#nonterritoriality

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[butterfly-with-a-sword]

just got back from a short vacation in Stratford, ON

these big lads are the best and I love them

one of them wandered into the middle of the road, forgot what he was doing, and sat down like a big feathery traffic cone for a few minutes

[rhig1x6nr]

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[leoparduscolocola]

One thing that’s been really interesting to me lately is how names for animals develop and change over time and vary depending on where you live, so I thought I’d make this poll about one of my favorite species:

[monsterfuckerconfessions]

(Cnc, breeding)

I want to be a dragon made into breeding stock.

Even though I’m more than large enough for a human to ride on my back, I’m small by dragon standards. My scales are soft and smooth, and don’t make very good armor. I’ve survived by being crafty and scavenging in other dragon’s territories under their noses…

But my luck has run out. I didn’t think to watch for humans. Netted and bound, a group of hunters sells me to a powerful mage. The high mage that breeds dragons, for familiars and dragon riders across many kingdoms. It’s no easy feat to keep dragons, never mind breed them, and this human is the best.

I’m well cared for, that much is certain. There’s plenty to eat, a beautiful pond to swim in, a basking rock, a ruined tower to roost in... They even went through the trouble of figuring out what I hoard to offer it as a reward… a reward for mating. It isn’t hard, in my case. The bigger dragons have no trouble mounting me and stuffing me full of their clutches.

And it’s not to say this wouldn’t have happened eventually, either. Even in the wild, scavenging, I was bound to be noticed encroaching on someone’s territory someday. I would’ve been forced to submit to remain, or move on to the next territory… so really, this was all a nice arrangement

The mage kept most of their dragons separate outside of planned breedings, but I was deemed nonterritorial and docile enough to be entrusted with visitors. Dragons belonging to dragon racers, warriors, royalty, and other mages frequently visited the high mage with their masters, and were boarded with me for their stay. Needless to say, they had an easy time burning off the steam of a long flight by making me their little toy.

.

[dichotomy-of-the-day]

Everything in reality is either nonterritorial or territorial.

[whats-in-a-sentence]

Pronghorn society is characterized by a distinction between territorial males, who establish territories and mate with females, and nonterritorial males, who live primarily in bachelor herds of seven to ten individuals throughout the spring and into early fall.

"Biological Exuberance: Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diversity" - Bruce Bagemihl

[bensonnymand92]

Carrying out EUS throughout COVID-19 postendemic period: An investigation via endoscopy center throughout Wuhan

Reproductive achievement had been positively linked together with male https://www.selleckchem.com/products/R7935788-Fostamatinib.html presence and therefore highest amongst territorial males. However, the actual connection among attendance as well as reproductive achievement also been around with regard to nonterritorial adult males. This means that that guy Galapagos seashore lions alter their work towards the competitive circumstance within the community. By raising presence in the peak of feminine oestrus, territorial men improve their possibility of reproducing effectively. Simply by adopting size-dependent tactics, nonterritorial men're capable of attain physical fitness while still growing. (C) This year Your Connection for the Examine involving Canine Behaviour. Created by Elsevier Ltd. Just about all privileges earmarked.History Supplement Deborah lack is among the most typical continual health concerns in the world and also prevalent nationwide. A growing system involving evidence points too minimal supplement D boasts negative effects in aerobic well being, such as Heart risk factors and undesirable aerobic outcomes for example myocardial infarction, heart failure and stroke. There exists a number of data recommending that a better percentage of folks together with heart disease possess minimal vitamin and mineral Deb when compared to basic human population. Many of us reviewed the frequency of vitamin D deficit and lack within suggested cardiothoracic surgery patients showing on the Alfred Healthcare facility inside Victoria, Sydney along with when compared this for you to current Victorian stats for those of the identical age group. Methods Straight grown-up elective cardiothoracic medical people outlined regarding either heart bypass graft surgical procedure or heart control device restoration or perhaps replacement surgery participating in The actual Alfred Hospital, Melbourne in between Come early july This year and also October 2012 were welcome to join. This guaranteed that will sufferers had been enrollment total a number of seasons. Starting a fast serum biological materials had been taken on the day of medical procedures, right after entrance. 70 volunteers took part in the study. In the class, 40% were due to possess coronary artery get around graft surgical procedure, 35% valve surgical treatment as well as 25% a combination of the two; 74% described getting high blood pressure levels, 69% hyperlipidaemia, 26% diabetes mellitus and also 39% a Body mass index bigger when compared with 30 kg/m(2). Results Analyze final results says Ninety two.5% involving individuals acquired Vitamin and mineral D amounts smaller when compared with 75nmol/L, Sixty seven.5% had quantities smaller compared to 60 nmol/L, 52.5% experienced quantities among 30-59 nmol/L and also 15% had amounts smaller as compared to 40 nmol/L. Limited vitamin and mineral N amounts put together within 80% of overweight individuals (BMI bigger than 30 kg/m(2)) in comparison with 59% of non-obese people.

[whackedbynature]

Giraffes are the tallest of all land animals; males (bulls) may exceed 5.5 metres (18 feet) in height, and the tallest females (cows) are about 4.5 metres. Using prehensile tongues almost half a metre long, they are able to browse foliage almost six metres from the ground. Giraffes are a common sight in grasslands and open woodlands in East Africa, where they can be seen in reserves such as Tanzania’s Serengeti National Park and Kenya’s Amboseli National Park. The genus Giraffa is made up of the northern giraffe (G. camelopardalis), the southern giraffe (G. giraffa), the Masai giraffe (G. tippelskirchi), and the reticulated giraffe (G. reticulata).

Giraffes grow to nearly their full height by four years of age but gain weight until they are seven or eight. Males weigh up to 1,930 kg (4,250 pounds), females up to 1,180 kg (2,600 pounds). The tail may be a metre in length and has a long black tuft on the end; there is also a short black mane. Both sexes have a pair of horns, though males possess other bony protuberances on the skull. The back slopes downward to the hindquarters, a silhouette explained mainly by large muscles that support the neck; these muscles are attached to long spines on the vertebrae of the upper back. There are only seven neck (cervical) vertebrae, but they are elongated. Thick-walled arteries in the neck have extra valves to counteract gravity when the head is up; when the giraffe lowers its head to the ground, special vessels at the base of the brain control blood pressure.BRITANNICA QUIZUltimate Animals QuizCould you lead the tour at your local zoo? Challenge your animal awareness with this quiz.

The gait of the giraffe is a pace (both legs on one side move together). In a gallop, it pushes off with the hind legs, and the front legs come down almost together, but no two hooves touch the ground at the same time. The neck flexes so that balance is maintained. Speeds of 50 km (31 miles) per hour can be maintained for several kilometres, but 60 km (37 miles) per hour can be attained over short distances. Arabs say of a good horse that it can “outpace a giraffe.”

Giraffes live in nonterritorial groups of up to 20. Home ranges are as small as 85 square km (33 square miles) in wetter areas but up to 1,500 square km (580 square miles) in dry regions. The animals are gregarious, a behaviour that apparently allows for increased vigilance against predators. They have excellent eyesight, and when one giraffe stares, for example, at a lion a kilometre away, the others look in that direction too. Giraffes live up to 26 years in the wild and slightly longer in captivity.

Giraffes prefer to eat new shoots and leaves, mainly from the thorny acacia tree. Cows in particular select high-energy low-fibre items. They are prodigious eaters, and a large male consumes about 65 kg (145 pounds) of food per day. The tongue and inside of the mouth are coated with tough tissue as protection. The giraffe grasps leaves with its prehensile lips or tongue and pulls them into the mouth. If the foliage is not thorny, the giraffe “combs” leaves from the stem by pulling it across the lower canine and incisor teeth. Giraffes obtain most water from their food, though in the dry season they drink at least every three days. They must spread the forelegs apart in order to reach the ground with the head.

Females first breed at four or five years of age. Gestation is 15 months, and, though most calves are born in dry months in some areas, births can take place in any month of the year. The single offspring is about 2 metres (6 feet) tall and weighs 100 kg (220 pounds). For a week the mother licks and nuzzles her calf in isolation while they learn each other’s scent. Thereafter, the calf joins a “nursery group” of similar-aged youngsters, while mothers forage at variable distances. If lions or hyenas attack, a mother sometimes stands over her calf, kicking at the predators with front and back legs. Cows have food and water requirements that may keep them away from the nursery group for hours at a time, and about half of very young calves are killed by lions and hyenas. Calves sample vegetation at three weeks but suckle for 18–22 months. Males join other bachelors when one to two years old, whereas daughters are likely to stay near the mother.

Rothschild's giraffe

Rothschild's giraffes (Giraffa camelopardalis) in Murchison Falls National Park, northern Uganda.© Hector Conesa/Shutterstock.com

Bulls eight years and older travel up to 20 km per day looking for cows in heat (estrus). Younger males spend years in bachelor groups, where they engage in “necking” bouts. These side-to-side clashes of heads cause mild damage, and bone deposits subsequently form around the horns, eyes, and back of the head; a single lump projects from between the eyes. Accumulation of bone deposits continues through life, resulting in skulls weighing 30 kg. Necking also establishes a social hierarchy. Violence sometimes occurs when two older bulls converge on an estrous cow. The advantage of a heavy, knobbed skull is soon apparent. With forelegs braced, bulls swing their necks and club each other with their skulls, aiming for the underbelly. There have been instances of bulls being knocked off their feet or even rendered unconscious.

Paintings of giraffes appear on early Egyptian tombs; just as today, giraffe tails were prized for the long wiry tuft hairs used to weave belts and jewelry. In the 13th century, East Africa supplied a trade in hides. During the 19th and 20th centuries, overhunting, habitat destruction, and rinderpest epidemics introduced by European livestock reduced giraffes to less than half their former range. Today giraffes are numerous in East African countries and also in certain reserves of Southern Africa, where they have enjoyed somewhat of a recovery. The West African subspecies of the northern giraffe is reduced to a small range in Niger.

Giraffes were traditionally classified into one species, Giraffa camelopardalis, and then into several subspecies on the basis of physical features. Nine subspecies were recognized by coat pattern similarities; however, it was also known that individual coat patterns were unique. Some scientists contended that these animals could be divided into six or more species, since studies had shown that differences in genetics, reproductive timing, and pelage patterns (which are indicative of reproductive isolation) exist between various groups. By the 2010s mitochondrial DNA studies had determined that genetic uniquenesses brought on by the reproductive isolation of one group from another were significant enough to separate giraffes into four distinct species.

reticulated giraffe

Reticulated giraffe (Giraffa reticulata), Kenya.© Corbis

The giraffe had long been classified as a species of least concern by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), which places all giraffes in the species G. camelopardalis. A study in 2016, however, determined that habitat loss resulting from expanding agricultural activities, increased mortality brought on by illegal hunting, and the effects of ongoing civil unrest in a handful of African countries had caused giraffe populations to plummet by 36–40 percent between 1985 and 2015, and, as of 2016, the IUCN has reclassified the conservation status of the species as vulnerable.

The only close relative of the giraffe is the rainforest-dwelling okapi, which is the only other member of the family Giraffidae. G. camelopardalis or something very similar lived in Tanzania two million years ago, but Giraffidae branched off from other members of the order Artiodactyla—cattle, antelope, and deer—about 34 million years ago. Lory Herbison & George W. Frame

[confusedlamp]

1, 13, and 17

1. 3rd Favorite Animal:

This is difficult actually because I have a hard time with the exact ranking of my favorite animals. But, excluding my cats and dogs which I love very much, I would say my top 3 are 1)Adele Penguins, 2)Frogs, and 3) Manatees. So manatees? I love my nonterritorial sea cows. 💚

13. Movie I haven't seen that I feel like everyone else has:

16 Candles. At least, I see it referenced a lot by slightly older adults and they expect me to know it and I have never watched it, nor do I have any desire to.

17. Best name for a lizard:

Garak. Yes, I'm a Julian Bashir stan.

[thehalfbakedlogician]

for the 20 myf spec evo discord server

seaminks, relatives of the minkwhales, are the most aquatic out of all the icelandic minks. They are intensely curious, inquisitive creatures, and while they are the most social of all the minks, they have fewer females per colony {up to four max.} They have thick, semi waterproofed fur, which can have a bluegrey, sooty bluegrey, or dark bluish black band down their back. like other minks, its specialized fur helps maintain some bouyancy while also allowing them to deep-dive for sessile organisms, temperate water fish {including salmon, trout, cod, eels, hatchet fish}, squids, and algaes. Their favorites are deep-water red algaes, which contain a compound which is akin to caffine in humans, allowing them to keep themselves awake in much of their range. Otherwise, they would drift off to sea and become lost or drown. A subspecies living around the island often rests on exposed boulders, but all seaminks can also shut down a part of their brain at a time in order to rest. The kits, one or two birthed at a time, will ride around on their parent's backs or bellies, and are quite precocial. These minks are nonterritorial and least likely to get into fights with other seamink colonies.

[yourladyindank]

Dumb question, but why do cats and dogs get along really well sometimes?

It has to do with personality and prey drive.

To most dogs, cats are prey. So a dog with a high prey drive will want to chase the cat, if not hurt it, because that’s what they do. So a dog with a low prey drive won’t have that problem.

To most cats, dogs are predators. So a cat with a high fear of danger will also have a high fear of dogs, especially if they’ve experienced being “hunted” by one. A cat with low fear and good/no experience, they may not have that problem.

Next is territory. Dogs and cats recognize eachother as not only the predator/prey situation, but also as rival predators, direct competitors. So a nonterritorial cat/dog won’t mind so much.

And there’s some other stuff too but that’s the big shit

[antoine-roquentin]

It is hard to give up something you claim you never had. That is the difficulty Americans face with respect to their country’s empire. Since the era of Theodore Roosevelt, politicians, journalists, and even some historians have deployed euphemisms—“expansionism,” “the large policy,” “internationalism,” “global leadership”—to disguise America’s imperial ambitions. According to the exceptionalist creed embraced by both political parties and most of the press, imperialism was a European venture that involved seizing territories, extracting their resources, and dominating their (invariably dark-skinned) populations. Americans, we have been told, do things differently: they bestow self-determination on backward peoples who yearn for it. The refusal to acknowledge that Americans have pursued their own version of empire—with the same self-deceiving hubris as Europeans—makes it hard to see that the US empire might (like the others) have a limited lifespan. All empires eventually end, but maybe an exceptional force for global good could last forever—or so its champions seem to believe.

The refusal to contemplate the scaling back of empire shuts down what ought to be our most urgent foreign policy debate before it has even begun. That is why these two new books are so necessary, and so welcome: they are the most serious efforts since Chalmers Johnson’s Blowback series (2004–2010) to reopen the question of American empire by taking for granted that it exists. Victor Bulmer-Thomas’s Empire in Retreat maintains that America has harbored imperial ambitions since its founding, and argues that its focus shifted in the twentieth century, from acquiring territory to penetrating foreign countries and influencing their governments to support US strategic and economic interests. David Hendrickson’s Republic in Peril sees that shift as the result of a decisive embrace of interventionism, aimed at extending US power throughout the world.

Both authors think withdrawal from overextended military commitments could strengthen America. Bulmer-Thomas, a British diplomat and scholar, recommends it as a pragmatic adjustment to shrinking support for US empire at home and abroad. Hendrickson, a political scientist at Colorado College, provides a theoretical rationale for it, exploring the possibility of what he calls a new internationalism, based on respect for the sovereignty of other nations. Yet even as they catalog the many signs of imperial decline (economic, political, cultural), neither is sanguine that American policymakers can manage a graceful retreat.

Bulmer-Thomas begins by recounting the rise of the US territorial empire. He shows that America’s relationship with the land it acquired during westward expansion resembled the relationship between European countries and their colonies abroad. The United States, like European colonial powers, subjugated (and nearly exterminated) aboriginal populations; used military occupation as a buffer between white settlers and rebellious natives; and established only limited representative governments in their occupied territories. One resident of America’s territories complained that they were treated like “mere colonies, occupying much the same relation to the General Government as the colonies did to the British government prior to the Revolution.”

Most textbooks date the beginning of America’s overseas expansion to 1898, when it acquired sovereignty over Cuba, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after the conclusion of its war with Spain. Yet as Bulmer-Thomas shows, the US empire went offshore much earlier. During the 1810s and 1820s, Americans carved out the state of Liberia in West Africa, allegedly as a refuge for free American blacks; the country in fact functioned as an American colony and later as a protectorate of the Firestone Rubber Company. The US established an imperial presence in East Asia as early as 1844, when the Treaty of Wanghia gave it the same privileged access to Chinese ports as the British Empire, and went on to acquire dozens of “guano islands” in the Pacific, where abundant bird droppings provided a rich source of fertilizer.

During the 1890s, the American zeal for distant acquisitions slipped into high gear, as politicians realized they were arriving late to the imperial game. Led by Theodore Roosevelt and other advocates of expansion, they sought land through annexation and collaboration with American business interests (Hawaii) as well as through war with Spain. These acquisitions began as additions to the territorial empire but gradually acquired a more ambiguous character. They came to form the foundation of what Bulmer-Thomas calls America’s “semi-global empire,” built not on territorial acquisition but on the maintenance of client states and various other forms of international interference, including military bases that supported occasional armed interventions in local conflicts and multinational corporations run mostly by Americans.

The Philippines offers a case in point of America’s nonterritorial form of empire. The US declared war on Spain in 1898 with the avowed intention of ending Spanish rule in Cuba, but even before the declaration President William McKinley had dispatched the US Asiatic Squadron under Commodore George Dewey to Hong Kong in preparation for an assault on the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. As soon as war was declared, Dewey moved quickly and crushed the Spanish forces. Their surrender emboldened the Filipino rebels, who erroneously assumed that the US had arrived to liberate them from their Spanish oppressors. The US military quickly disabused them of that delusion by embarking on a ferocious counterinsurgency campaign, which lasted for years and included the systematic torture and slaughter of Filipinos. As many as 250,000 died, but the US imperialists never doubted the sanctity of their cause. “Nothing can be more preposterous than the proposition that these men were entitled to receive from us sovereignty over the entire country which we were invading,” Secretary of War Elihu Root said in 1900 about the Filipino rebels. “As well the friendly Indians, who have helped us in our Indian wars, might have claimed the sovereignty of the West.”

Statehood was never considered during the debate over the Philippines: the only question was whether to establish a naval base at Manila and give the islands back to the Spanish or to annex the entire archipelago. The imperialists won the argument, and after the insurgents were finally suppressed the Philippines became a colony, from which investors in sugar, hemp, tobacco, and coconut oil could gain privileged access to US markets and Filipinos could emigrate to America in search of jobs. By the 1930s, congressional opposition to cheap exports as well as to cheap (and nonwhite) labor created support for Philippine independence, which was finally achieved in 1946. But it came with so many restrictions on trade and so much preferential treatment for American investors—not to mention continued maintenance of US military bases—that “it would be more accurate to describe the Philippines as becoming a US protectorate,” Bulmer-Thomas writes. “Thus, the end of colonialism in the Philippines did not mean the end of US imperial control.”

A similar pattern of indirect imperial control also applied to Central America and the Caribbean. The US dominated that region during the twentieth century through colonies (Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Panama Canal Zone), but more broadly by using its economic influence to interfere in domestic politics and maintain governments that would faithfully serve American interests (as was the case in Cuba until 1959), or by establishing asymmetrical bilateral treaties and customs receiverships—the collection of customs duties by US officials, who then used the money to pay off the debt service owed on American loans. This arrangement survived in the Dominican Republic until 1942 and in Haiti until 1947.

Military interventions underwrote economic domination. Sometimes this involved sending in the US Marines and leaving them in place for decades, as in Haiti from 1915 to 1934. Sometimes it required using military force to crush a rebellion and arranging for the emergence of a cooperative dictator, such as Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, whose brutalities the Americans tolerated as long as he respected US strategic interests in the region. This he did for thirty years, until his attempt in 1960 to overthrow the Venezuelan government cost him US support. Sensing an opportunity, his opponents assassinated him. But the US was still committed to maintaining the imperial relationship, and President Lyndon Johnson sent in the Marines in 1965 to prevent the left-of-center president Juan Bosch (who had been ousted by a military coup) from returning to power.

Johnson’s intervention recalled the conflicts of the early twentieth century, but during World War II and the cold war, US imperial strategies had begun to shift. As the USSR consolidated its power, the US scaled back its pursuit of territory abroad. Instead, it extended its imperial reach through the development of international institutions that would serve its interests but could not also be used against it. At Bretton Woods in 1944, the US initiated the creation of the IMF and the World Bank. Both institutions are headquartered in Washington, and the president of the World Bank has always been an American, by custom if not fiat.

The Point Four Program, drawn from Harry Truman’s inaugural address in 1949, linked the World Bank to the struggle with the Soviet Union for influence in the developing world, where the bank would make loans, with many political conditions attached, to governments and state-owned enterprises (later privately owned ones as well). The requirement that Congress approve these loans ensured that they would reflect what the US government considered its national interest. The United Nations, too, began as an American-dominated institution, though as its membership grew it became progressively harder for the US to control. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and bilateral treaties worldwide also served American policy under the guise of “collective security” against the Soviet threat.

All these arrangements were fortified by the principle articulated in the Truman Doctrine of 1947—that aggression must be stopped everywhere. Such a commitment “assumes that foreign conflicts feature evil aggressors and innocent victims,” as Hendrickson writes. This unexamined assumption was endorsed and promoted by leaders from both political parties, who helped sustain an atmosphere of perpetual moral crisis during the cold war. The US, working through the CIA, helped to overthrow elected left-leaning governments in Iran, Guatemala, Congo, Brazil, and Chile. Interventions anywhere could always be rationalized as counterinterventions against the allegedly omnipresent Soviet threat.

When the cold war ended, the US’s geopolitical rationale for military interventionism—the need to contain communism—swiftly disappeared, as the country found itself in the heady position of being the world’s sole superpower. This was what is now viewed, with some nostalgia, as the unipolar moment. And yet even in the absence of its longtime ideological rival, the United States continued to conduct foreign policy with the same moral fervor that had informed its actions in the cold war, and with the same confidence that it was a force for global good.

Under the presidency of Bill Clinton, much of official Washington began to believe “that US empire would best be served by the promotion of democracy abroad—or at least an American version of democracy—on the grounds that US security, free market economies and democracies are mutually reenforcing,” as Bulmer-Thomas writes. The rationale for democracy promotion, in the words of Clinton’s first National Security Strategy, was that “democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with the US to meet security threats and promote sustainable development.” This formulation could work in some circumstances, but not all. Other nations could have good reasons to see democracy promotion as a form of aggression, as Russia did when Clinton sought to expand NATO eastward despite the promises made by his predecessors in the first Bush administration and the warnings of many seasoned diplomats, led by George Kennan.

Establishing “US hegemony across the globe,” in Bulmer-Thomas’s words, was not only about promoting democracy abroad but also about maintaining military supremacy everywhere. In 2000, despite cuts in personnel and the closure of many US bases, the Defense Department committed itself to the pursuit of “full spectrum dominance.” This goal, outlined in Joint Vision 2020, the Department of Defense’s blueprint for the future, meant the worldwide control of land, sea, air, and space, including cyberspace.

The triumphalist mood following the end of the cold war also emboldened neoconservative ideologues. Two of them, William Kristol and Robert Kagan, founded the Project for the New American Century in 1997. Its “Statement of Principles” pledged to “rally support for American global leadership” through “a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity.” This was nothing if not an exceptionalist, even unilateralist creed, based on faith in the uniqueness of America’s position as a global leader. It evoked Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s claim that the US was “the indispensable nation.”

The neoconservatives found their president in George W. Bush. Even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Bush began to implement neoconservative policies, withdrawing from international organizations and agreements—including (in June 2002) the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. This decision, according to Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution and other critics at the time, signaled a swerve in US nuclear strategy from deterrence to “war-fighting.”

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon provided a new enemy, international terrorism, that was even more shadowy and elusive than international communism had been. Widespread panic among Americans and their allies was taken (especially in the US) to justify a permanent state of emergency, with damaging consequences for civil liberties and public debate at home, as well as for the many thousands of civilians who would become “collateral damage” in Iraq and Afghanistan.

After September 11, new rationales for military intervention abroad emerged—not only preventative war against terror (the false justification for invading Iraq) but also R2P (the Responsibility to Protect). As Hendrickson shows, R2P originated in the recommendation of a Canadian government commission and received a modified but contested acceptance by the UN in 2005. R2P provides a virtually blank check for using force on humanitarian grounds—an idea that has little support from non-Western nations. In practice it vitiates a central assumption of international law—that each state has the right to defend itself. In his second inaugural address, Bush spelled out the vision of universal empire behind R2P: “The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.” This was the Truman Doctrine on steroids.

Hendrickson thinks American disregard for international law helps explain the incoherence of contemporary strategic thought. According to exceptionalist ideology, the US is the primary guardian of international law, on which global stability depends. Yet Hendrickson (like Bulmer-Thomas) makes clear that more often than not, the putative rule-maker has in fact broken rules and acted in ways that it would not tolerate from any other nation.

The American exceptionalist double standard is especially apparent in its current military operations overseas. Consider the battle-ready presence of the US Navy in the South China Sea. Imagine a rival power behaving as aggressively in the Caribbean, lecturing us on our misdeeds (as we have lectured the Chinese) and appointing itself a neutral umpire for the region. A retired Chinese admiral, quoted by Hendrickson, puts the matter succinctly: the US Navy in East Asia is like “a man with a criminal record ‘wandering just outside the gates of a family home.’”

Or take the confrontation emerging on the western border of Russia. The missile defense system installed by NATO on Russia’s doorstep, combined with NATO troops conducting military exercises, could not be more provocative. No great power, least of all the United States, would allow deployments so close to its borders without protest and (probably) retaliation.

While Bulmer-Thomas treats imperial expansion as a continuous feature of American history that has run afoul of historical circumstance, Hendrickson reconstructs an anti-imperial tradition in Anglophone thought, which he calls “liberal pluralism” and recommends reviving in view of our crumbling American empire. In his view, liberal pluralism was embodied in the system of European nation-states (the “Westphalian system”) that emerged from the Thirty Years’ War. It was also the worldview of America’s founders, uniting Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton, and Madison in their suspicion of military adventures abroad. From the liberal pluralist perspective, war is the summum malum of international affairs; respect for the sovereignty of other nations is the best way to avoid it. Sovereignty is the core of international law: every state has the right to defend itself from external attack; none has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another.

The fact that liberal pluralism discourages interference does not, however, imply that it encourages nations to be passive bystanders in the face of immoral foreign policies, as contemporary political theorists who favor an interventionist approach like to claim. Liberal pluralism “does not,” Hendrickson insists, “dictate indifference to human rights”; it allows states to shelter dissidents and welcome refugees from oppression. “What it does not allow is coercive intervention in a foreign country to secure those rights.”

Hendrickson concentrates his criticisms on the reckless use of military force in foreign lands; he does not dismiss economic sanctions as an alternative. Nor does he rule out interference in extreme situations, such as the threat of genocide. But he insists that such interventions be—as far as possible—multilateral, peaceful, and respectful of international law. He proposes maintaining NATO, but with our nuclear guarantees to its members on a strictly “no-first-use” basis; preserving friendships with allies but also working out “rules of the road with putative adversaries.” He argues that fighting terrorism requires effective policing at home and the support of functioning governments abroad, not their overthrow. The liberal pluralist tradition, in his view, provides intellectual resources for reducing international tension and redirecting national wealth toward urgently necessary aims—rebuilding infrastructure, reviving the welfare state, and addressing the menace of climate change and oceanic catastrophe.

In recent years, popular support for imperial adventures has waned. Large majorities have opposed sending US troops to Libya, Syria, and Ukraine. The percentage of Americans who think it is “very important” that the US should “maintain superior military power worldwide” dropped from 68 percent in 2002 to 52 percent in 2014. And poll respondents ranked military supremacy sixth out of ten among foreign policy aims. The top-ranked goal was “protecting the jobs of American workers.”

The shift in public opinion is a response to a series of failed interventions: efforts at regime change in Iraq, Libya, and Syria have left behind chaos, failed states, terrorist recruits, and endless war. But whatever disagreements they may have had over policy details, all three presidents since September 11 have shared a commitment to US global military supremacy. No major policymaker wants to admit publicly what many suspect privately: that America’s imperial reach has begun to exceed its grasp. Barring a dramatic shift in public discourse, the American empire will not go gentle into that good night; more likely it will, as Dylan Thomas counseled the old, “burn and rave at close of day.”

No one burns and raves more flagrantly than Donald Trump. The failure of blank-check interventions fed the discontent he exploited in the 2016 campaign. Yet his chauvinist posturing has turned out to be little more than a belligerent, unhinged version of the militarized globalism he claimed to displace. So Trump lurches from one outrageous provocation to another while most of his critics repeat the stale formulas of global leadership. Neither side seems to notice that the rest of the world does not want to be led (though some countries may still want their security to be guaranteed by US power). More and more foreign countries are trying to go about their business on their own, even in areas once assumed to be vital to the US national interest—Latin America, the Middle East, the South China Sea, even the Korean peninsula, where the South Koreans have done what American leaders were unable or unwilling to do: initiate diplomacy with North Korea.

Other pillars of American power are also crumbling, as Bulmer-Thomas demonstrates in detail. Multinational corporations are no longer as dependent on American policies abroad for access to foreign markets; General Motors, for example, now sells more cars in China than anywhere else on earth, without benefit of a US presence there. Recent years have seen a steady fall in the US net investment ratio (gross investment less the consumption of fixed capital), both private and public. The consequence has been a decline in infrastructure (including public education), as well as a slowing of innovation and productivity. At the same time, neoliberal politicians in both parties, committed to cutting back the “entitlements” provided by the welfare state and privatizing the public sector, have underwritten the rise of inequality and social immobility. The effect has been to undermine the broad prosperity that was the domestic basis of the semi-global empire.

International institutions, rather than reinforcing American hegemony, challenge it. The UN, the IMF, and the World Bank have all proven unreliable in promoting US interests. At the UN, the US is more isolated than ever on the Security Council, as the dramatic increase in American vetoes shows. Various countries have learned to avoid borrowing from the IMF, with the onerous conditions it imposes, by building up their foreign exchange reserves and paying off existing debts. The World Bank now has two significant rivals, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank (which represents the BRICS countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). The Organization of American States has been superseded, since 2011, by the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, which insisted on the inclusion of Cuba despite US opposition. China is creating its own version of the Trans-Pacific Partnership without US participation, as well as expanding into sub-Saharan Africa and cutting a deal with Nicaragua for another isthmian canal.

Yet Trump and his opponents in the Washington consensus still envision a unipolar world, where the United States can ignore the legitimate claims of rival nations and do pretty much whatever it wants, whether because of its sheer greatness (Trump) or its exceptional goodness (Clinton et al.). Obama was cautious about intervening in Syria and eager to negotiate with Iran, but his administration maintained or intensified commitments to global military supremacy, blanket surveillance, targeted drone assassinations, and modernization of nuclear weapons, as well as engagement in the Middle East and East Asia. Fundamental policies persisted despite Obama’s misgivings.

Neither Bulmer-Thomas nor Hendrickson believes these policies can continue without catastrophe. And it might, in any case, not be in the US’s interests for them to continue. As Bulmer-Thomas reminds us, “Imperial retreat is not the same as national decline, as many other countries can attest. Indeed, imperial retreat can strengthen the nation-state just as imperial expansion can weaken it.” Yet as Hendrickson concludes, “It is crystal clear that the empire is fully determined to stick around,” despite our desperate need to dismantle it. The drift of global events may eventually require the United States to acknowledge the reality of a multipolar world, but we cannot assume that the process will be peaceful. Still, Hendrickson has performed an urgently necessary service in reconstructing the liberal pluralist tradition. He reminds us that there is a humane alternative to contemporary orthodoxy, if we can only recognize it.

[d0ntw0rrybehappy]

human intervention in animal "societies" (tw: rape)

something unsettling for you guys today: apparently male sea otters commonly rape female sea otters and juvenile seals to the point of death and it's likely due to pollution. scientists observed that the culprits were "nonterritorial males": sea otters who had not been able to take over a piece of territory and thus secure a mate. scientists also proven that there is an unnaturally high male to female ratio in otters in the monterey bay. and, they posit that pollution is leading to the higher mortality rate of female sea otters. because of the sex ratio, some males are left without mating options and seek out sexual surrogates. interestingly, a behavior we see as immoral/destructive/wrong (though more acceptable amongst animals) has likely become more prevalent as a result of human-caused environmental degradation -- in another species!!

another example of human intervention changing animal "society" is that of the "alpha/beta/omega" ranks of wolves. turns out this strict hierarchy only applies to wolves in captivity. wild wolves, while they will demonstrate dominance behavior, tend to form much smaller packs that consist exclusively of parents and pups. the wolves in captivity that were studied for this incredibly influential theory did not have kinship ties and had been grouped together in a small space.

i would argue that the idea of hierarchy/pecking order in fact reflects HUMAN society at the time (1920s-40s) (#anthropologyofscience)

you can read the otter study here (warning, very sad/gross/graphic pics) and more about wolf pack hierarchy here

[tamarindodiving]

Here at Catalina's archipelago, you can see these whitetip reef sharks almost every day! Whitetip reef sharks do not have to move to breathe and can be found lying motionless on the seafloor. They are nonterritorial so you can also find them laying together on the sand or even piled on top of each other inside a cave! 🦈🐠☀ Whitetip reef sharks have been around for at least 42 million years and hopefully, with some consciousness from our side they will be around for many more! https://ift.tt/2LTYqAk #costaricatours #scubalife #catalinas #scubadivingtours #tamarindodiving #guanacaste #costarica — view on Instagram https://ift.tt/33LxNml

[dichotomy-of-the-day]

Everything in reality is either territorial or nonterritorial.