Embroidery of Chernihiv region, Ukraine
The main cities in the Chernihiv region are Chernihiv, Bahmach, Nizhyn, Pryluky, and Novgorod Siversky.
Regardless of the traditional folk costume features this region can be divided into two parts. The northern part has similarities to Polissya, and the Southern part has some features from the Naddnipryan region.
Chernihiv embroidery artists borrowed a technic called "white on white" from the Naddnipryan region. It quickly became popular.
The most popular colors were white, red, and black. Sometimes you can also see a few touches of blue in patterns.
Most of the embroidery patterns on vyshyvankas were geometric. And has a lot of diamond-shaped pieces.
Diamond shapes are a symbol of fertility, a diamond with a dot in the center is a symbol of sown field.
Floral ornaments, anthropomorphic and zoomorphic motifs, the tree of life, beregins, and solar symbols were found on towels and other household items of this region.
That's the end, I hope you find it interesting and fell in love with Ukrainian embroidery as much as I am^
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D+6 Update @4PM
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Northern Front
Summary: Little information to go on; likely a regrouping in effect, assume prior dynamics in play.
* The much-reported massive convoy from Belarus seems to be stalled. Given the amount of equipment and personnel present this is no surprise; cat-herding will be required before a new assault can be conducted. With Russian attempts to encircle the city still apparently struggling to fight their way south – and with prior precedent regarding their vulnerability to flanking attacks in this area and its terrain – it’s likely that the major roads into Kiev will remain open as defenders move materiel into the city in preparation for the likely encirclement and very hard fighting to come.
* Information on this front seems sparse overall today and late yesterday. Only statements I can find regarding the fighting in the countryside east of Kiev are from Ukranian military/government officials who indicate their forces are fighting for towns at Pryluky and Nizhyn – naturally, crossroads. Given that the Kharkiv area/region has seen more videos of abandoned or captured supply trucks than any other – and considering how conducive the woodier, more varied terrain is to ambushes – we can presume that if the Russians bypass these towns, as they have preferred to do in the past, that they will continue to suffer the same supply interdiction issues. Their utility in the assault on Kiev is questionable, past being able to encircle the town to easy passage from the east.
Southern Front
Summary: Getting worse, but still, incredibly, holding.
* Kherson area: Better than has been reported. Seeing a lot of doomerism about this on the discord, for understandable reasons. Resistance in Kherson is, incredibly, still active. Russian troops apperently bypassed Mykolaiv and moved north along the N11 highway but were promptly ambushed and destroyed in the town of Bashtanka. I was not expecting such ambushes in this area, as the terrain is incredibly flat, level, and open – ideal tank country; that should play to Russian materiel advantages in artillery and armor. Judging by the truck with the towed field gun, this was not a recon element, either.
* Ukrainian officials claim they are committing their MI-24 Hinds to this area; continuing the trend of aggressive deployment of their limited air assets on this front. Given the incredible importance of the area, and the unfavorable defensive terrain outside of major cities and the Dnieper river itself, this makes sense.
* Reported artillery duel at Severodonetsk with “rockets lighting up the sky” last night and a video claiming to be Russians entering Starobilsk 45km north-east of there seems to indicate high mobility fights (counterbattery employment and the simple speed of advance from Dontesk.). More recently video of civilians blocking Russian troops (a recon element) in Kupiansk have been seen – which is 100km north-west of the aforementioned towns and only 100km east-southeast of Kharkiv. Those troops are likely from the north-eastern forces probing south to find a way around Kharkiv, but the speed with which towns well north-west of the old Donbas line have apparently fallen indicate to me that Ukranian eastern forces (on the Donbas line) are making a fighting retreat – or at least falling back in good order – likely to anchor a new line around the southeastern flank of Kharkiv.
* Combat reported in the vicinity of Vasilievka, 40km south of Zaporizhzhia. Russians at least this far north here. (This has not been geolocated.)
* Russians confirmed to be assaulting Poltava; in the form of two videos of abandoned tanks – whether out of fuel or simply deserting crews crews is unclear. (These have not been geolocated but preponderance of reports favors this. Multiple pictures of civilians in Poltava organizing support services; food etc. have been seen as well.)
* In addition, Russians in Kherson have been seenlooting stores for food.
* These events together indicate that supply exhaustion is affecting the southern push out of Crimea. This is of vital importance, given the criticality of defending crossings over the Dneiper river, the Russian army’s dependence on rail transport for logistics, and the intact rail line into the south via the Kerch strait bridge through Crimea. Regarding this, the widely reported TB-2 drone strike on a large Russian fuel tanker trainwas, incredibly, localized to a railway in Crimea by commercial satellite photography. This would mean the aircraft is operating in an area where an S-400 battery is almost certainly active. Barring more info the TB-2 should be suspected to have LO properties from certain angles at this point in time. The importance of this strike cannot be over-stated; it shows that Russian logistics in territory they solidly control is not beyond reach of Ukranian strikes. While Ukraine only had six TB-2s at beginning of hostilities, the fact that airframes are already being delivered by NATO means that Turkey may be willing to (quietly) deliver more.
* Maruipol is now under proper assault but defending forces seem well equipped with artillery and are making use of small, likely commercial drones to spot their attacks. Given the Russian’s have mostly not deployed their storied ground EW capability (more on this later) we can expect to see more low-cost, high effectiveness tactics like this. (More on this below.) If fanatic resistance in other Ukrainian cities are anything to go by Mauripol will hold for quite a while yet.
Analysis – state of Russian forces now and future performance
(Skip to “conclusions” if you’re lazy or an officer)
It is a fool’s errand to try and link every sighting of completely abandoned tanks and even high-end SAMs, butthis incident deserves note as the vehicle is fully functional – the Ukranians start the engine and drive it away without problem. Videos of farmers hauling away abandoned IFVs with their tractors are already making the rounds, but thisshows civilians with heavy equipment (cranes and flatbed tractor-trailers) removing a pair of SA-8 Gekos (one of the better and more sophisticated mobile SHORAD units with a limited capability for missile interception!). Not only are vehicles like this lighter than tanks and thus possible to move with lighter and more common civilian equipment, but they make a larger difference than a single tank does given the problems a persistent SAM threat causes for airpower and the relative shortage of such systems in the Ukranian OOB. Furthermore, the units being abandoned include Tor (SA-15) and Pantsir (SA-22) systems, among the most useful, sophisticated and brand-new surface to air systems in the Russian inventory. Additionally, all but the SA-22 are already present in Ukrainian stocks. For example, while only six SA-15/Tor systems were re-activated before the war, Ukraine has many more of them in storage that they did not have money to re-activate; thus there should be no shortage of spare parts and ammunition reloads, and there’s even operators trained to use the systems. Examples of deliberate recovery efforts being made on Russian vehicles, mostly SAMs, often by farmers with tractors are now so common I have lost count.
In addition, supply convoys are being intercepted and not only destroyed, but outright captured, esp. in the Kharkiv region where Russian efforts seem to be coming to grief quite frequently, for instance this truckload of280mm Smerch rockets. With the long range of this system and the relative low ammo stockpiles Ukraine has for it’s small number of launchers, captures like this weaken the Russians while strengthening the Ukrainians. This fuel truck reportedly ran into a tree after swerving to avoid civilians in the road, and this convoy was apparently ambushed, with one truck destroyed and another loaded with MLRS rockets captured.
The troubles of Russian forces go significantly deeper than ammunition supply, as well: early reports that Russian frontline troops were using cheap, civilian radios without encryption is now confirmed beyond a shadow of a doubt; thousands of people are listening in to unsecured Russian field communications using web-linked radio receivers and crowd-sourcing the intelligence collection from it. One unit in particular, Buran-30, has become famous for the frequency with which he gets lost and has to call for help from other units who are also lost. This is the likely reason why Russia has almost completely neglected to deploy its formidable ground EW systems (one was spotted yesterday moving towards Kherson, likely as a counter TB-2 drone measure.) Worse, POWs are reporting that they have no long-range radios to contact their headquarters whatsoever. Radios are not a logistical concern like ammunition, fuel, food, and other consumables that must be channeled into a fight by a constant (sometimes literal) pipeline; they are basic and vital pieces of common kit. To constantly be broadcasting unit movements in the clear, with United States ELINT assets hovering all around the nation, feeding that data to Ukrainian ground troops, is staggeringly incompetent and ill-prepared.
NextI wish to draw attention to something I’ve dubbed terrain attrition; i.e. the losses incurred by accidents crossing terrain. These happen in any military and are a major reason training with armored vehicles is important, but Russia seems to be having more problems than normal. Multiple videos of Russian tanks that drove off small (or over destroyed) bridges have been seen. More vehicles have been seen abandoned by the side of the road for unclear reasons. A video showing two abandoned T-80s that collided had a tow chain hooked between them; likely one had broken down. Multiple sightings of mud-bogged and abandoned vehicles have been seen as well; the S-22 above being one good example.
Due to good OPSEC by both sides’ uniformed military most OSINT so far has been civilian sightings of combat from (usually) a safe distance, and almost all of it has been of combat’s aftermath. Videos of the Russian advance into Kherson yesterday gave a rare look at Russian infantry actually maneuvering, and displaying incredibly lackadaisical attitudes about it. I initially took this as indication that UA had withdrawn from Kherson to the crossroads; we now know that is incorrect and that the city was still occupied at the time. Given overall performance of the entire Russian Federation Armed Forces over the past several days and persistent evidence of outright desertion, not just of individual vehicles but of entire OPs, vehicles included, the quality of regular Russian troops, including infantry,should no longer receive the benefit of the doubt.
One last data point: commercial imagery is now available of Ozerne Airbase in Zhytomr Oblast, showing the impacts of what were probably opening-day salvos by Iskanders. Incredibly, it shows the majority of the seven weapons deployed missed their targets. Tellingly, every impact seems offset from their likely intended target by the same distance, and in the same direction. This is highly reminiscent of the 2019 Indian Air Force strike on a terrorist camp in southern Pakistan which apparently missed the mark becausestrike planners misunderstood the intricacies of coordinate systems and as a result, missed their intended targets because the elevation data was not correct.
Conclusions
Let me paint you a picture. You have a military force that is suffering from high rates of desertion and abysmal morale, having persistent supply problems even in areas where intact railheads are not far to the rear, and have poorly trained troops who cannot conduct proper bounding overwatch movement in uncleared and suspected hostile cities, nor, apparently, can drive or service their vehicles properly, neither when negotiating tricky terrain or dealing with bogged-down machines. On an operational level this force is relying heavily on completely unsecured comms that are easily jammed by enterprising civilians broadcasting with their own radios and is feeding a constant stream of troop movement ELINT to enemy allies, giving hostile forces both indications of your maneuvering and easy artillery targets. Worse, your lower level maneuver elements often lack longer-range radios, leaving them unable to contact HQ. Your troops are engaging in repeated “thunder runs” with just one or two vehicles, likely for scouting, as your air force is loath to sortie and when it finally does on D+5 it’s flying strike jets around in the SHORAD/MANPAD envelope due to a likely shortage of PGMs. If this is not enough, your own air defenses are evidently unable to protect even your most important rear areas, using your best, most powerful long-range air defenses, given possible LO capabilities of a cheap drone that your intelligence agencies had years to study due to employment in nearby conflicts. If this is not enough, your operational-level strike planners cannot effectively utilize division-level long range precision fires because they apparently have a shortage of competent, trained and practiced personnel. On a force structure level, you have reportedly committed 80% of forces massed for the operation but still cannot muster enough infantry or mechanized forces to adequately secure your own lines of communication/supply from partisan/SOF activity and cannot commit to clearing tenacious defenders in towns that occupy key crossroads; forcing wheeled vehicles to deviate over side-roads where ambushes are much easier, or go overland and risk bogging down. Worse, you cannot utilize rail at all on two out of three fronts due to these same occupied cities, and in the third those lines are proven vulnerable to enemy airpower. Your enemy is extremely highly motivated, receiving top-tier SIGINT/ELINT support and very significant quantities of materiel aid down interior lines of communication that your air force will not or cannot perform deep interdiction against due to poor SEAD capability and the persistent mobile SAM threat against even higher altitudes that the enemy clearly retains. Your enemy has incredible support from the civilian populace, with passive resistance to your forces common, and materiel aid being supplied constantly. Enemy forces – with said civilian aid – are recovering your abandoned vehicles wherever possible, and where those vehicles were bogged down too much to easily recover, or in an area you are likely to retake,they destroy them in-situ to deny you their use.
Furthermore, this enemy has demonstrated a willingness to boldly use armor and mechanized infantry assets to conduct deep raids and attack your flank to cut your lines of communication, not afraid to parcel them out in small units and maneuver aggressively instead of trying to retain them for decisive massed action due to their moderate qualitative inferiority and significantly smaller numbers.
Right now, many analysts are saying that the Russian Federation’s early setbacks and mistakes were born of terrible restrictions in ROE and a worse operational concept that has hamstrung their forces by forcing them to fight in a manner contravening their doctrine; without significant use of combined arms and not enough reliance on their long-range fires. These analysts allege that a shift is now underway, and when the Russians resume their all-out push it will be in accord with their doctrine, and thus they will perform much better and inflict much higher casualties.
My conclusion: Given the above points, which call into question the basic quality of the troops, their ability to maintain supply flow mandatory for the doctrinal heavy use of artillery fires, and above all the absolutely atrocious state of their C2, I highly fucking doubt that the BTGs will suddenly start performing more like we expected them to. Furthermore, the Ukrainians have demonstrated real competence in the use of their armor assets; to the point where I would not rule out their ability to fight a tank battle in the South, if one should be required to advance on the southern Dneiper bridgeheads to retake them.
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Mykolayiv Shipyard Completed Overhaul of Ukrainian Naval Forces Warships
On July 30, at the Mykolayiv Shipyard, which is a part of the Ukroboronprom State Concern, the "Genichesk" inshore minesweeper and the "Pryluky" missile boat of Naval forces of the Ukraine's Armed Forces were floated out after a dock repair. #military
On July 30, at the Mykolayiv Shipyard, which is a part of the Ukroboronprom State Concern, the “Genichesk” inshore minesweeper and the “Pryluky” missile boat of Naval forces of the Ukraine’s Armed Forces were floated out after a dock repair. Within three months, the specialists of the shipyard restored the outer skin, propeller-steering complex, power plants, mechanisms, etc. The repair of…
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