#access control system software for office

[tektronixtechnology]

VMS With Facial recognition technology offers a robust layer of security by accurately identifying individuals based on their unique facial features. Unlike traditional methods such as ID cards or manual verification, facial recognition eliminates the risk of forged or stolen credentials. By cross-referencing visitor faces with a database of known individuals, security personnel can quickly identify potential threats and take necessary precautions.

Visitor Managemnet System

Visitor Registration Software

Visitor Access Control System

Visitor Management Software UAE

Visitor Access Control Systems Abu Dhabi

Visitor Management With Face recognition

[mariacallous]

In the span of just weeks, the U.S. government has experienced what may be the most consequential security breach in its history—not through a sophisticated cyberattack or an act of foreign espionage, but through official orders by a billionaire with a poorly defined government role. And the implications for national security are profound.

First, it was reported that people associated with the newly created Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) had accessed the U.S. Treasury computer system, giving them the ability to collect data on and potentially control the department’s roughly $5.45 trillion in annual federal payments.

Then, we learned that uncleared DOGE personnel had gained access to classified data from the U.S. Agency for International Development, possibly copying it onto their own systems. Next, the Office of Personnel Management—which holds detailed personal data on millions of federal employees, including those with security clearances—was compromised. After that, Medicaid and Medicare records were compromised.

Meanwhile, only partially redacted names of CIA employees were sent over an unclassified email account. DOGE personnel are also reported to be feeding Education Department data into artificial intelligence software, and they have also started working at the Department of Energy.

This story is moving very fast. On Feb. 8, a federal judge blocked the DOGE team from accessing the Treasury Department systems any further. But given that DOGE workers have already copied data and possibly installed and modified software, it’s unclear how this fixes anything.

In any case, breaches of other critical government systems are likely to follow unless federal employees stand firm on the protocols protecting national security.

The systems that DOGE is accessing are not esoteric pieces of our nation’s infrastructure—they are the sinews of government.

For example, the Treasury Department systems contain the technical blueprints for how the federal government moves money, while the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) network contains information on who and what organizations the government employs and contracts with.

What makes this situation unprecedented isn’t just the scope, but also the method of attack. Foreign adversaries typically spend years attempting to penetrate government systems such as these, using stealth to avoid being seen and carefully hiding any tells or tracks. The Chinese government’s 2015 breach of OPM was a significant U.S. security failure, and it illustrated how personnel data could be used to identify intelligence officers and compromise national security.

In this case, external operators with limited experience and minimal oversight are doing their work in plain sight and under massive public scrutiny: gaining the highest levels of administrative access and making changes to the United States’ most sensitive networks, potentially introducing new security vulnerabilities in the process.

But the most alarming aspect isn’t just the access being granted. It’s the systematic dismantling of security measures that would detect and prevent misuse—including standard incident response protocols, auditing, and change-tracking mechanisms—by removing the career officials in charge of those security measures and replacing them with inexperienced operators.

The Treasury’s computer systems have such an impact on national security that they were designed with the same principle that guides nuclear launch protocols: No single person should have unlimited power. Just as launching a nuclear missile requires two separate officers turning their keys simultaneously, making changes to critical financial systems traditionally requires multiple authorized personnel working in concert.

This approach, known as “separation of duties,” isn’t just bureaucratic red tape; it’s a fundamental security principle as old as banking itself. When your local bank processes a large transfer, it requires two different employees to verify the transaction. When a company issues a major financial report, separate teams must review and approve it. These aren’t just formalities—they’re essential safeguards against corruption and error.

These measures have been bypassed or ignored. It’s as if someone found a way to rob Fort Knox by simply declaring that the new official policy is to fire all the guards and allow unescorted visits to the vault.

The implications for national security are staggering. Sen. Ron Wyden said his office had learned that the attackers gained privileges that allow them to modify core programs in Treasury Department computers that verify federal payments, access encrypted keys that secure financial transactions, and alter audit logs that record system changes. Over at OPM, reports indicate that individuals associated with DOGE connected an unauthorized server into the network. They are also reportedly training AI software on all of this sensitive data.

This is much more critical than the initial unauthorized access. These new servers have unknown capabilities and configurations, and there’s no evidence that this new code has gone through any rigorous security testing protocols. The AIs being trained are certainly not secure enough for this kind of data. All are ideal targets for any adversary, foreign or domestic, also seeking access to federal data.

There’s a reason why every modification—hardware or software—to these systems goes through a complex planning process and includes sophisticated access-control mechanisms. The national security crisis is that these systems are now much more vulnerable to dangerous attacks at the same time that the legitimate system administrators trained to protect them have been locked out.

By modifying core systems, the attackers have not only compromised current operations, but have also left behind vulnerabilities that could be exploited in future attacks—giving adversaries such as Russia and China an unprecedented opportunity. These countries have long targeted these systems. And they don’t just want to gather intelligence—they also want to understand how to disrupt these systems in a crisis.

Now, the technical details of how these systems operate, their security protocols, and their vulnerabilities are now potentially exposed to unknown parties without any of the usual safeguards. Instead of having to breach heavily fortified digital walls, these parties  can simply walk through doors that are being propped open—and then erase evidence of their actions.

The security implications span three critical areas.

First, system manipulation: External operators can now modify operations while also altering audit trails that would track their changes. Second, data exposure: Beyond accessing personal information and transaction records, these operators can copy entire system architectures and security configurations—in one case, the technical blueprint of the country’s federal payment infrastructure. Third, and most critically, is the issue of system control: These operators can alter core systems and authentication mechanisms while disabling the very tools designed to detect such changes. This is more than modifying operations; it is modifying the infrastructure that those operations use.

To address these vulnerabilities, three immediate steps are essential. First, unauthorized access must be revoked and proper authentication protocols restored. Next, comprehensive system monitoring and change management must be reinstated—which, given the difficulty of cleaning a compromised system, will likely require a complete system reset. Finally, thorough audits must be conducted of all system changes made during this period.

This is beyond politics—this is a matter of national security. Foreign national intelligence organizations will be quick to take advantage of both the chaos and the new insecurities to steal U.S. data and install backdoors to allow for future access.

Each day of continued unrestricted access makes the eventual recovery more difficult and increases the risk of irreversible damage to these critical systems. While the full impact may take time to assess, these steps represent the minimum necessary actions to begin restoring system integrity and security protocols.

Assuming that anyone in the government still cares.

[justinspoliticalcorner]

Vittoria Elliott at Wired:

Elon Musk’s takeover of federal government infrastructure is ongoing, and at the center of things is a coterie of engineers who are barely out of—and in at least one case, purportedly still in—college. Most have connections to Musk and at least two have connections to Musk’s longtime associate Peter Thiel, a cofounder and chairman of the analytics firm and government contractor Palantir who has long expressed opposition to democracy. WIRED has identified six young men—all apparently between the ages of 19 and 24, according to public databases, their online presences, and other records—who have little to no government experience and are now playing critical roles in Musk’s so-called Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) project, tasked by executive order with “modernizing Federal technology and software to maximize governmental efficiency and productivity.” The engineers all hold nebulous job titles within DOGE, and at least one appears to be working as a volunteer. The engineers are Akash Bobba, Edward Coristine, Luke Farritor, Gautier Cole Killian, Gavin Kliger, and Ethan Shaotran. None have responded to requests for comment from WIRED. Representatives from OPM, GSA, and DOGE did not respond to requests for comment. Already, Musk’s lackeys have taken control of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and General Services Administration (GSA), and have gained access to the Treasury Department’s payment system, potentially allowing him access to a vast range of sensitive information about tens of millions of citizens, businesses, and more. On Sunday, CNN reported that DOGE personnel attempted to improperly access classified information and security systems at the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and that top USAID security officials who thwarted the attempt were subsequently put on leave. The AP reported that DOGE personnel had indeed accessed classified material. “What we're seeing is unprecedented in that you have these actors who are not really public officials gaining access to the most sensitive data in government,” says Don Moynihan, a professor of public policy at the University of Michigan. “We really have very little eyes on what's going on. Congress has no ability to really intervene and monitor what's happening because these aren't really accountable public officials. So this feels like a hostile takeover of the machinery of governments by the richest man in the world.”

[...] “To the extent these individuals are exercising what would otherwise be relatively significant managerial control over two very large agencies that deal with very complex topics,” says Nick Bednar, a professor at University of Minnesota’s school of law, “it is very unlikely they have the expertise to understand either the law or the administrative needs that surround these agencies.” Sources tell WIRED that Bobba, Coristine, Farritor, and Shaotran all currently have working GSA emails and A-suite level clearance at the GSA, which means that they work out of the agency’s top floor and have access to all physical spaces and IT systems, according a source with knowledge of the GSA’s clearance protocols. The source, who spoke to WIRED on the condition of anonymity because they fear retaliation, says they worry that the new teams could bypass the regular security clearance protocols to access the agency’s sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF), as the Trump administration has already granted temporary security clearances to unvetted people. This is in addition to Coristine and Bobba being listed as “experts” working at OPM. Bednar says that while staff can be loaned out between agencies for special projects or to work on issues that might cross agency lines, it’s not exactly common practice.

WIRED’s report on the 6 college-aged men between 19 and 24 that are shaping up DOGE in aiding and abetting in co-”President” Elon Musk’s technofascist takeover.

[autolenaphilia]

The main reason to use Firefox and Linux and other free and open source software is that otherwise the big tech monopolies will fuck you as the customer over in search of profits. They will seek to control how you use their products and sell your data. When a company dominates the market, things can only get worse for ordinary people.

Like take Google Chrome for example, which together with its chromium reskins dominate the web browser market. Google makes a lot of money from ads, and consequently the company hates adblockers. They already are planning to move to manifest V3, which will nerf adblockers significantly. The manifest V3 compatible chrome version of Ublock Orgin is a "Lite" version for a reason. Ublock's Github page has an entire page explaining why the addon works best in Firefox.

And Google as we speak are trying to block adblockers from working on Youtube, If you want to continue blocking Youtube ads, and since Youtube ads make the site unuseable you ought to want that, it makes the most sense to not use a browser controlled by Google.

And there is no reason to think things won't get worse. There is for example nothing stopping Google from kicking adblockers off their add-on stores completely. They do regard it as basically piracy if the youtube pop-ups tell us anything, so updating the Chrome extensions terms of service to ban adblocking is a natural step. And so many people seem to think Chrome is the only browser that exists, so they are not going to switch to alternatives, or if they do, they will switch to another chrominum-based browser.

And again, they are fucking chromium itself for adblockers with Manifest V3, so only Firefox remains as a viable alternative. It's the only alternative to letting Google control the internet.

And Microsoft is the same thing. I posted before about their plans to move Windows increasingly into the cloud. This already exists for corporate customers, as Windows 365. And a version for ordinary users is probably not far off. It might not be the only version of Windows for awhile, the lack of solid internet access for a good part of the Earth's population will prevent it. But you'll probably see cheap very low-spec chromebookesque laptops running Windows for sale soon, that gets around Windows 11's obscene system requirements by their Windows being a cloud-based version.

And more and more of Windows will require Internet access or validation for DRM reasons if nothing else. Subscription fees instead of a one-time license are also likely. It will just be Windows moving in the direction Microsoft Office has already gone.

There is nothing preventing this, because again on the desktop/laptop market Windows is effectively a monopoly, or a duopoly with Apple. So there is no competition preventing Microsoft from exercising control over Windows users in the vein of Apple.

For example, Microsoft making Windows a walled garden by only permitting programs to be installed from the Microsoft Store probably isn't far off. This already exists for Win10 and 11, it's called S-mode. There seem to be more and more laptops being sold with Windows S-mode as the default.

Now it's not the only option, and you can turn it off with some tinkering, but there is really nothing stopping Microsoft from making it the only way of using Windows. And customers will probably accept it, because again the main competition is Apple where the walled garden has been the default for decades.

Customers have already accepted all sorts of bad things from Microsoft, because again Windows is a near-monopoly, and Apple and Google are even worse. That’s why there has been no major negative reaction to how Windows has increasingly spies on its users.

Another thing is how the system requirements for Windows seem to grow almost exponentially with each edition, making still perfectly useable computers unable to run the new edition. And Windows 11 is the worst yet. Like it's hard to get the numbers of how many computers running Win10 can't upgrade to Win11, but it's probably the majority of them, at least 55% or maybe even 75%. This has the effect of Windows users abandoning still perfectly useable hardware and buying new computers, creating more e-waste.

For Windows users, the alternative Windows gives them is to buy a new computer or get another operating system, and inertia pushes them towards buying another computer to keep using Windows. This is good for Windows and the hardware manufacturers selling computers with Windows 11 pre-installed, they get to profit off people buying Windows 11 keys and new computers, while the end-users have to pay, as does the environment. It’s planned obsolescence.

And it doesn’t have to be like that. Linux distros prove that you can have a modern operating system that has far lower hardware requirements. Even the most resource taxing Linux distros, like for example Ubuntu running the Gnome desktop, have far more modest system requirements than modern Windows. And you can always install lightweight Linux Distros that often have very low system requirements. One I have used is Antix. The ballooning Windows system requirements comes across as pure bloat on Microsoft’s part.

Now neither Linux or Firefox are perfect. Free and open source software don’t have a lot of the polish that comes with the proprietary products of major corporations. And being in competition with technology monopolies does have its drawbacks. The lacking website compatibility with Firefox and game compatibility with Linux are two obvious examples.

Yet Firefox and Linux have the capacity to grow, to become better. Being open source helps. Even if Firefox falls, developers can create a fork of it. If a Linux distro is not to your taste, there is usually another one. Whereas Windows and Chrome will only get worse as they will continue to abuse their monopolistic powers over the tech market.

[kitkatt0430]

Free software recommendations for various things:

LibreOffice - A full home office suite comparable to Microsoft Office. Easy to use and you can choose the UI layout from several types; it can handle docx and other Microsoft Office document formats; it still does not include AI unless you specifically add that extension on purpose, so unlike other office suites it's not shoving AI down your throat.

Calibre - Ebook manager bundled with an ebook editor and ereader software. It can follow news feeds, downloading them into epub format. Convert ebooks from one format into (many) others. Run a server to make access your books from different computers/phones/tablets easier. And so much more... without even touching on the additional functionality that plugins can add. With plugins it can be used for DRM stripping (which can still remove DRM from even Kindle ebooks, if you have a kindle that you can download the ebook to and use to transfer to your computer). It can also handle downloading fanfics and their metadata using the FanFicFare plugin. (Which I've written tutorials about.) There are officially supported plugins (like FanFicFare) that are easy to install and unofficial plugins (like the DRM stripper) that take more work, so it's extremely customizable.

Syncthing - Want to host your own local file backup system? Have an old laptop that you can reformat with a linux distro? And maybe a spare hard drive? Perfect, you have what you need to set up a home file backup system. Reformat the computer with the new operating system, install syncthing on that computer and on the computer you want to back up files for and the two installations of the software can sync over your home network. Put it on your phone and back up your photos. The software is open source, encrypted, and you can turn it off so that your computer (or phone) is only running it on a trusted network. You control where the synced data lives, which computers on your network those synced folders are shared with (allowing for sharing between multiple computers) and even what type of file backups happen if data is, say, accidentally deleted. (File recovery!!!)

Plex or Emby - Both are free to install on any computer, point at any movie/tv show/audiobook/music files you've got sitting around, and bam you've got a home media streaming server. Both have paid tiers for more features (including tv tuner integration to act as a DVR), but what they can do for free is already impressive and well handled. Both have easy to use UI and it largely comes down to personal preference as to one is better than the other.

Notepad++ - A notepad type program that can also serve as a decent lightweight code editor. I use it for noodling around with code scripts and snippets, writing lists, and various other small tasks. It's not something I'd use for my professional code writing but it's great for just messing around with something on my own time.

[justforbooks]

House of Huawei by Eva Dou

A fascinating insight into a Chinese telecoms giant and its detractors

Huawei is not exactly a household name. If you’ve heard of it, you either follow the smartphone market closely – it is the main China-based manufacturer of high-end phones – or else consume a lot of news, because the company is at the centre of an ongoing US-China trade war.

But this enormous business is one of the world’s biggest producers of behind-the-scenes equipment that enables fibre broadband, 4G and 5G phone networks. Its hardware is inside communications systems across the world.

That has prompted alarm from US lawmakers of both parties, who accuse Huawei of acting as an agent for China’s government and using its technology for espionage. The company insists it merely complies with the local laws wherever it operates, just like its US rivals. Nevertheless, its equipment has been ripped out of infrastructure in the UK at the behest of the government, its execs and staffers have been arrested across the world, and it has been pilloried for its involvement in China’s oppression of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang.

Into this murky world of allegation and counter-allegation comes the veteran telecoms reporter Eva Dou. Her book chronicles the history of Huawei since its inception, as well as the lives of founder Ren Zhengfei and his family, starting with the dramatic 2019 arrest of his daughter Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s chief financial officer, at the behest of US authorities.

Dou’s command of her subject is indisputable and her book is meticulous and determinedly even-handed. House of Huawei reveals much, but never speculates or grandstands – leaving that to the politicians of all stripes for whom hyperbole about Huawei comes more easily.

At its core, this book is the history of a large, successful business. That doesn’t mean it’s boring, though: there’s the story of efforts to haul 5G equipment above Everest base camp in order to broadcast the Beijing Olympics torch relay. We hear about the early efforts of Ren and his team, working around the clock in stiflingly hot offices, to make analogue telephone network switches capable of routing up to 10,000 calls; and gain insights into the near-impossible political dance a company must perform in order to operate worldwide without falling foul of the changing desires of China’s ruling Communist party.

Dou makes us better equipped to consider questions including: is this a regular company, or an extension of the Chinese state? How safe should other countries feel about using Huawei equipment? Is China’s exploitation of its technology sector really that different to the way the US authorities exploited Google, Facebook and others, as revealed by Edward Snowden?

Early in Huawei’s history, Ren appeared to give the game away in remarks to the then general secretary of the Communist party. “A country without its own program-controlled switches is like one without an army,” he argued, making the case for why the authorities should support his company’s growth. “Its software must be held in the hands of the Chinese government.”

But for each damning event, there is another that introduces doubt. The book reveals an arrangement from when Huawei operated in the UK that gave GCHQ unprecedented access to its source code and operations centre. US intelligence agencies seemed as able to exploit Huawei equipment for surveillance purposes as China’s. While Huawei’s equipment was certainly used to monitor Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, it was hardware from the US company Cisco that made China’s so-called Great Firewall possible.

Anyone hoping for definitive answers will not find them here, but the journey is far from wasted. The intricate reporting of Huawei, in all its ambiguity and complexity, sheds much light on the murky nature of modern geopolitics. The people who shout loudest about Huawei don’t know more than anyone else about it. Eva Dou does.

Daily inspiration. Discover more photos at Just for Books…?

[silenceofthewave]

[There were many things that Soundwave was. Symbiont host bot. Surveillance extraordinaire. Third in Command of the Decepticon Forces. Head Communications Officer. However, the most important aspect of it was often the most forgotten about, or simply thought of in passing- Soundwave had almost complete control over the Nemesis' systems.]

THE EXODUS

[This control was for several reasons; it had the processing power built into its frame to ensure that the automated systems did not meet unexpected failure, it needed to be able to adjust trajectory, course and speed at the blink of an optic, groundbridging, ensuring weapons and communications arrays always performed at top capabilities.]

[The control the mech had over the ship was not absolute- to save processing power, and to prevent becoming utterly useless in its other duties, Soundwave had created a patch that allowed the ship AI to take over the less relevant tasks. They would check in often, go over reports, fix what was broken. Though, it was easy enough to regain that control, and that's exactly what Soundwave was doing.]

[The mech silently stood at its usual terminal, paying no attention to the vehicons that came in and out of the bridge. It could vaguely hear the outraged cries of Lord Megatron- something about Starscream not responding to his comms. Soundwave couldn't help the small smirk behind its visor. Soon, that was going to be the least of Megatron's worries.]

[No, soon enough, Megatron would have a complete catastrophe on his servos.]

[Indeed, Soundwave had spent the last two weeks painstakingly coding a seek-and-destroy virus. While it would have been much easier to simply set the Nemesis to self destruct and leave, there was no guarantee that it would actually self destruct. That process required two codes, both of which it knew, then sent out a ping to the high command. It only took one code- the code Megatron knew- to halt the process in its tracks.]

[A virus though? A virus could be built to be discreet, undetectable, and just as devistating. The virus itself was complex- it had to be, for its task was no simple one. It had to utilize the AI's blindspots and complex firewall navigation to remain undetected. It had to be able to pull power directly from the engine's electical outputs to various systems simultaneously. It had to have every access and failsafe code built into it.]

[The virus would take the electrical output and put each targeted system into overdrive. Not only would this completely fry any and all circuitry, systems like the space bridge, communications array and cloaking would be rendered completely unusable. The electrical generators that powered them would more than likely explode and require either a full replacement, rebuild or extensive repairs. The Nemesis and her crew would be rendered sitting targets with no escape.]

[Truly, it was a feat of software engineering.]

[Soundwave had run tests earlier last week on its outputs and capabilities, which explained the strange system failures and power fluctuations the vehicons had been complaining about. The code had to be perfect- Soundwave would not be there to witness its execution, nor would it be patched into the systems. If it were, it ran the risk of being disabled itself, either by Lord Megatron or the virus. That was a risk it was not willing to take.]

[Soundwave had finished uploading the virus and was in the process of setting a four hour timer when Lord Megatron stormed in. It quickly finished and shut off the terminal before facing the enraged mech that stood in the middle of the bridge. Megatron was pointing a clawed servo at it.]

"Where are the seekers, Soundwave." It wasn't a question, rather a demand.

[Soundwave considered its options carefully. Though, the longer it waited, the angrier Megatron seemed to get. It quickly scrambled together a series of images from the last few days. Starscream in their quarters tending to Aurora, Thundercracker and Skywarp getting ready for patrol, Slipstream and her trine arguing in their own quarters.]

"If that is where they are, then why can't I find them? In fact," Megatron stepped closer to Soundwave.

[His field was alight with anger and suspicion. Megatron was close enough to touch, to get a true read. His field betrayed the way he knew something was going on, but Soundwave had no way of connecting the dots without that physical contact. Yet, it did not reach out, and neither did Megatron.]

"You know why, don't you?"

[Megatron raised a clawed servo, his index digit a mere milimeter away from Soundwave's visor. Still, they did not touch. Megatron was undoubtedly toying with it at this point.]

"I knew that little fling you had, and that slagged sparkling was going to cause more trouble than its worth." Megatron's voice was low, and if Soundwave didn't know any better, it would have classified the tone as sultry.

"I told Starscream to stay away from you, that I couldn't have my invaluable third in command distracted from its duties."

[Soundwave stayed maddeningly silent. It had no idea where Megatron's mind was- what he thought was going on, what he was going to do. There was an electrical charge that ran up its spinal strut and its HUD flashed the option to activate its battle protocols. It quickly denied that, standing stone still.]

"But, you wouldn't betray me, would you Soundwave?"

[Megatron's voice teetered between fake and genuine concern. Soundwave shut down the urge to shudder and shook its helm.]

"No, I didn't think so."

[Megatron's servo finally made contact with Soundwave's visor as he pet the mech with the back of his knuckles. Images instantly floated to Soundwave's mind, visions of unspeakable violence aimed towards itself, its mate, the seekers and...Aurora.]

[Megatron was threatening it.]

"Bring me the seekers, Soundwave." Megatron did not need to tack on the or else.

[Still, his threats rang hollow to Soundwave. There would have been a time where Soundwave would have ended the interaction cowering in fear, not unlike Starscream, but that time was also when its loyalty was unquestionable. Now, there was no loyalty left- not to Megatron at least.]

[Soundwave had evolved past whatever was keeping it here. Whether it be that it had no other tangible experiences than fighting to survive or that simply the Decepticons were all it had left- neither of those things were true now. It had something to live and fight for other than itself and someone it used to call Lord.]

[Megatron had left the bridge by now. The remaining vehicons stood as silent as ever, their fields anxious and jittery. It paid no mind to them as it faced the terminal and turned it on.]

[Soundwave opened an encrypted message link and searched the frequencies until it found the one it was looking for. Autobot signals and messaging might be encrypted, but there was always at least one open comm link available. It was untraceable, and had to go through several layers of scrambling, but it was a well known secret. Anyone who dared use it, at least within the Decepticon ranks, was immediately considered a traitor.]

[At this point, that is exactly what Soundwave was.]

[Soundwave unspooled a datacable and connected it to the terminal. It uploaded a large data packet containing vital Decepticon intelligence, and an inert copy of the virus, only to prove its good faith. It sent the datapacket with the following message.]

Use this wisely.

[Soundwave turned off the terminal. It had a limited amount of time to enact the next portion of the plan. Luckily, it had been smart enough to transport its Rumble and Frenzy to an unused, secure site a few days ago. It had stolen medical supplies to keep them stable- not like Knockout would notice anyway. Still, its spark ached. They were stable, but still had not even shifted. Soundwave didn't know if they ever would again.]

[It lightly shook its helm, perishing the thought. It needed to disconnect itself from the ship entirely, not focus on its woes. Soundwave quickly found its way to the engineering terminal and plugged itself in.]

[One by one, it disconnected from the systems. The sensations of the freed up processing power quickly began to leave it dizzy and unwell. Its frame had been constructed with the intended load of the Nemesis. To no longer have that weight on its neural net was both freeing and debilitating. Its thoughts raced by too fast- there was nothing to hinder them anymore.]

[The last one it disconnected from was surveillance. Its HUD suddenly became quiet. Too quiet. There was no constant video chatter, no moving images in the corner of its optics. For once, it could see the reflection of its optics against the tinted glass. That was perhaps the most unsettling part.]

[Soundwave had to take a moment. It felt like it was swimming under solvent, while also being pulled into a tidepool. Perhaps it had detached itself too fast, but time was not something it had. Still, everything felt terribly empty and lonely, its HUD blank, its mind startlingly clear.]

[Now, all there was left to do was...Leave.]

[There would be no goodbyes. Knockout was gone, and it doubted Shockwave would want one. Soundwave certainly was not going to say goodbye to Megatron.]

[It was not the time for sentimentality. Soundwave had already packed its things and left it with Rumble and Frenzy. The only issue was that Soundwave no longer had a space bridge. It would have to fly.]

[Quietly, the mech made its way to the very same flight deck that its relationship with Starscream started on. Luckily, there was no one out there. The sun blazed low on the horizon, painting the sky with firey reds and oranges. Tinges of purple could be seen the higher it looked. Briefly, Soundwave wondered if the Stolen Secret would ever witness sunsets as beautiful as this.]

[Without a final look back, Soundwave transformed and raced into the sky.]

[underafullmoon3]

If you aren't concerned that YOUR personal sensitive information (taxpayer data/sensitive Treasury data) is now floating around in the wrong hands, I would suggest educating yourself on what is at stake here.

"There are many disturbing aspects of this. But perhaps the most fundamental is that Elon Musk is not a federal employee, nor has he been appointed by the President nor approved by the Senate to have any leadership role in government. The “Department of Government Efficiency,” announced by Trump in a January 20th executive order, is not truly any sort of government department or agency, and even the executive order uses quotes in the title. It’s perfectly fine to have a marketing gimmick like this, but DOGE does not have power over established government agencies, and Musk has no role in government. It does not matter that he is an ally of the President. Musk is a private citizen taking control of established government offices. That is not efficiency; that is a coup" - Seth Masket, Political Scientist

He and his civilian crew of software engineers, none of whom have been vetted for a security clearance or have sworn an oath to our Constitution, and some of whom are actually MINORS, now have FULL control over ALL payments for:

• Social Security

• Medicare

• Federal salaries & pensions

• Tax refunds

• Federal bonds

• Federal contractors

• Federal grants....and more

They also have full access to ALL of the personal data that goes with it....your income, social security #, bank account #, etc.

The things they are doing: plugging new systems and hard drives directly into the government IT infrastructure, copying data to take other places, etc., is so unbelievably in violation of security regulations (required by law) that it leaves me dumbfounded.

It would be impossible for them to properly protect government data with the methods that are being reported. It would be incredibly easy to hack or leak this data, and I’d be shocked if that doesn’t happen, likely by foreign hackers who see a big fat opportunity in front of them.

We should assume our personal data has been compromised, including social security, earnings records, personal information, possibly health information, financial and tax information, even bank accounts if you’ve ever done bank drafts or used direct deposit.

[meret118]

Elon Musk's henchmen have reportedly installed a commercial server to control federal databases that contain Social Security numbers and other highly sensitive personal information.

. . .

"According to two members of OPM staff with direct knowledge, the Musk team running OPM has the ability to extract information from databases that store medical histories, personally identifiable information, workplace evaluations, and other private data," wrote investigative reporters Caleb Ecarma and Judd Legum. "The arrangement presents acute privacy and security risks, one of the OPM staffers said."

. . .

The government outsiders were identified as University of California Berkeley student Akash Bobba, a software engineer who graduated high school less than three years ago and interned at Meta and Palantir, and Edward Coristine, another 2022 high school graduate and former software engineering intern at Musk’s Neuralink.Musk also installed former xAI employee Amanda Scales as the OPM's new chief of staff, and he placed in the department longtime SpaceX employee Brian Bjelde, former Twitter engineer Gavin Kliger and former Boring Company software engineer Riccardo Biasini.

. . .

The civil servants in charge of the office's information technology services were instructed new chief information officer Greg Hogan, who took over after Donald Trump's inauguration, to grant full access – including "code read and write permissions" – to Musk's associates, according to the OPM staffers.“

They have access to the code itself, which means they can make updates to anything that they want,” the staffer said.Musk's associates now have access to federal government’s official hiring site USAJOBS and OPM’s Enterprise Human Resources Integration (EHRI) system, as well as USA Staffing, USA Performance and employee health care website HI, which together store Social Security numbers, home addresses, employment records, birthdates, salaries, private health information, job description and disciplinary actions.“

They’re looking through all the position descriptions… to remove folks,” said one OPM staffer. “This is how they found all these DEI offices and had them removed — [by] reviewing position description level data.""The health insurance one scares me because it's HIPAA [protected] information, but they have access to all this stuff,” the staffer added.

[mostlysignssomeportents]

Brother makes a demon-haunted printer

I'm on a 20+ city book tour for my new novel PICKS AND SHOVELS. Catch me in RICHMOND TOMORROW (Mar 5) and in AUSTIN> on Mar 10. More tour dates here. Mail-order signed copies from LA's Diesel Books.

You guys, I don't want to bum you out or anything, but I think there's a good chance than some self-described capitalists aren't really into capitalism.

Sorry.

Take incentives: Charlie Munger, capitalism's quippiest pitchman, famously said, "Show me the incentive and I’ll show you the outcome." And here's some mindblowing horseshoe theory for ya: Munger agrees with the noted Communist agitator Adam Smith, whose anti-rentier, pro-government-regulation jeremiad "The Wealth of Nations" contains this notorious passage:

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages.

Incentives matter – if you design a system that permits abuse, you should expect abuse. Now, I'm not 100% on board with this: every one of us has ways to undetectably cheat the system and enrich ourselves, but most of the time, most of us play by the rules.

But it's different for corporations: the myth of "shareholder supremacy" has reached pandemic levels among the artificial lifeforms we call corporate persons, and it's impossible to rise through the corporate ranks without repeating and believing the catechism that there is a law that requires executives to lie, cheat and steal if it results in an extra dollar for the investors, in the name of "fiduciary duty":

https://pluralistic.net/2024/09/18/falsifiability/#figleaves-not-rubrics

And this attitude has leaked out into politics and everyday life, so that many of our neighbors have been brainwashed into thinking that a successful cheat is a success in life, that pulling a fast one "makes you smart":

https://pluralistic.net/2024/12/04/its-not-a-lie/#its-a-premature-truth

In a world dominated by a belief in the moral virtue and legal necessity of ripping off anyone you can get away with cheating, then, sure, any system that permits cheating is a system in which cheating will occur.

This shouldn't be controversial, but if so, how are we to explain the whole concept of the Internet of Things? Installing networked computers into our appliances, office equipment, vehicles and homes is an invitation of mischief: the software in those computers can be remotely altered after you purchase them, taking away the features you paid for and then selling them back to you.

Now, an advocate for market-based solutions has a ready-made response to this: if a company downgrades a device you own, this merely invites another company to step in with a disenshittifying plug-in that makes things better. If the company that made your garage-door opener pushes an over-the-air update that blocks you from using an ad-free, well-designed app and forces you to use an enshittified app that forces you to look at ads before you can open the garage, well, that's an opportunity for a rival company to sell you a better software update for your garage-door opener, one that restores the lost functionality:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/11/09/lead-me-not-into-temptation/#chamberlain

I'm no hayekpilled market truefan, but I'm pretty sure that would work.

However.

The problem is that since 1998, that kind of reverse-engineering has been a felony under Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which bans bypassing "an effective access control"

https://locusmag.com/2020/09/cory-doctorow-ip/

There's a pretty obvious incentive at play when companies have the ability to unilaterally alter how their products work after you buy them and you are legally prohibited to change how the product works after you buy them. This is the first lesson of the Darth Vader MBA: "I am altering the deal. Pray I don't alter it any further":

https://pluralistic.net/2023/10/26/hit-with-a-brick/#graceful-failure

I've been banging this drum for decades now – like when I got into a public (friendly) spat with the editor of Wired magazine over their reviews of DRM-based media devices. I argued that it was irresponsible to review a device that could be unilaterally downgraded by the manufacturer at any time, without – at a minimum – noting that the feature you're buying the gadget for might disappear without warning after you've shelled out your hard-earned money:

https://pluralistic.net/2022/12/03/painful-burning-dribble/#law-of-intended-consequences

Of course, companies that get a reputation for these kinds of shenanigans might lose market share to better competitors. Sure, if the company that made your phone or your thermostat or your insulin pump reached into it across the internet and made it worse, you're shit out of luck when it comes to that device. But you can buy your next device from a better company, right?

Well, sure – in a competitive market, that's a plausible theory of "market discipline." Companies that fear losing business to rivals might behave themselves better.

In theory.

But in practice, the world's "advanced economies" have spent the past 40 years running an uncontrolled experiment in what happens if you don't enforce competition law, and instead allow companies to buy all their competitors. The result is across-the-board industrial oligopolies, cartels, duopolies and monopolies in nearly every category of good and service:

https://www.openmarketsinstitute.org/learn/monopoly-by-the-numbers

Now, even a duopoly has some competition. If you don't like Coke, there's always Pepsi. But again, in practice, companies in concentrated industries find it easy to "tacitly collude" to adopt one another's worst habits – the differences between the outrageous payment processing charged by Apple's App Store and the junk fees charged by Google Play are about as meaningful as the differences between Coke and Pepsi.

Which brings me to printers.

I know.

Ugh.

Printers are the worst and HP is the worst of the worst. For years, HP has been abusing its market dominance – and its customers' wallets – by inflating the price of ink and rolling out countermeasures to prevent you from refilling your old cartridges or buying third-party ink. Worse, HP have mastered the Darth Vader MBA, bushing updates to its printers that sneakily downgrade them after you've bought them and taken them home.

Here's a sneaky trick HP came up with: they send a "security update" to your printer. After you click "OK," a little progress bar zips across the screen and the printer reboots itself, and then…nothing. The printer declares itself to be "up to date" and works exactly like it did before you installed the update. But inside the printer, a countdown timer has kicked off, and then, months later, the "security update" activates itself, like a software Manchurian Candidate.

Because that "security update" protects the security of HP, against HP customers. It is designed to detect and reject the very latest third-party ink cartridges, which means that if you've just bought a year's worth of ink at Costco, you might wake up the next day and discover that your printer will no longer accept them – because of an update you ran six months before.

Why does HP put such a long fuse on its logic bomb? For the same reason that viruses like covid evolve to be contagious before you show symptoms. If the update immediately broke compatibility with third party ink, word would spread, and some HP customers would turn off their printers' wifi before the "security update" could be applied to them.

By asymptomatically incubating the infection over a long, patient timescale, HP maximizes the spread of the contagion, guaranteeing a global pandemic of enshittiification:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/11/ink-stained-wretches-battle-soul-digital-freedom-taking-place-inside-your-printer

HP has done this – and worse – over and over, and every time I write about it, people pop up to recommend their Brother printers as the enshittification-free alternative. I own a Brother, an HL3170-CDW laser printer that's basically indestructible, cheerfully accepts third-party toner, and costs almost nothing to run.

But I still don't connect it to my wifi. The idea that Brother is a better company than HP – that is possesses some intrinsic antienshittificatory virtue – has always struck me as a foolish belief. Brother has means, motive and opportunity to push over-the-air downgrades to block third-party ink as HP.

Which is exactly what they've done.

Yesterday, Louis Rossman, hero of the Right to Repair movement, revealed that Brother had just pushed a mandatory over-the-air update that locks out third-party ink:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpHX_9fHNqE

Rossman has a thorough technical breakdown of the heist, but it boils down to this. Brother is just as shit as HP. Look from the men to the pigs and the pigs to the men all you want – you will never spot the difference. Take the Pepsi Challenge – bet you won't be able to guess which is which:

https://wiki.rossmanngroup.com/wiki/Brother_ink_lockout_%26_quality_sabotage

This was the absolutely predictable outcome of the regulatory incentives our corporate overlords created, the enormous, far-reaching power we handed to these corporations. With that great power came no responsibility:

https://pluralistic.net/2025/02/26/ursula-franklin/#franklinite

Filling our devices with computers that run programs that can be changed in secret, that we're not allowed to inspect or alter? It's a recipe for a demon-haunted world, where the devices we entrust with our livelihood, our privacy and our wellbeing are possessed by hellions who escape from the digital Tartarus and are unleashed upon humanity.

Demons have possessed the Internet of Things. It's in Teslas:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/07/28/edison-not-tesla/#demon-haunted-world

and in every other car, too:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/07/24/rent-to-pwn/#kitt-is-a-demon

Our devices – phones, pacemakers, appliances and home security systems – are designed to prevent us to find out what they're doing. That means that when malicious software infects them, then – by design – these devices prevent us from knowing about it or doing anything about it:

https://pluralistic.net/2024/01/18/descartes-delenda-est/#self-destruct-sequence-initiated

This should not come as a surprise to anyone. Show me the incentive and I'll show you the outcome.

If you'd like an essay-formatted version of this post to read or share, here's a link to it on pluralistic.net, my surveillance-free, ad-free, tracker-free blog:

https://pluralistic.net/2025/03/05/printers-devil/#show-me-the-incentives-i-will-show-you-the-outcome

[mariacallous]

On February 10, employees at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) received an email asking them to list every contract at the bureau and note whether or not it was “critical” to the agency, as well as whether it contained any DEI components. This email was signed by Scott Langmack, who identified himself as a senior adviser to the so-called Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). Langmack, according to his LinkedIn, already has another job: He’s the chief operating officer of Kukun, a property technology company that is, according to its website, “on a long-term mission to aggregate the hardest to find data.”

As is the case with other DOGE operatives—Tom Krause, for example, is performing the duties of the fiscal assistant secretary at the Treasury while holding down a day job as a software CEO at a company with millions in contracts with the Treasury—this could potentially create a conflict of interest, especially given a specific aspect of his role: According to sources and government documents reviewed by WIRED, Langmack has application-level access to some of the most critical and sensitive systems inside HUD, one of which contains records mapping billions of dollars in expenditures.

Another DOGE operative WIRED has identified is Michael Mirski, who works for TCC Management, a Michigan-based company that owns and operates mobile home parks across the US, and graduated from the Wharton School in 2014. (In a story he wrote for the school’s website, he asserted that the most important thing he learned there was to “Develop the infrastructure to collect data.”) According to the documents, he has write privileges on—meaning he can input overall changes to—a system that controls who has access to HUD systems.

Between them, records reviewed by WIRED show, the DOGE operatives have access to five different HUD systems. According to a HUD source with direct knowledge, this gives the DOGE operatives access to vast troves of data. These range from the individual identities of every single federal public housing voucher holder in the US, along with their financial information, to information on the hospitals, nursing homes, multifamily housing, and senior living facilities that HUD helps finance, as well as data on everything from homelessness rates to environmental and health hazards to federally insured mortgages.

Put together, experts and HUD sources say, all of this could give someone with access unique insight into the US real estate market.

Kukun did not respond to requests for comment about whether Langmack is drawing a salary while working at HUD or how long he will be with the department. A woman who answered the phone at TCC Management headquarters in Michigan but did not identify herself said Mirksi was "on leave until July." In response to a request for comment about Langmack’s access to systems, HUD spokesperson Kasey Lovett said, “DOGE and HUD are working as a team; to insinuate anything else is false. To further illustrate this unified mission, the secretary established a HUD DOGE taskforce.” In response to specific questions about Mirski’s access to systems and background and qualifications, she said, “We have not—and will not—comment on individual personnel. We are focused on serving the American people and working as one team.”

The property technology, or proptech, market covers a wide range of companies offering products and services meant to, for example, automate tenant-landlord interactions, or expedite the home purchasing process. Kukun focuses on helping homeowners and real estate investors assess the return on investment they’d get from renovating their properties and on predictive analytics that model where property values will rise in the future.

Doing this kind of estimation requires the use of what’s called an automated valuation model (AVM), a machine-learning model that predicts the prices or rents of certain properties. In April 2024, Kukun was one of eight companies selected to receive support from REACH, an accelerator run by the venture capital arm of the National Association of Realtors (NAR). Last year NAR agreed to a settlement with Missouri homebuyers, who alleged that realtor fees and certain listing requirements were anticompetitive.

“If you can better predict than others how a certain neighborhood will develop, you can invest in that market,” says Fabian Braesemann, a researcher at the Oxford Internet Institute. Doing so requires data, access to which can make any machine-learning model more accurate and more monetizable. This is the crux of the potential conflict of interest: While it is unclear how Langmack and Mirski are using or interpreting it in their roles at HUD, what is clear is that they have access to a wide range of sensitive data.

According to employees at HUD who spoke to WIRED on the condition of anonymity, there is currently a six-person DOGE team operating within the department. Four members are HUD employees whose tenures predate the current administration and have been assigned to the group; the others are Mirski and Langmack. The records reviewed by WIRED show that Mirski has been given read and write access to three different HUD systems, as well as read-only access to two more, while Langmack has been given read and write access to two of HUD’s core systems.

A positive, from one source’s perspective, is the fact that the DOGE operatives have been given application-level access to the systems, rather than direct access to the databases themselves. In theory, this means that they can only interact with the data through user interfaces, rather than having direct access to the server, which could allow them to execute queries directly on the database or make unrestricted or irreparable changes. However, this source still sees dangers inherent in granting this level of access.

“There are probably a dozen-plus ways that [application-level] read/write access to WASS or LOCCS could be translated into the entire databases being exfiltrated,” they said. There is no specific reason to think that DOGE operatives have inappropriately moved data—but even the possibility cuts against standard security protocols that HUD sources say are typically in place.

LOCCS, or Line of Credit Control System, is the first system to which both DOGE operatives within HUD, according to the records reviewed by WIRED, have both read and write access. Essentially HUD’s banking system, LOCCS “handles disbursement and cash management for the majority of HUD grant programs,” according to a user guide. Billions of dollars flow through the system every year, funding everything from public housing to disaster relief—such as rebuilding from the recent LA wildfires—to food security programs and rent payments.

The current balance in the LOCCS system, according to a record reviewed by WIRED, is over $100 billion—money Congress has approved for HUD projects but which has yet to be drawn down. Much of this money has been earmarked to cover disaster assistance and community development work, a source at the agency says.

Normally, those who have access to LOCCS require additional processing and approvals to access the system, and most only have “read” access, department employees say.

“Read/write is used for executing contracts and grants on the LOCCS side,” says one person. “It normally has strict banking procedures around doing anything with funds. For instance, you usually need at least two people to approve any decisions—same as you would with bank tellers in a physical bank.”

The second system to which documents indicate both DOGE operatives at HUD have both read and write access is the HUD Central Accounting and Program System (HUDCAPS), an “integrated management system for Section 8 programs under the jurisdiction of the Office of Public and Indian Housing,” according to HUD. (Section 8 is a federal program administered through local housing agencies that provides rental assistance, in the form of vouchers, to millions of lower-income families.) This system was a precursor to LOCCS and is currently being phased out, but it is still being used to process the payment of housing vouchers and contains huge amounts of personal information.

There are currently 2.3 million families in receipt of housing vouchers in the US, according to HUD’s own data, but the HUDCAPS database contains information on significantly more individuals because historical data is retained, says a source familiar with the system. People applying for HUD programs like housing vouchers have to submit sensitive personal information, including medical records and personal narratives.

“People entrust these stories to HUD,” the source says. “It’s not data in these systems, it’s operational trust.”

WASS, or the Web Access Security Subsystem, is the third system to which DOGE has both read and write access, though only Mirski has access to this system according to documents reviewed by WIRED. It’s used to grant permissions to other HUD systems. “Most of the functionality in WASS consists of looking up information stored in various tables to tell the security subsystem who you are, where you can go, and what you can do when you get there,” a user manual says.

“WASS is an application for provisioning rights to most if not all other HUD systems,” says a HUD source familiar with the systems who is shocked by Mirski’s level of access, because normally HUD employees don’t have read access, let alone write access. “WASS is the system for setting permissions for all of the other systems.”

In addition to these three systems, documents show that Mirski has read-only access to two others. One, the Integrated Disbursement and Information System (IDIS), is a nationwide database that tracks all HUD programs underway across the country. (“IDIS has confidential data about hidden locations of domestic violence shelters,” a HUD source says, “so even read access in there is horrible.”) The other is the Financial Assessment of Public Housing (FASS-PH), a database designed to “measure the financial condition of public housing agencies and assess their ability to provide safe and decent housing,” according to HUD’s website.

All of this is significant because, in addition to the potential for privacy violations, knowing what is in the records, or even having access to them, presents a serious potential conflict of interest.

“There are often bids to contract any development projects,” says Erin McElroy, an assistant professor at the University of Washington. “I can imagine having insider information definitely benefiting the private market, or those who will move back into the private market,” she alleges.

HUD has an oversight role in the mobile home space, the area on which TCC Management, which appears to have recently wiped its website, focuses. "It’s been a growing area of HUD’s work and focus over the past few decades," says one source there; this includes setting building standards, inspecting factories, and taking in complaints. This presents another potential conflict of interest.

Braesemann says it’s not just the insider access to information and data that could be a potential problem, but that people coming from the private sector may not understand the point of HUD programs. Something like Section 8 housing, he notes, could be perceived as not working in alignment with market forces—“Because there might be higher real estate value, these people should be displaced and go somewhere else”—even though its purpose is specifically to buffer against the market.

Like other government agencies, HUD is facing mass purges of its workforce. NPR has reported that 84 percent of the staff of the Office of Community Planning and Development, which supports homeless people, faces termination, while the president of a union representing HUD workers has estimated that up to half the workforce could be cut The chapter on housing policy in Project 2025—the right-wing playbook to remake the federal government that the Trump administration appears to be following—outlines plans to massively scale back HUD programs like public housing, housing assistance vouchers, and first-time home buyer assistance.

[wolfliving]

Bossware Surveillance Buildings

A case study on technologies for behavioral monitoring and profiling using motion sensors and wireless networking infrastructure inside offices and other facilities"

Wolfie Christl, Cracked Labs, November 2024

This case study is part of the ongoing project “Surveillance and Digital Control at Work” (2023-2024) led by Cracked Labs, which aims to explore how companies use personal data on workers in Europe, together with AlgorithmWatch, Jeremias Prassl (Oxford), UNI Europa and GPA, funded by the Austrian Arbeiterkammer.

Case study “Tracking Indoor Location, Movement and Desk Occupancy in the Workplace” (PDF, 25 pages) Summary

As offices, buildings and other corporate facilities become networked environments, there is a growing desire among employers to exploit data gathered from their existing digital infrastructure or additional sensors for various purposes. Whether intentionally or as a byproduct, this includes personal data about employees, their movements and behaviors.

Technology vendors are promoting solutions that repurpose an organization’s wireless networking infrastructure as a means to monitor and analyze the indoor movements of employees and others within buildings. While GPS technology is too imprecise to track indoor location, Wi-Fi access points that provide internet connectivity for laptops, smartphones, tables and other networked devices can be used to track the location of these devices. Bluetooth, another wireless technology, can also be used to monitor indoor location. This can involve Wi-Fi access points that track Bluetooth-enabled devices, so-called “beacons” that are installed throughout buildings and Bluetooth-enabled badges carried by employees. In addition, employers can utilize badging systems, security cameras and video conferencing technology installed in meeting rooms for behavioral monitoring, or even environmental sensors that record room temperature, humidity and light intensity. Several technology vendors provide systems that use motion sensors installed under desks or in the ceilings of rooms to track room and desk attendance.

This case study explores software systems and technologies that utilize personal data on employees to monitor room and desk occupancy and track employees’ location and movements inside offices and other corporate facilities. It focuses on the potential implications for employees in Europe. To illustrate wider practices, it investigates systems for occupancy monitoring and indoor location tracking offered by Cisco, Juniper, Spacewell, Locatee and other technology vendors, based on an analysis of technical documentation and other publicly available sources. It briefly addresses how workers resisted the installation of motion sensors by their employers. This summary presents an overview of the findings of this case study….

[juanabaloo]

There's a Treasury coup going on, led by Musk. The Nazi Republicans are fine with this and the legacy (traditional) media doesn't seem to care. (It start Friday sometime. Friday Jan 31st, 2025) I'll link to the source, but I wanna include the full article from Wired in text here.

They have identified the 6 engineers (supposedly they are engineers) who are part of this coup. These people have names, they are not nameless shadows. May they never know a moment of peace in their godforsaken lives.

[Personally I have zero issue with them being young. The real problem is their lack of experience and training with confidential data, lack of security clearance, and them participating in a fucking coup.]

Vittoria Elliott Additional reporting by Zoë Schiffer and Tim Marchman Wired.com Feb 2, 2025 2:02 PM

The Young, Inexperienced Engineers Aiding Elon Musk’s Government Takeover

Engineers between 19 and 24, most linked to Musk’s companies, are playing a key role as he seizes control of federal infrastructure.

The engineers are Akash Bobba, Edward Coristine, Luke Farritor, Gautier Cole Killian (also known as Cole Killian), Gavin Kliger, and Ethan Shaotran. None have responded to requests for comment from WIRED. Representatives from OPM, GSA, and DOGE did not respond to requests for comment.

(Source: Wired.com)

Full article under the cut, including some initial details like university and internship jobs for some of the six.

Elon Musk’s takeover of federal government infrastructure is ongoing, and at the center of things is a coterie of engineers who are barely out of—and in at least one case, purportedly still in—college. Most have connections to Musk, and at least two have connections to Musk’s longtime associate Peter Thiel, a cofounder and chair of the analytics firm and government contractor Palantir who has long expressed opposition to democracy.

WIRED has identified six young men—all apparently between the ages of 19 and 24, according to public databases, their online presences, and other records—who have little to no government experience and are now playing critical roles in Musk’s so-called Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) project, tasked by executive order with “modernizing Federal technology and software to maximize governmental efficiency and productivity.” The engineers all hold nebulous job titles within DOGE, and at least one appears to be working as a volunteer.

The engineers are Akash Bobba, Edward Coristine, Luke Farritor, Gautier Cole Killian, Gavin Kliger, and Ethan Shaotran. None have responded to requests for comment from WIRED. Representatives from OPM, GSA, and DOGE did not respond to requests for comment.

Already, Musk’s lackeys have taken control of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and General Services Administration (GSA), and have gained access to the Treasury Department’s payment system, potentially allowing him access to a vast range of sensitive information about tens of millions of citizens, businesses, and more. On Sunday, CNN reported that DOGE personnel attempted to improperly access classified information and security systems at the US Agency for International Development and that top USAID security officials who thwarted the attempt were subsequently put on leave. The Associated Press reported that DOGE personnel had indeed accessed classified material.

“What we're seeing is unprecedented in that you have these actors who are not really public officials gaining access to the most sensitive data in government,” says Don Moynihan, a professor of public policy at the University of Michigan. “We really have very little eyes on what's going on. Congress has no ability to really intervene and monitor what's happening because these aren't really accountable public officials. So this feels like a hostile takeover of the machinery of governments by the richest man in the world.”

Bobba has attended UC Berkeley, where he was in the prestigious Management, Entrepreneurship, and Technology program. According to a copy of his now-deleted LinkedIn obtained by WIRED, Bobba was an investment engineering intern at the Bridgewater Associates hedge fund as of last spring and was previously an intern at both Meta and Palantir. He was a featured guest on a since-deleted podcast with Aman Manazir, an engineer who interviews engineers about how they landed their dream jobs, where he talked about those experiences last June.

Coristine, as WIRED previously reported, appears to have recently graduated from high school and to have been enrolled at Northeastern University. According to a copy of his résumé obtained by WIRED, he spent three months at Neuralink, Musk’s brain-computer interface company, last summer.e [e seems to be a typo]

Both Bobba and Coristine are listed in internal OPM records reviewed by WIRED as “experts” at OPM, reporting directly to Amanda Scales, its new chief of staff. Scales previously worked on talent for xAI, Musk’s artificial intelligence company, and as part of Uber’s talent acquisition team, per LinkedIn. Employees at GSA tell WIRED that Coristine has appeared on calls where workers were made to go over code they had written and justify their jobs. WIRED previously reported that Coristine was added to a call with GSA staff members using a nongovernment Gmail address. Employees were not given an explanation as to who he was or why he was on the calls.

Farritor, who per sources has a working GSA email address, is a former intern at SpaceX, Musk’s space company, and currently a Thiel Fellow after, according to his LinkedIn, dropping out of the University of Nebraska—Lincoln. While in school, he was part of an award-winning team that deciphered portions of an ancient Greek scroll.

Kliger, whose LinkedIn lists him as a special adviser to the director of OPM and who is listed in internal records reviewed by WIRED as a special adviser to the director for information technology, attended UC Berkeley until 2020; most recently, according to his LinkedIn, he worked for the AI company Databricks. His Substack includes a post titled “The Curious Case of Matt Gaetz: How the Deep State Destroys Its Enemies,” as well as another titled “Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense: The Warrior Washington Fears.”

Killian, also known as Cole Killian, has a working email associated with DOGE, where he is currently listed as a volunteer, according to internal records reviewed by WIRED. According to a copy of his now-deleted résumé obtained by WIRED, he attended McGill University through at least 2021 and graduated high school in 2019. An archived copy of his now-deleted personal website indicates that he worked as an engineer at Jump Trading, which specializes in algorithmic and high-frequency financial trades.

Shaotran told Business Insider in September that he was a senior at Harvard studying computer science and also the founder of an OpenAI-backed startup, Energize AI. Shaotran was the runner-up in a hackathon held by xAI, Musk’s AI company. In the Business Insider article, Shaotran says he received a $100,000 grant from OpenAI to build his scheduling assistant, Spark.

“To the extent these individuals are exercising what would otherwise be relatively significant managerial control over two very large agencies that deal with very complex topics,” says Nick Bednar, a professor at University of Minnesota’s school of law, “it is very unlikely they have the expertise to understand either the law or the administrative needs that surround these agencies.”

Sources tell WIRED that Bobba, Coristine, Farritor, and Shaotran all currently have working GSA emails and A-suite level clearance at the GSA, which means that they work out of the agency’s top floor and have access to all physical spaces and IT systems, according a source with knowledge of the GSA’s clearance protocols. The source, who spoke to WIRED on the condition of anonymity because they fear retaliation, says they worry that the new teams could bypass the regular security clearance protocols to access the agency’s sensitive compartmented information facility, as the Trump administration has already granted temporary security clearances to unvetted people.

This is in addition to Coristine and Bobba being listed as “experts” working at OPM. Bednar says that while staff can be loaned out between agencies for special projects or to work on issues that might cross agency lines, it’s not exactly common practice.

“This is consistent with the pattern of a lot of tech executives who have taken certain roles of the administration,” says Bednar. “This raises concerns about regulatory capture and whether these individuals may have preferences that don’t serve the American public or the federal government.”

Additional reporting by Zoë Schiffer and Tim Marchman.

[teqful]

How-To IT

Topic: Core areas of IT

1. Hardware

• Computers (Desktops, Laptops, Workstations)

• Servers and Data Centers

• Networking Devices (Routers, Switches, Modems)

• Storage Devices (HDDs, SSDs, NAS)

• Peripheral Devices (Printers, Scanners, Monitors)

2. Software

• Operating Systems (Windows, Linux, macOS)

• Application Software (Office Suites, ERP, CRM)

• Development Software (IDEs, Code Libraries, APIs)

• Middleware (Integration Tools)

• Security Software (Antivirus, Firewalls, SIEM)

3. Networking and Telecommunications

• LAN/WAN Infrastructure

• Wireless Networking (Wi-Fi, 5G)

• VPNs (Virtual Private Networks)

• Communication Systems (VoIP, Email Servers)

• Internet Services

4. Data Management

• Databases (SQL, NoSQL)

• Data Warehousing

• Big Data Technologies (Hadoop, Spark)

• Backup and Recovery Systems

• Data Integration Tools

5. Cybersecurity

• Network Security

• Endpoint Protection

• Identity and Access Management (IAM)

• Threat Detection and Incident Response

• Encryption and Data Privacy

6. Software Development

• Front-End Development (UI/UX Design)

• Back-End Development

• DevOps and CI/CD Pipelines

• Mobile App Development

• Cloud-Native Development

7. Cloud Computing

• Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)

• Platform as a Service (PaaS)

• Software as a Service (SaaS)

• Serverless Computing

• Cloud Storage and Management

8. IT Support and Services

• Help Desk Support

• IT Service Management (ITSM)

• System Administration

• Hardware and Software Troubleshooting

• End-User Training

9. Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning

• AI Algorithms and Frameworks

• Natural Language Processing (NLP)

• Computer Vision

• Robotics

• Predictive Analytics

10. Business Intelligence and Analytics

• Reporting Tools (Tableau, Power BI)

• Data Visualization

• Business Analytics Platforms

• Predictive Modeling

11. Internet of Things (IoT)

• IoT Devices and Sensors

• IoT Platforms

• Edge Computing

• Smart Systems (Homes, Cities, Vehicles)

12. Enterprise Systems

• Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)

• Customer Relationship Management (CRM)

• Human Resource Management Systems (HRMS)

• Supply Chain Management Systems

13. IT Governance and Compliance

• ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure Library)

• COBIT (Control Objectives for Information Technologies)

• ISO/IEC Standards

• Regulatory Compliance (GDPR, HIPAA, SOX)

14. Emerging Technologies

• Blockchain

• Quantum Computing

• Augmented Reality (AR) and Virtual Reality (VR)

• 3D Printing

• Digital Twins

15. IT Project Management

• Agile, Scrum, and Kanban

• Waterfall Methodology

• Resource Allocation

• Risk Management

16. IT Infrastructure

• Data Centers

• Virtualization (VMware, Hyper-V)

• Disaster Recovery Planning

• Load Balancing

17. IT Education and Certifications

• Vendor Certifications (Microsoft, Cisco, AWS)

• Training and Development Programs

• Online Learning Platforms

18. IT Operations and Monitoring

• Performance Monitoring (APM, Network Monitoring)

• IT Asset Management

• Event and Incident Management

19. Software Testing

• Manual Testing: Human testers evaluate software by executing test cases without using automation tools.

• Automated Testing: Use of testing tools (e.g., Selenium, JUnit) to run automated scripts and check software behavior.

• Functional Testing: Validating that the software performs its intended functions.

• Non-Functional Testing: Assessing non-functional aspects such as performance, usability, and security.

• Unit Testing: Testing individual components or units of code for correctness.

• Integration Testing: Ensuring that different modules or systems work together as expected.

• System Testing: Verifying the complete software system’s behavior against requirements.

• Acceptance Testing: Conducting tests to confirm that the software meets business requirements (including UAT - User Acceptance Testing).

• Regression Testing: Ensuring that new changes or features do not negatively affect existing functionalities.

• Performance Testing: Testing software performance under various conditions (load, stress, scalability).

• Security Testing: Identifying vulnerabilities and assessing the software’s ability to protect data.

• Compatibility Testing: Ensuring the software works on different operating systems, browsers, or devices.

• Continuous Testing: Integrating testing into the development lifecycle to provide quick feedback and minimize bugs.

• Test Automation Frameworks: Tools and structures used to automate testing processes (e.g., TestNG, Appium).

19. VoIP (Voice over IP)

VoIP Protocols & Standards

• SIP (Session Initiation Protocol)

• H.323

• RTP (Real-Time Transport Protocol)

• MGCP (Media Gateway Control Protocol)

VoIP Hardware

• IP Phones (Desk Phones, Mobile Clients)

• VoIP Gateways

• Analog Telephone Adapters (ATAs)

• VoIP Servers

• Network Switches/ Routers for VoIP

VoIP Software

• Softphones (e.g., Zoiper, X-Lite)

• PBX (Private Branch Exchange) Systems

• VoIP Management Software

• Call Center Solutions (e.g., Asterisk, 3CX)

VoIP Network Infrastructure

• Quality of Service (QoS) Configuration

• VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) for VoIP

• VoIP Traffic Shaping & Bandwidth Management

• Firewall and Security Configurations for VoIP

• Network Monitoring & Optimization Tools

VoIP Security

• Encryption (SRTP, TLS)

• Authentication and Authorization

• Firewall & Intrusion Detection Systems

• VoIP Fraud DetectionVoIP Providers

• Hosted VoIP Services (e.g., RingCentral, Vonage)

• SIP Trunking Providers

• PBX Hosting & Managed Services

VoIP Quality and Testing

• Call Quality Monitoring

• Latency, Jitter, and Packet Loss Testing

• VoIP Performance Metrics and Reporting Tools

• User Acceptance Testing (UAT) for VoIP Systems

Integration with Other Systems

• CRM Integration (e.g., Salesforce with VoIP)

• Unified Communications (UC) Solutions

• Contact Center Integration

• Email, Chat, and Video Communication Integration

[justforbooks]

Source Code: My Beginnings by Bill Gates

In contrast to the current crop of swaggering tech bros, the Microsoft founder comes across as wry and self-deprecating in this memoir of starting out

Bill Gates is the John McEnroe of the tech world: once a snotty brat whom everyone loved to hate, now grown up into a beloved elder statesman. Former rivals, most notably Apple’s Steve Jobs, have since departed this dimension, while the Gates Foundation, focusing on unsexy but important technologies such as malaria nets, was doing “effective altruism” long before that became a fashionable term among philosophically minded tech bros. Time, then, to look back. In the first of what the author threatens will be a trilogy of memoirs, Gates recounts the first two decades of his life, from his birth in 1955 to the founding of Microsoft and its agreement to supply a version of the Basic programming language to Apple Computer in 1977.

He grows up in a pleasant suburb of Seattle with a lawyer father and a schoolteacher mother. His intellectual development is keyed to an origin scene in which he is fascinated by his grandmother’s skill at card games around the family dining table. The eight-year-old Gates realises that gin rummy and sevens are systems of dynamic data that the player can learn to manipulate.

As he tells it, Gates was a rather disruptive schoolchild, always playing the smart alec and not wanting to try too hard, until he first learned to use a computer terminal under the guidance of an influential maths teacher named Bill Dougall. (I wanted to learn more about this man than Gates supplies in a still extraordinary thumbnail sketch: “He had been a World War II Navy pilot and worked as an aeronautical engineer at Boeing. Somewhere along the way he earned a degree in French Literature from the Sorbonne in Paris on top of graduate degrees in engineering and education.”) Ah, the computer terminal. It is 1968, so the school terminal communicates with a mainframe elsewhere. Soon enough, the 13-year-old Gates has taught it to play noughts and crosses. He is hooked. He befriends another pupil, Paul Allen – who will later introduce him to alcohol and LSD – and together they pore over programming manuals deep into the night. Gates plans a vast simulation war game, but he and his friends get their first taste of writing actually useful software when they are asked to automate class scheduling after their school merges with another. Success with this leads the children, now calling themselves the Lakeside Programming Group, to write a payroll program for local businesses, and later to create software for traffic engineers.

There follows a smooth transition to Harvard, where in the ferment of anti-war campus protests our hero is more interested in the arrival, one day in 1969, of a PDP-10 computer. Gates takes classes in maths but also chemistry and the Greek classics. Realising he doesn’t have it in him to become a pure mathematician, he goes all-in on computers once a new home machine, the Altair, is announced. He and Paul Allen will write its Basic, having decided to call themselves “Micro-Soft”.

The early home computer scene, Gates notes, was a countercultural, hippy thing: cheap computers “represented a triumph of the masses against the monolithic corporations and establishment forces that controlled access to computing”, and so software was widely “shared”, or copied among people for free. It was Gates himself who, notoriously, pushed back against this culture when he found out most users of his Basic weren’t paying for it. By “stealing software”, he wrote in an open letter in 1976, “you prevent good software from being written. Who can afford to do professional work for nothing?” This rubbed a lot of people up the wrong way and still does, at least in the more militant parts of the “open-source” world. But he had a point. And that, readers, is why your Office 365 account just renewed for another year. Fans of Word and Excel, though, will have to wait for subsequent volumes of Gates’s recollections, as will those who want more about his later battles with Apple, though Steve Jobs does get an amusing walk-on part. (Micro-Soft’s general manager keeps a notebook of sales calls, on one page of which we read: “11.15 Steve Jobs calls. Was very rude.”). This volume, still, is more than just a geek’s inventory of early achievements. There is a genuine gratitude for influential mentors, and a wry mood of self-deprecation throughout. Gates gleefully records his first preschool report: “He seemed determined to impress us with his complete lack of concern for any phase of school life.” Later, he explains how he acquired a sudden interest in theatre classes. “Admittedly the main draw for me was the higher percentage of girls in drama. And since the main activity in the class was to read lines to each other, the odds were very good that I’d actually talk to one.” Strikingly, unlike most “self-made” billionaires, Gates emphasises the “unearned privilege” of his upbringing and the peculiar circumstances – “mostly out of my control” – that enabled his career. Adorably, he even admits to still having panic dreams about his university exams. The book’s most touching pages recount how one of his closest friends and colleagues in the programming group, Kent Evans, died in a mountaineering accident when he was 17. “Throughout my life, I have tended to deal with loss by avoiding it,” Gates writes. He says later that if he were growing up today, he would probably be identified as “on the autism spectrum”, and now regrets some of his early behaviour, though “I wouldn’t change the brain I was given for anything”. There is a sense of the writer, older and wiser, trying to redeem the past through understanding it better, a thing that no one has yet seen Elon Musk or Mark Zuckerberg attempt in public. That alone makes Bill Gates a more human tech titan than most of his rivals, past and present.

Daily inspiration. Discover more photos at Just for Books…?

[ishamalik7500]

Computer Networks: Basics, Types, and Benefits Explained

Computer networks are a big part of today’s highly automated world. They connect people, systems, and devices, making communication and resource sharing effortless. Whether it’s examining the internet, collaborating on projects, or sharing files, computer networks play a vital role in both personal and professional environments. We’ll cover the basics of computer networks, discuss their different types, and see the benefits they deliver.

What is a Computer Network?

A computer network is basically a system where multiple devices are linked together to share resources and exchange data. These devices can include laptops, mobile phones, servers, and networking equipment like routers. Networks enable smooth communication and allow devices to work together efficiently, making everything from browsing the web to managing complex business operations much easier.  

Types of Computer Networks

Personal Area Network (PAN):

Personal Area Networks are designed as small networks intended for individual purposes. They usually span a limited distance and link devices such as.

smartphones, laptops, and tablets. For instance, connecting your phone to your computer via Bluetooth forms a simple PAN.

Local Area Network (LAN):

LANs are commonly used in homes, schools, and offices to connect devices within a limited area. For example, to allow employees to share files and printers seamlessly, all the computers in an office might be connected to a LAN.

Wide Area Network (WAN):

A WAN stretches over a significantly larger territory, often connecting devices or LANs across cities, countries, or even continents. The internet is the most well-known example of a WAN, authorized global connectivity.

Metropolitan Area Network (MAN):

Sitting between LANs and WANs, a MAN is typically used to connect networks across a campus or city. Cable TV networks are a common example of a MAN.

Wireless Networks:

Wireless networks use technologies like Bluetooth or Wi-Fi to connect devices without cables. They’re widely used in offices, homes, and public places, offering convenience and mobility.

Key Components of Computer Networks

Devices (Nodes): Servers that interact within the network these include computers and smartphones. 

Connections (Links): The physical or wireless pathways that transfer data between devices.

Protocols: These are the rules that control data transmission, such as TCP/IP, to maintain smooth communication.

Switches and Routers: Switches connect devices in a network, while routers link different networks together.

Benefits of Computer Networks

Resource Sharing:

Networks make things easy to share like files, printers, and software applications, reducing the need for duplicate resources.

Seamless Communication:

With instant messaging, email, and video calls, networks ensure quick and authentic communication, no matter how far away are you.

Cost Savings:

By collecting resources and data storage, networks cut down on operational costs, especially for businesses.

Anywhere Access:

Modern networks allow you to access data from any connected device, whether you are at home or on the go.

Scalability:

As your needs develop networks will grow too, by supporting more users and devices over time.

Increased Productivity:

It reduces delays in automated processes and real-time data sharing and streamlines workflows, boosting efficiency.

Why Computer Network Skills Are Crucial for Entry-Level Corporate Roles

For those starting their careers, knowledge of computer networks can be a significant asset:

Essential for Office Environments:

 In today's world, most workplaces rely on LANs and WANs for everyday operations. Knowing how these networks function allows employees to balance basic connectivity issues, making sure work stays on track without interruptions.

Supports Collaboration Tools: 

Corporate tools like Microsoft Teams, Slack, and cloud-based systems depend heavily on networks. Understanding their underlying principles helps entry-level employees adapt quickly to these platforms. 

Enhances Problem-Solving Skills:

Entry-level employees with networking knowledge can help IT, teams, by identifying and resolving minor network problems, exhibiting their value early on.

Boosts Technical Proficiency:

Networking skills indicate a candidate’s technical potential, giving them a head start in industries where tech literacy is required.

Prepares for Future Roles:

As technology makes progress, advanced networking concepts like cybersecurity and IoT integration are becoming integral. Early experience with networks lays a strong beginning for growth in these areas.

Challenges of Computer Networks

Security Risks: Networks are at risk of threats like hacking and malware, requiring robust security measures.

Cost of Setup: High-quality network infrastructure can be costly to install and maintain.

Technical Complexity: Balancing and managing networks frequently need specialized skills.

Conclusion

Computer networks are essential in today’s globalized world. From pushing day-to-day operations in businesses to enabling global communication, their impact is wide-ranging. For aspiring professionals, having computer networking skills can provide a competitive advantage, especially in entry-level corporate roles where technical knowledge is highly valued. By understanding the basics of networks and their benefits, individuals, and organizations can unlock new levels of productiveness and innovation.

I mastered Computer Network at NIPSTec, which is renowned as the best Computer Network institute in Delhi. If you're in Delhi and looking for top-notch training in computer networks, visit NIPSTec for expert guidance and practical learning.