#Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party

[darkmaga-returns]

Microsoft, NVIDIA, Amazon, OpenAi, and other US companies were caught exporting Ai technologies to the CCP and Chinese military through foreign businesses and an Amazon Web Services (AWS) loophole.

Karen Kingston

Jan 06, 2025

Unless otherwise noted, written content is copyright of Karen Kingston, Karen Kingston LLC.

January 6, 2025: On January 2, 2025, the leaders of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sent a letter urging US Secretary of Commerce, Gina Raimondo, to close the commerce loopholes that enable US companies to provide the most advanced Ai systems and technologies to the Chinese military. Ironically, these ‘loopholes’ include the extreme lack of US laws (passed by Congress) that regulate the Ai industry.

Per the letter from Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI) and Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL), the US Department of Commerce will soon be publishing new international Ai commerce guidance, “which will create a global licensing regime for the export of advanced Ai processors and potential restrictions on Ai self-learning neural networks.”

MicroSoft, Dell, OpenAi, and NVIDIA are Actively Exporting Ai Technologies to CCP Business Partners

While the urgent demand for the United States to regulate the Ai industry may not appear to be a ‘dire national security threat’ to the majority of Congress, in a similar letter sent last January from Mike Gallagher (former Chairman of House Oversight Committee on the CCP), Gallagher calls attention to two (2) United Arab Emirates (UAE) based companies, specifically G42 and Dark Matter, that have China-based business partners which support “the CCP’s surveillance state and human rights abuses.”

[meret118]

The import method also minimizes the chances that Temu's packages will be screened for compliance with the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party said. That law blocks products from China's Xinjiang region, where systematic human rights abuses against the Uyghur minority have been reported.

. . .

"On average, some of them are going to be exactly the same, some of them are going to be coming from exactly the same sellers" that consumers might find at other retailers, The Atlantic's Mull said last year. "Others are going to be a little bit junkier. Others might use substandard materials that might not always pass muster in the U.S. for safety standards."

Also worth noting: Pinduoduo's app and website — but not Temu itself — has for several years been on the U.S. list of "Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy," recently updated by the Office of the United States Trade Representative.

The USTR listing says that despite Pinduoduo's claims of adopting new anti-counterfeiting initiatives, a litany of issues remains, including refusals to remove bogus products and "a further deterioration of Pinduoduo's already ineffective seller vetting."

[beardedmrbean]

Jan. 21 (UPI) -- U.S. Department of Homeland Security officers have searched a Chinese auto parts maker that a congressional committee has accused of trade fraud.

DHS officers executed the search warrant at Harco Manufacturing Group in Moraine, Ohio, on Thursday, according to the Dayton Daily News. Harco is a subsidiary of Sunsong, the Chinese parts manufacturer. Sunsong acquired Harco in 2015. The address for Harco is the same address Sunsong North America lists on its website.

There is growing concern among U.S. lawmakers that some Chinese companies are evading U.S. tariffs, the news portals Axios and Bloomberg have reported.

The search was "part of an ongoing federal investigation," a DHS spokesperson told Dayton Daily News.

In September, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party in September wrote a letter to DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas accusing Qingdao Sunsong of moving some of its production to Thailand to evade U.S. tariffs.

The letter identified Qingdao Sunsong's public filings, which say the company's products are subject to U.S. import tariffs of 25% imposed on certain goods made in China and that "in order to reduce tariff costs, the issuer has accelerated production in Thailand."

In the letter to Mayorkas, Republican congressmen Mike Gallagher of Wisconsin and Darin LaHood of Illinois called Sunsong's actions a "case of blatant trade fraud that is having a catastrophic impact on American manufacturers."

"The use of transshipment to evade United States tariffs is a serious violation of U.S. law and undermines American economic and national security," the lawmakers wrote.

The Biden administration has kept many of the tariffs that the Trump administration imposed on China beginning in 2018.

China has not met its commitment laid out in a 2020 trade deal with the U.S., which required the country to increase its purchases of U.S. goods and services.

[kaurwreck]

utterly inane and meaningless detail that nevertheless feels wild: one of the lead drafters of the TikTok ban legislation, the Deputy Staff Director & Chief Counsel for the US House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, also played Aidan Keller in the US remake of The Ring (2002).

[the-eternal-quest-for-balance]

The DHS has not complied. Instead, DHS responded with a letter expressing a commitment to “good faith” cooperation but failed to submit any substantive documents by the October 7 deadline.

In a recent phone call, DHS officials reportedly offered no timeline or assurance of document production.

Committee Chairman James Comer voiced his frustration with DHS’s apparent reluctance to cooperate, prompting him to release a segment of the DHS internal documents.

According to the committee, whistleblower documents reveal that DHS officials were discussing concerns about the CCP targeting Governor Walz on the same day Vice President Kamala Harris selected him as her running mate.

Internal communications for the “Nation State Threat — National Functional Team” indicate that the CCP marked Minnesota Governor Tim Walz as a primary “target” for influence in U.S. politics.

“Because of DHS’s lack of compliance with the Committee’s legal subpoena and unwillingness to cooperate in good faith, the Committee is releasing a small portion of the Department’s internal communications it received from a whistleblower.  The information shows DHS officials with subject matter expertise discussing, on the same day Vice President Kamala Harris selected Governor Walz as her running mate, the CCP’s targeting of Governor Walz,” Chairman Comer said in a statement.

[mybeautifulchristianjourney]

“Pandemic” policing was policy written on a whim.

That’s the gritty gist of damning revelations released by the United States COVID Select Subcommittee made public on Friday.

The May 31 press release contained direct quotes from COVID Safe Czar, Anything Fauci, and contains 144 “I don’t recalls” throughout its 473 pages.

Fauci’s remarks were transcribed from his ’14-hour, 2-day testimony before the committee in January.’

Answering accountability questions, Fauci told the committee, he didn’t “recall” discussions about the science for social distancing, or forcing kids to wear masks.

When asked about where the rule for social distancing came from, Fauci said, “I don’t recall. It sort of just appeared.

“I was not aware of studies” supporting a “six feet rule,” he added.

 “That in fact, would be a very difficult study...

[democracyunderground]

ANOTHER ONE BITES THE DUST. BLAMING THE 'DYSFUNCTION' THEIR OWN PARTY CREATES "Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., who announced last month he would not run for re-election, will resign from Congress early, he confirmed in a statement Friday.

Gallagher’s departure before the end of his term in January is another blow to Speaker Mike Johnson, R-La., and House Republicans, who have been struggling to govern and demonstrate stability in this Congress.

2 sources familiar with the matter told NBC News of Gallagher's plan to resign early Friday. The Wisconsin Republican then released a statement announcing that he will depart April 19.

Gallagher informed Johnson of his decision earlier this week. Johnson, in a post on X, praised Gallagher's "extraordinary work in the House" and for "courageously exposing the threat Beijing poses to the U.S."

His resignation could cause more headaches for House Republicans. Rep. Ken Buck, R-Colo., who also is not seeking re-election, is resigning from Congress on Friday, cutting the GOP’s minuscule majority to 218-213. When Gallagher leaves, the majority would further shrink to 217-213, meaning Republicans could only afford a single defection on any vote if Democrats vote together.

Gallagher’s decision to leave April 19 also means that there will not be a special election to fill his seat. Under Wisconsin state law, vacancies after the second Tuesday in April are filled in the general election, so Gallagher’s replacement will be decided in November and his seat will remain empty until January.

A source close to Gallagher said the decision to leave was in the works and not related to anything happening in House lately. Gallagher has a young family that he and his wife hope to grow and the House schedule is not conducive to that, the source said.

Gallagher, 40, an Iraq War veteran, is the chairman of the select committee investigating the Chinese Communist Party, and serves on the Intelligence Committee. It’s highly unusual for a committee chairman to resign in the middle of the term.

But Gallagher, an institutionalist first elected to Congress in 2016, has grown frustrated with his own party. He was one of three Republicans who voted against the impeachment of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas last month.

He is one of several top Republican chairmen who are not running for re-election in November following a tumultuous House session.

Earlier Friday, Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, R-Ga., filed a motion to oust Johnson from the speakership over his handling of funding the government, though no vote is scheduled yet. It follows a similar motion, made by Rep. Matt Gaetz, R-Fla., that successfully toppled then-Speaker Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., last fall.

Meanwhile, shortly after the House passed its final government funding package for fiscal year 2024 on Friday, retiring Rep. Kay Granger, R-Texas, said she would step down as chairwoman of the Appropriations Committee, setting off an early battle among Republicans to succeed her in the powerful post. Unlike Gallagher and Buck, Granger said she will serve out her House term, which ends in January.

In his statement, Gallagher said he worked closely with GOP leaders on the timing of his announcement — shortly after the House voted to avert a shutdown — and looks forward to Johnson naming a new China committee chairman.

"I will forever be proud of the work I did on the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees, chairing the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, and chairing the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party," Gallagher said. "It has truly been an honor to serve in the House of Representatives."

[mariacallous]

On July 18, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) concluded the Third Plenum of its 20th Party Congress. Held in a secured military conference hotel on the western outskirts of Beijing, proceedings closed with a ritual appearance by top leader Xi Jinping. Third Plenums, so called because they’re the third meeting of the party’s five-year cycles, cover economic policy; outcomes are scrutinized by cadres and global businesses alike.

This Third Plenum duly addressed the economy but also broke from precedent: When the conclave wasn’t scheduled during the accustomed time last fall, speculation swirled around delays due to party purges and economic headwinds. With the session finally finished, we can now parse speeches and documents for insights into Beijing’s economic thinking—and gauge how CCP institutions have fared under Xi’s norm-bending rule.

One recurring catchphrase this session has been “reform and opening up”—a term with a rich history but invoked today in circumstances starkly different from the time of its original coinage. In 1978, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping was picking up the pieces after Mao Zedong’s chaotic rule. Deng sought to create stable conditions for economic growth. He sidelined Maoist cadres advocating “class struggle” and promoted reformers keen on economic experimentation. The 1978 Third Plenum keynote speech was Deng’s victory lap. In his clipped Sichuanese accent, speaking at the same military hotel, Deng called for China to open itself to foreign capitalists and overseas manufacturing firms. This new “reform and opening up” policy drove decades of growth, lifting the masses from poverty and integrating the People’s Republic with the global economy.

While official meetings were erratic under Mao, Deng sought a steadier rhythm. The terrors of the Cultural Revolution were subsiding; cadres found a certain solace in bureaucratic rituals. The headline event of the party calendar is the National Congress; in the pattern set after Mao’s death, it is held usually in October of years ending with 2 and 7. (Xi, for instance, ascended as CCP general secretary in 2012, gained a second term in 2017, and an unprecedented third in 2022.) At a full Congress, thousands of delegates convene in Beijing to ratify decisions about leadership and ideology, while 99 million party members look on.

After the Congress concludes, subsidiary plenums are called over the ensuing five-year span until the next full session. These intermediate meetings typically convene a few hundred CCP bigwigs and selected experts and have historically been held five to nine times (most commonly seven) before the following Congress half a decade later. Plenums typically cover party appointments (First Plenum), government personnel (Second), economic reform (Third), party-building activities (Fourth), fixing a new Five-Year Plan (Fifth), management of culture and history (Sixth), and a closing summation (Seventh) before the next Congress. Each meeting also disposes of sensitive party business arising in the interim. Since the Second Plenum in early 2023, several members of Xi’s top team—including ministers of defense and foreign affairs—have vanished into the CCP’s disciplinary apparatus, snared in graft and other indiscretions. At this plenum, their fates were finalized. Some offenders, stripped of party membership, now face criminal trial. Others got off more leniently: Last week, former Foreign Minister Qin Gang, who was disappeared for a year, formally lost membership of the elite Central Committee. But in an official document, he kept the appellation “comrade”—demotion without total disgrace. Such individual intrigues ultimately matter less than the overall tone: the “party line” and “main melody” of propaganda. In earlier eras, plenum themes reflected a more collective leadership. Today, that agenda closely follows the will of Xi himself.

Ever since Deng’s 1978 breakthrough set the template, observers have eagerly watched Third Plenums for portents of change. Results have always varied. Over the 1980s, one Third Plenum widened economic reforms from the countryside to the cities, but, with inflation rising, the next Third Plenum tightened statist wage controls and commodity price caps. After the Tiananmen Square crackdown in June 1989 froze political reforms, the 1993 Third Plenum signaled that economic reforms would continue: The communiqué made rhetorical room for capitalism by advocating a “socialist market economy.” This turn of phrase translated into epochal change: the dismantling of many state-owned enterprises and the end of “iron rice bowl” welfare security for more than 20 million people. The Third Plenums in 2003 and 2008 were, in hindsight, milquetoast: missed opportunities to update China’s growth model and rectify an unruly (and sometimes greedy) party apparatus.

When Xi took over in 2012, he had a mandate from his colleagues to secure the CCP’s future by taming corruption and enacting structural reforms. Xi’s first Third Plenum as leader—in November 2013—was met with high expectations. The conclave announced big changes: a plan to end the one-child policy and a determination to let market forces take a “decisive” role in the economy. Outside observers, squinting to see China’s economic modernization tracking toward convergence with the West, hailed the plenum as a masterstroke and Xi as a bold “reformer.”

The one-child policy was duly scrapped after several years. But the CCP soured on market mechanisms after Chinese stocks swooned in 2015, threatening the stability of the broader economy. The state responded with heavy-handed measures: strong-arming equity sales and detaining financial reporters. Meanwhile, party institutions grew more visible in everyday life and acted more assertively toward private businesses. Crackdowns snared rights lawyers and journalists; government regulators humbled China’s booming tech sector. Politics took priority—and command—over economics.

By 2018, Xi had decided to abolish term limits for the presidency of the People’s Republic, a post held concurrently with the more important role of CCP general secretary. Though the position is a state title—technically outside the party bureaucracy and calendar—this move seemingly disturbed the regular rhythms of party politics. The Third Plenum in 2018 fell early, landing in February rather than the fall. Unusually, that meeting focused on personnel rather than economic issues.

Today, a look back on Xi’s inaugural Third Plenum in 2013 shows the limitations of prognosticating based on that or any other party meeting. Some plans were implemented. In other cases, unexpected events may have overtaken the best intentions. But whatever the rhetoric, more than a decade later, the reality is trending toward more government intervention in the economy rather than less. A reformer Xi has been—but rarely in the direction Western observers might have hoped. Since Xi took power and held his inaugural Third Plenum at the expected time, two subsequent Third Plenums have fallen outside their usual season. Xi is now in power indefinitely, having amassed more formal titles and personal influence than any leader since Mao.

At the recently concluded Third Plenum, Xi and his comrades affirmed the expected themes with range of slogans, with some—such as “reform and opening up” and “Chinese-style modernization”—reflecting Deng’s legacy. Documents highlighted security and control while also calling for “high-quality development” in key sectors, such as green tech and semiconductors, believed to be crucial to future growth. Some perennial problems have resurfaced again after being mentioned in past Third Plenums but never faced.

In 2003 and 2013, communiqués suggested a property tax to raise local government revenue for health and welfare spending, but no comprehensive policy resulted. Now, a crumpling real estate sector threatens to tip into crises in local government debt and the economy at large. In 2024, the CCP sounds more tepid today toward market forces than in 2013, reprising the 1993 slogan of a “socialist market economy” while calling for “market order” and making scant mention of the private sector.

Even in 1978, the important politicking actually happened behind the scenes before Deng’s inaugural Third Plenum. In Deng’s keynote speech ending the session, even as he exhorted his comrades to “liberate [their] thinking” and “look forward,” he made no mention of the phrase “reform and opening up,” instead quoting from Lenin and praising Mao. Deng framed his new initiatives through Mao’s language, saying that to pursue true Marxism, cadres must “seek truth from facts.” Deng’s call for a foreign investment law came last in a list of draft legislation covering routine topics such as forestry, factories, and labor. The radical impact of Deng’s reforms only became apparent over time, through actions rather than words.

So it may have been with the Third Plenum in 2013, when Xi framed his ambitions in the language of his immediate predecessors. Whatever is said at the dais, Chinese policymaking ultimately depends as much—or more—on personalities, and the pressure of events, as on showpiece meetings of party or state.

This year’s arrhythmic Third Plenum has, so far, yielded a 5,000-word communiqué and a “decision” document, along with a profusion of records, commentary, and clarifications to elucidate the CCP’s will. These hail Xi’s “comprehensively deepening reforms” but have offered few specifics so far. Whatever the future of China’s politics and economy, Xi’s continuing central role in guiding both appears ensured.

[beardedmrbean]

Washington — 

U.S. lawmakers Thursday charged the Chinese Communist Party is using coercive economic practices to achieve worldwide dominance over the United States.

The accusations came at a hearing of the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Partydays after U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen met with Chinese officials in Beijing to discuss the nations’ economic relationship.

Yellen said that while the United States was taking targeted national security actions, “a decoupling of the world's two largest economies would be disastrous for interests for both countries and destabilizing for the world, and it would be virtually impossible to undertake. We want a dynamic and healthy global economy that is open, free and fair.”

Diplomatic relations between the two countries have been tense since the U.S. downed a Chinese spy balloon earlier this year. Witnesses told the House panel Thursday U.S. companies are facing increasing threats operating inside China.

“There's no such thing as a private company in China, a raft of legislation like the updated counterespionage law, the data security law, the anti-foreign sanctions law has codified what was always true. China reserves the right to swipe any data, to seize any assets and take IP that it wishes,” committee Chairman Mike Gallagher said.

According to committee members, China’s restrictive environment is resulting in a so-called “brain-drain” of its own business people, turning China into the top country in the world for the departure of wealthy individuals, fleeing what they fear is the Communist Party’s ability to arbitrarily seize assets.

Witnesses testified the environment in China is becoming increasingly restrictive for American companies and individuals.

“In the last few months, PRC authorities are now charging any domestic or foreign businessperson with espionage simply for providing any services using PRC information to grant or give to third-country-based customers,” Piper Lounsbury, chief research and development officer at Strategy Risks, a risk management firm for companies doing business in China, said.

“The crackdown on consulting businesses, the enhanced data, secrecy laws and the flow of PRC information just highlight the negative symmetry that we have with China. This means that even companies now can't even do due diligence in advance of any sort of business transaction,” Lounsbury, said.

The Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry pushed back against criticism of its business practices Monday in response to a U.S. State Department travel advisory issued this month warning Americans citizens of the “risk of wrongful detention.”

“China is a country under the rule of law. The decision of relevant departments to carry out security review of foreign companies according to law is based on laws and facts. China welcomes citizens and enterprises from all over the world to visit China and do business in China, and protects their safety and legitimate rights and interests in China, including freedom of exit and entry,” said Mao Ning, a spokesperson for the ministry.

Witnesses, though, told the committeetold lawmakers that American businesses face a restrictive environment led from the top down by President Xi Jinping, potential intellectual property theft and the constant threat of seized assets.

“The issue is how much do I need to lose to have access to the market, so it’s a balancing act,” said Desmond Shum, a businessman whose ex-wife, Whitney Duan, was arrested by the Chinese. Shum, the author of Red Roulette: An Insider's Story of Wealth, Power, Corruption and Vengeance in Today’s China, told U.S. news program 60 Minutes that he and his then-wife participated in corrupt business practices in China.

In its latest report to Congress in 2022, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, set up by Congress in 2000 to monitor and report on the national security implications of the U.S.-China economic relationship, as well as make recommendations, said U.S. businesses and investors are reevaluating their reengagement in China.

“China has subverted the global trade system and moved further from the spirit and letter of its obligations under its WTO accession protocol,” the report said. “China’s subsidies, overcapacity, intellectual property theft, and protectionist nonmarket policies exacerbate distortions to the global economy. These practices have harmed workers, producers, and innovators in the United States and other market-based countries.”

The commission went on to say the United States’ ability to overcome harmful trade practices was undermined by the lack of a coherent strategy.

[jcmarchi]

Congress pushes GPS tracking for every exported semiconductor

New Post has been published on https://thedigitalinsider.com/congress-pushes-gps-tracking-for-every-exported-semiconductor/

Congress pushes GPS tracking for every exported semiconductor

America’s quest to protect its semiconductor technology from China has taken increasingly dramatic turns over the past few years—from export bans to global restrictions—but the latest proposal from Congress ventures into unprecedented territory. 

Lawmakers are now pushing for mandatory GPS-style tracking embedded in every AI chip exported from the United States, essentially turning advanced semiconductors into devices that report their location back to Washington.

On May 15, 2025, a bipartisan group of eight House representatives introduced the Chip Security Act, which would require companies like Nvidia to embed location verification mechanisms in their processors before export. 

This represents perhaps the most invasive approach yet in America’s technological competition with China, moving far beyond restricting where chips can go to actively monitoring where they end up.

The mechanics of AI chip surveillance

Under the proposed Chip Security Act, AI chip surveillance would become mandatory for all “covered integrated circuit products”—including those classified under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090, 3A001.z, 4A090, and 4A003.z. Companies like Nvidia would be required to embed location verification mechanisms in their AI chips before export, reexport, or in-country transfer to foreign nations.

Representative Bill Huizenga, the Michigan Republican who introduced the House bill, stated that “we must employ safeguards to help ensure export controls are not being circumvented, allowing these advanced AI chips to fall into the hands of nefarious actors.” 

His co-lead, Representative Bill Foster—an Illinois Democrat and former physicist who designed chips during his scientific career—added, “I know that we have the technical tools to prevent powerful AI technology from getting into the wrong hands.”

The legislation goes far beyond simple location tracking. Companies would face ongoing surveillance obligations, required to report any credible information about chip diversion, including location changes, unauthorized users, or tampering attempts. 

This creates a continuous monitoring system that extends indefinitely beyond the point of sale, fundamentally altering the relationship between manufacturers and their products.

Cross-party support for technology control

Perhaps most striking about this AI chip surveillance initiative is its bipartisan nature. The bill enjoys broad support across party lines, co-led by House Select Committee on China Chairman John Moolenaar and Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi. Other cosponsors include Representatives Ted Lieu, Rick Crawford, Josh Gottheimer, and Darin LaHood.

Moolenaar said that “the Chinese Communist Party has exploited weaknesses in our export control enforcement system—using shell companies and smuggling networks to divert sensitive US technology.” 

The bipartisan consensus on AI chip surveillance reflects how deeply the China challenge has penetrated American political thinking, transcending traditional partisan divisions.

The Senate has already introduced similar legislation through Senator Tom Cotton, suggesting that semiconductor surveillance has broad congressional support. Coordination between chambers indicates that some form of AI chip surveillance may become law regardless of which party controls Congress.

Technical challenges and implementation questions

The technical requirements for implementing AI chip surveillance raise significant questions about feasibility, security, and performance. The bill mandates that chips implement “location verification using techniques that are feasible and appropriate” within 180 days of enactment, but provides little detail on how such mechanisms would work without compromising chip performance or introducing new vulnerabilities.

For industry leaders like Nvidia, implementing mandatory surveillance technology could fundamentally alter product design and manufacturing processes. Each chip would need embedded capabilities to verify its location, potentially requiring additional components, increased power consumption, and processing overhead that could impact performance—precisely what customers in AI applications cannot afford.

The bill also grants the Secretary of Commerce broad enforcement authority to “verify, in a manner the Secretary determines appropriate, the ownership and location” of exported chips. This creates a real-time surveillance system where the US government could potentially track every advanced semiconductor worldwide, raising questions about data sovereignty and privacy.

Commercial surveillance meets national security

AI chip surveillance proposal represents an unprecedented fusion of national security imperatives with commercial technology products. Unlike traditional export controls that simply restrict destinations, the approach creates ongoing monitoring obligations that blur the lines between private commerce and state surveillance.

Representative Foster’s background as a physicist lends technical credibility to the initiative, but it also highlights how scientific expertise can be enlisted in geopolitical competition. The legislation reflects a belief that technical solutions can solve political problems—that embedding surveillance capabilities in semiconductors can prevent their misuse.

Yet the proposed law raises fundamental questions about the nature of technology export in a globalized world. Should every advanced semiconductor become a potential surveillance device? 

How will mandatory AI chip surveillance affect innovation in countries that rely on US technology? What precedent does this set for other nations seeking to monitor their technology exports?

Accelerating technological decoupling

The mandatory AI chip surveillance requirement could inadvertently accelerate the development of alternative semiconductor ecosystems. If US chips come with built-in tracking mechanisms, countries may intensify efforts to develop domestic alternatives or source from suppliers without such requirements.

China, already investing heavily in semiconductor self-sufficiency following years of US restrictions, may view these surveillance requirements as further justification for technological decoupling. The irony is striking: efforts to track Chinese use of US chips may ultimately reduce their appeal and market share in global markets.

Meanwhile, allied nations may question whether they want their critical infrastructure dependent on chips that can be monitored by the US government. The legislation’s broad language suggests that AI chip surveillance would apply to all foreign countries, not just adversaries, potentially straining relationships with partners who value technological sovereignty.

The future of semiconductor governance

As the Trump administration continues to formulate its replacement for Biden’s AI Diffusion Rule, Congress appears unwilling to wait. The Chip Security Act represents a more aggressive approach than traditional export controls, moving from restriction to active surveillance in ways that could reshape the global semiconductor industry.

This evolution reflects deeper changes in how nations view technology exports in an era of great power competition. The semiconductor industry, once governed primarily by market forces and technical standards, increasingly operates under geopolitical imperatives that prioritize control over commerce.

Whether AI chip surveillance becomes law depends on congressional action and industry response. But the bipartisan support suggests that some form of semiconductor monitoring may be inevitable, marking a new chapter in the relationship between technology, commerce, and national security.

Conclusion: The end of anonymous semiconductors from America?

The question facing the industry is no longer whether the US will control technology exports, but how extensively it will monitor them after they leave American shores. In this emerging paradigm, every chip becomes a potential intelligence asset, and every export a data point in a global surveillance network.

The semiconductor industry now faces a critical choice: adapt to a future where products carry their own tracking systems, or risk being excluded from the US market entirely. 

As Congress pushes for mandatory AI chip surveillance, we may be witnessing the end of anonymous semiconductors and the beginning of an era where every processor knows exactly where it belongs—and reports back accordingly.

See also: US-China tech war escalates with new AI chips export controls

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[darth-puma-vader]

As awareness grows of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) influence in the United States, a former congresswoman from California is shedding light on the regime’s reach in the state, across the country, and around the world.

Michelle Steel, who served in Congress from 2021 to 2025 and sat on several committees dealing with China-related issues, raised concerns about the CCP’s influence on the U.S. higher education system in a recent interview with EpochTV’s “California Insider.”

“Universities were the worst one. We have a prominent university in California called UC Berkeley ... and they received $220 million from China,” Steel said.

Under the Higher Education Act of 1965, universities must report to the Department of Education every six months any foreign gifts or contracts—either individually or combined—valued at $250,000 or more in a calendar year.

Steel alleged the university never reported the money.

The allegations surfaced in 2023 when Education and Workforce Committee chairwoman Rep. Virginia Foxx (R-N.C.) and then Select Committee on China chairman Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) stated in a letter to University of California–Berkeley officials that the university failed to report investments from the Chinese municipal government—$220 million of which was intended to fund a campus in Shenzhen, China—for the Tsinghua-Berkeley Shenzhen Institute, a joint research initiative.

Tsinghua University, one of China’s top institutions, is governed by the country’s Ministry of Education.

In exchange for the money it received, the university allegedly provided exclusive tours of advanced semiconductor research facilities to Chinese delegations, including senior Chinese regime officials, according to another letter to the National Science Foundation from House Science, Space, and Technology Committee chairman Rep. Frank Lucas (R-Okla.) and Research and Technology Subcommittee chairman Rep. Mike Collins (R-Ga.).

[home-inspiration-blog]

House panel requests data from USC on Chinese nationals

A subcommittee in the U.S. House of Representatives has sent a letter to USC requesting information on Chinese nationals taking classes at the university. The House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party lists its mission as working “on the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party and [to] develop a plan of action to defend the American people, our economy, and our values.” In the…

[rockhaven777]

加州非法生物实验室背后藏匿大批卖美贼？ 国会众议院中共委员会调查报告中透露，中共藏在美国渗透最严重的加州非法生物实验室被调查，报告中提到FBI、CDC的工作失误，那些推脱阻挠推诿的卖美贼定将在调查中暴露。 Are there a large number of traitors hiding behind California's illegal biolabs? The investigation report from the U.S. House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party reveals that illegal biolabs in California, the state most deeply infiltrated by the CCP, have been investigated. The report highlights operational failures by the FBI and CDC, and those traitors who evade, obstruct, and shift blame will surely be exposed during the investigation. #生物实验室 #CCP #卖美贼 #避风港Haven #NewsAnalys

[michigantopnews]

Michigan Lawmakers Warn Universities: Cut China Ties or Lose Funding

Michigan Representatives call for Eastern Michigan University, Oakland University, and the University of Detroit Mercy to end joint programs with Chinese universities linked to the Chinese military. Moolenaar, Walberg Demand Michigan Universities Sever China Ties WASHINGTON, D.C. – Congressman John Moolenaar, Chair of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, and Congressman…