#Cliff Kupchan

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2023: MSS Think Tank on "Effects of the Ukraine Crisis and Lessons Learned"

This overview from the PRC Ministry of State Security think tank — the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) — can provide insight into some Chinese perspectives on the Ukraine-Russia war and possibly on some of the less sensitive information passed up the line to its main customer, the PRC Foreign Affairs Leading Group. I found this article on aisixiang.com [and here…

[mariacallous]

In the summer of 1814, U.S. and British negotiators gathered in Ghent in the hopes of putting an end to the war that had begun two years earlier when England invaded the United States. The British, confident of victory, demanded major territorial concessions; when the U.S. delegation, led by John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, rebuffed those extortionate terms, the British proposed to redraw boundaries to include current gains, which contained parts of New England. News of the burning of Washington, which reached Europe in early October, tempted the Americans to concede.

Instead, they stalled, hoping for good news. That news soon arrived in the form of U.S. victories around Lake Champlain and in Baltimore. Just before Christmas, the British withdrew all demands and agreed to postpone the most contentious issues for future discussion. The Treaty of Ghent put an end to the era when U.S. sovereignty was threatened.

The moral of this story is that premature diplomacy during warfare is a mistake; the dynamism of the battlefield must be allowed to shape the conditions of negotiation. Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has urged his colleagues in the Biden administration to “seize the moment” for diplomacy now that Ukraine has fought the Russian army “to a standstill.” But that’s the wrong metaphor; the Ukrainians first withstood the Russian onslaught and have since pushed it back. A diplomatic bid a month ago might have conceded Russian control of Kherson, a city Ukraine has since regained, just as an agreement in September 1814 would have lopped off a significant portion of New England. The moment will come for diplomacy; it’s not now.

In an earlier column on the letter progressive Democrats sent to U.S. President Joe Biden on Ukraine, I wrote of my reservations about the left’s antiwar case for diplomacy. The stronger argument, however, is on the right, or at least the non-left. This side correctly points out that while Ukraine’s interest in protecting its territorial integrity is unlimited, the West has many other concerns that it must hold in balance with its support of Ukraine. In an article in the National Interest, Cliff Kupchan, chairman of the Eurasia Group, recently listed the grave and long-term costs of the war: accelerated “deglobalization,” rising food and energy prices and the social and political unrest those spikes can provoke, nuclear instability, and, above all, the prospect of war between Russia and NATO, possibly including a Russian resort to nuclear weapons.

In a recent conversation, Kupchan told me that he was “in the minority that thinks we should entertain talks with the Russians.” The cost that most concerns him is the military one. “We haven’t,” he said, “found Putin’s red line.” Russian President Vladimir Putin was not risk-averse, as he had been thought to be. He might respond to what he regarded as a threat to his regime with a form of escalation, nuclear or otherwise, that would be calamitous for the West, whether or not the Ukrainians regarded it as a price worth paying. Kupchan’s brother Charles, a professor of international affairs at Georgetown University, has also made the case that “the Kremlin’s resort to a nuclear weapon becomes a realistic option should Russian forces face full expulsion from eastern Ukraine and Crimea.”

This turns the argument about diplomacy and timing upside-down, suggesting that the West needs to begin formulating a diplomatic endgame before the Ukrainians succeed so well on the battlefield that Putin pulls the world down upon himself—and us. That kind of reasoning is, of course, the whole point of nuclear blackmail. When I said as much to Cliff Kupchan, he pointed to the additional costs of the war, very much including the horrendous deaths of hundreds of Ukrainian children. Yet this is a cost that the Ukrainians themselves seem willing to bear.

That said, simply calling Putin’s bluff would be the height of madness. The Biden administration is acutely conscious of the problem of the red line; even as he authorized another $400 million in military hardware for Ukraine, the president refused to provide long-range drones that could hit targets inside Russia. The argument for diplomacy says, in effect, that Washington must restrain not only itself but Ukraine; if not, as the international relations scholar Emma Ashford recently wrote, “[I]t may find its carefully calibrated response to the war being overtaken by a dangerous fantasy of absolute victory.” Ashford takes a careful middle position, suggesting that while a negotiated solution “seems impossible today,” U.S. diplomats “should begin to raise—both publicly and to [their] partners—the difficult questions that such an approach would entail.”

That sounds reasonable—don’t try to push Ukraine into sitting down with Russia but do begin to prepare for discussions that you know are bound to come. But is it? I raised the issue with Stephen Sestanovich, a Russia expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. Sestanovich said that even publicly airing possible end scenarios could sap Ukrainian will, the most precious commodity of all. “Yes, at some point you can sit down and talk to the Ukrainians about their future,” he said. “But you must have respect for how much harm you could do to them.” The analogy that occurred to Sestanovich was Winston Churchill’s refusal to consider Italian diplomatic feelers in May 1940 for fear that doing so would undermine British morale.

The reason that plans for a possible endgame should remain inside diplomats’ desks right now has to do not only with timing and tactics but with other kinds of costs that diplomatic realists tend to soft-pedal. The British realized after the War of 1812 that the United States was too strong and well-located to be retaken. Putin, however, would be emboldened by an agreement that granted him, for example, something a bit better than the status quo of 2014. In fact, he will remain a threat to his neighbors and to the West so long as he retains the capacity to do harm. Sestanovich suggests that if Ukraine continues to advance in the east and take back much of what it has lost, “the Russians will be in full panic mode” and Putin’s own rule will be threatened. That is, in effect, the best-case scenario for Ukrainian military success. (The worst-case scenario, of course, is that Putin lashes out against that threat.)

The question, at bottom, is: How much does it matter? So far, the United States and Europe—to a much greater degree—have concluded that halting Russian aggression in Ukraine is worth a good deal of sacrifice. The fact that the professed values of the West turn out to be real has obviously come as a shock to Putin; it has also come as a shock, if a very pleasant one, to many people in the West. But that will is hardly bottomless. Biden and his fellow leaders will not keep bearing the political and economic burden in order to achieve Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s maximal terms, which include Russian reparations and the return of every inch of Ukrainian territory.

The time will come when diplomats pull those plans out of their desks. But first we must see how much further, with our help, Ukraine can push back Putin’s advance. Doing so is in our interest as well as Ukraine’s.

[eupraxsophy]

The Rise of the Middle Powers

Foreign Policy has a great piece exploring the rise of six so-called “middle powers“—a complex and often nebulous classification of countries that occupy the space between “regular” nations and the “great powers” that substantially influence global geopolitics, economics, and culture. American political analyst Cliff Kupchan describes middle powers as “countries with significant leverage in…

[insideusnet]

These Are the Top Risks the World Faces in 2023 : Inside US

These Are the Top Risks the World Faces in 2023 : Inside US

The world faces some of “the most dangerous” risks in decades in 2023, according to a report published this week by the Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy. , “A small group of individuals has amassed an extraordinary amount of power, making decisions of profound geopolitical consequence with limited information in opaque environments,” according to Ian Bremmer and Cliff Kupchan, the…

[newstfionline]

Wednesday, January 6, 2021

Covidization (Worldcrunch) COVID-19 is killing people even without the virus. Spain’s Lung Cancer Group, a research body, believes lung cancer will have killed 1,300 people more in the country in 2020 than predictive models had anticipated before the pandemic struck. Between January and April this year, lockdowns and diverted healthcare resources meant 30% fewer initial oncology consultations than during those months in 2019. This is just one of the many pathologies with significantly worse data for what many are calling a “covidization” of healthcare. Covidization is a term coined by Madhukar Pai, a tuberculosis researcher at Montreal’s McGill University to describe the pandemic’s distorting effect on resource allocation, prioritization and media attention in fighting other pathologies. Data appear to have confirmed his opinion. Since April this year, the European Commission has devoted 137 million euros to research on the coronavirus, or twice all the monies spent in 2018 on tuberculosis, malaria and AIDS.

Travel in the COVID-era (Foreign Policy) In a signal of what travel in a pandemic world will look like, a group of U.S. airlines have called on the United States to drop travel restrictions banning citizens from Europe and elsewhere in favor of a pre-flight negative coronavirus test requirement. The airlines have backed a U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) proposal to create a global program for testing travelers prior to entering U.S. borders. Vice President Mike Pence, the head of the White House coronavirus task force, is due to discuss the proposal during a meeting today.

Golf is not essential travel (AP) The speculation began with curious activity by U.S. military aircraft reported circling President Trump's Turnberry golf resort in western Scotland in November. Then the Sunday Post in Scotland reported that Glasgow Prestwick Airport “has been told to expect the arrival of a US military Boeing 757 aircraft, that is occasionally used by Trump, on January 19.” Could the American president, on his last full day in office, wing his way to his ancestral Scotland to hit the links at his shuttered resort, possibly missing the inauguration? On Tuesday, the leader of Scotland, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, was asked if Trump was headed her way, and what might be her message to him? At her daily news briefing, Sturgeon said, “I have no idea what Donald Trump’s travel plans are, you’ll be glad to know. … But “We are not allowing people to come into Scotland now without an essential purpose, which would apply to him, just as it applies to everybody else. Coming to play golf is not what I would consider an essential purpose.” The White House said that the reports of a Trump trip to Turnberry were “not accurate. President Trump has no plans to travel to Scotland.”

Divided U.S., Not Covid, Is the Biggest Risk to World in 2021, Survey Finds (Bloomberg) With the global economy still in the teeth of the Covid-19 crisis, the Eurasia group sees a divided U.S. as a key risk this year for a world lacking leadership. “In decades past, the world would look to the U.S. to restore predictability in times of crisis. But the world’s preeminent superpower faces big challenges of its own,” said Eurasia Group President Ian Bremmer and Chairman Cliff Kupchan in a report on the top risks for 2021. Starting with the difficulties facing the Biden Administration in a divided U.S, the report flags 10 geopolitical, climate and individual country risks that could derail the global economic recovery. An extended Covid-19 impact and K-shaped recoveries in both developed and emerging economies is the second biggest risk factor cited in the report. Biden will have difficulty gaining new confidence in U.S. global leadership as he struggles to manage domestic crises, the report said. With a large segment of the U.S. casting doubt over his legitimacy, the political effectiveness and longevity of his “asterisk presidency,” the future of the Republican Party, and the very legitimacy of the U.S. political model are all in question, it added. “A superpower torn down the middle cannot return to business as usual. And when the most powerful country is so divided, everybody has a problem,” said Bremmer and Kupchan.

Venezuela’s socialists take control of once-defiant congress (AP) Nicolás Maduro was set to extend his grip on power Tuesday as the ruling socialist party prepared to assume the leadership of Venezuela’s congress, the last institution in the country it didn’t already control. Maduro’s allies swept legislative elections last month boycotted by the opposition and denounced as a sham by the U.S., the European Union and several other foreign governments. While the vote was marred by anemically low turnout, it nonetheless seemed to relegate into irrelevancy the U.S.-backed opposition led by 37-year-old lawmaker Juan Guaidó. The opposition’s political fortunes have tanked as Venezuelans own hopes for change have collapsed. Recent opinion polls show support for Guaidó having fallen by more than half since he first rose to challenge Maduro two years ago. Meanwhile, Maduro has managed to retain a solid grip on power and the military, the traditional arbiter of political disputes.

Few reforms would benefit Japan as much as digitising government (Economist) It is a ritual almost as frequent and as fleeting as observing the cherry blossoms each year. A new Japanese government pledges to move more public services online. Almost as soon as the promise is made, it falls to the ground like a sad pink petal. In 2001 the government announced it would digitise all its procedures by 2003—yet almost 20 years later, just 7.5% of all administrative procedures can be completed online. Only 7.3% of Japanese applied for any sort of government service online, well behind not only South Korea and Iceland, but also Mexico and Slovakia. Japan is an e-government failure. That is a great pity, and not just for hapless Japanese citizens wandering from window to window in bewildering government offices. Japan’s population is shrinking and ageing. With its workforce atrophying, Japan relies even more than other economies on gains in productivity to maintain prosperity. The Daiwa Institute of Research, a think-tank in Tokyo, reckons that putting government online could permanently boost gdp per person by 1%. The lapse is all the more remarkable given Japan’s wealth and technological sophistication. Indeed, that seems to be part of the problem. Over the years big local technology firms have vied for plum contracts to develop it systems for different, fiercely autonomous, government departments. Most ended up designing custom software for each job. The result is a profusion of incompatible systems.

An ‘orchard of bad apples’ weighs on new Afghan peace talks (AP) Afghan negotiators are to resume talks with the Taliban on Tuesday aimed at finding an end to decades of relentless conflict even as hopes wane and frustration and fear grow over a spike in violence across Afghanistan that has combatants on both sides blaming the other. Torek Farhadi, a former Afghan government advisor, said the government and the Taliban are “two warring minorities,” with the Afghan people caught in between—“one says they represent the republic, the other says we want to end foreign occupation and corruption. But the war is (only) about power.” The stop-and-go talks come amid growing doubt over a U.S.-Taliban peace deal brokered by outgoing President Donald Trump. An accelerated withdrawal of U.S. troops ordered by Trump means just 2,500 American soldiers will still be in Afghanistan when President-elect Joe Biden takes office this month. The Taliban have grown in strength since their ouster in 2001 and today control or hold sway over half the country. But a consensus has emerged that a military victory is impossible for either side.

Iraq, Struggling to Pay Debts and Salaries, Plunges Into Economic Crisis (NYT) Economists say Iraq is facing its biggest financial threat since Saddam Hussein’s time. Iraq is running out of money to pay its bills. That has created a financial crisis with the potential to destabilize the government—which was ousted a year ago after mass protests over corruption and unemployment—touch off fighting among armed groups, and empower Iraq’s neighbor and longtime rival, Iran. With its economy hammered by the pandemic and plunging oil and gas prices, which account for 90 percent of government revenue, Iraq was unable to pay government workers for months at a time last year. Last month, Iraq devalued its currency, the dinar, for the first time in decades, immediately raising prices on almost everything in a country that relies heavily on imports. And last week, Iran cut Iraq’s supply of electricity and natural gas, citing nonpayment, leaving large parts of the country in the dark for hours a day. “I think it’s dire,” said Ahmed Tabaqchali, an investment banker and senior fellow at the Iraq-based Institute of Regional and International Studies. “Expenditures are way above Iraq’s income.” Many Iraqis fear that despite Iraqi government denials there will be more devaluations to come.

Qatar ruler lands in Saudi Arabia for summit to end blockade (AP) Qatar’s ruling emir arrived in Saudi Arabia and was greeted with an embrace by the kingdom’s crown prince on Tuesday, following an announcement that the kingdom would end its yearslong embargo on the tiny Gulf Arab state. The decision to open borders was the first major step toward ending the diplomatic crisis that has deeply divided U.S. defense partners, frayed societal ties and torn apart a traditionally clubby alliance of Arab states. The diplomatic breakthrough comes after a final push by the outgoing Trump administration and fellow Gulf state Kuwait to mediate an end to the crisis. The timing was auspicious: Saudi Arabia may be seeking to both grant the Trump administration a final diplomatic win and remove stumbling blocs to building warm ties with the Biden administration, which is expected to take a firmer stance toward the kingdom. Qatar’s only land border has been mostly closed since June mid-2017, when Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain launched a boycott of the small but influential Persian Gulf country. The Saudi border, which Qatar relied on for the import of dairy products, construction materials and other goods, opened briefly during the past three years to allow Qataris into Saudi Arabia to perform the Islamic hajj pilgrimage. It was unclear what concessions Qatar had made regarding a shift in its policies. While the Saudi decision to end the embargo marks a milestone toward resolving the spat, the path toward full reconciliation is far from guaranteed.

[chivalrouswooly]

Check out the top risks of 2020

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An interesting submission! I’ll take some time and read a lot of it later.

We’re already seeing a lot of risk #1.

[newstinxahoi]

Biden sẽ không vội vã giải quyết chiến tranh thương mại với Trung Quốc

Joe Biden thừa hưởng từ người tiền nhiệm mối quan hệ rối ren với Trung Quốc, từ cuộc chiến thương mại đến lệnh trừng phạt các hãng công nghệ lớn.

Vài tuần gần đây, quan hệ Mỹ - Trung càng trở nên căng thẳng, khi Washington áp thêm lệnh hạn chế lên việc kinh doanh và đầu tư vào Trung Quốc. Tân tổng thống Mỹ sẽ có cách tiếp cận dễ đoán hơn và mang tính ngoại giao hơn cựu Tổng thống Donald Trump. Tuy nhiên, giới phân tích cho rằng chính quyền mới không thể nới lỏng sức ép với Bắc Kinh quá nhiều trong vấn đề thương mại và công nghệ.

"Mỹ rất khó đảo ngược xu hướng cứng rắn gần đây trong các chính sách với Trung Quốc, đặc biệt khi quan điểm tiêu cực về Bắc Kinh đang ngày càng tăng", Sylvia Sheng – chiến lược gia toàn cầu tại JP Morgan Asset Management cho biết trong một báo cáo tuần này.

Những người được Biden đề cử vào nội các của ông cũng củng cố quan điểm này. Bà Janet Yellen – sự lựa chọn của Biden cho vị trí Bộ trưởng Tài chính hôm thứ Ba cam kết sẽ giải quyết "những động thái phi pháp, bất công và mang tính lạm dụng" của Trung Quốc.

Joe Biden khi là Phó tổng thống Mỹ, gặp Chủ tịch Trung Quốc Tập Cận Bình năm 2013. Ảnh: Reuters

Cách tiếp cận đa phương về thương mại

Chính quyền Trump đầu năm ngoái đã ký hiệp định thương mại giai đoạn một với Trung Quốc, sau gần 2 năm phát động chiến tranh thương mại bằng cách áp thuế nhập khẩu mạnh tay với hàng Trung Quốc. Theo thỏa thuận, hai nước đồng ý giảm một số loại thuế và Mỹ dừng áp thuế bổ sung với 160 tỷ USD hàng Trung Quốc. Đổi lại, Trung Quốc phải mua 200 tỷ USD hàng hóa Mỹ.

Dù vậy, tiến độ của thỏa thuận này chưa được như dự định. Tính đến tháng 11/2020, Trung Quốc mới đang trên đà hoàn thành nửa số sản phẩm cần mua, theo phân tích của Viện Kinh tế Quốc tế Peterson.

Còn rất nhiều vấn đề khác chưa được giải quyết. Ông Trump chưa xử lý được phàn nàn lớn nhất của Washington với Bắc Kinh, gồm thiên vị công ty quốc doanh và cáo buộc Trung Quốc ăn cắp công nghệ Mỹ. Giới chức Trung Quốc đến nay vẫn phủ nhận các cáo buộc này.

"Ai đó có thể sẽ muốn quay về những ngày tốt đẹp trước kia và nối lại quan hệ thương mại", Roger Kay - nhà phân tích công nghệ tại Endpoint Technologies cho biết trong một báo cáo tuần này. Tuy nhiên, quan hệ Mỹ - Trung Quốc là "một chiều", ông nói. Kay cho rằng Bắc Kinh thường yêu cầu các công ty Mỹ hợp tác với doanh nghiệp Trung Quốc và giao ra lượng cổ phần lớn.

Dù việc gỡ bỏ thuế nhập khẩu với Trung Quốc không thể là ưu tiên lớn với chính quyền Biden, một số chuyên gia, và cả bà Yellen, cho biết chính quyền mới sẽ hợp tác tốt hơn với các đồng minh lớn để chính sách thương mại dễ đoán hơn. Ví dụ, Biden sẽ khó có khả năng tấn công các đồng minh lâu năm tại châu Âu như Trump.

"Biden luôn nói ông ấy muốn tiếp cận Trung Quốc thông qua một liên minh. Và điều này cần thời gian để gây dựng", William Reinsch - một chuyên gia thương mại tại CSIS cho biết, "Mối quan hệ với Trung Quốc quá quan trọng để phớt lờ, nhưng tôi không thấy ông ấy vội vã chút nào".

Giải quyết căng thẳng công nghệ

Biden cũng sẽ phải điều hướng lại căng thẳng trong cả công nghệ và kinh doanh. Việc này rất khó lắng xuống, do cả hai đảng đều thống nhất quan điểm là Trung Quốc đe dọa an ninh quốc gia Mỹ.

Sau khi tấn công hãng thiết bị viễn thông Huawei và mạng xã hội video TikTok, Trump tiếp tục gây sức ép lên Trung Quốc trong những tuần cuối nhiệm kỳ. Chính quyền của ông áp hàng loạt lệnh trừng phạt mạnh tay lên các công ty Trung Quốc, khiến Biden khó tái thiết quan hệ một cách dễ dàng nếu ông muốn.

Hãng chip SMIC, hãng smartphone Xiaomi và hàng loạt công ty Trung Quốc khác bị đưa vào danh sách cấm nhận đầu tư của Mỹ. Sàn chứng khoán New York gần đây ra lệnh ngừng giao dịch với cổ phiếu 3 hãng viễn thông lớn của Trung Quốc và vài công ty khác để tuân thủ lệnh cấm đầu tư.

Một số hành động gần đây của Trump, bao gồm lệnh cấm người Mỹ giao dịch với các ứng dụng Trung Quốc, vẫn chưa được thực hiện hoàn chỉnh trong nhiệm kỳ của ông. Các chính sách khác, như cấm TikTok và WeChat, thì vẫn đang mắc kẹt ở tòa án. Hiện chưa rõ liệu Biden có nỗ lực thúc đẩy các biện pháp này hay không.

Tuy nhiên, "kể cả nếu Mỹ quay về thời kỳ dùng chính sách ngoại giao và ngôn ngữ có kiểm soát hơn, chúng ta có thể vẫn sẽ thấy các công ty công nghệ Trung Quốc bị xa lánh dưới thời Biden", Alex Capri - nhà nghiên cứu tại Hinrich Foundation nhận xét. Ông chỉ ra dịch vụ đám mây của Alibaba có thể gặp phải sự phản đối trên toàn cầu như công nghệ 5G của Huawei.

Một số chuyên gia lạc quan hơn về cách tiếp cận của Biden. "Chúng tôi cho rằng ông ấy sẽ tập trung vào các vấn đề trong nước", các nhà phân tích tại Jefferies cho biết trong một báo cáo hồi giữa tuần, "Dù nội các của ông ấy nói về Trung Quốc khá cứng rắn, chúng tôi cho rằng chiến lược của ông ấy sẽ thống nhất và ít tác động đến các thị trường tài chính hơn".

Tuy nhiên, những người khác thì khẳng định viễn cảnh quan hệ Mỹ - Trung Quốc xấu đi vẫn tồn tại. Hãng tư vấn Eurasia Group cho biết căng thẳng Mỹ - Trung là một trong những rủi ro lớn nhất của năm 2021. Ông cho rằng Biden có khả năng lên danh sách các đồng minh gồm EU, Nhật Bản và Ấn Độ để cùng chống lại Trung Quốc.

"Chính quyền mới sẽ có thành tựu, vì mối ngờ vực với Trung Quốc đang ngày càng lan rộng rồi", Ian Bremmer, Cliff Kupchan - các lãnh đạo của Eurasia Group nhận định trong một báo cáo tháng này.

Hà Thu (theo CNN)

[orbemnews]

Evaluation: The China commerce warfare is one factor Joe Biden will not be speeding to repair From a grueling commerce warfare to a slew of sanctions on the nation’s most outstanding tech corporations, the Trump administration spent the majority of the final 4 years piling stress on the USA’ largest financial rival. Issues solely turned extra heated in latest weeks as Washington slapped extra restrictions on Chinese language enterprise and funding. Biden will strike a extra predictable and diplomatic tone than former President Donald Trump. However analysts say that the brand new administration is not more likely to ease up on Beijing an excessive amount of in relation to tech and commerce. “It’s troublesome to see a US reversal of the latest hawkish developments in China coverage, given the more and more destructive views on China within the US,” Sylvia Sheng, a worldwide strategist at JP Morgan Asset Administration, wrote in a analysis notice this week. Biden’s cupboard nominees are already beginning to bolster that view. Janet Yellen, his decide to guide the Treasury Division, promised Tuesday to tackle China’s “abusive, unfair and unlawful practices.” “China is undercutting American corporations by dumping merchandise, erecting commerce limitations, and making a gift of subsidies to companies,” she instructed the Senate Finance Committee, echoing a few of the Trump administration’s largest criticisms of the world’s second largest economic system. A multilateral strategy on commerce The Trump administration agreed to what was billed as a “truce” with Beijing in early 2020, nearly two years after beginning the commerce warfare by slapping heavy tariffs on Chinese language items. As a part of that deal, the 2 nations agreed to scale back some tariffs and permit Beijing to keep away from extra taxes on nearly $160 billion of the nation’s items. China additionally agreed to buy $200 billion value of US merchandise over the subsequent couple of years. That settlement hasn’t precisely performed out as meant. As of November, China was on tempo to buy solely about half of that quantity, in accordance with an evaluation from the Peterson Institute for Worldwide Economics. There are many different unfastened ends, too. Trump by no means resolved a few of Washington’s largest complaints about Beijing, together with its favoritism for state-owned enterprises and his accusation that the nation steals US know-how. (Chinese language officers have repeatedly denied such allegations and argued that any tech secrets and techniques handed over by American corporations have been a part of agreed offers.) “It could be tempting to return to the great previous days and simply tie again collectively these frayed commerce hyperlinks,” wrote Roger Kay, a tech analyst at Endpoint Applied sciences, in a report this week. However the US-China relationship was “one-sided,” he added, stating that Beijing has usually demanded American corporations accomplice with Chinese language ones and hand over giant stakes of their operations, amongst different necessities. Whereas eradicating tariffs on Chinese language items doubtless will not be an enormous precedence for Biden, a number of consultants — and Yellen herself — stated the brand new administration will wish to make higher use of its main alliances to craft a extra predictable commerce technique. It is laborious, for instance, to see Biden attacking Washington’s longtime European allies the way in which Trump did. Biden “continues to say he needs to strategy China by way of a coalition of different democracies, and that can take time to construct,” stated William Reinsch, a commerce professional on the Heart for Strategic and Worldwide Research who served for 15 years as president of the Nationwide Overseas Commerce Council. “The [China] relationship is just too vital to disregard, however I do not see him speeding into something.” Navigating tech tensions Biden may even should navigate escalating tensions in know-how and enterprise. These doubtless aren’t going to subside, given bipartisan help for the view that China poses a significant risk to US nationwide safety. After focusing on telecoms gear maker Huawei and social media platform TikTok, Trump ratcheted up the stress on China as his time period wound down. Throughout its previous few weeks, his administration imposed a collection of harsh penalties on Chinese language corporations that can make it laborious for Biden to simply reset relations, even when he needed to. Chipmaker SMIC (SMICY), smartphone maker Xiaomi and a handful of different corporations have been banned from accepting American funding, for instance. And the New York Inventory Alternate not too long ago halted buying and selling in three huge Chinese language telecom corporations and several other different corporations to adjust to the funding ban, which applies to corporations that Washington deems to be affiliated with or supportive of the Chinese language army. A few of Trump’s latest actions — together with an order that will ban US transactions with some Chinese language apps — weren’t absolutely applied throughout his time in workplace. Others, together with his makes an attempt to ban TikTok and Tencent’s (TCEHY) WeChat app, have been tied up in courtroom. It isn’t clear whether or not Biden will attempt to see these measures by. However “even when there’s a return to measured language and diplomacy, we may see extra strategic decoupling from Chinese language digital corporations” beneath Biden, Alex Capri, a analysis fellow at Hinrich Basis and a visiting senior fellow at Nationwide College of Singapore, instructed CNN Enterprise final week. He pointed to the likelihood that Alibaba’s (BABA) cloud providers may face the sort of international backlash that Huawei’s 5G enterprise has run into. Some consultants are extra optimistic about how Biden may proceed. “We anticipate Biden’s crew to give attention to home points,” Jefferies analysts wrote in a Wednesday analysis notice. “Though Biden’s cupboard candidates have talked robust on China, we imagine his technique could be extra consensual and fewer disruptive to monetary markets.” However others preserve that the prospect of worsening US-China tensions nonetheless exist. The consultancy Eurasia Group sees US-China tensions as one of many largest dangers of 2021, including that Biden will doubtless enlist allies from the European Union, Japan and India to push again on China. “The brand new administration can have some successes — suspicion of China is broadly rising,” wrote Eurasia Group President Ian Bremmer and Chairman Cliff Kupchan in a report this month. Supply hyperlink #Analysis #Biden #China #ChinatradewarisonethingJoeBidenwon'tberushingtofix-CNN #Economy #Fix #Joe #rushing #Trade #war #Wont

[loozfo-gaucqo]

"Coronavirus and the Sweden Myth" by Ian Bremmer, Cliff Kupchan and Scott Rosenstein via NYT Opinion https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/04/opinion/coronavirus-sweden-herd-immunity.html?partner=IFTTT

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"Coronavirus and the Sweden Myth" by Ian Bremmer, Cliff Kupchan and Scott Rosenstein via NYT Opinion https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/04/opinion/coronavirus-sweden-herd-immunity.html?partner=IFTTT

[dauyye-duivva]

"Coronavirus and the Sweden Myth" by Ian Bremmer, Cliff Kupchan and Scott Rosenstein via NYT Opinion https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/04/opinion/coronavirus-sweden-herd-immunity.html?partner=IFTTT

[yeirvi-tearvo]

"Coronavirus and the Sweden Myth" by Ian Bremmer, Cliff Kupchan and Scott Rosenstein via NYT Opinion https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/04/opinion/coronavirus-sweden-herd-immunity.html?partner=IFTTT

[newstfionline]

Iran protests and death toll grow as tension rises

By Erin Cunningham, Washington Post, January 2, 2017

ISTANBUL--Anti-government protests in Iran flared on more fronts Tuesday amid clashes that left at least nine people dead, state media reported, as leaders in Tehran struggled to respond to the most serious internal crisis in nearly a decade.

Six days of demonstrations--which have left at least 20 people dead--showed no signs of easing as the anger from the streets found new targets. What began as frustration over Iran’s sluggish economy has broadened to include open defiance of Iran’s Islamic leadership itself.

There was no apparent evidence of cracks in Iran’s ruling network of clerics and security networks, including the powerful Revolutionary Guard whose influence extends deep into Iran’s economy and policymaking.

But Iran’s establishment was clearly caught off guard by the speed and ferocity of the protests--the largest outpouring of opposition to the state since disputed 2009 presidential elections.

It also has underscored the range of tensions buffeting Iran, which has one of the region’s most highly developed middle classes and among the most educated and tech-savvy populations.

Many young Iranians are frustrated by limits on reformers, including President Hassan Rouhani, to push for greater social freedoms and political openness in a country where the ruling clerics still hold all the cards. Working-class Iranians and others, meanwhile, are increasingly unhappy with a stagnant economy despite the lifting of international sanctions under the nuclear accord with world powers.

In a replay of the rhetoric from 2009, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, posted comments Tuesday asserted the current protests were encouraged by the country’s “enemies”--often used as shorthand for the United States, its allies and anti-government Iranian exiles.

“In recent days, enemies of Iran used different tools including cash, weapons, politics and intelligence apparatus to create troubles for the Islamic Republic,” said the statement from Khamenei on his official website.

Khamenei made no comment on how security forces should confront the demonstrations, saying only that he will address the nation “when the time is right.” But other top officials have called for harsher crackdowns. Khamenei’s claim of outside links to the protests suggested that he viewed the events as more than a domestic upheaval and could support much tougher measures.

Also worrisome for Iran’s leaders is the spread of the protests into provincial areas, traditionally conservative strongholds not often drawn into the political activism led by groups in Tehran and other cities.

The demonstrators appeared to be leaderless and their demands diffuse, ranging from better living conditions to more political freedoms and even an end to the Islamic republic. Their chants and attacks on government buildings broke taboos in a system that brooks little dissent.

The prospect of a harsher response from security forces raised fears of further violence in a country buffeted by conflict elsewhere in the region. Iran has sent cash, weapons and fighters to prop up proxies and allies from Syria to Lebanon and Gaza--and that, too, has become a focus of the protests. The country’s expensive foreign policy adventures were scorned by some demonstrators who chanted, “Leave Syria, think about us!”

Videos circulated online of protesters fleeing tear gas and water cannons, while others confronted police. On Monday, demonstrators again gathered in Tehran, as well as in an array of provincial cities, including Kermanshah in the west and Shiraz in central Iran, according to reports on social media. They chanted “Death to the dictator!”--referring to Khamenei--and called on security forces to join them.

This brought a strong rebuke from the country’s judicial chief. “I demand all prosecutors across the country to get involved,” said Sadegh Larijani, the Associated Press reported. Their “approach should be strong,” he said.

The head of Tehran’s Revolutionary Court also warned Tuesday that arrested protesters could potentially face death penalty cases when they come to trial, the AP reported.

“When it comes to regime survival, Khamenei calls the shots,” Cliff Kupchan, chairman of the political risk firm Eurasia Group, said in a briefing note Sunday. “And he’s got a lot of loyal and ruthless troops at his disposal.”

The protests “are very unlikely to result in a revolutionary tipping point for Iran,” Kupchan wrote. But they “could well recur and will inflict a hit on regime legitimacy.”

“Unrest is admittedly unpredictable,” he continued, adding that “coming days could take unexpected turns.”

[caukwe-noorri]

"Coronavirus and the Sweden Myth" by Ian Bremmer, Cliff Kupchan and Scott Rosenstein via NYT Opinion https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/04/opinion/coronavirus-sweden-herd-immunity.html?partner=IFTTT

[letsmuiwjezaevbe]

"Coronavirus and the Sweden Myth" by Ian Bremmer, Cliff Kupchan and Scott Rosenstein via NYT Opinion https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/04/opinion/coronavirus-sweden-herd-immunity.html?partner=IFTTT

[wiucnu-feukqo]

"Coronavirus and the Sweden Myth" by Ian Bremmer, Cliff Kupchan and Scott Rosenstein via NYT Opinion https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/04/opinion/coronavirus-sweden-herd-immunity.html?partner=IFTTT