#EuroStack

[andypiper]

New blog post: Revisiting #LOPUG, talking cloud plaforms, enterprise software, and my own changing perspectives on the world. #CloudComputing #DigitalSovereignty

[marcogiovenale]

"eurostack’s open letter calling for technological sovereignty"

credo abbia senso (sicuramente più di un’entrata in guerra): EuroStack’s open letter calling for technological sovereignty: https://nextcloud.com/blog/open-letter-eurostack/ _

[sublimesublimecreator]

The Quiet Digital Sovereignty Crisis in European Tech

While policymakers debate regulations and funding packages, Europe's digital autonomy slips further away each quarter. European providers continue to lose ground despite ambitious digital sovereignty initiatives.

What interests me most isn't just the market dominance (70% controlled by US giants) but the practical questions that never get answered: How do you retain engineering talent when salaries are 2-3x higher across the Atlantic? How do you build sovereign infrastructure when procurement officers still choose American platforms?

And then there's the uncomfortable truth about innovation cycles. By the time Europe's projects navigate through bureaucracy, the technology landscape has already shifted. This isn't just about building European alternatives; it's about the speed at which they can evolve.

The fundamental tension between Europe's regulatory-first approach and the market realities of technological development remains unresolved. Until it is, the sovereignty gap will only widen.

[anselmolucio]

El largo camino hacia la soberanía digital de Europa

Dependencias digitales de la Unión Europea (Gráfico: EuroStack) La Unión Europea es un gigante comercial pero un enano en la carrera de las nuevas tecnologías. Estados Unidos es hegemónico en servicios y plataformas en la nube, Taiwán y otros países asiáticos son líderes en la fabricación de microchips y China posee la mayoría de las minas de las llamadas tierras raras. Cada vez es más evidente…

[scienza-magia]

Pericolo switch off, le iniziative europee

EuroStack, il piano per un'Europa indipendente da Big Tech. Secondo il collettivo Eurostack bisogna fare un tentativo per smarcarsi il più possibile dai player extra Ue. Prima che sia troppo tardi. Ecco come Il collettivo indipendente EuroStack mette nero su bianco le azioni chiave che l’Europa deve portare avanti per tentare di smarcarsi il prima possibile dai player extra-Ue, in particolare le Big tech americane, e lo fa in una missiva indirizzata alla presidente della Commissione europea Ursula von der Leyen e alla commissaria per la Sovranità tecnologica Henna Virkkunen. La lettera è firmata da un centinaio fra aziende e associazioni europee del mondo tecnologico e digitale insieme a Connect Europe, che rappresenta le principali telco. “La regolamentazione non funziona, è un’illusione ottica. L’Europa deve cambiare passo”, dice a Wired l’economista Cristina Caffarra, “madrina” di EuroStack, iniziativa in gran parte made in Italy, nata e condivisa insieme con Francesco Bonfiglio, Sebastiano Toffaletti e Vittorio Bertola. “Le tech company americane sono dei colossi che non si possono arginare con norme e sanzioni. La discrepanza per dimensione e competenze è abnorme e le risorse e le capacità sono impari. La realtà è questa. Siamo sulle sabbie mobili di un mondo che non ci appartiene. E i nodi stanno venendo al pettine”. Il rischio di un’escalation si sta facendo concreto più che mai: nei giorni scorsi la Commissione Ue ha adottato una serie di misure nell’ambito del Digital markets act che riguardano Google ed Apple accusate di aver violato il perimetro delle regole, una decisione che in molti hanno interpretato come “storica” e che rischia di mandare su tutte le furie il presidente degli Stati Uniti Donald Trump, che sulla questione della regolamentazione europea e delle misure a “danno” delle Big tech americane intende dire la sua. La tensione è dunque alle stelle e non sono da escludersi contromisure che potrebbero far saltare il banco. Cosa accadrebbe se le grandi compagnie americane, da Google a Microsoft, da Meta ad Apple (e la lista è ben più lunga) su ordine del presidente Trump staccassero la spina all’Europa?  Ai ritmi attuali la dipendenza dalle tecnologie non continentali diventerà quasi totale in meno di tre anni, allerta EuroStack. E la sovranità digitale non è sufficiente. Lo si è visto con il progetto a guida franco-tedesca GaiaX, di cui le Big tech americane fanno parte, e che si è di fatto impantanato nei lacciuoli della governance. Lo sa bene Francesco Bonfiglio che è stato a capo di GaiaX. “L’industry europea deve mobilitarsi perché, se è vero che competere ad armi pari con le Big tech non è possibile, è però possibile invertire la dinamica della domanda – sottolinea Caffarra -. In Europa ci sono decine, centinaia di aziende tecnologiche con elevate competenze”.  Già un anno fa, nel mese di maggio, Leandro Aglieri, presidente di Cloud for Defence e amministratore delegato per l’Italia di Vates - fra le aziende firmatarie della lettera di EuroStack - in occasione del primo Vates Innovation Summit, lanciava l’appello all’industry per dare vita a un Rinascimento digitale europeo.  E a Capri il prossimo 30 maggio andrà in scena la seconda edizione del summit che riunirà esperti nazionali e internazionali a dibattere proprio del delicato tema della sovranità tecnologica e digitale europea in uno scenario trumpiano che sta sparigliando le carte in tavola. “Ciò di cui le imprese europee hanno bisogno è una strategia di politica industriale pragmatica per ridurre le dipendenze nelle tecnologie critiche - scrive EuroStack nella lettera - e bisogna concentrarsi su iniziative selezionate per superare le criticità strutturali dell'Europa”, dal nanismo figlio della frammentazione alla burocrazia che continua a imperare in molti paesi, in primis l’Italia, fino alla mancanza di capitali adeguati. Nella lista delle cose da fare indicata da EuroStack c’è “l’obbligo di comprare europeo” a partire dagli appalti pubblici. “L'obiettivo non è escludere gli attori non europei, ma creare uno spazio in cui i fornitori europei possano legittimamente competere e giustificare gli investimenti - si legge ancora nel documento - creando un'offerta redditizia e sostenendo un approccio di aggregazione e standard industriali comuni in grado di fornire alternative europee scalabili”. E bisogna “dare priorità ai servizi con forti prospettive di adozione, che rispondono a esigenze reali come la soddisfazione di obiettivi di sicurezza informatica”. Per ogni progetto finanziato devono essere definiti business drivers (Bd), fattori critici di successo (Csf) indicatori chiave di prestazione (Kpi). E per quel che riguarda le risorse, secondo EuroStack è necessario rivedere e riorganizzare i piani nell'ambito del Digital Decade, “riassegnando i fondi laddove appropriato e dando priorità a progetti tangibili, rilevanti per il mercato e orientati ai risultati” e dare vita a un Fondo sovrano per le infrastrutture. Secondo l’economista Caffarra “la chiave di volta è generare domanda sulle aziende europee come fanno gli americani e i cinesi. E se si vogliono prevedere sussidi o incentivi allora devono andare a chi acquista queste tecnologie, in modo da poterle sostenere nello switch off”. Read the full article

[mariacallous]

The German high command learned a key lesson after losing World War I: Never fight a two-front war. That’s why Germany signed the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact with the Soviet Union, which stated that neither country would attack the other for a decade. But Adolf Hitler couldn’t count to 10, and Germany ended up in World War II—another two-front war that ended badly for Germany.

The same dictum goes for trade wars. It’s okay to fight a one-front war, but not a war with the whole world. As comedian Norm Macdonald joked on The Late Show in 2015, “In the early part of the previous century, Germany decided to go to war, and who did they go to war with? The world … Then about 30 years pass and Germany decides, again, to go to war. And, again, it chooses as its enemy the world!”

Now, U.S. President Donald Trump has decided to start a trade war, and who does he choose to attack? The world. On his so-called “Liberation Day” in April, Trump imposed tariffs on most countries, even islands with penguins and allies that run trade deficits with the United States.

The result is that the rest of the world appears to resent the United States now and is beginning to plan for a post-American trading system. Japan, South Korea, China, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are in talks to cooperate on trade, as are the European Union and China. Canada is also looking to the EU for closer trade and investment ties in light of Trump’s tariffs.

Regardless, Trump seems to think that the United States is still the top dog, the head honcho, the boss. But it’s time to face the facts: The United States will lose massively from his trade war.

The reason is simple. Too many U.S. companies, especially in advanced industries, need global market access to survive and thrive. The model Trump company is a low to moderate tech and nontraded American company selling almost all its output domestically. Think kitchen knife makers, furniture producers, and golf club companies. (Does Trump know that he and his fellow country club members will soon pay more for a new set of irons?) If Trump protects these companies from overseas competition, his thinking goes, these companies will thrive. How could they not with a large protected market?

Not so fast. The United States cannot be powerful without robust advanced industries. And those industries will seriously struggle in Trump’s new world.

There are multiple vectors of challenge. The first is that U.S. firms that produce for export—think Boeing, Merck, General Electric, and others—will see their input costs increase significantly as they pay tariffs on imported components and materials.

Second, as other nations enact reciprocal tariffs, these companies’ products will be priced out of foreign markets. Companies in other countries will buy South Korean memory chips rather than those manufactured by Micron. Airbus jets, not Boeing. Hitachi machinery, not Caterpillar. You get the idea.

On top of that, Trump is opening the floodgates for blatant discrimination against U.S. firms. The EU is using Trump’s aggression to justify its “EuroStack”: a plan to eventually replace almost all U.S. tech products, from computer chips to severs, with those made in Europe. And while the bloc has finally announced plans to boost military spending, it will do so by purchasing European-made weapons.

This gets to a related challenge. While U.S. exporters under Trump’s trade war will be increasingly shut out of foreign markets, their competitors will find themselves in a globally integrated market, albeit sans the United States. That will be particularly true as other nations take steps to create more integrated markets through new trade agreements. Foreign companies will have the scale needed to innovate and thrive. By contrast, U.S. producers, dependent on the relatively smaller U.S. market, will slowly shrivel and perhaps ultimately die.

Trump’s import substitution strategy (ISI) has been tried elsewhere before. It failed. The international development community widely embraced ISI in the 1950s and ’60s as a growth strategy—and many developing nations held onto it until the 1980s and beyond. One reason it failed was that countries, even relatively large ones like Brazil, did not have big enough markets to efficiently make increasingly complex goods. A recent analysis of global industrial policies by the International Monetary Fund found that it was nations that adopted export strategies, such as South Korea and Taiwan, that thrived—not those that championed ISI.

Even though the U.S. economy is much bigger than, say, South Korea’s, today’s advanced industries require larger markets than the United States can provide to survive—if only to generate the revenues needed to pay for continuous research and development.

But there’s more. As the United States’ role as the global trade hegemon wanes, China will surely take its place. Beijing has spent the last 15 years penetrating every global institution. With Trump leading the U.S. exit from many of them—such as the World Health Organization, the Paris Agreement, and the United Nations Human Rights Council—victory is China’s.

We are already seeing, and will likely continue to see, vastly more countries traveling to Beijing and kowtowing to Chinese President Xi Jinping to cut trade deals. Brazil and Colombia, once the largest recipient of U.S. economic assistance in South America, have already gone down that road. Chinese advanced industries may not have U.S. market access after the trade war, but they will have the rest of the world’s. American companies, meanwhile, will be left with the scraps of the U.S. market.

After Trump’s drawdown of foreign aid, China is also spending much more than the United States to win the hearts and minds of other countries. It doesn’t take a weather person to know which way the wind blows: east. As Xi recently wrote in an article for a Russian newspaper, “unilateralism, hegemony and acts of bullying are inflicting severe harm” around the world. Only Trump could make China look like the defender of free trade and solidarity.

To be clear, Trump needed to go to (trade) war with nations not playing fair. The top offender is China, which started the global trade war around 2006 and has ramped it up since Xi took office. Along with some other countries, Beijing has engaged in systemic mercantilist practices, helping to hollow out U.S. manufacturing and leading to massive U.S. trade deficits.

China conducted massive intellectual property theft. It bludgeoned foreign firms, forcing them to produce in China and transfer technology. Then, it closed its markets once it gained production capabilities in a particular industry.

U.S. attempts to address China’s cheating through the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been few and far between, in part because the WTO is structured in ways that make effectively prosecuting such actions nearly impossible. U.S. firms also largely refused to cooperate with the WTO for fear of Chinese government retribution. The same goes for the EU.

The relatively few cases the United States brought and won provided mostly pyrrhic victories, such as quotas for rare-earth exports and wind power subsidies, neither of which changed competitive realities. And in most cases, China filed counter suits to U.S. suits. Trump was right: It was time to declare war. But not, as Macdonald would say, on the world all at once.

So, is there any hope? Probably not. But if Trump is one thing, it is unpredictable.

Here’s what Trump should have done: first focus on a few of the worst offenders of global trading rules, such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and India. Before imposing tariffs, invite those countries to talk, list key U.S. demands, and give them 90 days to fix them. Only impose tariffs if they refuse to respond. And while doing that, focus on the trade barriers and irritants that are most important to U.S. competitiveness in advanced industries.

If these nations want to expand their shrimp exports, then who cares? If they want to close their markets to U.S. whiskey, that’s not worth fighting about. But attacking U.S. tech firms and limiting access to advanced U.S. goods and services—that’s worth going to the mattresses over.

Then, pivot to Europe. After that, pivot to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. You get the picture. But don’t go to war with the whole world at the same time. All that does is create a worldwide anti-American alliance.

When China conducts its trade wars, it has enough sense to not attack every country all at once. Beijing launches a trade strike on a particular nation and then waits for a bit, gauging the foreign response; when outrage has died down, it launches another. And like a frog in boiling water, other nations have taken China’s blows with barely a whimper.

China remains the only country with the will and the means to destroy U.S.—and Western—advanced technology industries. Trump’s trade war should be designed to keep Beijing from winning. Above all, that means working with U.S. allies. But in the face of the United States’ increasing hostility and declining power, many nations find it easier to cut deals with Beijing.

Without allies, any war is lost. Unless Trump shows a willingness to negotiate with U.S. allies—something he refused to do when he met with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in May—the United States will be just as globally isolated as it was before World War I. However, the big difference between then and now is that technology requires U.S. firms to attain global scale to survive and that China has emerged to outcompete them.

We can only hope that the United States emerges from its own multifront conflict better than Germany did.

[jcmarchi]

Reigniting the European digital economy's €200bn AI ambitions

New Post has been published on https://thedigitalinsider.com/reigniting-the-european-digital-economys-e200bn-ai-ambitions/

Reigniting the European digital economy's €200bn AI ambitions

There is a sense of urgency in Europe to re-imagine the status quo and reshape technology infrastructures. Timed to harness Europe’s innovative push comes GITEX EUROPE x Ai Everything (21-23 May, Messe Berlin).

The world’s third largest economy and host nation for GITEX EUROPE x Ai Everything, Germany’s role as the European economic and technology leader is confirmed as its ICT sector is projected to reach €232.8bn in 2025 (Statista).

GITEX EUROPE x Ai Everything is Europe’s largest tech, startup and digital investment event, and is organised by KAOUN International. It’s hosted in partnership with the Berlin Senate Department for Economics, Energy and Public Enterprises, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, Berlin Partner for Business and Technology, and the European Innovation Council (EIC).

Global tech engages for cross-border and industry partnerships

The first GITEX EUROPE brings together over 1,400 tech enterprises, startups and SMEs, and platinum sponsors AWS and IBM. Also in sponsorship roles are Cisco, Cloudflare, Dell, Fortinet, Lenovo, NTT, Nutanix, Nvidia, Opswat, and SAP.

GITEX EUROPE x Ai Everything will comprise of tech companies from over 100 countries and 34 European states, including tech pavilions from India, Italy, Morocco, Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, South Korea, UK, and the UAE.

Trixie LohMirmand, CEO of KAOUN International, organiser of GITEX worldwide, said: “There is a sense of urgency and unity in Europe to assert its digital sovereignty and leadership as a global innovation force. The region is paving its way as a centre-stage where AI, quantum and deep tech will be debated, developed, and scaled.”

Global leaders address EU’s tech crossroads

Organisers state there will be over 500 speakers, debating a range of issues including AI and quantum, cloud, and data sovereignty.

Already confirmed are Geoffrey Hinton, Physics Nobel Laureate (2024); Kai Wegner, Mayor of Berlin; H.E. Jelena Begović, Serbian Minister of Science, Technological Development and Innovation; António Henriques, CEO, Bison Bank; Jager McConnell, CEO, Crunchbase; Mark Surman, President, Mozilla; and Sandro Gianella, Head of Europe & Middle East Policy & Partnerships, OpenAI.

Europe’s moves in AI, deep tech & quantum

Europe is focusing on cross-sector AI uses, new investments and international partnerships. Ai Everything Europe, the event’s AI showcase and conference, brings together AI architects, startups and investors to explore AI ecosystems.

Topics presented on stage range from EuroStack ambitions to implications of agentic AI, with speakers including Martin Kon, President and COO, Cohere; Daniel Verten, Strategy Partner, Synthesia; and Professor Dr. Antonio Krueger, CEO of German Research Centre for Artificial Intelligence.

On the show-floor, attendees will be able to experience Brazil’s Ubivis’s smart factory technology, powered by IoT and digital twins, and Hexis’s AI-driven nutrition plans that are trusted by 500+ Olympic and elite athletes.

With nearly €7 billion in quantum investment, Europe is pushing for quantum leadership by 2030. GITEX Quantum Expo (GQX) (in partnership with IBM and QuIC) covers quantum research and cross-industry impact with showcases and conferences.

Speakers include Mira Wolf-Bauwens, Responsible Quantum Computing Lead, IBM Research, Switzerland; Joachim Mnich, Director of Research & Computing, CERN, Switzerland; Neil Abroug, Head of the French National Quantum Strategy, INRIA; and Jan Goetz, CEO & Co-Founder, IQM Quantum Computers, Finland.

Cyber Valley: Building a resilient cyber frontline

With cloud breaches doubling in number and AI-driven attacks, threat response and cyber resilience are core focuses at the event. Fortinet, CrowdStrike, Kaspersky, Knowbe4, and Proofpoint will join other cybersecurity companies exhibiting at GITEX Cyber Valley.

They’ll be alongside law enforcement leaders, global CISOs, and policymakers on stage, including Brig. Gen. Dr. Volker Pötzsch, Chief of Division Cyber/IT & AI, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; H.E. Dr. Mohamed Al-Kuwaiti, Head of Cybersecurity, UAE Government; Miguel De Bruycker, Managing Director General, Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium; and Ugo Vignolo Lutati, Group CISO, Prada Group.

GITEX Green Impact: For a sustainable future

GITEX Green Impact connects innovators and investors with over 100 startups and investors exploring how green hydrogen, bio-energy, and next-gen energy storage are moving from R&D to deployment.

Key speakers so far confirmed are Gavin Towler, Chief Scientist for Sustainability Technologies & CTO, Honeywell; Julie Kitcher, Chief Sustainability Officer, Airbus; Lisa Reehten, Managing Director, Bosch Climate Solutions; Massimo Falcioni, Chief Competitiveness Officer, Abu Dhabi Investment Office; and Mounir Benaija, CTO – EV & Charging Infrastructure, TotalEnergies.

Convening the largest startup ecosystem among 60+ nations

GITEX EUROPE x Ai Everything hosts North Star Europe, the local version of the world’s largest startup event, Expand North Star.

North Star Europe gathers over 750 startups and 20 global unicorns, among them reMarkable, TransferMate, Solarisbank AG, Bolt, Flix, and Glovo.

The event features a curated collection of earlys and growth-stage startups from Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Netherlands, Switzerland, Serbia, UK, and UAE.

Among the startups, Neurocast.ai (Netherlands) is advancing AI-powered neurotech for Alzheimer’s research; CloudBees (Switzerland) is the delivery unicorn backed by Goldman Sachs, HSBC, and Lightspeed; and Semiqon (Finland), the world’s first CMOS transistor with the ability to perform in cryogenic conditions.

More than 600 investors with $1tn assets under management will be scouting for new opportunities, including Germany’s Earlybird VC, Austria’s SpeedInvest, Switzerland’s B2Venture, Estonia’s Startup Wise Guys, and the US’s SOSV.

GITEX ScaleX launches as a first-of-its-kind growth platform for scale-ups and late-stage companies, in partnership with AWS.

With SMEs making up 99% of European businesses, GITEX SMEDEX connects SMEs with international trade networks and investors, for funding, legal advice, and market access to scale globally.

Backed by EISMEA and ICC Digital Standards Initiative, the event features SME ecosystem leaders advising from the stage, including Milena Stoycheva, Chairperson of Board of Innovation, Ministry of Innovation and Growth, Bulgaria; and Oliver Grün, President, European Digital SME Alliance and BITMi.

GITEX EUROPE is part of the GITEX global network tech and startup events, taking place in Germany, Morocco, Nigeria, Singapore, Thailand, and the UAE.

For more information, please visit: www.gitex-europe.com.

[unita2org]

EUROPA "COLONIA DIGITALE"

Radar 16 Aprile 2025 di Valerio Sale Colonia digitale è la definizione che si può attribuire all’Europa nella guerra commerciale dichiarata da Trump. Perché gli Stati europei dipendono totalmente dagli Usa per i servizi tech. La denuncia di ‘Eurostack’ ‘Eurostack’ Eurostack è un gruppo indipendente creato da alcuni eurodeputati per promuovere “L’indipendenza digitale europea”. Il 14 marzo…

[infernovm]

Sovereign European Cloud API claims to offer interoperability without lock-in

Europe’s efforts to free itself from the domination of US cloud platforms have reached an important first milestone with the announcement of the Sovereign European Cloud API (SECA). A collaboration between European providers Aruba and IONOS, and cloud marketplace Dynamo, the SECA API is being positioned as a building block in the continent’s larger EuroStack initiative, an ambitious project to…

[mariacallous]

Europe is under siege—not by armies but by supply chains and algorithms. Rare-earth minerals, advanced semiconductors, and critical artificial intelligence systems all increasingly lie in foreign hands. As the U.S.-China tech cold war escalates, U.S. President Donald Trump battles Europe’s attempt to regulate tech platforms, Russia manipulates energy flows, and the race for AI supremacy intensifies, Europe’s fragility is becoming painfully clear. For years, policymakers have warned about the continent’s reliance on foreign technology. Those alarms seemed abstract—until now.

Geopolitical flashpoints, from the Dutch lithography firm ASML’s entanglement in the U.S.-China chip war to Ukraine’s need for foreign satellite services, reveal just how precarious Europe’s digital dependence really is. If Europe doesn’t lock down its technological future, it risks becoming hostage to outside powers and compromising its core values.

Fragmented measures aren’t enough. A European Chips Act here, a half-implemented cloud or AI initiative there won’t fix a system where every layer—from raw materials to software—depends on someone else. Recent AI breakthroughs show that whoever controls the stack—digital infrastructure organized into a system of interconnected layers—controls the future.

The U.S. government ties AI research to proprietary chips and data centers through its Stargate program, while China’s DeepSeek masters the entire supply chain at lower costs. Europe can’t keep treating chips, supercomputing, and telecommunication as discrete domains; it needs a unifying vision inspired by digital autonomy and a grasp of the power dynamics shaping the global supply chain.

Without a coherent strategy, the continent will be a mere spectator in the biggest contest of the 21st century: Who controls the digital infrastructure that powers everything from missiles to hospitals?

The answer is the EuroStack—a bold plan to rebuild Europe’s tech backbone layer by layer, with the same urgency once devoted to steel, coal, and oil. That will require a decisive mobilization that treats chips, data, and AI as strategic resources. Europe still has time to act—but that window is closing. Our proposed EuroStack offers a holistic approach that tackles risks at every level of digital infrastructure and amplifies the continent’s strengths.

The EuroStack comprises seven interconnected layers: critical raw materials, chips, networks, the Internet of Things, cloud infrastructure, software platforms, and finally data and AI.

Every microchip, battery, and satellite begins with raw materials—lithium, cobalt, rare-earth metals—that Europe doesn’t control. China commands 60-80 percent of global rare-earth production, while Russia weaponizes gas pipelines. Europe’s green and digital transitions will collapse without secure access to these resources. Beijing’s recent export restrictions on gallium and germanium, both critical for semiconductors, served as a stark wake-up call.

To survive, Europe must forge strategic alliances with resource-rich nations such as Namibia and Chile, invest in recycling technologies, and build mineral stockpiles modeled on its strategic oil reserves. However, this strategy will need to steer clear of subsidizing conflict or profiting from war-driven minerals, as seen in the tensions between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the latter’s criminal complaints against Apple in Europe—demonstrating how resource struggles can intensify regional instability.

Above this resource base lies the silicon layer, where chips are designed, produced, and integrated. Semiconductors are today’s geopolitical currency, yet Europe’s share of global chip production has dwindled to just 9 percent. U.S. giants such as Intel and Nvidia dominate design, while Asia’s Samsung and TSMC handle most of the manufacturing. Even ASML, Europe’s crown jewel in lithography, finds itself caught in the crossfire of the U.S.-China chip war.

Although ASML dominates the global market for the machines that produce chips, Washington is using its control over critical components and China over raw materials to put pressure on the company. To regain control, Europe must double down on its strengths in automotive, industrial, and health care chipsets. Building pan-European foundries in hubs such as Dresden, Germany, and the Dutch city of Eindhoven—backed by a 100 billion euro sovereign tech fund—could challenge the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act and restore Europe’s foothold.

Next comes connectivity, the digital networks that underpin everything else. When Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, Kyiv’s generals relied on Starlink—a U.S. satellite system—to coordinate defenses. And U.S. negotiators last month suggested cutting access if no deal were made on Ukrainian resources. Europe’s own Iris2 network remains behind schedule, leaving the European Union vulnerable if strategic interests clash.

Meanwhile, China’s Huawei still dominates 5G infrastructure, with Ericsson and Nokia operating at roughly half its size. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has even floated buying Starlink coverage, underscoring how urgent it is for Europe to accelerate Iris2, develop secure 6G, and mandate a “Buy European” policy for critical infrastructure.

A key but often overlooked battleground is the Internet of Things, or IoT. Chinese drones, U.S. sensors, and foreign-controlled industrial platforms threaten to seize control of ports, power grids, and factories. Yet Europe’s engineering prowess in robotics offers a lifeline—if it pivots from consumer gadgets to industrial applications. By harnessing this expertise, Europe can develop secure, homegrown IoT solutions for critical infrastructure, ensuring that smart cities and energy grids are built on robust European standards and safeguarded against cyberattacks.

Then there is the cloud, where data is stored, processed, and mined to train next-generation algorithms. Three U.S. giants—Amazon, Microsoft, and Google—dominate roughly 70 percent of the global market. The EU’s Gaia-X project attempted to forge a European alternative, but traction has been limited.

Still, the lesson from DeepSeek is clear: Controlling data centers and optimizing infrastructure can revolutionize AI innovation. Europe must push for its own sovereign cloud environment—perhaps through decentralized, interoperable clouds that undercut the scale advantage of Big Tech—optimized for privacy and sustainability. Otherwise, European hospitals, banks, and cities will be forced to rent server space in Virginia or Shanghai.

A sovereign cloud is more than a mere repository of data; it represents an ecosystem built on decentralization, interoperability, and stringent privacy and data protection standards, with client data processed and stored in Europe.

Gaia-X faltered due to a lack of unified vision, political commitment, and sufficient scale. To achieve true technological sovereignty, Europe must challenge the monopolistic dominance of global tech giants by ensuring that sensitive information remains within its borders and adheres to robust regulatory frameworks.

When it comes to software, Europe runs on U.S. code. Microsoft Windows powers its offices, Google’s Android runs its phones, and SAP—once a European champion—now relies heavily on U.S. cloud giants. Aside from pockets of strength at companies such as SAP and Dassault Systèmes, Europe’s software ecosystem remains marginal. Open-source software offers an escape hatch but only if Europe invests in it aggressively.

Over time, strategic procurement and robust investments could loosen U.S. Big Tech’s grip. A top priority should be a Europe-wide, privacy-preserving digital identity system—integrated with the digital euro—to protect monetary sovereignty and curb crypto-fueled volatility. Piece by piece, Europe can replace proprietary lock-in with democratic tools.

Finally, there is AI and data, the layer where new value is being generated at breakneck speed. While the United States and China have seized an early lead via OpenAI, Anthropic, and DeepSeek, the field remains open. Europe boasts world-class supercomputing centers and strong AI research, yet it struggles to translate these into scalable ventures. The solution? “AI factories”—public-private hubs that link Europe’s strengths in health care, climate science, and advanced manufacturing.

Europeans could train AI to predict wildfires, not chase ad clicks, and license algorithms under ethical frameworks, not exploitative corporate terms. Rather than only mimicking ChatGPT, Europe should fund AI for societal challenges through important projects of common European interest, double down on high-performance computing infrastructure, and build data commons that reflect core democratic values—privacy, transparency, and human dignity.

The EuroStack isn’t about isolationism; it’s a bold assertion of European sovereignty. A sovereign tech fund of at least 100 billion euros—modeled on Europe’s pandemic recovery drive—could spark cross-border innovation and empower EU industries to shape their own destiny. And a Buy European procurement act would turn public purchasing into a tool for strategic autonomy.

This act could go beyond traditional mandates, championing ethical, homegrown technology by setting forward-thinking criteria that strengthen every link in Europe’s digital ecosystem—from chips and cloud infrastructures to AI and IoT sensors. European chips would be engineered for sovereign cloud systems, AI would be trained on European data, and IoT devices would integrate seamlessly with European satellites. This integrated approach could break the cycle of dependency on foreign suppliers.

This isn’t about shutting out global players; it’s about creating a sophisticated, multidimensional policy tool that champions European priorities. In doing so, Europe can secure its technological future and assert its strategic autonomy in a rapidly evolving global order.

Critics argue that the difference in mindset between Silicon Valley and Brussels is an obstacle, especially the bureaucratic nature of the EU and its focus on regulation. But other countries known for bureaucracy—such as India, China, and South Korea—have achieved homegrown digital technology from a much lower technological base than the EU. Indeed, through targeted industrial policies and massive investments, South Korea has become a world leader in the layers of chips and IoT. The EU currently already has a strong technological base with companies such as ASML, Nokia, and Ericsson.

European overregulation is not the issue; the real problem is a lack of focus and investment. Until now, the EU has never fully committed to a common digital industrial policy that would allow it to innovate on its own terms. Former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s recent report on EU competitiveness—which calls for halting further regulation in favor of massive investments—and incoming German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s bold debt reforms signal a much-needed shift in mindset within the EU.

In the same spirit, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has launched a defense package providing up to 800 billion euros to boost Europe’s industrial and technological sovereignty that could finally align ambition with strategic autonomy.

If digital autonomy isn’t at the forefront of these broader defense and infrastructure strategies, Europe risks missing its last best chance to chart an independent course on the global stage.

To secure its future, Europe must adopt a Buy European act for defense and critical digital infrastructures and implement a European Sovereign Tech Agency in the model of the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency—one that drives strategic investments, spearheads AI development, and fosters disruptive innovation while shaping a forward-looking industrial policy across the EU.

The path forward requires ensuring that investments in semiconductors, networks, and AI reinforce one another, keeping critical technologies—chips, connectivity, and data processing—firmly under the EU’s control to prevent foreign interests from pulling the plug when geopolitics shift.

Europe’s relative decline once seemed tolerable when these risks felt hypothetical, but real-world events—from undersea cable sabotage to wartime reliance on foreign satellite constellations—have exposed the EU’s fragility.

If leaders fail to seize this moment, they will cede control to external techno-powers with little incentive to respect Europe’s needs or ideals. Once this window closes, catching up—or even keeping pace—will be nearly impossible.

The EuroStack represents Europe’s last best chance to shape its own destiny: Build it, or become a digital colony.