#otto neurath

[disciplinethepainter]

[tagitables]

My heart ! 🤍

[henriduree]

Zitat d. W. 30

[geopolicraticus]

Frontiers - Spring 2023

Many years ago I retrieved a book from a free book bin. It was Carl Hempel’s Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science. I was intrigued by the idea of concept formation, and the book has turned out to be an ongoing influence on my thought to the present day. Hempel’s monograph was squarely within the tradition of Anglo-American analytical philosophy, featured as Vol. II, No. 7 in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science (IEUS), an ambitious but unfinished positivist project, closely associated with the Vienna Circle and logical empiricism.

I have since acquired several other monographs from the IEUS. In Vol. II, No. 1, Foundations of the Social Sciences by Otto Neurath, I found an anticipation of big history in which Neurath imagines, “all sciences as dovetailed to such a degree that we may regard them as parts of one science which deals with stars, Milky Ways, earth, plants, animals, human beings, forests, natural regions, tribes, and nations—in short, a comprehensive cosmic history.” (p. 9) However, the unity of science imagined by Neurath was reductive rather than emergent, being based upon the conceptual framework of early twentieth century positivism. There is a collection of papers, Otto Neurath and the Unity of Science, edited by Symons, Pombo, and Torres, focusing on just this difference between reductive and emergent conceptions of unified science.

Another monograph in the IEUS, Vol. II, No. 5, The Technique of Theory Construction by Joseph H. Woodger (who, in another work, The Axiomatic Method in Biology, has given a spectacularly reductive account of biology), includes this interesting aside: “The mere ordering of statements does not of itself create new information.” (p. 77)

While this is true, it ignores the fact that the ordering of information has a significant bearing upon emphasis and obviousness. The reductive unification of the sciences orders knowledge hierarchically, emphasizing the fundamental nature of physics in a material universe. An emergentist unification of science also orders knowledge hierarchically, but with the emphasis on the implicit possibilities that flower into later complexity. Both are true; each is complementary to the other; and each puts knowledge in a decidedly different light.

The logical empiricists, largely neglected today, are to be admired for the consistency and thoroughness with which they set about the reorganization of knowledge built from the bottom up by an explicit program of concept formation that built a common conceptual framework for the enterprise. Big history also seeks a thorough-going reorganization of knowledge on emergentist lines. Pulling back from the detail both of traditional history and of reductivist theories of knowledge, big history is a re-ordering of knowledge that places the facts of the world in light of the bigger picture—perhaps this is not new information, but it is a new perspective on information.

Big history would do well to study the history of concept formation, the better to understand the process of concept formation, and to pursue its own systematic effort at big history concept formation no less ambitious than that of the logical empiricists. There is much material upon which to draw. Years after I found Hempel’s monograph, I got a copy of Heinrich Rickert’s The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science: A Logical Introduction to the Historical Sciences. This work also systematically approaches concept formation, but Rickert belonged to those philosophers who thought that history requires a method distinct from that of the natural sciences, so his work is complementary to that of Hempel.

Once I started actively seeking out works on concept formation I also found Alfred Schutz’s 1954 paper “Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences.” Schutz had attended a seminar held by Nagel and Hempel, and, impressed by their methods, sought to extend the analysis of concept formation to the social sciences, and within a phenomenological framework. Again, this places knowledge in another light, and constitutes another complementary effort from which big history can learn. 

[shituationist]

it's amazing that so many lesswrongers see "sparks" of "AGI" in large language models because

the bulk of them are neo-hayekians, and their widespread belief in prediction markets attests to this

it's now very well documented that "knowledge" which models haven't been trained on ends up being confabulated when models are queried for it, and what you receive is nonsense that resembles human generated text. even with extensive training, without guardrails like inserting a definite source of truth and instructing the model not to contradict the knowledge therein (the much vaunted "RAG" method, which generates jobs for knowledge maintainers and which is not 100% effective - there is likely no model which has a reading comprehension rate of 100%, no matter how much you scale it or how much text you throw at it, so the possibility of getting the stored, human-curated, details wrong is always there), you're likely to keep generating that kind of nonsense

of course, hayek's whole thing is the knowledge problem. the idea that only a subset of knowledge can be readily retrieved and transmitted for the purpose of planning by "a single mind".

hayek's argument is very similar to the argument against general artificial intelligence produced by hubert dreyfus, and I don't think I'm even the first person to notice this. dan lavoie, probably one of the brightest austrian schoolers, used to recommend dreyfus's book to his students. both hayek and dreyfus argue that all knowledge can't simply be objectivized, that there's context-situated knowledge and even ineffable, unspeakable, knowledge which are the very kinds of knowledge that humans have to make use of daily to survive in the world (or the market).

hayek was talking in a relatively circumscribed context, economics, and was using this argument against the idea of a perfect planned economy. i am an advocate of economic planning, but i don't believe any economy could ever be perfect as such. hayek, if anything, might have even been too positive about the representability of scientific knowledge. on that issue, his interlocutor, otto neurath, has interesting insights regarding incommensurability (and on this issue too my old feyerabend hobbyhorse also becomes helpful, because "scientific truths" are not even guaranteed to be commensurable with one another).

it could be countered here that this is assuming models like GPT-4 are building symbolic "internal models" of knowledge which is a false premise, since these are connectionist models par excellence, and connectionism has some similiarity to austrian-style thinking. in that case, maybe an austrianist could believe that "general AI" could emerge from throwing enough data at a neural net. complexity science gives reasons for this to be disbelieved too however. these systems cannot learn patterns from non-ergodic systems (these simply cannot be predicted mathematically, and attempts to imbue models with strong predictive accuracy for them would likely make learning so computationally expensive that time becomes a real constraint), and the bulk of life, including evolution (and the free market), is non-ergodic. this is one reason why fully autonomous driving predictions have consistently failed, despite improvements: we're taking an ergodic model with no underlying formal understanding of the task and asking it to operate in a non-ergodic environment with a 100% success rate or close enough to it. it's an impossible thing to achieve - we human beings are non-ergodic complex systems and we can't even do it (think about this in relation to stafford beer's idea of the law of requisite variety). autonomous cars are not yet operating fully autonomously in any market, even the ones in which they have been training for years.

hayek did not seem to believe that markets generated optimal outcomes 100% of the time either, but that they were simply the best we can do. markets being out of whack is indeed hayek's central premise relating to entrepreneurship, that there are always imperfections which entrepreneurs are at least incentivized to find and iron out (and, in tow, likely create new imperfections; it's a complex system, after all). i would think hayek would probably see a similar structural matter being a fundamental limitation of "AI".

but the idea of "fundamental limitations" is one which not only the lesswrongers are not fond of, but our whole civilization. the idea that we might reach the limits of progress is frightening and indeed dismal for people who are staking bets as radical as eternal life on machine intelligence. "narrow AI" has its uses though. it will probably improve our lives in a lot of ways we can't foresee, until it hits its limits. understanding the limits, though, are vital for avoiding potentially catastrophic misuses of it. anthropomorphization of these systems - encouraged by the fact that they return contextually-relevant even if confabulated text responses to user queries - doesn't help us there.

we do have "general intelligences" in the world already. they include mammals, birds, cephalopods, and even insects. so far, even we humans are not masters of our world, and every new discovery seems to demonstrate a new limit to our mastery. the assumption that a "superintelligence" would fare better seems to hinge on a bad understanding of intelligence and what the limits of it are.

as a final note, it would be funny if there was a breakthrough which created an "AGI", but that "AGI" depended so much on real world embodiment that it was for all purposes all too human. such an "AGI" would only benefit from access to high-power computing machinery to the extent humans do. and if such a machine could have desires or a will of its own, who's to say it might not be so disturbed by life, or by boredom, that it opts for suicide? we tell ourselves that we're the smartest creatures on earth, but we're also one of the few species that willingly commit suicide. here's some speculation for you: what if that scales with intelligence?

[mariacallous]

On June 22, 1936, the philosopher Moritz Schlick was on his way to deliver a lecture at the University of Vienna when Johann Nelböck, a deranged former student of Schlick’s, shot him dead on the university steps. Some Austrian newspapers defended the madman, while Nelböck himself argued in court that his onetime teacher had promoted a treacherous Jewish philosophy. David Edmonds traces the rise and fall of the Vienna Circle—an influential group of brilliant thinkers led by Schlick—and of a philosophical movement that sought to do away with metaphysics and pseudoscience in a city darkened by fascism, anti-Semitism, and unreason. The Vienna Circle’s members included Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, and the eccentric logician Kurt Gödel. On its fringes were two other philosophical titans of the twentieth century, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper. The Circle championed the philosophy of logical empiricism, which held that only two types of propositions have cognitive meaning, those that can be verified through experience and those that are analytically true. For a time, it was the most fashionable movement in philosophy. Yet by the outbreak of World War II, Schlick’s group had disbanded and almost all its members had fled. Edmonds reveals why the Austro-fascists and the Nazis saw their philosophy as such a threat. The Murder of Professor Schlick paints an unforgettable portrait of the Vienna Circle and its members while weaving an enthralling narrative set against the backdrop of economic catastrophe and rising extremism in Hitler’s Europe.

[criswj]

Icon(ic) [C5]

LOOK AT THIS THING

iykyk

This image was imprinted in a disc sent into space. Why you might ask. Well, it was because this thing is us, all of the imagery you are seeing is us, and its meant to give any external life form a way to find us and show how we look. How? idk BUT Appart from the obvious men and women drawing, in the left that thing is our adress in relation to the sun, to the bottom is a solar system in order showing the general direction our space pioneers are sent to, and to the top apparently that is an electron particle in hydrogen.

Quite hard if you ask me.

Our professor showed us this picture to open our next topic: Icons

ICONS.

Now it makes a little more sense right?

What are icons? To put it simply, an icon is a graphical resource used to communicate something.

Easy right? Icons are usually simple and easy to read, they have a tendency to be simplistic and/or abstract, and this comes from way back. Recalling the GUI post, icons had to be readable on a low pixel grid as the Xerox Alto display. For that, many abstractions were made. Maybe we have this restrictions to blame when it comes to what is considered standard this day and age.

ISOTYPE.

In 1920, philosopher Vienés Otto Neurath with help of Gerd Arntz and his team created Isotype (International System of Typographic Picture Education) with the goal to have a universal visual language.

Isotype has influenced a lot of what we see today, things like crossing road, workers signals, school near signals, etc. After all Isotype takes something visually and abstracts it to a primordial and recognizable shape.

[rxshl]

ON EMPIRICISM: THE VIENNA CIRCLE

Habitual exposure makes things invisible. Fish are unaware of the water they move through, just as we humans typically fail to notice the air around us, unless there is a breeze.

For as long as most of us have been alive, our modern culture’s methods for exploring reality have prioritized mathematical logic and empirical science as the exclusive means to uncover truths about existence. Even spiritual intuitions or faith in a received religion is almost always framed in reference (and sometimes in opposition) to the standards of science. Scientific standards are like the air around us or the water in which fish swim.

Of course, this was not always so. In European culture, it took several centuries of struggle for empirical science and mathematics to push back against received religious “wisdom” about how the universe works. Scientists were often threatened with excommunication or death for promulgating empirical findings that contradicted church teachings (see: Copernicus). Even as empirical science rose in its powers of persuasion and credibility, social fissures developed and violence ensued (see: Darwin).

The cultural shift toward science as the arbiter of truth was not a constant march but rather a fitful, sporadic, and haphazard journey. During the centuries-long transition, it was not uncommon to find people with one foot solidly in each camp. Most notable among them, perhaps, was Sir Isaac Newton himself, discoverer of the laws of gravity and codiscoverer of calculus, who nonetheless produced far more written pages on alchemy than he ever did on mathematics or science.

At some point, though, the balance of power did shift. Science gained ground throughout the nineteenth century, with the advent of the Industrial Revolution. Scientific successes such as germ theory and the electric light bulb were vivid and immediate indicators of its reliability. And with the collapse of the old social orders in the violent chaos and destruction of World War I, momentum picked up speed.

The war had demolished the Austro-Hungarian Empire and reordered political power throughout Europe. Medieval hierarchies (the church and the aristocracy) were giving way to capitalism, communism, socialism, and fascism. Meanwhile, modern art, music, and writing were flourishing. Eventually, a movement coalesced in Vienna, one that would ultimately solidify what was to become our modern perspective.

From his office at Berggasse, Freud paved the way for a radical new understanding of human behavior. Not far away, Gustav Klimt and Egon Schiele were painting, Gustav Mahler and Arnold Schoenberg were composing, and Robert Musil and Stefan Zweig were writing.

Within this emergent hotbed of cultural activity, a diverse group of idealistic thinkers came together to concretize the view that empirical science and mathematical logic, exclusively, should guide our understanding of the world. These philosophers, scientists, mathematicians, logicians, and political and social theorists would later come to be known as the Vienna Circle.

They sought to banish nonscientific insights from what they considered reasonable, modern discourse and to purge philosophy of the more fanciful speculations of prior centuries. They didn’t aspire to perform science themselves but sought to catapult philosophy into the twentieth century; with the aid of modern logic, their aim was to make philosophy as scientific as possible.

The Vienna Circle was first gathered in 1924 by the philosopher Moritz Schlick, the social reformer Otto Neurath, and the mathematician Hans Hahn. Meeting regularly on Thursday evenings in a small lecture hall at the University of Vienna, the group referred to themselves as “logical positivists” and immediately entered into a decade of heated, though largely collegial, debate. What mattered most to them was how to characterize scientific knowledge and how to understand the nature of mathematics. Their fervent mission was to prevent philosophical confusion rooted in unclear language and unverifiable claims. They wished instead to convert philosophy into something “scientific” and set mathematics on complete and consistent foundations. As a corollary to all this, they also sought to banish metaphysics from modern thought.

Metaphysics is a field of philosophical inquiry concerned with questions that cannot be answered through an examination of material existence. Any attempts to understand the nature of life after death or the existence of a soul, for instance, would be a metaphysical speculation, as would efforts to comprehend the nature of gods and goddesses, or of a singular creator God.

Until the modern era, statements about consciousness fell exclusively within the realm of metaphysics. Church doctrines derived from ancient texts or spiritual insights—the only attempts to grapple with consciousness available at the time—were all metaphysical.

To a member of the Vienna Circle struggling to push past medieval modes of thought, anything with the whiff of metaphysics was to be summarily dismissed. If something could not be ascertained by empirical science or mathematical formal logic, it was deemed worthless. Indeed, among this crowd, declaring some statement to be “metaphysics” was to suggest not merely that it was wrong but that it was devoid of any meaning or significance. When debates within the circle grew heated, a declaration of “metaphysics!” by an opposing thinker was the ultimate smackdown.

The Vienna Circle led the way for our modern culture to award science and mathematics exclusive ownership over the truth. And the many successes of empirical science—from the development of antibiotics and vaccines to the exploration of other planets—fully demonstrated the power and importance of scientific methods.

As it turned out, though, while the philosophical vision of the Vienna Circle was idealistic and well-intentioned, it was also naive and destined to fall short.

[snowshoe1980]

In the 1930s, Austrian sociologist, philosopher, and curator Otto Neurath (December 10, 1882–December 22, 1945) and his not-yet-wife Marie pioneered ISOTYPE — the International System Of TYpographic Picture Education, a new visual language for capturing quantitative information in pictograms, sparking the golden age of infographics in print.

[taxxpayermoney]

Otto Neurath

[tagitables]

🖊 Phillip Frank

[ameliea1]

Las marcas y su evolución

En ciertos casos, es imperativo realizar cambios en la identidad visual de una marca para proporcionarle una nueva imagen que mantenga una conexión con la actual. Estos cambios pueden variar en su grado de transformación, pero es esencial conservar la esencia gráfica.

En ocasiones, cambios drásticos pueden destruir una marca, convirtiéndola en algo irreconocible, como sucedió en el caso de Twitter.

Este tipo de gestión de marca y su identidad visual va en contra del objetivo de mantener una esencia gráfica reconocible.

Tipos de Logos

Isotipo o Isotipo:

Era un sistema ordenado de signos visuales desarrollado para superar ambigüedades y limitaciones del lenguaje verbal. Está compuesto exclusivamente por imágenes, sin incluir texto.

El proyecto ISOTYPE fue liderado por el filósofo y economista austríaco Otto Neurath.

Logotipo:

Se refiere al uso exclusivo de letras para representar gráficamente la marca. En este caso, la tipografía sirve como imagen.

Imagotipo:

Es la representación visual de una marca que se compone de un isotipo y un logotipo, elementos que pueden utilizarse por separado. El imagotipo fusiona un ícono y un texto de manera distintiva.

Isologo:

Consiste en la unión de un logotipo con un isotipo, donde la tipografía e imagen se funden en una entidad indivisible.

Icono:

Es un símbolo gráfico presente en la pantalla de dispositivos electrónicos que representa un programa o sistema operativo.

Los iconos han evolucionado desde versiones monocromáticas con pocos píxeles hasta iconos a todo color, con mayor resolución, perspectiva y profundidad.

Me fascina cómo los iconos han cambiado con el tiempo, desde versiones monocromáticas con pocos píxeles hasta diseños a todo color y mayor complejidad. Crear un icono es un desafío que requiere planificación y claridad en los objetivos.

Realizamos un ejercicio de creación de un icono de 8x8 píxeles, lo cual resultó ser un gran reto. Crear un icono en un espacio tan reducido y limitado por colores y píxeles es una tarea compleja y requiere claridad en el diseño.

Posteriormente, repetimos el ejercicio con un icono de 16x16 píxeles y a todo color, lo cual resultó ser un poco más manejable, aunque la elección de colores y la cantidad de píxeles aún presentaban desafíos.

[marbellota]

La parte GRÁFICA y VISUAL  de las cosas

Los íconos son una representación gráfica esquemática que se utilizan para identificar los programas y diversas funciones.

Xerox Star con su primera interfaz gráfica, muestra funciones a través de los íconos, a partir de ello fueron evolucionando a medida que iban avanzando las interfaces gráficas, aumentando la densidad de pixeles

1920: Otto Neurath ingenió un sistema de pictogramas como lenguaje universal para que todos puedan entenderlo, denominado ISOTYPE. Respondiendo a una necesidad que el contexto exigía, periodo post guerra, analfabetismo en altos índices, por lo tanto las imágenes eran mas sencillas de comprender y recordar.

[shituationist]

Do you have any good sources/links critiquing market socialism? I’m thinking C4SS in particular.

I think the best book critiquing market liberalism in general is John O'Neill's the Market: Ethics, Knowledge and Politics, which comprehensively addresses major arguments in favor of markets or against socialist planning. O'Neill examines the Weber/von Mises "calculation problem," the von Hayek "knowledge problem," as well as critiques of planning from public choice theory and neoclassical welfare theory. O'Neill does this by contrasting the philosophies and underlying philosophical assumptions of pro-market thinkers to those of Otto Neurath, who was a partisan of non-monetary socialist planning up until his death, and whose contributions to the debate are often underpublicized (usually in favor of making Oskar Lange, himself a market socialist, the primary interlocuter with the Austrians).

Otto Neurath himself is worth reading because he provides an epistemological defense of economic planning. You can find his collected economic writings on libgen pretty easily. It's worth perusing in tandem with O'Neill's book.

Honorable mention to Paul Cockshott and Allin Cottrell's essay "Anti-Hayek", which is a decent materialist counter to the esoteric epistemology von Hayek uses to suggest socialist planning is ineffective. Their essay on Leonid Kantoravich's linear programming and in-kind planning is also worth reading as a critique of the Weber/von Mises position on economic calculation. Cockshott has unfortunately sullied his legacy via his 70s Maoist sex politics, but his essays critiquing the Austrian positions in the socialist planning debates are still worthy of consideration.

William Kapp was a critic of market liberalism whose book the Social Costs of Private Enterprise prefigured a lot of critiques of laissez-faire markets that later ecological economists like Georgescu-Roegen and Herman Daly (who were not exactly "anti-market" but whose critiques do underline how the neoclassical idealization of markets is not... ideal) would make more famous. Kapp focuses on the non-monetary and unmonetizable effects of private enterprise, which by definition can not enter into the strictly monetary accounting that informs the decision-making of any commercial enterprise, and which empirically cut against the pretensions of theoretical/rationalistic market liberal utopias.

The Parecon guys, Robin Hahnel and Michel Albert, provide both an institutional framework for planning and several critiques of market liberalism which are applicable to market socialism and market anarchism. Robin Hahnel's Milton's Myths series on socialisteconomist is really good and intended for a popular audience. Pat Devine is a thinker of a similar type who is less of a marginalist, unfortunately I can't name any essays or books of his off the top of my head, but he seems of interest.

Paul Mattick's "Limits of the Mixed Economy" I think would be relevant to Keynesian and post-Keynesian policy recommendations, since Keynesianism is of enduring interest to social democrats. I've never finished it though, so I don't really know. I do know it's talked about a lot in that way. Would be interesting to come back to that book some day myself.

As far as mutualism goes, I think Marx's critique of Proudhon's mutualism and similar schemes in the Poverty of Philosophy is definitive, even if Marx was not entirely honest w/r/t his object of critique. Engels's additions to this critique in his late prefaces to the Poverty of Philosophy and his debates with German Proudhonists over the housing question provide a sound enough basis for rejecting those kinds of schemes in favor of common ownership (i.e. communism).

<everything beyond this is based on personal reminiscence and not really a direct answer, take with a grain of salt>

With regards to C4SS, it's harder to say, b/c C4SS's moment seems to have passed, their moment was not that long in the first place, and they've always been defined politically more by their break from right-wing libertarianism than their antagonism to, say, Marxists, who are antagonistic intellectually but don't really have neo-mutualists on their radar, or anarchist-communists, who either just side with the Marxists, gesture vaguely in the direction of "the commons", or otherwise don't care enough about the topic to argue about it. As such I don't think C4SS itself has ever been singled out by anyone in an important way, but insofar as market anarchism is just market liberalism taken to its logical conclusions, critiques of the latter apply just as much to the former, and the sources above all provide compelling arguments against market liberalism and in favor of socialist planning.

Groups like C4SS thrived (relatively - C4SS has never had that large of a following) in a political atmosphere where the word "socialism" was still a very dirty one, where there was a lot of enthusiasm around p2p filesharing networks and p2p networks in general, where the overarching political consensus was that there was no alternative to markets and commerce, and where acephalous and amorphous political movements (that were seemingly structurally analogous to markets) had not yet exposed their limitations but seemed to be a genuine threat to state power (and not just a particular state power, but state power in general). Under those conditions, where leftists felt embarrassed to be proponents of what in the popular imagination had just been discredited with the fall of the Soviet bloc, C4SS style p2p utopianism was something you could gesture vaguely towards as an alternative, since those p2p schemes avoided the "centralized," "monolithic," and "sclerotic" epithets so often applied to central planning regimes, and fit well within the American political imaginary which has long treated decentralization as a virtue (the list of American endorsers of decentralism includes such diverse names as Thomas Jefferson, Henry David Thoreau, John C. Calhoun, Lysander Spooner, George Wallace, Murray Bookchin and Bob Black). That atmosphere has given way to one where the left once again favors more traditionally structured organizations, especially after the fizzle-out of the 2020 uprisings and the abject failure that was decentralist-anarchist (non-/anti-)leadership in places like Seattle and Portland, which resulted in no lasting victories and which frankly embarrassed the anarchist movement in North America (reminiscent of the numerous embarrassments for anarchists recounted in Engels's the Bakuninists at Work). There are still true believers, but right-wing libertarianism no longer funnels people in their direction as much now that the Libertarian Party has more or less successfully been merged into the network of miscellaneous reactionary movements. Self-identifying "left-libertarians" seem to me to be an increasingly rare breed.

Genuine market liberalism is also increasingly unpopular on the left and right. Liberals under Biden have embraced "industrial policy" which is ill-defined but seems to involve the state playing an active role in economic development, especially fostering domestic industries to reduce dependence on what the state identifies as its foreign rivals. Given how the libertarian movement continues to shed a lot of its left-wing cultural sympathies (not that there aren't holdouts), an SEK3 type is hard to imagine emerging from today's libertarian milieu, especially the libertarians below the age of 25.

I guess shameless self-promotion here for my own article for a "Mutual Exchange" series where I critiqued anarchist decentralism and the "decentralization/centralization" dichotomy that C4SS-ites are so endeared to: https://c4ss.org/content/53124

I know I've gone off a bit here, so I'll stop pontificating, but I hope this is helpful to anyone who's interested in these debates or in a potentially unreliable narrative developed primarily through online interactions.

[andreacrialesdgr]

El ícono

Los íconos son metáforas de una idea/concepto del mundo real. Evolución de los íconos: de fotos a cosas simples.

Por ejemplo iOS se volvió minimalista del iOS 6 al iOS 7.

Las interfaces: desde los jeroglíficos que eran formas de comunicación. El icono es una representación gráfica esquemática.

Grillas y gráficos: Primer videojuego gráfico fue SpaceInvaders

En 1920, Otto Neurath inventa el Isotype (International System of Typographic Picture Education), sistema de pictogramas

Isotipo - Imagotipo - Logotipo - Isologo

Pictograma: un código visual universal.

Las imágenes simplificadas son superiores a las imágenes detalladas. Los iconos son planos, sin perspectiva, simples.

Historia de los iconos

Apple Lisa: waste basket, fonts, colores, outline

1988: personalizable el escritorio de Apple

1989: NeXT - skeumorfismo, densidad de pixeles, escala de grises

1990: 16 colores

1993: sombras y 3D

1997: BeOS

1998: IRIX, flotan los objetos con sombras

1999: Rhapsody con transparencia

2001: Mac OS X de Steve Jobs, Windows XP, Windows Vista

2007: smartphones con iconos - HTC, Apple web con flat design (sin degradados ni sombras

Los iconos muestran la evolución de las marcas. Usan la proporción dorada, espiral áureo. TOOL - Lateralus.

[lala-079]

Que es el icono?

Otto Neurath crea el Isotype, es un sistema de pictogramas.