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#Asia Au-Yeung
roesolo · 2 years
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The Best Kind of Mooncake is one you share
The Best Kind of Mooncake is one you share @pagestreetkids
The Best Kind of Mooncake, by Pearl Au-Yeung, (Oct. 2022, Page Street Kids), $18.99, ISBN: 9781645675563 Ages 4-8 A young girl sits by her family’s booth in a busy Hong Kong market, waiting patiently for her end-of-the-day treat: a mooncake with a double-yolk center. The best kind! A stranger comes charging into the marketplace, exhausted and hungry after leaving his village, sleeping in trees,…
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fayewongfuzao · 7 months
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[一条Yit ENG SUBS ] Susie Au talks about filming Faye's MVs 'Last Blossom', 'Pledge', 'Moon at that Moment', etc. (turn on CC/Subtitles)
Faye Wong's chief MV director Susie Au, known as the "Hong Kong MV Queen", has cooperated with most of the entertainment industry in Asia: Eason Chan, Miriam Yeung, Sammi Cheng, Andy Lau, Jacky Cheung...... Your must-sing songs in KTV, many MVs are from her. In January this year, YIT film crew visited Susie Au's home in Guangzhou and chatted with her about her interactions with superstars and the stories behind the MVs.
(SOURCE)
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mbs and asoue so far have two background child actors in common- emily delahunty (carmelita’s lackey / lindsay the messenger) and asia au-yeung (snow scout 2 / student 1) so i think it would be really really funny if these were the same goddamn kids who just cannot catch a break and keep ending up as background characters in highly traumatic situations
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azulasnailtech · 3 years
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who would you cast for toph. mai , azula and ty lee in netflix live action?
hi, anon!!! first of all thank you for asking and sorry it took me so long to respond, my modem died and i had to wait for a new one in the mail!
anyway, i'm not so great at fancasting roles that would preferably be played by kids since most child actors do mostly children's media, which i don't really watch (and yes i recognize the irony of saying that as an avatar blog). but tbh i don't think i'd have any idea who to cast as toph even if i did. she is by far the most likely character to be played by a complete unknown imo, since there isn't exactly a wealth of roles to be played by a 10-14yo blind asian girl. (there is every possibility that they cast a sighted actress to play toph, but considering the effort netflix is putting in to find an actor for teo who uses a wheelchair, i do think they will strongly prefer a visually impaired actress for toph)
azula i think has already been booked by Momona Tamada (age 15, japanese canadian), but if she wasn't, I'd maybe consider Emily Delahunty (age 16, i think. filipino-british canadian), I've never watched her in anything, but she has a ton of credits for a girl her age, which speaks well of her. it also looks like she is followed by Gordon Cormier, and the azula and aang actors having a rapport would be a nice perk. face-wise she wouldn't be bad for ty lee, either. another option for azula could be Miya Cech (age 14, japanese american) who looks the part and similarly gets booked a lot.
in my dream world a nationally ranked junior gymnast would decide to retire from the sport and take up acting to play ty lee, lmao. i think Zoé Allaire-Bourgie (age 17, thai canadian) is living her best life right now, so i'll leave her alone. i really like Sophia Hammons (age 14, asian-pacific (i think indonesian, specifically) american) for ty lee. she has booked a part on netflix before as well as playing a starring role in a dcom, and lists herself as being skilled at dance and kickboxing; also, she really has the face for it imo.
mai is kinda tricky because you want her to form a cohesive unit with azula and ty lee (who i'm casting with actresses age 14-16) while also looking appropriate paired romantically with Dallas Liu (age 21). so i'd guess someone who's 17-19 rn, since they'd be 18-20 by the time book 2 would film. Madison Hu (age 19, chinese american) could definitely be a contender. while mai is obviously east asian in the cartoon, i think she (or ty lee) could end up being played by a south asian actress in the live action, since there are indian influences in the fire nation that they might want to reflect with characters who are ethnically indian (subcontinent) but Azula would for sure remain east asian since the rest of the fire nation royal family are. Saara Chaudry (age 17, indian canadian) is quite accomplished for her age.
BONUS: i know nothing about these two girls because they don't have a strong online presence, but Asia Au-Yeung and Chloe Ling have both done background parts on netflix originals (like Ian Ousley) so I would not be surprised to see them pop up in atla
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chrisnaustin · 3 years
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If only I were she!
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seedfinance · 3 years
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US digital dollar: Will fiat currency ride the crypto wave? | Business and Economy News
The US dollar has been the leading global reserve currency for many decades, backed by the full confidence and creditworthiness of the US government and the value of its powerful economy.
But in recent years, the world’s dominant currency unit has faced an increasing number of threats, from its own inefficient financial infrastructure to the introduction of the Chinese e-yuan to the specter of Facebook’s Diem and cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin.
As countries like the Bahamas, China and Sweden test the viability of the central bank digital currency (CBDC), US policymakers are taking stock.
Two US-based efforts are exploring the concept of a digital fiat dollar at a time when cash is no longer king.
The Digital Currency Initiative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) is working with the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston on research to accelerate the hypothetical currency shift in an experiment called Project Hamilton. The President of the Boston Fed has said that a future “Fedcoin” would mix the functions of Venmo and Apple Pay.
And the Digital Dollar Project, a collaboration between the non-profit Digital Dollar Foundation and consulting firm Accenture Plc, is launching five pilot projects next year. This company hopes to stimulate public discussion and take practical steps towards a CBDC.
“There are a number of reasons why central banks around the world are seriously considering CBDC, including data collection and economic data protection, financial system modernization, financial inclusion, precision in government execution and monetary policy,” said Christopher Giancarlo, co-founder the Digital Dollar Foundation and former US government regulator.
Giancarlo told Al Jazeera that “geopolitical concerns, competition from stablecoins” [like Diem] with bank payment systems and the leadership role in setting standards for the global interoperability of digital currencies ”are also motivating the US.
“The private sector has been exploring the possibilities of digital assets like bitcoin for over a decade, and now the public sector is trying to catch up,” he said.
“Doesn’t need mining blocks”
There is no guarantee the US will successfully adopt a digital dollar, Chris Ostrowski, executive director of the UK-based Digital Monetary Institute, told Al Jazeera.
Progressive, libertarian, and business-minded technologists all have different ideas about what a CBDC should look like without agreeing on goals, design, or functionality.
Digital dollar advocates like Rohan Gray, president of the Modern Money Network and professor at Willamette University College of Law, argue that a nationwide approach can advance a coordinated, multi-path framework.
A number of U.S. lawmakers have proposed digital wallets to help Americans with and without bank accounts get benefits and make payments [File: J Scott Applewhite/AP Photo]Gray believes US President Joe Biden should work with Congress to find a dollar digitization path, just as government agencies – at least in theory – join forces to address complex issues like the coronavirus pandemic, economic recovery, and climate change .
“We’re not talking about an instrument or platform or technology, we’re talking about a wide range of legislative changes,” Gray told Al Jazeera.
One of the controversial solutions being considered by progressives is a proposal by Senator Sherrod Brown, an Ohio Democrat, to create a FedAccount digital dollar wallet so that every American can receive benefits and make payments.
The system would be easily accessible at local banks and would have no fees. This ties in with a bill co-financed by Senators Bernie Sanders and Kirsten Gillibrand for the US Postal Service to provide private customer business.
A related idea is the Public Banking Act, introduced by Representatives Rashida Tlaib and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, which aims to “introduce banking as a public utility, a globally proven model for keeping money local and reducing costs by bringing Wall Street middlemen, shareholders and high-paid executives “.
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Some digital tokens like Bitcoin rely on energy-sucking Proof of Work (PoW) consensus mechanisms to validate transactions and mint new coins, which involves running thousands of computers working in unison [File: Bloomberg]Gray sees future “eCash” solutions as a populist tool to combat inequality and make money more democratic by offering token-based digital currencies on prepaid cards, alongside account-based ledger technology, in which people hold assets directly at the central bank hold.
Like many left-wing advocates of the digital dollar, Gray says that blockchain – the technology behind cryptocurrencies – is not needed where there is enough centralized trust.
“Blockchain is supposed to be a consensus among a number of colleagues on a common state of affairs, but that’s not the question you’re trying to resolve here,” he said, referring to the way crypto networks verify transactions. “No mining blocks or proof of work are required for this.”
Decentralized crypto and CBDC could one day coexist. But either way, private Bitcoin has accelerated the discussion about the latter partially replacing paper bills and metal coins.
“Advantages and Risks”
Regardless of whether a digital dollar is ultimately based on blockchain or is only influenced by the principles of cryptocurrency, US politicians of all stripes seem to largely agree on the desire not to fall behind in a global competition for the digitization of the greenback .
Many see a U.S. economy that has always pioneered the internet and fintech sectors and fear that at some point Beijing will shift from limited national implementation of its CBDC to a replacement for the popular Alipay and WeChat payment systems that already dominate much of Asia.
On the whole, despite concerns about illegal funding and money laundering, US officials have criticized the impact of the Chinese model on surveillance and consumer data collection.
Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen have both signaled growing support for a digital dollar, though their comments about the lack of complete user anonymity have cast doubt – especially among conservative lawmakers.
Some libertarian members of the US House of Representatives are optimistic about cryptocurrency but pessimistic about major governments. At a June 15 Task Force on Financial Technology hearing, senior Republican member Warren Davidson, an Ohio congressman, suggested that officials are still “learning” about a digital dollar.
Describing the current financial infrastructure as “already secure, effective, dynamic and efficient,” he said the US should push digitization “for the right reasons, not just to put pressure on ourselves.”
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Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell has signaled increasing support for a digital dollar [File:  Graeme Jennings/Pool via Reuters]Davidson’s main criticism is of “healthy money” – concerns that digital dollars could potentially undermine stability and prosperity. However, he also warns against moving away from the “permissionless” aspects of cash that allow privacy in peer-to-peer transactions.
He told Al Jazeera that the digital dollar should be created “not as a control tool, but as a store of value and a medium of exchange.”
Patrick McHenry, senior Republican on the House of Representatives Financial Services Committee, called for a thorough study of both the “benefits and risks” and agreed to the Fed’s commitment to “get it right.” [rather] to be the first ”.
Other Republicans focus on the inflationary potential of “printing” too much money or the pitfalls of the public sector trying to mimic what commercial banks are already doing. From a cybersecurity perspective, too, holding the intermediary banks could isolate the Fed.
“Convenient addition to cash”
In connection with the 21st Century Dollar Act, a bipartisan bill requiring the US Treasury Secretary to post status updates on the dominance of the dollar and the progress of the CBDC development, a consensus with Wall Street and financial technology companies could emerge.
About 80 percent of central banks are actively studying the CBDC concept, including the European Central Bank and the Bank of England, which recently published papers on the subject.
Last October, the Bahamas rolled out the “sand dollar,” the first national introduction of such a technology by a central bank. In April, the Central Bank of the East Caribbean presented its DCash. And the Bank of Jamaica plans to launch a digital currency next year.
The Jamaican program uses Ireland-based eCurrency Mint Inc as its technology provider. That company’s chief markets officer, Miles Au Yeung, suggests the US could do the same.
He told Al Jazeera that only the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve should have the authority to create, issue and distribute this new form of legal tender.
“Each CBDC must be able to function within the financial system’s existing payment channels, including bank accounts, apps and payment cards, while expanding to smartphones, QR codes and other innovative ways to store digital assets,” said Yeung.
“The digital currency needs to achieve instant and final billing,” he added, saying it should be able to scale “massively with minimal energy consumption.”
In the Bahamas, local company NZIA Ltd implemented the new digital currency, which General Counsel John Kim described to Al Jazeera as “the most mature, advanced system of its kind”.
While Jamaica’s CBDC is not based on blockchain, the Bahamas model is a “best of both worlds” hybrid that combines blockchain and centralized systems, says Kim, who adds that he takes a “wait and see” approach to the digital US dollar tracked.
“When redesigning a mission-critical national infrastructure,” he said, “readiness is just as important as readiness.”
source https://seedfinance.net/2021/07/12/us-digital-dollar-will-fiat-currency-ride-the-crypto-wave-business-and-economy-news/
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olympictickets · 5 years
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Swimmer Stephanie Au’s Tokyo 2020 Olympics qualifying hopes struck by Hong Kong airport disorder
Disruptions at the airport almost caused Hong Kong’s swimming team to scrap their Singapore World Cup campaign, one of the qualifying events for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. Fans from all over the world can book Summer Olympics Swimming Tickets online from our trusted online ticketing market platform.
Headed by Stephanie Au Hoi-shun and Chan Kin-Lok, the six-member squad only managed to leave on Tuesday night for the third and final leg of FINA’s Asia series, but the flight was first cancelled on Monday night after the latest protests by demonstrators at Hong Kong International Airport. The local swimmers tried to board a flight on Tuesday evening but that flight was cancelled as well.
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Later in the evening, the swimmers managed to book another flight and were let in by protesters after pleading to them that they were representing Hong Kong and it was very important for them to fly to Singapore in hopes of qualifying for the Tokyo Olympics. The swimmers managed to catch the flight from Terminal 2.
Head coach Chen Jianhong on Tuesday morning said: “We are now trying to get a flight to Singapore on Wednesday morning, but no one knows what’s going to happen at the airport at this moment. The Singapore leg is one of the Olympic qualifiers, which is important for Au, one of our best swimmers, especially after her performance at the Hong Kong Open Championships over the weekend, where Chan also did very well.
“But the safety of our swimmers should come first. If we cannot leave tomorrow, we will have to reconsider our plan as the Singapore Open will begin on Thursday. We also have to plan for the return to Hong Kong after the race is over on Saturday and no one can predict what will happen in the next few days.”
Au, a three-time Olympian since the 2008 Beijing Games, plans to have another crack at the Olympic qualifying A standard after equalling her season-best in the women’s 100m  backstroke on Sunday in Fo Tan. The part-time model finished her favourite event in one minute and 0.81 seconds. The A standard qualifying time for Tokyo is 1:00.25. But her plans are now hanging in the air as protesters reoccupied Hong Kong airport on Tuesday and stopped most air traffic.
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The Hong Kong medley relay team still has a chance of reaching the Tokyo Olympic Games after finishing 14th at the world championships in Gwangju, South Korea, last month. The quartet of Au, Chan, Yeung and Haughey clocked 4:03.52, two places behind the required ranking for making it to Tokyo. But four slots remain open for the relay.
The coach said: “We want to do a better time in the US to strengthen our position in the medley relay,”
Olympics fans can get Olympics Tickets through our trusted online ticketing market place. OlympicTickets2020.com is the most reliable source for Tokyo Olympics Tickets.
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itsfinancethings · 5 years
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At the farthest edge of Hong Kong, where suburban foothills descend into a riverine border with China, a lone sentry shoos away traffic. The checkpoint, his gestures and the line of U-turning vehicles indicate, is closed.
Behind him towers the glass and concrete skyline of Shenzhen—the nearest Chinese city to Hong Kong. Without the usual throng of travelers, buses and hawkers here at Lo Wu station, the only noise comes from water buffalo grunting across the tracks.
This and nine other border crossings were recently shut in a bid to contain the outbreak of the deadly coronavirus, COVID-19, that emerged in the central Chinese metropolis of Wuhan, wreaking havoc on the mainland and spreading far beyond.
In Hong Kong, the symbolically charged boundary with the mainland has become yet another font of militant unrest after months of anti-government protest. Residents in this semi-autonomous enclave—which the British handed back to China in 1997—insist the whole thing must be sealed. A suspected bombing campaign appeared to be an attempt to pressure the government into doing just that. Nobody was injured, but the spate of homemade explosives, planted at a hospital, a public toilet and Lo Wu station, took “one big step closer to terrorism,” police said earlier this month.
Beyond the looming health scare, this latest fight to control the people, pathogens and ideas that cross the border reflects the same deep distrust of the Chinese Communist Party that exploded during the recent protests. It also exposes a dirty secret that many protesters and their supporters try to downplay: how easily antipathy toward the party translates into resentment of ordinary mainland Chinese.
Beijing’s increasing assertiveness in recent years has fueled outrage against perceived encroachment. It has also helped catalyze a distinct Hong Kong identity—one rooted in defending the territory’s unique freedoms against an influx of mainland money, people and power. “Hong Kong is not China” has become a rallying cry throughout the city, sprayed onto walls and chanted at protests. Anger extends to anything identified with China: emblems, businesses and even people.
Long distrusted as agents of demographic, socioeconomic and even political occupation, mainlanders are now feared as vectors of disease, emboldening a bigotry that increasingly spills into violence.
“As long as the epidemic keeps worsening, people will at the back of their minds blame the mainlanders and think, ‘After all, it’s the mainlanders who started all this,’” says Willy Lam, an expert in Chinese politics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
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ANTHONY WALLACE/AFP via Getty Images This photo taken in Hong Kong on Feb. 6, 2020, shows the border fence with Shenzhen, China (background), near Lo Wu station.
Read more: The Coronavirus Outbreak Could Derail Xi Jinping’s Dreams of a Chinese Century
A nightmare relived
In Asia’s financial center, where more than 60 cases have been recorded compared to the mainland’s 75,000, anxiety is compounded by memories of another nightmare. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) traumatized the city in 2003, claiming 299 lives. Then, Hong Kong was in the middle of the outbreak. Now, the epicenter lies about 600 miles away.
Yet the cosmopolitan hub of 7.5 million resembles a city in lockdown. Restaurants, shopping malls and public transportation are largely deserted as people work from home and schools are closed. Medical masks are in such short supply that lines hundreds long form beside pharmacies rumored to have stock. Runs on toilet paper, bleach and rice have denuded grocery store shelves.
After months of bitter protests, lack of confidence in the government runs deep. Panic is “spreading faster than the virus because the government is not acting in an efficient manner,” says Dr. Ho Pak Leung, a microbiologist and director of the Centre for Infection at the University of Hong Kong.
Union members, democracy activists and even pro-establishment politicians have joined together in calling for the border’s closure. Striking medical workers have threatened to quit en masse. Hong Kong’s embattled leader, Chief Executive Carrie Lam, rejected sealing the border as impractical and discriminatory but eventually agreed to shut all but three checkpoints and impose a mandatory, 14-day quarantine for anyone entering from the mainland. The measures are unprecedented but not enough to the many who fear that contagion will overtake Hong Kong and mainland patients will sap its medical reserves.
“We have to protect our own people first,” says Ng, a patient care assistant who joined the recent strike. “If our medical system goes down, then there will be no one to help Hongkongers.”
With the border still partially open, some have taken it upon themselves to enforce their own restrictions. Several restaurants refuse to serve speakers of Mandarin (the official language of the mainland, unlike Hong Kong where Cantonese dominates). Some hotels require certificates of health from mainland guests, and a student from Hubei told local media that mainlanders quarantined at a university were doxxed.
Read more: The Pandemic of Xenophobia and Scapegoating
Yet experts have warned that the draconian travel bans adopted by much of the world may only divert vital resources from public health tasks and inflame Sinophobia.
“I don’t see any public health reason to justify sealing of borders at this point in the outbreak,” says Tara Kirk Sell, a senior scholar at Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security.
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Paul Yeung/Bloomberg via Getty Images Medical workers wearing protective masks gather during a protest outside the Hospital Authority’s head office in Hong Kong, China, on Feb. 4, 2020.
A fraught boundary
Beyond the public health debate, the push to seal the border brims with political subtext.
With its riverbanks, barbed wire fences, passport checks and a compact no-man’s land, the 25-mile perimeter sets Hong Kong apart from the rest of China, designating it as a place where the laws of the mainland do not apply.
A colonial relic, the boundary follows the same line as it did under the British. Their efforts in the 1970s and 1980s to reinforce the border and maintain a stable population—after the influx of refugees in previous decades—transformed the territory. Once a temporary sanctuary for those fleeing famine and political instability, it became a settled homebase with a specific local identity, anthropologist Ip Iam-chong writes in “Politics of Belonging: a study of the campaign against mainland visitors in Hong Kong.”
After Hong Kong retroceded to China in 1997, the border served as a “firewall” protecting the city’s autonomy, says Jeffrey Twu, who researches border conflicts and nationalist movements at Columbia University.
“This call to shut down the border is not so much about asking the government to literally close all the immigration booths. It’s really this urgent call for the government to rethink its relation vis-à-vis the central government in Beijing,” he says.
But the increasing permeability of the border in recent years has exacerbated the fears of local activists that Hong Kong, with the British gone, will become just another Chinese city. After Beijing loosened restrictions on travel in 2003, mainland visitors provided an economic lifeline for Hong Kong’s SARS-bruised economy, filling hotel rooms, restaurants, malls and boutiques. But as visitor numbers swelled from 7 million in 2002 to 51 million in 2018—nearly seven times the city’s population—resentment grew.
Increasingly, the economy catered to the needs of deep-pocketed Chinese day-trippers, who were accused of everything from congesting the streets to allowing their children to defecate in public. “Many of them are very rude,” Isaac Au, a 30-year-old Hongkonger, says of mainlanders in what are fairly common sentiments. “When they are rich they think that they can just spend money and they are the kings of the world.”
Birth tourism, competition for college spots and the growing use of Mandarin has also irritated locals. Conspicuous consumption by mainland shoppers—some estimates say the city accounts for up to 10% of the $285 billion annual global sales of luxury goods—has exacerbated the sense that many Hongkongers are being priced out of their own city. So has the influx of mainland money into the local property market, already one of the world’s most expensive.
Beijing has attempted to boost territorial integration through massive infrastructure projects. A high-speed railway that directly connected Hong Kong to 58 mainland cities, and brought the Chinese capital Beijing within nine hours’ reach, opened in 2018. So did a $18.8 billion bridge linking Hong Kong to the former Portuguese colony of Macau and the mainland Chinese city of Zhuhai.
Attempts were made to foster cultural assimilation too—like a 2012 campaign to introduce “patriotic education” in Hong Kong schools. But that initiative fueled bitter protests and China’s growing has proximity left Hongkongers cold. According to an annual survey by the Hong Kong University Public Opinion Program, Hongkongers’ sense of being Chinese hit an all-time low in 2019. Among 18 to 29 year olds, 75 percent identified as “Hong Kong” rather than Chinese, while 49 percent of those 30 or older felt the same.
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Kyle Lam/Bloomberg via Getty Images Graffiti reading “Hong Kong Is Not China” is displayed on the wall of a highway during a protest in the Central district of Hong Kong, China, on July 21, 2019.
Escalating violence
This simmering angst has regularly burst into xenophobia. In 2012, a local newspaper ad infamously depicted mainland Chinese as locusts draining the city of its resources and “locusts” has since stuck as a derogatory name for mainlanders. Nativist groups sprang up, pledging to defend their home. One, Hong Kong Indigenous, staged “reclaim” campaigns in 2015, targeting mainland shoppers.
The initially fringe cause found far wider support during the recent pro-democracy protests, which morphed into a broad, ideological battle to both win greater political freedoms and preserve Hong Kong’s special identity. “Reclaim Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Time,” the movement’s defining credo, was coined by jailed activist Edward Leung, a former member of Hong Kong Indigenous. (Ironically, Leung, who argued for tighter borders and even full independence, was born in Wuhan.)
After adopting Leung’s clarion call, some protesters also embraced his advocacy of more militant tactics. Violence, once dismissed as extreme, has become largely accepted as the only way to pressure a sclerotic regime because of the lack of other viable outlets.
Samson Yuen, an expert on social movements at Lingnan University says that, in Hong Kong, people cannot directly elect their leader or legislature, yet are deeply fearful of falling under authoritarian Beijing’s control. “It’s really a symptom of how ill the whole political situation is,” he says. “If there was democracy, people wouldn’t be throwing petrol bombs on the street.”
Coronavirus is just the latest trigger. At a protest-aligned restaurant in the buzzing shopping and entertainment district of Tsim Sha Tsui, diners say they feel more comfortable now that Mandarin-speakers are barred from the establishment. The entrance is covered with pastel-colored Post-It notes expressing support for Hong Kong’s autonomy and exhorting fellow customers to “stay healthy.” People wait in line for a table, even as neighboring eateries sit empty.
“Hongkongers don’t have a choice about our government, about our freedom. But for eating at least, we do,” says Keith, a 33-year-old patron.
And while coronavirus paranoia is certainly not unique to the city, the outbreak provides yet another vehicle for Hongkongers to distinguish themselves from mainland Chinese.
“I blame China for it,” says 23-year-old Karmen, echoing old prejudices. “They eat everything there. We don’t do that.”
This “racialization” says Andrew Junker, a sociologist at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, could prove dangerous amid the violent protest tactics that have become normalized in recent months.
“The dehumanization of the mainland Chinese makes it easier to engage in violence and to believe in an IRA-style separatist ideology and militantism,” he says, referring to the Irish Republican Army, a paramilitary organization that waged a terrorist campaign to drive the British out of Northern Ireland until the 1998 Good Friday Agreement ended most of the conflict.
It seems like a long way from the once troubled streets of Belfast to Lo Wu station. But two homemade explosive devices were found there on Feb. 2; shortly afterward, an anonymous message on social media threatened mainland Chinese arrivals.
“You come to our city to spread germs, but have you considered clearly if you would be able to continue living if you cross the border?” it said.
“I protect my city, [you are] welcome to personally experience the force of a bombing.”
— Additional reporting by Hillary Leung / Hong Kong
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hksquash · 6 years
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2018 Draws Announced
Hong Kong draws feature equal prize money
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Title sponsored by Everbright Sun Hung Kai and presented by Hong Kong Squash the “Hong Kong Squash Open 2018”, as one of the highly anticipated sporting extravaganzas in the world, will be performed at Hong Kong Squash Centre and Hong Kong Park Sports Centre from 19 to 25 November 2018.
HK Squash are delighted that the event  has been recognized as an “M” Mark event that helps enhance the image of Hong Kong as Asia’s sports event capital. The “M” Mark awarded by the Major Sports Events Committee, symbolizing intense, spectacular and signature event in the territory sports calendar.  Introducing by PSA, the new World Tour structure will be adapted from 2018/19 season and as one of the World Tour highest ranked event, the top 30 players will return to this star- studded tournament for a tempting winning purse of HK$3.29 million and demonstrate the best squash to delight the worldwide fans.
The 2018 Everbright Sun Hung Kai Hong Kong Squash Open has committed to offering equal prize money for the first time, with $329,000 split equally between the men’s and women’s draws. This means that every Platinum tournament on the PSA Tour that runs a men and women’s event simultaneously - comprising the U.S. Open, Tournament of Champions, El Gouna International, British Open and now the Hong Kong Open - have all committed to equal prize money.
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The World No 1 and defending champion Mohamed Elshorbagy heads up the men’s draw, the “Egyptian Beast” is seeded to meet the World No.2 Ali Farag in a mouthwatering final encounter while, local top players, the World No.14 Max Lee, World No. 22 Leo Au and World No. 27 Yip Tsz Fung will join the battlefield along with the wildcard holders Henry Leung and Wong Chi Him.
For the women’s event, the world No.1 and defending champion Nour El Sherbini tops the draw while the current world champion Raneem El Welily occupies the following seeding. The local highest ranked player, Annie Auwho gets back to top 10 this month receives a bye into the round two to meet either Amanda Sobhy or Amanda Landers Murphy whereas her fellows Joey Chan, Liu Tsz Ling, Tong Tsz Wing and two wildcard holders Vanessa Chu and Lee Ka Yi will feature in the opening round.
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Mr. David Mui, MH JP, Chairman of Hong Kong Squash attended the ceremony along with the honorable guests included Mr. Yeung Tak-keung, Commissioner for Sports of Home Affairs Bureau, Mr. Li Bingtao, Executive Director & CEO of Everbright Sun Hung Kai, Mr. Karl Kwok Chi Leung, MH, Chairman of Major Sports Events Committee, Mr. Duncan Chiu, Vice Chairman and Mr. Cedric Tyen, Honorary Secretary of Hong Kong Squash, Miss Tammy Ou-Yang and Miss Ng Ka Yee of TVB artists and other co-sponsors representatives to give their supports and anticipation for the yearly tournament.
The first three rounds will be held at Hong Kong Squash Centre from 19 Nov to 22 Nov, and the quarter-finals onward will be at the adjacent Hong Kong Park Sports Centre on 23 Nov- 25 Nov.
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Identifying our baby Snow Scouts 101
Alright so we’ve been talking about the Snow Scouts on the Discord and I’ve managed to identify all of them by actor so here’s my screenshot collection under the cut. I’m in class rn otherwise I’d include my evidence but here’s the basics:
Most of them were found out by googling the actor names listed in the TSS credits and comparing faces. 
Two of the actors (Emerson D’Sylva and Stephen John Kosar) didn’t have images online. However, Stephen John Kosar and Maya Kooner (revolution girl) were the only two Scouts credited in TGG2, and only two Scouts spoke in that ep, so that’s a pretty easy process of elimation. 
Anyway screencaps under the cut.
Chloe Ling
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Asia Au-Yeung
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Baya Ipatowicz
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Jaedon Siewart 
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Mamie Laverock
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Stephen John Kosar 
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Emerson D’Sylva 
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Maya Kooner
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squashsite · 6 years
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Hong Kong draws feature equal prize money
Title sponsored by Everbright Sun Hung Kai and presented by Hong Kong Squash the “Hong Kong Squash Open 2018”, as one of the highly anticipated sporting extravaganzas in the world, will be performed at Hong Kong Squash Centre and Hong Kong Park Sports Centre from 19 to 25 November 2018.
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HK Squash are delighted that the event  has been recognized as an “M” Mark event that helps enhance the image of Hong Kong as Asia’s sports event capital. The “M” Mark awarded by the Major Sports Events Committee, symbolizing intense, spectacular and signature event in the territory sports calendar.  Introducing by PSA, the new World Tour structure will be adapted from 2018/19 season and as one of the World Tour highest ranked event, the top 30 players will return to this star- studded tournament for a tempting winning purse of HK$3.29 million and demonstrate the best squash to delight the worldwide fans.
The 2018 Everbright Sun Hung Kai Hong Kong Squash Open has committed to offering equal prize money for the first time, with $329,000 split equally between the men’s and women’s draws. This means that every Platinum tournament on the PSA Tour that runs a men and women’s event simultaneously - comprising the U.S. Open, Tournament of Champions, El Gouna International, British Open and now the Hong Kong Open - have all committed to equal prize money.
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The World No 1 and defending champion Mohamed Elshorbagy heads up the men’s draw, the “Egyptian Beast” is seeded to meet the World No.2 Ali Farag in a mouthwatering final encounter while, local top players, the World No.14 Max Lee, World No. 22 Leo Au and World No. 27 Yip Tsz Fung will join the battlefield along with the wildcard holders Henry Leung and Wong Chi Him.
For the women’s event, the world No.1 and defending champion Nour El Sherbini tops the draw while the current world champion Raneem El Welily occupies the following seeding. The local highest ranked player, Annie Au who gets back to top 10 this month receives a bye into the round two to meet either Amanda Sobhy or Amanda Landers Murphy whereas her fellows Joey Chan, Liu Tsz Ling, Tong Tsz Wing and two wildcard holders Vanessa Chu and Lee Ka Yi will feature in the opening round.
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Mr. David Mui, MH JP, Chairman of Hong Kong Squash attended the ceremony along with the honorable guests included Mr. Yeung Tak-keung, Commissioner for Sports of Home Affairs Bureau, Mr. Li Bingtao, Executive Director & CEO of Everbright Sun Hung Kai, Mr. Karl Kwok Chi Leung, MH, Chairman of Major Sports Events Committee, Mr. Duncan Chiu, Vice Chairman and Mr. Cedric Tyen, Honorary Secretary of Hong Kong Squash, Miss Tammy Ou-Yang and Miss Ng Ka Yee of TVB artists and other co-sponsors representatives to give their supports and anticipation for the yearly tournament.
The first three rounds will be held at Hong Kong Squash Centre from 19 Nov to 22 Nov, and the quarter-finals onward will be at the adjacent Hong Kong Park Sports Centre on 23 Nov- 25 Nov.
Tickets will be available at Hong Kong Squash office from 19 Oct. Please call 2523 2225 for more details. For more information, please contact Hong Kong Squash at 2869 1592 or fax to 2869 0118.
Update : Gregory Gaultier withdraws injured, draw update to follow
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We’ll be updating our HK minisite shortly
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kidsviral-blog · 6 years
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MC Jin's Second Chance
New Post has been published on https://kidsviral.info/mc-jins-second-chance/
MC Jin's Second Chance
Over a decade ago, MC Jin was signed to Ruff Ryders — the first Chinese-American rapper to approach mainstream success, only to vanish from the scene as quickly as he arrived. Now, after becoming an unlikely star in Hong Kong and overcoming stereotypes he helped promote, he’s attempting a comeback. But is anyone listening?
The Chinese-American rap artist MC Jin is the last act scheduled to perform on the final evening of the Orange County Night Market, a series of outdoor festivals inspired by the culture of strolling open-air, dusk-to-midnight bazaars in Asia.
Jin, 32, bounds up the stage erected at the center of the fairgrounds. His voice booms from the speakers, shouting for those standing near the back to come closer, while he glides across the length of the stage to slap palms in the pit. He wears black and gold high-tops, black cargo shorts, and a black long-sleeved tee printed with a glossy white Mercedes-Benz logo across the chest but parodied by the words MERDERES DEMZ. A black five-panel cap sits backwards on his head.
A natural performer, Jin stalks the stage with charisma and confidence. Watching him rap is a delight. It all feels effortless, the sprezzatura with which he spits rhymes, the intimacy created between the rapper and the legion of upturned faces that Sunday night. Jin basks in the glow of attention. He conscripts the crowd in singing, chanting, and clapping along throughout the first few songs; he hams it up admirably for all the phones bobbing in the air. When he snatches one out of a young woman’s hands and plants a kiss on the screen, she shrieks with glee.
MC Jin at the Orange County Night Market instagram.com
Photos and video footage later proliferate Instagram and Twitter with the hashtags #MCJin and #JourneyTo1459, a nod to his new studio album entitled XIV:LIX, or 14:59, which references the dwindling seconds of a clock counting down the proverbial 15 minutes of fame.
More than a decade ago, Jin freestyle rapped his way to sudden stardom on BET’s flagship hip-hop television program, 106 & Park. In 2002, Jin Au-Yeung was 19, the baby-faced newcomer on “Freestyle Friday,” the show’s weekly battle segment for aspiring emcees. Swimming in an oversize navy blue sweater, the brim of a bucket hat angled over one eye, the 5-foot-6-inch Chinese kid from Queens annihilated the returning champ that first week, and went on to collect six more consecutive wins to earn a spot in 106 & Park’s “Freestyle Friday” Hall of Fame.
Touted the first mainstream Asian-American rapper, he had the ears of the hip-hop world and the devotion of every Asian-American kid with even a passing interest in rap music. Following the BET run, Jin scored a deal with Ruff Ryders, the label that developed artists Eve, DMX, and Jadakiss. To say that hype surrounded Jin’s studio debut is an understatement. Back then, he endured constant comparisons to Eminem, as much for a shared history of coming up the freestyle battle circuit and because of his race. Jin was another outsider trying to come up in a genre dominated by black artists.
You might count a handful DJs and producers — Q-bert and Invisibl Skratch Piklz, DJ Babu of Dilated Peoples, the Fifth Platoon crew in New York — but Jin was undeniably the only rapper out there calling himself “the original chink-eyed MC.” In a New York Times Magazine profile, Ta-Nehisi Coates once wrote of Jin as “the Great Yellow Hip-Hop Hope.”
In 2003, Rolling Stone had named him one of the year’s top new artists to watch. The producer credits on Jin’s The Rest Is History reads like a murderer’s row of hitmakers — Just Blaze, Wyclef Jean, Swizz Beats, Kanye West — but when it was released in 2004, the record received tepid reviews and underperformed in sales.
“I didn’t realize it, but when I first got into battling, as early as age 13, 14, that [freestyle battling] would be my gift and my curse. There’s this stigma about being a battle rapper,” Jin says. “There was a chip on my shoulder, like, ‘Yo, I gotta prove that battle rappers can make songs.’” He shakes his head. “It was just one more thing to add on to the distractions that pulled me away from being able to be truly creative.”
We’re sitting in The Arche, pronounced “ark,” the recording studio at the SEED Center, the vast warehouse in downtown Los Angeles that Jin’s manager and longtime friend, Carl Choi, stripped and transformed into the home to the Great Company, the artist management and event production venture Choi heads up. The Jin in front of me now is toned-down version of the boisterous, ebullient rapper stomping around on stage at the Orange County Night Market a week ago. He is easygoing, and quick with spitfire wisecracks. He speaks fast, sometimes interrupting himself to clarify a detail, jumping forward or looping back to the topic at hand. Jin is always in command of the conversation, even while his mouth appears to rattle on extemporaneously.
In the decade and some years since his 106 & Park and Ruff Ryders days, Jin’s star has blotted, if not faded entirely. Word spread that he’d quit the rap game and had moved to Hong Kong to capitalize on all that new China money.
Jin is back, though in truth, he’d never quite arrived in the first place. “What was driving me then? Fame, money, self-glorification,” Jin admits. “The difference between now and 10 years ago is that [I have] so much more clarity now. So much more purpose. The XIV:LIX mind-set is ‘Yo, Jin, this could be the last interview you ever do, so be honest, be authentic, be grateful, be sincere. This could be the last song, the last album.’”
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Photograph by Jon Premosch for BuzzFeed News
Jin and Ruff Ryders parted ways after the disappointing reception to The Rest Is History. “It was looming in the air. We all knew it was a matter of time,” he says of being released. A few independently released mixtapes came out to little notice. By 2007, he was living back home in Queens, the Au-Yeung family of four (Jin, his parents, and younger sister Avah) all crowded into a desolate basement apartment.
“It was the darkest two years of this whole past decade,” Jin says. “I was in the depression zone — and I don’t use that word lightly.”
“I was on the verge of hanging it all up: Maybe troop on over to Best Buy and see if they’re hiring.“
“I was on the verge of hanging it all up: Maybe it’s time to really let this music thing go, and troop on over to Best Buy and see if they’re hiring,” he says, describing his mind-set then. “At least I’d know I have a job, and it’s not based on popularity and acceptance and hype. I just clock in, stock the TVs, and clock out.”
Jin moved to Hong Kong in 2008; he released a Cantonese-language album through Universal, which led to acting gigs in Chinese film and television. Jin calls the choice to attempt resuscitation of his music dreams overseas a “no-brainer.” He says, “There was absolutely nothing going on for me here in the U.S. at the time, career-wise.” Around the time, Jin found a renewed faith in Christianity. He says, “God really allowed me to blossom. To me, that was the biggest thing to come out of the Hong Kong experience. The last thing I [expected].”
Though Jin was a household name in Hong Kong by then, acting on TV and in films, hosting variety shows, cashing checks for paid endorsements, even appearing alongside a top government official in a state-sponsored holiday greeting spot, he packed it all up and moved back to New York to be a full-time dad to baby boy Chance, who arrived in 2012.
He quiets, and his hands stop moving; he’s not scratching his head, pounding a fist into an open palm, shooting gun-fingers, waving a hand in the air while the other mimes holding a microphone. Mando Fresko, a radio personality on L.A.’s hip-hop station Power 106 who advised on the production of XIV:LIX, says of Jin, “He’s fast at everything. He’s fast at writing songs, fast at recording. Once he feels it, he runs with it. He doesn’t second-guess. He’ll hop in the booth and knock it out.”
In putting together the new album, Jin recorded 35 songs in total. Fifteen tracks ultimately made it on the record. The first single is “Chinese New Year,” a revelatory celebration of Jin’s Chinese-American identity, the story of his family’s immigrant, working-class roots, and a candid acknowledgment of the failures in his rap career thus far — including regret over “Learn Chinese,” the first single off The Rest Is History, and probably still the most recognizable song in Jin’s oeuvre.
“I’m at a point now where I don’t cringe if I hear ‘Learn Chinese,’” he says now. “But I don’t think there was ever one point when I was genuinely, genuinely proud of that song.’” He adds, “I definitely still cringe at that video.”
The video for “Learn Chinese” is a study in the hackneyed stereotypes of Orientalist fantasy. Jin plays two characters in it: the villain in an eye patch and thin mustache who leads a gang of karate-chopping henchmen, and the hero who rescues the sexy Asian girls from some den of iniquity deep in the bowels of a glamorized Chinatown ghetto. The concept is intercut with shots of Jin in a maroon jogging suit rapping underneath an arched, neon-lit Chinese gate, a diamond-encrusted “R” chain swinging from his neck, the famous logo of the Ruff Ryders.
Jin recalls the awe he felt collaborating with Wyclef, who produced “Learn Chinese” and makes a cameo in the video as hype man, bouncing and weaving with his palms pressed in prayer hands, and occasionally bowing, high-kicking. “If Clef said, ‘Yo, you should do this,’ whatever it would have been, I probably was like, cool, let’s do it. Everything he’s suggesting was gold to me.”
Oliver Wang, a music writer and professor of sociology at California State University, Long Beach, has criticized the song for its failure to actually break racial stereotypes of Asian-American men. “It’s still wholly conservative in its ideal of what masculinity looks and sounds like,” Wang asserts. “The video still ascribes to all the same tropes of hegemonic masculinity that we’re familiar with in terms of capacity for violence, sexual prowess.”
“I had this opportunity to make a statement. My criticism of it now is: You had this opportunity and that was the statement you made?”
Jin blames his youth and industry naiveté for the misguided execution. “I look back, and I had this opportunity to make a statement. That was my first single to the world that the label was going to get behind. My criticism of it now is: You had this opportunity, Jin, and that was the statement you made?”
He has higher hopes for the single off XIV:LIX. “I have absolute peace when ‘Chinese New Year’ comes on right now. Whether I’m in a room by myself or it’s in a room full of strangers, or people I do know. Just that alone tells me it’s different from ‘Learn Chinese.’”
At least one critic is cheered; Wang writes to me by email, “It’s like Jin made an 180. On ‘Chinese New Year,’ it’s all about looking inward via introspection and he basically apologizes for his 21-year-old self on ‘Learn Chinese,’ which is striking since it’s rare to see many rappers walking back their own earlier catalog.”
Steven Y. Wong, curator at the Chinese American Museum, is more skeptical. Wong has written about the challenges that artists and arts institutions, like the one where he works, face when addressing culturally specific stories. He says, “Too often, our own ethnic communities celebrate the four F’s (famous people, festivals, fashion, and food), with good intentions, to perhaps demonstrate success, acceptance, and assimilation.” In his estimation, these themes fail to present the nuanced complexities of a community of people, and actually perpetuate “the misconceptions and cultural reductions that prevail in the American imagination” when it comes to Asian-Americans.
The song hits three of Wong’s four F’s: Bruce Lee (famous people), Chinese New Year (festival), and wontons and dim sum (food). The musical production, too, grates Wong’s ears, with its “guzheng- and erhu-sounding pentatonic loops,” stringed instruments that Wong dismisses as “a stereotypical strategy to incorporate an essentialized Chinese-ness.” And that “gung hay fat choy” chorus? Wong calls it “cliché.”
Other listeners are not as discerning and despite his long absence, still seems to have a core following interested in seeing how his Hong Kong detour might bode well for his revived music career at home. Not that he’s overly worried.
“To me right now, fun is taking a drive to Home Depot,” he says. “How’s the album doing, planning for this, got a gig there, social media, all that stuff is out the window. I’m just pushing the cart, Chance is sitting there. We’re talking about we need to get new shingles, whatever. To me, that’s living.”
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Photograph by Jon Premosch for BuzzFeed News
The night of the XIV:LIX launch party at the Sayers Club in Hollywood, a line of a hundred or so people stand listlessly against the brick-wall facade of the nightclub, waiting for a stoic woman with waist-long black hair to find their names on her clipboard. About 50 have been admitted into the front of the house, where a step-and-repeat is set up next to a long wraparound bar. There are men in vests and shirtsleeves, and brightly colored bow ties. The more casually dressed have affected styles of studied dishevelment; ironic logo shirts, cuffed jeans, Nike Air Force 1s. The women wear high-waisted shorts, sheer tops, and heavy gold necklaces, eyelids glittering in iridescent colors.
At 8:20 p.m., guests are ushered into the black-box theater space decorated in the manner of a 1920s speakeasy. Edison bulbs hang from the vaulted ceiling. Half a dozen chesterfield sofas circle the stage, leaving a small aisle for the cocktail waitresses in black hot pants to deliver bottle service. Private booths line the periphery of the room, but most of the attendees remain standing in the aisles or leaning against the massive stretch of bar at the back, dimly lit by a row of wrought-iron candelabras.
Mando Fresko, the Power 106 radio host, commands the DJ booth, spinning a mix of old and new hip-hop joints by Common, Kendrick Lamar, Drake, Macklemore. Jin is somewhere in the room greeting old friends and fans, but when Mando jams Outkast’s “ATLiens,” he gallops to the booth and bumps fists, then raps along to every word in the first verse.
Jin runs through all 15 songs on XIV:LIX, performing parts of tracks live, wisecracking with Fresko, narrating the story of how the album was conceived and brought to light. He is accompanied by a drummer on stage. At one point in the night, he indulges the audience with a freestyle rap session over the snares and kicks, and the crowd goes nuts for it, whooping and whistling for more.
The morning after the party, Jin is visibly drained. “I wanna go home.” Then, he softens. “That’s how I feel, you know? Want to go home. See the fam.”
I recall a moment near the end of our first interview session, when he tells me that he’s not as confident as the persona he projects on stage. He’d just finished giving a blow-by-blow account of how he came to win his first “Freestyle Friday” battle on 106 & Park, from the open casting in Harlem, to how he felt about his chances after the audition, getting the callback (“The taping’s on Wednesday — that blew my mind right there. ‘Freestyle Friday’ isn’t even on Friday!”), the story on defending champ Hassan who stood over a foot taller than him, his strategy going into the battle, down to the David-defeats-Goliath moment when the judges announced him as the winner.
“Sometimes, man, these different chapters don’t always end up panning out the way you think.”
In those quiet seconds after this elaborate, detailed account, his eyes cast toward the rug on the floor, I glimpsed some vague, irretrievable sadness about him. The last thing he’d said, before we stopped recording, was this: “Sometimes, man, these different chapters, different seasons, don’t always end up panning out the way you think.”
I never see that Jin again, not once, in the two weeks I spend trailing him at radio interviews, meet-and-greets, and club shows where he’s mobbed by drunken, crushing crowds. (One determined young woman sidled up to me at Emerson, a nightclub in Hollywood, and demanded that I take a photo with her: “You’re MC Jin’s wife, aren’t you?”)
The day of the album launch, the accompanying XIV:LIX merchandise also arrives in office: CDs with 15 different covers, T-shirts, embroidered hats. Jin studies the liner notes in silence, then quips: “The Great Company, with two O’s, though?” A dreadful silence, then he says, “I’m just kidding!” The staffer in charge of merchandise wails and nearly collapses, while everyone else guffaws.
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Photograph by Jon Premosch for BuzzFeed News
“I would like to think that XIV:LIX will open up a lot of doors in 2015.” A tour is in the works and he hopes to pursue more acting, picking up where he left off in Hong Kong. Late last year, he appeared in Revenge of the Green Dragons, a crime drama directed by Andrew Lau and Andrew Loo, and executive produced by Martin Scorsese. Jin’s performance as a rookie NYPD detective is nothing spectacular, but he delivers his lines adequately and manages to hold his own opposite Ray Liotta.
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MC Jin in Hong Kong, 2008 Jerome Favre / AP Photo
I ask him if it’s a goal to be signed to a major label again. A long pause, then he says, “That’s a good question.” Another pause, and then he decides, “Yeah. It is.” His approach now, however, is vastly changed from the Ruff Ryders days — acknowledging that the industry, too has changed. “Now, I’m not in the mind-set of ‘I’ll do anything to sign, whatever deal you give me I’ll take.’ At one point, that probably was the reality. I was just thirsty for a deal, whatever kind of deal it is.”
Carl Choi, Jin’s manager, says “some sort of collaborative deal makes sense,” which means retaining creative control, but with a major label’s financial resources. Though Jin has been under Choi’s management for years now, the Great Company is a startup venture; XIV:LIX was made in part through crowdsourced funding via a successful Pledge Music campaign.
Choi is no neophyte, however. He has previously managed another Asian-American rap act to platinum success. For years, he was inseparable from the dance/hip-hop group Far East Movement. The relationship imploded after the quartet signed with Interscope in 2010.
At the time, Choi felt strongly that Far East Movement should’ve gone it alone, without the mainstream label deal. “Their songs were getting picked up on the radio, we had traction with touring,” Choi says. “I told the guys, I think we can do this indie, but because I was trying to get them out of that deal, I became the enemy.”
Since breaking with Choi, Far East Movement has gone on to open for Lady Gaga, Calvin Harris, and Lil Wayne. Their hit single, “Like a G6,” has sold over 2 million copies. Kevin Nishimura, one member of Far East Movement, declined to speak on his relationship to the group’s former manager, though he allowed that upon signing with Interscope, the label suggested a name change for the band.
“Right then and there, it really struck us, that’s something that’s not negotiable,” Nishimura says. All four members of Far East Movement are Asian, but their lyrics have never explicitly referenced race. Nishimura explains that that’s partly why the foursome from L.A., with deep roots in Koreatown, have insisted on keeping their original name. “It’s been our way of representing,” he says.
Jin, on the other hand, has never shied away from discussions of race. “People always want to debate, are you black enough or not-black enough, are you Asian enough or not-Asian enough. Like, how do you gauge that?” He chuckles, and continues: “These last few weeks, I’ve been at the OC Night Market, [which is] predominantly Asian. I’m there speaking Cantonese, being myself. And then there’s the Christian music conference I attended in Tampa. Completely opposite, totally not Asian, a good diverse mix of folks. To me, that authenticity, people can feel it. I don’t feel like I have to turn off or on something.”
Though he no longer suffers the comparisons to Eminem (“Number-one reason people don’t call me the Asian Eminem anymore is because he went on to sell billions of records, build this magnificent career, and I went the opposite way,” he says, with a wry laugh), Jin acknowledges that he is a “stan” of his, as well as Macklemore. But he distinguishes himself from another popular white rapper who’s been at the center of recent heated debates in hip-hop: Iggy Azalea. Last year, Azalea was derided by many rap purists, including Q-Tip, for being dismissive of the genre’s cultural roots. “I’m very vocal about saying that we have to remember hip-hop is black culture,” Jin says. “It can grow and evolve, yeah, but my own personal take is that we can never get to a point where we forget that, or not acknowledge it. It comes from respect, and I’m big on the history of hip-hop.”
A couple nights after his album release party, Jin is feted by chef Roy Choi at POT, the hipster Korean restaurant at the newly revamped Line Hotel. The comedic female rapper Awkwafina is there, eating dinner with Dumbfoundead, the Korean-American emcee who’s now going by the stage name Parker. Both are featured in Bad Rap, a documentary on Asian-Americans in hip-hop, directed by Salima Koroma.
In a glib deadpan, Parker says, “Asians in rap? That shit is a very hard mix.”
“If you don’t address race, then people are like, why don’t you talk about the elephant in the room,” says Awkwafina. She adds, “But you have to do it right. It can’t be gimmicky.” A native New Yorker, she calls Jin a “hometown hero,” and she remembers seeing him years ago, “rolling around Flushing with that Ruff Ryders chain, just chilling with friends.”
The two sit at the bar, drinking beers and sharing several plates of food between them. A few feet behind them, an Asian family tucks into their meal wordlessly: grandparents, parents, and two teenage daughters. Jin is on a break. In the meantime, the DJ spins old-school rap songs and cuts from Jin’s XIV:LIX. When he returns behind the bar and grabs the mic again, one of the teenage girls, her hair dyed a shocking pink ombré, turns around in her chair and starts recording with her phone. Jin freestyles a few bars, then leads off chanting, “What’s for dessert, Chef Roy? What’s for dessert?” The entire restaurant chimes in; one of the waitstaff dances exuberantly for a moment by the host stand, popping and locking.
Later, Choi answers by handing Jin a round cake with white icing. The rapper grins, then looks around, and asks innocently, “What do I do with this?” His eyes widen, as if threatening to dump the cake over one of his team. Someone takes the cake from him, and then Jin runs off again, ready to grab the mic and entertain the restaurant’s staff and guests.
Read more: http://www.buzzfeed.com/jeanho/mc-jins-second-chance
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telecomupdate · 7 years
Text
Grand Finale of Inter-Tertiary-Institute Capture the Flag (CTF) Contest 2017--HKUST team captures the checkered flag
HONG KONG, June 12, 2017 /PRNewswire/ -- The final round of the 'Inter-Tertiary-Institution Capture the Flag (CTF) Contest 2017' took place on 10 June at the Hong Kong Applied Science and Technology Research Institute (ASTRI) premises. Organised jointly by ASTRI and iChunQiu.com, the contest was the first of its kind in Hong Kong and Macau.
Grand Finale of Inter-Tertiary-Institute Capture the Flag (CTF) Contest 2017 -- HKUST team captures the checkered flag
Photo caption: Honourable guests of the event (From left to right of the first row) Ms Vivian Lee, Marketing Manager, Greater China Region, FireEye Hong Kong Limited; Ms Lin Wen, Project Manager, Tencent Security Platform Department; Ms Dream Chen, Person-in-charge of External Cooperation, Security Platform Department, Tencent; Ms Eunice Cheng, Director of Public Affairs, ASTRI; Ir Allen Yeung, JP, Government Chief Information Officer of HKSAR; Dr Duncan Wong, Vice President (Financial Technologies), ASTRI; Mr Yu Lei, Vice President, iChunQiu College; Mr Albert Leung, Senior Systems Manager, Office of the Government Chief Information Officer of HKSAR; and Ms Zhu Yan-fei, Director, iChunQiu College; take photos with fellow participants.
Ten finalist teams took part in the event finale - representing the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, School of Professional and Continuing Education of the University of Hong Kong, and Hong Kong Institute of Vocational Education. The contest followed an on-site 'ethical hackathon' format focusing on topics like web-security, cryptography and reverse engineering. In addition to demonstrating their skills, the finalists had to rely heavily on real-time team work and cooperation.
Emphasising the importance of grooming our next generation of technology-savvy professionals, Dr Frank Tong Fuk-kay, CEO of ASTRI, said "In the face of growing threats of cyber-attacks worldwide, the demand for cybersecurity is certain to surge. ASTRI is obliged to help train cybersecurity professionals for both public and private sectors to strengthen their resilience to cyber threats. The 'Capture the Flag' contest not only exposes the students to cybersecurity management of the real world, but it also helps pave the way for them to become real experts in the field in future." Dr Tong thanked the programme partners and sponsors for their support, and also encouraged the participants to "retain their passion in this field and pursue the right career choice for their futures."
The initiative was backed by 'GovCERT.HK' of The Office of the Government Chief Information Officer (OGCIO), HKSAR Government. "The first-ever Inter-Tertiary-Institute CTF Contest 2017 was a commendable effort where young learners actively participated and demonstrated their skills. This also raised awareness of the importance of cybersecurity among our students," said Ir Allen Yeung, JP, Government Chief Information Officer of the SAR. "The contest has equipped students with practical skills and experience in the field of cybersecurity. We hope students will pursue their interest in this field, and leverage their strengths by developing successful future careers," he added.
"The CTF Contest has been a great platform to identify and nurture young cyber-talents. The first CTF contest in the Mainland took place in 2014 - the number of contests and participants have both grown exponentially there ever since. 'CTF' is like a spark, and I can already see the popularity and excitement of CTF in Hong Kong and Macao to go through a dramatic rise in the future. iChunQiu team is very happy to provide Hong Kong and Macao students with technical and knowledge support in this contest," said Mr Yao Lei, Vice President of iChunQiu.com.
HKT was a diamond sponsor of the programme. Mr Larry Wong, the organisation's Head of China Commercial and CPE Business, said that "Cybersecurity is a major challenge facing all walks of life nowadays. HKT has rich experience in dealing with cybersecurity, and we are pleased to see that young people are passionate about this contest. HKT will continue contributing to cybersecurity management, and helping young people to become skilled professionals in this field."
"It has been very exciting and delightful to witness the first local CTF event in Hong Kong. We hope this can enhance the awareness of cybersecurity locally, and inspire our talented young generation to develop professional knowledge and skills in this specialised domain," said Mr Ronald Pong, Dean of Hong Kong Information Security Academy -- another diamond sponsor of the event.
The champion of the contest was Team VXRLNXAlpha from Hong Kong University of Science and Technology who scored the highest marks. The 1st runner-up was Team 400 Pound Hackers from Hong Kong Polytechnic University; while the 2nd runner-up was Team VXRLNXBeta, another team from Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
Launched on 7 March 2017, the CTF contest held its first-round challenge on 1-2 April where participants competed in a 36-hour, non-stop on-line challenge. 317 students from 96 teams representing 14 institutions took part in the preliminary round.
About CTF
CTF is a globally accepted popular platform modelled as a series of simulated cyber-attacks that emulate what happens in the real-life digital space. This exciting, competitive platform gauges the students' skills in managing information security and deterring cyber-attacks. The contest is sponsored by HKT - Hong Kong's telecommunications service provider and leading operator in fixed-line, broadband and mobile communication services, and Hong Kong Information Security Academy (HKISA) - a leading provider of cyber and information security insights and training, as well as Cyberworld (Asia) Ltd and FireEye. The initiative is backed by 'GovCERT.HK' of The Office of the Government Chief Information Officer (OGCIO), HKSAR Government.
About ASTRI
Hong Kong Applied Science and Technology Research Institute Company Limited (ASTRI) was founded by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2000 with the mission of enhancing Hong Kong's competitiveness in technology-based industries through applied research.  ASTRI's core R&D competences in various areas are organised under seven Technology Divisions, namely Communications Technologies, Electronics Components, Mixed Signal Systems IC, Advanced Digital Systems, Opto-electronics, Security and Data Sciences, and Intelligent Software and Systems. Five areas of applications including financial technologies, intelligent manufacturing, next generation network, health technology, and smart city are identified for major pursuit. For further information about ASTRI, please visit www.astri.org
Media enquiries:
For enquiries, please contact Ms. Cherry Au (Tel: 3406 2993, email: [email protected])
Photo - http://ift.tt/2s2qrbZ
Read this news on PR Newswire Asia website: Grand Finale of Inter-Tertiary-Institute Capture the Flag (CTF) Contest 2017--HKUST team captures the checkered flag
0 notes
itsfinancethings · 5 years
Link
At the farthest edge of Hong Kong, where suburban foothills descend into a riverine border with China, a lone sentry shoos away traffic. The checkpoint, his gestures and the line of U-turning vehicles indicate, is closed.
Behind him towers the glass and concrete skyline of Shenzhen—the nearest Chinese city to Hong Kong. Without the usual throng of travelers, buses and hawkers here at Lo Wu station, the only noise comes from water buffalo grunting across the tracks.
This and nine other border crossings were recently shut in a bid to contain the outbreak of the deadly coronavirus, COVID-19, that emerged in the central Chinese metropolis of Wuhan, wreaking havoc on the mainland and spreading far beyond.
In Hong Kong, the symbolically charged boundary with the mainland has become yet another font of militant unrest after months of anti-government protest. Residents in this semi-autonomous enclave—which the British handed back to China in 1997—insist the whole thing must be sealed. A suspected bombing campaign appeared to be an attempt to pressure the government into doing just that. Nobody was injured, but the spate of homemade explosives, planted at a hospital, a public toilet and Lo Wu station, took “one big step closer to terrorism,” police said earlier this month.
Beyond the looming health scare, this latest fight to control the people, pathogens and ideas that cross the border reflects the same deep distrust of the Chinese Communist Party that exploded during the recent protests. It also exposes a dirty secret that many protesters and their supporters try to downplay: how easily antipathy toward the party translates into resentment of ordinary mainland Chinese.
Beijing’s increasing assertiveness in recent years has fueled outrage against perceived encroachment. It has also helped catalyze a distinct Hong Kong identity—one rooted in defending the territory’s unique freedoms against an influx of mainland money, people and power. “Hong Kong is not China” has become a rallying cry throughout the city, sprayed onto walls and chanted at protests. Anger extends to anything identified with China: emblems, businesses and even people.
Long distrusted as agents of demographic, socioeconomic and even political occupation, mainlanders are now feared as vectors of disease, emboldening a bigotry that increasingly spills into violence.
“As long as the epidemic keeps worsening, people will at the back of their minds blame the mainlanders and think, ‘After all, it’s the mainlanders who started all this,’” says Willy Lam, an expert in Chinese politics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Tumblr media
ANTHONY WALLACE/AFP via Getty Images This photo taken in Hong Kong on Feb. 6, 2020, shows the border fence with Shenzhen, China (background), near Lo Wu station.
Read more: The Coronavirus Outbreak Could Derail Xi Jinping’s Dreams of a Chinese Century
A nightmare relived
In Asia’s financial center, where more than 60 cases have been recorded compared to the mainland’s 75,000, anxiety is compounded by memories of another nightmare. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) traumatized the city in 2003, claiming 299 lives. Then, Hong Kong was in the middle of the outbreak. Now, the epicenter lies about 600 miles away.
Yet the cosmopolitan hub of 7.5 million resembles a city in lockdown. Restaurants, shopping malls and public transportation are largely deserted as people work from home and schools are closed. Medical masks are in such short supply that lines hundreds long form beside pharmacies rumored to have stock. Runs on toilet paper, bleach and rice have denuded grocery store shelves.
After months of bitter protests, lack of confidence in the government runs deep. Panic is “spreading faster than the virus because the government is not acting in an efficient manner,” says Dr. Ho Pak Leung, a microbiologist and director of the Centre for Infection at the University of Hong Kong.
Union members, democracy activists and even pro-establishment politicians have joined together in calling for the border’s closure. Striking medical workers have threatened to quit en masse. Hong Kong’s embattled leader, Chief Executive Carrie Lam, rejected sealing the border as impractical and discriminatory but eventually agreed to shut all but three checkpoints and impose a mandatory, 14-day quarantine for anyone entering from the mainland. The measures are unprecedented but not enough to the many who fear that contagion will overtake Hong Kong and mainland patients will sap its medical reserves.
“We have to protect our own people first,” says Ng, a patient care assistant who joined the recent strike. “If our medical system goes down, then there will be no one to help Hongkongers.”
With the border still partially open, some have taken it upon themselves to enforce their own restrictions. Several restaurants refuse to serve speakers of Mandarin (the official language of the mainland, unlike Hong Kong where Cantonese dominates). Some hotels require certificates of health from mainland guests, and a student from Hubei told local media that mainlanders quarantined at a university were doxxed.
Read more: The Pandemic of Xenophobia and Scapegoating
Yet experts have warned that the draconian travel bans adopted by much of the world may only divert vital resources from public health tasks and inflame Sinophobia.
“I don’t see any public health reason to justify sealing of borders at this point in the outbreak,” says Tara Kirk Sell, a senior scholar at Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security.
Tumblr media
Paul Yeung/Bloomberg via Getty Images Medical workers wearing protective masks gather during a protest outside the Hospital Authority’s head office in Hong Kong, China, on Feb. 4, 2020. P
A fraught boundary
Beyond the public health debate, the push to seal the border brims with political subtext.
With its riverbanks, barbed wire fences, passport checks and a compact no-man’s land, the 25-mile perimeter sets Hong Kong apart from the rest of China, designating it as a place where the laws of the mainland do not apply.
A colonial relic, the boundary follows the same line as it did under the British. Their efforts in the 1970s and 1980s to reinforce the border and maintain a stable population—after the influx of refugees in previous decades—transformed the territory. Once a temporary sanctuary for those fleeing famine and political instability, it became a settled homebase with a specific local identity, anthropologist Ip Iam-chong writes in “Politics of Belonging: a study of the campaign against mainland visitors in Hong Kong.”
After Hong Kong retroceded to China in 1997, the border served as a “firewall” protecting the city’s autonomy, says Jeffrey Twu, who researches border conflicts and nationalist movements at Columbia University.
“This call to shut down the border is not so much about asking the government to literally close all the immigration booths. It’s really this urgent call for the government to rethink its relation vis-à-vis the central government in Beijing,” he says.
But the increasing permeability of the border in recent years has exacerbated the fears of local activists that Hong Kong, with the British gone, will become just another Chinese city. After Beijing loosened restrictions on travel in 2003, mainland visitors provided an economic lifeline for Hong Kong’s SARS-bruised economy, filling hotel rooms, restaurants, malls and boutiques. But as visitor numbers swelled from 7 million in 2002 to 51 million in 2018—nearly seven times the city’s population—resentment grew.
Increasingly, the economy catered to the needs of deep-pocketed Chinese day-trippers, who were accused of everything from congesting the streets to allowing their children to defecate in public. “Many of them are very rude,” Isaac Au, a 30-year-old Hongkonger, says of mainlanders in what are fairly common sentiments. “When they are rich they think that they can just spend money and they are the kings of the world.”
Birth tourism, competition for college spots and the growing use of Mandarin has also irritated locals. Conspicuous consumption by mainland shoppers—some estimates say the city accounts for up to 10% of the $285 billion annual global sales of luxury goods—has exacerbated the sense that many Hongkongers are being priced out of their own city. So has the influx of mainland money into the local property market, already one of the world’s most expensive.
Beijing has attempted to boost territorial integration through massive infrastructure projects. A high-speed railway that directly connected Hong Kong to 58 mainland cities, and brought the Chinese capital Beijing within nine hours’ reach, opened in 2018. So did a $18.8 billion bridge linking Hong Kong to the former Portuguese colony of Macau and the mainland Chinese city of Zhuhai.
Attempts were made to foster cultural assimilation too—like a 2012 campaign to introduce “patriotic education” in Hong Kong schools. But that initiative fueled bitter protests and China’s growing has proximity left Hongkongers cold. According to an annual survey by the Hong Kong University Public Opinion Program, Hongkongers’ sense of being Chinese hit an all-time low in 2019. Among 18 to 29 year olds, 75 percent identified as “Hong Kong” rather than Chinese, while 49 percent of those 30 or older felt the same.
Tumblr media
Kyle Lam/Bloomberg via Getty Images Graffiti reading “Hong Kong Is Not China” is displayed on the wall of a highway during a protest in the Central district of Hong Kong, China, on July 21, 2019.
Escalating violence
This simmering angst has regularly burst into xenophobia. In 2012, a local newspaper ad infamously depicted mainland Chinese as locusts draining the city of its resources and “locusts” has since stuck as a derogatory name for mainlanders. Nativist groups sprang up, pledging to defend their home. One, Hong Kong Indigenous, staged “reclaim” campaigns in 2015, targeting mainland shoppers.
The initially fringe cause found far wider support during the recent pro-democracy protests, which morphed into a broad, ideological battle to both win greater political freedoms and preserve Hong Kong’s special identity. “Reclaim Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Time,” the movement’s defining credo, was coined by jailed activist Edward Leung, a former member of Hong Kong Indigenous. (Ironically, Leung, who argued for tighter borders and even full independence, was born in Wuhan.)
After adopting Leung’s clarion call, some protesters also embraced his advocacy of more militant tactics. Violence, once dismissed as extreme, has become largely accepted as the only way to pressure a sclerotic regime because of the lack of other viable outlets.
Samson Yuen, an expert on social movements at Lingnan University says that, in Hong Kong, people cannot directly elect their leader or legislature, yet are deeply fearful of falling under authoritarian Beijing’s control. “It’s really a symptom of how ill the whole political situation is,” he says. “If there was democracy, people wouldn’t be throwing petrol bombs on the street.”
Coronavirus is just the latest trigger. At a protest-aligned restaurant in the buzzing shopping and entertainment district of Tsim Sha Tsui, diners say they feel more comfortable now that Mandarin-speakers are barred from the establishment. The entrance is covered with pastel-colored Post-It notes expressing support for Hong Kong’s autonomy and exhorting fellow customers to “stay healthy.” People wait in line for a table, even as neighboring eateries sit empty.
“Hongkongers don’t have a choice about our government, about our freedom. But for eating at least, we do,” says Keith, a 33-year-old patron.
And while coronavirus paranoia is certainly not unique to the city, the outbreak provides yet another vehicle for Hongkongers to distinguish themselves from mainland Chinese.
“I blame China for it,” says 23-year-old Karmen, echoing old prejudices. “They eat everything there. We don’t do that.”
This “racialization” says Andrew Junker, a sociologist at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, could prove dangerous amid the violent protest tactics that have become normalized in recent months.
“The dehumanization of the mainland Chinese makes it easier to engage in violence and to believe in an IRA-style separatist ideology and militantism,” he says, referring to the Irish Republican Army, a paramilitary organization that waged a terrorist campaign to drive the British out of Northern Ireland until the 1998 Good Friday Agreement ended most of the conflict.
It seems like a long way from the once troubled streets of Belfast to Lo Wu station. But two homemade explosive devices were found there on Feb. 2; shortly afterward, an anonymous message on social media threatened mainland Chinese arrivals.
“You come to our city to spread germs, but have you considered clearly if you would be able to continue living if you cross the border?” it said.
“I protect my city, [you are] welcome to personally experience the force of a bombing.”
— Additional reporting by Hillary Leung / Hong Kong
0 notes
ebizupdate · 7 years
Text
Grand Finale of Inter-Tertiary-Institute Capture the Flag (CTF) Contest 2017--HKUST team captures the checkered flag
HONG KONG, June 12, 2017 /PRNewswire/ -- The final round of the 'Inter-Tertiary-Institution Capture the Flag (CTF) Contest 2017' took place on 10 June at the Hong Kong Applied Science and Technology Research Institute (ASTRI) premises. Organised jointly by ASTRI and iChunQiu.com, the contest was the first of its kind in Hong Kong and Macau.
Grand Finale of Inter-Tertiary-Institute Capture the Flag (CTF) Contest 2017 -- HKUST team captures the checkered flag
Photo caption: Honourable guests of the event (From left to right of the first row) Ms Vivian Lee, Marketing Manager, Greater China Region, FireEye Hong Kong Limited; Ms Lin Wen, Project Manager, Tencent Security Platform Department; Ms Dream Chen, Person-in-charge of External Cooperation, Security Platform Department, Tencent; Ms Eunice Cheng, Director of Public Affairs, ASTRI; Ir Allen Yeung, JP, Government Chief Information Officer of HKSAR; Dr Duncan Wong, Vice President (Financial Technologies), ASTRI; Mr Yu Lei, Vice President, iChunQiu College; Mr Albert Leung, Senior Systems Manager, Office of the Government Chief Information Officer of HKSAR; and Ms Zhu Yan-fei, Director, iChunQiu College; take photos with fellow participants.
Ten finalist teams took part in the event finale - representing the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, School of Professional and Continuing Education of the University of Hong Kong, and Hong Kong Institute of Vocational Education. The contest followed an on-site 'ethical hackathon' format focusing on topics like web-security, cryptography and reverse engineering. In addition to demonstrating their skills, the finalists had to rely heavily on real-time team work and cooperation.
Emphasising the importance of grooming our next generation of technology-savvy professionals, Dr Frank Tong Fuk-kay, CEO of ASTRI, said "In the face of growing threats of cyber-attacks worldwide, the demand for cybersecurity is certain to surge. ASTRI is obliged to help train cybersecurity professionals for both public and private sectors to strengthen their resilience to cyber threats. The 'Capture the Flag' contest not only exposes the students to cybersecurity management of the real world, but it also helps pave the way for them to become real experts in the field in future." Dr Tong thanked the programme partners and sponsors for their support, and also encouraged the participants to "retain their passion in this field and pursue the right career choice for their futures."
The initiative was backed by 'GovCERT.HK' of The Office of the Government Chief Information Officer (OGCIO), HKSAR Government. "The first-ever Inter-Tertiary-Institute CTF Contest 2017 was a commendable effort where young learners actively participated and demonstrated their skills. This also raised awareness of the importance of cybersecurity among our students," said Ir Allen Yeung, JP, Government Chief Information Officer of the SAR. "The contest has equipped students with practical skills and experience in the field of cybersecurity. We hope students will pursue their interest in this field, and leverage their strengths by developing successful future careers," he added.
"The CTF Contest has been a great platform to identify and nurture young cyber-talents. The first CTF contest in the Mainland took place in 2014 - the number of contests and participants have both grown exponentially there ever since. 'CTF' is like a spark, and I can already see the popularity and excitement of CTF in Hong Kong and Macao to go through a dramatic rise in the future. iChunQiu team is very happy to provide Hong Kong and Macao students with technical and knowledge support in this contest," said Mr Yao Lei, Vice President of iChunQiu.com.
HKT was a diamond sponsor of the programme. Mr Larry Wong, the organisation's Head of China Commercial and CPE Business, said that "Cybersecurity is a major challenge facing all walks of life nowadays. HKT has rich experience in dealing with cybersecurity, and we are pleased to see that young people are passionate about this contest. HKT will continue contributing to cybersecurity management, and helping young people to become skilled professionals in this field."
"It has been very exciting and delightful to witness the first local CTF event in Hong Kong. We hope this can enhance the awareness of cybersecurity locally, and inspire our talented young generation to develop professional knowledge and skills in this specialised domain," said Mr Ronald Pong, Dean of Hong Kong Information Security Academy -- another diamond sponsor of the event.
The champion of the contest was Team VXRLNXAlpha from Hong Kong University of Science and Technology who scored the highest marks. The 1st runner-up was Team 400 Pound Hackers from Hong Kong Polytechnic University; while the 2nd runner-up was Team VXRLNXBeta, another team from Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
Launched on 7 March 2017, the CTF contest held its first-round challenge on 1-2 April where participants competed in a 36-hour, non-stop on-line challenge. 317 students from 96 teams representing 14 institutions took part in the preliminary round.
About CTF
CTF is a globally accepted popular platform modelled as a series of simulated cyber-attacks that emulate what happens in the real-life digital space. This exciting, competitive platform gauges the students' skills in managing information security and deterring cyber-attacks. The contest is sponsored by HKT - Hong Kong's telecommunications service provider and leading operator in fixed-line, broadband and mobile communication services, and Hong Kong Information Security Academy (HKISA) - a leading provider of cyber and information security insights and training, as well as Cyberworld (Asia) Ltd and FireEye. The initiative is backed by 'GovCERT.HK' of The Office of the Government Chief Information Officer (OGCIO), HKSAR Government.
About ASTRI
Hong Kong Applied Science and Technology Research Institute Company Limited (ASTRI) was founded by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2000 with the mission of enhancing Hong Kong's competitiveness in technology-based industries through applied research.  ASTRI's core R&D competences in various areas are organised under seven Technology Divisions, namely Communications Technologies, Electronics Components, Mixed Signal Systems IC, Advanced Digital Systems, Opto-electronics, Security and Data Sciences, and Intelligent Software and Systems. Five areas of applications including financial technologies, intelligent manufacturing, next generation network, health technology, and smart city are identified for major pursuit. For further information about ASTRI, please visit www.astri.org
Media enquiries:
For enquiries, please contact Ms. Cherry Au (Tel: 3406 2993, email: [email protected])
Photo - http://ift.tt/2s2qrbZ
Read this news on PR Newswire Asia website: Grand Finale of Inter-Tertiary-Institute Capture the Flag (CTF) Contest 2017--HKUST team captures the checkered flag
0 notes
itsfinancethings · 5 years
Link
February 19, 2020 at 02:27AM
At the farthest edge of Hong Kong, where suburban foothills descend into a riverine border with China, a lone sentry shoos away traffic. The checkpoint, his gestures and the line of U-turning vehicles indicate, is closed.
Behind him towers the glass and concrete skyline of Shenzhen—the nearest Chinese city to Hong Kong. Without the usual throng of travelers, buses and hawkers here at Lo Wu station, the only noise comes from water buffalo grunting across the tracks.
This and nine other border crossings were recently shut in a bid to contain the outbreak of the deadly coronavirus, COVID-19, that emerged in the central Chinese metropolis of Wuhan, wreaking havoc on the mainland and spreading far beyond.
In Hong Kong, the symbolically charged boundary with the mainland has become yet another font of militant unrest after months of anti-government protest. Residents in this semi-autonomous enclave—which the British handed back to China in 1997—insist the whole thing must be sealed. A suspected bombing campaign appeared to be an attempt to pressure the government into doing just that. Nobody was injured, but the spate of homemade explosives, planted at a hospital, a public toilet and Lo Wu station, took “one big step closer to terrorism,” police said earlier this month.
Beyond the looming health scare, this latest fight to control the people, pathogens and ideas that cross the border reflects the same deep distrust of the Chinese Communist Party that exploded during the recent protests. It also exposes a dirty secret that many protesters and their supporters try to downplay: how easily antipathy toward the party translates into resentment of ordinary mainland Chinese.
Beijing’s increasing assertiveness in recent years has fueled outrage against perceived encroachment. It has also helped catalyze a distinct Hong Kong identity—one rooted in defending the territory’s unique freedoms against an influx of mainland money, people and power. “Hong Kong is not China” has become a rallying cry throughout the city, sprayed onto walls and chanted at protests. Anger extends to anything identified with China: emblems, businesses and even people.
Long distrusted as agents of demographic, socioeconomic and even political occupation, mainlanders are now feared as vectors of disease, emboldening a bigotry that increasingly spills into violence.
“As long as the epidemic keeps worsening, people will at the back of their minds blame the mainlanders and think, ‘After all, it’s the mainlanders who started all this,’” says Willy Lam, an expert in Chinese politics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Tumblr media
ANTHONY WALLACE/AFP via Getty Images This photo taken in Hong Kong on Feb. 6, 2020, shows the border fence with Shenzhen, China (background), near Lo Wu station.
Read more: The Coronavirus Outbreak Could Derail Xi Jinping’s Dreams of a Chinese Century
A nightmare relived
In Asia’s financial center, where more than 60 cases have been recorded compared to the mainland’s 75,000, anxiety is compounded by memories of another nightmare. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) traumatized the city in 2003, claiming 299 lives. Then, Hong Kong was in the middle of the outbreak. Now, the epicenter lies about 600 miles away.
Yet the cosmopolitan hub of 7.5 million resembles a city in lockdown. Restaurants, shopping malls and public transportation are largely deserted as people work from home and schools are closed. Medical masks are in such short supply that lines hundreds long form beside pharmacies rumored to have stock. Runs on toilet paper, bleach and rice have denuded grocery store shelves.
After months of bitter protests, lack of confidence in the government runs deep. Panic is “spreading faster than the virus because the government is not acting in an efficient manner,” says Dr. Ho Pak Leung, a microbiologist and director of the Centre for Infection at the University of Hong Kong.
Union members, democracy activists and even pro-establishment politicians have joined together in calling for the border’s closure. Striking medical workers have threatened to quit en masse. Hong Kong’s embattled leader, Chief Executive Carrie Lam, rejected sealing the border as impractical and discriminatory but eventually agreed to shut all but three checkpoints and impose a mandatory, 14-day quarantine for anyone entering from the mainland. The measures are unprecedented but not enough to the many who fear that contagion will overtake Hong Kong and mainland patients will sap its medical reserves.
“We have to protect our own people first,” says Ng, a patient care assistant who joined the recent strike. “If our medical system goes down, then there will be no one to help Hongkongers.”
With the border still partially open, some have taken it upon themselves to enforce their own restrictions. Several restaurants refuse to serve speakers of Mandarin (the official language of the mainland, unlike Hong Kong where Cantonese dominates). Some hotels require certificates of health from mainland guests, and a student from Hubei told local media that mainlanders quarantined at a university were doxxed.
Read more: The Pandemic of Xenophobia and Scapegoating
Yet experts have warned that the draconian travel bans adopted by much of the world may only divert vital resources from public health tasks and inflame Sinophobia.
“I don’t see any public health reason to justify sealing of borders at this point in the outbreak,” says Tara Kirk Sell, a senior scholar at Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security.
Tumblr media
Paul Yeung/Bloomberg via Getty Images Medical workers wearing protective masks gather during a protest outside the Hospital Authority’s head office in Hong Kong, China, on Feb. 4, 2020. P
A fraught boundary
Beyond the public health debate, the push to seal the border brims with political subtext.
With its riverbanks, barbed wire fences, passport checks and a compact no-man’s land, the 25-mile perimeter sets Hong Kong apart from the rest of China, designating it as a place where the laws of the mainland do not apply.
A colonial relic, the boundary follows the same line as it did under the British. Their efforts in the 1970s and 1980s to reinforce the border and maintain a stable population—after the influx of refugees in previous decades—transformed the territory. Once a temporary sanctuary for those fleeing famine and political instability, it became a settled homebase with a specific local identity, anthropologist Ip Iam-chong writes in “Politics of Belonging: a study of the campaign against mainland visitors in Hong Kong.”
After Hong Kong retroceded to China in 1997, the border served as a “firewall” protecting the city’s autonomy, says Jeffrey Twu, who researches border conflicts and nationalist movements at Columbia University.
“This call to shut down the border is not so much about asking the government to literally close all the immigration booths. It’s really this urgent call for the government to rethink its relation vis-à-vis the central government in Beijing,” he says.
But the increasing permeability of the border in recent years has exacerbated the fears of local activists that Hong Kong, with the British gone, will become just another Chinese city. After Beijing loosened restrictions on travel in 2003, mainland visitors provided an economic lifeline for Hong Kong’s SARS-bruised economy, filling hotel rooms, restaurants, malls and boutiques. But as visitor numbers swelled from 7 million in 2002 to 51 million in 2018—nearly seven times the city’s population—resentment grew.
Increasingly, the economy catered to the needs of deep-pocketed Chinese day-trippers, who were accused of everything from congesting the streets to allowing their children to defecate in public. “Many of them are very rude,” Isaac Au, a 30-year-old Hongkonger, says of mainlanders in what are fairly common sentiments. “When they are rich they think that they can just spend money and they are the kings of the world.”
Birth tourism, competition for college spots and the growing use of Mandarin has also irritated locals. Conspicuous consumption by mainland shoppers—some estimates say the city accounts for up to 10% of the $285 billion annual global sales of luxury goods—has exacerbated the sense that many Hongkongers are being priced out of their own city. So has the influx of mainland money into the local property market, already one of the world’s most expensive.
Beijing has attempted to boost territorial integration through massive infrastructure projects. A high-speed railway that directly connected Hong Kong to 58 mainland cities, and brought the Chinese capital Beijing within nine hours’ reach, opened in 2018. So did a $18.8 billion bridge linking Hong Kong to the former Portuguese colony of Macau and the mainland Chinese city of Zhuhai.
Attempts were made to foster cultural assimilation too—like a 2012 campaign to introduce “patriotic education” in Hong Kong schools. But that initiative fueled bitter protests and China’s growing has proximity left Hongkongers cold. According to an annual survey by the Hong Kong University Public Opinion Program, Hongkongers’ sense of being Chinese hit an all-time low in 2019. Among 18 to 29 year olds, 75 percent identified as “Hong Kong” rather than Chinese, while 49 percent of those 30 or older felt the same.
Tumblr media
Kyle Lam/Bloomberg via Getty Images Graffiti reading “Hong Kong Is Not China” is displayed on the wall of a highway during a protest in the Central district of Hong Kong, China, on July 21, 2019.
Escalating violence
This simmering angst has regularly burst into xenophobia. In 2012, a local newspaper ad infamously depicted mainland Chinese as locusts draining the city of its resources and “locusts” has since stuck as a derogatory name for mainlanders. Nativist groups sprang up, pledging to defend their home. One, Hong Kong Indigenous, staged “reclaim” campaigns in 2015, targeting mainland shoppers.
The initially fringe cause found far wider support during the recent pro-democracy protests, which morphed into a broad, ideological battle to both win greater political freedoms and preserve Hong Kong’s special identity. “Reclaim Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Time,” the movement’s defining credo, was coined by jailed activist Edward Leung, a former member of Hong Kong Indigenous. (Ironically, Leung, who argued for tighter borders and even full independence, was born in Wuhan.)
After adopting Leung’s clarion call, some protesters also embraced his advocacy of more militant tactics. Violence, once dismissed as extreme, has become largely accepted as the only way to pressure a sclerotic regime because of the lack of other viable outlets.
Samson Yuen, an expert on social movements at Lingnan University says that, in Hong Kong, people cannot directly elect their leader or legislature, yet are deeply fearful of falling under authoritarian Beijing’s control. “It’s really a symptom of how ill the whole political situation is,” he says. “If there was democracy, people wouldn’t be throwing petrol bombs on the street.”
Coronavirus is just the latest trigger. At a protest-aligned restaurant in the buzzing shopping and entertainment district of Tsim Sha Tsui, diners say they feel more comfortable now that Mandarin-speakers are barred from the establishment. The entrance is covered with pastel-colored Post-It notes expressing support for Hong Kong’s autonomy and exhorting fellow customers to “stay healthy.” People wait in line for a table, even as neighboring eateries sit empty.
“Hongkongers don’t have a choice about our government, about our freedom. But for eating at least, we do,” says Keith, a 33-year-old patron.
And while coronavirus paranoia is certainly not unique to the city, the outbreak provides yet another vehicle for Hongkongers to distinguish themselves from mainland Chinese.
“I blame China for it,” says 23-year-old Karmen, echoing old prejudices. “They eat everything there. We don’t do that.”
This “racialization” says Andrew Junker, a sociologist at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, could prove dangerous amid the violent protest tactics that have become normalized in recent months.
“The dehumanization of the mainland Chinese makes it easier to engage in violence and to believe in an IRA-style separatist ideology and militantism,” he says, referring to the Irish Republican Army, a paramilitary organization that waged a terrorist campaign to drive the British out of Northern Ireland until the 1998 Good Friday Agreement ended most of the conflict.
It seems like a long way from the once troubled streets of Belfast to Lo Wu station. But two homemade explosive devices were found there on Feb. 2; shortly afterward, an anonymous message on social media threatened mainland Chinese arrivals.
“You come to our city to spread germs, but have you considered clearly if you would be able to continue living if you cross the border?” it said.
“I protect my city, [you are] welcome to personally experience the force of a bombing.”
— Additional reporting by Hillary Leung / Hong Kong
0 notes