#Michael Sandel

[weil-weil-lautre]

Bernard Williams & Michael Sandel on Justice (2000)

[emvisual]

El peligro no es que sea difícil distinguir lo real de lo falso, sino que esa distinción deje de importarnos.

Michael Sandel. Filósofo.

[amatorfilozofus]

Könyvajánló

Nemrégiben jelent meg Puzsér Róbert új könyve „Metafizika” címmel. Erről a könyvről én nem fogok kritikát írni, mert valószínűleg soha nem fogom elolvasni. 15 000 ezer forint esetén az ember nagyon meg kell, hogy gondolja, mire költi, és amit, a könyvvel kapcsolatban olvasni lehet, számomra rendkívül taszító. Néhány példa:

„A kötet az agy mindkét féltekével kommunikáló meditációs objektum, amely összművészeti igénnyel kalauzolja az Olvasót a megismerés szellemi ösvényén...”

„A „Metafizika” című könyv szerkezete azon az ismereten alapul, hogy a transzcendensre (léten túli, tapasztalat feletti...) vonatkozó tudás nem lineárisan, hanem koncentrikusan épül fel.”

Az első mondat szimplán végtelen önteltséget sugall nekem, a második mondatot nem is értem, de lehet ez csak az én műveletlenségem.

Mikor erről a könyvről hallottam, az első dolog, ami eszembe jutott az volt, hogy lehet lesz olyan ember, aki életében egy filozófia könyvet fog olvasni és az pont ez lesz. Olvasatlanul is megkockáztatom azt az állítást, hogy, sok olyan filozófia könyv van, amit sokkal inkább érdemes elolvasni (és olcsóbb is…).

A korábbi posztjaim alapján, az lenne logikus, hogyha egy Richard Rorty könyvet ajánlanék, de nem ezt fogom tenni. Pontosabban fogok ajánlani egyet, de úgy gondolom a legfontosabb filozófia könyv, amit ma valaki magyarországon kézbe vehet az Michael J. Sandeltől „Az Érdem Zsarnoksága” című könyv. Legnagyobb meglepetésemre a MCC Press adta ki magyarul. Én hangos könyvként hallgattam meg a szerző előadásában, de annyira tetszett, hogy azóta a polcra is felkerült. Ez a könyv szerintem tökéletes példája annak, hogyan érdemes filozofálni napjainkban. Ebben a könyvben nem találunk metafizikai fejtegetéseket. A könyv arról szól, miért nem érdemes egy társadalmat az érdemelvűségre építeni. Egy rendkívül meggyőző magyarázatot is ad arra, hogyan jutott el az Egyesült Államok Donald Trump megválasztásáig. Illetve a legfontosabb szerintem az, hogy Sandel rendkívüli együttérzéssel ír a globalizáció „veszteseiről”, és arról, hogy az érdemelvűség hogyan rongálja a társadalom szövetét (nem mellékenésen kevesebb, mint 5000 forint…).

Rorty a kedvenc filozófusom, szóval tőle mindenképpen szeretnék ajánlani.  Esetében a „Filozófia és Társadalmi Remény” című könyvét ajánlanám. Ez a könyv talán a legjobb első találkozás Rorty-val. Rövid összefoglalását tartalmazza Rorty filozófiai gondolatainak, különböző esszéket tartalmaz szerteágazó témákban, és egy önéletrajzi írást is tartalmaz. (Rorty-val kapcsolatban tervezek egy későbbi posztot, ami részletesen belemenne írásainak ismertetésébe.) Hogy elsősorban a Sandel könyvet ajánlom, az egyszerűen azért van, mert jelen pillanatban aktuálisabbnak látom. Magyar értelmiségieknek szerintem nagyon fontos lenne, hogy megismerkedjenek ezekkel a könyvekkel, mert ellensúlyozni tudná azt a fajta neoliberális gondolatvilágot, ami jelenleg is domináns. Mi ezzel a gond? A neoliberalizmussal (direkt nem csak „liberalizmust” írok, mert az mást és mást jelent különböző kontextusban, ami rendkívül megnehezíti az erről való beszélgetéseket) az a probléma, hogy egy szélsőséges individualizmust feltételez: mindenki magáért felel, és aki sikeres az megérdemli, és megküzdött a sikeréért, aki nem az lusta, és csak magát okolhatja. Ez egy rendkívül káros tévhit, és szerintem Michael J. Sandel könyve nagyszerűen meg is magyarázza miért, és az olvasóban erősíti az együttérzést, és a szolidaritást embertársai iránt.

[teoriapoliticabrasileira]

Notas sobre o comunitarismo

Por comunitarismo entende-se uma corrente da teoria política anglo-saxã que se desenvolveu a partir dos anos 1980 como contraponto ao chamado liberalismo procedimental ou liberalismo igualitário de autores como Rawls, Dworkin ou Amartya Sen.

Seus principais exponentes são:

Michael Sandel, autor de Liberalismo e os limites da Justiça, 1982; Chales Taylor, autor de Hegel, 1975; As Fontes do Self, 1983, e Argumentos Filosóficos, 1995; Asladair Macintyre, autor de Depois da Virtude, 1980; e Michael Walzer, autor de Esferas da Justiça, de 1983.

 Do atomismo ao holismo como ontologia do social

Embora não possua uma unidade doutrinária ou institucional, e acolha uma diversidade de abordagens e referenciais teóricos, o comunitarismo pode ser identificado, a menos para fins didáticos, como uma teoria moral e política que enfatiza os elementos comunitários e dialógicos na construção da identidade dos sujeitos morais. Com efeito, o comunitarismo coloca em xeque os postulados e fundamentos individualistas e utilitários que caracterizam as correntes filosóficas modernas, sejam elas de matriz utilitária ou neokantiana, e enfatizam os vínculos comunitários e históricos que configuram as relações sociais.

Assim, o debate liberal-comunitarista se dá em grande medida, como notou Charles Taylor (1995), em torno de definições ontológicas sobre a condição humana. O liberalismo ou o utilitarismo tendem para as fundações atomistas, em que o coletivo é consequência das ações dos indivíduos, ao passo que os comunitaristas tenderiam a uma visão de tipo holista, em que o todo precede as partes. 

Assim, Michael Sandel critica a figura do indivíduo desencarnado, ou o self liberto que protagoniza as teorias do liberalismo procedimental. Asladair MacIntyre, por sua vez, lança mão de uma definição do indivíduo como unidade narrativa. Já Charles Taylor condena os fundamentos monológicos da teoria social individualista em favor de uma concepção dialógica do sujeito, cuja identidade depende da relação de reconhecimento recíproco como um Outro. 

As relações de alteridade e troca são enfatizadas nessas teorias morais e políticas. 

 A construção do self: singularidade de autenticidade

Como nota Taylor, uma das formas de negação da dignidade humana se manifesta na privação do reconhecimento da identidade singular de cada um. Nos constituímos em relação com os outros. Não somos mônodas incomunicáveis e autocentradas, mas seres cujas histórias e expectativas estão entrelaçadas em complexas redes e vínculos sociais. A identidade reclama reconhecimento porque ela se constrói numa relação dialógica.

Taylor identifica a mordernidade como um novo tipo de sociedade que reclama a identidade como autoconstrução de si, como um aprofundamento no seu próprio ser. A autenticidade configura-se como um valor próprio de sociedades em que os status fixos e aristocráticos perdem vigência. A “virada subjetivista” se manifesta na filosofia de Rousseau, no romantismo e num ideal de vida com sinceridade em relação aos seus próprios valores.

Do universalismo abstrato à pluralidade das culturas

Os comunitaristas também se inclinam para uma concepção convencionalista dos princípios morais e políticos. Eles nutrem um ceticismo em relação á possibilidade de critérios universais e atemporais para definição do justo e do injusto, do certo e do errado. 

Não existe, nessa perspectiva, um critério neutro e uma fundação universal para a justiça ou a moralidade. A moralidade ou a justiça derivam de concepções partilhadas do bem. Elas são, portanto, convencionais. Não há um céu platônico onde o filósofo pode contemplar uma ideia atemporal e neutra da justiça. O discurso sobre o que é justo está enredado na particularidade da nossa linguagem, nas relações concretas que se estabelecem, nas tradições e expectativas compartilhadas. Em outras palavras, os critérios de justiça derivam das particularidades históricas em que os próprios termos do justo e injusto, do certo e do errado são elaboradas e ganham significação. 

Essa inclinação para o particular marca uma afinidade entre o comunitarismo e o pensamento conservador. No século XIX, o apelo ao particular que caracteriza a forma de pensar conservadora tinha como inimigo a igualdade universal pregada pela Revolução Francesa e por seus adeptos no estrangeiro. Assim, figuras como Burke na Inglaterra, Savigni ou Herder na Alemanha, cerravam fileiras contra o igualitarismo abstrato da Revolução em defesa da força normativa tradição das culturas nacionais particulares de seus países (cf. Mannheim, O Pensamento Conservador).

 Dois modos da emancipação: igualdade/distribuição vs. reconhecimento

Para Taylor, o liberalismo seria “cego às diferenças”. Sua estratégia emancipotoria seria fundamentalmente ignorar as qualidades concretas dos sujeitos históricos em nome de uma cidadania tão igual quanto abstrata. A legitimidade de uma ordem política consiste precisamente em mandamentos de alcance universal que ignore as diferenças.

“Todos são iguais perante as leis, independentemente da raça, orientação sexual, classe, etc”.

Essa é a formulação mais emblemática da estratégia liberal de uma igualdade de status. A diferença de tratamento seria própria de sociedades aristocráticas, baseadas no privilégio hereditário.

A igualdade de direitos (que pode incluir também direitos sociais) é formulada com base nessa legitimidade universal e imparcial.

As teorias comunitaristas ou multiculuturalistas enfatizam a diferença concreta e não a similaridade. Tal como os conservadores mobilizavam a nação e a nacionalidade contra as pretensões universalistas do cidadão abstrato das Declarações, os teóricos do reconhecimento enfatizarão a inscrição particular do indivíduo.

Essa dimensão conservadora e até mesmo reacionária da linguagem comunitarista e identitária não passará desapercebida pelos adeptos do liberalismo e sua linguagem dos direitos universais. Alvaro de Vita nota que

“em tempos idos, a crítica social (liberal ou socialista) costumava se exprimir em um discurso universalizante e em uma linguagem igualitária, cabendo a expoentes do reacionarismo político, como Herder e de Maistre, invocar identidades e diferenças culturais contra o racionalismo iluminista. É perturbador como isso hoje parece ter se invertido ou no mínimo se tornado muito mais confuso. Em virtude da crítica multiculturalista, aqueles que, na academia e no mundo político, entendem que a concepção de cidadania de T.H. Marshall (ou idéias similares) fornece um ideal plausível de progresso social para as sociedades democráticas, têm sua convicção abalada pela suspeita de que o componente universalista e igualitário desse ideal normativo é indiferente a formas significativas de inferiorização social. E os herdeiros multiculturalistas de Herder se concebem como teóricos de esquerda, que dão o peso moral apropriado às exigências de reconhecimento de grupos discriminados” (Vita, 2002, p. 07-08).

A conversão da linguagem da diferença e da identidade - originalmente conservadora e reacionária - à esquerda e ao progressismo se dá a partir de uma nova sensibilidade em relação às desigualdades e violência contra grupos sociais específicos. A vulnerabilização e marginalização de minorias étnicas, religiosas, linguísticas, mulheres, gays, negros, (imigrantes latinos ou orientais nos EUA), evidenciaria os limites do modelo de emancipação como igualdade de direitos. 

Os chamados novos movimentos sociais pleiteiam precisamente o reconhecimento de sua singularidade, de seu modo de vida, suas crenças, seus valores, sua história. Não se trata de reivindicar a integração na cultura dominante, mas de ser reconhecido pela autenticidade e singularidade de seu próprio grupo social (Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference). 

Mulheres negras, reconhecidas como mulheres negras, não como “cidadãs”. Reconhecidas pelas suas histórias particulares, suas vivências, suas particularidades, suas lutas e expectativas de emancipação. 

Assim, a linguagem da identidade e do reconhecimento, inicialmente forjada em território anti-iluminista e conservador, adquire uma tonalidade crítica e emancipatória. Crítica por reconhece no discurso universalista e inclusiva do liberalismo, uma ideologia no sentido marxiano do termo, isto é, a falsificação do real para justificar o domínio de um grupo sobre outro. No caso exemplificado acima, o domínio do patriarcado heteronormativo branco. Emancipatória porque se dirige contra o status quo e se compromete com as demandas das classes subalternas. 

[indizombie]

A discussion on discrimination at the IITs needs to be predicated on a discussion on merit as it is the embedded idea of merit that gives license to discriminate. The political philosopher, Michael Sandel, in the book ‘The Tyranny of Merit’ presents a scathing critique of meritocracy as a social ideal and argues how hubris among the elites and a politics of humiliation are natural outcomes of meritocracy. Variations of graded inequality and, consequently, discriminatory judgements  about one’s so-called abilities are deeply entrenched within the veneer of merit at the IITs.

'Discrimination in the IITs is something to write about', Hindu

[theperfectguys-imoo]

Michael Dean Johnson & Nick Sandell

[just-a-pole-sir]

Fuck, Rim, Lick

Michael Dean Johnson, Nick Sandell, Nick Topel

Fuck Topel

Rim Sandell

Lick Michael

[dreams-of-mutiny]

“A philosophy untouched by the shadows on the wall can only yield a sterile utopia.”

― Michael J. Sandel

[lescroniques]

Sordesa i enginyeria genètica: una elecció per a la procreació?

Michael J. Sandel / elconfidencial.com iStock Fa alguns anys una parella va decidir que volia tenir un fill amb sordesa. Igual que altres membres de la comunitat Orgull Sord, Sharon Duchesneau i Candy McCullough reivindicaven la sordesa com una identitat cultural; no com una discapacitat que hagués de curar-se…[…] (elconfidencial.com)

[sebperest]

Bu sıralar okuduğum bütün kitapları beğeniyor gibiyim. Ama, evet, bunu da pek beğendim. Michael J. Sandel'ın Adalet'ini herkeslere tavsiye ederim. Batı'da güncel adalet yaklaşımlarını, bunların kökenlerini ve tenkitlerini yapan bir eser. Avamî tabirle 'kafa açıyor.' #kitap

[bocadosdefilosofia]

«Esta predilección por la neutralidad mueve al liberalismo por la senda de la fe en el mercado. El mayor atractivo de los mercados no es que procuren eficiencia y prosperidad, sino que parecen liberarnos de la necesidad de mantener desagradables y conflictivos debates sobre cuáles son los bienes que debemos valorar. Pero esa es, en el fondo, una falsa promesa. Desterrar del debate público las cuestiones moralmente polémicas no hace que estas queden sin dilucidar; solo significa que serán los mercados, presididos por los sectores más ricos y poderosos de la sociedad, los que decidirán esas cuestiones por nosotros.»

Michael J. Sandel: El descontento democrático, Epílogo. Editorial Debate (Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial), pág. 349. Barcelona, 2023.

TGO

@bocadosdefilosofia

@dias-de-la-ira-11

[sloth-hallo-hier-bin-ich]

Frühstück mit Gert - Teil 2. Breakfast with Gert - Part 2.

Does our democracy function despite or because of its political structures? Sometimes one could get the impression that our basic democratic order works in spite of all political institutions. Yet they are supposed to support us citizens. A lesson that liberalism has taught us: A state that stays out of ethical-moral discourses promotes injustices in society instead of counteracting them. Gert Scobel looks at the work of philosopher Michael Sandel to shed light on precisely these contradictions.

[vqtblog]

Pablo Guimón: Michael J. Sandel, filósofo: “La izquierda debe ofrecer una visión positiva del patriotismo”

[amatorfilozofus]

Rupert Sheldrake on the Dogmas of Science

Recently I saw the banned TED talk of biochemist Rupert Sheldrake, where he suggests that there are ten dogmas held by scientists today which doesn’t hold up to scrutiny and is holding science back. The TED talk was more than ten years ago, but the reason because I would still like to write about it now is that as I see trust in science is fading, and I am concerned about this. Firstly I would like to comment on Sheldrake’s talk because I think many people today resonate with its message that science is dogmatic and elitist, secondly I would like to suggest that this is just a symptom of distrust in science and suggest what the real reason is for this distrust, and finally I would like to say why this distrust is dangerous.

Is Science Dogmatic?

I don’t think I need to address the individual items on Sheldrake’s list. The important point is that are these really dogmas? In one sense he is right, but I would like to argue that this is not a problem for science. Thomas Kuhn in his famous book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” makes a distinction between what he calls “normal science” and “revolutionary science”. Normal science is conducted under an accepted paradigm, where the task is to “solve puzzles”, to include the relevant phenomenon in the theoretical framework of this paradigm. Science only becomes revolutionary when there are problems which resist and cannot be assimilated into the paradigm after several attempts. At this point, a new paradigm needs development to explain phenomena resistant to the existing one and those already accommodated by the previous paradigm. A notable example is black body radiation, which couldn't be assimilated under Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism, leading to a revolutionary moment in physics. Maxwell's theory treated radiated energy as a continuous quantity, but Max Planck's suggestion to treat it as discrete allowed the construction of the equation for black body radiation called Plank’s law. It seems to me many people think that revolutionary science is “real science”, and normal science is just holding things back. This understanding is terribly flawed. Normal science is essential, if we had scientific revolutions each week we wouldn’t be able to make any progress at all.  Just imagine if all scientists were busy planning their revolution and wouldn’t cooperate in a shared paradigm with others. The lifeblood of science is cooperation, without people peer reviewing each other’s work, and trying to reproduce test results there would be no constraint on science at all and would sink into chaos. Normal science is an essential part of scientific development and having a consensus on a paradigm makes science possible. There might come a point when the paradigm becomes a hindrance that is true, and since science is a human endower some scientists might refuse to accept a new paradigm, but it seems this is something we just need to accept, because a “cure” for this would be worse than the “disease”. A very interesting story about this is Adam Becker’s book “What is Real?” which tells the story of the development of a field in physics called “quantum foundation”, against which the scientific community was very hostile in the beginning. With that in mind let’s go back to Sheldrake’s complaints. In general what I would like to say about the “dogmas” he mentions is that he might be right, but that is not the point: anybody could be right about anything but the scientific community is not obligated to respond to anybody who has doubts about its current practices. The scientific community is made up of well-educated experts with lots of experience. Sheldrake just cannot expect that scientists would jump on every idea he has, if they don’t think it’s worthwhile. Just to pick one example: Sheldrake questions that some quantities in nature which are considered as constants are truly constants (such as the velocity of light in vacuum or the gravitational constant). Most of the scientific community believes that these are truly constants which we can measure more and more accurately. Why should we invest money and time in this study? The theories which apply these constants indirectly give evidence: they work, satellites orbit the earth, nuclear energy provides us with electricity, and brains can be scanned by MRI. Sheldrake points to changes in the value of these constants but jumps to a conclusion which would put all our major physical theories into jeopardy while much simpler down to earth explanations would be available, like the change in measurement accuracy. As Wilfrid Sellars wrote:

„For empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once”

People find Sheldrake convincing because our culture is extremely individualistic, we want the story about the lone genius to be true, the one who goes against convention and changes the world. Science is not like that, science is best when people cooperate and build on each other’s work,  in fact humans are at their best when the cooperate. Cooperation can involve and should involve critical engagement with the works of others, but also openness in reaching a consensus.

Distrust of Science

Now that we discussed this, I would like to move to what I see as fading trust in the scientific community. I think the best book which can explain this is Michael J. Sandel’s “The Tyranny of Merit”.

In the 70’s and 80’s neoliberalism became the mainstream school of economics and by the election of Margarethe Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the United States deregulation and reduction of welfare spending became the focus of economic policy. Tax reduction was a major target but this was quite disproportionate favouring the wealthy and this lead to increase in wealth and income inequality. Globalization escalated this trend further.

All of this was a major problem for the working class with lower education, but in this time of need the left basically deserted their regular voters and became the party of the “educated” classes. Due to the increased of economic power in the industry leftist parties if they wanted to remain had to make concessions to them and so gave up representing the working class. They adopted what Michael J. Sandel calls “the rhetoric of rising”, which promised that if one works hard enough and achieves a college degree, than he or she will be capable to afford decent living. Although education is important, this is not realistic for the majority, so working class people rightly became disappointed, and resentful of the left. This economic and social change was also supplemented with the story of individual responsibility: the poor were blamed that it’s their fault for not getting a decent education and the affluent was told that they deserve their success because they worked hard to get it. This message divides people, and makes it hard to have solidarity to the less fortunate. It is clear that in this situation poor and working class people became suspicious of intellectuals.  As Sandel says: “One of the casualties of meritocracy’s triumph may be the loss of broad public support for higher education. Once widely seen as an engine for opportunity, the university has become, at least for some, a symbol of credentialist privilege and meritocratic hubris.”

The Dangers facing us

It is an especially bad time to lose faith in science. The institutions of science are our only line of defence against disinformation. These can come from many places: in earlier times the tobacco industry was notorious for spreading lies about the effects of smoking; currently the oil industry does the same thing to make us doubt the existence or the effects of human-induced climate change. Economic power and interest distorts science. Social media made it especially easy for misinformation to spread, and it’s not just industry giants we need to defender ourselves against, authoritarian states such as Russia also spend a lot of money in spreading misinformation.

How can this trust be regained? I agree with Michael Sandel that we need to challenge the tranny of merit and embrace the fact that our failures and success are not just our own doing. We are at our best when we cooperate and cooperation means that we need to take responsibility for each other. If intellectuals stopped looking at poor and working class people as responsible for their own failures and start seeing them as fellow citizens whose needs are as important as their owns then maybe this trust can be regained.

[hijolehijola]

On the pathetically low value we attribute to lives lost in traffic accidents to justify bad driving habits

   “Critics of utilitarianism point to such episodes as evidence that cost-benefit analysis is misguided, and that placing a monetary value on human life is morally obtuse. Defenders of cost-benefit analysis disagree. They argue that many social choices implicitly trade off some number of lives for other goods and conveniences. Human life has its price, they insist, whether we admit it or not.    For example, the use of the automobile exacts a predictable toll in human lives—more than forty thousands deaths annually in the United States. But that does not lead us as a society to give up cars. In fact, it does not even lead us to lower the speed limit. During an oil crisis in 1974, the U.S. Congress mandated a national speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour. Although the goal was to save energy, an effect of the lower speed limit was fewer traffic fatalities.    In the 1980s, Congress removed the restriction, and most states raised the speed limit to sixty-five miles per hour. Drivers saved time, but traffic deaths increased. At the time, no one did a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the benefits of faster driving were worth the cost in lives. But some years later, two economists did the math. They defined one benefit of a higher speed limit as a quicker commute to and from work, calculated the economic benefit of the time saved (valued at an average wage of $20 an hour) and divided the savings by the number of additional deaths. They discovered that, for the convenience of driving faster, Americans were effectively valuing human life at the rate of $1.54 million per life. That was the economic gain, per fatality, of driving ten miles an hour faster.    Advocates of cost-benefit analysis point out that by driving sixty-five miles an hour rather than fifty-five, we implicitly value human life at $1.54 million—much less than the $6 million per life figure typically used by U.S. government agencies in setting pollution standards and health-and-safety regulations. So why not be explicit about it? If trading off certain levels of safety for certain benefits and conveniences is unavoidable, they argue, we should do so with our eyes open, and should compare the costs and benefits as systematically as possible—even if that means putting a price tag on human life.”

- Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s The Right Thing To Do?

[probablyasocialecologist]

In theory, in a meritocracy, hard work leads to elevated socioeconomic status and stability, and such status and stability is available to all talented hard workers. In recent years, much ink has been spilled over the realization that meritocrats aren’t much different from the aristocrats of the past. I, for instance, have always worked hard. I also have White, married, college-educated, financially stable parents. I have both inherited and achieved their same level of education, economic stability, and social standing. In a meritocracy, social advantages can look like the reward of hard work, even if they really are inherited. Books like William Deresiewicz’s Excellent Sheep (2014) and Daniel Markovits’s The Meritocracy Trap (2019) have identified both the ways in which the meritocracy excludes deserving workers and how its values fail to satisfy those within it. The philosopher and Harvard professor Michael Sandel’s recent contribution to the discussion, The Tyranny of Merit (2020), goes even further in its examination of the injustice of these values and the impossibility of perfecting a meritocratic system of reward. “The problem with meritocracy is not only that the practice falls short of the ideal,” Sandel writes, but that “it is doubtful that even a perfect meritocracy would be satisfying, either morally or politically.” These books argue that the system is functionally closed. It cuts off most (not quite all, keeping the myth of mobility alive) of the people who are not already within its demographic fold. Meritocrats are indeed talented hard workers, by and large. And yet what gets them – us – to the top is not hard work. It is birth. Wealth begets wealth. Power, power. Ballet class begets ballet class. Advanced Placement courses beget Advanced Placement courses and SAT prep sessions and summer enrichment and service opportunities.

[...]

A second problem is that the meritocrats aren’t happy. The relentless pursuit of achievement and advantage engenders anxiety, which often manifests itself in working harder. We keep working to maintain our status and to ensure our children have what they are supposed to have – piano lessons and tutoring and international travel – only to face despair. Suicide, substance abuse, clinical anxiety, and depression all occur at high levels among the meritocrats. These signals of deep dissatisfaction send a warning that this life of relentless hard work, entertainment, affluence, busyness, restlessness, and achievement does not accomplish much that matters. In Sandel’s view, meritocracies are bound to fail not because they can never live up to their own ideals, but because they rest upon a foundational assumption that GDP defines the common good, that economic productiveness is the highest value for society. Sandel traces the history of meritocratic ideals through Protestantism and western philosophical traditions. In his lengthy discussion of Friedrich Hayek’s capitalist philosophy, he comes to a concise conclusion: “[Hayek] does not consider the possibility that the value of a person’s contribution to society could be something other than his or her market value.” Reducing humans to their earning potential is dehumanizing, and it fails to consider non-monetary contributions that individuals make within their families and communities.