#era multipolar

[zvaigzdelasas]

"These people are trying to destroy U.S. power [in] the world"

[theblindmachine]

Listen: https://open.spotify.com/episode/2sExBP7Lk2Ltz1ki8l6uv1 "**The New World Order: Trump’s Geopolitical Ambitions in a Multipolar Era** In the ever-turbulent arena of global politics, the world is witnessing a seismic shift towards a multipolar geopolitical order. As Donald Trump embarks on his second term, his foreign policy strategies are increasingly embracing a reality where multiple powers challenge American hegemony. In this week’s episode, Tom and Helen delve deep into the implications of this transition, exploring the question: is American acceptance of a multipolar world the linchpin in Trump’s geopolitical game plan? Gone are the days when the United States sat comfortably atop the global hierarchy, dictating terms and conditions while the rest of the world played by its rules. The rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, and the strategic maneuvering of nations like India and Brazil have turned the geopolitical landscape into a complex chessboard. It’s clear: power dynamics are shifting, and the United States can no longer operate under the illusion of unchallenged supremacy. Tom and Helen unpack this reality by examining Trump’s foreign policy blueprint. Is he leaning into this multipolarity as a strategic advantage? By recognizing the limits of unilateral action, is he attempting to reframe America's role on the world stage? Surprisingly, Trump’s rhetoric often captures a sense of realism that challenges traditional foreign policy establishments. Instead of insisting on unilateral dominance, he appears to be cultivating bilateral relationships with other powers—albeit in a manner that is undeniably unpredictable. The episode also navigates the often-turbulent waters of American public opinion. Are the American people ready to embrace this new order, or is there a lingering preference for the old ways? Trump's ability to tap into a growing sentiment that acknowledges a multipolar world may not only resonate with his base but could redefine the core of American nationalism itself. Is it possible that by fostering strategic partnerships and acknowledging the rise of other powers, Trump is crafting a new form of American exceptionalism? As Tom and Helen discuss these vital themes, they highlight how Trump's approach could lead to both opportunities and challenges. A multipolar world isn't inherently bad for American interests; it could mean more nuanced diplomacy, increased trade partnerships, and a recalibration of military commitments. However, it also poses significant challenges, from potential flashpoints in global conflicts to the need for the U.S. to navigate a global landscape fraught with competing ideologies. In conclusion, as we dissect the intricate layers of this geopolitical transformation, one thing becomes painfully clear: the era of dominance is giving way to a more complex, interconnected world. Whether Trump’s aspirations translate into meaningful geopolitical shifts or merely hollow rhetoric remains to be seen. But as we ponder the future, one crucial question lingers: can America successfully navigate its role in a new multipolar order, or will it find itself lost in the vast expanse of global change? Join us on Acast for the full conversation as we unravel the complexities of Trump's second term and the dawn of a multipolar world."

[probablyasocialecologist]

This unequal exchange leads to truly massive net transfers from South to North. In the final year of data, we see the following: A net South-North flow of 12 billion tons of embodied materials, and 21 Exajoules of embodied energy. According to recent research, this quantity of materials and energy would be enough to provide infrastructure and supplies to provision decent living standards – universal healthcare, education, modern housing, sanitation, electricity, heating/cooling, induction stoves, refrigerators, freezers, washing machines, public transit, computers, and mobile phones – for the entire population of the global South, but instead it is siphoned away for consumption and accumulation in the core. A net flow of 820 million hectares of embodied land. This is twice the size of India. This land could be used to provide nutritious food for up to 6 billion people, but instead it is used to produce things like sugar for Coca-Cola and beef for McDonald's, consumed in the North. A net flow of 826 billion hours of embodied labour. That’s more than the total annual labour rendered by the entire workforce of the US and European Union combined. That labour could be used to staff hospitals and schools in the global South, and produce food and goods for local needs, but instead it is used to churn out tech gadgets and fast fashion for Northern corporations. These results reveal that the high levels of consumption and growth in the core rely heavily on net appropriation from the South, today just as much as during the colonial era.  In the case of materials and labour, around half of the total consumption in the core is net-appropriated from the South.

18 April 2025

[dostoyevsky-official]

Retreat of Syrian Forces Threatens ‘Saigon Moment’ for Russia

Syria has partly been an ideological project for Putin. The intervention in Syria became a way for Russia to extend its vision of a multipolar world opposed to the Western liberal order, said Nicole Grajewski, fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of a coming book on Russia’s relationship with Iran, including in Syria. “To see Russian planes leave Syria as rebel forces move onward towards their air bases, and their assets in Damascus fall, this would be so devastating for the Russian image of itself,” she said. “It would be akin to a Saigon moment for them.” Putin’s assistance was instrumental to Assad’s survival, and showed Moscow’s allies far beyond the Middle East that Russian intervention could help push back popular uprisings, said a former Russian official. African leaders began to invite Russia, and specifically contractors from the Wagner paramilitary group who also played a critical role in Syria, to help stabilize their regimes.  Syria holds significant strategic value for Russia as well. The Khmeimim air base near the coastal city of Latakia serves as a logistical hub for flights to Libya, the Central African Republic, and Sudan, where Russian private contractors and soldiers have operated for years.  A naval base in the port city of Tartus serves as the only replenishment and repair point for the Russian navy in the Mediterranean, where it has brought in goods by bulk through the Black Sea. Tartus has granted Putin access to a warm water port, something Russian rulers for centuries before him sought in the Middle East. The port could also potentially connect Russia to Libya—like Syria, a Soviet-era ally—where it seeks a naval base to extend its reach into sub-Saharan Africa. A rebel takeover of those Syrian coastal positions could jeopardize Russia’s global-power projection. “Syria provided so many advantages at a low cost,” said Anna Borshchevskaya, senior fellow at the Washington Institute think tank and author of a book on Putin’s war in Syria. “Losing Syria would be a big strategic defeat that would reverberate beyond the Middle East. It would have global repercussions.”

[allthebrazilianpolitics]

Is Lula Anti-American? It's complicated.

It’s the question in Washington that won’t go away: “Is Lula anti-American?” Since returning to Brazil’s presidency on January 1, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has repeatedly caused alarm in the U.S. capital and elsewhere with his comments on Ukraine, Venezuela, the dollar and other key issues. An unconfirmed GloboNews report in June said President Joe Biden may have abandoned any intentions of visiting Brasilia before the end of the year because of frustration with Lula’s positions.    

The question causes many to roll their eyes, and with good reason. Three decades after the end of the Cold War, some in the United States continue to see Latin America in “You’re either with us or against us” terms. Washington has a long record of getting upset with Brazil’s independent stances on everything from generic AIDS drugs in the 1990s to trade negotiations in the 2000s and the Edward Snowden affair in the 2010s. A large Latin American country confidently operating in its own national interest, neither allied with nor totally against the United States, simply does not compute for some in Washington, and maybe it never will.   

That said, there is a long list of reasonable people in places like the White House and State Department, in think tanks and in the business world who are perfectly capable of understanding nuance — and have still perceived a threat from Lula’s foreign policy in this, his third term. The list of perceived transgressions is long and growing: Lula has repeatedly echoed Russian positions on Ukraine, saying both countries share equal responsibility for the war. In April, Lula said blame for continued hostilities laid “above all” with countries who are providing arms—a slap at the United States and Europe, delivered while on a trip to China, no less. Lula has worked to revive the defunct UNASUR bloc, whose explicit purpose was to counter U.S. influence in South America. He has repeatedly urged countries to shun the U.S. dollar as a mechanism for trade when possible, voicing support for new alternatives including a common currency with Argentina or its other neighbors. Lula has been bitterly critical of U.S. sanctions against Venezuela–”worse than a war,” he has said—while downplaying the repression, torture and other human rights abuses committed by the dictatorship itself.    

For some observers, the inescapable conclusion is that Lula’s foreign policy is not neutral or “non-aligned,” but overtly friendly to Russia and China and hostile to the United States. This has been a particular letdown for many in the Democratic Party who briefly saw Lula as a hero of democracy and natural ally after he, too, defeated an authoritarian, election-denying menace on the far right. And for the record, it’s not just Americans who feel this way: the left-leaning French newspaper Liberation, in a front-page editorial prior to Lula’s visit to Paris in June, called him a “faux friend” of the West.  

To paraphrase the old saying, it’s impossible to know what truly lurks in the hearts of men. But as someone who has tried to understand Lula for the past 20 years, with admittedly mixed results, let me give my best evaluation of what’s really happening: Lula may not be anti-U.S. in the traditional sense, but he is definitely anti-U.S. hegemony, and he is more willing than before to do something about it.  

That is, Lula and his foreign policy team do not wish ill on Washington in the way that Nicolás Maduro or Vladimir Putin do, and in fact they see the United States as a critical partner on issues like climate change, energy and infrastructure investment. But they also believe the U.S.-led global order of the last 30 years has on balance not been good for Brazil or, indeed, the planet as a whole. They are convinced the world is headed toward a new, more equitable “multipolar” era in which, instead of one country at the head of the table, there will be, say, eight countries seated at a round table—and Brazil will be one of them, along with China, India and others from the ascendant Global South. Meanwhile, Lula has lost some of the inhibitions and brakes that held him back a bit during his 2003-10 presidency, and he is actively out there trying to usher the world along to this promising new phase—with an evident enthusiasm and militancy that bothers many in the West, and understandably so. 

Continue reading.

[azspot]

Of course, in this multipolar era, Russia is not the only foreign nuclear power the United States has to worry about. North Korea recently signed a mutual-defense treaty with Russia that could expand its own nuclear program. Israel’s unacknowledged nuclear program poses risks as its war in Gaza continues and spreads. And after the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, Israel’s chief adversary may soon attain nuclear weapons of its own (possibly with Russian support). Most alarming of all is China’s rapidly expanding program, which appears to be aiming for eventual parity with Russia and the United States. China’s nuclear advancement has overturned much of the established wisdom around bipolar deterrence and could lead to a new, supercharged three-state arms race.

The Forgotten Epidemic

[abr]

La distrazione fatale di quelli che si bevono che all'imperialismo 'mericano kapitalishta che ci porterebbe in casa il wokismo (wow), sia preferibile un "modello multipolare" ... a guida credono russa in realtà cinese.

Per codesti la Guerra Fredda e il "sovranismo" hahah sovietico son passati senza lasciar tracce.

Le alternative vere sarebbero ben altre, speriamo di vederle in campo non solo in Argentina ma anche negli Usa post elezioni. Non sarà cmq. una passeggiata di salute (sarà chemioterapia).

La distrazione fatale è contrapporre a imperialismo kapitalishta ... un super imperialismo ben più illiberale repressivo pauperista. Il quale se la canta e suona via mainstream media e kul-tura, per distrarre la gente da come stia manipolando il vero campo di gioco, IL MERCATO.

Infatti tentano di imputare al modello dell'economia di mercato tutti i guasti della sua deriva social socialista statalista in corso da decenni con la finanziarizzazione globalista spinta dai guadagni cinesi (non giudei, cucù sveglia).

Il bello è che codesti distratti sono gli stessi che si stava meglio prima ... prima de che? Ma pensa, prima che il Muro di Berlino venisse giù ... cioè quando il cd. Imperialismo Usa era ben più militarizzato, concreto e tangibile che adesso. Quando l'Occidente era coeso - salvo minoranze rumorose ben finanziate: come adesso, mai nulla di nuovo sotto il sole.

[niconiconwo]

An era of multipolarity continues to speed towards us, and an uncertain future for the union as well. That's why part of what people should be doing now is preparing in advanced of this.

Be prepared for us to not always be able to simply force our way internationally anymore. Get your state legislature to pass dead-man laws that outline how to proceed smoothly to full independence and what things will happen or change if and when that comes to pass.

A collapse of the federal system is not necessarily a total collapse at the state level. This is the true merit of our federal union.

[reviewofpolitics]

China’s Hydrogen Bomb and the New Cold War

In a world increasingly defined by multipolar tension, China’s rapidly evolving nuclear capabilities are more than a military flex—they’re a geopolitical signal. The recent developments surrounding China's hydrogen bomb arsenal have reignited concerns not just about arms proliferation, but about a broader return to Cold War-style competition. Except this time, it’s not just Washington and Moscow in play—Beijing is rising fast, and it’s playing by new rules.

The Hydrogen Bomb: Power and Prestige

Unlike atomic bombs that rely solely on fission, hydrogen bombs use a two-stage process involving both fission and fusion. The result? A weapon that can unleash destruction on an exponentially larger scale. The U.S. and Russia have possessed these devices since the 1950s. China, for its part, tested its first hydrogen bomb in 1967—an early sign of ambition. But for decades, its nuclear posture remained relatively modest and defensive.

That’s changing. Fast.

Recent U.S. intelligence and satellite data suggest that China is not only modernizing its nuclear arsenal but also expanding it—aggressively. Missile silos in Xinjiang. New mobile launch systems. Hypersonic glide vehicles. And most concerning of all: highly compact hydrogen bomb designs that can be MIRVed (Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicles), enabling a single missile to carry multiple warheads.

From Minimal Deterrence to Strategic Expansion

China once adhered to a policy of minimum deterrence—keeping its nuclear arsenal just large enough to discourage an attack. But today, that doctrine is being quietly replaced. Analysts believe China is aiming for a credible second-strike capability, the gold standard of nuclear deterrence, which ensures a retaliatory response even if an opponent strikes first.

This shift changes everything.

It means China is no longer content with being a regional power with a symbolic deterrent. It wants global influence backed by hard power—and it’s willing to risk escalation to get there.

Why This Signals a New Cold War

During the original Cold War, the U.S. and USSR engaged in a relentless arms race, not just to build nukes, but to shape ideology, influence, and global norms. What we’re seeing today echoes that era—but with 21st-century dynamics.

Tech-Driven Tensions: The new arms race isn’t just about nukes—it's about AI, cyberwarfare, space militarization, and hypersonics. China’s nuclear push is just one pillar of a broader strategic shift.

Multipolar Complexity: Unlike the binary U.S.-Soviet Cold War, today’s conflict includes more actors (India, North Korea, Iran) and more flashpoints (Taiwan, the South China Sea, space).

Opaque Intentions: China’s political system makes its military intentions harder to read. Unlike NATO, Beijing doesn’t publish detailed defense white papers or engage in transparent arms control dialogue.

How the West Is Reacting

The U.S. is now reassessing its nuclear posture, funding modernization of its own arsenal, and boosting cooperation with allies like the UK, Australia (through AUKUS), and Japan. Missile defense systems are being recalibrated. There’s also increasing urgency around arms control talks—though Beijing has so far resisted joining trilateral disarmament discussions.

Some worry that escalating nuclear posturing could lead to a Thucydides Trap—the idea that rising and established powers are destined for conflict. Whether that conflict is cold or hot may depend on how the world responds to China’s next moves.

Conclusion: Cold War 2.0, With Chinese Characteristics

China’s hydrogen bomb developments aren’t just about military hardware—they're a message. A message that Beijing is no longer a quiet observer in the nuclear order, but an assertive actor aiming to rewrite the rules. The New Cold War isn’t coming—it’s already here. And this time, the weapons are faster, smarter, and more destabilizing than ever.

Whether diplomacy, deterrence, or something darker prevails may depend on whether the world recognizes this early warning for what it is: a high-stakes turning point in global security.

চীনের হাইড্রোজেন বোমা এবং নতুন শীতল যুদ্ধ

আজকের বহুমুখী বৈশ্বিক উত্তেজনার জগতে, চীনের পরমাণু শক্তির দ্রুত উন্নয়ন শুধু সামরিক শক্তি প্রদর্শন নয়—এটি একটি ভূ-রাজনৈতিক সংকেত। হাইড্রোজেন বোমা নিয়ে সাম্প্রতিক অগ্রগতি আবারও উদ্বেগ সৃষ্টি করেছে, কেবল অস্ত্র ছড়িয়ে পড়া নিয়ে নয়, বরং শীতল যুদ্ধের মতো প্রতিযোগিতার এক নতুন রূপ ফিরে আসছে।

হাইড্রোজেন বোমা: শক্তি ও মর্যাদা

হাইড্রোজেন বোমা একটি দুই-পর্যায়ের প্রক্রিয়ায় কাজ করে—যেখানে ফিশন ও ফিউশন দুইটাই থাকে। এটি পারমাণবিক বোমার চেয়ে অনেক বেশি শক্তিশালী। যুক্তরাষ্ট্র ও রাশিয়া ১৯৫০-এর দশক থেকে এই ধরনের বোমা তৈরি করেছে। চীন তার প্রথম হাইড্রোজেন বোমা ১৯৬৭ সালে পরীক্ষা করে। কিন্তু দীর্ঘদিন ধরে চীনের পারমাণবিক নীতি ছিল সংযত ও প্রতিরক্ষামূলক।

কিন্তু এখন পরিস্থিতি বদলাচ্ছে—খুব দ্রুত।

যুক্তরাষ্ট্রের গোয়েন্দা তথ্য ও স্যাটেলাইট চিত্রে দেখা যাচ্ছে, চীন তার পারমাণবিক ভাণ্ডার শুধু আধুনিক করছে না, বরং দ্রুত বিস্তৃত করছে। নতুন মিসাইল সাইলো, মোবাইল লঞ্চার, হাইপারসনিক অস্ত্র এবং ছোট কিন্তু মারাত্মক হাইড্রোজেন বোমা যা একাধিক লক্ষ্যবস্তুতে আঘাত করতে পারে।

ন্যূনতম প্রতিরোধ থেকে কৌশলগত সম্প্রসারণে

চীন একসময় ন্যূনতম প্রতিরোধের নীতি মানত—শুধু যতটুকু দরকার ততটুকু অস্ত্র রাখা। এখন সেটা বদলেছে। এখন তারা এমন শক্তি চাইছে, যাতে কেউ আগে হামলা করলেও তারা পাল্টা জবাব দিতে পারে।

এর মানে চীন শুধু আঞ্চলিক শক্তি নয়—এখন তারা বৈশ্বিক ক্ষমতার খেলায় নামছে।

কেন এটা নতুন শীতল যুদ্ধের ইঙ্গিত দিচ্ছে

পুরনো শীতল যুদ্ধে যুক্তরাষ্ট্র ও সোভিয়েত ইউনিয়ন একে অপরের সঙ্গে অস্ত্র প্রতিযোগিতায় লিপ্ত ছিল। এখন সেই চিত্র ফিরে আসছে—তবে আরও জটিল ও প্রযুক্তিনির্ভর আকারে।

প্রযুক্তিনির্ভর প্রতিযোগিতা: কেবল পরমাণু অস্ত্র নয়, এখন এআই, সাইবার যুদ্ধ, মহাকাশ এবং হাইপারসনিক অস্ত্রও এই প্রতিযোগিতার অংশ।

বহু-শক্তির সংঘর্ষ: এখন শুধু যুক্তরাষ্ট্র-চীন নয়, ভারত, উত্তর কোরিয়া, ইরান এবং দক্ষিণ চীন সাগরও এই সংকটের অংশ।

চীনের অস্বচ্ছ কৌশল: চীন তাদের সামরিক পরিকল্পনা খুব গোপনে রাখে—এটা বিশ্বের জন্য একধরনের অনিশ্চয়তা তৈরি করছে।

পশ্চিমা প্রতিক্রিয়া

যুক্তরাষ্ট্র এখন নিজের পারমাণবিক নীতি পুনর্বিবেচনা করছে। মিত্রদের সঙ্গে সহযোগিতা (যেমন AUKUS), প্রতিরক্ষা ব্যবস্থা হালনাগাদ, এবং অস্ত্র নিয়ন্ত্রণ আলোচনা আবার গুরুত্ব পাচ্ছে। যদিও চীন এখনো এই আলোচনায় সম্পূর্ণভাবে যুক্ত হয়নি।

উপসংহার: চীনা বৈশিষ্ট্যের সঙ্গে নতুন শীতল যুদ্ধ

চীনের হাইড্রোজেন বোমা শুধু অস্ত্র নয়—এটা এক ধরনের বার্তা। চীন এখন নিয়ম বদলাতে চায়। নতুন শীতল যুদ্ধ শুরু হয়ে গেছে, এবং এই যুদ্ধ আরও জটিল ও বিপজ্জনক।

चीन का हाइड्रोजन बम और नई शीत युद्ध की शुरुआत

आज की दुनिया में जहाँ कई शक्तियाँ उभर रही हैं, वहाँ चीन की परमाणु क्षमता में तेज़ी से हो रहा विकास सिर्फ़ एक सैन्य प्रदर्शन नहीं है—यह एक साफ़ संदेश है। हाल ही में चीन के हाइड्रोजन बम से जुड़े घटनाक्रम ने फिर से चिंता पैदा कर दी है कि क्या हम एक नए शीत युद्ध की ओर बढ़ रहे हैं।

हाइड्रोजन बम: ताकत और प्रतिष्ठा

हाइड्रोजन बम परमाणु बम से कहीं अधिक शक्तिशाली होता है, क्योंकि यह फिशन और फ्यूजन दोनों प्रक्रियाओं का इस्तेमाल करता है। अमेरिका और रूस के पास 1950 से यह तकनीक है। चीन ने पहली बार 1967 में हाइड्रोजन बम का परीक्षण किया था। लेकिन लंबे समय तक उसकी नीति रक्षात्मक और सीमित थी।

अब सब कुछ बदल रहा है—बहुत तेज़ी से।

अमेरिकी खुफिया रिपोर्ट्स और सैटेलाइट चित्रों के अनुसार, चीन अब सिर्फ़ अपने हथियारों को अपग्रेड नहीं कर रहा, बल्कि उन्हें बड़े स्तर पर बढ़ा भी रहा है—मिसाइल साइलो, हाइपरसोनिक वाहन और एक ही मिसाइल से कई बम गिराने वाली तकनीक (MIRV) शामिल हैं।

न्यूनतम प्रतिरोध से रणनीतिक विस्तार तक

पहले चीन सिर्फ़ इतना परमाणु हथियार रखता था जिससे दुश्मन हमला करने से डरे। अब वह नीति बदल चुकी है। अब चीन ऐसी क्षमता चाहता है कि अगर कोई देश पहले हमला करे तो वह ज़रूर जवाब दे सके।

इससे पूरी रणनीति बदल जाती है।

अब चीन सिर्फ़ क्षेत्रीय ताकत नहीं रहना चाहता—वह वैश्विक शक्ति बनना चाहता है और इसके लिए जोखिम उठाने को तैयार है।

क्यों यह नई शीत युद्ध की निशानी है

पुराने शीत युद्ध में अमेरिका और सोवियत संघ हथियारों के साथ-साथ विचारधारा और वैश्विक प्रभाव के लिए लड़े थे। अब वही इतिहास दोहराया जा रहा है—लेकिन नई तकनीक के साथ।

तकनीकी दौड़: अब सिर्फ़ परमाणु नहीं, बल्कि एआई, साइबर युद्ध, स्पेस हथियार और हाइपरसोनिक मिसाइलें भी मैदान में हैं।

बहु-ध्रुवीय संघर्ष: अब संघर्ष में भारत, उत्तर कोरिया, ईरान और ताइवान जैसे नए खिलाड़ी भी हैं।

गोपनीय रणनीति: चीन अपने इरादों को छुपाकर रखता है, जिससे अन्य देश असमंजस में रहते हैं।

पश्चिमी देशों की प्रतिक्रिया

अमेरिका अपनी परमाणु नीति पर फिर से विचार कर रहा है। UK, ऑस्ट्रेलिया (AUKUS), और जापान के साथ मिलकर वह अपनी सैन्य तैयारियाँ मज़बूत कर रहा है। साथ ही हथियार नियंत्रण की बातचीत भी ज़रूरी हो गई है—हालाँकि चीन अब तक इस वार्ता में शामिल नहीं हुआ है।

निष्कर्ष: चीनी शैली की नई शीत युद्ध

चीन का हाइड्रोजन बम केवल एक हथियार नहीं है—यह एक संदेश है। अब चीन केवल दर्शक नहीं रहना चाहता, वह दुनिया के नियम बदलना चाहता है। नई शीत युद्ध शुरू हो चुकी है, और इस बार यह पहले से भी ज़्यादा तेज़, ज़्यादा स्मार्ट और ज़्यादा खतरनाक है।

#China #HydrogenBomb #Geopolitics #NuclearWeapons #ColdWar2 #GlobalSecurity 

#ChinaMilitary #WorldPolitics #DefenseNews #NuclearArmsRace #StrategicPower 

#IndoPacific #USChinaTensions #ChinaNews #NewColdWar #MilitaryTech #InternationalRelations

[darkmaga-returns]

A U.S. economic ‘re-balancing’ is coming. Putin is right. The post-WWII economic order ‘is gone’

The post-WWII geo-political outcome effectively determined the post-war global economic structure. Both are now undergoing huge change. What remains stuck fast however, is the general (Western) weltanschauung that everything must ‘change’ only for it to stay the same. Things financial will continue as before; do not disturb the slumber. The assumption is that the oligarch/donor class will see to it that things remain the same.

However, the power distribution of the post-war era was unique. There is nothing ‘forever’ about it; nothing inherently permanent.

At a recent conference of Russian industrialists and entrepreneurs, President Putin highlighted both the global fracture, and set out an alternate vision which is likely to be adopted by BRICS and many beyond. His address was, metaphorically speaking, the financial counterpart to his 2007 Munich Security Forum speech, at which he accepted the military défie posed by ‘collective NATO’.

Putin is now hinting that Russia has accepted the challenge posed by the post-war financial order. Russia has persevered against the financial war, and is prevailing in that too.

Putin’s address last week was, in one sense, nothing really new: It reflected the classic doctrine of the former premier, Yevgeny Primakov. No romantic about the West, Primakov understood its hegemonic world order would always treat Russia as a subordinate. So he proposed a different model – the multipolar order – where Moscow balances power blocs, but does not join them.

At its heart, the Primakov Doctrine was the avoidance of binary alignments; the preservation of sovereignty; the cultivation of ties with other great powers, and the rejection of ideology in favour of a Russian nationalist vision.

[tieflingkisser]

Do Kamala Harris’s Neocon Supporters Just Hate Trump, or Is There Something More to Her Appeal?

Personally, I would not accept an endorsement from a world-historic war criminal.

The Iraq war — sold on lies and bungled in its prosecution — has become the embodiment of American hubris in the 21st century. Hundreds of thousands died, allies were alienated, and the U.S. became mired in a decadeslong boondoggle that is still unfolding. By 2007, a few years after the war was launched, all but its most diehard proponents had come to see it as the mistake it was. Today, those same diehard war hawks — the very people who planned and carried out the Iraq invasion — are proudly throwing their full support behind Vice President Kamala Harris in the November presidential election. Chief among them is former Vice President Dick Cheney. Not far behind are a clutch of other Bush-era figures aligned with the neoconservative movement, like Bill Kristol; former officials like former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales; and staffers for the late former Republican presidential nominee Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz.

[...]

These hawks say they’re endorsing Harris largely to stop Donald Trump — citing his conduct and “chaotic leadership” — but these prominent conservatives are backing the Democratic nominee because their visions for U.S. foreign policy increasingly appear to be aligned. The Democratic and Republican parties are more unified than ever in their commitment to preserving American hegemony and preventing the multipolar world from emerging. As vice president, Cheney was one of the principal architects not only of the Iraq War, which left hundreds of thousands of Iraqis dead, but also the U.S.’s worldwide torture regime. The aftershocks of America’s eight-year occupation are still being felt in the region and in our domestic politics to this day. Former Rep. Liz Cheney, R-Wy., who inherited her father’s hawkish views, has also pledged to do whatever she can to elect Harris, including launching a PAC that has raised millions of dollars to boost the Democrat’s campaign.

[...]

The Harris campaign isn’t just courting moderates and conservatives as part of a short-term strategy to win the election. Rather, Democrats are actively supporting and spouting neoconservative ideas. During her keynote address at the Democratic National Convention, Harris vowed: “As commander-in-chief, I will ensure America always has the strongest, most lethal fighting force in the world” — as her party blocked any Palestinian Americans from appearing on the convention stage to speak about Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza.

[virtualmemoriespodcast]

Episode 622 - Fred Kaplan

After 4+ decades as a reporter and with a half-dozen nonfiction books under his belt, Fred Kaplan rejoins the show to celebrate his first foray into fiction, A CAPITAL CALAMITY (Miniver Press)! We talk about how lockdown got him to start A Capital Calamity, how his history in national security and the defense sector informs the novel (& its accidental march torward WWIII), how his protagonist is & isn't a Fred-Not-Traveled, and what it was like to make things up after a career spent reporting the facts. We get into the moral quandaries of being an insider in Washington, his experience working for Les Aspin in the '70s, the early morning storytelling revelations that opened up the novel to him, and why he set a major scene of the book above The Comedy Cellar in NYC. We also get into whether we're slow-walking into WWIII, the lessons learned from the 2017-2021 era and how they may affect his coverage of the new administration, his jazz recommendations, the fun of dissecting Washington cocktail party culture, the pros & cons of a multipolar world, and more. Follow Fred on Bluesky, Facebook and Twitter • More info at our site • Support The Virtual Memories Show via Stripe, Patreon, or Paypal, and subscribe to our e-newsletter

Check out the new episode of The Virtual Memories Show

[jgmail]

«Incertidumbre internacional en el 2025». Resumen de la presentación

Por Alexander Dugin

Traducción de Juan Gabriel Caro Rivera

Tesis principales de mi intervención en la conferencia del MGIMO sobre «Incertidumbre internacional en el 2025».

Existen varios niveles de indeterminación en el orden mundial moderno:

1) La incertidumbre frente a la transición de un mundo unipolar a un mundo multipolar. ¿Resulta imposible decir inequívocamente si ya entramos en la multipolaridad o todavía estamos en la unipolaridad? El noch nicht de Heidegger como problema filosófico es bastante complicado. La multipolaridad está en auge y la unipolaridad en declive, pero su agonía puede ser peligrosa. Los últimos ataques desesperados de los globalistas, algunos de ellos exitosos, contra Rusia en Ucrania, Georgia, Moldavia, Rumanía y Siria demuestran que la unipolaridad no ha desaparecido por completo. El dragón del globalismo se encuentra herido de muerte, pero sigue vivo. La bipolaridad de las Relaciones Internacionales conceptualizada por Waltz vuelve a ponerse en juego, pues él creía que China era el segundo polo del mundo después del colapso de la URSS. La unipolaridad fue conceptualizada por Gilpin. La multipolaridad fue esbozada por Huntington y Fabio Petito.

2) La segunda incertidumbre es la ambigua descripción teórica de la multipolaridad. ¿Qué es un polo? ¿Es un Estado soberano (como en el sistema westfaliano y en el realismo clásico)? ¿O es una civilización? Pero entonces, ¿cuál es el estatus político de tal concepto cultural-religioso? La mejor respuesta fue dada por Chang Weiwei, un experto chino del Ministerio de Defensa que introdujo el concepto de Estado-Civilización. El Presidente Putin y el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores ruso Lavrov utilizan este mismo concepto. El Estado-Civilización es una civilización (con un sistema desarrollado de valores tradicionales y una fuerte identidad) organizada como un superestado donde se agrupan toda una constelación de pueblos y Estados que comparten un paradigma civilizatorio común. Pero hoy en día todo el mundo entiende por «polo» o «centro» (en el caso de la policentricidad) cosas diferentes: Estados (grandes e independientes), civilizaciones (políticamente no integradas) y Estados-Civilizaciones propiamente dichos. Hoy en día existen 4 Estados-Civilización independientes:

Occidente colectivo (OTAN-tierra),

Rusia,

China

E India.

Existen más civilizaciones como la islámica, la africana y la latinoamericana fuera de las 4 anteriormente enumeradas. Sólo falta que estos últimos se integren en superestados. Al mismo tiempo, Occidente puede dividirse en Norteamérica y Europa. Existe también la posibilidad de que nazca una civilización budista. A esta incertidumbre conceptual y a la apertura real del proceso de transformación de las civilizaciones y los Estados en Estados-Civilizaciones, se añade el problema de las fronteras. Este es el problema más acuciante de la construcción de la Teoría del Mundo Multipolar. Una frontera es una zona de superposición entre dos o más civilizaciones con presencia o ausencia de Estados soberanos de pequeña escala. Las fronteras forman parte de esta segunda incertidumbre.

3) La tercera incertidumbre es Trump y su estrategia. Trump no está dispuesto a aceptar la multipolaridad y es partidario de la hegemonía estadounidense. Pero lo ve de forma radicalmente distinta a los globalistas que han estado en el poder en EEUU durante las últimas décadas (ya sean demócratas o republicanos). Los globalistas identifican el dominio militar y político, la superioridad económica y la ideología liberal basada en la imposición de valores antitradicionales a todo el mundo (incluido EEUU) como su verdadero objetivo. Entienden por hegemonía la hegemonía no de un país, sino de un sistema ideológico liberal internacional. Trump está convencido de que son los intereses nacionales de Estados Unidos los que deben estar en el centro de atención y que esto debe basarse en los valores tradicionales estadounidenses. En otras palabras, estamos ante una hegemonía conservadora de derechas, ideológicamente opuesta a la liberal de izquierdas de Clinton, el neocon Bush Jr, Obama y Biden. ��A qué conducirá el trumpismo en las Relaciones Internacionales? Es imposible decirlo todavía. Objetivamente puede ayudar a acelerar la multipolaridad, pero también puede ralentizarla.

En el 2025 nos enfrentaremos a estas tres incertidumbres simultáneamente. Por lo tanto, vale la pena dar al término «incertidumbre» el estatus de un concepto independiente y multivalente que es en muchos aspectos clave para la correcta comprensión de los procesos mundiales.

[mariacallous]

On Thursday evening, Vladimir Putin spent more than three hours treating a crowd at the Valdai Discussion Forum to his usual litany of criticisms of the West for its “neocolonial policies” and the destruction of “traditional values.” As he’s done many times, the Russian president talked about the emerging “multipolar world” and argued that “Russia’s existence” guarantees the survival of the globe’s “diversity, variety, and complexity, which is a key to successful development.” Meduza’s Andrey Pertsev explains how the Kremlin hopes to etch Putin’s Valdai Club speech in history.

When fielding questions from the audience and moderator Fyodor Lukyanov, Putin publicly congratulated Donald Trump on his electoral victory in the U.S., praising the president-elect for demonstrating courage after his first assassination attempt. Putin also said he doesn’t reject dialogue with Washington and repeated his readiness for potential peace talks — but not on the “basis of Kyiv’s demands.”

After Putin’s participation at the Valdai Forum, his administration distributed guidelines to Russia’s state-run and pro-Kremlin news outlets (and to “experts” who act as the national media’s pundits) explaining what they should tell the public about the event. Meduza obtained a copy of these guidelines, which don’t mention the president’s comments about Trump or potential peace talks. In other words, the Kremlin neither ordered nor prohibited reporting on these topics.

Instead, the Putin administration’s coverage guidelines frame his Valdai Forum speech as “the event of the year in the realm of ideas and meaning” and depict the president himself as “a major global leader” spearheading the “doctrine of a new world order.” In fact, Russia’s propagandists have been told to lay it on even thicker by arguing that Putin’s speeches demonstrate “a breadth of political and philosophical thought” and that the “depth of his understanding of processes” distinguishes him from his cruder Western counterparts.

According to the Kremlin’s media guidelines, Putin’s ideas belong to a “philosophy of universal development and security,” and the Russian president himself has become “the voice of the world’s majority — and at the same time, the voice of the ordinary man.” 

The administration breaks Putin’s “new world order doctrine” into six points:

Openness between states;

The absence of “universal dogmas”;

The necessity of considering each country’s voice in making “global decisions”;

The rejection of certain international blocs (this apparently doesn’t apply to the BRICS organization);

Closing the developmental gap between nations; and

Pursuing equality for all peoples.

The Kremlin’s guidelines tell the media to emphasize that “Russia in the Putin era” has a special role in “building the new world order.” Russia’s grand contribution, says the presidential administration, is to “protect the rights and freedoms of humanity.” At the same time, the Kremlin’s guidelines ignore the many rights and freedoms that Russian officials have legally revoked in recent years.

Pro-Kremlin media outlets have already started acting on these instructions. For example, the website Vzglyad.ru lifted several quotes from the administration’s guidelines in its report on Putin’s Valdai speech, calling it the “doctrine of a new world order” and evidence of the president’s “broad political vision.”