit. Such a scenario produces similar results as the private-to-private transfer procedure described above. If the property does not sell even at an opening bid at below cost or fair market value, the city should donate the property to anyone who can renovate it.

Donation is not only an option of last resort. In fact, the properties should be donated when it costs the city little to do so and organizations present the city with viable plans that would add to community redevelopment. The city should support plans of building playgrounds, community centers, tutoring facilities, gardens, non-profits, or other entities by giving organizations the unused, hazardous, and unsalable properties.

One incredibly important change to the current blight strategy is to amend the demolition review process. This would ensure historic properties are not destroyed and that the properties deemed in danger of collapse are truly unsalvageable. Currently code enforcement inspectors are the only inspectors of the properties. They are not structural engineers. Nor are they architects. They do not have the necessary knowledge or qualifications to make such determinations. Moreover, currently the Director of Code Enforcement has the final say on whether to demolish a property. There is no review panel or specific procedure in place that ensures the director made the right choice. A proper review process in not an optional change; it is a necessary one.

CONCLUSION

Blight is not a simple problem, and it cannot be fixed with simple solutions. Blight exists in New Orleans because of the city’s distinctive history and circumstances. The unique combination of federal homeownership incentives, population decline, persistent high levels of poverty, earth shattering storms, restrictive legislation, and poor policy have made New Orleans a consistent site for abandoned and dilapidated properties. It takes solutions that address the city’s needs to revitalize its communities and stimulate the economy, not a lot of demolitions.

The city suffered with this problem long before Mitch Landrieu ever even considered running for mayor. Yet, when he took office, he promised he could conquer the deep-seated problem. He claimed pumping up enforcement, consolidating agencies, and improving tracking would do the trick. He was so confident that he made a promise, a promise that he claimed he fulfilled. Yet, he points the public to a professor’s statistics, and there is no count detailing how he reached his 10,000 mark.

No one can deny that blight has improved since Landrieu has taken office. The city has come a long way, especially since Hurricane Katrina. His strategy is not a bad one. Many properties have been rehabilitated and put back into commerce, but many properties have also been demolished, and many properties are still blighted. The strategy is good, but it is not perfect, and it cannot be effectively amended without accurate accountability. It is important to explore alternative strategies that reduce costs and make the properties available to competent buyers. New Orleanians are at a crossroads of deciding the future landscape of their city. We can continue patching over a problem, or we can properly fix it and lay down the infrastructure for future generations.

[1] "NOLA Mayor Watch." NOLA Mayor Watch RSS. N.p., Dec. 2009. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://www.nolamayorwatch.com/>.

[2] Chieppo, Charles. "New Orleans' Winning Strategy in the War on Blight." New Orleans' Winning Strategy in the War on Blight. GOVERNING the State and Localities, 18 Mar. 2014. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://www.governing.com/blogs/bfc/col-new-orleans-blightstat-vacant-dilapidated-property.html>.

[3] Fleming, supra.

[4] Maldonado, Charles. "Mission Accomplished: Landrieu Administration Promises One Thing on Blight, Delivers Another." The Lens. N.p., 22 Apr. 2014. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://thelensnola.org/2014/04/22/mission-accomplished-landrieu-administration-promises-one-thing-on-blight-delivers-another/>.

[5] See: 2014 New Orleans Blight Reduction Report. Nola.gov. City of New Orleans, Jan. 2014. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. (p.5) <http://www.nola.gov/getattachment/Performance-and-Accountability/Initiatives-and-Reports/BlightSTAT/Blight-Report_web.pdf/>. Chieppo, supra (calling New Orleans’ blight plan “a national model”).

[6] Maldonado, Charles. "Local." New Orleans Mayor Promises One Thing on Blight, Delivers Another. The Lens, 23 Apr. 2014. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://www.govtech.com/local/New-Orleans-Mayor-Promises-One-Thing-on-Blight-Delivers-Another.html>. (“Blight has undoubtedly been reduced since Katrina, but the city is still dotted by vacant, crumbling homes and overgrown lots. Only a handful of neighborhoods are close to being free of blight. So where are these 10,000 properties that have been fixed up?”).

[7] Bullington, Jonathan. "Partial Building Collapse in French Quarter; No Injuries Reported." NOLA.com. The Times-Picayune, 21 Oct. 2014. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://www.nola.com/traffic/index.ssf/2014/10/balcony_collapse_in_french_qua.html>.

[8] See: "BlightStatus." BlightStatus: Home. City of New Orleans, Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://blightstatus.nola.gov/>.

[9] Id.

[10] New Orleans, Louisiana Municipal Code art. IV § 26-236, M.C.S., Ord. No. 25454.

[11] New Orleans, Louisiana Municipal Code art. III, Sec. 28, et seq.

[12] TrendSend. New Orleans Metropolitan Association of Realtors. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://www.trendgraphix.com/FactsAndTrends/Member/FtReport.aspx>.. Figured generated from reports that were published October 2014, based on data available at the end of September 2014. All reports are based on data supplied by the Baton Rouge MLS, the New Orleans Metropolitan Association of Realtors, Mississippi Gulf Coast, Central Louisiana Association of Realtors, Realtor Association of Acadiana, Southwest Louisiana MLS or their MLS.

[13] "2012-2016 Consolidated Plan." Office of Community Development, City of New Orleans, 13 Aug. 2012. Web. 11 Nov. 2014, (p.27). <http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nola.gov%2Fcommunity-development%2Fdocuments%2Fgeneral-reports%2F2012-2016-consolidated-plan-city-of-new-orleans-w%2F>.

[14] Committee for a Better New Orleans, supra at 6.

[15] National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701 et seq.

[16] "Louisiana Architecture: 1945-1965 Post-War Subdivisions and the Ranch House." Office of Lieutenant Governor Department of Culture, Recreation & Tourism. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. (p. 5-6). <http://www.crt.state.la.us/Assets/OCD/hp/nationalregister/historic_contexts/ranchhousefinalrevised.pdf>.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at 3.

[19] Germany, Kent B. "The Politics of Poverty and History: Racial Inequality and the Long Prelude to Katrina." Journal of American History. 94 (Dec. 2007): 743-51.

[20] Id.

[21] History. New Orleans Redevelopment Authority, Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http%3A%2F%2Fnoraworks.org%2Fabout%2Fhistory> (explaining 1970s urban renewal programs as the first of their kind).

[22] Germany, supra.

[23] See: Alexander, Frank S. “Louisiana Land Reform in the Storm’s Aftermath.” Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University (Dec 2007) (p.6). <http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/w07-9.pdf >.

[24] Billiot, Joseph, Huntleigh Gilbard, and Megan Irving. “Blight Busting Strategies in New Orleans,” Loyola University New Orleans, PRS Policy Brief 0910-01. 20 July 2010, (p. 4). <http://fsjna.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/BlightStrategyLOYOLA-2010july20.pdf>.

[25] 2012-2016 Consolidated Plan, supra at 13.

[26] Alexander, supra at 2007.

[27] Plyer, Allison. "Population Loss and Vacant Housing in New Orleans Neighborhoods." The Data Center. 05 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://www.datacenterresearch.org/reports_analysis/population-loss-and-vacant-housing/>.

[28] Fussell, Elizabeth. "Katrina Stirs the Gumbo Pot: The Arrival and Reception of Latinos in Post-Katrina New Orleans." Home. Russell Sage Foundation, Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://www.russellsage.org/research/katrina-stirs-the-gumbo-pot-elizabeth-fussell>.

[29]Costonis, John. “New Orleans, Katrina and Kelo: American Cities in the Post-Kelo Era” (2008). Faculty Scholarship. Paper 61. p. 406. <http://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/faculty_scholarship/61>.

[30] Costonis, John. “Narrative as Lawmaking: The Anti-Kelo Story” (2010). Planning and Environmental Law, American Planning Association, Vol. 62, No. 1, p.10 <https://www.planning.org/conference/previous/2010/pdf/AntiKelo.pdf> (internal quotes omitted) (“Section 4(B)(1) prohibits the taking ‘for predominant use’ or ‘for transfer of ownership’ to any ‘private person or entity.’ Section 4(H) requires that during the 30 years following a taking, the former owner enjoys a right of first refusal before the condemning authority may transfer property to another private party. The two provisions can plausibly be read to cripple private transfers. What difference, it might be asked, does it make to cripple private transfers, given that Louisiana allows condemnation of blighted property? The answer: the difference between eminent domain’s success or failure as a recovery tool.”)

[31] Lovett, John A. "City Square by the Fordham Urban Law Journal." City Square by the Fordham Urban Law Journal RSS. Fordham Urban Law Journal, 13 May 2013. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://urbanlawjournal.com/3-tragedy-or-triumph-in-post-katrina-new-orleans-by-john-a-lovett/>.

[32] "New Orleans Blight Ordinance Times-Picayune Update." Safeguard Properties. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://www.safeguardproperties.com/News/All_Client_Alerts/2006/08/New_Orleans_Blight_Ordinance_Times-Picayune_Update.aspx>.

[33] History, New Orleans Redevelopment Authority, supra.

[34] 2014 New Orleans Blight Reduction Report, supra at 14.

[35] Plyer, Allison, and Elaine Ortiz. "Benchmarks for Blight: How Much Blight Does New Orleans Have?" The Data Center. 21 Aug. 2012. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://www.datacenterresearch.org/reports_analysis/benchmarks-for-blight/>.

[36] Flemming, Eileen. "Mayor Landrieu Unveils Blight-Eradication Plan." WWNO. 20 Sept. 2010. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://wwno.org/post/mayor-landrieu-unveils-blight-eradication-plan>.

[37] 2014 New Orleans Blight Reduction Report, supra at 11.

[38] Id. at 12-13.

[39] Id.

[40] Flemming, Eileen. "Mayor Landrieu Unveils Blight-Eradication Plan, supra.

[41] 2014 New Orleans Blight Reduction Report, supra at 16.

[42] Id.

[43] Id. at 11.

[44] Id.

[45] Buchanan, Susan. "City’s Business of Fighting Blight Is through Use of Sheriff’s Auctions." The Louisiana Weekly. 23 Jan. 2012. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://www.louisianaweekly.com/city%E2%80%99s-business-of-fighting-blight-is-through-use-of-sheriff%E2%80%99s-auctions/>.

[46] "Fighting Blight: What Is the Process?" Code Enforcement. City of New Orleans, Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://www.nola.gov/code-enforcement/fighting-blight/>.

[47] Neighborhoods, Strengthening, and Facilitating Recovery. Housing Code Enforcement, supra at 3; "CE Hearings Calendar | Data.NOLA.gov | Enabling New Orleans." Data.NOLA.gov. City of New Orleans, Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <https://data.nola.gov/dataset/CE-Hearings-Calendar/g7yr-kp9j>.

[48] Neighborhoods, Strengthening, and Facilitating Recovery. Housing Code Enforcement, supra at 3.

[49] 2014 Blight Resource Guide, supra at 9.

[50] Neighborhoods, Strengthening, and Facilitating Recovery. Housing Code Enforcement, supra at 4.

[51] 2014 Blight Resource Guide, supra at 9.

[52] See: Neighborhoods, Strengthening, and Facilitating Recovery. Housing Code Enforcement, Nolacitycouncil.com. City of New Orleans. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. http://www.nolacitycouncil.com/docs/resources/HousingCodeHandbook.pdf;

Committee for a Better New Orleans, and Greater New Orleans Housing Alliance. 2014 Blight Resource Guide. June 28, 2013 (p. 7). http://nolablightguide.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/brg-design-draft-online1.pdf

[53] Id. at 10.

[54] Neighborhoods, Strengthening, and Facilitating Recovery. Housing Code Enforcement, supra at 13.

[55] Times-Picayune Staff. "New Orleans Blight Tear-down List Is Far from Final." NOLA.com. The Times-Picayune, 1 Apr. 2011. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/04/new_orleans_blight_tear-down_l.html>.

[56] "Council to Consider Changes to Demolition Process for Blighted Buildings." Council to Consider Changes to Demolition Process for Blighted Buildings. WWLTV, Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://www.wwltv.com/videos/news/2014/09/04/14608106/>.

[57] Id.

[58] Neighborhoods, Strengthening, and Facilitating Recovery. Housing Code Enforcement, supra at 18.

[59] City is granted first lien privilege pursuant to R.S. 9:4821(1); Mortgage holders and original owner positions pursuant to Section 28-18, La. CCP 2373.

[60] "Orleans Parish Sheriff - Civil Division." Orleans Parish Sheriff - Civil Division. N.p., n.d. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://www.civilsheriff.com/>.

[61] Buchanan, Susan. "City’s Business of Fighting Blight Is through Use of Sheriff’s Auctions," supra.

[62] "NORA Fall 2014 Auction: October 25, 2014." New Orleans Redevlopment Authority. N.p., 23 Sept. 2014. Web. <http%3A%2F%2Fwww.noraworks.org%2Fpress%2F172-nora-fall-2014-auction-october-25-2014>.

[63] See Isaacson, Leigh. Lens Investigation: Can the City Take Credit for Fixing 10,000 Blighted Properties? WVUE New Orleans. World Now, 29 Apr. 2014. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <http://raycomgroup.worldnow.com/story/25313437/former-blightstat-manager-city-cant-take-credit-for-10000-remediated-properties>.

[64] Maldonado, Charles. "Mission Accomplished: Landrieu Administration Promises One Thing on Blight, Delivers Another," supra.

[65] Id.

[66] Id.

[67] 2014 New Orleans Blight Reduction Report, supra at 14

[68] "Mayoral Debate Part 2: Addressing City Blight." YouTube. 15, 15 Dec. 2009. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9y10CN0tW0A>.

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