#dataconfidentiality

[biuro-tlumaczen-advance]

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[jinactusconsulting]

How do you ensure data consistency across various systems and databases within an organization?

Ensuring data consistency across various systems and databases within an organization is crucial for accurate reporting, effective decision-making, and smooth business operations. Data consistency can be achieved through various techniques and best practices, including:

Data Integration and Centralization: Implement a robust data integration strategy to centralize data from different sources into a unified data repository or data warehouse. This ensures that all systems and applications within the organization access and update a single, authoritative source of data.

Master Data Management (MDM): Utilize Master Data Management solutions to create and maintain a master record of critical data entities (e.g., customers, products) that are shared across different systems. This helps in ensuring consistent and standardized data across the organization.

Data Standardization: Enforce data standardization practices to ensure uniformity in data format, naming conventions, and data definitions across various systems. This reduces the risk of data inconsistencies arising from variations in data representation.

Data Quality Management: Implement data quality management processes to identify and resolve data quality issues. Regular data quality checks and cleansing activities help maintain consistent and accurate data.

Data Governance: Establish a data governance framework that defines data ownership, data stewardship, and data management policies. This ensures that data consistency measures are implemented and monitored effectively.

Data Validation Rules: Define and enforce data validation rules and constraints for each data attribute in the databases and systems. These rules should check data integrity and enforce business rules to maintain consistency.

Transaction Management: Implement transaction management mechanisms to ensure that changes to data across multiple systems are carried out in a controlled manner. Transactions help maintain data consistency even in the event of system failures or errors.

Real-time Data Replication: Use real-time data replication technologies to synchronize data across databases and systems in real-time. This ensures that the most up-to-date information is available uniformly across the organization.

Change Management Processes: Implement change management processes to govern any modifications to data structures or data-related processes. These processes help maintain data consistency during system upgrades or changes.

Data Versioning and Timestamps: Implement version control and timestamps to track changes to data over time. This allows for easy identification of the most recent data and helps maintain data consistency in historical records.

Regular Data Audits: Conduct periodic data audits to identify any discrepancies or inconsistencies in data across systems. Address any identified issues promptly to maintain data consistency.

Training and Awareness: Train employees on data consistency best practices and the importance of data integrity. Awareness among staff helps minimize human errors and improves adherence to data consistency guidelines.

By combining these strategies, organizations can ensure data consistency across their various systems and databases, enabling reliable and accurate data for better decision-making and operational efficiency.

[garymdm]

What is Confidential Data? And How Does it Differ From Sensitive Data?

Is all private data equal? #ConfidentialData isn't just about personal info - it's any info your organization keeps secret. Learn how to protect it from breaches and legal trouble.

The increased focus on data privacy regulations has us thinking a lot about confidential data, often assuming it’s just personal information. But the definition can be surprisingly complex, even for personal data! The Regulatory Maze: Personal Data DefinitionsConfidential Data: Beyond Personal InformationExamples of Confidential Data:Securing Confidential DataConfidential vs. Sensitive Data:…

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[meracashier]

आज ‘डाटा संरक्षण दिवस’ (Data Privacy Day) मनाया जा रहा है, जो आपको डाटा की सुरक्षा के महत्व के बारे में और व्यक्तिगत जानकारी की रक्षा करने के लिए प्रोत्साहित करता है.

[mahdi-sabour]

Key Reinstallation Attacks: Forcing Nonce Reuse in WPA2

Mathy Vanhoef imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be Frank Piessens imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven Frank.Piessens@cs.kuleuven.be ABSTRACT We introduce the key reinstallation attack. This attack abuses design or implementation flaws in cryptographic protocols to reinstall an already-in-use key. This resets the key’s associated parameters such as transmit nonces and receive replay counters. Several types of cryptographic Wi-Fi handshakes are affected by the attack. All protected Wi-Fi networks use the 4-way handshake to generate a fresh session key. So far, this 14-year-old handshake has remained free from attacks, and is even proven secure. However, we show that the 4-way handshake is vulnerable to a key reinstallation attack. Here, the adversary tricks a victim into reinstalling an already-in-use key. This is achieved by manipulating and replaying handshake messages. When reinstalling the key, associated parameters such as the incremental transmit packet number (nonce) and receive packet number (replay counter) are reset to their initial value. Our key reinstallation attack also breaks the PeerKey, group key, and Fast BSS Transition (FT) handshake. The impact depends on the handshake being attacked, and the data-confidentiality protocol in use. Simplified, against AES-CCMP an adversary can replay and decrypt (but not forge) packets. This makes it possible to hijack TCP streams and inject malicious data into them. Against WPATKIP and GCMP the impact is catastrophic: packets can be replayed, decrypted, and forged. Because GCMP uses the same authentication key in both communication directions, it is especially affected. Finally, we confirmed our findings in practice, and found that every Wi-Fi device is vulnerable to some variant of our attacks. Notably, our attack is exceptionally devastating against Android 6.0: it forces the client into using a predictable all-zero encryption key. KEYWORDS security protocols; network security; attacks; key reinstallation; WPA2; nonce reuse; handshake; packet number; initialization vector 1 INTRODUCTION All protected Wi-Fi networks are secured using some version of Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA/2). Moreover, nowadays even public hotspots are able to use authenticated encryption thanks to the Hotspot 2.0 program [7]. All these technologies rely on the 4-way handshake defined in the 802.11i amendment of 802.11 [4]. In this Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. CCS’17, October 30–November 3, 2017, Dallas, TX, USA. © 2017 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to Association for Computing Machinery. ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-4946-8/17/10. . . $15.00 https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134027 work, we present design flaws in the 4-way handshake, and in related handshakes. Becausewe target these handshakes, bothWPAand WPA2-certified products are affected by our attacks. The 4-way handshake provides mutual authentication and session key agreement. Together with (AES)-CCMP, a data-confidentiality and integrity protocol, it forms the foundation of the 802.11i amendment. Since its first introduction in 2003, under the name WPA, this core part of the 802.11i amendment has remained free from attacks. Indeed, the only currently known weaknesses of 802.11i are in (WPA-)TKIP [57, 66]. This data-confidentiality protocol was designed as a short-term solution to the broken WEP protocol. In other words, TKIP was never intended to be a longterm secure solution. Additionally, while several attacks against protected Wi-Fi networks were discovered over the years, these did not exploit flaws in 802.11i. Instead, attacks exploited flaws in Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) [73], flawed drivers [13, 20], flawed random number generators [72], predictable pre-shared keys [45], insecure enterprise authentication [21], and so on. That no major weakness has been found in CCMP and the 4-way handshake, is not surprising. After all, both have been formally proven as secure [39, 42]. With this in mind, one might reasonably assume the design of the 4-way handshake is indeed secure. In spite of its history and security proofs though, we show that the 4-way handshake is vulnerable to key reinstallation attacks. Moreover, we discovered similar weaknesses in other Wi-Fi handshakes. That is, we also attack the PeerKey handshake, the group key handshake, and the Fast BSS Transition (FT) handshake. The idea behind our attacks is rather trivial in hindsight, and can be summarized as follows. When a client joins a network, it executes the 4-way handshake to negotiate a fresh session key. It will install this key after receiving message 3 of the handshake. Once the key is installed, it will be used to encrypt normal data frames using a data-confidentiality protocol. However, because messages may be lost or dropped, the Access Point (AP) will retransmit message 3 if it did not receive an appropriate response as acknowledgment. As a result, the client may receive message 3 multiple times. Each time it receives this message, it will reinstall the same session key, and thereby reset the incremental transmit packet number (nonce) and receive replay counter used by the data-confidentiality protocol. We show that an attacker can force these nonce resets by collecting and replaying retransmissions of message 3. By forcing nonce reuse in this manner, the data-confidentiality protocol can be attacked, e.g., packets can be replayed, decrypted, and/or forged. The same technique is used to attack the group key, PeerKey, and fast BSS transition handshake.

When the 4-way or fast BSS transition handshake is attacked, the precise impact depends on the data-confidentiality protocol being used. If CCMP is used, arbitrary packets can be decrypted. In turn, this can be used to decrypt TCP SYN packets, and hijack TCP connections. For example, an adversary can inject malicious CCS’17, October 30–November 3, 2017, Dallas, TX, USA. Mathy Vanhoef and Frank Piessens content into unencrypted HTTP connections. If TKIP or GCMP is used, an adversary can both decrypt and inject arbitrary packets. Although GCMP is a relatively new addition to Wi-Fi, it is expected to be adopted at a high rate in the next few years [58]. Finally, when the group key handshake is attacked, an adversary can replay group-addressed frames, i.e., broadcast and multicast frames. Our attack is especially devastating against version 2.4 and 2.5 of wpa_supplicant, a Wi-Fi client commonly used on Linux. Here, the client will install an all-zero encryption key instead of reinstalling the real key. This vulnerability appears to be caused by a remark in the 802.11 standard that suggests to clear parts of the session key from memory once it has been installed [1, §12.7.6.6]. Because Android uses a modified wpa_supplicant, Android 6.0 and Android Wear 2.0 also contain this vulnerability. As a result, currently 31.2% of Android devices are vulnerable to this exceptionally devastating variant of our attack [33]. Interestingly, our attacks do not violate the security properties proven in formal analysis of the 4-way and group key handshake. In particular, these proofs state that the negotiated session key remains private, and that the identity of both the client and Access Point (AP) is confirmed [39]. Our attacks do not leak the session key. Additionally, although normal data frames can be forged if TKIP or GCMP is used, an attacker cannot forge EAPOL messages and hence cannot impersonate the client or AP during (subsequent) handshakes. Instead, the problem is that the proofs do not model key installation. Put differently, their models do not state when a negotiated key should be installed. In practice, this means the same key can be installed multiple times, thereby resetting nonces and replay counters used by the data-confidentiality protocol. To summarize, our main contributions are: • We introduce key reinstallation attacks. Here, an attacker forces the reinstallation of an already-in-use key, thereby resetting any associated nonces and/or replay counters. • We show that the 4-way handshake, PeerKey handshake, group key handshake, and fast BSS transition handshake are vulnerable to key reinstallation attacks. • We devise attack techniques to carry out our attacks in practice. This demonstrates that all implementations are vulnerable to some variant of our attack. • We evaluate the practical impact of nonce reuse for all dataconfidentiality protocols of 802.11. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces relevant aspects of the 802.11 standard. Our key reinstallation attack is illustrated against the 4-way and PeerKey handshake in Section 3, against the group key handshake in Section 4, and against the fast BSS transition handshake in Section 5. In Section 6 we asses the impact of our attacks, present countermeasures, explain where proofs failed, and discuss lessons learned. Finally, we present related work in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8. 2 BACKGROUND In this section we introduce the 802.11i amendment, the various messages and handshakes used when connecting to a Wi-Fi network, and the data-confidentiality and integrity protocols of 802.11. 2.1 The 802.11i Amendment After researchers showed that Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) was fundamentally broken [30, 65], the IEEE offered a more robust solution in the 802.11i amendment of 802.11. This amendment defines the 4-way handshake (see Section 2.3), and two data-confidentiality and integrity protocols called (WPA-)TKIP and (AES-)CCMP (see Section 2.4). While the 802.11i amendment was under development, the Wi-Fi Alliance already began certifying devices based on draft version D3.0 of 802.11i. This certification program was called Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA). Once the final version D9.0 of 802.11i was ratified, the WPA2 certification was created based on this officially ratified version. Because both WPA and WPA2 are based on 802.11i, they are almost identical on a technical level. The main difference is that WPA2 mandates support for the more secure CCMP, and optionally allows TKIP, while the reverse is true for WPA. Required functionality of both WPA and WPA2, and used by all protected Wi-Fi networks, is the 4-way handshake. Even enterprise networks rely on the 4-way handshake. Hence, all protected Wi-Fi networks are affected by our attacks. The 4-way handshake, group key handshake, and CCMP protocol, have formally been analyzed and proven to be secure [39, 42]. 2.2 Authentication and Association When a client wants to connect to a Wi-Fi network, it starts by (mutually) authenticating and associating with the AP. In Figure 2 this is illustrated in the association stage of the handshake. However, when first connecting to a network, no actual authentication takes places at this stage. Instead, Open System authentication is used, which allows any client to authenticate. Actual authentication will be performed during the 4-way handshake. Real authentication is only done at this stage when roaming between two APs of the same network using the fast BSS transition handshake (see Section 3). After (open) authentication, the client associates with the network. This is done by sending an association request to the AP. This message contains the pairwise and group cipher suites the client wishes to use. The AP replies with an association response, informing the client whether the association was successful or not. 2.3 The 4-way Handshake The 4-way handshake provides mutual authentication based on a shared secret called the Pairwise Master Key (PMK), and negotiates a fresh session key called the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK). During this handshake, the client is called the supplicant, and the AP is called the authenticator (we use these terms as synonyms). The PMK is derived from a pre-shared password in a personal network, and is negotiated using an 802.1x authentication stage in an enterprise network (see Figure 2). The PTK is derived from the PMK, Authenticator Nonce (ANonce), Supplicant Nonce (SNonce), and the MAC addresses of both the supplicant and authenticator. Once generated, the PTK is split into a Key Confirmation Key (KCK), Key Encryption Key (KEK), and Temporal Key (TK). The KCK and KEK are used to protect handshake messages, while the TK is used to protect normal data frames with a data-confidentiality protocol. If WPA2 is used, the 4-way handshake also transports the current Group Temporal Key (GTK) to the supplicant.

[sensitive-virgo]

#MedicalTranscription #RoyalMedicalTranscription #KolkataBasedMedicalTranscription #MedicalTranscriptionInKolkata #ICD10Guidelines #MedicalDocumentation #DataConfidentiality Earlier Manual Documentation used to be the primary method to record data in medical transcription. However, with the passage of time, Manual Documentation fails to meet ICD Guidelines in reference to medical documentation. It is found to lose it importance, thereby becoming obsolete. Here are the reasons behind…