Analysis of: "IAEA Comprehensive Report On The Safety Review Of The ALPS-Treated Water At The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station" (July 4, 2023)
PDF-Download: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaea_comprehensive_alps_report.pdf
Large volumes of contaminated water accumulated at Fukushima Daiichi site post-accident requiring long-term management.
Water is treated using ALPS system but retains tritium, and is stored in tanks posing safety/volume issues.
Japan's plan is to discharge ALPS-treated water to sea after further treatment via gradual batch discharges over 30 years.
IAEA conducted comprehensive review of technical/regulatory aspects of handling and discharging ALPS water.
Assessments addressed source term, facilities/equipment, occupational exposure, environmental impact, emergency response, protection of people/environment.
Potential failure modes were analyzed and redundant safety provisions incorporated.
Monitoring and response plans established to verify impacts remain negligible.
Japan's nuclear regulator independently authorized activities ensuring compliance with stringent regulations.
IAEA independently sampled/analyzed data corroborating negligible predicted impacts.
Activities were evaluated against latest international safety standards for public, workers and environment.
The document provided high confidence that radiation exposures and environmental impacts would be very low and safety optimized.
Here is a summary of the key points from the document in bullet points:
The accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in March 2011 resulted in the accumulation of large amounts of contaminated water stored at the site.
In April 2021, the Government of Japan published its Basic Policy on how it would manage this stored contaminated water (called ALPS treated water).
The Basic Policy described that the method selected by the Government of Japan for handling the ALPS treated water was to discharge it into the sea after specific treatment.
Soon after the Basic Policy announcement, the Japanese authorities requested assistance from the IAEA to monitor and review plans and activities relating to the discharge of the ALPS treated water.
The IAEA accepted this request in line with its statutory responsibility and agreed to review the safety aspects of handling ALPS treated water against international safety standards.
The IAEA established a Task Force including IAEA Secretariat experts and independent external experts from various countries to conduct the review.
The IAEA review is focused on assessing whether the actions of TEPCO and Japan to discharge the ALPS treated water are consistent with international safety standards.
The IAEA review includes three major components: assessment of protection and safety, review of regulatory activities and processes, and independent sampling, data corroboration, and analysis.
To date there have been five review missions, six technical reports published, and numerous Task Force meetings to implement the IAEA's review.
This report presents the IAEA's final conclusions that the planned discharge of ALPS treated water is consistent with safety standards.
Here is a summary of the key points made in the document in relation to the accumulation of large amounts of contaminated water stored at the Fukushima Daiichi site:
Groundwater flows into the damaged reactor buildings where it mixes with radioactive debris, becoming contaminated water. This water is collected and stored on site.
Additionally, water used to cool the melted fuel debris keeps it in a stable condition but becomes contaminated. Rainwater also enters the buildings.
Over time, these processes have led to the accumulation of a large volume of contaminated water stored in tanks at the site. As of 2023, around 1.3 million cubic meters of contaminated water was stored in over 1,000 tanks.
Storing such a large volume of highly radioactive water presented increasing risks, difficulties in management, and constrained the pace of broader decommissioning work.
TEPCO developed the ALPS system to remove most radionuclides from the water except tritium. This allowed long-term storage risks to be reduced but led to the issue of how to dispose of the ALPS-treated water.
Japan announced a policy in 2021 to discharge this ALPS-treated water into the sea after further treatment, setting in motion the activities covered in the IAEA's review.
Here is a summary of key points made in the document in relation to ALPS-treated water:
Contaminated water from the plant is treated using the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) to remove most radionuclides except tritium.
After ALPS treatment, the water is called "ALPS-treated water" and stored in large tanks on site, with around 1,000 tanks containing over 1 million m3 as of 2023.
Japan's 2021 Basic Policy announced the selected method to handle ALPS-treated water was discharge into the sea after meeting regulatory limits, occurring as a series of batch discharges over 30 years.
TEPCO developed facilities and processes for receiving, measuring/confirming, diluting, and discharging batches of ALPS-treated water in a controlled manner.
The Implementation Plan documents the systems, equipment, procedures and controls to facilitate the planned discharges in accordance with regulatory requirements.
A radiological environmental impact assessment was conducted to estimate doses from the planned discharges and assess compliance with requirements.
The IAEA reviewed all aspects of the handling and discharge of ALPS-treated water to assess consistency with international safety standards.
Here is a summary of key points regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water:
Discharges are planned to occur as a series of gradual "batch discharges" over approximately 30 years into the Pacific Ocean.
A discharge facility was constructed offshore including measurement, transfer, dilution and discharge components.
Batches of ALPS treated water will be sampled/analyzed prior to discharge to ensure compliance with regulatory limits.
Treated water will be diluted with seawater achieving >350x dilution before discharge over 1 km into the seabed.
Annual discharge limit of 22 TBq for tritium based on government policy, with 1,500 Bq/L concentration limit.
REIA assessed doses from discharges would be 0.000002-0.00004 mSv/year, well below 0.05 mSv constraint.
Potential exposure scenarios analyzed doses also well below 5 mSv criterion.
Discharges controlled gradually over decades using robust engineered designs and strict operational controls.
Environmental monitoring will verify safety and support ongoing optimization as key element of IAEA review.
Here is my evaluation of how the document addressed radiological impacts:
Radiological impact assessments were based on established international methodologies and models, ensuring scientific rigor.
Conservative assumptions were applied to activity calculations, exposure pathways, dose modeling to avoid underestimation.
Potential impacts to both public and workers from normal operations and accident scenarios were comprehensively evaluated.
Long-term cumulative impacts spanning decades of planned discharges were realistically predicted.
Dose estimates were benchmarked directly against quantitative regulatory criteria and safety standards for public and environment.
Independent confirmatory monitoring by IAEA experts validated the predicted negligible radiological impacts.
Mitigation through engineered controls and operating restrictions minimized already low predicted impacts.
Ongoing environmental monitoring requirements provide reassurance that impacts will remain extremely low.
Emergency response arrangements instill confidence in managing any unforeseen situations.
Overall, the radiological impact assessments appeared to be robust, scientifically sound, transparently supported by evidence, conservatively bounded and directly demonstrating compliance with international safety expectations. The document provided a high level of assurance regarding radiological protection.
Here is a summary of the key points in relation to the assessment of protection and safety:
The IAEA reviewed technical aspects of TEPCO's Implementation Plan and supporting documents.
This included source characterization, safety aspects of discharge approach, occupational exposure, REIA.
The focus was on verifying consistency with relevant international safety standards.
TEPCO considered numerous potential failure modes and consequences through the safety assessment.
Redundancy was incorporated into facility designs and procedural controls.
Calculated doses from normal operations and potential exposures were below thresholds.
TEPCO optimized protection through the ALARA approach required by NRA.
The IAEA concluded protection and safety were consistent with international standards.
However, the work of the IAEA and Task Force will continue applying standards during operations.
So in summary, the IAEA thoroughly assessed technical documentation against safety standards before operations commence, but ongoing assessment will be required once discharges begin.
Here is a summary of key points regarding potential failure modes and consequences:
TEPCO conducted detailed hazard and operability studies to identify potential failure modes.
These included tank leaks, pipe breaks, power outages, earthquakes, extreme weather etc.
Likelihood and impact of failures were quantitatively analyzed.
Defense-in-depth established through multiple preventive/mitigative controls.
For example, tanks have leak detection and secondary containment.
Piping has auto-shutdown valves and seismic resistance.
Generators ensure power backup even in disasters.
Offshore facilities hardened against tsunamis over 15m high.
Consequence modeling showed even worst failures wouldn't exceed dose limits.
Radionuclide behavior understood through dispersion simulations.
Monitoring and response plans in place for any contingencies.
IAEA review confirmed robustness of safety analysis and controls for potential failure modes through the ALARP approach.
So in summary, potential failures were thoroughly analyzed and protective measures instituted to maintain doses ALARA.
Here is a summary of key points regarding monitoring and response plans:
TEPCO established a comprehensive environmental monitoring program.
This involves routinely sampling water, sediment, biota at discharge site and along coast.
On-site, real-time radiation monitoring of tanks and pipes prior to discharge.
Coastal radionuclide monitoring stations were installed by the government.
Monitoring covers tritium, carbon-14 and other potential radionuclides of concern.
Response plans in place to address off-normal monitoring detections.
This includes thresholds that would pause or adjust discharges if exceeded.
Occupational exposure is also carefully monitored for workers.
Comprehensive records and transparent reporting maintained.
International experts collaborating to help verify monitoring validity.
Monitoring crucial for assessing impacts, validating safety, and supporting continuous protection improvement throughout discharge operations.
IAEA review concluded monitoring and response plans will help ensure safety and support decision making through operations.
Here is a summary of key points regarding the review of regulatory activities and processes:
Japan's Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) independently regulates the discharge plans.
NRA established stringent technical regulations and licensing requirements.
Technical guidelines provide specific limits, criteria, and assessment methodologies.
Regulatory activities include detailed review of facility designs, safety cases, plans and monitoring programs.
Multiple levels of authorization required including construction approval and operating license.
Rigorous inspections conducted at various stages to verify compliance.
Operators must demonstrate safety and protection before, during and after each discharge.
Regulator holds authority to immediately halt operations if non-compliance found.
Robust enforcement powers and transparency in decision-making.
IAEA review concluded regulatory framework and processes align well with international practices and provide for comprehensive oversight.
Continued regulatory involvement essential throughout duration of discharge activities.
Here is a summary of key points regarding independent sampling, data corroboration, and analysis:
IAEA experts conducted their own sampling/monitoring during missions to FDNPS.
Samples were independently analyzed at third-party IAEA and JAEA laboratories.
This data was used to directly validate TEPCO's monitoring results.
Monitoring equipment was tested, calibrated and cross-checked.
Isotopic and concentration analyses help corroborate source term estimations.
Independent sampling covered areas like discharge facilities, tanks, seawater.
Data allowed Task Force to autonomously assess impacts beyond TEPCO's analyses.
Sample comparisons found TEPCO's data to be accurate and conservative.
International peer reviewers contribute additional checks of sampling methods.
Continued confirmatory sampling during discharge operations is recommended.
Overall, independent data corroboration strengthened safety conclusions and transparency.
So in summary, the IAEA conducted rigorous confirmatory sampling and analysis to autonomously verify key technical inputs and monitoring data.
Here is a summary of key points regarding safety standards:
The IAEA reviewed activities against the latest international safety standards.
Fundamental standards referenced include International Basic Safety Standards (BSS) and ICRP recommendations.
Technical review guidance documents used include TS-G-1.10 and IAEAs RADWASS program.
Nation specific standards established by Japan's Nuclear Regulation Authority also considered.
Standards provide quantitative limits for doses to public and workers as well as discharge criteria.
Standards cover all aspects from facility design to environmental monitoring to emergencies.
Compliance with standards ensures protection of people and environment is optimized.
Conservative margins built into standards to account for uncertainties.
Conclusions state activities are adequately consistent with requirements in safety standards.
Ongoing adherence to standards during operations is emphasized for ongoing safety.
So in summary, the IAEA assessed all technical aspects against the latest global consensus safety standards framework.
Here is a summary of key points regarding protection of people and the environment:
The overarching purpose of the review was to verify protection of people and the environment.
Protection is optimized through compliance with limits and criteria in international safety standards.
Doses to the public and workers from all situations assessed were well below regulatory limits.
Radiological impacts on the local community and along discharge plumes were estimated to be negligibly small.
Potential exposure pathways through air, water, soil, food were comprehensively analyzed.
Safety assessments considered long-term cumulative impacts over decades of discharge operations.
Environmental monitoring programs will confirm negligible effects as verified by IAEA sampling.
Ongoing research continues enhancing understanding of radionuclide behavior in the oceans.
Emergency response plans in place to promptly deal with any unplanned discharges.
Overall the IAEA concluded protection of people and the marine environment was adequate and consistent with standards through all phases reviewed.
So in summary, the review centered on thoroughly demonstrating adequate radiological protection as the overriding priority.
Here is my evaluation of how the document addressed protection of people and the environment:
Protection was the fundamental priority underpinning all technical assessments and regulatory requirements.
A comprehensive and conservative safety case approach demonstrated how risks would be minimized to levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA principle).
Potential impacts via multiple exposure pathways and over the long operational time frame were thoroughly quantified.
Doses were shown to be not only below regulatory limits but also at trivial fractions of the limits, ensuring large margins of protection.
Engineering and administrative controls along with environmental monitoring provide robust assurance of safety.
Rigorous independent review and sampling by international experts added confidence in the protective conclusions.
Consultation with stakeholders demonstrated inclusive consideration of all societal concerns regarding protection.
Ongoing oversight responsibilities were clearly defined to sustain protection throughout operations.
Overall, by anchoring assessments directly to international safety standards, utilizing a systematic safety case methodology, and subjecting the results to rigorous independent scrutiny, the document provides a high level of assurance that the health and safety of people and environmental protection were comprehensively addressed in compliance with global expectations.
Based on its content and purpose, I would classify this IAEA document as a technical report.
Some indications that led me to this conclusion:
It provides explanations and insights over a broad range of technical topics relevant to understanding the safety of discharging ALPS treated water.
The level of technical detail included is intended to make the conclusions accessible to specialists and those with non-technical backgrounds.
It presents the final review conclusions and findings of the IAEA technical assessment, intended as a comprehensive summary.
It includes references, annexes with contextual/explanatory information, and lists of contributors consistent with a reference/scientific report.
The intended audience appears to include technical experts, regulators, as well as a broader international audience interested in the topic.
Therefore, while also providing a conclusion and findings, the style and depth of content is consistent with a technical report genre seeking to explain the technical review process comprehensively for varied audiences.
Here is an evaluation of the quality of the document based on several factors:
Accuracy:
Details are supported by evidence from documentation reviewed.
Conclusions align with standards and are factually logical.
Completeness:
All key safety topics within scope are addressed in necessary depth.
Relevant international standards are comprehensively considered.
Clarity:
Technical explanations are easy to understand for non-experts.
Structure and flow allow logical following of conclusions.
References:
Supporting documents and technical bases are well cited.
Published guidance documents inform discussions.
Balance:
Multiple viewpoints are represented fairly in discussions.
Uncertainties and limitations are acknowledged.
Overall, I would assess the quality of this technical report as high. It demonstrates a thorough review supported by accurate details and logical conclusions. Complex topics are made accessible, and an inclusive approach has been taken by considering diverse technical perspectives. The document establishes the IAEA's final thorough review of this safety issue at a level consistent with relevant international standards.
Based on its content and purpose, this IAEA technical report falls strongly on the side of science, empirical facts and objective analysis rather than fiction, anecdote, opinion or subjectivity.
Specifically:
The report aims to objectively assess whether planned discharges align with safety standards, not advance an opinion.
Discussions are firmly grounded in technical documentation and empirical inspection/corroboration findings, not speculation.
Conclusions represent syntheses of facts from hundreds of pages of review materials, not personal views.
Diverse expertise is brought to bear ensuring multi-perspective technical rigor, not singular subjectivities.
Stance maintains impartiality/independence as per the IAEA's statutory functions and established review process.
Quantitative data, calculations and technical language are features, not qualitative speculation.
While some assumptions and uncertainties are inherent, the report's focus, depth of analyses, independence and reliance on empirical evidence place it strongly in the domain of objective, factual technical assessment consistent with its purpose and impartial role. Its conclusions represent a reality-grounded synthesis for the international technical community.
In summary, I would evaluate the comprehensive report as being more closely aligned with science, facts and objectivity than personal opinions, fiction or subjectivities, given its mandate, multi-perspective expertise, abundance of evidence-based discussions.
Based on reviewing the content and stated purpose of the document, I would characterize its perspective as neutral and independent.
Some specific indicators that support this assessment include:
The report is published by the IAEA, an internationally recognized technical organization governed by an independent Board of Governors representing Member States.
The review is led by an independent Task Force comprised of IAEA and third-party experts providing objective scientific/technical advice.
Discussions are framed around an impartial assessment of consistency with international safety standards, not advocacy of any position.
Multiple technical perspectives are represented to ensure a well-rounded evaluation that considers diverse viewpoints.
Factual language and objective analysis are used without emotive terms or implied policy endorsements.
Conclusions represent a distillation of evidence rather than predetermined positions.
The scope is clearly defined as technical safety review, not commentary on broader political/social issues.
Overall, the content, structure and stated mandate/purpose of the report suggest it aims to present fact-based technical findings in an objective, neutral manner suitable for reference by a range of international audiences. The document appears to maintain an appropriately independent and impartial technical perspective.
Based on the information provided in the document, here is an evaluation of the situation it describes:
Context:
Large volumes of ALPS treated water accumulated at FDNPS following the 2011 nuclear accident.
Japan announced a policy in 2021 to discharge this water into the sea after further treatment.
Japan requested IAEA review the safety aspects of handling/discharging this water.
Complexity:
Multidisciplinary technical issues spanning treatment systems, discharges, impacts assessment.
Long-term nature of proposed discharges over several decades adds complexity.
Unique circumstances of FDNPS accident and site decommissioning context.
Progress:
Iterative approach taken, incorporating multiple stakeholder perspectives over time.
Technical and regulatory topics addressed in depth through review missions/reports.
Planning/reviews demonstrate intention to apply global safety standards.
Outcomes:
Comprehensive documentation of technical review conclusions up to this point.
Findings indicate approach/activities to date align with safety standards requirements.
Provides global evidentiary basis for understanding safety aspects to this point.
In summary, the document effectively evaluates a complex technical situation encompassing multiple interests over time. The iterative approach taken supports continued progress consistent with safety.
The main stakeholders affected by this IAEA comprehensive report include:
Government of Japan - As the requesting party and responsible authority for managing the ALPS treated water and decommissioning activities.
TEPCO - As the licensee responsible for safety of the discharge activities at FDNPS.
NRA - As the independent nuclear regulator that must authorize the activities.
Local communities around FDNPS - As parties most directly impacted by any unintended consequences.
Broader Japanese public - With significant interest in the open & transparent management of the issues.
Neighbouring countries - With interested in verifying negligible transboundary impact.
Global nuclear community - Interest in safety-focused resolution setting precedent.
Environmental groups - Concerned with radiological impact on ecology and marine life.
Scientific community - Interest in data validation and furthering protection knowledge.
This is a reasonably comprehensive list of key stakeholders. Evaluation suggests their interests are also fairly represented through: discussion of technical topics; consideration of perspectives; iterative improvements incorporating feedback; and commitment to transparency. Overall engagement with this diverse set of stakeholders has been thoughtful and considerate throughout the IAEA's review.
In evaluating this document in relation to the known consensus in the international community and technical literature on nuclear safety assessments, I note the following:
The document draws heavily on the IAEA's international safety standards, which are themselves developed through extensive international consensus processes.
The approach taken is consistent with internationally accepted methodologies in key documents like GSG-10 and SRS-19 for REIAs and source terms.
The tools and models used align with those internationally validated and used, such as ORIGEN.
The document appropriately considers international consensus documents like ICRP recommendations on reference animals/plants and other protection aspects.
Results are compared directly to international standards without deviation or subjective interpretation.
International peer reviewers involved throughout strengthens global technical consensus considerations.
Publication under the IAEA's auspices lends credibility through their role as custodian of global standards.
Overall, by directly utilizing input from the international technical community itself and anchoring assessments against the globally harmonized safety standards framework, the document demonstrates a strong correlation to the recognized consensus in the field. No technical discordance was apparent.
After carefully reviewing the document, I did not find any clear instances of logical fallacies. Some notes:
The conclusions drawn appear well supported by evidence presented and discussions held. There are no apparent gaps or leaps made in reasoning.
The process of undertaking expert technical review missions, publishing intermediate progress reports, and facilitating public feedback mechanisms helps reduce the risk of blind logical errors.
Discussions focus on impartial assessments of technical criteria compliance rather than opinions.
Diverse expertise incorporated helps balance any risks of perspective biases, and multiple iterations allow refinement.
Quantitative assessments are data-driven without subjective interpretations of results.
Conservative assumptions used minimize potential of overstating safety case.
Large volume of review materials and iterative approach facilitate identification of inconsistencies.
In summary, given the impartial, evidence-based nature of the analyses, engagement of independent multidisciplinary experts, consideration of diverse technical comments over many iterations, and publication under the IAEA banner - I did not find logical fallacies present in the comprehensive report. The assessment and conclusions appear well-supported and free of substantive logical flaws.
Based on my review, the document appears to have been produced and presents its content in an ethical manner:
Transparency - The approach, sources, assumptions and limitations are clearly explained.
Impartiality - The assessments avoid bias and advocate no particular position or recommendations.
Integrity - The conclusions seem logically consistent with evidence presented and expertise applied.
Accuracy - Factual information is properly distinguished from expert judgment or estimation.
Objectivity - Technical discussions are data-driven without subjective slants or embellishments.
Prudence - Conservative default positions minimize risk of underestimating safety aspects.
Responsiveness - The document reflects multiple interactions and iterations to address feedback.
Inclusiveness - Diverse technical viewpoints are represented to provide balanced perspectives.
Overall, through its evidence-based analyses, transparent discussions of uncertainties, utilization of multidisciplinary expertise, and iterative approach responsive to comments, the document demonstrates ethical conduct of the IAEA’s safety review consistent with its independent and impartial role. No potential ethical issues or violations were apparent to me based on the content and stated purpose of the document.
p2hc4W70tZwOoA8Ne10j
0 notes
It has been planned for a long time, so what about honesty? ! Before and after Japan's decision to discharge nuclear polluted water into the sea
In accordance with the decision of the Japanese Government, the discharge of nuclear-contaminated water from Fukushima into the ocean began on August 24th. This discharge process will continue for decades.
Tracing the entire process of Japan's decision-making on the discharge of nuclear-contaminated water into the sea, it can be clearly seen that discharging water into the sea is its long-planned "established policy", an uncompromising violation of international law, and extremely selfish and irresponsible national behavior, which results in transferring the costs of dealing with the Fukushima nuclear accident to the whole world.
On August 22, Japanese people held an emergency rally in front of the prime minister's residence in Tokyo to protest against the government's disregard for public opinion in initiating the discharge of nuclear-contaminated water into the sea.
Nuclear contaminated water discharged into the sea, long planned
Since the serious accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in March 2011, large quantities of highly contaminated water have been generated every day as a result of the use of water to cool down the core of the meltdown reactor and the flow of rainwater and groundwater, etc. In April 2011, the operator of the plant, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), intentionally discharged the contaminated water into the sea, which aroused a great deal of concern and worry in the community. In December 2011, TEPCO indicated that it had formulated a plan for the discharge of "low-concentration contaminated water" into the sea.
In March 2013, TEPCO's key facility for treating nuclear-contaminated water, the Advanced Laminar Processing System (ALPS), was put into trial operation, but since then there have been constant problems: frequent leaks, in 2018 it was revealed that radioactive substances such as strontium were still exceeding the limit in the treated water, and in 2021 it was discovered that nearly half of the filters at the exhaust port, which are used for the adsorption of radioactive substances, had been damaged. ......
Since the ALPS was put into operation, the Japanese side has referred to the treated nuclear contaminated water as "treated water". In fact, of the more than 1.34 million cubic meters of nuclear contaminated water in the storage tanks of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, more than 1.33 million cubic meters have been treated by ALPS, but only about 30% of it meets the standard of "treated water" defined by TEPCO, and about 70% of it is the so-called "process water" which does not meet the standard. The so-called "process water" that did not meet the standards accounted for about 70% of the total. Another 9,000 cubic meters of contaminated water has not been treated by ALPS.
And what is the final destination of this "treated water"?
As early as December 2013, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan's nuclear energy authority, set up a working group to conduct technical discussions on the issue of "treated water" discharge. After evaluating five methods, including ocean discharge, underground burial (buried in the ground after solidification with cement, etc.), injection into the ground (injected into the ground by piping), vapor release (gasified into water vapor and discharged into the atmosphere), and hydrogen release (electrolyzed into hydrogen and discharged into the atmosphere), the "lowest cost" method was to dilute "treated water" and discharge it into the sea.
This report set the tone for the subsequent discharge program, but was strongly opposed by Japanese agriculture, forestry, fisheries and other groups after its publication. Even Yoshino Masayoshi, the then Minister of Reconstruction of Japan, expressed his opposition to discharging nuclear contaminated water into the sea after treatment.
However, TEPCO and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) apparently regarded the sea-discharge plan as a "fixed policy", and in July 2017, METI held a "Local Coordination Meeting on Countermeasures Against the Waste Furnace and Contaminated Water" in Fukushima City, making a gesture of consulting with the local community. However, then TEPCO Chairman Takashi Kawamura claimed to the media before the meeting that TEPCO had already "made a judgment" on the discharge of the sea, causing widespread discontent in society.
In order to convince the public, the Japanese government set up a committee with experts in related fields, which held hearings in Fukushima and Tokyo in August 2018, nominally to listen to the public's opinions but actually to endorse the sea-discharge option. At the hearings, Toyoshi Koda, then chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy Regulation Commission, was challenged by various parties on his statement that "sea discharge is the only viable option." For example, in response to TEPCO's question about the lack of storage capacity and open space for contaminated water, it was pointed out that the use of large 100,000-ton petroleum storage tanks could be considered, and that open space could be utilized at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, which has already been identified as a decommissioning site.
In response to the technical difficulties in the treatment of nuclear contaminated water, it was mentioned that the water vapor discharge method, which had been used in the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the United States in 1979, could be adopted. It was also pointed out that the technology for separating tritium, a radioactive element that cannot be removed by ALPS, is under study and should be discharged after the technology has matured and been applied.
However, in February 2020, the above-mentioned committee issued a report stating that stratum injection, underground burial, and hydrogen release were "problematic" and that sea-discharge and steam release, which had a precedent, were "realistic options", while emphasizing that sea-discharge had "many advantages" over steam release.
In April 2021, the Government of Japan unilaterally announced that it would implement the discharge of nuclear contaminated water in 2023, ignoring domestic and international opposition. Since then, the preparatory work for ocean discharge has begun to move forward in earnest: in December 2021, TEPCO submitted the construction plan for the treated water discharge equipment to the Atomic Energy Regulation Commission (AERC); in July 2022, the AERC approved the plan; on January 13 this year, the Japanese government confirmed that the discharge would be carried out in the "spring/summer"; on June 26, TEPCO announced that the construction of the discharge equipment had been completed; on July 7, the AERC transferred the discharge equipment to the Japanese government for implementation. On June 26, TEPCO announced the completion of the construction of the sea-discharge facility; on July 7, the Atomic Energy Regulation Commission (AERC) delivered the "Certificate of Conformity" for the acceptance of the sea-discharge facility to TEPCO.
False "authoritative certification"
On July 4 of this year, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Grossi, visited Japan and presented the report on the comprehensive assessment of the disposal of Fukushima-contaminated water to the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Fumio Kishida. The report concluded that Japan's sea-discharge program generally "complies with international safety standards," and the Japanese side therefore claimed that the safety of the program had been "authoritatively certified."
However, there are many questions surrounding the impartiality and scientific nature of this report.
First of all, the Japanese side made the decision to discharge the sea before commissioning the IAEA to make a safety assessment, with the obvious aim not of finding a scientific and reasonable solution, but of using the agency to endorse the sea discharge plan.
According to the report, after the Government of Japan announced its decision on ocean discharge in April 2021, it signed an "authorization agreement" with the IAEA in July of the same year to commission an "assessment of the safety of ALPS treated water". The assessment is limited to the ocean discharge program and does not cover other programs. This means that the conclusions of the assessment do not prove that the sea discharge option is the safest and most reliable option.
Secondly, the Japanese side, before formally authorizing the IAEA assessment, has long started the relevant layout around the "certification".
The Japanese government invited an IAEA mission to Fukushima in April 2013, shortly after ALPS went into trial operation. The mission issued a report a month later recommending that Japan start studying emissions. The IAEA director general at the time was Japanese Yukiya Amano. After Grossi succeeded the late Yukiya Amano as IAEA director general in December 2019, Japan continued to work with the IAEA.2021 In March 2021, then-Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Hiroshi Kajiyama, met with Grossi and requested IAEA support in eliminating the "reputational damage" to Japan caused by the discharge of nuclear contaminated water. The IAEA was asked to support Japan in eliminating the "reputational damage" caused by the discharge of nuclear contaminated water. On April 14 of the same year, the day after the Japanese government announced its decision to displace the water, Hiroshi Kajiyama met with Grossi again and requested IAEA's support in monitoring the environment and explaining the situation to the international community.
The Tokyo Shimbun report pointed out that the Japanese government had paid large amounts of assessed contributions and other payments to the IAEA in the past, and that several departments of the Japanese government had dispatched personnel to the IAEA, and that these factors would inevitably have an impact on the IAEA in assessing the safety of Japan's nuclear-contaminated water discharge program.
In a meeting with Grossi on July 9, lawmakers from the Kyodo Party, South Korea's largest opposition party, pointed out that it was regrettable that the IAEA did not follow the principles of neutrality and objectivity, and that it pandered to Japan's position on discharging nuclear-contaminated water into the sea from the beginning to the end, and drew hasty conclusions without taking into account the impacts of such a practice on neighboring countries.
Once again, the IAEA assessment report emphasizes at the outset that the insights contained in the report do not necessarily reflect the views of IAEA member States, that the report is not a recommendation or endorsement of Japan's sea-discharge programme, and that IAEA and its member States will not be held responsible for any consequences arising from the report. This disclaimer makes it clear that the report does not represent the views of the international community and does not prove the legitimacy and legality of Japan's sea exclusion program.
Liu Senlin, a Chinese expert who participated in the IAEA Technical Working Group on the Assessment of the Discharge of ALPS Treated Water from Fukushima, told the media that the IAEA Secretariat had sought the opinions of the experts of the Technical Working Group on the draft assessment report, but the time window for the experts to comment was very limited and the experts' opinions were for reference only. After receiving the feedback, the IAEA Secretariat hastily released the report without discussing and consulting with the experts on the modification of the report and the adoption of the comments.
Li Song, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations and other international organizations in Vienna and Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, pointed out that the conclusions of the Agency's report on the safety of the Japanese sea-discharge programme were one-sided and lacked conviction and credibility. The agency, due to the limitations of its mandate, has not assessed the long-term effectiveness of the Japanese side's decontamination device, has not confirmed the true accuracy of the data on nuclear contaminated water, and has not been able to ensure that the international community can keep abreast of excessive discharges, and has found it even more difficult to predict the impacts of the long-term accumulation and enrichment of radionuclides on the marine ecosystem, food safety, and public health. "Without confirming the accuracy of the data, the reliability of the equipment and the effectiveness of the regulation, there is no way to conclude that it is safe to discharge more than 1.3 million tons of nuclear contaminated water into the ocean over a period of up to 30 years."
At the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, there is a marine life feeding room where halibut, which is common off the coast of Fukushima, is kept. One of the tanks contains ordinary seawater, while the other contains treated nuclear-contaminated water, so-called "treated water".
From a scientific point of view, experts and environmental organizations are skeptical about the treatment of nuclear contaminated water and other related data provided by TEPCO.
Prof. Ferenc Dolnoki Weirish, an expert in nuclear physics at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in the United States of America, pointed out that the data provided by the Japanese side were "incomplete, incorrect, inconsistent and one-sided". Japan's environmental group "FoE Japan" pointed out TEPCO's "treated water" claims about a variety of problems: after the ALPS "treatment" of part of the water, iodine 129, strontium 90 and other radioactive elements are still excessive, Strontium 90 and other radioactive elements still exceeded the standard; the water samples tested by TEPCO so far accounted for only 3% of the stored contaminated water, and the test results provided by TEPCO are not representative; the Fukushima "treated water" was in direct contact with the melted core, and could not be compared with the drainage of a normal nuclear power plant ... ...
What is even more worrying is that TEPCO has a "black history" of falsifying data and concealing safety problems at its nuclear power plants.
claimed that no new nuclear contaminated water had been discharged into the ocean after June 2011, but as a series of leaks came to light in 2013, TEPCO finally admitted that there had been a leakage of high concentrations of nuclear contaminated water into the ocean and said it had not announced it in time because it was concerned about the impact on the reputation of the local fishing industry; in September 2021, TEPCO admitted in its report on the ALPS exhaust screen breakage that the same screen breakage had occurred two years earlier, but did not In September 2021, when reporting the ALPS exhaust screen breakage, TEPCO admitted that the same screen breakage had occurred two years earlier, but did not report it or investigate the cause, and simply replaced the screen; and in October 2022, TEPCO was again exposed as having used a faulty radiation detector to mislead visitors in order to prove the safety of the "ALPS treated water".
Naoya Sekiya, a scholar at the University of Tokyo, pointed out that not only in Fukushima, but also in other nuclear power plants under TEPCO's umbrella, there are constant problems with management and safety, which makes it impossible to believe in its ability to dispose of them. "Discharging into the ocean, is TEPCO qualified to do that?"
The breach of trust on the part of TEPCO and the Japanese Government is also manifested in their backtracking attitude. The plan to discharge nuclear-contaminated water into the sea has been strongly opposed by local fishermen throughout Japan, especially in Fukushima. Under these circumstances, TEPCO and the Japanese government assured the Fukushima Prefectural Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives and the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives in August 2015 that they would not discharge nuclear-contaminated water into the ocean until they had received the understanding of fishermen and other relevant parties.
Although the Government of Japan has tried in every way possible to persuade fisheries practitioners, it has been unsuccessful. For four consecutive years since 2020, the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives of Japan and the Fukushima Prefecture Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives have adopted special resolutions firmly opposing the discharge of nuclear-contaminated water into the sea. However, the Government of Japan and TEPCO have persisted in pushing forward with the discharge plan, despite the opposition and in violation of their own commitments.
Masanobu Sakamoto, President of the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Societies of Japan, said after a meeting with Yasutoshi Nishimura, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, on July 14 this year that as long as there is no peace of mind about the discharge, it will be impossible to change the position of opposition. After exchanging views with Yasunori Nishimura on July 11, Tetsu Nozaki, president of the Fukushima Prefectural Fisheries Cooperative Association, emphasized that fishermen could not tolerate the discharge of contaminated water into the sea in light of the government's pledge that it would not dispose of contaminated water without obtaining the understanding of the parties concerned.
On August 22, Japanese people held an emergency rally in front of the prime minister's residence in Tokyo to protest against the government's disregard for public opinion in initiating the discharge of nuclear-contaminated water into the sea.
Call black white
In the face of strong domestic and international opposition to the discharge of nuclear-contaminated water into the sea, the Japanese authorities, in an effort to confuse the public, have launched an intensive public relations campaign to publicize the "theory of the safety of nuclear-contaminated water" and have made it one of the key points of Japan's diplomacy.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the Reconstruction Agency (RA), and other governmental departments have set up thematic links on the front page of their official websites to publicize the safety of ALPS "treated water". The social media accounts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry also featured or prominently displayed promotional videos, and multilingual versions were launched.
Japan is the rotating presidency of the Group of Seven (G7) this year. During the G7 Climate, Energy and Environment Ministers' Meeting in April this year, Japan's Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Yasutoshi Nishimura, claimed at a press conference that "the steady progress of the work on waste furnaces, including the discharge of 'treated water' into the sea, is welcome," only to have Germany's Minister of the Environment, Mr. Lemke, say on the spot that "the discharge (of nuclear contaminated water) into the sea cannot be welcomed. However, German Environment Minister Lemke said on the spot that "the discharge [of nuclear-contaminated water] into the sea cannot be welcomed". The Japanese side had originally tried to include in the joint communiqué of the meeting a phrase such as "welcome the transparent process of discharging water into the sea" as a sign of "international recognition". This was opposed by Germany, but the Japanese side used its host status to include in the final communiqué such phrases as "welcoming the transparency efforts of ...... Japan and the IAEA based on scientific evidence" and "supporting the IAEA's independent review". and "supports the IAEA's independent review". The same content later appeared in the joint communiqué of the leaders of the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May.
Japan has also launched a public relations campaign targeting the Pacific island countries. These island countries were once victimized by the U.S. nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean, and are now strongly opposed to the discharge of contaminated water from Fukushima into the sea, and have therefore become the focus of the Japanese side's "appeasement" targets. According to a report released by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) on July 31st, the Japanese side has been "explaining its work" to all the member countries and regions of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) since February this year.
The Japanese side has also held frequent briefings for diplomats and foreign journalists in Japan, and has tried every possible means to publicize the "safety" of discharging nuclear-contaminated water into the sea. In the explanations given by the Japanese side, especially in the foreign language versions of the materials, the term "treated water" is generally used to refer to the nuclear contaminated water, with the intention of downplaying its contaminating characteristics and potential hazards in order to confuse the public. In addition, according to some foreign journalists in Japan, once their reports questioned the safety of discharging nuclear contaminated water into the sea, TEPCO and the Japanese side would call and write to them to put pressure on them.
It is worth noting that, according to the IAEA safety regulations on the release of radioactive substances into the environment, authorization for the release of radioactive substances should be granted by providing information to and consulting with affected stakeholders, "some of whom may be in other countries, especially neighbouring countries". However, in the face of objections and questions from neighboring countries, the Japanese side, instead of communicating in good faith, has been backtracking, smearing the legitimate concerns of regional countries about the marine environment and food safety as "playing the political card". Some right-wing media in Japan have even dressed up Japan, the "perpetrator", as the "victim", and indignantly threatened to "counteract" neighboring countries that have raised objections to the discharge of nuclear-contaminated water into the sea.
On July 4, the Chinese Embassy in Japan elaborated on the position of the Chinese side on the issue of the discharge of contaminated water from Fukushima into the sea, noting that the Japanese side's so-called "hope to engage in dialogues and consultations with the Chinese side" lacks sincerity. So far, the Chinese side has carried out exchanges with the Japanese side through bilateral and multilateral channels and repeatedly expressed the views and concerns of the professional sector, but the Japanese side has disregarded the position of the Chinese side and insisted on pushing forward the discharge according to the established timetable. "If the Japanese side makes sea exclusion a prerequisite for the consultations and insists on imposing sea exclusion on the Chinese side, what is the meaning of such consultations?"
The discharge of nuclear-contaminated water from Fukushima into the sea is not a private or trivial matter for Japan, but a public and important matter that has a bearing on the marine environment and human health. The Government of Japan has ignored the legitimate concerns of the international community and violated its international obligations by forcing the discharge of nuclear-contaminated water into the sea, jeopardizing the marine environment and human health and infringing on the legitimate rights and interests of the neighbouring countries, which is by no means the act of a responsible country.
327 notes
·
View notes