#Euroscepticism

[l-in-c-future]

It's not a promising sign for the future of UK's social-political ecosystem. It is an alarming early signal to UK's Westminister style of parliamental democracy.

UK is at risk of walking on the trajectory of USA under Farage's right wight populism.

The stubborn returns of Brexit ghostly influence in the parliament put UK in a more vulnerable position in defending the country against D Trump's external bullish intimidations and domestic weakening of democracy health.

[iamthetruenhaz]

Russia's prep work

I originally wrote this as a reply to a reddit comment about the prep work Putin's Russia has done to reconquer Eastern Europe (and Central Asia) and soften up the West in order to "reclaim" the "lost" global power status the USSR had.

Putin* has been prepping his "reconquering" of Eastern Europe and Central Asia since he stepped into office. He took on an openly anti-western course since the Munich speech in 2007. He probably saw American global dominance weakening following Afghanistan and Iraq and because Russia had stabilised after the 90s, he thought it was time to act.

First he paved the way with the Chechen war where he "won" and got to jump on the War on terror bandwagon and use Islamic terrorism as a boogeyman for his own imperialistic purpose to rile up Russians against external threats.

Then he invaded Georgia to probe the soil and see how the west would react. They mostly ignored him so he went on to meddle in Eastern European politics, coerce Ukraine for gas and fund right-wing parties all across Europe (at the time mostly to drive a wedge between Eastern and Western Europe and suck EE countries back into Russian orbit) while pumping anti-western sentiment and Soviet nostalgia at home.

He saw that the west was disunited because of the US-UK-EU split following the wars in Iraq, Libya and Syria. He capitalized on that in several ways using both the wars and the refugee crisis that followed. One, to increase racist and nationalist propaganda and stir up hatred against "the liberal gay western cabal" and the resulting Euroscepticism. Two, to prop up the "proper" traditionalist Russia as an alternative. Three, to paint Eastern European countries as a puppet of the US liberals who were "ackschually" nazis in disguise, which was easy when the West was divided between trying to coax them into the EU and leaving them as a buffer-zone backwater. The brightest example of the latter was in late 2021 when Lukashenko started dumping Middle Eastern migrants on the Polish border so the Poles could be painted as a racist, white supremacist state. Unlike, you know, Belarus (really Russia) which weaponized the migrants.

Then he failed in Ukraine when his puppet's sharp turn away from a planned EU accession path caused the Euromaidan revolts. Pro-Russian protesters soon spawned, staging provications (my own country had a wave of protests and pro-russian counter-protests back then and I remember neonazis and other paid protesters being at the forefronts). Russian media started hurling accusations of nazism against pro-western protesters.

All of a sudden, it's like a switch was flipped in Russian society. Decommunization was out the window. In 2015, Stalin was chosen as the most influential figure in *world* history by Russians. All the anti-Western, Russian irredentist, traditionalist, racist and homophobic sentiments coalesced into one, directed against the "evil nazi gay jewish West". Putin started openly provoking the West with displays of military force, close flybys in territorial waters, playing Cuban missile crisis in Kaliningrad. All to rack up the atmosphere of an imminent Cold War II and maybe even WWIII where a "wronged", "humiliated" Russia would finally make the West pay. The WWII victory celebrations also took on the appearance of a war cult, with jingoistic slogans like "we can do it again", "to Berlin" and "we're coming for the German women" displayed on every 9th May parade. Eastern European countries, especially the Baltics and Poland, noticed and tried to raise alarm, but were mostly told to keep their paranoia down and ignored.

In the last decade, he used his military and propaganda machine (what we call "hybrid warfare") to create the impression of the following: (1) The West is imperialist (and is being hypocritical about it), waging pointless bloody wars in the Middle East; (2) The West is weak in those wars, causing Russia to step in like in Syria and deal with the issue "properly"; (3) Western democracies are weak in dealing with "barbaric" refugees because they're too greedy not to let them in but too soft to throw the bad apples out (this was used to boost nationalism and Euroscepticism).

By those means, Russian propaganda managed to manipulate both anti-imperialist and nationalist groups within the West as well as in Russia and Eastern Europe and pave the way for its "just war" of "reconquering" Eastern Europe. In the West, the image of Eastern Europe was molded as either "poor backwards savages we're better off without" (for nationalists), "paranoid silly yokels crying wolf about Russia who is now playing nice" (for moderates), "ingrates not worth defending so we'll pull out" (for Trump-like US conservatives) or "backwards homophobic barbarians we don't want here because they'll ruin our utopia" (for progressivists). In Russia, they were portrayed as "lost property", accused them of being "taken over by nazis" anytime they tried to acknowledge any of the repressions suffered from USSR, and "unconscious puppets of the West" and routinely threatened with "annexation in 3 days" whenever they "misbehaved" by taking a stance against Russia's politics, whether past or current. Finally, in Eastern European countries themselves, Russia tried to ruin the image of the liberal West by portraying them as "the real fascists", "liberalism gone so far it circled back to fascism" and to prop up its own image as the "savior from debauchery upholding the good ols ways".

Also worth noting that Putin was all too eager to intervene in any country that tried to reject Russian dominance or even its own pro-Russian dictatorship. He was ready to support Belarus in 2020 and intervened in Kazakhstan in 2022 just a month before the invasion of Ukraine.

So yeah, it was quite the prep work. All to ensure that when he went on his imperialistic crusade in EE, people at home and in the West and even in Eastern Europe itself would applaud him, failing that be indifferent, failing THAT remain unheard.

* by "Putin" I don't necessarily mean just him, but the lobby behind him as well.

[uterus-cramps]

In case anyone was conflicted by the sieg heil Elon pulled

People will try and tell you that he was "giving his heart out". But is that how you give your heart out? Thumb tucked and everything, bro. I can see where people come from, why people would be in denial. I have skeptics in my life so I know how they think. I myself like looking into things before coming to a conclusion. Maybe it's because you don't want it to be true, or you can't believe it, or you simply don't care. But y'all... The first time I saw that, I knew that was intentional.

He has spewed antisemitism for a while now, alright y'all? Exhibit A:

This Eric guy, whoever he is, I frankly don't give a damn, says that the Jewish people are to blame for immigration and for pushing hatred against the "whites". He is "deeply disinterested in giving the tiniest shit" about Jewish people who are experiencing antisemitism because they are to blame for immigration... Alrighty. Then Elon retweets, saying "You have said the actual truth" Exsqueeze me? This is harmful, antisemitic rhetoric.

Exhibit B:

The AfD (Alternative für Deutschland). A far-right party in Germany that is seen as a successor to the Nazi party. Elon Musk, promoting a Neo-nazi party. Charming.

"Euroscepticism is a political position involving criticism of the European Union."

Exhibit C:

Many Neo-Nazis and Christian nationalists and white supremacists seem to be jumping for joy. These aren't even all of them.

If them fuckers are happy about something that you did, you probably shouldn't be doing it.

Exhibit D:

I don't have solid proof about this, this is mainly speculation for me as I haven't looked into it too much. But with all them kids he's having with all these white women makes me feel like he's tryna "repopulate the white race." Great replacement and all that. I've read that he's tweeted about that kind of stuff, but I don't have Twitter so I can't go find them.

I'll definitely look more into this later, but here is this in case you're interested.

I give credit to "The Humanist Report" on YouTube for this information, the images, and for giving me the inspiration to make this post. I encourage you to watch the video he posted recently on Elon if you're looking for something more in depth.

[mariacallous]

A new report by analysis company OpenMinds ahead of the Romanian presidential election rerun on Sunday claims that 48 of 202 Romanian-language Telegram channels consistently promote Russian propaganda.

The election comes amid concerns about foreign meddling, particularly from Russian-backed entities allegedly using social media to manipulate public opinion in Romania on behalf of the far-right.

The report, entitled ‘End of Democracy: How Pro-Russian Telegram Channels Influence Romanian Elections’, says that the channels have been active since early 2022, reposting content from Russian state-sponsored media outlets such as RT and Sputnik, as well as messages from the Russian Embassy in Romania and pro-Kremlin bloggers.

The report documents over 4,000 unique reposts from these sources, averaging 103 per month.

George Simion, the main far-right candidate and the favourite in the Sunday election, receives favourable coverage from these channels despite his stated support for NATO and increased defence spending by European states.

”Pro-Kremlin channels show a consistent alignment in their narratives about both Simion (and the far right) and ‘the system’. Beyond reposting Russian content on the war or international affairs, some also directly adopt Russian perspectives on the Romanian elections,” the OpenMinds report says.

Simion, leader of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), is known for his nationalist stance and Euroscepticism. His messaging strategy heavily relies on platforms like Telegram, where he criticises censorship and promotes nationalist narratives.

The channels often mirror Kremlin-style rhetoric criticising the Romanian government and accusing it of orchestrating a “coup” and veering toward “dictatorship” because of the annulment of the December 2024 election.

[captaindibbzy]

Europe likes to pretend that Brexit is an outliner and they are all very united in how good the EU is.

France is scaring me. But France is no different from everyone else. It's just next door.

The Eurosceptics are being courted by the far right and there is no room in the pro camp for skepticism of a club that is far from perfect. So they gravitate to the people they feel are listening. Ever since the EU was formed they have been talking about reforms. When Brexit happened they talked about reform. But the people who run the EU really don't want to cause it suits them as is. They have jobs for life with good wage, benefits, retirement. Euroscepticism that pushed Brexit were denounced as radicals and racists and the picture was painted that the fault lies with the people who want to leave.

Nobody learned anything from Brexit. Nobody looked at why it happened. And now there is very much a danger of fracture across the EU and I feel a huge part of that is how people failed to interact with nuance in Brexit.

[new876868767]

[ad_1] Karol Nawrocki’s victory in the 2025 Polish presidential election has shattered the optimism of liberal and pro-EU voters in Poland, writes Adam Holesch. Amid rising tensions over Europe’s future trajectory, the recent elections in Poland and Romania both sharply juxtaposed liberal, pro-European visions with national-conservative and far-right Euroscepticism. In both contests, the mayors of the respective capitals emerged in the second round as standard-bearers for democratic and European values. Opposing them were candidates who mobilised powerful populist narratives, framing the election as a clash between “we, the people” and “them, the establishment”. Yet while both races were influenced by this polarised narrative, the outcomes diverged significantly. This divergence has profound implications, especially in Poland, where hopes of democratic renewal after 2023 now face serious challenges. Continuation rather than rupture? As with many past elections, the 2025 Polish presidential contest is best understood within the context of the two-decade rivalry between Prime Minister Donald Tusk, co-founder of Civic Platform (PO), and Jarosław Kaczyński, co-founder of Law and Justice (PiS). Since 2005, largely operating from the PiS party headquarters, Kaczyński has polarised Polish society, transforming elections into personal and ideological battles against Tusk. This rivalry has produced alternating victories in parliamentary elections. Tusk’s Civic Platform triumphed in 2007 and 2011, and formed a coalition government after the 2023 elections, despite PiS winning the most votes. In contrast, PiS secured victories in 2005, 2015 and 2019, suggesting a slight electoral edge. However, presidential elections follow a different pattern. PiS secured victories in 2005, 2015 and 2020, while Civic Platform only succeeded in 2010 under extraordinary circumstances after the plane crash that killed then-president Lech Kaczyński, Jarosław’s twin brother. Thus, the 2025 result, where PiS-backed Karol Nawrocki narrowly defeated Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski, appears more a continuation than a rupture. The outcome closely mirrors 2020 when PiS-backed incumbent Andrzej Duda similarly edged out Trzaskowski. Why, then, has this result reignited fears over Poland’s democratic trajectory? The presidential veto The reason is that the 2023 parliamentary elections, hailed as a critical democratic renewal, had set high expectations across Europe. Celebrated by liberals, pro-EU citizens and the European Commission, these elections were the EU’s first significant reversal of democratic backsliding, prompting the conditional release of previously frozen EU funds dependent upon Prime Minister Tusk dismantling PiS-era judicial reforms. Following this parliamentary shift, the presidency – still held by PiS-backed Andrzej Duda – remained a significant institutional barrier to rule of law reforms. Poland’s president holds substantial veto powers, including informal mechanisms like referring legislation to the Constitutional Tribunal for preemptive review. Historically, when aligned politically, the presidency typically supports the government. When opposed, however, presidents can become powerful veto players or risk becoming political “lame ducks” if parliament possesses a sufficient majority to override vetoes. Tusk’s shift to the right To secure victory in 2025, the governing coalition under Tusk shifted sharply rightward, surprising European partners. Tactics such as continued pushbacks at the Belarusian border, suspending asylum rights and adopting a hostile stance toward refugees and migrants entered mainstream Polish politics, shocking even figures like filmmaker Agnieszka Holland. Although justified to the EU as necessary manoeuvres to outflank PiS long-term, these moves risked alienating Tusk’s base. On Ukraine, Tusk linked Poland’s support for Kyiv’s EU accession to historical acknowledgments and exhumation of Polish victims from the Volhynia massacres – a stance traditionally associated with the far-right Konfederacja. Additionally, Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski’s anti-Ukrainian rhetoric and Trzaskowski’s proposal to reduce benefits for unemployed Ukrainian women signalled broader rightward shifts. This aligns with populist theory suggesting that adopting far-right positions often backfires, as voters prefer the “original” source. Trzaskowski’s defeat can partly be explained by miscalculations about PiS’s historical advantage in presidential elections and Nawrocki’s successful populist positioning. Unlike Romania, where urban liberal mobilisation secured victory, Poland’s demographics – largely rural and small-town – favoured Nawrocki’s “common people” narrative. Furthermore, re-democratisation and rule of law were not salient issues for voters. More pressing was the coalition’s failure to reform Poland’s restrictive abortion law, a key pledge hampered internally and publicly blamed on presidential veto threats. This alienated – among others – liberal female voters instrumental in the 2023 victory. Consequences of Nawrocki’s win The immediate consequence is a loss of momentum for liberals. Despite surviving an early confidence vote, Tusk faces a challenging task holding together a diverse coalition without the unifying optimism of 2023. Left-wing coalition partners increasingly oppose Tusk’s rightward shift, and polling now favours a possible PiS-led parliamentary majority by 2027, strengthened by Konfederacja’s rise. Nawrocki will likely obstruct Tusk’s legislative agenda, while Jarosław Kaczyński actively courts coalition MPs to fracture government stability. A second consequence is the intensifying challenge of cohabitation, demanding strategic recalibration. President Duda previously stalled critical reforms by referring legislation to the PiS-controlled Constitutional Tribunal, and he vetoed key measures, including amendments to the Election Law and the bill disbanding the Russian Influence Commission. Tusk’s government, anticipating presidential obstruction, hesitated to introduce contentious legislation, particularly on abortion, reinforcing perceptions of inertia. Nawrocki’s presidency and the rule of law Nawrocki, a more staunchly conservative figure than Duda, might cooperate selectively (for instance on migration and Russia policy) but will likely resist rule of law reforms vigorously. Thus, the strategy known as “Transition 2.0”, which relied on future cooperation by a Civic Platform president, now requires fundamental reassessment. Though some reforms were enacted by the Tusk government regarding the Constitutional Tribunal, the National Court Register and judicial disciplinary practices, Justice Minister Adam Bodnar also faced criticism for slow reforms and limited accountability measures. With Nawrocki in power and the Constitutional Tribunal still loyal to PiS, the prospects for constitutional resolution appear severely constrained. Nawrocki is expected to resist liberal legislative initiatives, including easing abortion laws, extending LGBTQI+ protections and broadening hate speech laws. Despite these obstacles, Tusk must proceed with drafting promised legislation to maintain credibility and signal commitment to democratic norms, even if only symbolically. Prospects and risks for the future Despite current setbacks, the cohabitation need not signal the end of Poland’s re-democratisation process. Poland’s political system limits presidential dominance, ensuring the Tusk government can still achieve policy milestones, potentially securing a veto-overriding parliamentary majority by 2027. However, significant risks remain, particularly coalition fragility and voter disillusionment. From a broader European perspective, electoral politics increasingly resembles a competitive match between pro-EU and sovereigntist forces. While Romania resisted far-right advances and the governing coalition in the Netherlands with Geert Wilders’ PVV broke apart, Poland – until recently a beacon of democratic renewal – is struggling to maintain its momentum. The critical question remains: can Tusk recalibrate effectively, or has Poland’s path to democratic renewal stalled indefinitely? Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: canon_photographer / Shutterstock.com [ad_2] Source link

[darkmaga-returns]

1. The New York Times:

Homeowners in places most exposed to climate disasters are increasingly giving up on paying their insurance premiums, leaving them exposed to financial ruin, according to sweeping new government data. The numbers show how climate change is eroding the underpinnings of American life by making home insurance costlier and harder to hang on to, even as wildfires, hurricanes and other calamities increasingly threaten what is, for many people, their most valuable asset. “Homeowners’ insurance is where many Americans are now feeling the financial effect of climate change directly, in their pocketbook,” said Ethan Zindler, climate counselor at the Treasury Department. “Nature doesn’t really care whether people are living in a blue state or a red state or another state, or whether you do or don’t believe in climate change.” The rising cancellation rates are part of a broader trend captured by the Treasury Department, which analyzed information for 246 million insurance policies issued by 330 insurers nationwide from 2018 through 2022. The result is the most comprehensive look yet at the effect of climate change on the American home insurance market. (Source: nytimes.com)

2. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard:

The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is pushing a heady mix of Prussian imperial nostalgia and a shrewd form of Euroscepticism that catches the mood of post-globalist German voters. The insurgent Right-wing party of Alice Weidel – a gay, Hayekian, Mandarin-speaking Goldman Sachs alumni, who worked for the Bank of China and wrote a paper on the Chinese pension system – is flying high as elections approach next month, reaching 22 percent in the latest INSA poll. The German media fears that the “shy voter syndrome” may understate the strength of the AfD support. If the final tally reaches the mid-20s, it could leave Germany in much the same state of political paralysis as France, unable to form a stable government on the broken rubble of the old party system. Foreign investors have persuaded themselves that Friedrich Merz, the Christian Democrat leader, is going to win a landslide on a manifesto of free market reform, fiscal stimulus and a blitz of investment. Germany is more likely to end up with the immobilism of another grand coalition, unable to rid itself of a social democrat dinosaur wedded to rust bowl industries and the obsolete model of the last century. (Source: telegraph.co.uk)

[newsssc]

The ghost of Euroscepticism: the role of the poverty trap | National and international economy

In recent years, a spectre has been haunting Europe: Euroscepticism. The recent elections to the European Parliament have revealed a trend that was already evident in the various national elections: extremist parties, particularly those on the far right, have gained supporters and political representation in leaps and bounds. This phenomenon is not limited to a few countries. In some, these…

[eucopresidency]

Panic at the Dutch-Co

Deutsche Welle

THE HAGUE –  Dutch-ed but not Ditch-ed

Hours after the PVV’s decisive victory (and the subsequent uproar), the Dutch Foreign Ministry released a brilliant set of powerpoint slides in order to quell the outrage.

In it, they clarified a great many important things:

The Netherlands has not left the EU or the EUCO. For now.

As long as Prime Minister Rutte remains in power, the Dutch foreign policy has not changed.

The Legislature (where the PVV is in power) and the Executive (where the PVV is not in power) are two different branches of the Dutch Government.

In other news, the PVV is struggling to figure out how the arbitrarily long and complex mechanisms to amend the Dutch Constitution - or otherwise pull out of the EU. However, they are getting the hang of it – slowly but surely. 

Perhaps this would be a good time for the EUCO to take substantive action – especially in the face of such brazen and bold Euroscepticism.

[billy-g]

Why is the AfD a Threat to Germany?

Germany’s “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) is an emerging right-wing party founded in 2012, created in response to the conservative interests of Euroscepticism. One of the main concerns with the AfD is the harsh stances they take on immigration, and use aggressive tactics to attack opposing media. Free and Independent journalism is established in their society, and threats made by the AfD have called into question their respect for this system

References:

AP News. (2024, January 28). The popularity of a far-right party produces counter-rallies across Germany. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/alternative-for-germany-far-right-protests-democracy-965a340f6dc925dd230102ea8847598d 

Betz, Hans-Georg. (2019). Facets of nativism: a heuristic exploration. Patterns of Prejudice. 53. 1-25. 10.1080/0031322X.2019.1572276. 

Burton, S. (2020, May 20). Artikel :   :  artikel :  MDI. Mediendienst Integration. https://mediendienst-integration.de/artikel/journalists-in-germany-face-hatred-and-attacks.html 

Grieshaber, K. (2023, September 28). Shelters for migrants are filling up across Germany as attitudes toward the newcomers Harden. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/germany-migration-asylum-housing-22372cf1e5ece2e55c5f2e6c9d10e594 

Index. Bienvenue sur le site de Reporters sans frontières. (n.d.). https://rsf.org/en/index 

Manucci, Luca. (2019). Populism and the Media. 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.001.0001. 

Obermaier, Magdalena & Hofbauer, Michaela & Reinemann, Carsten. (2018). Journalists as targets of hate speech. How German journalists perceive the consequences for themselves and how they cope with it. Studies in Communication and Media . 7. 499-524. 10.5771/2192-4007-2018-4-499. 

Steinlein, E. (2023, May 4). ABC of the German media system. deutschland.de. https://www.deutschland.de/en/topic/culture/an-overview-of-press-freedom-and-the-media-in-germany Witting, V., & Thurau, J. (2024, March 11). Germany’s AFD: Euroskeptics turned far-right populists – DW – 03/11/2024. dw.com. https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-afd-euroskeptics-turned-far-right-populists/a-64607308

[generallemarc]

Party for Freedom: Nationalism, right-wing populism, right-wing to far-right

GreenLeft/Labor(alliance between two parties): Green politics, social democracy, center-left to left-wing,

People's Party for Freedom and Democracy: Conservative liberalism, center-right

New Social Contract: Christian democracy, center to center-right

Democrats 66: Social liberalism, center

Farmer-Citizen Movement: Agrarianism, conservatism, center-right to right-wing

Christian Democratic Appeal: Christian democracy, conservatism, center to center-right

Socialist Party: "Democratic" socialism, left-wing populism, left-wing to far-left

DENK: Muslim minority interests, support for Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, social democracy, center-left to left-wing

Party for the Animals: Animal rights, anti-capitalism, left-wing to far-left

Forum for Democracy: National conservatism, right-wing populism, far-right

Reformed Political Party: Christian conservatism, social conservatism, right-wing.

Christian Union: Christian democracy. Fiscally center-left, socially center-right

Volt: Pro-European federalism. Center.

JA21: Conservative liberalism, right-wing populism, Euroscepticism. right-wing to far-right.

Map of the 2023 Dutch General Election

[vowill89]

Why Is Euroscepticism On The Rise Across Europe? Hey, check out this video I provided my voice for.

[yaldabaothadeez]

Sad frogs and Englishmen: the alt-right and euroscepticism

[mariacallous]

The Czech Republic threw open its doors to Ukrainians after Russia’s invasion and today hosts over 300,000 refugees. Yet attacks on Ukrainians are rising, encouraged by radical political forces, disinformation and, it’s claimed, Russian intelligence.

“Are you Ukrainian?” 48-year-old Zdenek H. asked as he stopped his car in front of Lilia Kostysyna and Tetana Tolsttihina in Plasy near the Czech city of Pilsen in August. When they nodded he leapt out and brutally beat them in front of their young children. Lilia spent three days in hospital.

In contrast to the mood of defiance towards Moscow and solidarity towards Ukraine that persists among the majority of the population, summer has been awash with incidents of intimidation and violence towards refugees from the war-torn state. An alarming report by the legal organisation In Iustitia highlighted how hate crimes directed at Ukrainians are continuing to “significantly increase”.

While Lilia Kostysyna was still recovering in hospital, a 35-year-old Ukrainian man died after being beaten outside a nightclub in Teplice. The Luna Club swiftly announced a ban on Ukrainians. Police charged a Czech man with the murder in mid-September.

Fertile ground

Since the end of COVID-19 restrictions, populist and radical political forces and peddlers of disinformation have been busy whipping up anger.

The fiscally conservative policies of the government, the war in Ukraine, the influx of refugees, and the cost-of-living crisis have provided fertile ground. Protests with a reactionary and nationalist flavour have punctuated the past 18 months or so.

Adding to the pressure, the populist political opposition, picking up where they left off during the 2015 migrant crisis, insists that the government’s enthusiastic support of Kyiv comes at the cost of neglecting citizens at home.

“The widespread aid to Ukrainians by the current government is disproportionate to the aid to our socially vulnerable citizens,” claims Tomio Okamura, leader of the radical-right Freedom and Direct Democracy, or SPD.

This narrative has helped drain support for hosting Ukrainian refugees across Czech society. Data from CVVM shows that 75 per cent of people were happy to accept people fleeing the war in spring 2022; a year later that number had fallen to 56 per cent.

The antipathy extends from parliament’s nationalist populists and radicals to the margins, where an array of extremist forces, sometimes operating as non-parliamentary political parties, preach a cocktail of authoritarian, anti-democratic and pro-Russian narratives.

The rise in violent attacks on Ukrainians “reflects the influence of critics of the involvement of the Czech state in supporting Ukrainian refugees and the Ukrainian government in defending its territory,” In Iustitia stated. “It is… violence intended to express intolerance towards refugees or support for Russian imperialism.”

The government’s vocal boasting of its generous donations of weapons and military equipment to Kyiv, and of hosting more Ukrainian refugees per capita than any other state, have offered these reactionary forces grist for their mill.

Disinformation networks pumping out fake news have run with such topics to rouse anger among poorer and less-educated Czechs, and to extend the series of increasingly pro-Russian “patriot” protests over the last year or so.

“Rallies are organised where Euroscepticism is propagated, calls for the current government’s change are made, and calls to withdraw the Czech Republic from NATO, along with protests against providing military aid to Ukraine and against support of Ukrainian refugees,” noted a report by the Ukrainian Support and Cooperation Centre (USCC).

Crime and punishment

Czech disinformation networks will tell you that Ukrainian refugees are stealing identity cards in order to access social services, or that shops are banning them to avert theft.

The In Iustitia report highlighted “misleading information disseminated about the newcomers, including references to their allegedly higher crime rates.”

The attack on Lilia and Tatiana did not come out of the blue. Days before, radicals had been busy rousing anti-Ukrainian feelings in Pilsen over the rape and attempted murder of a 15-year-old girl by an 18-year-old Ukrainian man.

Demonstrators, bedecked in Czech flags and chanting “My jsme doma!” (This is our home!), marched through the city in protest.

Reports that a 16-year-old Ukrainian was responsible for raping a woman in Prague compounded the situation, fuelling claims of rife criminality among Ukrainians.

Senior government officials leapt to try to quash the growing narrative. President Petr Pavel warned against those seeking to whip up fear for political ends.

Interior Minister Vit Rakusan pledged that the police would deliver justice in the cases regardless of nationality, while cautioning that hate speech would also be prosecuted.

“Czechia remains one of the safest countries in the world. The crime rate in this country is not growing with the growing number of foreigners,” he insisted at a press conference.

According to In Iustitia, 0.4 per cent of Ukrainians in the Czech Republic committed a crime in 2022. The figures for Slovaks and Poles run from 2-3 per cent. Ukrainians were, however, the target in 22 per cent of all hate crimes in the first half of 2023.

Strange bedfellows

Ironically, the extremist networks have had some of their biggest impact among the Roma, a minority, numbering around 250,000, that ordinarily is the most common victim of hate crime in the Czech Republic.

Anger against Ukrainians was sparked by the tragic death of a Roma man during a fight on a tram in the second city of Brno in June.

Despite efforts by community leaders to calm the situation, anger has sizzled throughout the summer with protests and marches, at times flavoured with intimidation of Ukrainians.

Extremists, including political figures more used to pumping out racist rhetoric against Roma, have encouraged the anger, while disinformation networks have made false claims of further Ukrainian crimes against this minority.

Roma social media influencers like David Mezei, who talks of knife-wielding Ukrainians who should “go back to where they came from”, have worked to deepen the antipathy.

“These figures have a huge impact among the most economically deprived sections of the Roma community, which, as in mainstream Czech society, is the most vulnerable to radicalisation,” explains Miroslav Broz, a veteran Roma rights campaigner from the Konexe NGO.

Income and education are the main factors that influence the perception of refugees, notes Martina Kavanova from PAQ Research. “The poorer population… has a less positive attitude towards accepting refugees,” she says. “This is related to the fear of a reduction in support from the state [and] competition on the labour market.”

This competition has pushed some Roma to adopt the symbols and language of Czech nationalists, points out Broz.

Weakness

Activists, government officials and the security services all note that the targets and tactics suggest Russian involvement. That the long history of discrimination afflicting the Roma is not only being exploited by nationalists, anti-system activists and conspiracy theorists, but by the Kremlin also.

“Russian intelligence knows that these social divisions are one of Czech society’s weaknesses,” asserts Marketa Kocmanova, a radicalisation expert at Charles University.

“Both the Roma and Ukrainian communities have experienced discrimination and unequal access to resources, contributing to feelings of frustration and resentment,” says Lucia Fukova, government commissioner for Roma affairs. “The influence of disinformation campaigns and foreign propaganda, particularly Russian narratives, has added a volatile dimension.”

The direct involvement of Russia in spreading disinformation in Czechia was confirmed in September by Security Information Service (BIS) chief Michal Koudelka. The head of the counterintelligence agency claimed that Moscow had sought contact with leading figures of the anti-government demonstrations and paid huge sums to Czech personalities to spread the Russian narrative.

[phaeton-flier]

Always funny to see what positions old leftists have that much of the left wing has moved past; compare Corbyn's Euroscepticism

Oh hell yeah

[academicsoftie]

Hi, we are working on an authentic assignment on the topic of : "Euroscepticism and its correlation with the awareness of EU, political views and nationality". Pls help us with solving our survey ♡ Your help would be appreciated:)