#Iran Israel Oil Embargo

[digitalguap]

Russia Slams Israel, Iran Wants Arab Embargo, U.S. Targets Iranian Oil

Welcome to our blog, where we aim to provide you with the latest updates and insights into the complex geopolitical landscape. In this post, we delve into the intensifying tensions between Russia, Israel, Iran, and the United States. As we navigate through this intricate web of international relations, we bring you the latest developments where Russia criticizes Israel, Iran demands an Arab…

[wezgworld]

Happy 100th Birthday Henry Kissinger

Henry Kissinger meeting Chairman Mao Zedong Henry Kissinger is a political heavyweight. Of that there can be no doubt. Even the harshest of this US politician-come-guru, Henry Kissinger’s critics will have to admit that he is just that – a veteran in the ring of international geopolitics.  Today, 27th May 2023, Henry Kissinger celebrates his 100th birthday. He is the only surviving member of the…

[zvaigzdelasas]

Joe Biden campaigned in 2020 on the promise of new ideas, more competence, and a “return to normality.” But when it comes to economic sanctions, President Biden has chosen instead to maintain the path that his predecessor set. From Venezuela to Cuba to Iran, the Biden administration’s approach to sanctions has remained remarkably similar to Trump’s. On the campaign trail, candidate Biden promised to rejoin the Iran deal and to “promptly reverse the failed Trump policies that have inflicted harm on the Cuban people and done nothing to advance democracy and human rights.” Yet two and a half years after taking office, the Biden administration has made little progress towards fulfilling these promises. While economic sanctions may not seem important to the average American, they have strong implications for the global economy and America’s national interests. President Biden initially showed promise by requesting that the Treasury Department conduct a swift review of U.S. sanctions policies. However, the review’s publication in October 2021 was underwhelming. It produced recommendations such as adopting “a structured policy framework that links sanctions to a clear policy objective,” and “ensuring sanctions are easily understood, enforceable, and, where possible, reversible.” If the U.S. was not already undertaking these measures, it is fair to ask what exactly was taken into consideration when prior sanctions were implemented. The failure to reenter the Iran deal is the most egregious error of Biden’s sanctions policies. Apart from harming American credibility and acting as a strong deterrent to any future countries looking to enter diplomatic agreements with the U.S., Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy has been a complete failure. As the United States Institute of Peace notes, Iran’s “breakout time” —the time required to enrich uranium for a nuclear bomb — stood at around 12 months in 2016. As of today, Iran’s breakout time stands at less than a week. It did not have to be this way. Although Iran violated segments of the JCPOA after American withdrawal, it never left the deal completely, signaling potential for a reconciliation. Yet the Biden administration declined to lift sanctions initially. As Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, told CNN in early 2021, “It was the United States that left the deal. It was the United States that violated the deal.”[...]

Biden has shown similar hesitancy on Cuba. Although the administration has taken certain steps to undo Trump’s hardline stance, there remains much room for progress. Six decades of maximum pressure on Cuba have failed completely, serving primarily to harm Cuban civilians and exacerbate tensions with allies who wish to do business with Cuba. The U.S. embargo of Cuba is incredibly unpopular worldwide. A U.N. General Assembly Resolution in support of ending the embargo received 185 votes in support, with only two against — the U.S. and Israel. Steps such as reopening the American embassy in Havana and removing restrictions on remittances are positive developments, yet the Biden administration could do much more. Primary among these are removing Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list and ending the embargo once and for all. This would not only improve daily life for Cuban civilians, but increase business opportunities for Cubans and Americans alike. Trump also attempted his maximum pressure strategy with Venezuela, but failed to achieve anything resembling progress. In one of his final actions in office, he levied even more sanctions on Venezuela, further isolating one of the region’s largest oil producers. Venezuela is another country where the Biden administration has taken mere half-measures. Easing some sanctions in late 2022 is a positive sign, but there is no serious justification for keeping any of the Trump-era sanctions in place. All of these actions have had major consequences, not only for the citizens of the sanctioned countries, but also for Americans. As oil prices spiked following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the fact that Iran and Venezuela, two of the world’s largest oil producers, were unable to sell on the U.S. market no doubt led to higher gas prices for American consumers. And the millions of Americans with family in sanctioned countries face serious difficulties in visiting and sending remittances to their family members. Despite these measures, none of these countries are considered serious threats to the U.S. In a March 2023 Quinnipiac poll, Americans rightly ignored Iran, Venezuela and Cuba when asked which country “poses the biggest threat to the United States.” Just two percent chose Iran as the biggest threat, with zero choosing Cuba or Venezuela.

These sanctions are unpopular, ineffective and quite often counterproductive to American interests. While changing the course of U.S. foreign policy can take quite some time, the dangers of hesitancy are quite clear. Rather than maintaining the Trump status quo on sanctions, which saw record increases, President Biden should fulfill his campaign promises and end the ineffective and costly sanctions on countries such as Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela, and return to the use of diplomacy to further American national interests.

You know things are bad when The Hill is coming after you as a democrat (note the lack of mention about sanctions on China or DPRK)

22 Jun 23

[mightyflamethrower]

Iranian-backed militias have attacked American installations and forces in Syria, Iraq, and Jordan some 170 times.

Ostensibly, these terrorist groups claim they are hitting US forces to coerce America into dropping its support of Israel and demanding a cease-fire in the Gaza war.

In reality, these satellite terrorists are being directed in a larger effort by Iran to pry the US. out of the Middle East, in the manner of the 1983 Marine barracks bombing.

That way, Iran will be free to fulfill its old dream of becoming a nuclear shield for a new Shiite/Persian terrorist axis from Tehran to Damascus to Beirut to the West Bank and Gaza—surrounding Israel and intimidating the Gulf regimes and more moderate states like Jordan and Egypt into concessions.

These Iranian appendages have made a number of unfortunately correct assumptions about America in general and the Biden administration in particular.

One, after the recent serial humiliations of the flight from Afghanistan, the passivity of watching a Chinese spy balloon traverse with impunity the continental United States, the mixed American signals on the eve of the Ukraine war, the troubled Pentagon’s recruitment and leadership lapses, and the destruction of the US southern border, both Iran and its surrogates feel that the United States either cannot or will do much of anything in response to their aggression.

They see the U.S. military short thousands of recruits, its leadership politicized, its munition stocks depleted by arms shipments to Ukraine and Israel, and the massive abandonment of weapons in Kabul.

Two, they view Joe Biden’s serial appeasement as a force multiplier of these perceptions of American weakness. After entering office, the Biden administration begged for a renewed Iran deal from a preening theocracy. It sought to ensure calm by delisting the Houthis from global terrorist designations and sending hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas and radical Palestinians to buy good behavior.

Biden may have agreed that Iran was the spider in the center of the Middle East Islamic terrorist web, but only thereby to win over it with bribes such as lifting embargoes and sanctions to ensure an Iranian windfall of $90 or more billion in oil sales revenue.

Biden greenlighted a bribery payment of $6 billion to Iran to return American hostages, thereby ensuring more will be taken. It loudly distanced itself from the Netanyahu government. The gulf encouraged radicals to believe they could coerce Israel into accepting radical Islamic states on the West Bank and Gaza.

Three, after hitting American stations and bases 170 times and seeing little sustained, much less disproportionate, responses, Iran and its satellites now feel they are winning proxy wars with the US.

They have all but shut down the Red Sea as an international shipping route—damaging Europe, Egypt, and Israel, which all depend on Red Sea commerce for vital imports and exports.

Iran has forced Biden to publicly alienate the Netanyahu government and push a ceasefire down Israel’s throat. And it has helped to spark international pro-Hamas protests throughout Europe and the US that timid and compliant left-wing governments fear could lose them close elections.

But most damaging are administration spokesmen who mouth the same empty script after each serial attack: 1) The US will respond at the time and place of its own choosing. 2) The US finds no direct evidence of Iranian involvement, although it clearly has supplied the attackers; 3) The US does not wish a wider war and has no plans to attack Iran itself.

Translated to our enemies, it means an 80-year-old non-compos-mentis president is in no position to prevent, much less win, a theater-wide Middle East war that his own serial appeasement has now nearly birthed.

Biden and the Democratic Party know, as National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan pointed out just prior to the October 7 attacks on Israel, that the administration inherited a deterred and quiet Middle East. And then it blew up on their appeasing watch.

Now they are terrified of a theater-wide conflict breaking out during an election year—a fact known to all of America’s Middle East enemies.

Biden and company have forgotten the ancient wisdom that preparing loudly only for peace guarantees war. To prevent war, it should return to oil sanctions on Iran, embargo its banking transactions, slap a travel ban on Iran and its allies, cut off all aid to Hamas and the West Bank, and restore a true terrorist designation for the Houthis.

US officials must stop aimlessly babbling. If the administration must speak, Washington should do so by conveying disproportionality and unpredictability. And if, and when, America were to strike, it should do so in silent and devastating fashion.

When serially attacked, loudly responding that we will only proportionally strike back and wish no wider war will only ensure a big, ugly one.

[cadavidson]

Branco Cartoon: Israel vs. Iran, Hamas, and BLM terrorists

Branco Cartoon: Israel vs. Iran, Hamas, and BLM terrorists A.F. Branco Cartoon – Overreach   Most people now realize that Iran is directly involved with Hamas and the recent attacks on Israel through the funding they have received from Biden, the $6 billion, and $58 billion through oil revenue when Biden ignored the embargo placed on their production by Trump. This can even be traced back to…

[hello-bechnaseekhocom-fan]

Navigating the Storm: Middle East Crisis and Oil Prices in the Modern Context

Middle East Crisis and Oil Prices. Explore the intricate link between the ongoing Middle East crisis and the volatile ebb and flow of global oil prices in this insightful article

Introduction: Middle East Crisis and Oil Prices

In the intricate dance of global economics, the price of oil stands as a crucial barometer, reflecting the delicate balance between supply, demand, and geopolitical uncertainties. This article delves into the historical dynamics of oil prices, drawing parallels to contemporary challenges, particularly the ongoing Middle East crisis.

also read : Tracking Systems: Addressing the Auto Theft Surge by Insurers

The Evolution of Oil Prices: A Historical Perspective

In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the global oil market experienced a semblance of stability, characterized by a relatively consistent oil price. During this period, the dynamics of the industry were relatively straightforward, with supply and demand playing primary roles in determining prices. However, the tranquility of this era underwent a seismic shift in the 1970s, ushering in a new chapter marked by turbulence and geopolitical upheavals.

The catalysts for this transformation were two pivotal events that sent shockwaves through the global oil landscape. The first, the OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil embargo in 1973, was a strategic move by oil-producing nations to retaliate against those that had supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War. This deliberate reduction in oil supply had far-reaching consequences, leading to what became known as the 1973 oil crisis.

Shortly thereafter, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 further intensified the volatility. The toppling of the Shah of Iran and the subsequent establishment of an Islamic republic not only disrupted oil production in the region but also added a new layer of complexity to global geopolitics. The combination of these structural drivers and historical shocks served as a harbinger of the modern-day complexities we grapple with in the realm of oil prices.

To truly understand the intricacies of the current oil market, it is essential to delve into the profound impacts of these 20th-century events. The OPEC oil embargo and the Iranian Revolution were watershed moments that not only shaped the trajectory of oil prices but also laid the groundwork for the intricate dance between geopolitical events and the energy market that persists to this day. (more to read)

[safdarrizvi]

Israel is moving towards a total naval blockade from all sides

The commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guard said:

"They will soon face the closure of the Mediterranean Sea, the Strait of Gibraltar and other waterways"

The port of Eliat, which lies on the Red Sea, is already completely blocked. Those ships that continued to cooperate with Israel bypass Africa and arrive at Israel's shores in the Mediterranean via Gibraltar. The question is how can these ships be blocked?

Today an Israeli ship was hit deep in the Arabian Sea near India. News that showed that the Red Sea is not the only place where Israeli ships can be targeted.

Iran possesses kamikaze drones with long range, high explosive power and invisible to anti-aircraft systems due to their electric motor.

These drones can easily target commercial ships moving in the Mediterranean towards Israel's ports, launched from Lebanon. A very short distance and a very easily achievable stage. In this case, a total naval blockade of Israel will occur.

An incredibly precise plan for a total embargo on Israel by Iran. To make the situation even more complicated for Israel, of the land routes, Jordan is the only country that is currently helping Israel bypass the Houthi blockade in a small percentage. But drones may also be flown here by Islamic militant organizations in Iraq targeting US military bases.

Israel will be completely blocked commercially, from all sides. And as the situation with the Houthis has shown, the United States has no answer to this threat. If they decide to attack Yemen and Lebanon, then the war will escalate to such an extent that not only ships to Israel but all ships passing through the Suez Canal will be stopped.

This will cause a big blow to the economy of Europe, an increase in the prices of goods and oil and a big inflation.

[mariacallous]

Since the Israel-Hamas war began on Oct. 7, voices in Washington have increasingly chastised the Biden administration for what they say is an inadequate enforcement of oil sanctions against Iran. Bills have now been proposed in the U.S. Congress to prod the administration to better enforce sanctions against Iranian oil.

The broad embargo imposed on the Iranian economy after former U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to abandon the Iran nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is still in place. But Iranian oil sales have spiked. According to domestic reporting, Iran’s hydrocarbon export income was $42 billion in 2022—a significant increase from $25 billion in 2021 and $19 billion in 2020.

Republicans have charged that the Biden administration has willfully ignored Iran’s evasion of U.S. extraterritorial sanctions. Sen. Ted Cruz, a Republican who opposes the Iran nuclear deal, accused the Biden administration of walking back the Trump administration’s efforts to stop Iran from exporting petroleum. A lobbying group that championed the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign against Iran accused the Biden administration of selectively enforcing oil sanctions and derided its strategy as “maximum deference.” The Wall Street Journal editorial board recently accused Biden of “choosing not to enforce” Iran-related oil sanctions.

Indeed, the notion that the Biden administration is intentionally allowing Iran’s oil sales has gone mainstream even among seasoned Iran and energy experts. Bloomberg’s Javier Blas said in January that Biden had walked away from the maximum pressure campaign, and that the “conspiracy theorist inside” him believed that Biden is ignoring Iran’s oil exports to contain commodity inflation. Sara Vakhshouri, the president of energy consultant SVB International, claimed that there hasn’t been a serious crackdown on Iran’s oil sales since the Trump administration. And the Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s Henry Rome argued that while the maximum pressure campaign is still in place, Biden has not systemically enforced it. All three understandably pointed to the rise in Iran’s oil exports during the Biden presidency as the basis for their analyses.

But while Iran’s oil exports have grown significantly during the Biden administration, this trend may have predated his tenure. There is data that indicates that the recovery of Iranian oil sales from their very low levels in early 2020 actually started while the Trump administration was still in office.

In late 2020, firms monitoring the global oil trade reported significant jumps in Iran’s exports. Three prominent firms that monitor the global energy trade reported to the Wall Street Journal that Iran’s oil exports in the fall of 2020 had more than doubled from earlier that year— although their estimates varied widely—as Iran developed more sophisticated evasion capacities and Chinese demand grew.

One must also consider that the decline in the rate of sanctioning does not mean that the U.S. approach has softened under Biden. While the Trump administration’s public foreign-policy pronouncements could, at times, be painfully vague and confounding, the defining of the Iran sanctions effort as a maximum pressure campaign was actually apt. The idea was to sanction entire sectors and key economic nodes of the Iranian economy to induce a shock effect.

Obama administration officials, by contrast, favored a process by which sanctions are ratcheted up over time. They argued that this strategy is best for inducing policy modification in the target state. But the architects of Trump’s maximum pressure campaign on Iran abandoned this approach in favor of an immediate scorched-earth strategy. This involved a breathless pace of sanctions designations by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), usually several rounds a week, that blanketed Iranian economic interactions with the world.

The Trump administration imposed so many sanctions on Iran that, in its last year in office, the administration acknowledged coming up short on targets to designate, with National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien stating that the problem with countries such as Iran is that “we have so many sanctions on those countries right now that there’s very little left for us to do.”

In fact, in the final months of the Trump administration, OFAC seemed to be designating already-targeted entities under additional nonnuclear authorities. This was seen by many as an effort to make rejoining the JCPOA difficult for a future administration. Since that agreement was premised on the removal of nuclear sanctions specifically, the imposition of terrorism or other designations on major economic entities in Iran would create new barriers to the resumption of mutual JCPOA compliance.

Considering this, it is unreasonable to expect that the Biden administration would carry out the feverish pace of designating targets that the Trump administration did. But that does not mean that the Biden administration has not tried to slow the pace of Iranian oil sales. Aside from multiple rounds of new sanctions targeting Iranian hydrocarbon exports, petrochemical networks, and sanctions evasion, the Biden administration has also convinced countries to revoke the privilege of flying their flags from ships accused of carrying Iranian oil.

To understand why Iranian oil exports are growing, one must consider both the market and sanctions contexts. Admittedly, the natural opacity of sanctioned trade and China’s petroleum imports makes coming to hard conclusions rather difficult. The nonreporting and lack of transparency  have long been key countersanctions strategies that Iran and its business partners exercise with vigor.

That being said, several factors provide greater explanatory value on why Iran’s oil sales have expanded so much.

First, Iranian oil exports during the years of the Trump administration were heavily depressed, not just because of sanctions but also because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated slowdown in the global economy. China’s aggressive zero-COVID policies meant that its importation of petroleum slowed down more than most other countries, and for longer periods of time. So while the anemic Iranian export figures during this time were credited to the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign, much of the success, in hindsight, was due to the broader slowing of global demand.

Second, the rise of demand after the pandemic receded created new price pressures that likely led China’s small, independent “teapot” refiners, eternally looking to compete with larger, state-run refining behemoths, to seek cheaper oil. The fact that Iran is offering oil at a discount is far more attractive when per-barrel prices are higher.

Third, Iran and China have taken various steps to enhance their economic cooperation in recent years. The two countries signed a 25-year economic cooperation agreement in March 2021 and recently inked a set of deals to operationalize this pact. Iran has also joined both the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement and the BRICS group of countries (which consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and six recently added countries, including Iran). There is some healthy skepticism about the future of Sino-Iranian economic relations, including from this author, but if China wanted to more aggressively serve as Iran’s white knight, encouraging the greater purchase of Iranian oil would likely be the first step toward accomplishing that.

Fourth, for most of the past two decades, China has pursued a cautious strategy in the Middle East that calls for Beijing not to present itself as a major impediment to U.S. designs in the region. This has undoubtedly put downward pressure on Sino-Iranian trade, including in hydrocarbons. This strategy was meant to delay a serious deterioration of Sino-U.S. relations. With that becoming fait accompli, one key reason for Beijing to limit oil imports from Iran was removed.

Commenting on the signing of the 25-year economic cooperation agreement, Hua Liming, the former Chinese ambassador to Tehran, stated that “[s]ince the Carter administration, the US has often reminded China of its relations with Iran, which was seen by Americans as an impediment to the US-China relationship. But with fundamental changes in China-US relations in recent months, that era has gone.”

Finally, since the start of the sanctions campaign against Russia, many new actors have become involved in sanctioned trade. Russia is by far the largest economy to be so thoroughly targeted by a Western sanctions campaign. There has also been a significant expansion of export controls against China during the Biden administration, which forebodes a future sanctions campaign as Washington tries to halt what is seen in many Western capitals as Beijing’s revisionism. As sanctions become the West’s weapon of choice in this new era of great-power competition, there will be a significantly greater financial incentive for Beijing, Moscow, and their business partners around the world to facilitate sanctioned trade.

Obviously, due to the mentioned lack of transparency, we can largely only speculate about the extent to which the natural tendency of states and firms to avoid sanctioned trade has been watered down, but there is some evidence that this is occurring.

The degree to which countries that are usually considered Western allies have allowed their jurisdictions to be used for Russian sanctions evasion shows a pattern that is unlikely to be strictly limited to Russia. The fact that a country such as India would lower its port insurance requirement and resort to nontraditional financing structures to facilitate deliveries of Russian oil shows that the world is adapting to the new environment of heightened sanctions risk, but not always in a way the West would prefer.

Ultimately, the increase in Iran’s oil sales or the slower rate of OFAC designations are not adequate to argue that the Biden administration has taken a softer approach to Iran. It’s not clear that the Trump administration’s more aggressive posture would have fared better against the factors laid out above. As sanctions practitioners have stated, targeted states tend to adapt to sanctions over a period of time, and while they may not recover fully, the impact of sanctions tends to hit a peak and then decline to some extent. Playing a never-ending game of whack-a-mole with target adaptation has limits.

For example, if Biden really wanted to take on Iranian oil sales, he could aggressively target the “ghost fleet” of vessels carrying Iranian crude, as well as regional intermediaries in Southeast Asia (which he has done, to a point) and the Chinese teapot refineries that are reported to be the primary purchasers of Iranian oil.

But it’s not clear whether these intermediaries have any exposure to Western markets or financial institutions, and the ghost vessels and teapot refiners definitely have almost none. Thus, OFAC designations may not be particularly effective. If sanctions are deployed against various Chinese companies involved in Iran’s oil industry to no avail, would that make other similar actors more or less likely to engage Iran? Various Chinese entities, such as logistics firms with greater sanctions exposure, have been targeted, but they seem to be continuing their trade in Iranian oil.

Perhaps a broader campaign targeting the financial institutions that serve the teapot refineries can be more effective, but that would require a wider targeting of the Chinese financial system than Washington is ready for at this time. Yet it’s also important to point out that the Trump administration had opportunities to take all of these steps—but it did not do so, either.

[noisynutcrusade]

If the Arab brothers dump Gaza

At the Riyadh summit, Iran asked for an oil embargo against Israel but Saudi Arabia said no, the opposite of what it had done in ’73. Arab countries abandon their “brothers” once again Source link

[commercialawarenesstoday]

Al Jazeera - Counting the cost

Iran's involvement in the war will likely boost the oil price to $150

Dependency of oil

Oil price goes up, energy goods will go up

Israel is quite remote to the central global economy system.

Supply chain in Israel is quite limited.

Unless region

Economically is containable problem.

Ukraine - major exporter of grains

Destruction of supply of oil

OPEC has been unilaterrly suppresed production 1 million barrel

OPEC configuration - Russia (OPEC plus)

2024 will be a very difficult year - US elections coming, sensitivity for the increase of prices.

How much does that analysis change if the war has escalated?

Incentive for Hezballoah to get involved. Iran and US are in the midst of negotiation. Former government negotiator - hostages and funds have great de-escalation of war.

Final point - China - flows will continue - embargo against the west.

[cavenewstimes]

Oil falls as Israel embargo issues fade, Venezuela sanctions to relieve

By Katya Golubkova and Emily Chow TOKYO, Oct 19 (Reuters) – Oil rates fell on Thursday, reversing gains in the previous session, after OPEC revealed no indications of supporting Iran’s require an oil embargo on Israel and as the United States prepares to reduce Venezuela sanctions to enable more oil to stream worldwide. Brent LCOc1 futures for December fell 0.5%, or 43 cents, to $91.07 a barrel.…

[zvaigzdelasas]

[Arab News is Saudi Media]

[The New Arab is Saudi Media]

Members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) should impose an oil embargo and other sanctions on Israel and expel all Israeli ambassadors, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said on Wednesday.

18 Oct 23

[mightyflamethrower]

Iranian-backed militias have attacked American installations and forces in Syria, Iraq, and Jordan some 170 times.

Ostensibly, these terrorist groups claim they are hitting US forces to coerce America into dropping its support of Israel and demanding a cease-fire in the Gaza war.

In reality, these satellite terrorists are being directed in a larger effort by Iran to pry the US. out of the Middle East, in the manner of the 1983 Marine barracks bombing.

That way, Iran will be free to fulfill its old dream of becoming a nuclear shield for a new Shiite/Persian terrorist axis from Tehran to Damascus to Beirut to the West Bank and Gaza—surrounding Israel and intimidating the Gulf regimes and more moderate states like Jordan and Egypt into concessions.

These Iranian appendages have made a number of unfortunately correct assumptions about America in general and the Biden administration in particular.

One, after the recent serial humiliations of the flight from Afghanistan, the passivity of watching a Chinese spy balloon traverse with impunity the continental United States, the mixed American signals on the eve of the Ukraine war, the troubled Pentagon’s recruitment and leadership lapses, and the destruction of the US southern border, both Iran and its surrogates feel that the United States either cannot or will do much of anything in response to their aggression.

They see the U.S. military short thousands of recruits, its leadership politicized, its munition stocks depleted by arms shipments to Ukraine and Israel, and the massive abandonment of weapons in Kabul.

Two, they view Joe Biden’s serial appeasement as a force multiplier of these perceptions of American weakness. After entering office, the Biden administration begged for a renewed Iran deal from a preening theocracy. It sought to ensure calm by delisting the Houthis from global terrorist designations and sending hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas and radical Palestinians to buy good behavior.

Biden may have agreed that Iran was the spider in the center of the Middle East Islamic terrorist web, but only thereby to win over it with bribes such as lifting embargoes and sanctions to ensure an Iranian windfall of $90 or more billion in oil sales revenue.

Biden greenlighted a bribery payment of $6 billion to Iran to return American hostages, thereby ensuring more will be taken. It loudly distanced itself from the Netanyahu government. The gulf encouraged radicals to believe they could coerce Israel into accepting radical Islamic states on the West Bank and Gaza.

Three, after hitting American stations and bases 170 times and seeing little sustained, much less disproportionate, responses, Iran and its satellites now feel they are winning proxy wars with the US.

They have all but shut down the Red Sea as an international shipping route—damaging Europe, Egypt, and Israel, which all depend on Red Sea commerce for vital imports and exports.

Iran has forced Biden to publicly alienate the Netanyahu government and push a ceasefire down Israel’s throat. And it has helped to spark international pro-Hamas protests throughout Europe and the US that timid and compliant left-wing governments fear could lose them close elections.

But most damaging are administration spokesmen who mouth the same empty script after each serial attack: 1) The US will respond at the time and place of its own choosing. 2) The US finds no direct evidence of Iranian involvement, although it clearly has supplied the attackers; 3) The US does not wish a wider war and has no plans to attack Iran itself.

Translated to our enemies, it means an 80-year-old non-compos-mentis president is in no position to prevent, much less win, a theater-wide Middle East war that his own serial appeasement has now nearly birthed.

Biden and the Democratic Party know, as National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan pointed out just prior to the October 7 attacks on Israel, that the administration inherited a deterred and quiet Middle East. And then it blew up on their appeasing watch.

Now they are terrified of a theater-wide conflict breaking out during an election year—a fact known to all of America’s Middle East enemies.

Biden and company have forgotten the ancient wisdom that preparing loudly only for peace guarantees war. To prevent war, it should return to oil sanctions on Iran, embargo its banking transactions, slap a travel ban on Iran and its allies, cut off all aid to Hamas and the West Bank, and restore a true terrorist designation for the Houthis.

US officials must stop aimlessly babbling. If the administration must speak, Washington should do so by conveying disproportionality and unpredictability. And if, and when, America were to strike, it should do so in silent and devastating fashion.

When serially attacked, loudly responding that we will only proportionally strike back and wish no wider war will only ensure a big, ugly one.

[radio-rebel-477]

This article highlights Iran’s response, which ushers Muslim countries to sanction Israel, after the controversial and developing story surrounding a deadly attack on a hospital in Gaza. According to Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian, specific terms of the sanction would include the expulsion of Israeli ambassadors and imposing an oil embargo on Israel. Tension amongst the Israel-Hamas conflict escalated significantly after an air raid earlier this week killed over 500 people in a hospital in Gaza. Israel denies responsibility for the attack, suggesting that it was a terrorist misfire and the work of the IDF, whereas Hamas and many of the neighboring Muslim countries continue to assert that it was indeed Israel. The aftermath of the attack has led to an uproar of protests in front of Israeli embassies, with protesters seeking to highlight the continued atrocities that now seem to not even spare the weak.

During my reading, I noticed that back and forth of the blame game mixed in with competing, yet incomplete evidence was used as the basis of arguments of “who did what” and “who is wrong for what.” I find myself thinking about all of the social media social justice that I have seen in the past 24 hours that denounces Israel as a demonic and violent aggressor with zero regard for human life. However, today’s news shares that the United States intelligence agencies possess hard evidence that the hit was in fact a Palestinian rocket misfire. And so I wonder: What becomes of these social media posts? Do we consider them to be internet pollution? Or failed attempts to be informational? If what the United States is said to have is true, does everyone just go back on what they said? Was it just one big "oops, my bad!"? I understand where the intent of reposting comes from; however, with the click of a button, misinformation can catch fire quicker than anything else. Although we as media users might just see it as a mistake on our part that we can easily delete from our profiles, misinformation has tangible consequences for people beyond a PR nightmare. Therefore, as I wrap up my rambling thoughts, I hope that in the massive amount of information we as consumers must sift through, we are able to explore the possibilities and actually take the time to understand an issue before reposting.

#POLS477

[antonio-velardo]

Antonio Velardo shares: Iran’s Call for Oil Embargo on Israel Roils Markets by Stanley Reed

By Stanley Reed A top Iranian official urged Islamic countries to halt oil shipments to Israel, briefly causing a jump in crude prices. Published: October 18, 2023 at 11:59AM from NYT Business https://ift.tt/T06KBNr via IFTTT