#No AUKUS Military alliance

[mouth-almighty]

[mapsontheweb]

AUKUS - trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States

[agreenroad]

Pacific island States support the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – a problem for Australia in joining AUKUS nuclear military alliance

Pacific island States support the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – a problem for Australia in joining AUKUS nuclear military alliance

[loving-n0t-heyting]

I imagine there are obviously disadvantages to growing up in fuckville, WY, but at least then yr never gonna have to read in the paper about yr hometowns former mayor trying to coax japan into maintaining an armed submarine fleet as the fourth member of an expanded (J)AUKUS military alliance bc he graduated to being ambassador to japan after declining to run for mayor again once it came out he suppressed evidence of a brutal police murder to win a reelection runoff

[mariacallous]

On the sidelines of July’s NATO summit in Washington, a new industrial alliance quietly came to life. The leaders of the United States, Canada, and Finland announced the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, or ICE Pact, a trilateral deal on polar icebreaker production. The agreement aims to leverage the technological expertise and production capacity of these three Arctic states to build a modern fleet of icebreaking vessels for NATO countries and their global partners.

The ICE Pact is a response to two strategic challenges facing the United States and its allies. Both are tied to growing competition with China.

First, the United States’ atrophying shipbuilding industry risks being pushed further into irrelevance by China’s sprawling shipbuilding empire; this could also hamstring Washington’s ability to compete with Beijing’s naval modernization efforts. Second, rising geopolitical competition in the Arctic has laid bare the need for deeper coordination among NATO allies and their partners to counter the growing alignment between China and Russia in the region.

The deal remains in its early stages; July’s announcement was merely a public commitment to begin negotiations toward a memorandum of understanding that will be announced by the end of the year. As negotiators shape the pact over the coming months, they will need to overcome considerable political obstacles.

The decline of U.S. shipbuilding is a crisis long in the making. For decades, foreign shipbuilders in Asia took advantage of low input costs and leveraged state subsidies to undercut competitors in the global market. Today, just three countries—China, South Korea, and Japan—build over 90 percent of global tonnage, a metric used to measure shipyard output. The United States accounts for a meager 0.2 percent.

China’s rise as the dominant global producer of both commercial and naval vessels has refocused minds around shipbuilding in Washington. Last year, China alone accounted for over half of the world’s production of civilian and merchant ships.

This surge in commercial production has occurred in dual-use shipyards, which are built not only to construct tankers and container ships for global clients, but also warships for China’s navy. Combining commercial and military production has helped China’s shipbuilders keep their orderbooks full and revenues flowing, turbocharging the country’s naval-industrial development. The practice is common across China’s military production ecosystem, where blurred lines between civilian and defense firms help the People’s Liberation Army access foreign technology and capital that may otherwise be restricted.

The Biden administration has introduced an expansive slate of policies aimed at slowing China’s ongoing military buildup, now including its shipbuilding prowess. In April, the White House announced an investigation into Beijing’s use of non-market industrial practices, including billions of dollars in state subsidies and cheap credit for its shipyards that will likely result in new tariffs on Chinese-built ships in the coming years.

Now, the White House is searching for ways to revitalize the United States’ own battered shipbuilding industry. Taking a cue from the nuclear submarine agreement unveiled between the United States, Australia, and Britain in 2021 known as AUKUS, the ICE Pact seeks to fuse the combined industrial capacity and technological expertise of U.S. allies into a shipbuilding consortium focused on polar icebreakers.

The decision to home in on icebreakers was prompted both by strategic necessity and market opportunity in today’s environmental and geopolitical landscapes. The Arctic has grown in importance as melting sea ice unlocks new sea lanes and access to natural resources. With Moscow and Beijing tightening their military and commercial cooperation in the region, NATO countries must urgently boost their operational capabilities there, too.

China’s growing role in the Arctic is of particular concern. Leaders in Beijing have dubbed the country a “near-Arctic state” and are actively seeking to boost its influence over the region’s governance. More worrying, high-level Chinese strategic documents promote the use of dual-use scientific and economic engagement to make inroads for its military to operate in the Arctic.

The U.S. Department of Defense’s most recent Arctic Strategy, published in July 2024, identifies China’s increased activities in the region as the top strategic challenge, and NATO has taken an increasingly hard rhetorical line against China’s northern advances in recent years. “The increased competition and militarization in the Arctic region, especially by Russia and China, is concerning. … We cannot be naïve and ignore the potentially nefarious intentions of some actors in the region. We must remain vigilant and prepare for the unexpected,” Rob Bauer, the chair of NATO’s Military Committee, said last year.

But there is a widening gap between NATO partners and their competitors in icebreaker production. These highly specialized vessels are crucial for enabling military forces to reach and operate in the Arctic’s frozen waters. Russia alone operates a fleet of over 40 state- and nonstate-owned ice-class vessels, including several nuclear-powered icebreakers. China now has four in operation—two were put to service in the last five years—and has plans to build more.

Meanwhile, Finland has 12 operational icebreakers, Canada boasts nine, and the United States has just two aging hulls in dire need of upgrades. Yearslong delays and cost overruns have plagued an existing plan to build several new heavy polar icebreakers for the U.S. Coast Guard via the Polar Security Cutter program.

Although these dynamics are concerning, they also create opportunities. The expanding strategic importance of the world’s polar regions is expected to spur a demand for 70 to 90 icebreakers among U.S. allies and partners over the next decade, according to U.S. officials. If successful, the ICE Pact will ensure that this demand flows into orderbooks at U.S., Canadian, and Finnish shipyards.

It will take decades of sustained investment to put U.S. shipyards on a viable path to global competitiveness. Yet the ICE Pact serves as a creative first step in chipping away at China’s shipbuilding dominance.

By working with allies, U.S. officials hope to “build economies of scale in American, Finnish, or Canadian shipyards to create polar icebreakers,” according to a White House press briefing, and spur the demand needed to incentivize private and public investment into a shared production ecosystem. If successful, this approach could offer a model for broader collaboration with allies on advanced sectors of the shipbuilding market.

The deal has three components: information and technology exchange, workforce development, and attracting orders from international partners. The ICE Pact’s core wager, however, is that by combining the three countries’ production capacities, it can sufficiently reduce the costs of building each vessel to attract interest from global buyers.

Finland—which officially joined NATO in 2023—will be a critical partner in this effort. Finnish firms lead the world in polar icebreaker development, boasting an 80 percent market share in icebreaker design and 60 percent share in global production. Several Canadian companies are likewise global powerhouses in design and production. The United States, for its part, can take advantage of its thriving high-tech ecosystem to lead on the development of next-generation technologies, such as space-based monitoring systems and unmanned surface, air, and undersea assets optimized to support polar missions.

While the ICE Pact so far shows promise, its path to success will require deft negotiation around several potential sticking points.

First, several top Finnish firms involved in icebreaker design and production have significant operations in China. Aker Arctic, a world leader in ice-class ship design based in Helsinki, played a critical role in design and testing for the development of China’s first domestically produced polar icebreaker, the Xue Long 2. Another major Finnish firm, Wartsila, helped build the ship’s power system.

Security-minded officials from the United States may be hesitant to partner with companies that are actively supporting the buildup of China’s polar capabilities. The risk of sensitive technology transfer to Beijing’s dual-use shipyards will likely prove a particularly strong point of concern.

Another possible stumbling block is the ongoing dispute between the United States and Canada over the latter’s claims to exclusive jurisdiction over vast swaths of Arctic waters along the critical Northwest Passage sea route, which connects the Atlantic and Pacific oceans through the islands of northern Canada. Until recently, the decades-old dispute—rooted in differing interpretations of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea—had remained on the back burner. It has returned to the fore in recent years as politicians on both sides increasingly turn their attention to the Arctic’s rising importance to global trade and security. Addressing these roadblocks is critical to the ICE Pact’s long-term success.

Looking forward, building collective capabilities to safeguard peace and security in the Arctic must remain one of NATO’s north stars. Maintaining a NATO presence in this remote frontier is key to preserving the alliance’s Arctic influence—and protecting U.S. interests.

[pikslasrce]

saw your tags on the bluey post, Australia loves having the military as they actively participate in wars :/ they have an alliance with the uk and us and put so much money in 'defense' it's not even funny. Just look up "AUKUS"

ah. i mean it makes sense given that theyre part of the imperial core 😭👍

[fuckyeahmarxismleninism]

Melbourne, Australia: Vigil at US Consulate: No to US Wars! No to US Sanctions! Close the Bases!

Tuesday, January 17 - 5.30 p.m.

553 St. Kilda Road, Melbourne

The Australian Government has already committed over 400 million dollars to the US proxy war against Russia in Ukraine and Australia is the largest military funder outside of NATO. It has sent heavy weaponry and drones and is also training Ukrainian troops directly. The war in Ukraine has been used by the Albanese Government to make Australia a de facto member of NATO.

Ukraine has been turned into a killing field as the US, NATO and its allies have used the country as part of their long term plans of militarily encircling Russia. The US has made it clear that “victory” in Ukraine is not peace for the region but the military defeat of Russia in order to turn it into a semi-colony to be exploited by western imperialism.

Australia is also neck deep in US Imperialist war plans against China. The new AUKUS alliance with Britain and the US means 170 billion dollars will be spent on nuclear submarines. Nuclear armed B52s will be permanently in Australia in addition to the thousands of Marines and the spy and other military bases we already host.

Unless an international movement is mobilised the US and its allies are on a trajectory for a nuclear WW3. In Australia we must fight for the end of the US alliance, the end of AUKUS and the removal of all US bases. We must fight for the hundreds of billions being spent on planning to kill be spent on health and housing and the environment not on death machines. .This action coincides with an action in Sydney by Anti-War West Sydney and is part of week of actions called by the United National Anti-War Coalition in the US.

We are also planning a rally on February 25th in the city as part of a further international anti-war actions. Join us!

[beardedmrbean]

As citizens of other nations attempt to escape the crisis-hit Sudanese capital Khartoum, one thing stands out: it’s an ‘every man for himself’ scramble.  Armed forces from around the world and across the region are hastily attempting to get their nationals out, but one government – or aspiring government, perhaps – is notable by its absence. That’s the European Union.

That’s odd, because the EU – as distinct from Nato – has theoretically had a variety of different rapid-response forces for decades, way back to the European Rapid Operational Force announced in 1995 (and disbanded in 2012). The latest foolish plan along these lines is French President Macron’s call last month for a European army able to act independently of the US and Nato, including a 5,000-strong “rapid response force”.

In fairness to Macron, he was the one who called the warring Sudanese generals and brokered a ceasefire of sorts, which has helped a lot with the initial rescue efforts. He was pushing on an open door as it was in the interests of both sides for foreigners to leave unscathed, but it was nonetheless a minor diplomatic win for Macron.

Macron, of course, needs every win he can get given the fact that France is basically in a state of insurrection at the moment. The other lever that French presidents traditionally reach for in times of domestic crisis is bashing the US or Nato. Macron’s recent calls for an EU rapid response force could be dismissed as a swipe at Nato, except that he is apparently serious about trying to develop some kind of EU-only military capability.

It’s not the most foolish insult to Nato and the USA that a French president has ever offered – that would probably be the “get out and stay out” call by Charles De Gaulle in 1966 – but it is intensely rude and unhelpful in these tense times. Macron’s apologists would doubtless point to the Aukus pact and argue that the UK and US are drifting away from the defence of Europe; but Aukus is exactly the opposite of that. It is a focus on the real emerging threat: China.  

We must remember that Nato was formed in 1947, the same year that the US Joint Chiefs of Staff stood up to address the new threats of a Cold War world. Today there is talk of creating a civilian equivalent of the Joint Chiefs to manage US civilian departments effectively and efficiently against the burgeoning Chinese menace. France could learn from this sort of thinking.

Anything that undermines the cohesiveness of the West and Nato is music to Chinese ruler Xi Jinping’s ears. Xi knows that his main adversary, the US, must build and strengthen a network of alliances as the red dragon begins to spread its wings. While the current focus is on Taiwan, analysts with broader vision watch the humble deference Putin is showing to Xi out of necessity.

It’s not too soon to wonder about the future of the Russian Far East – parts of which have a Chinese ethnic majority – in the event of a collapsed or badly weakened regime in Moscow. Given Xi’s clear intent to unify China and the Chinese, including Taiwan and elsewhere, it’s to be hoped that the right people in the Pentagon and elsewhere are already thinking about this.  

Such a shift in focus by China could happen sooner than one might think. If we suppose that the current war in Ukraine were to end with the collapse of Putin’s regime, it might not be only Ukraine that wound up joining Nato. A badly weakened Russia, potentially newly free and democratic in that scenario, might ask to join Nato as well. The Motherland would certainly need some new friends in that case. Such an upheaval would bring Nato eyeball to eyeball with the People’s Republic across the soon to be disputed Siberian tundra.  

However things play out in the Ukraine and with China, a strong Nato is absolutely vital to the security of the West – and, bluntly, to the security of France. Nato members must and should shoulder their share of the burden by paying 2 per cent of GDP towards defence: just seven of the 30 member nations currently do so. France does not, for instance. It is shameful that the USA accounts for fully 70 per cent of the alliance’s defence expenditure, and even more shameful that Macron is calling for European members to commit their forces – already too small – to a mickey-mouse EU force structure that nobody will take seriously.

Anything that undermines Nato is playing with fire. Even if enough troops can be robbed from existing Nato commitments or double-hatted, an EU force would be crippled at birth by the very nature of the EU. Agreement on its mission, its command and on actually deploying it would be Byzantine and unlikely to happen.

The EU army would also be hamstrung by the military limitations of its members. The recent French deployment to Mali highlighted one of the major shortcomings of any such force: airlift. In the case of Mali, Britain provided the necessary US-made C-17 and Chinook heavy transports and choppers. Britain’s C-17s are the only heavy long-range military transport planes in Western Europe: Britain’s Chinooks are the only viable heavy helicopters.

Part of the calculation that Putin made when he invaded Ukraine was the ineffectiveness and lack of cohesion of Nato. The concerted response of the US, the UK and many European nations in arming and supporting Ukraine came as an unpleasant shock to him.

That response has not gone unnoticed in Beijing either. Any invasion of Taiwan would involve a 180 km opposed crossing of the Taiwan Strait: a feat impossible without naval, air and missile-bombardment supremacy as well as the complete physical and military isolation of Taiwan. The very existence of a strong and unified Nato makes those conditions near impossible.

President Macron must understand, despite his domestic political problems, that continued aspiration to an unviable EU force independent of Nato and the USA fundamentally undermines the defence of the West. That includes the defence of France.

[warsofasoiaf]

Do you think a FAUKUS alliance instead of a AUKUS one would have been a better move ? As a French citizen I remember how the submarine deal was taken badly and it seems like a huge mistake to put aside a third nuclear and military power that has interest in the region (New Caledonia and Fr Polynesia). Now that time has passed and with the current geopolitical state, what are your thoughts on this ? Thank you as always! French Anon

I've always heard it called FRAUKUS, not FAUKUS. Anyway, I wrote about this back when it happened and potential ways for the United States to increase their partnership with France.

Given the distance between Australia and the potential flashpoint being near China, nuclear submarines made more sense than the diesel-electric submarines in the previous French deal - the ability to go long distances silently fits better with Australia's strategic needs whereas a diesel submarine would be more useful for a closer power like Japan where the distance isn't a factor. Then you figure the cost overruns and while I do understand the French viewpoint, from the Australian viewpoint, the AUKUS submarine deal was a more sensible alternative.

I think France has a lot to offer, has power projection, and has aligned goals in the Pacific that a FRAUKUS alliance, with intelligence sharing and defensive coordination, is a solid move. Given cooling relations between Europe and China, though economic considerations give the United States much more room to be tougher on China, I think that France could be a very valuable partner in the Indo-Pacific region.

Thanks for the question, French Anon.

SomethingLikeALawyer, Hand of the King

[kneedeepincynade]

The imperialists always have money for war and propaganda,but never for their own people.

The post is machine translated

Translation is at the bottom

The collective is on telegram

⚠️ TAN KEFEI: "LA CHINA SI OPPONE FERMAMENTE ALL'AUMENTO DEL BUDGET MILITARE DI USA E UK CON IL PRETESTO DELLA "MINACCIA MILITARE DELLA CINA" ⚠️

🇨🇳 Il Colonnello Tan Kefei - Portavoce del Ministero della Difesa Nazionale della RPC - ha affermato che il Partito Comunista Cinese è contrario all'aumento del Budget Militare di USA e Regno Unito in funzione anti-Cinese:

💬 "Pechino si oppone fermamente all'aumento dei Budget Militari dei rispettivi Paesi con il pretesto della "minaccia militare della Cina", per i Paesi del Mondo, la Cina rappresenta un'opportunità fondamentale, non una sfida" ❌

💬 "[...] Washington conduce guerre e crea disordini ovunque. Gli USA rappresentano la più grande minaccia per la Pace, la Sicurezza e la Stabilità nel Mondo. Allo stesso tempo, chiediamo al Regno Unito di adeguare la propria mentalità, e mantenere una corretta comprensione della posizione di Pechino" ⭐️

🇨🇳 Il Colonnello si è anche focalizzato sul Progetto AUKUS, guidato da USA, UK e Australia, un chiaro inizio di costruzione di una vera e propria alleanza anti-Cinese in stile NATO:

💬 "La Cina è contraria alla creazione di AUKUS tra USA, UK e Australia. un tale circolo, dominato dalla mentalità della Guerra Fredda, non ha alcuna utilità, è estremamente dannoso" 🔥

📈 Nel mentre gli USA approvano un Budget per la "Difesa" pari a 842 Miliardi di Dollari, e chiedono ai loro vassalli di aumentare a dismisura le spese militari, sforando persino il 2% del PIL, il Governo Cinese preferisce focalizzarsi sullo Sviluppo Economico, e non sulla Corsa alle Armi 📊

🤦‍♀️ Non pensavo fosse necessaria tale spiegazione, ma - vedendo certi articoli - lo è: se, in Cina, il Budget per la Difesa viene aumentato del 7,2%, non significa che viene aumentato al 7,2% del PIL 📊

📊 Il Budget per la Difesa della Cina per il 2023 è di 1.5537 Trilioni di Yuan, pari a 224,79 Miliardi di Dollari, un aumento pari al 7,2% rispetto al 2022, ma +7,2% al Budget per la Difesa ≠ 2% del PIL del Paese 📈

🌸 Iscriviti 👉 @collettivoshaoshan

⚠️ TAN KEFEI: "CHINA FIRMLY OPPOSES US AND UK MILITARY BUDGET INCREASE UNDER THE PRETEXT OF "CHINA'S MILITARY THREAT" ⚠️

🇨🇳 Colonel Tan Kefei - Spokesman of the Ministry of National Defense of the PRC - stated that the Communist Party of China is against the increase of the Military Budget of the US and the UK in an anti-Chinese function:

💬 "Beijing strongly opposes the increase of the military budgets of their respective countries under the pretext of "China's military threat", for the countries of the world, China represents a fundamental opportunity, not a challenge" ❌

💬 "[...] Washington wages wars and creates turmoil everywhere. The USA poses the greatest threat to Peace, Security and Stability in the World. At the same time, we ask the UK to adjust its mentality, and maintain a correct understanding of Beijing's position" ⭐️

🇨🇳 The Colonel also focused on the AUKUS Project, led by the USA, UK and Australia, a clear beginning of building a real NATO-style anti-Chinese alliance:

💬 "China is against the creation of AUKUS between US, UK and Australia. such a circle, dominated by the mentality of the Cold War, is useless, it is extremely harmful" 🔥

📈 While the US approves a "Defense" Budget of 842 Billion Dollars, and asks their vassals to dramatically increase military spending, even exceeding 2% of GDP, the Chinese Government prefers to focus on Economic Development, and not on the Arms Race 📊

I didn't think such an explanation was necessary, but - seeing certain articles - it is: if, in China, the Defense Budget is increased by 7.2%, it does not mean that it is increased to 7.2% of GDP 📊

📊 China's Defense Budget for 2023 is 1.5537 Trillion Yuan, equal to 224.79 Billion Dollars, a 7.2% increase from 2022, but +7.2% to the Defense Budget ≠ 2% of the country's GDP 📈

🌸 Subscribe 👉 @collettivoshaoshan

[sa7abnews]

Fox News AI Newsletter: Meet Vayu's new street-smart delivery bot

New Post has been published on https://sa7ab.info/2024/08/16/fox-news-ai-newsletter-meet-vayus-new-street-smart-delivery-bot/

Fox News AI Newsletter: Meet Vayu's new street-smart delivery bot

IN TODAY’S NEWSLETTER:- Forget drones, this street-smart robot could be future of local deliveries- US, UK and Australia take next step in integrating AI defense systems- Maria Bartiromo interviews lifelike artificial intelligence cloneEATING FROM ROBOTS: In recent years, the e-commerce landscape has transformed dramatically, with delivery drones and robots emerging as pivotal innovations. Vayu Robotics has introduced its first delivery robot, “The One,” which aims to revolutionize how goods are delivered. Let’s explore the features of Vayu’s robot, its implications for the future of delivery services and its broader impact on the e-commerce industry.INTEGRATED: The latest technology integrating artificial intelligence with unmanned aerial vehicles in “contested environments” has passed the test following trials conducted by the U.S., U.K. and Australia’s military alliance, AUKUS, officials said Friday.BOT OR NOT?: Delphi co-founder and CEO Dara Ladjevardian designed an artificial intelligence clone of himself that told FOX Business host Maria Bartiromo all about itself.FOLLOW FOX NEWS ON SOCIAL MEDIAFacebookInstagramYouTubeTwitterLinkedInSIGN UP FOR OUR OTHER NEWSLETTERSFox News FirstFox News OpinionFox News LifestyleFox News HealthDOWNLOAD OUR APPSWATCH FOX NEWS ONLINEFox News GoSTREAM FOX NATIONFox NationStay up to date on the latest AI technology advancements and learn about the challenges and opportunities AI presents now and for the future with Fox News here.

[christinamac1]

Nuked - The Submarine Fiasco that Sank Australia’s Sovereignty

The Submarine Fiasco that Sank Australia’s Sovereignty The United States sank the French submarines deal and formed the AUKUS military pact, to smash a new Indo-Pacific strategic alliance of France, Australia and India that wanted friendship with China. FRIENDS OR ALLIES DeClassified, by Andrew Fowler | 12 Aug, 2024 The United States’ push to cement itself as the dominant military power in the…

[duckpaddling]

"

The other day the US Navy’s highest-ranking officer just casually mentioned that the AUKUS military alliance which is geared toward roping Australia into a future US-driven military confrontation with China will remain in place no matter who wins the presidential election.

“Regardless of who is in our political parties and whatever is happening in that space, it’s allies and partners that are always our priority,” said Admiral Lisa Franchetti in response to the (completely baseless) concern that Trump will withdraw from military alliances and make the US “isolationist” if elected."

[thxnews]

Indo-Pacific Partnerships: Austin Highlights Regional Security

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin underscored the pivotal role of US alliances at a time of growing challenges in the Indo-Pacific region during a change of command ceremony at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam on Friday.  

Reinforcing Regional Cooperation

With allies Australia, Japan and the Philippines at his side, Austin emphasized the importance of deepening cooperation to uphold a "free and open Indo-Pacific" amid China's military buildup and provocations. He praised the multi-nation naval drills and expanded defense agreements underpinning the US commitment to deterring Beijing's "coercive behavior" from the East and South China Seas to the Taiwan Strait. "Together with our unmatched network of allies and partners, you're advancing our shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific," Austin told Indo-Pacific Command (Indo-Pacom) personnel.   Key Partnership Milestones: Deploying cutting-edge US Marine units to Japan Four new US military access sites in the Philippines Bolstered Major Defense Partnership with India AUKUS submarine deal with Australia and UK  

Lloyd J. Austin III speaks with Adm. John Aquilino, at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command headquarters, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. Photo by Sgt. Sanders. US Department of Defense.  

Pivot to New Indo-Pacom Leadership

The ceremony marked Navy Adm. John Aquilino's retirement after spearheading a "transformation" of the US force posture under his four-year tenure as the previous Indo-Pacom commander. Austin credited Aquilino for securing munitions upgrades, new deterrent capabilities for troops, and orchestrating unparalleled cooperation across the region's allied militaries. Austin said: "Indo-Pacom has risen to meet the moment, together with our allies and partners, and it has moved us closer to our shared vision of an Indo-Pacific that is free and open and secure — again and again and again."   Taking over is Navy Adm. Samuel Paparo, a 37-year veteran flier who until now led the US Pacific Fleet. The Pentagon expects his deep regional experience will enable Indo-Pacom to "deny and defend against attempts to break the peace."   Pressing Indo-Pacific Threats - China's Military Assertiveness - North Korea's Nuclear Program - Russian Influence Operations - Violent Extremist Groups  

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III arrives at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command headquarters, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, May 2, 2024. Photo by Sgt. Jackie Saunders. DOD.   Pivotal Theater for US Security Austin acknowledged Indo-Pacific security challenges for elite American forces despite diplomatic milestones. China's drive to reshape the global order stands as the "pacing threat" for US defense strategy. But North Korea's illicit nuclear program, Russia's disruptive meddling, and emboldened terrorist groups add further volatility. As the ceremonies concluded, Austin expressed confidence the new commander has what it takes to "lead with principle and pride" in confronting these complex dynamics alongside regional partners. "We know that you will keep America safe," the Pentagon chief declared.   Sources: THX News & US Department of Defense. Read the full article

[mariacallous]

There’s growing skepticism among the American public about U.S. commitments abroad, matched with growing doubt among allies and partners—monitoring political currents in the United States—about the credibility of those commitments. Even for those who still retain faith in Washington, concern is rising about U.S. capacity to meet its commitments, considering increased demands on U.S. attention and resources amid ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Observers question if the United States can properly meet what it calls its pacing challenge—China—in the Indo-Pacific or beyond.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and other U.S. officials have argued that the United States can walk and chew gum at the same time, mainly because of its unparalleled network of allies and partners. To uphold what it calls the rules-based international order, Washington has increasingly leaned upon existing alliances and partnerships that exist largely outside of the multilateral institutions that previously underpinned that order, such as the United Nations and World Trade Organization.

Instead, Washington has sought to strengthen long-standing treaty alliances (i.e., NATO as well as the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea alliances) and tried to reenergize or establish various minilateral bodies throughout the Indo-Pacific, ranging from the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) and AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity) and Chip-4 (a proposed grouping of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States). However, these groupings have achieved only limited traction and continue to face significant hurdles.

The United Nations Command (UNC), a U.S.-led multinational command headquartered in South Korea (formally named the Republic of Korea, or ROK), is often overlooked in discussions of the minilateral architecture that Washington hopes to construct in the Indo-Pacific. To be sure, there are good reasons for this. The UNC has a narrow scope, and its own history was marked by long periods when it was understaffed and relatively unimportant, even on the Korean Peninsula.

Nevertheless, the UNC has a much longer history and is far more institutionalized than other minilaterals, such as the Quad or AUKUS. If the broader multilateral architecture has fallen into disrepair, building a latticework of institutions and bodies underneath it may be the next best alternative. The recent ROK-UNC defense ministerial meeting provides an opportunity to underscore recent efforts to modernize the UNC.

The UNC was established in the early stages of the Korean War as a U.S.-led, multinational warfighting command, made up of 15 member states that sent forces and five others that provided medical or humanitarian assistance. However, UNC member state commitment quickly waned after the armistice was signed and most members withdrew their forces.

And following the establishment of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command in 1978, all warfighting responsibilities were passed from the UNC to that group, while the UNC remained focused on implementing, managing, and enforcing the armistice. Over the next 20 years, it was deemphasized and understaffed.

In the early 2000s, South Korea’s remarkable political and economic transformation resulted in many UNC member states, such as Australia, Canada, and the U.K., strengthening diplomatic ties with Seoul and, by extension, recommitting in various ways to the UNC. Improved inter-Korean relations brought increased attention to the UNC’s role overseeing the demilitarized zone and military demarcation line between the two Koreas. Additionally, North Korea’s nuclear program meant the UNC’s armistice enforcement responsibilities took on added significance. Successive four-star U.S. commanders in chief of the UNC began to see increased involvement by the group’s member states as an untapped resource.

Starting in 2008, a multinational coordination center was established under United States Forces Korea, a U.S. unilateral command, but later folded into the UNC as part of the broader so-called revitalization campaign begun in 2015 (and ended in 2018). The center facilitates multinational planning and coordination in and outside of U.S.-ROK military exercises.

In 2018, the Canadian and U.S. governments co-hosted the Vancouver Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula. It brought together 18 foreign ministers from the ROK, Japan, and UNC member states that provided support to Seoul during the Korean War, marking the first diplomatic consultation based upon UNC affiliation since the war. And since 2018, successive Canadian, Australian, and U.K. officers have served as the deputy commander at the UNC headquarters, with another Canadian three-star general recently appointed to the position.

Under the new terminology of UNC “modernization,” the U.S.-ROK alliance has welcomed increased member state involvement on the Korean Peninsula, with Washington and Seoul aligning their messaging on the issue. For example, during the alliance’s Ulchi Freedom Shield combined military exercises in August, ROK and U.S. officials announced the participation of UNC personnel in a joint statement, a subtle yet noteworthy shift in strategic communication given that previous announcements were unilaterally made by United States Forces Korea.

Moreover, the ROK itself has begun to welcome greater UNC member state participation in its own military activities. In October, bomb disposal teams from Belgium, Canada, New Zealand, and the Philippines, alongside U.S. personnel and naval assets, participated in South Korea’s multinational mine warfare drills. Simultaneously, ROK and U.K. forces engaged in combined, high-tech military training drills at the Korea Combat Training Center, which included a company of the British Army’s Scots Guards.

Importantly, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has been outspoken in his praise of the UNC as playing a critical role in peace on the Korean Peninsula. This stance differs from both his progressive and conservative predecessors, who criticized the UNC for infringing on South Korean sovereignty, whether by limiting inter-Korean engagement or hamstringing the ROK’s self-defensive measures against North Korean provocations. Yoon has also openly noted that the UNC’s rear bases and facilities in Japan play an important role in deterring North Korea, marking one part of a broader effort to boost bilateral ROK-Japan ties.

The ROK-UNC Member States Defense Ministerial Meeting held on Nov. 14 in Seoul, the day after the annual U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, built upon these previous efforts. The meeting was notable in that it was the first such meeting hosted by the ROK and combined defense ministers and representatives from 17 UNC member states, although only South Korea and United States sent their highest-level defense officials.

In addition to honoring the past contributions and sacrifices of member states, one outcome of the meeting was the participants’ determination to “continue increasing mutual exchange and cooperation between the ROK-U.S. Alliance and UNC Member States to inform our combined training and exercises”; in other words, to build upon existing efforts.

The participants’ joint statement was also of note, declaring “that they will be united upon any renewal of hostilities or armed attack on the Korean Peninsula challenging the principles of the United Nations and the security of the Republic of Korea.” The statement offered a toned-down rehashing of the so-called Greater Sanctions Statement released during the Korean War.

Unlike the 1952 statement, this year’s version jettisoned mention of being “prompt to resist” or expanding the conflict beyond the frontiers of the Korean Peninsula, even though any renewed conflict in Korea would almost certainly expand beyond the peninsula and do so quickly.

The November meeting’s value was more symbolic than substantive. Nonetheless, it provides a framework upon which to build in the future. This could be done in several ways.

First, beginning with this inaugural meeting and in addition to South Korea’s continued strengthening of bilateral relations with individual UNC member states, an official multilateral diplomatic consultative body should be created under the UNC’s name. And South Korea should take a leading role as a host nation of the annual gathering. Currently, the U.S. four-star commander of the UNC/CFC/USFK presides over a regular roundtable attended by ambassadors (and military attaches) from each member country.

However, the UNC should also create and convene the new consultative body, with annual meetings led by South Korea’s Defense or Foreign Ministry. Over time, it also may be worthwhile for other UNC member states not only to increase the level of defense officials attending, but also to host such meetings in their home countries, signaling to their publics the importance of the commitment.

Second, for substantive military cooperation, member states’ participation in the UNC’s “force-providing” mission is necessary. Up to this point, UNC member states have been reticent to clearly delineate what sort of contribution they could or would make in the case of a renewal of hostilities—but they need to indicate more clearly what assistance they could offer.

Further down the road, the UNC should develop an institutional framework for the provision of forces. Once tasks and resources are allocated based on member states’ capabilities and willingness, the UNC should establish institutional mechanisms for government-level requests. Strengthening both multilateral and bilateral cooperation will emphasize South Korea’s responsibility and leadership, especially as the alliance moves toward a future-oriented, ROK-led Combined Forces Command.

Visiting force agreements would clarify South Korea’s status as a host nation and facilitate stable and institutionalized force contributions from member states. These agreements can have several benefits, including strengthening diplomatic cooperation among UNC members, mitigating domestic political resistance in member states, and expediting the process of readying forces for combat. Given that both the United States (as the lead nation) and South Korea (as the host nation) are invested in this process, a compromise approach to negotiating these visiting force agreements is necessary.

Third, following the joint communique released after the recent U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, Washington and Seoul should seek to broaden UNC membership through the participation of like-minded countries that share values with the ROK and the United States, anchored in the principles and mandates of the U.N. Charter. This should start with South Korea adding its own general-level officers to the UNC; move on to adding previous member states, such as India and Germany; and potentially expand to others where the situation is currently politically fraught, such as Japan.

Fourth, more effort should go into public diplomacy within South Korea to garner support for modernizing the UNC. The ROK-UNC meeting already caused blowback from Pyongyang, which called it a “dangerous scheme to ignite a new war of aggression.” Beijing also likely views any upgrading of the UNC with profound skepticism. If improved U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral relations are seen by Pyongyang and Beijing as the creation of an Asian NATO, then a more robust UNC—along the lines recommended above—would only enhance that feeling, which is one that some South Koreans share.

That would require smart public diplomacy to counter. This messaging should emphasize that rather than a U.S.-led militarization strategy that compromises Korean sovereignty, the process would require Seoul’s leadership. And no UNC member state is going to increase and regularize its commitment without determining that it’s in its own interest to do so and that its voice will be heard. In fact, such a process will reduce, relatively speaking, the U.S. ability to shape the environment, since Washington will need to incorporate allied and partner perspectives into both peacetime and crisis-oriented planning.

Moreover, growing multilateral consultation and diplomatic signaling around maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula could help shift some of the balance away from nuclear blandishments and strategic asset deployments as the optimal way to deter North Korea. It may help reduce the temperature by growing the team. Finally, given the intense demands on U.S. resources and attention, it behooves all stakeholders involved to think hard now about ways to upgrade the UNC.

Washington calls North Korea a “persistent threat.” But from Seoul’s view, it is a steadily worsening one. Seoul needs more partners willing to support its defense. For Washington, which had serious doubts about its ability to meet the challenge from China even before the intensification of conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, inviting greater and more formalized allied contributions to the UNC makes sense, especially before a crisis or conflict forces its hand.

The innumerable, complex challenges and enormous demands on U.S. forces and resources in a potential conflict with China are such that Washington needs to clarify what other allies and partners can bring to bear. Shoring up these commitments now, during peacetime, would not only help with preparedness, but also send a powerful collective deterrent signal, thus reducing the chances of conflict to begin with.

A true peace on the peninsula may continue to elude the United States, China, and the two Koreas (at least for the foreseeable future). At the very least, efforts should be made to stabilize the armistice.