#Modi economic policies

[signode-blog]

A Resounding Victory: The Indian Financial Market's Response to the 2019 Lok Sabha Election Results

The 2019 Lok Sabha elections in India were a significant event, not only politically but also economically. The landslide victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under the leadership of Narendra Modi sent ripples across various sectors, notably the financial markets. This blog post delves into the intricate dynamics of how the Indian financial markets responded to the BJP’s victory and what…

[townpostin]

Union Minister Lauds Budget's Rural Focus in Chandil Visit

Sanjay Seth highlights benefits for villages, poor, farmers, women, and youth Union Minister of State for Defence Sanjay Seth praises the central budget during his visit to Chandil, emphasizing its focus on rural development. CHANDIL – Union Minister of State for Defence and Ranchi MP Sanjay Seth visited Chandil on Sunday, praising the recently presented Union Budget for its comprehensive…

[easterneyenews]

Narendra Modi: Everything About The PM Of India

Narendra Modi, the current Prime Minister of India, is a leader who has left an indelible mark on the nation's political, economic, and social landscape. Known for his dynamic leadership, visionary policies, and charismatic personality, Modi has transformed India in numerous ways. This comprehensive blog delves into everything about Narendra Modi, offering insights into his early life, political journey, significant achievements, and influence on India and the world.

Early Life and Background

Narendra Damodardas Modi was born on September 17, 1950, in Vadnagar, a small town in northern Gujarat, India. Coming from a humble background, Modi's early life was marked by hardship and determination. He helped his father sell tea at the local railway station, an experience that shaped his understanding of grassroots issues and the common man's struggles.

Education and Early Interests

As per the UK Newspapers News Modi completed his schooling in Vadnagar and later pursued a degree in political science, earning an M.A. from Gujarat University in Ahmedabad. His early interest in serving the nation led him to join the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu nationalist organization, in the early 1970s. Modi set up a unit of the RSS’s students’ wing, the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, in his area, where he honed his leadership skills and ideological beliefs.

Political Journey

Modi's political journey began with his active involvement in the RSS, which eventually led to his association with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1987. Within a year, he was made the general secretary of the Gujarat branch of the party. Modi played a pivotal role in strengthening the party’s presence in the state, contributing to the BJP's success in the 1995 state legislative assembly elections and the formation of the first-ever BJP-controlled government in India.

Chief Minister of Gujarat

In 2001, Narendra Modi was appointed the Chief Minister of Gujarat, following the poor response of the incumbent government to the Bhuj earthquake. He entered his first-ever electoral contest in a February 2002 by-election, winning a seat in the Gujarat state assembly.

Modi’s tenure as chief minister was marked by both achievements and controversies. His role during the 2002 communal riots in Gujarat drew international criticism, with allegations of condoning the violence or failing to act decisively to stop it. Despite these controversies, Modi’s political career in Gujarat was marked by repeated electoral successes in 2002, 2007, and 2012, establishing him as a formidable leader within the BJP.

Rise to National Leadership

Modi's success in Gujarat laid the foundation for his rise to national prominence. In June 2013, Modi was chosen as the leader of the BJP’s campaign for the 2014 elections to the Lok Sabha. His campaign focused on development, good governance, and anti-corruption, resonating with millions of Indians. In the 2014 elections, he led the BJP to a historic victory, securing a clear majority of seats in the Lok Sabha.

First Term as Prime Minister (2014-2019)

Modi was sworn in as Prime Minister on May 26, 2014. His first term was marked by several significant initiatives and reforms aimed at transforming India:

Goods and Services Tax (GST): Launched in 2017, GST is one of the most significant tax reforms in India's history, simplifying the indirect tax structure.

Demonetization: In 2016, Modi announced the demonetization of high-value currency notes to curb black money and counterfeit currency.

Swachh Bharat Abhiyan: Launched in 2014, this nationwide cleanliness campaign aimed to eliminate open defecation and improve solid waste management.

Digital India: An ambitious program to transform India into a digitally empowered society and knowledge economy.

Make in India: Aimed at making India a global manufacturing hub, this initiative encourages companies to manufacture their products in India.

Modi's foreign policy achievements included hosting Chinese President Xi Jinping and making a highly successful visit to New York City, where he met with U.S. President Barack Obama.

Second Term as Prime Minister (2019-2024)

The Modi-led BJP won a majority again in the 2019 general election. His second term saw continued efforts to promote Hindu culture and implement economic reforms:

Revocation of Jammu and Kashmir's Special Status: In October 2019, Modi's government revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, bringing it under the direct control of the union government.

COVID-19 Pandemic Response: Modi took decisive action to combat the COVID-19 outbreak, implementing strict nationwide restrictions and promoting vaccine development and distribution.

Despite facing protests and criticism for some policies, such as agricultural reforms, Modi's leadership remained influential. The BJP faced setbacks in state elections in late 2018, but Modi's charisma and a security crisis in Jammu and Kashmir boosted his image ahead of the 2019 elections.

Third Term as Prime Minister (2024-Present)

In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP won 240 seats, and the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) secured 293 of the 543 seats, allowing Modi to become Prime Minister for a third consecutive term. Although the BJP did not secure a majority on its own, the NDA's coalition support ensured their continued governance.

Personal Life and Public Image

Narendra Modi is known for his disciplined lifestyle, early morning yoga sessions, and simple living. Despite his high-profile status, he remains deeply connected to his roots and continues to draw inspiration from his early life experiences.

Communication and Public Engagement

Modi's communication skills are unparalleled, often using social media and public addresses to connect with citizens. His monthly radio program, "Mann Ki Baat," has become a popular platform for sharing his thoughts and initiatives with the nation.

Conclusion

Narendra Modi's journey from a small-town boy to the Prime Minister of the world's largest democracy is a testament to his resilience, dedication, and visionary leadership. His impact on India's socio-economic fabric, governance, and international relations is profound and continues to shape the country's future.

Whether admired or criticized, Narendra Modi's influence on India and the global stage is undeniable. His story is not just about a political leader but also about the transformative power of determination and leadership.

Stay tuned to our blog for more updates and in-depth analyses of Narendra Modi's policies, initiatives, and their impact on India and the world.

[reasonsforhope]

"India’s announcement that it aims to reach net zero emissions by 2070 and to meet fifty percent of its electricity requirements from renewable energy sources by 2030 is a hugely significant moment for the global fight against climate change. India is pioneering a new model of economic development that could avoid the carbon-intensive approaches that many countries have pursued in the past – and provide a blueprint for other developing economies.

The scale of transformation in India is stunning. Its economic growth has been among the highest in the world over the past two decades, lifting of millions of people out of poverty. Every year, India adds a city the size of London to its urban population, involving vast construction of new buildings, factories and transportation networks. Coal and oil have so far served as bedrocks of India’s industrial growth and modernisation, giving a rising number of Indian people access to modern energy services. This includes adding new electricity connections for 50 million citizens each year over the past decade. 

The rapid growth in fossil energy consumption has also meant India’s annual CO2 emissions have risen to become the third highest in the world. However, India’s CO2 emissions per person put it near the bottom of the world’s emitters, and they are lower still if you consider historical emissions per person. The same is true of energy consumption: the average household in India consumes a tenth as much electricity as the average household in the United States.  

India’s sheer size and its huge scope for growth means that its energy demand is set to grow by more than that of any other country in the coming decades. In a pathway to net zero emissions by 2070, we estimate that most of the growth in energy demand this decade would already have to be met with low-carbon energy sources. It therefore makes sense that Prime Minister Narendra Modi has announced more ambitious targets for 2030, including installing 500 gigawatts of renewable energy capacity, reducing the emissions intensity of its economy by 45%, and reducing a billion tonnes of CO2. 

These targets are formidable, but the good news is that the clean energy transition in India is already well underway. It has overachieved its commitment made at COP 21- Paris Summit [a.k.a. 2015, at the same conference that produced the Paris Agreement] by already meeting 40% of its power capacity from non-fossil fuels- almost nine years ahead of its commitment, and the share of solar and wind in India’s energy mix have grown phenomenally. Owing to technological developments, steady policy support, and a vibrant private sector, solar power plants are cheaper to build than coal ones. Renewable electricity is growing at a faster rate in India than any other major economy, with new capacity additions on track to double by 2026...

Subsidies for petrol and diesel were removed in the early 2010s, and subsidies for electric vehicles were introduced in 2019. India’s robust energy efficiency programme has been successful in reducing energy use and emissions from buildings, transport and major industries. Government efforts to provide millions of households with fuel gas for cooking and heating are enabling a steady transition away from the use of traditional biomass such as burning wood. India is also laying the groundwork to scale up important emerging technologies such as hydrogen, battery storage, and low-carbon steel, cement and fertilisers..."

-via IEA (International Energy Agency), January 10, 2022

Note: And since that's a little old, here's an update to show that progress is still going strong:

-via Economic Times: EnergyWorld, March 10, 2023

[beguines]

Whereas the election of Modi had already demonstrated that this new India was prepared to sacrifice Muslims and others for the purported chance to economically transform the country (read: corporatize it), it was only natural that Palestinians too would be discarded if it meant getting closer to Israel and the boon of global capital. By refusing to allow parliament to pass a resolution against Israeli aggression in Gaza and by abstaining from the resolution endorsing the 2015 UN report that called for accountability for Israeli crimes, India had shown that it was no longer prepared to provide Palestinians even performative support. Moreover, equivocating that both sides had an "equal responsibility" to lower tensions and prevent unnecessary loss of life, Modi's government had already amended the substantive nature of its foreign policy on the question of Palestine.

India had normalized relations with Israel in 1992 without Palestinians achieving statehood or self-determination. In 2014, New Delhi went one step further. It upgraded its public appreciation for Zionism and Israel and reduced its foreign policy to a contorted and performative "sympathy" for the Palestinian cause. It also began to illustrate a respect and intention to emulate Israeli policy at home. In 2014, the Punjab Police traveled to Israel for training on "security and anti-terror operations." A year later, the Indian Police Service (IPS) began an annual program in which recent graduates would spend one week studying "best practices in counterinsurgency, managing low intensity warfare and use of technology in policing and countering terror" with the Israel National Police Academy. In 2015, the Indian government began the implementation of a "smart border" along the Line of Control. These partnerships with Israel did little to deter the Indian foreign ministry from insisting that its commitment to the Palestinians remained unchanged. But the changes had arrived. And it had been a long time coming. India's decision to abstain from holding Israel accountable to the UNHCR resolution in 2015, was the surest sign that India believed in Israel's fundamental right to self-defense, and therefore, its right to exist as a settler-colonial state, unconditionally.

Azad Essa, Hostile Homelands: The New Alliance Between India and Israel

[metamatar]

If right wing is licking Modi's dick. How did it feel like licking Dhruv's dick? Batao?

I have actually never really managed to watch a Dhruv Rathee video in full in my life, he's very much a politics for dummies kind of guy. I don't know how to say this without sounding arrogant but I am read widely enough that he is not really valuable for offering me any new insight. I use alt news to see the state of misinformation in the media so his debunking videos aren't useful either. But I pay attention to what he's making videos on because he is very very popular, his videos seem to really reach people. I'm also too cool to take a full time influencer seriously. I'd rather open the EPW and read an academic present their work.

I'm also a hindu hating communist, while his whole appeal is he is a hindu liberal. He is very weak on caste. He couches his criticisms with his love for "our culture." His economic policies are just neoliberalism with just less corruption. Interestingly, he was pro Modi in 2014 while I opposed Modi on the grounds Rathee is now opposing the guy, so maybe we can radicalise him lol. Apparently he's come out in favour of one state which is palestine while living in germany. We are still, however ideological opponents, allied only because the violence of fascism forecloses any political possibilities till its defeated. I do respect his integrity and energy in an ecosystem entirely full of right wing personalities funded by the govt.

[zvaigzdelasas]

[DW is German State Media]

Running an administration made up of three staunchly right-wing parties appears to be tedious but it hasn't changed her, says the leader of the post-fascist, radical right-wing Brothers of Italy party.[...]

Over the past year, Meloni, 46, hasn't repeated any of the more radical slogans she was so fond of while campaigning. At home in Italy, she is trying to shape domestic policy according to strict conservative family ideals while on the economic front she has more or less carried on with the relatively successful policies of her predecessor, Mario Draghi. Meanwhile at the European level, she has been almost moderate. One doesn't hear acerbic criticism of the EU from her these days and around the world, she seeks out friends and allies. In fact, she leaves the radical statements to her coalition partners: Matteo Salvini of the right-wing League (in Italian, Lega) party and Antonio Tajani, the country's foreign minister and head of Forza Italia, which was previously led by the late Silvio Berlusconi.[...]

The one thing that doesn't seem to weigh on her daily duties as Italy's leader is the fact that her own party's logo features the eternal flame that sits on the tomb of former Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. Her partners in Europe also seem to be looking past that. One hears EU administrators in Brussels confess surprise at how "mild-mannered" and "soft-spoken" the Italian leader has become.[...]

At a Rome press conference with Germany's Chancellor Olaf Scholz, head of the centrist Social Democrats, Meloni told reporters that both were in agreement on all of the most important policy areas and that they were looking for pragmatic cooperation. Scholz didn't object. Meloni also seems to have built a rapport with European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen. [...]

During a recent visit to the Italian island of Lampedusa, von der Leyen and Meloni also seemed to be on the same page when it came to migration policy. That means monitoring borders, reducing arrivals and collaborating more closely with transit countries. Meloni's suggestion that the navy should blockade the coasts of North Africa was the only one that didn't win support from von der Leyen. The two women have already traveled to Tunisia twice to try and wring an agreement out of the autocratic Tunisian president on holding back migrants. Meloni sees that as part of her strategy to focus more on North Africa than previous heads of state have done, in her bid to stem migration.[...]

The heads of the EU and G7 states were actually relieved when Meloni expressed unconditional support for Ukraine in the war with Russia. US President Joe Biden praised Meloni's stance about how defending Ukraine also defends Europe's freedom.

"I hope you'll be nice to me," Biden joked when Meloni visited him at the White House in Washington this summer. Meloni responded with a telling laugh. Only a year ago Biden had branded her election victory a danger to democracy. Meloni let it be known that the pair were on friendly terms again after the one-on-one meeting in Washington. Meloni, who was completely inexperienced in foreign policy, has also been making friends at international summits, such as the recent G20 meeting in New Delhi. The public affection demonstrated by India's nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi prompted excited comments on social media in that country. The names, Meloni and Modi, were melded to create the new label "Melodi."

A win for moderation! /s

24 Sep 23

[everything-is-crab]

:))

This is what I meant when I said both rightoids and liberals in India are equally dumb as fuck. Both are pro imperialists. She's not even lower caste and yet she's speaking on behalf of us. I have seen this trend in a lot of "anticasteist" upper caste women (who unfortunately have more voices than people like me, actually women from oppressed castes).

How are these people different from the white supremacists who say brown people are intellectually and socially inferior?

"At least the goras let us have meat" oh okay we're gonna ignore the 3 million lives lost in Bengal famine caused by Churchill's policies (after which he blamed it on us instead of his own greediness). Did he let those people eat meat then? Unhinged shit. They wouldn't let people fill their bellies cause sometimes instead of food crops they wanted our ancestors to grow cotton, indigo, spices, tea. Which also left areas prone to land disasters. Commercial stuff that they could sell at much cheaper prices in their own countries and others in the Western world as well. Also levied extremely unreasonably high taxes. Leaving us with no money. Delusional world these middle/upper class liberals live in where the British let us have meat. They didn't even let us have rice.

The British protected the caste system. Read Sharmila Rege's work about how the British introduced the process of "Brahmanisation" in colonial India.

This is the exact thing Hindu nationalists are doing rn! And have been doing forever! Protecting Western imperialists! Why do you think Modi is bootlicking the US so much? Do you think the farmers' protests and the after effects of globalization after 1991 are disconnected from Western imperialism?

Just because nationalists claim to be against white dominance doesn't mean they practice what they preach.

And this folks is why you need to incorporate class and gender in your analysis and not read about the work of only the middle class men of a community :)

Women and poor people matter too.

But unfortunately many earlier anti caste activists who were middle or upper class were anti Marxists and only later few like the Dalit Panthers and R.B More realized the importance of Marxist analysis for understanding modern caste based oppression more. Yes many Indian Marxists ignored casteism. But that does not mean we must dispose it as a useless theory.

But who tf cares about the Dalit Panthers or anyone else? Have you even heard of any other names that aren't Phule or Ambedka? Everyone followed and still follow people like Periyar, Ambedkar, Phule who were all from relatively well off family. And why will people who uncritically follow these people not think colonization was as bad? All of them attended British school and went for higher studies as well. The British was staunchly anti communist. They constantly resisted communist activists in colonial India. This is a privilege even today many people from oppressed castes cannot enjoy.

I have seen all these upper caste women, ignore people like me pointing this out. They think we're against education of oppressed castes (why would I advocate that for my own community?). But rather we take issue to these men ignoring their economic and male privilege and speaking on behalf of all of us.

A reminder that Periyar criminalized devadasis and read Ambedkar's arguments against Hindutva solutions to the Partition (hint: he cared more about the money that could be wasted in missionaries rather than the violence and human rights and unironically called Muslim people "tyrannical" and referred to "Muslim oppression" on Hindus). He was anti casteist, but he was Islamophobic.

To avoid with this kind of thinking, follow Dalit feminist theory. Dalit femininism from its inception has been pro Marxist (cause women make most of poor here). And they explain the effects of colonization on lower caste women (how the British introduced evidence act, a law that justified rape against lower caste women and let me remind you gang rape of lower caste women by upper caste men is a national issue. Ex the Manipur case, the rape of Phoolan Devi, the Hathras case etc). And how dowry (that earlier used to be a practice mainly amongst upper castes was now becoming dominant in lower castes as well due to capitalization of economy during colonial era). Maybe then you will understand why the British abolished sati but not any temple prostitution or other issues faced exclusively by women from oppressed castes. In fact they called upper caste women those who deserve to be protected but lower caste women were inherently deviant in their justification. But please go ahead and argue how imperialism brings "good things" sometimes.

Just read about caste reformation during colonial era. The choice isn't between hindutva and colonial era. The choice is between hindutva and hindutva along with colonial rule. Why do most liberals pretend the British never favored the Brahmins over everybody else?

White supremacy is so much better than Hindu supremacy for women of lower castes am I right guys?

This is so much better?

Also reminded of the "breast cloth" controversy. Do not mistake that anti caste activism is always anti caste for both Dalit men and women. Sometimes it favors Dalit men. And oppresses Dalit women further. Cause usually the colonizers never cared about oppressed castes but when they did, it was only for the men.

Ik many upper caste Marxists are not good at anti caste politics but I cannot separate Marxism from my anti caste or feminist politics. And as a Marxist from a formerly colonized country, I cannot ignore the imperial divide between the West (that is white dominated) and the global south (that includes India). You cannot separate the conditions of brown and black people today in the global south from the past dynamics of the colonizer and the colonized.

Lower caste women are obviously very poor. The poorest of all with least social protection. These upper caste women can sit on their asses and write papers and blogs on how much white supremacy was much cooler. But the ones from oppressed castes and working class? They don't have this privilege. They have the same burden of upper caste women related to marriage and domestic work and everything. But on top of that they have to do labor as well. And after globalization, when condition of "blue collar jobs" degraded (wages lowered, subsidies cut, worker protection rights gone etc) , the percentage of women in these fields increased. That's not a coincidence. Men always force women into lower earning occupations that have little job security. I am not gonna ignore this.

Fuck Hindutva. But fuck white supremacy too. For me neither is better. Both go hand in hand in fact. Look at the Hindu nationalists in France allying with white supremacists over shared conservative interests.

[mariacallous]

The world is embarking on a critical year for the future of democracy. Elections in India, Indonesia, South Africa, and the United States—to name just a few prominent countries headed to the polls in 2024—would normally be routine affairs. But many of these democracies are at an inflection point. Can the strengthening tides of polarization, institutional degradation, and authoritarianism be reversed? Or will democracy reach a breaking point?

Every democracy has its own particular set of characteristics. In each country holding elections this year, voters will judge incumbent governments on familiar issues such as inflation, employment, personal security, and a sense of confidence about their future prospects. But the foreboding that accompanies the world’s elections in 2024 stems from one singular fact: The uneasy accommodation between nationalism and democracy is coming under severe stress.

The crisis in democracy is in part a crisis in nationalism, which today seems to revolve around four issues: how nations define membership; how they popularize a version of historical memory; how they locate a sovereign identity; and how they contend with the forces of globalization. In each of these, nationalism and liberalism are often in tension. Democracies tend to navigate this tension rather than resolve it. Yet, around the world, nationalism is slowly strangling liberalism—a trend that could accelerate in a damaging way this year. As more citizens cast their ballots in 2024 than in any other year in the history of the world, they will be voting not only for a particular leader or party but for the very future of their civil liberties.

Let’s first discuss how societies set parameters for membership. If a political community is sovereign, it has a right to make decisions on whom to exclude from or include in membership. Liberal democracies have historically opted for a variety of criteria for membership. Some have privileged ethnic and cultural factors, while others have picked civic criteria that merely demand allegiance to a common set of constitutional values.

In practice, a range of considerations have guided the immigration policies of liberal democracies, including the economic advantages of immigration, historical ties to particular groups of people, and humanitarian considerations. Most liberal societies have dealt with the membership question not on a principled basis but through various arrangements, some more open than others.

The question of membership is increasing in political salience. The causes may vary. In the United States, a surge of migrants at the southern border has politically foregrounded the issue, forcing even the Biden administration to reverse some of its promised liberal policies. To be sure, immigration has always been an important political issue in the United States. But since the political arrival of Donald Trump, it has acquired a new edge. Trump’s so-called Muslim ban—even though it was eventually repealed—raised the specter of new forms of overt or covert discrimination forming the basis of a possible future U.S. immigration regime.

Europe’s refugee crisis—induced by global conflicts and economic and climate distress—is inflecting the politics of every country. Sweden has grown deep concerns about its model of integrating immigrants, ushering in a right-wing government in 2022. In the United Kingdom, Brexit hinged in part on concerns over immigration. And in India, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi will implement the 2019 Citizenship Amendment Act, which excludes Muslim refugees from certain neighboring countries from a pathway to seeking citizenship. For New Delhi, membership concerns are driven by the need to prioritize a large ethnic majority. Similarly, the status of migrants in South Africa is being increasingly contested.

The increasing salience of membership is worrying for the future of liberalism. Since liberal values have historically been compatible with a variety of immigration and membership regimes, a liberal membership regime may not be a necessary condition for creating a liberal society. One could argue that not having a well-controlled membership policy is more likely to undermine liberalism by upsetting the social cohesion on which liberalism relies. But it is a remarkable fact that many of the world’s political leaders who endorse closed or discriminatory membership regimes, from Hungary’s Viktor Orban to the Netherlands’s Geert Wilders, also happen to oppose liberal values. That makes it harder to create a distinction between being anti-immigration and anti-liberal.

The second dimension of nationalism is the contest over historical memory. All nations need something of a usable past—a story that binds its peoples together—that can be the basis of a collective identity and self-esteem. The distinction between history and memory can be overdrawn, but it is important. As the French historian Pierre Nora put it, memory looks for facts, especially ones that suit the veneration of the main object of recollection. Memory has an affective quality: It is supposed to move you and constitute your identity. It draws the boundaries of communities. History is more detached; the facts will always complicate both identity and community.

History is not a morality tale as much as it is a very difficult form of hard-won knowledge, always aware of its selectivity.

Memory is easiest to hold on to as a morality tale. It is not just about the past. Memory is a kind of eternal truth about one’s collective identity, to keep and carry forward.

Memories are increasingly being emphasized in the political arena. In India, to take the most obvious case, historical memory is central to the consolidation of Hindu nationalism. In January, Modi will open a temple to the god Ram in Ayodhya, built on the site where Hindu nationalists demolished a mosque in 1992. It is an important religious symbol. But it is also central to the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s narrative that the most salient historical memory for Indians should not be colonial rule by the British but a thousand-year history of subjugation by Islam. Modi declared Aug. 5, the day the foundation stone of the temple was laid in 2020, as being as important a national milestone as Aug. 15, the day of India’s independence from the British in 1947.

In South Africa, questions of memory may seem less pronounced. But the compromise of the Nelson Mandela years, which some now see as sacrificing economic justice for the cause of social solidarity, is increasingly being interrogated. Faced with continuing inequality, economic worries, and declining social mobility, many South Africans are questioning the legacy of Mandela and whether he did enough to empower Black people in the country. This reflects some disillusionment with the ruling African National Congress. But this reconsideration could also potentially redefine the memory in terms of which modern South Africa has understood itself.

In the United States, the contest over how to tell the national story goes back to the Founding Fathers. But debates around this are more politically visible than ever, with politicians from Trump to Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis basing their candidacies in part on what it means to be American and how to “make America great again.” Florida, for example, created dubious standards for the teaching of Black history, seeking to regulate what students learn about race and slavery. This is not just a contest over the politics of pedagogy; behind it is a larger, anxious political debate about how the United States remembers its past—and therefore how it will build its future.

The third dimension in the surge of nationalism is the contest over popular sovereignty, or the will of the people. There has always been a close connection between popular sovereignty and nationalism, as the former required the formation of the concept of a people with a distinct identity and special solidarity toward one another. During the French Revolution, inspired by the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the popular sovereign was supposed to have a singular will. But if the will of the people is unitary, what explains differences? Furthermore, if there are differences among people, as there naturally are, then how is one to ascertain the will of the people? One way out of this puzzle is to see who can effectively perform the will of the able—and in doing so represent the other side as betraying that will, rather than as merely carrying an alternative interpretation of it. In order for such a performance to take place, one has to castigate anyone who represents an alternative viewpoint as an enemy of the people. In that sense, rhetorical invocations of “the people”—understood as a unitary entity—always run the risk of being anti-pluralist. Even when democracies around the world have embraced a pluralist and representative conception of democracy, there is a residual trace of unity that gets transposed to the nation. The nation is not a nation, or cannot acquire a will, unless it is united.

People rally around a unitary will by benchmarking their national identity: We are Indian by virtue of X or American by virtue of Y. Sometimes, this kind of benchmarking of identity can be quite productive; it is a reminder to citizens of what gives their particular community a distinct identity. Yet one of nationalism’s features is that it struggles to make room for its own contestation. The opposition is delegitimized or stigmatized not because it has a different point of view on policy matters but because its views are represented as anti-national. It is not an accident that the rhetoric of national populists is often directed against forces that are seen to challenge their version of the national identity or their benchmarking of nationalism. As national identities become more contested, there are increasing chances that unity can be achieved only by being imposed.

As a political style, national populism thrives not so much by finding enemies of the people but enemies of the nation, who are often measured by certain taboos. Almost all modern populists—from Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Modi, Orban, and Trump—draw the distinction between people and elites not in terms of class but in terms of who authentically represents the nation. Who gets benchmarked as the true nationalist? The cultural contempt for the elite gets its strength not just from the fact that they are elites but that they can be represented as elites who are no longer part of the nation, as it were. This kind of rhetoric increasingly sees difference as seditious rather than merely a disagreement. In India, for example, national security charges are deployed against students who question the government’s stance on Kashmir. This is seen not just as a contestation—or possibly a misguided view—but an anti-national act than needs to be criminalized.

The fourth dimension of the crisis of nationalism relates to globalization. Even in the era of hyperglobalization, national interest never faded away. Countries embraced globalization or greater integration into the world economy because they thought it served their interests. But a critical question in this year’s elections in all democracies is a reconsideration of the terms on which they engage the international system.

Globalization created winners but also losers. The loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States or premature de-industrialization in India was bound to prompt a reconsideration of globalization—and all of this was happening even before the COVID-19 pandemic, which accentuated a fear of dependency on global supply chains.

Countries are increasingly convinced that the assertion of political control over the economy—their ability to create a legitimate social contract—requires rethinking the terms of globalization. The trend is to feel more skeptical about globalization and to seek out greater self-sufficiency for national security or economic reasons. “America First” and “India First” are to a certain extent understandable, particularly in a context where China has emerged as an authoritarian competitor.

But the current moment seems like a much larger pivot in the politics of nationalism. Globalization, while seeking to advance national interests, also mitigated nationalism. It presented the global order as something other than a zero-sum game in which all countries could mutually benefit by greater integration. It was not suspicious of cosmopolitan solidarity. Increasingly, democracies are abandoning this assumption, with profound consequences for the world. Less globalization and more protectionism will inevitably translate to more nationalism—a trend that will also hurt global trade, especially for smaller countries that need the rising tide of open borders and commerce.

Each of the four features of nationalism described here—membership, memory, sovereign identity, and openness to the world—has shadowed democracy since its inception. All democracies are also facing their own profound economic challenges: inequality and wage stagnation in the United States, the crisis of employment in India, and corruption in South Africa. There is no necessary binary between economic issues and the politics of nationalism. Successful nationalist politicians such as Modi see their economic success as a means of consolidating their nationalist visions. And in times of stress, nationalism is the language through which grievance can be articulated. It is the means by which politicians give a sense of belonging and participation to the people.

Nationalism is the most potent form of identity politics. It views individuals and the rights they have through the prism of the compulsory identity to which nationalism confines them. Nationalism and liberalism have long been competing forces. It is easier to navigate the tension between them if the stakes around nationalism are lowered, not raised. Yet it is increasingly likely that in many elections in 2024, the nature of the national identities of these countries will be at stake along the four dimensions listed above. These contests could invigorate democracy. But if the recent past is any guide, the salience of nationalism in politics is more likely to pose a threat to liberal values.

Advancing forms of nationalism that do not allow their own meaning to be contested or that seek to preserve the privilege of particular groups generally produces a more divisive and polarized society. India, Israel, France, and the United States each face a version of this challenge. Issues of memory and membership are the least amenable to being resolved by simple policy deliberation. The truths they trade on are not about facts that could be a basis for a common ground. It is notorious, for example, that we often choose our histories because of our identity rather than the other way around.

Perhaps most importantly, assaults on liberal freedoms are often justified in the name of nationalism. For example, freedom of expression is most likely to discover its limits if it is seen to target a deeply cherished national myth. Every emerging populist or authoritarian leader who is willing to abridge civil liberties or pay short shrift to institutional integrity wears the mantle of nationalism. It allows such leaders to crack down on dissent by using the canard “anti-national.” In many ways, this year’s elections may well decide whether democracy can successfully negotiate the dilemmas of nationalism—or whether it will be degraded or crushed.

George L. Mosse, the great 20th-century historian of fascism, described this challenge in his inaugural lecture at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1979: “If we do not succeed in giving nationalism a human face, a future historian might write about our civilization what Edward Gibbon wrote about the fall of the Roman Empire: that at its height moderation prevailed and citizens had respect for each other’s beliefs, but that it fell through intolerant zeal and military despotism.”

[allthebrazilianpolitics]

Lula faces numerous challenges as Brazil assumes G20 presidency

Lula also takes over at a time of bitter internal divisions in the group, legacy of outgoing president Narendra Modi.

As Brazil takes over the G20 presidency on December 1 from India, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva will be challenged to fulfil his promise of holding up the interests of the global south amid two ongoing wars and a slowing global economy.

Lula also takes over at a time of bitter internal divisions within the group, the legacy of outgoing president Narendra Modi, whose team, eager to force a joint declaration, ran roughshod over diplomatic niceties in closed-door meetings.

Despite these hurdles, Lula is forging ahead and has announced Brazil’s three key priorities as head of the G20: social inclusion and the fight against hunger, phasing out fossil fuels in favour of renewable energy and reforming global economic governance.

The Group of Twenty – the G20 – is a forum for the world’s largest economies to coordinate on key issues of global policy. Between them, G20 countries represent 85 percent of global output and two-thirds of the world’s population.

Continue reading.

[signode-blog]

A Turning Point in India's Economic Landscape: How the Financial Markets Reacted to the 2014 Lok Sabha Election Results

The 2014 Lok Sabha elections in India marked a watershed moment in the country’s political and economic history. For the first time in 30 years, a single party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), secured a clear majority in the Indian Parliament, paving the way for Narendra Modi to become the Prime Minister. This political shift had profound implications for the Indian financial markets,…

[townpostin]

Budget Backlash: Local MLA Mangal Kalindi Slams Fiscal Plan

Critics argue new budget fails to address inflation, job creation The recently unveiled budget faces criticism for allegedly neglecting key issues affecting common citizens and farmers. JAMSHEDPUR – The fiscal proposals put forth by Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman in the annual budget for the Modi government’s third term has generated considerable flutter among local politicians and several…

[head-post]

Modi claims victory in Indian general election, but falling support pushes for coalition

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced his alliance’s victory in the Indian general election, according to AP News.

He claimed a mandate to push his programme, although his party lost ground to a stronger-than-expected opposition. It opposed his controversial economic course and polarising policies.

Today’s victory is the victory of the world’s largest democracy.

Modi told his party’s headquarters on Tuesday that Indian voters had “shown immense faith” in both his party and his National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition.

Official results from the Indian Election Commission on Wednesday showed that the NDA won 294 seats. This is more than the 272 seats needed to win a majority, but still far less than expected. For the first time since its Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power in 2014, it did not secure a majority on its own. In 2019, it managed to win a record 303 seats.

The Congress Party won 99 seats, improving its result from 52 in the 2019 elections. The Samajwadi Party also secured 37 seats in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh, a major disappointment for the BJP. Meanwhile, the All India Trinamool Congress won 29 seats in the state of West Bengal and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam gained 22 seats in the southern state of Tamil Nadu.

The opposition INDIA coalition won a total of 232 seats. Milan Vaishnav, director of the South Asia Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, stated:

At the very least, the result pricks the bubble Prime Minister Modi’s authority. He made this election about himself. Today, he is just another politician, cut to size by the people.

Read more HERE

[udo0stories]

Sana Shayin, a third-year student studying international relations at King's College London, has been exposed to a lively and thought-provoking atmosphere on a regular basis. Her passions for human rights advocacy and diplomacy have grown throughout this degree. Given the current and rapidly changing political landscape of the region, she is thrilled to be a part of International Relations Today as the Editor for South and Central Asia and contribute to the academic discourse in the field. India is home to about 200 million Muslims, making it one of the world's largest Muslim populations, despite being a minority in the nation that is predominantly Hindi. Despite constitutional protections, Indian Muslims frequently experience violence, intolerance and discrimination since the country’s independence in 1947. Experts claim that anti-Muslim sentiment has surged since Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power in 2014 and began promoting a Hindu nationalist agenda. The government has enacted divisive policies that opponents claim will disenfranchise millions of Muslims and blatantly disregard their rights since Modi was reelected in 2019. Since Modi assumed office, there has been a rise in violence against Muslims. The acts have sparked protests in India and drawn criticism from all around the world. According to several analysts covering India, Modi’s reelection in 2024 would probably increase religious conflict in the nation. The Demographics India is a diverse nation in terms of religion, ethnicity, and language. The majority of its Muslims, who identify as Sunnis, make up roughly 15% of the population, making them by far the largest minority group. Hindus make up about 80% of the population. Similar to the Hindu population, the Muslim population in the country is diverse, with differences in caste, ethnicity, language, and access to political and economic power. Partition's Impact on Hindu-Muslim Relations Scholars claim that the animosity between Muslims and Hindus in India stems in part from the 1947 partition of British India and the schisms that happened during the British colonial era. The British decided to abandon the subcontinent after World War II because their economy was destroyed and they could no longer maintain their empire. Before the country was divided, Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi led the Indian National Congress in organizing massive protests and acts of civil disobedience against the British government in an effort to gain independence. Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s political organisation, the All India Muslims League, demanded a separate state for Muslims. In 1947, a British judge arbitrarily drew the boundaries between a Hindu-majority India and a Muslim-majority Pakistan, which included what is now Bangladesh. The Partition resulted in widespread migrations of Muslims to Pakistan and Hindus and Sikhs to India, as well as deadly riots and horrifying intercommunal violence. Survivors remember villages burning to the rubble, dead tossed in the streets, and blood-soaked trains transporting refugees from one nation to another. Historians estimate that between 200,000 and 500,000 people died. It is unclear why groups of people who had lived together for hundreds of years fought one another. The British "divide-and-rule" policy, which gave the Muslim minority—roughly 25% of the population—some electoral advantages, has drawn criticism from some analysts. Others highlight disputes between political movements that organized followers of the Muslim and Hindu faiths. Nearly 35 million Muslims still lived in India after Partition. The Religion Factor  The nation’s 75-year-old constitution upholds egalitarian values such as nondiscrimination and socioeconomic equality. The Constitution does not specifically require the separation of church and state, despite the word "secular" being added to the preamble in 1976. Congress party leaders who fought for

India’s independence promoted a country that treated all its people equally, regardless of their religious beliefs. Gandhi, who championed a unified India free from discrimination, was assassinated by Nathuram Godse, a Hindi nationalist, in 1948. The first prime minister of India, Nehru, considered the greatest threat to the country as those seeking to split the country along religious lines, particularly among Hindu factions. He felt that secularism was necessary to create a harmonious society and prevent another tragedy similar to what happened after Partition. Hindu nationalists contend that since Hindus’ sacred territories are inside India, whereas Christian and Muslim holy territories are outside, Hindus are the “true sons of the soil.” Generally speaking, they support laws meant to convert India into a Hindu state. Even though the majority of Indian Muslims are sprung from Hindus who converted to Islam, many regard them as foreigners. Founded in 1980, the BJP traces its origins to the political wing of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu nationalist paramilitary volunteer group. The BJP secured a single-party majority in the Lok Sabha—India’s lower house of parliament and most powerful political body—for the first time in 2014, electing party leader Narendra Modi as Prime Minister. In 2019, the party won a majority once more following a contentious campaign packed with anti-Muslim rhetoric. What type of discrimination do Indian Muslims face?  Muslims have faced prejudice in the workplace, in the classroom, and in housing. Many face obstacles in their pursuit of riches, political influence, and limited access to essential services, including healthcare. Furthermore, even with constitutional protections, people frequently have difficulty obtaining justice after being the target of prejudice. Muslims’ presence in parliament has stagnated over the past 20 years; following the 2019 elections, they controlled only 5% of the seats. This is partially because of the BJP’s ascent; by the middle of 2022, the party had zero Muslim Members of Parliament. In the meantime, a 2019 report by the NGO Common Cause, situated in India, discovered that half of the police polled exhibited anti-Muslim prejudice, which decreased their likelihood of stepping in to prevent crimes against Muslims. Analysts have also noted widespread impunity for those who attack Muslims. Recently, state and national courts and government bodies have often reversed convictions or dropped prosecutions against Hindus accused of participating in violence against Muslims. States are passing more and more legislation that limits the religious freedoms of Muslims, such as laws that forbid wearing headscarves in public places and prohibit conversion. Additionally, in a move critics refer to as “bulldozer justice,” authorities have punished Muslims extrajudicially. Authorities in multiple states demolished people’s homes in 2022, claiming the buildings didn’t have the necessary permits. Critics countered that they mainly targeted Muslims, some of whom had recently taken part in demonstrations. Although the practice has persisted, India’s Supreme Court responded by ruling that demolitions “cannot be retaliatory.” What controversial policies has the Modi government imposed on Muslims? The Citizenship Amendment Act was passed by the parliament in December 2019 and signed by Modi. It permits Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, and Christian migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan to obtain citizenship more quickly. Critics claim that because the law excludes Muslims and applies a religious standard to citizenship for the first time, it is discriminatory. The Modi government claims that the law was made to protect these three countries' mostly Muslim vulnerable religious minorities from persecution. Simultaneously, the BJP pledged to finish the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in its 2019 election manifesto. The NRC was created in the 1950s

specifically for the state of Assam in order to determine whether the residents of that state were immigrants from what is now Bangladesh's neighbor or Indian citizens. The Assam government revised its registry in 2019, leaving out about two million Bengali Hindus and Muslims. Assume that this process is implemented across the nation. Critics contend that in that scenario, a sizable Muslim population might become stateless because they lack the necessary documentation and are not qualified for the Citizenship Amendment Act's expedited citizenship process. Meanwhile, Jammu and Kashmir, the only Muslim-majority state in India, has seen its political stature eroded under Modi. The state, located in the mountainous border region under dispute with Pakistan, was divided into two parts and its special constitutional authority was taken away by the government in August 2019. Since then, Indian authorities have repressed the people’s rights in the area, frequently in the name of preserving security. In 2021, they detained well-known political figures and activists, harassed and arrested journalists, and shut down the internet 85 times. The government maintains that security has improved, yet since the division, armed groups have killed dozens of civilians.  In December 2023, the Supreme Court, upholding the government’s decision,  ruled that the territory should regain statehood in time for local elections the following year. "Muslims' status will change more the longer Hindu nationalists are in power, and it will be harder to reverse such changes," says Ashutosh Varshney, a Brown University expert on Indian intercommunal conflict. Maintaining India's Secularism Although there is an increase in anti-Muslim sentiment among Hindus, experts say it is wrong to assume that all Hindus and BJP supporters are against Muslims. Muslims and Hindus have resisted the BJP's attempts to weaken secularism in India in the form of activists, law scholars, and students. For instance, following the passage of the Citizenship Amendment Act, some state chief ministers declared they would not carry out the law, and about 2,000 academics and professionals signed a declaration condemning it for violating the spirit of the Constitution. Global Reactions Numerous foreign governments and international organizations have denounced the BJP's discriminatory policies towards Muslims, highlighting specific concerns with the Citizenship Amendment Act, the BJP's actions in Kashmir, and anti-Muslim rhetoric. The UN human rights office described the Citizenship Amendment Act as “fundamentally discriminatory.” Iran, Kuwait, and Qatar were among the Muslim-majority countries to file formal complaints against India in 2022 over public officials’ Islamophobic remarks. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), comprising fifty-seven member states, has demanded that India cease the “systematic practices against Indian Muslims” and the “growing spate of hatred and defamation of Islam.” Nevertheless, Modi has succeeded in deepening India’s relations with the Gulf countries dominated by Muslims, including the United Arab Emirates, where he presided over an event for Indian expats and dedicated a brand-new Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi. Since they have strengthened ties with India, successive U.S. administrations have been hesitant to denounce the country’s atrocities openly. For instance, in February 2020, President Donald Trump visited India and complimented Prime Minister Narendra Modi on his support for religious liberty while remaining silent on the violence that had broken out in Delhi. Instead of openly criticizing the BJP government or Modi, the Joe Biden administration has opted to strengthen the strategic partnership between India and the United States. It is believed that Biden has privately voiced concerns about human rights. India, however, received its lowest ranking of “country of particular concern” in the 2020 report from the independent U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom—a designation it has held since 2004.

The most recent reports have upheld that classification and pushed for the US government to impose sanctions on Indian officials who are accountable for mistreatment. Some members of Congress have also expressed concerns.

[indizombie]

During the decades that followed independence, when India liberalized its economy and companies needed government permission to raise capital or expand operations, Indian businesses competed while figuring out how to master a byzantine bureaucracy. Then, there were strict limits on private businesses: about whether they could lay off employees or which sectors they could invest in, for example. But in 1991, then-Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and then-Finance Minister Manmohan Singh launched economic reforms that allowed Indian businesses to begin to flex their muscles. If the old Gujarat model made businesses succeed by keeping them away from the government’s tentacles, the version embraced by Modi and Adani now blurs the lines between the state and the private sector.

Salil Tripathi, ‘Gautam Adani and the New Indian Capitalism’, Foreign Policy

[collapsedsquid]

The post-fascism piece was a bit vague on the question of “How US-centric is this analysis“ because I am a bit vague on this question, French and German far-right don’t have the same intellectual antecedents as US anarcho-capitalism but seem headed in the same direction, this is why I attempted that “materialist” analysis about post-industrial post-modernity.

But Bolsonaro, Duterte, Modi, and Erdogan are all people who seem to be similar but do not lead post-industrial economies, they are “middle-income” countries.  The framework under which I fit them into this analysis is to say that Bolsonaro and Duterte have basically given up on mass industrialization, they do not aspire to it.  One quip that I wish I could credit to myself is to say that if someone proposed the economic policies of the Brazilian dictatorship to Bolsonaro he would call them a communist.  Duterte I know even less about but I’m going to say he’s in the same situation.  Modi and Erdogan though, I would say are not post-nationalist, they remain solid nationalists, they seek still seek national power in the old-fashioned sense.

There were a few digressions I cut or almost started on that post-fascism piece but I thought I’d throw this out there.