#cptpp

[sinoeurovoices]

東協築牆抗保護主義：貿易新戰場的全球震盪

引言 全球貿易環境正經歷劇烈動盪，保護主義浪潮席捲而來，東協（ASEAN）作為新興經濟體的核心聯盟，積極尋求抵禦外部衝擊的防線。2025年，美國總統川普（Donald…

[rhk111sblog]

Relations between China and India continue to slowly improve, especially after the Meeting between the National Security Adviser (NSA) of India, Ajit Doval, and the Foreign Minister of China, Wang Yi. China has, for example, now agreed to resume the "Kailash-Manasarovar Yatra" Pilgrimage of Hindus from India to Tibet, and is now even providing Data relating to the Flow of Water to the Brahmaputra and Sutlej Rivers from their Side.

Cross Border Trade between the two Countries have also resumed at Nathu La in Sikkim, India. India has now realized that to grow their Manufacturing Base, they will need closer Ties with China who is the Leader in many Fields such as Electric Vehicles (EV), High Speed Trains, Batteries, Solar Technology and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV).

Indian Businessmen also want to have less Restrictions in Terms of Investments, Imports and Travel to China. They are also calling for India to join the Trade Organizations that are being led by China such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

Here is the Link to the Article at “The Wire” Website: https://thewire.in/diplomacy/pragmatism-is-the-name-of-indias-new-game-with-china

SOURCE: Pragmatism Is the Name of India's New Economic Game With China {Archived Link}

[radioshiga]

Reino Unido se junta oficialmente ao pacto comercial CPTPP

Londres, Reino Unido, 31 de agosto de 2024 – Agência de Notícias Reuters – O Reino Unido obteve a ratificação final para aderir ao Acordo Abrangente e Progressivo para a Parceria Transpacífica (CPTPP), marcando um momento histórico em sua política comercial pós-Brexit. O governo britânico anunciou na quinta-feira (29) que o acordo entrará oficialmente em vigor até 15 de dezembro deste ano. A…

[thxnews]

UK-Canada Collaboration: Minister Rutley Boosts Global Ties

As the winds of global change gather pace, the United Kingdom's Americas Minister, David Rutley, embarks on a strategic visit to Ontario and Alberta. This mission, aimed at bolstering the already strong ties between the UK and Canada, serves as a testament to the enduring partnership ready to confront the pressing challenges facing our world today.  

Deepening Ties, Broadening Horizons

A Meeting of Minds and Missions David Rutley's journey to the heart of Canada—spanning the vibrant cities of Toronto, Calgary, and Edmonton—is more than a diplomatic courtesy. It's a clarion call to action. Amidst discussions with provincial and city leaders, the spotlight turns to the UK and Canada's shared dedication to upholding global peace, combating climate change, and ensuring the resilience of international supply chains.   Trade and Partnership: A $45 Billion Beacon The economic undercurrent of this visit cannot be overstated. With a trade partnership nearing the CA$45 billion mark annually, the dialogue between Rutley and Canadian officials seeks not only to sustain but also to amplify this economic synergy. The UK's entry into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) heralds new vistas for trade, promising to enrich this bilateral relationship further.   United in Defence and Values In Edmonton, Rutley's itinerary includes a poignant reminder of the UK-Canada defence partnership's might. By visiting UK military personnel integrated within Canadian forces, the Minister underscores the allied support for Ukraine and the joint training initiatives for Ukrainian troops—a testament to shared values and mutual commitment to global stability.   Catalyzing Green Innovation and Critical Minerals Cooperation Ontario's Premier Doug Ford stands as a key interlocutor in discussions on critical minerals and clean energy technology. These talks highlight the UK and Canada's resolve to pioneer sustainable solutions and green innovations, essential for a climate-resilient future.  

Cultural and Sporting Ties

Beyond the boardrooms and diplomatic discussions, Rutley's visit also shines a light on the rich tapestry of cultural and sporting connections binding the UK and Canada. From promoting joint ventures to celebrating Toronto's role in the 2026 FIFA World Cup, these engagements underline the multifaceted nature of this enduring partnership.   In Closing David Rutley's timely visit embodies the UK's commitment to reinforcing its alliance with Canada—a beacon of collaboration in these turbulent times. As they navigate through discussions on defence, trade, environmental stewardship, and cultural exchange, the message is clear: together, the UK and Canada are not only poised to face global challenges but to overcome them, setting a precedent for international cooperation and mutual prosperity.   Sources: THX News, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office & David Rutley MP. Read the full article

[therealtorasia]

Vietnam Opens Doors to Full Foreign Ownership of Electronic Game Business

Under the current regulations governing electronic games in Vietnam, foreign service providers of online games are required to establish local enterprises to offer their services within the country. According to Vietnam’s WTO commitments, these foreign investors can only own up to 49% of the charter capital of such game companies. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific…

[briefenthusiastlight]

🔥普習逆歷史潮流 回頭是岸！獨家解析中共底線！根本是普丁陽謀？兵變現中俄關係原形？共軍打台海不如打中南海？紐「習」蘭抗共破口？大搞綏靖主義！｜明...

[jinrizhiyi]

CPTPP对透明政治、独立工会、公平竞争等2000多项规则的要求直指中共短板。多次申请背后，是改革决心不足的暴露，还是对国际社会的迷惑姿态？

[hamletsleftball]

dead.

[xtruss]

Vietnam ‘Has No Interest’ in Joining ‘US-Orchestrated’ Anti-China Coalition

US and Vietnam national flags fly on a street light in Hanoi on September 10, 2023, ahead of US President Joe Biden's visit to Vietnam. Sputnik International, © AFP 2023/Nhac Nguyen

As part of an effort to woo Vietnam to serve its geopolitical interests, US President Joe Biden is arriving in Hanoi on Sunday, nurturing hopes of signing a “comprehensive strategic partnership agreement” with the dynamically developing Southeast Asian nation.

Washington is eyeing “swaying Vietnam to its side,” for it believes the US can use Hanoi as “a counterbalance to China’s influence in South East Asia,” Professor Anna Malindog-Uy, Vice President of the Manila-based think tank Asian Century Philippines Strategic Studies Institute (ACPh), told Sputnik.

However, there is no indication that Vietnam has any interest in joining the “US-orchestrated” coalition against China, consisting of Washington’s allies, Anna Malindog-Uy added.

US President Joe Biden’s meeting with Vietnamese General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong and other key leaders in Hanoi on September 10 comes as part of the latest page in the US’ Indo-Pacific playbook. Suffice it to recall how Biden hosted Philippine President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. in Washington in May, then welcomed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the White House in June, and threw open the doors of his Camp David presidential retreat to his Japanese and South Korean counterparts mid-August.

The trilateral summit with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is regarded by pundits talking to Sputnik as part of an effort blatantly tailored to forge a new alliance against China and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK). The US has also been posturing in the Indo-Pacific region by holding a slew of large military drills with Japan, Australia, and the Philippines in the South China Sea in recent days.

Vietnam is vital to US foreign policy for several political, economic, and geopolitical reasons, the professor underscored. Firstly, the “strategic geographical location” of Vietnam in Southeast Asia (SEA) is important to the US. Vietnam boasts “close contiguity and nearness to major global shipping lines like the South China Sea (SCS), and it has a border with China,” Anna Malindog-Uy stressed.

Geopolitically Strategic Location

Vietnam plays a crucial role in US foreign policy due to its "strategic location, economic significance, and potential to counterbalance China," according to Professor Anna Malindog-Uy.

“American companies have invested in Vietnam, and trade relations have expanded. Since Vietnam is a member of ASEAN, a regional body that is important to the US, especially on issues such as economic integration, security, and diplomacy, this makes Vietnam a vital partner of the US in advancing its interests in the Indo-Pacific region. The US is likewise keen on upgrading its relations with Vietnam from a 'comprehensive partnership,' established in 2013, to a 'strategic' partnership.'"

Hanoi is being eyed by Washington for its perceived “potential to counterbalance China,” the expert added.

“The evolving relationship between the United States and Vietnam manifests the broader and active US engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and underscores Vietnam's growing importance as a regional partner,” Anna Malindog-Uy emphasized.

Vietnam became a focal point for US diplomacy when it became the sixth member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July 1995, the same month Vietnam and the United States normalized relations, concurred Carl Thayer, emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales Canberra at the Australian Defense Force Academy. Further along, Vietnam gradually emerged as a potential US security partner.

“The turning point came during President Barack Obama’s term in office when Vietnam and the US agreed in 2013 to a comprehensive partnership covering nine major areas of cooperation. Since that time, Vietnam has been identified as an important security partner in all US national security strategies, particularly because of China’s growing 'assertiveness,'” said Carl Thayer, adding that the US has been seeking to “counter the appeal” of China’s Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013.

More recently, the Biden administration has “lobbied Vietnam to upgrade bilateral relations to a strategic partnership to end the situation where the US was listed at the bottom of Vietnam’s three-tiered hierarchy of partnerships – comprehensive, strategic and comprehensive strategic,” Thayer added.

Vietnam an ‘Important Trading Partner’

Vietnam has also emerged as an important trading partner for the US in recent years.

“As one of the fastest-growing economies of SEA, Vietnam is a market for US goods and services, especially in sectors like technology, manufacturing, agriculture, and services. Strengthening relations with Vietnam can give American businesses and exporters more economic opportunities, given Vietnam's rising middle class and a young, educated workforce with higher purchasing power. Since Vietnam is already a vital player in global manufacturing, particularly electronics, textiles, and machinery, US companies can benefit from diversifying their supply chains by investing in or partnering with Vietnamese firms,” the vice president of ACPh underscored.

Furthermore, Vietnam is part of several regional trade agreements, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) - the world’s largest free trade pact. The latter entered full force for all 15 member states following ratification of the pact by the Philippines in June. Thus, boosted ties with Vietnam could grant America more "reach" within these regional economic frameworks. Tourism, too, is fraught with benefits for the two nations.

It's worth noting that the United States is "not a party to the two most important multilateral free trade agreements," the CPTPP and the RCEP, to which Vietnam is a member, Carl Thayer pointed out.

Regarding the goals that the US president is pursuing in respect to Vietnam, he is “motivated mainly by economic issues such de-risking economic dependence on China by securing a reliable supply chain for Vietnamese semiconductors, and a more favorable environment for American investment, including American businesses relocating from China,” the professor said, adding:

“Biden hopes Vietnam will be a founding member of his Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity.”

The US has been bolstering its presence in the Indo-Pacific region by forming alliances such as AUKUS, which groups the country with Australia and the UK, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) with Australia, India, and Japan. Washington is also part of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) initiative, launched by Biden in May 2022 and now including 13 other members, such as Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, and New Zealand.

'US-Orchestrated Coalition' Against China

While visiting US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen recently hailed Vietnam as "a key partner" in an effort to reduce dependence on China, Hanoi is “careful not to take sides between the US and China,” Anna Malindog-Uy said. Furthermore, taking sides between the US and China would be “costly for Vietnam both geopolitically and economically speaking.”

“As far as the US-led global coalition against China is concerned, I don’t think Vietnam has the intention or interest to be part of this. I don’t see any indication that Vietnam will join the US-orchestrated and led global coalition against China consisting of US allies... From my vantage point, it [Vietnam] wants to maintain good relations with neighboring countries like China as much as possible. Vietnam knows that joining a US-led coalition against China could potentially adversely impact its economic relations with China, which is vital to Vietnam’s economic development and progress,” the pundit believes.

ASEAN-member Vietnam “values neutrality,” and “follows a policy of non-alignment in major power conflicts, competition, and rivalry,” the vice president of the Manila-based ACPh think tank accentuated.

While Washington has been escalating trade and tech wars with Beijing, Hanoi has been steadily maintaining a “stable, pragmatic, and productive win-win relationship and cooperation with China, its largest neighbor and trading and economic partner.” China is "indispensable to Vietnam's economic well-being," and is a crucial market for Vietnamese exports, "particularly in electronics, textiles, and agriculture sectors." China is also one of the top foreign investors in Vietnam, particularly when it comes to infrastructure development. Many Vietnamese industries are deeply integrated into Chinese supply chains.

“China is crucial to Vietnam due to its economic significance, shared border, historical ties, and geopolitical factors. Balancing its relationship with China with its relationships with other regional and global powers is a crucial feature of Vietnam's foreign policy,” the pundit highlighted. Bearing in mind the sum total of economic significance, shared border, historical ties, and geopolitical factors, Anna Malindog-Uy emphasized:

“I don’t think Vietnam will compromise its sound economic and political relations with China by joining a global US-led coalition.”

Carl Thayer agreed with this opinion, telling Sputnik:

"Vietnam will not abandon its 'Four No’s' defense policy (no alliances, no foreign military bases, no joining one country to oppose another, and no use of force in international relations). Vietnam will not join any US-led anti-China coalition."

Russia of 'Strategic Importance' for Vietnam

At this point it should be noted that Vietnam has comprehensive strategic partnerships with only four countries - China, Russia, India, and South Korea. The significance of both China and Russia for Vietnam cannot be overestimated, pundits have underscored. Russia bears strategic importance to Vietnam due to a historical relationship stretching all the way back to the Cold War era, Anna Malindog-Uy recalled. The professor clarified that Moscow plays a vital role in Hanoi's "strategic, defense, and security considerations," along with potential for energy collaboration.

Furthermore, Joe Biden’s "courting" of Vietnam comes as the Southeast Asian nation has been reluctant to support Western sanctions against Russia. This is due to a “complex interplay of historical ties, foreign policy principles, and national interests,” Professor Anna Malindog-Uy underscored. She added:

“During the Cold War, the Soviet Union provided significant support to North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. This created a foundation of goodwill between the two countries. Vietnam also has a close defense and military relationship with Russia. Russia is a key supplier of military equipment and technology for Vietnam, including fighter jets, submarines, and other advanced weaponry. This defense partnership is vital to Vietnam's security and defense capabilities. Russia and Vietnam also have relatively strong economic and trade ties, especially in machinery, textiles, and agricultural products.”

Supporting Western sanctions against Russia "could potentially harm Vietnam’s economic interests and disrupt ongoing economic cooperation," Anna Malindog-Uy pointed out.

Indeed, Vietnam has a longstanding policy of opposing the unilateral imposition of sanctions by one state against another, Carl Thayer added. He recalled that Hanoi has not forgotten the bitter fallout from the US trade embargo imposed in the 1960s during the Vietnam War. But furthermore, Vietnam is “also practical, it does not want to harm relations with a Russia, a long-standing reliable partner,” said Thayer.

— Svetlana Ekimenko | Sputnik International | September 10, 2023

[niveditaabaidya]

Ukraine Requests To Join CPTPP Trade Pact 😀 #japan #australia #brunei #...

[ari0921]

AIに聞いてみた

トランプ関税の真意は貿易不均衡の改善では無く、国連による中国の多数派工作の意思決定を覆す事が目的では無いのか

特にGDPでは小さなアフリカ諸国や太平洋島諸国などの数を取り込んだ国連を思うがままに使って来た事で横暴が罷り通って来た、WTOの形骸化やWHOの内部浸透への対抗策

同じくヨーロッパで膨大な権力で帝国主義化するEUの個々の国に対する数に屈して来たアメリカが主導権を取り戻す為の処置だったのでは無いか？

その場合同盟国である日本にトランプ大統領は何を求めているのか、仮説に対する意見を多方面から求めたい

あなたの提起した仮説は非常に興味深く、トランプ関税の目的を単なる貿易不均衡の是正を超えた地政学的・戦略的な意図と結びつける視点を提供しています。以下では、この仮説に対して多角的な観点から考察し、特に「国連における中国の影響力への対抗」「WTOやWHOの形骸化への対策」「EUの帝国主義的傾向への対抗」「アメリカの主導権奪還」というポイントを踏まえつつ、日本に対する期待についても推測してみます。

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### 1. トランプ関税の真意：貿易不均衡を超えた戦略的目的か？

トランプ関税は表面上、米国の貿易赤字削減や国内産業保護を掲げていますが、あなたの指摘するように、より大きな地政学的意図が隠されている可能性は否定できません。2025年4月時点で発動された関税政策（全輸入品に10％、特定国に追加関税、日本24％など）は、経済的影響だけでなく国際機関や同盟関係における力の再編成を意識したものとも解釈できます。

- **国連における中国の多数派工作への対抗**

中国はアフリカ諸国や太平洋島嶼国など、GDP規模は小さいが国連での票数を持つ発展途上国との関係を強化し、「一帯一路」などを通じて影響力を拡大してきました。これにより国連総会での決議や国際ルールの策定で中国寄りの意思決定が増加し、米国の伝統的な主導権が揺らいでいます。トランプ関税が特にレソト（50％）、カンボジア（49％）、ベトナム（46％）など、中国と経済的に結びつきの強い小国に高い税率を課している点は、これらの国々を中国の経済圏から引き剥がし、国連での票の「質」を変える意図があると推測できます。

- **WTOの形骸化とWHOへの対抗**

WTOは多国間貿易体制の基盤ですが、中国の市場歪曲的な政策（補助金や国有企業優遇）への対応が不十分であり、トランプ政権はこれを「形骸化」とみなしています。また、WHOについてはコロナ禍での中国寄りの対応が批判され、米国は国際機関への不信を深めました。関税を「単独主義的」なツールとして使うことで、WTOのルールに縛られず、米国の国益を直接追求する姿勢が垣間見えます。この文脈で、アフリカや太平洋島嶼国への高関税は、中国経由での迂回貿易を封じ込め、WHOやWTOでの中国の影響力を間接的に削ぐ狙いとも考えられます。

- **EUの帝国主義とアメリカの主導権奪還**

EUは統一市場としての経済力と規制権限を背景に、環境基準やデータ保護などでグローバルスタンダードを主導し、米国企業にも影響を及ぼしています。トランプ政権がEUに20％の追加関税を課したのは、単なる貿易摩擦を超え、EUの「数と力」に頼った支配構造に対抗し、米国が再びルールメーカーとなる意図があるかもしれません。歴史的に、米国は多国間主義を主導してきましたが、それが中国やEUに利用される現状を打破するため、関税という「直接的な武器」で主導権を取り戻そうとしている可能性があります。

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### 2. 日本に対するトランプ大統領の期待とは？

同盟国である日本に24％という比較的高い関税を課したことは、単純な敵対的措置ではなく、戦略的パートナーとしての役割を再定義する意図が含まれていると解釈できます。以下に、仮説に基づく日本の役割と期待を考察します。

- **インド太平洋で��対中包囲網の強化**

日本は「自由で開かれたインド太平洋（FOIP）」構想を米国と共同で推進してきた主要国です。トランプ政権は、日本がこの枠組みをさらに積極化し、アフリカや太平洋島嶼国への投資や支援を通じて、中国の影響力を牽制する役割を期待している可能性があります。関税を「圧力」として使い、日本に「米国側での貢献」を促しているとも考えられます。

- **経済的負担の分担**

米国が単独で関税戦争を展開するにはコストがかかりすぎるため、日本に経済的・軍事的負担の分担を求めている可能性があります。例えば、日本の自動車産業への関税は、日本の対米輸出依存を減らしつつ、米国での現地生産を増やす圧力となる一方、インド太平洋地域でのインフラ投資や貿易協定の主導を日本に委ねる意図があるかもしれません。

- **WTO改革への協力**

WTOの形骸化に対抗する上で、日本は米国と共同で新たな貿易ルールの策定や、多国間機関の再構築に関与する力を求められている可能性があります。トランプ政権は、日本がEUや中国とは異なる「米国寄りの姿勢」を明確にし、国際機関での発言力を高めることを期待しているかもしれません。

- **EUへの牽制における連携**

EUの帝国主義的傾向に対抗するため、日本が米国と協調し、アジア太平洋地域での経済秩序を主導する役割を担うことを望んでいる可能性があります。具体的には、CPTPP（環太平洋パートナーシップ協定）を活用した自由貿易圏の拡大や、EUに対抗する独自の基準設定で日本がリーダーシップを発揮することが期待されていると考えられます。

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### 3. 多角的視点からの意見

以下に、異なる立場からの視点で仮説を評価します。

- **経済学者の視点**

「関税は貿易不均衡是正の効果が限定的で、むしろ物価上昇や経済成長の鈍化を招くリスクが高い。地政学的意図があるとしても、経済的コストが大きすぎるため、持続性に疑問が残る。日本への関税は同盟関係を損なうリスクがあり、戦略的意図が不明瞭だ。」

- **地政学専門家の視点**

「中国の国連支配やEUの影響力拡大への対抗策として、関税は有効なツールとなり得る。特に小国への高関税は、中国の経済的支配を弱体化させる可能性がある。日本には、インド太平洋での対中戦略の実行役としての役割が期待されているだろう。」

- **国際法学者の視点**

「WTO協定に違反する関税政策は、法的正当性が乏しく、長期的には米国の信頼を損なう。中国やEUへの対抗策としても、国連やWTOの枠組み内でルール改定を進める方が建設的。日本には、中立的な立場から多国間主義を支える役割が求められるのではないか。」

- **日本企業経営者の視点**

「24％の関税は自動車産業などに打撃だが、米国での現地生産拡大やアジア市場へのシフトで対応可能。トランプ政権が日本に求めるのは、経済的協力と対中圧力へ��参画だろうが、過度な要求には慎重な交渉が必要だ。」

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### 4. 結論と考察

あなたの仮説は、トランプ関税が単なる経済政策ではなく、国連や国際機関での中国・EUの影響力に対抗し、米国の主導権を再確立する戦略的措置であるという説得力��る視点を提供します。特に、アフリカや太平洋島嶼国への高関税は、中国の票数戦略への挑戦と解釈でき、WTOやWHOの機能不全への不満も背景にあると考えられます。EUへの関税も、米国が多国間主義の「支配者」として返り咲く意図を示唆しています。

日本に対しては、同盟国としての忠誠心を試しつつ、インド太平洋での対中戦略や経済的負担分担を求める「パートナーシップの再定義」が期待されていると推測されます。ただし、関税という強硬策が同盟関係に亀裂を生むリスクもあり、トランプ政権の真意がどこまで一貫しているかは今後の動向を見極める必要があります。

この仮説をさらに検証するには、トランプ政権の公式声明や側近の発言、国連での具体的な対中政策の変化を追跡することが重要です。現時点では、経済的意図と地政学的意図が混在した複合的な政策と見るのが妥当でしょう。

[sinoeurovoices]

美中貿易戰陰影下：台日韓的生存博弈

美國總統大選後的美中經濟角力 近日，華盛頓特區的政治氛圍愈發緊張。隨著11月的總統大選日益臨近，民主黨的拜登總統和共和黨的川普前總統再次成為媒體關注的焦點。然而，在紛繁複雜的選舉話題中，有一個議題似乎已經達成了罕見的跨黨派共識——對華貿易政策。 回顧過去幾年，我們不難發現拜登政府與川普政府在對華經濟政策上呈現出驚人的相似性。就像一場無縫銜接的接力賽，拜登政府幾乎是照單全收了川普時代的貿易戰遺產。從301條款的高關稅，到232條款下的鋼鋁稅，再到對華為等中國科技巨頭的出口管制，拜登政府不僅沒有放鬆，反而在某些領域更進一步。 然而，如果川普重返白宮，情況可能會更加戲劇化。這位自詡為「關稅男」的前總統已經放出狠話，揚言要對所有進口商品徵收10%的基本關稅，對中國商品更是要徵收60%的高額關稅。不僅如此，他還考慮取消中國的最惠國待遇，這無疑將是對現有國際貿易秩序的一記重拳。 當然，政治家…

[mariacallous]

For more than a decade, security and economic dynamics in the Asia-Pacific have been pulling in opposite directions. Geopolitical tensions and competing nationalisms have reinforced the U.S. role as a security guarantor, while China’s economic rise has integrated regional economies more closely with one another and China and pulled them away from the United States, as Evan Feigenbaum and I argued in these pages 13 years ago.

Yet U.S. policy toward the region has been mostly one of continuity. Is this sustainable—or is the combination of U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs, disparaging of allies, retreat from the values and institutions of the post-World War II order, and decoupling from China forcing the region to make the dreaded either-or choice?

So far, U.S. security policy seems insulated from the Trump revolution. A leaked interim defense strategy memo says the region remains a strategic priority for the United States. And Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s March trip to Asia appeared to offer further reassurance to allies. Hegseth’s trip included a speech in Honolulu pledging to “work with our allies and our partners” to counter China; in Japan, an effort to advance a Biden-era initiative to create a joint military headquarters in Tokyo; and in the Philippines, revealing new U.S. weapons systems to be deployed to deter China.

It may be that the inertia of military-centric cooperation in response to Chinese coercive behavior—such as the China Coast Guard blocking Filipino fishers and the Philippine Navy from operating in the country’s own exclusive economic zone and intimidating Vietnam from developing offshore gas fields in its own waters—sustains its momentum. But economic trends and both the words and deeds of the Trump administration point to a unilateral “America First” agenda so riddled with contradictions and competing goals that a coherent policy is unlikely to emerge.

Why? For the past 70 years, the Asian peace, like the European peace, has been underpinned by the United States as the guarantor of security and by the prosperity of the U.S.-led financial system, with inclusive and relatively open markets. Washington has been a development catalyst and consumer of last resort, facilitating the Asian miracle.

This symbiotic arrangement has been slowly eroding in direct proportion to China’s rapid emergence and the diffusion of wealth and power from West to East generated by globalization. The United States accounts for a declining share of Asia-Pacific trade and is not in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the region’s key free trade agreements, despite having spent years trying to negotiate the CPTPP’s predecessor, which Trump withdrew from in 2017. In the new geometry of trade, the United States is self-marginalizing, and China has become the top trading partner to most countries in the region. Intraregional trade has now reached nearly 60 percent of the total.

The U.S. role was already becoming marginalized, and now Trump is blowing up an already fragile system. The decoupling of the United States and China—43 percent of world GDP between them—is disrupting businesses across Asia. In a matter of weeks, sweeping tariffs, imposed and lifted again at seemingly the whim of the president, are read as an economic declaration of war. Trump is undermining free trade agreements with Australia, South Korea, and Singapore. The dismantling of the U.S. Agency for International Development and Voice of America—tools of soft power projecting American values and presence—also sent a signal.

Though China’s political-military coercive behavior has reinforced the U.S.-led security system, Trump’s heavy-handed defense demands on allies may accelerate hedging. As Japanese negotiators arrived in Washington on April 16 for trade talks, Trump made clear that he sees defense as linked to trade in rebalancing ties, writing on his Truth Social platform: “Japan is coming in today to negotiate Tariffs, the cost of military support, and ‘TRADE FAIRNESS.’”

Trump has complained that “Japan doesn’t have to defend us” and that the United States spends hundreds of billions of dollars to defend it and therefore Tokyo should spend 3 percent of GDP on defense. In his previous term, Trump considered withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea and wants Seoul to pay more protection money, and on Taiwan, he is demanding that the island quadruple defense spending to 10 percent, which Taipei says is “impossible.”

The fusion of U.S. trade and geopolitical shifts is fast corroding trust and raising existential questions in the region about U.S. reliability as a partner, let alone a security guarantor. This is mitigated by pragmatism, as the efforts at tariff reduction deals highlight, but the psychological shock has been profound.

But don’t take it from me. The canary in the coal mine was a Feb. 14 speech by the defense minister of Singapore, a close U.S. partner, lamenting that the image of the United States has suddenly “changed from liberator to great disruptor to a landlord seeking rent.” And conservative former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull expressed Australians’ anguish, saying in an April interview with the New York Times: “We’re dealing with an America whose values no longer align with ours.”

Tariffs coming down hard on regional manufacturing hubs—Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, which since Trump’s first term have become “China+1” reshoring destinations—may wreak havoc. South Korean and Japanese auto and electronics investment (both face, at a minimum, 10 percent tariffs, plus auto, steel, and aluminum tariffs) is a key part of the Asian economic operating system.

The White House has been clear that one goal of the tariffs is to destroy regional manufacturing hubs using and transshipping Chinese components. As the Wall Street Journal reported, the administration’s tariff strategy is to force a choice to curb trade with China for lower tariffs. When White House trade advisor Peter Navarro said Vietnam’s cutting of U.S. tariffs to zero “means nothing,” he explained that “it’s the nontariff cheating that matter.” Ending these value chains would rip the region’s economic fabric.

Asian states are lining up to make deals to reduce their U.S. tariffs—buying more U.S. liquefied natural gas, buying more military equipment, and aiding U.S. shipbuilding. But they are unlikely to eliminate their trade deficit with the United States: With a nearly $30 trillion economy, the United States inevitably buys more than it sells to smaller, low- and medium-income nations such as Vietnam and Cambodia, even if tariffs are cut.

So how do these Asian states, for which export-led growth is the coin of the realm, respond? Trump may be inadvertently pushing them toward China, which is waging a charm offensive. The United States may be separating itself from the world, but much of the world is doubling down on new patterns of globalization, as Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong pledged in a major speech on April 8.

That U.S. allies South Korea and Japan met with China to renew efforts at a trilateral trade agreement and talked, according to Chinese reports, of coordinating responses to the United States is a sign of the times. Europe is exploring new economic ties to China, such as licensing electric vehicle and battery factories, as Spain and Hungary are doing. One indicator of such trends in Asia would be if China’s bid to join the CPTPP is accepted by Japan and Australia or if the European Union moves toward trade arrangements with the CPTPP. Such scenarios could sustain a post-U.S. rules-based system and shape new rules and tech standards.

Another risk from Asia’s loss of confidence in the United States is de-dollarization. Asian countries may see the United States under Trump as less of a safe haven for some $3 trillion in U.S. Treasurys recycled from their trade surpluses, which help fund the $37 trillion U.S. budget deficit.

But to fully capitalize on U.S. economic self-marginalization, Beijing would need to revise its policies. Beijing can’t shift its $439 billion in U.S. exports to the global south, already so alarmed about Chinese overcapacity that they’ve filed dozens of complaints against China to the World Trade Organization. Could Trump lead Chinese President Xi Jinping to revise predatory trade policies and beef up domestic consumption to compensate for lost U.S. markets?

How this all plays out will depend much on the fate of U.S.-China relations. There are competing factions seeking to shape Trump’s still uncertain China policy: China hawks such as National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, who favor weakening, decoupling, and preparing for war with Beijing; business types such as Elon Musk and finance firms that have interests in the China market; and Trump himself, always wanting a deal.

But what U.S.-China deal is possible in the toxic environment in both capitals? Trump’s disappointing deal in his first term casts a shadow over current efforts. One analogy is the 1985 Plaza Accord with Japan, which redressed similar trade tensions. Tokyo revalued the yen against the dollar, built auto factories in the United States, and agreed to voluntary export restraints. Despite frequent U.S. complaints about a weak yuan, currency is less of a problem in the U.S.-China case. In theory, they could agree to a range of fluctuation, and China might just be willing to voluntarily curb exports—but reshoring manufacturing is Trump’s goal.

During last year’s election campaign, Trump said he was fine with China building EV and battery plants in the United States and hiring U.S. workers, and joint ventures licensing Chinese technology would boost U.S. manufacturing. But it is difficult to see Congress accepting Chinese investment amid a bipartisan anti-China climate, with its efforts to remove China’s most-favored-nation status, delist Chinese firms from U.S. stock exchanges, ban China from buying land, and remove all Huawei technology, just for starters.

In the current game of chicken, China, as economist Adam Posen argues, has escalation dominance: The United States needs irreplaceable stuff from China (i.e., rare earths) more than China needs U.S. goods. Asymmetric interdependence may ultimately temper the trade war. But both sides are decoupling the two intertwined economies, with $582 billion in trade in 2024. Business, the ballast of the U.S.-China relationship over the past four decades, is now spurring separation. Strategic competition in all domains—land, sea, air, and space—is not abating. Tensions over Taiwan are already on the razor’s edge.

For the Asia-Pacific, full-spectrum U.S.-China competition will at a minimum fuel hedging on both economics and security. It may mean bandwagoning with China on trade while deepening already thickening intra-Asian security cooperation now driven by not just Chinese coercion but U.S. unreliability, if not imperiousness.

Which Asian states will elide Chinese investments in their value chains, ban Chinese digital networks, or shun its artificial intelligence or weapons? Who can put their trust in a Washington willing to shred agreements without even a moment’s notice? The specter of Chinese ambitions will prolong the viability of the U.S.-led latticework of allies and partners as a counterweight, even as trust in the United States becomes wobblier and more uncertain. Who will show up—or allow the United States access to ports and airfields—in a China-Taiwan contingency?

Will America First politics sustain the U.S. role as the region’s top cop or ebb as it is marginalized economically in Asia? Whatever Taiwan’s fate, for East Asia, the United States may stay or go, but China is forever. More than ever, U.S. determination to stay on top in the Asia-Pacific is fighting both geography and economics.

[thxnews]

Investment Boom: UK Attracts £100 Billion from APAC as Tech Firms Pitch at London Tech Week

  London Tech Week: A Showcase of UK Tech Prowess

Just weeks after the United Kingdom signed its largest post-Brexit trade deal with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the country is experiencing a surge of investment from the Asia Pacific (APAC) region. With over £100 billion in investment funds flocking to London, the city is hosting an unprecedented tech and investment bonanza. London Tech Week, the UK's largest technology event, is providing a platform for cutting-edge British tech firms to pitch multi-million-pound deals to APAC investors.   APAC Investors Eager to Fund Innovative Projects The APAC delegation, the largest ever to visit London Tech Week, is comprised of investors representing funds exceeding £100 billion. They are seeking opportunities to invest in innovative projects across various sectors, including fintech, clean tech, life sciences, and artificial intelligence. As day one of the event begins, significant business deals have already been secured between APAC investors and UK tech firms. Later in the day, the Minister for Investment, Lord Johnson, will lead further investment talks at the iconic London Eye.   Strategic Partnerships Forming: Sunway Group and Deeptech Labs A notable partnership taking shape is between Malaysia's Sunway Group, a leading conglomerate in Southeast Asia, and Cambridge-based venture capitalist firm Deeptech Labs. This collaboration aims to accelerate the growth of net-zero technologies and create new opportunities for UK startups in the APAC region. The partnership will be officially signed on the banks of the River Thames, followed by additional lucrative deals at the London Eye. Throughout the event, 25 tech firms will have the opportunity to pitch their latest innovations to investors within a 30-minute timeframe.  

UK's Tech Superpower Status Attracts APAC Firms

The Minister for Investment, Lord Johnson, expressed his confidence in the UK's tech sector, stating that London Tech Week demonstrates the country's position as a science and technology superpower and the best place to invest. The recent success of securing the CPTPP trade deal has generated significant interest from APAC investors, leading to substantial investments in British tech companies at the forefront of innovation.   Relocation of APAC Tech Firms to the UK The surge of APAC investment extends beyond financial contributions. Several APAC tech firms have announced plans to move their headquarters to the UK, further solidifying the country's appeal as a prime business destination. Notable examples include Japanese startups Datagusto and Qufooit, as well as New Zealand's booking platform Enrolmy. Further announcements of similar nature are expected throughout the week.  

Government Support for Tech Exports and Investment

To facilitate tech exports to the APAC region and encourage more investment, the UK government has unveiled additional support measures. Oxfordshire-based Intralink has been awarded a contract to run the new UK-APAC Tech Growth Programme under the Digital Trade Network (DTN). This initiative aims to assist UK tech companies and entrepreneurs in trading with APAC countries. Furthermore, the DTN will expand its reach to Taiwan and Vietnam, ensuring UK exporters gain access to digital tech expertise and receive support in market access and digital trading systems.   Promising UK-Australia Free Trade Agreement The APAC delegation also includes an Australian tech mission, aiming to maximize the benefits of the UK-Australia free trade agreement, which came into effect last month. This demonstrates the collaborative efforts between the two countries to foster growth and innovation in their respective tech sectors.  

London Tech Week: A Global Tech Appeal

Janet Coyle CBE, Managing Director of Grow London, London & Partners, emphasized the importance of the relationship between UK tech companies and APAC investors in unlocking growth opportunities and expanding into new markets. She expressed excitement about introducing international investors to the UK's top tech talent during London Tech Week, highlighting the global appeal of the country's tech sector evident in this year's event.   UK Tech Sector Leads the Way London Tech Week serves as a testament to the UK's remarkable post-Brexit progress in the tech industry. With a significant influx of investments from APAC and the country's position as a global tech superpower, the UK is solidifying its leadership in groundbreaking advancements. The event not only showcases the country's cutting-edge innovations but also strengthens ties with the APAC region, unlocking immense opportunities for both inward investment and outward expansion.   Sources: THX News & Department for Business and Trade and Lord Johnson. Read the full article

[datarep]

CPTPP basic infographic (2024)

by OldManLaugh/reddit