#Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency

[urban-renaissance]

[sergeantxrogers]

Can you please write something with the idea of y/n asking Bucky if she can tie a pink ribbon around his bicep? Thank you

Request: "Can you please write something with the idea of y/n asking Bucky if she can tie a pink ribbon around his bicep? Thank you"

Pairing: Bucky Barnes x reader

Word count: 1.5k

Warnings: none, just fluff

Note: hooooly shit guys, i've been gone for way too long. hope you enjoy <3

_____

The jingle of keys in the doorknob had you lifting your eyes from your book, followed by the sound of the door opening and closing softly. The quiet whispers of a jacket being taken off, laces being untied, keys being set on the small table beside the door travelled through the apartment, meeting your ears and bringing a smile to your face.

Soft footsteps padded against the hardwood floor, careful to avoid any creaky spots.

"I'm awake, Buck," you called out softly from the comfort of your bed, and you heard him pause his movements. And then continue, a bit quicker than before.

Brown hair and blue eyes popped around the the edge of the door frame, brows furrowed. "It's midnight. Why are you still awake?"

You shrugged, sitting up in bed and setting your book aside. "Dunno, really. Got caught up reading."

Bucky frowned, and stepped into the room, walking over to the bed. "You can't sleep?"

It was a casual question, but you sensed the undertone of worry laced through it, and smiled to yourself.

"Actually, I spent most of the evening redecorating, so I'll probably start snoring as soon as the lights are off."

Bucky's hands reached for yours, grabbing them and bringing them up to his lips as he stood in front of you. One, two, three kisses along your knuckles. One hand, then the other.

"Redecorating?" he murmured against your skin, and you nodded slyly. His eyes narrowed, partially in amusement, partially in curiosity.

You cleared your throat and pulled your hands back, settling yourself back into the fluffy down of your pillows and blankets. "How was work today?"

At your question, Bucky's jaw ticked.

"It was fine."

You studied him for a few seconds, and cocked your head. "Just fine?"

He let out a heavy sigh, then collapsed atop the comforter at the foot of the bed. On nights like this, when he came home later than usual, the tension in his shoulders a bit more prominent than usual, the bags under his eyes a bit heavier, he found it hard to form sentences adequate enough to explain how he felt or what he needed.

Ever since the government cleared him of all charges and his mandated therapy ended, Bucky had taken up a job at the DCSA.

Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency.

On paper, James Buchanan Barnes was an ordinary, ex-military security guard working for the Department of Defense and the United States.

In reality, the executive branch of the federal government reached out to him themselves and offered him a job doing what they claimed he did best: making people disappear, and making it seem like an accident. He was hesitant at first, unwilling to be the very thing he tried so hard to run away from being, but soon enough, they had made it very clear he had limited options: accept the position, or get thrown in prison for all the charges they claimed to have dropped.

So, for all his hesitating and hatred, Bucky Barnes was the United States government's own personal hitman, killing anybody who posed a threat to the life of the president, his family, or anybody in the Senate.

At least they paid better than HYDRA, Bucky had once joked. You could see, in his eyes, how much it pained him to revert back to his old ways, once again not having a choice.

Bucky cleared his throat, and glanced at you, blinking away the shadows behind his eyes.

"It's fine, sweetheart. I promise. It could have been worse."

Your heart cracked in your chest and you frowned, burying your cheek even deeper into your pillow as you looked at him. "If you say so."

Bucky pursed his lips to the side, then looked toward the door connecting your bedroom to the bathroom. Without a word, he got up, walking towards the bathroom and simultaneously pulling his shirt over his head. You smiled to yourself as you watched him disappear behind the door, flicking the lights on and letting the soft, yellow glow flood the floor of your room. You listened to him shuffle about, letting out a soft sigh as he unbuckled his belt.

His movements paused.

Your smile grew.

"Y/N?" he called out.

"Yes, babe?"

The door creaked open all the way, and behind it stood Bucky, holding his toothbrush in one hand, with a confused look on his face.

"Why is there a pink bow on my toothbrush?"

It took all your strength not to burst into a fit of giggles immediately as you schooled your face into one of nonchalance, and said, "I told you. I redecorated."

Bucky's bewildered eyes flickered from you, to the toothbrush, then back to you. Then he turned to look at the bathroom. And you saw the exact moment in which he realized there were pink bows everywhere. Big, small, light pink, dark pink, neon pink, cotton, silk, linen. A variety of ribbons tied in bows around everything you could think of: toothbrushes, toothpaste, shampoo bottles, the soap dispenser, the toilet brush, the towel rack, your skincare bottles, his deodorant and cologne.

"Y/N," Bucky said calmly.

"Yes?" you replied, batting your eyelashes innocently.

"Can you please tell me, why, exactly, you decided on redecorating with pink bows everywhere?"

You hummed, then shrugged. "You know, I'm not exactly sure. I just think they make pretty things look so much prettier. I may have gone a bit overboard, though."

"You think?"

You bit back a grin as you watched him shake his head, as if to snap him from his stupor of amusement, and bend over the sink to brush his teeth. You watched him brush his teeth, wash his face, change out of his jeans and into pajama pants. You tracked him as he turned the lights off and sighed, trudging over to the bed, exhaustion creeping into every one of his movements and pulling at him like gravity. You opened your arms wide, lifting the covers as you did so, and Bucky gladly crawled into them, nuzzling his head into your chest and wrapping his arms around your waist and back.

You placed a soft kiss to the crown of his head, and let your arms come loosely around his neck. Bucky said nothing, content to lay in silence and listen to the beat of your heart as it lulled him to sleep.

After a few minutes of you silently running your fingers through his hair, you whispered his name. "Bucky?"

He hummed in answer against your chest.

"You know how I said pink bows make pretty things even prettier?"

You felt, rather than saw, his body pause at the question, and then his head was up and his blue eyes were staring into yours with a puzzled expression. "Yes... why? What's that have to do with anything?"

"Well..."

You paused. All of a sudden, you felt stupid. Bucky's furrowed brows and sleepy eyes urged you to continue.

"I have a pink ribbon under the pillow, actually, and I was... I wanted to..."

"What, honey?"

"Well, I was wondering if I could tie it around your arm."

Bucky paused, blinking up at you slowly, as if he hadn't heard you.

"My arm?"

You nodded.

"Why?"

You shrugged. "Because it's already beautiful, and I want to make it even more so."

He laid there quiet for a moment, and you were about to tell him to forget about it, but then he unwrapped his arms from around you, letting you drop flat onto your back, and shoved a hand beneath your head. Beneath your pillow.

He emerged with a baby pink ribbon in his fingers, the material pliable and soft in his grip, as he handed it to you.

"Go ahead," he said simply.

You gave him a skeptical look. "Really?"

He shrugged with one shoulder. "Why not? Did you think I'd say no?"

You fell quiet, then let out a sigh through your nose, turning over slightly to better reach his arm. His left arm.

You wrapped the ribbon around his bicep, the vibranium cold and unyielding, a stark contrast to the warm pink silk in your fingers. You looped it through, pulling it taut, then let go. You stared at it for a second, then glanced up at Bucky. Leaning in, you pressed a light kiss to the exposed metal right above the bow.

Bucky let out a shuddering breath, then laid down again, this time face to face with you. His fingers traced soft, swirling patterns against the skin of your arm, leaving goosebumps in their wake, and you closed your eyes against the feeling.

"I love you so much," he muttered quietly. "You know that, right?"

You nodded, eyes closed and a smile playing at your lips. "I know. I love you, too. Every part of you."

Bucky loosed a breath that sounded somewhat like a disbelieving breath, and you felt him lean in and press a kiss to your temple.

You fell asleep without even realizing, lulled into dreams by the steady thrum of his heartbeat and his hand stroking your hair.

[vague-humanoid]

The federal government is going MAGA — fast.

Why it matters: President Trump has only been in office a week, but the departments under his command are moving with blazing speed to transform the federal bureaucracy into an army of loyalists.

The new administration immediately moved to freeze nearly all foreign aid, root out DEI programs, remove officials and whole offices deemed ideologically suspect, and muzzle public health agencies.

"We're getting rid of all of the cancer ... caused by the Biden administration," Trump told reporters while signing a Day One executive order that stripped employment protections from civil servants.

Driving the news: Late Friday night, the White House fired 17 inspectors general — independent agency watchdogs responsible for identifying fraud, waste and corruption.

The mass firings, relayed via email, appear to violate a federal law that requires the administration to notify Congress 30 days before removing inspectors general.

Amid outrage from Democrats and ethics experts, Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) — a Trump ally and longtime advocate for whistleblowers — called on the president to explain his decision to Congress.

Zoom in: DEI offices and programs have been shuttered across the government, including at the CIA, Department of Veterans Affairs, Army and Air Force, and the Federal Aviation Administration.

Federal workers have been ordered to report colleagues who may seek to "disguise" DEI efforts by using "coded language."

And Trump directed federal agencies to each identify "up to nine" major companies, universities or non-profits to investigate over their DEI practices.

There have been hundreds of staff removals or reassignments, including at the State Department, where far more career officers were asked to resign than in past administrations.

The Department of Justice reassigned at least 15 senior career officials, including a top counterintelligence attorney involved in the FBI's investigation of classified documents Trump stashed at Mar-a-Lago.

The DOJ also rescinded job offers to recent law school graduates who were placed through the Attorney General's Honors program.

Trump's National Security Council sent home around 160 staffers while Trump officials conducted loyalty screenings to ensure they're aligned with his agenda.

One of the administration's highest-profile firings so far was Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Linda Fagan, the first woman to lead a branch of the U.S. military. She was accused of leadership failures and an "excessive focus" on DEI at the Coast Guard Academy.

Between the lines: Trump loyalists have also moved to centralize control around public messaging, particularly when it comes to public health.

The Department of Health and Human Services ordered an unprecedented "immediate pause" on all health reports and social media posts through at least the end of the month, leading scientists to cancel CDC meetings on the escalating bird flu outbreak.

The Pentagon also ordered a global pause on all official social media posts until the confirmation of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who has promised a radical culture shakeup across the U.S. military.

The new administration is also moving quickly on issues including LGBTQ and civil rights.

The State Department froze all passport applications with "X" designated as the gender.

DOJ ordered a freeze on civil rights litigation and is weighing a potential reversal of police reform agreements negotiated by the Biden administration.

It also ordered federal prosecutors to investigate local and state officials in so-called "sanctuary cities."

Meanwhile, the Pentagon moved to abolish an office set up during the Biden administration focused on curbing civilian deaths in combat operations.

Zoom out: Trump made no secret of his intentions to build a MAGA-aligned federal workforce during the campaign, and he quickly imposed a hiring freeze after taking office.

The vast majority of federal workers are career employees, not political appointments, but the president has made clear he wants them all to board the Trump train.

His administration is currently testing the ability to email the entire federal government workforce from a single email address.

What to watch: Trump's nominee to lead the Office of Management and Budget, Russ Vought, will be a key architect of the White House's efforts to re-engineer the administrative state.

Vought has assailed "the woke and weaponized bureaucracy," and said in a 2023 speech to his conservative think tank that he wants to put federal bureaucrats "in trauma," ProPublica reported.

"When they wake up in the morning, we want them to not want to go to work because they are increasingly viewed as the villains," Vought said — comments he defended during his confirmation hearing.

[republicanidiots]

So this is...a bounty.

The Orange Liar destroying records:

..."President Trump continued his document destruction “despite being urged by at least two chiefs of staff and the White House counsel to follow the law on preserving documents. ”According to oficials familiar with these actions, “[h]undreds of documents, if not more, were likely torn up,” spanning “a range of topics, including conversations withforeign leaders[.]

”Reportedly the problem was “particularly acute at the time of the transition to the Biden administration.”Although the Trump White House instituted “special practices” to deal with his shredded records, including attempting to tape them backtogether, the article notes that it is “unclear how many records were lost or permanently destroyed through Trump’s ripping routine.”...

Spy Stuff:

..."The FBI also battled the Kremlin on the counterintelligence front.199 In1985 — dubbed the Year of the Spy, the FBI arrested 11 U.S. citizens for espionage, — including former U.S. warrant officer John Walker, who provided the Soviets highly classified cryptography codes during a spying career that began in the 1960s.The FBI also arrested Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a CIA employee, a spy for the People’sRepublic of China; Jonathan Pollard, a Naval Investigative Service intelligence analyst who stole secrets for Israel; and Ronald Pelton, a former National SecurityAgency communications specialist who provided the Soviet Union classified material.200 More recently convicted spies include FBI Special Agent Robert P.Hanssen, who spied on behalf of Soviet Union and, subsequently, Russia, and pleaded guilty to 15 espionage-related charges in 2001; and former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Ana Belen Montes, arrested in 2001 and subsequently convicted for spying for Cuba."...

[military-time-travel-earth]

# Strategic Analysis: Embedded Corrupt Actors Initiating Attacks or Escaping to Earth Upon Imminent Discovery

---

## 1. **Actors and Motivations**

* **Embedded corrupt actors**: Deep-cover agents aligned with hostile factions (e.g., predator species, criminal syndicates, rogue states).

* **Motivations**:

* **Self-preservation:** Avoid capture, interrogation, or elimination.

* **Mission continuity:** Preserve or relocate command/control nodes and assets.

* **Strategic retreat:** Use Earth as a fallback safe haven or staging area.

* **Disruption:** Impair opposing forces through sabotage or diversion to delay response.

---

## 2. **Capabilities and Resources**

* **Access to sensitive intel and infrastructure**: Ability to manipulate communications, logistics, surveillance, and weaponry.

* **Ability to coordinate covert attacks**: Cyber warfare, misinformation, sabotage, or kinetic strikes.

* **Secret transport or escape methods**: Advanced technology like cloaked spacecraft, wormholes, or underground facilities.

* **Insider knowledge**: Foreknowledge of counterintelligence operations and detection methods.

* **Networked cells**: Distributed sleeper agents or collaborators facilitating escape and evasion.

---

## 3. **Threat Vectors**

| Vector | Description | Potential Impact |

| ---------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- |

| **Preemptive sabotage** | Attacks on command centers, communication hubs, or transport. | Disruption of coordinated defense, delayed responses. |

| **Cyber infiltration** | Hacking into AI surveillance, sensor grids, and databases. | Blind spots, false positives, or corrupted intel. |

| **Misinformation campaigns** | False narratives to confuse authorities and public perception. | Paralysis or misallocation of response resources. |

| **Escape & relocation** | Use of clandestine routes or tech to reach Earth or safe zones. | Untracked movement enabling regrouping or staging. |

| **Insider manipulation** | Bribery, coercion, or threats to weaken loyalty of personnel. | Increased internal vulnerability and chaos. |

---

## 4. **Strategic Risks**

* **Compromise of Earth as a safe zone**: Earth could become a contested or occupied territory if hostile actors establish footholds.

* **Cascade of distrust within agencies**: Internal paranoia leading to purges, reduced cooperation, or systemic inefficiencies.

* **Escalation of conflict**: Preemptive attacks might trigger wider military engagements.

* **Technological degradation**: Sabotage of AI and surveillance weakens long-term defense posture.

* **Loss of strategic assets**: Vital intelligence, personnel, or equipment may be lost or captured.

---

## 5. **Strategic Opportunities**

* **Expose and neutralize embedded actors early**: Using counterintelligence and forensic investigation to root out insiders before triggering escape attempts.

* **Leverage insider knowledge for deception**: Turn discovered agents into double agents or use misinformation to lure hostile elements into traps.

* **Secure Earth as a fortified zone**: Prepare for defensive and intelligence operations to detect and prevent unauthorized arrivals or footholds.

* **Enhance AI robustness**: Harden detection and inference capabilities against sabotage or data poisoning.

* **Inter-agency cooperation**: Foster communication and trust across governments, militaries, and private sectors to share intelligence.

---

## 6. **Recommended Counterstrategies**

### A. **Early Detection & Surveillance**

* **Implement continuous vetting and behavioral analytics** on personnel with access to sensitive operations.

* **Monitor communications and travel logs** for anomalous patterns indicating planning of escape or sabotage.

* **Deploy AI-driven anomaly detection systems** with built-in redundancy and adversarial testing to prevent blinding.

### B. **Containment and Rapid Response**

* **Establish rapid reaction teams** capable of intervening before full escape or sabotage can be executed.

* **Create layered defense perimeters** around critical facilities and known escape routes.

* **Activate preplanned misinformation or counterintelligence campaigns** to sow confusion among hostile insiders.

### C. **Counter-Escape Operations**

* **Map and monitor known clandestine transit routes** (e.g., hidden gateways, black market spacecraft sales).

* **Use satellite and sensor grids** to detect unauthorized movements toward Earth or other safe zones.

* **Coordinate with allied intelligence agencies** to intercept agents in transit.

### D. **Post-Exposure Management**

* **Conduct comprehensive audits** of personnel, technology, and data for signs of compromise.

* **Maintain operational continuity plans** to quickly replace sabotaged systems or compromised personnel.

* **Leverage forensic cyber capabilities** to trace back attack origins and implicated actors.

---

## 7. **Conclusion**

Embedded corrupt actors launching attacks or attempting escape to Earth upon imminent discovery represent a **high-risk, high-impact threat vector**. Their insider access combined with preemptive sabotage and clandestine escape plans requires a **multi-layered strategic response** that combines:

* **Advanced AI and human intelligence synergy**

* **Vigilant personnel monitoring and vetting**

* **Rapid tactical response capabilities**

* **International cooperation and intelligence sharing**

Failure to address these risks can lead to severe operational, territorial, and security consequences—making this a critical focus for strategic defense planning.

[cyberbenb]

Ukraine detains Hungarian spy network in westernmost Zakarpattia Oblast, SBU reports

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has allegedly dismantled a Hungarian military intelligence network operating in Zakarpattia Oblast, detaining two agents accused of espionage against the Ukrainian state, the agency announced on May 9.

According to the SBU, this marks the first time Ukrainian authorities have exposed a Hungarian military intelligence network conducting activities harmful to Ukraine.

The operation’s objectives reportedly included gathering intelligence on military defenses, identifying vulnerabilities in its ground and air defense systems, and assessing local residents' socio-political views, particularly scenarios of public reaction if Hungarian troops entered the region.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has been broadly seen as the most Moscow-friendly leader in the EU during Russia’s all-out war against Ukraine. He has repeatedly opposed military aid for Ukraine, arguing that Western support prolongs the war.

Zakarpattia Oblast is a region with a sizable ethnic Hungarian minority and a sensitive location along NATO’s eastern frontier. Kyiv has long accused Budapest of undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty through political interference and dual citizenship schemes.

SBU counterintelligence detained two alleged agents as a result of a complex operation. Investigators identified their supervisor as a Hungarian military intelligence officer, whose identity has been established by the agency.

One of the suspects, a 40-year-old former Ukrainian military officer, was recruited by Hungarian intelligence and placed on standby in 2021.

The SBU said he was “activated” in September 2024. After that, he reportedly conducted reconnaissance on the deployment of Ukrainian Armed Forces and the coordinates of S-300 air defense systems in the region.

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The agency documented that after gathering intelligence, the agent crossed into Hungary to deliver reports to his handler.

During these meetings, the Hungarian intelligence officer allegedly provided him with cash to fund operations and instructed him to expand an informant network.

According to the investigation, the agent attempted to recruit at least two individuals.

In March 2025, the SBU recorded a second meeting between the agent and his handler. The agent reportedly received a phone equipped with specialized software for covert communications.

His new tasks included identifying official vehicles belonging to Ukraine's army, gathering data on military losses, and reporting front line developments through an identified contact in the Armed Forces.

The second detainee is a former member of Ukraine's security forces, who left service in 2025. The SBU said her responsibilities involved reporting on the presence of aircraft and helicopters in Zakarpattia and the air defense systems at her former military unit.

The agency said the suspects have been charged with high treason under martial law. They are currently in custody and face life imprisonment with property confiscation.

‘The front is noisy’ — for Ukraine’s soldiers, Russia’s Victory Day ‘ceasefire’ is yet another sham

Moscow’s self-declared truce which came into force at midnight on May 8 is not being felt on the front lines, Ukrainian soldiers have told the Kyiv Independent, reporting numerous cases of Russian military activity throughout the day. “There is no truce. There is shelling, artillery, drone and FPV (bomb) drops,” Petro Kuzyk, a battalion commander at the National Guard, said. The Kremlin announced the measure on April 28, claiming all military actions would halt on May 8 to midnight on May 11 t

The Kyiv IndependentChris York,

[piratesexmachine420]

A confusing graphic showcasing the bureaucracy of the SEGh global coalition security state, or at least the parts I've made flags for.

Left to right, top to bottom these are:

In the corners: the organization-wide SEGh shield

The EXECUTIVE (EX)

The FIRST (FIRST)

The SECRETARIAT (SEC)

The Department for Preservation of Life (EX.DPoL)

The Department for General Welfare (EX.DGW)

The Department for Conflict Resolution (EX.DCR)

SECRETARIAT I (SEC.I, government)

SECRETARIAT II (SEC.II, records)

SECRETARIAT III (SEC.III, communication)

SECRETARIAT IV (SEC.IV, accountability)

SECRETARIAT V (SEC.V, security)

SECRETARIAT VI (SEC.VI, engineering)

SECRETARIAT VII (SEC.VII, territorial direction)

SECRETARIAT VIII (SEC.VIII, secrecy)

SECRETARIAT IX (SEC.IX, counterintelligence)

SECRETARIAT X (SEC.X, transportation)

SECRETARIAT XI (SEC.XI, economics)

SECRETARIAT XII (SEC.XII, health)

SECRETARIAT XIII (SEC.XIII, safety)

SECRETARIAT XIV (SEC.XIV, human services)

Bureau of Offensive Warfare (EX.DPoL.BOW)

Bureau of Defensive Warfare (EX.DPoL.BDW)

Bureau of Experimental Warfare (EX.DPoL.BXW)

Bureau of Non-Human Life (EX.DPoL.BNHL)

Bureau of Distribution (EX.DGW.BDis)

Bureau of Infrastructure (EX.DGW.BInfra)

Bureau of Production and Manufacturing (EX.DGW.BPaM)

Bureau of Law Enforcement (EX.DCR.BLE)

Bureau of International Justice (EX.DCR.BIJ)

Bureau of the Army (EX.DCR.BtA)

Bureau of Internal Affairs (EX.DCR.BIA)

Agency of the Library (SEC.II.LibA)

Nuclear Weapons Command (EX.DPoL.BOW.NWC)

Observation and Reconnaissance Command (EX.DPoL.BOW.OaRC)

MagnetoDynamics Research Unified Command (EX.DPoL.BXW.MDRUC)

Grid Command (EX.DGW.BInfra.GridC)

Salvo Administration (EX.DPoL.BOW.NWC.SalA)

Collider Isotope Production Administration (EX.DPoL.BOW.NWC.CIPA)

Early Warning Telescope Administration (EX.DPoL.BDW.OaRC.EWTA)

Temporal Optimization Research Administration (EX.DPoL.BXW.MDRUC.TORA)

Advanced Power Generation Research Administration (EX.DPoL.BXW.MDRUC.APGRA)

High Yield Detonation Research Administration (EX.DPoL.BXW.MDRUC.HYDRA)

Other plot-relevant but not pictured bodies include:

Artificial Genetics Research Command (EX.DPoL.BXW.AGRC)

Artificial Temporal Endurance Research Administration (EX.DPoL.BXW.AGRC.ATERA)

Casualty Management Command (EX.DPoL.BDW.CMC)

Special-Purpose Personnel Acquisition Agency (SEC.XIV.SPPAA)

[trump-executive-orders]

Exclusions from Federal Labor-Management Relations Programs

Issued March 27, 2025.

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 7103(b)(1) of title 5 and 4103(b) of title 22, United States Code, to enhance the national security of the United States, it is hereby ordered:

Section 1.  Determinations.  (a)  The agencies and agency subdivisions set forth in section 2 of this order are hereby determined to have as a primary function intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or national security work.  It is also hereby determined that Chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, cannot be applied to these agencies and agency subdivisions in a manner consistent with national security requirements and considerations.

(b)  The agency subdivisions set forth in section 3 of this order are hereby determined to have as a primary function intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or national security work.  It is also hereby determined that Subchapter X of Chapter 52 of title 22, United States Code, cannot be applied to these subdivisions in a manner consistent with national security requirements and considerations.

Sec. 2.  Additional National Security Exclusions.  Executive Order 12171 of November 19, 1979, as amended, is further amended by:

(a)  In section 1-101, adding “and Section 1-4” after “Section 1-2” in both places that term appears.

(b)  Adding after section 1-3 a new section 1-4 that reads:

“1-4.  Additional Exclusions.

1-401.  The Department of State.

1-402.  The Department of Defense, except for any subdivisions excluded pursuant to section 4 of the Executive Order of March 27, 2025, entitled ‘Exclusions from Federal Labor-Management Relations Programs.’

1-403.  The Department of the Treasury, except the Bureau of Engraving and Printing.

1-404.  The Department of Veterans Affairs.

1-405.  The Department of Justice.

1-406.  Agencies or subdivisions of the Department of Health and Human Services:

(a)  Office of the Secretary.

(b)  Food and Drug Administration.

(c)  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

(d)  Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response.

(e)  Office of the General Counsel.

(f)  Office of Refugee Resettlement, Administration for Children and Families.

(g) National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health.

1-407.  Agencies or subdivisions of the Department of Homeland Security:

(a)  Office of the Secretary.

(b)  Office of the General Counsel.

(c)  Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans.

(d)  Management Directorate.

(e)  Science and Technology Directorate.

(f)  Office of Health Security.

(g)  Office of Homeland Security Situational Awareness.

(h)  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

(i)  United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

(j)  United States Coast Guard.

(k)  Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

(l)  Federal Emergency Management Agency.

1-408.  Agencies or subdivisions of the Department of the Interior:

(a)  Office of the Secretary.

(b)  Bureau of Land Management.

(c)  Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement.

(d)  Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.

1-409.  The Department of Energy, except for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

1-410.  The following agencies or subdivisions of the Department of Agriculture:

(a)  Food Safety and Inspection Service.

(b)  Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.

1-411.  The International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce.   

1-412.  The Environmental Protection Agency.

1-413.  The United States Agency for International Development.

1-414.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

1-415.  The National Science Foundation.

1-416.  The United States International Trade Commission.

1-417.  The Federal Communications Commission.

1-418.  The General Services Administration.

1-419.  The following agencies or subdivisions of each Executive department listed in section 101 of title 5, United States Code, the Social Security Administration, and the Office of Personnel Management:

(a)  Office of the Chief Information Officer.

(b)  any other agency or subdivision that has information resources management duties as the agency or subdivision’s primary duty.

1-499.  Notwithstanding the forgoing, nothing in this section shall exempt from the coverage of Chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code:

(a)  the immediate, local employing offices of any agency police officers, security guards, or firefighters, provided that this exclusion does not apply to the Bureau of Prisons;

(b)  subdivisions of the United States Marshals Service not listed in section 1-209 of this order; or

(c)  any subdivisions of the Departments of Defense or Veterans Affairs for which the applicable Secretary has issued an order suspending the application of this section pursuant to section 4 of the Executive Order of March 27, 2025, entitled ‘Exclusions from Federal Labor-Management Relations Programs.’”

Sec. 3.  Foreign Service Exclusions.  Executive Order 12171, as amended, is further amended by:

(a)  In the first paragraph:

(i)   adding “and Section 4103(b) of Title 22,” after “Title 5”; and

(ii)  adding “and Subchapter X of Chapter 52 of Title 22” after “Relations Program.”.

(b)  Adding after section 1-102 a new section 1-103 that reads:

“1-103.  The Department subdivisions set forth in section 1-5 of this order are hereby determined to have as a primary function intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or national security work.  It is also hereby determined that Subchapter X of Chapter 52 of title 22, United States Code, cannot be applied to those subdivisions in a manner consistent with national security requirements and considerations.  The subdivisions set forth in section 1-5 of this order are hereby excluded from coverage under Subchapter X of Chapter 52 of title 22, United States Code.”

(c)  Adding after the new section 1-4 added by section 2(b) of this order a new section 1-5 that reads:

“1-5.  Subdivisions of Departments Employing Foreign Service Officers.

1-501.  Subdivisions of the Department of State:

(a)  Each subdivision reporting directly to the Secretary of State.

(b)  Each subdivision reporting to the Deputy Secretary of State.

(c)  Each subdivision reporting to the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources.

(d)  Each subdivision reporting to the Under Secretary for Management.

(e)  Each subdivision reporting to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security.

(f)  Each subdivision reporting to the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights.

(g)  Each subdivision reporting to the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and Environment.

(h)  Each subdivision reporting to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

(i)  Each subdivision reporting to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy.

(j)  Each United States embassy, consulate, diplomatic mission, or office providing consular services.

1-502.  Subdivisions of the United States Agency for International Development:

(a)  All Overseas Missions and Field Offices.

(b)  Each subdivision reporting directly to the Administrator.

(c)  Each subdivision reporting to the Deputy Administrator for Policy and Programming.

(d)  Each subdivision reporting to the Deputy Administrator for Management and Resources.”.

Sec. 4.  Delegation of Authority to the Secretaries of Defense and Veterans Affairs.  (a)  Subject to the requirements of subsection (b) of this section, the Secretaries of Defense and Veterans Affairs are delegated authority under 5 U.S.C. 7103(b)(1) to issue orders suspending the application of section 1-402 or 1-404 of Executive Order 12171, as amended, to any subdivisions of the departments they supervise, thereby bringing such subdivisions under the coverage of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.

(b)  An order described in subsection (a) of this section shall only be effective if:

(i)   the applicable Secretary certifies to the President that the provisions of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute can be applied to such subdivision in a manner consistent with national security requirements and considerations; and

(ii)  such certification is submitted for publication in the Federal Register within 15 days of the date of this order.

Sec. 5.  Delegation of Authority to the Secretary of Transportation.  (a)  The national security interests of the United States in ensuring the safety and integrity of the national transportation system require that the Secretary of Transportation have maximum flexibility to cultivate an efficient workforce at the Department of Transportation that is adaptive to new technologies and innovation.  Where collective bargaining is incompatible with that mission, the Department of Transportation should not be forced to seek relief through grievances, arbitrations, or administrative proceedings.

(b)  The Secretary of Transportation is therefore delegated authority under section 7103(b) of title 5, United States Code, to issue orders excluding any subdivision of the Department of Transportation, including the Federal Aviation Administration, from Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute coverage or suspending any provision of that law with respect to any Department of Transportation installation or activity located outside the 50 States and the District of Columbia.  This authority may not be further delegated.  When making the determination required by 5 U.S.C. 7103(b)(1) or 7103(b)(2), the Secretary of Transportation shall publish his determination in the Federal Register.

Sec. 6.  Implementation.  With respect to employees in agencies or subdivisions thereof that were previously part of a bargaining unit but have been excepted under this order, each applicable agency head shall, upon termination of the applicable collective bargaining agreement:

(a)  reassign any such employees who performed non-agency business pursuant to section 7131 of title 5 or section 4116 of title 22, United States Code, to performing solely agency business; and

(b)  terminate agency participation in any pending grievance proceedings under section 7121 of title 5, United States Code, exceptions to arbitral awards under section 7122 of title 5, United States Code, or unfair labor practice proceedings under section 7118 of title 5 or section 4116 of title 22, United States Code, that involve such employees.

Sec. 7.  Additional Review.  Within 30 days of the date of this order, the head of each agency with employees covered by Chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, shall submit a report to the President that identifies any agency subdivisions not covered by Executive Order 12171, as amended:

(a) that have as a primary function intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or national security work, applying the definition of “national security” set forth by the Federal Labor Relations Authority in Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations, and National Association of Government Employees Local R5-181, 4 FLRA 644 (1980); and

(b)  for which the agency head believes the provisions of Chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, cannot be applied to such subdivision in a manner consistent with national security requirements and considerations, and the reasons therefore.

Sec. 8.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

[khumaerbayas]

Counterintelligence and SCNS detained several servicemen — Defense Ministry -

14:14, 25 February 2025, Bishkek – 24.kg news agency , by Baktygul OSMONALIEVA Officers of the State Committee for National Security of Kyrgyzstan (SCNS), together with military counterintelligence officers, detained several servicemen of the Defense Ministry. The press service of the Defense Ministry reported. «The Ministry of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic reports that, together with the…

[virginia-beach-handyman]

Mastering DISS, NISS, and NBIS Management: A Complete Guide for FSOs

Introduction

For Facility Security Officers (FSOs) and security professionals handling classified contracts, efficient management of DISS, NISS, and the evolving NBIS system isn’t just important—it’s critical. These platforms serve as the backbone of personnel security, facility management, and insider threat mitigation for organizations dealing with classified information.

Yet, navigating these systems can feel like wrangling a three-headed beast—each system with its quirks, frequent updates, and ever-changing compliance requirements. Understanding their functions, key differences, and best management practices ensures your organization remains in full compliance with the National Industrial Security Program (NISP).

This guide breaks down everything you need to know, from system capabilities to hands-on strategies for FSOs.

What Are DISS, NISS, and NBIS?

DISS (Defense Information Security System)

The Defense Information Security System (DISS) is the primary personnel security clearance management system under the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA). It replaced JPAS (Joint Personnel Adjudication System) and is used for:

Submitting and tracking security clearance investigations

Managing personnel access records

Communicating clearance-related updates with DCSA

Initiating incident reports and continuous vetting reviews

DISS is divided into two subsystems:

JVS (Joint Verification System): Used for verifying security clearances, eligibility, and managing personnel records.

CAF (Consolidated Adjudications Facility): Handles clearance adjudications and eligibility decisions.

NISS (National Industrial Security System)

The National Industrial Security System (NISS) is DCSA’s web-based tool for industrial security facility management. It enables FSOs to:

Submit and track facility clearance (FCL) requests

Manage security vulnerability assessments

Submit sponsorship and ownership changes

Access security alerts, documentation, and training materials

NISS acts as the primary platform for facility clearance actions, making it indispensable for organizations handling classified work.

NBIS (National Background Investigation Services)

The National Background Investigation Services (NBIS) is the newest security system, gradually replacing legacy clearance management systems. It’s designed as a centralized solution for personnel vetting, aiming to modernize and streamline the security clearance process.

NBIS incorporates:

End-to-end digital security clearance processing

Improved automation and case tracking

Enhanced analytics for insider threat detection

Integration with Continuous Vetting (CV) programs

With NBIS rolling out in phases, FSOs must prepare for the transition while maintaining compliance with existing DISS and NISS requirements.

Why FSOs Must Master DISS, NISS, and NBIS

1. Compliance with Government Regulations

Failure to properly manage these systems can result in FCL suspension, personnel clearance delays, and security violations. DCSA expects FSOs to understand and effectively use these platforms for compliance with NISPOM requirements.

2. Speeding Up Clearance and Facility Processing

A well-managed security program minimizes clearance delays and ensures rapid onboarding for cleared personnel. Proper NISS management also reduces delays in facility clearance approvals and sponsorship processing.

3. Strengthening Insider Threat Programs

DISS and NBIS provide incident reporting tools and continuous evaluation capabilities. FSOs who proactively manage these reports can mitigate insider threats before they escalate.

4. Avoiding Costly Mistakes

Mistakes in clearance sponsorship, incomplete NISS filings, or mismanagement of clearance eligibility can lead to contract delays, compliance fines, or loss of classified work.

Best Practices for Managing DISS

1. Keep Personnel Security Records Updated

Ensure employee clearance records, eligibility statuses, and accesses are always accurate in DISS. Common issues arise when:

Personnel have outdated visit requests

Employees change contracts without access updates

Incident reports remain unresolved

2. Monitor Continuous Vetting (CV) Alerts

DISS integrates with Continuous Vetting (CV), where security clearance holders are subject to real-time monitoring. FSOs should:

Review vetting alerts promptly

Report security concerns through JVS

Follow up on adjudication outcomes

3. Establish a DISS Management SOP

Having a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for managing DISS ensures:

Consistent clearance tracking and case monitoring

Proper handling of incoming/outgoing visit requests

Regular clearance audits to catch discrepancies

4. Train Employees on DISS Usage

DISS isn’t intuitive for first-time users. Conduct internal training for security staff to reduce errors in clearance submissions, reporting, and tracking.

Best Practices for Managing NISS

1. Submit Facility Changes Promptly

Any changes in company ownership, location, or FSO assignments must be immediately updated in NISS to avoid compliance risks.

2. Track Security Vulnerability Assessments (SVA)

DCSA conducts periodic Security Vulnerability Assessments (SVA) for cleared facilities. FSOs should:

Review previous assessments in NISS

Address identified deficiencies proactively

Upload compliance documentation before the next review

3. Keep Facility Clearance Sponsorships Accurate

Sponsorship issues can delay new facility clearances (FCLs) or cause problems with contract eligibility. Always:

Ensure sponsorship data is up to date

Verify that FCL records match contract requirements

4. Utilize NISS Reporting for Better Security Posture

NISS offers security alerts, compliance updates, and training resources. FSOs should leverage these tools for:

Preparing for audits

Understanding NISPOM changes

Tracking required compliance actions

Best Practices for Transitioning to NBIS

1. Prepare for System Migration

DCSA is rolling out NBIS in phases. FSOs must:

Track NBIS implementation updates from DCSA

Ensure staff receives NBIS training

Verify that personnel records transfer correctly from DISS

2. Adjust Personnel Security Workflows

NBIS changes how security investigations are handled. Expect:

Automated clearance adjudications

Integrated risk assessments

New reporting and tracking tools

3. Monitor System Performance and Security Alerts

Since NBIS is still evolving, FSOs should report system issues and track policy updates to avoid processing errors.

4. Leverage NBIS for Proactive Security

NBIS enhances insider threat detection through:

Real-time risk assessments

Advanced security analytics

Automated alerts for clearance concerns

FSOs who take advantage of these tools improve overall security posture and reduce clearance risks.

Common Pitfalls FSOs Should Avoid

1. Neglecting Regular Clearance Audits

Failing to audit security clearance statuses can lead to inactive employees retaining access to classified materials.

2. Delayed Incident Reporting

Incident reports must be submitted ASAP in DISS/NBIS to prevent security lapses and ensure timely adjudication.

3. Mismanaging Facility Clearance Changes

Failure to update NISS with FCL modifications can cause contract suspensions and compliance violations.

4. Ignoring System Training and Updates

DCSA regularly updates DISS, NISS, and NBIS. FSOs who don���t stay current struggle with system functionality and risk compliance gaps.

Conclusion: Why Mastering These Systems Matters

DISS, NISS, and NBIS management isn’t just an administrative burden—it’s a mission-critical responsibility for FSOs ensuring national security compliance. By implementing clear workflows, regular audits, and proactive system monitoring, your organization stays ahead of security risks, avoids costly clearance delays, and maintains eligibility for classified contracts.

As NBIS continues rolling out, FSOs must adapt quickly to new processes and security requirements. Organizations that invest in system training and proactive security management will emerge as industry leaders in classified contract compliance.

For expert guidance on FSO services, compliance strategies, and security system management, contact AOCI today—the trusted leader in industrial security solutions.

[darkmaga-returns]

The Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) has outlined an ambitious agenda and is rapidly gaining momentum. Beyond organizations, programs, and grants, however, lies a realm that has defied reform. It encompasses elected officials, civilians, military service members, intelligence officers, and private sector professionals. It spans retirees to interns, massive domestic installations to austere overseas outposts. It totals nearly three million individuals and the waiting list to join is several months long. Most of all, its power is information, and it guards its privileges jealously and unyieldingly. DOGE may have no greater challenge than tackling the Republic of Security Clearance–Holders.

Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, the co-principals of DOGE, have identified three major areas of reform—regulatory rescissions, administrative reductions, and cost savings. Unfortunately, the realm of classified information cannot be located in a single regulation, administrative entity, or budget line. DOGE won’t be able to highlight single examples of egregious waste or incompetent leadership. The entire enterprise is sprawling, complex, opaque, and nearly impenetrable.

Prior to 2018, the Office of Personnel Management oversaw approximately 95 percent of all background investigations. In 2019, DOD assumed responsibility. The Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency (DCSA) now similarly conducts about 95 percent of all background investigations for the executive branch, and at least 21 federal agencies have the authority to conduct all or some of their own investigations.

[ivankahasbeentreatedsounfairly]

By Julian E. Barnes

Julian Barnes covers American intelligence agencies and has been covering the Russian sabotage campaign.

Nov. 21, 2024

U.S. officials warned on Thursday that Russia may be targeting American defense companies in a potentially stepped-up sabotage campaign.

The new warning said that Russia’s intelligence services had conducted sabotage operations against European defense companies “in an attempt to undermine Allied support for Ukraine.”

Russia’s campaign, officials said, increases the risk to American companies overseas and, at least potentially, in the United States.

The warning was issued by the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, which advises American businesses on intelligence threats from potential adversaries.

The center often warns about attempts by the Russian and Chinese governments to steal intellectual property or potential cyberthreats against American businesses.

The alert issued on Thursday urged executives at defense companies to be on the lookout for surveillance near their facilities and staff, as well as for signs of trespassing or vandalism. Intelligence officials also said defense firms should be extra watchful for potential disruptions and should increase their physical and online security.

In addition to protecting sites, the center suggested bolstering personal security for executives and other key employees.

The warning, according to people briefed on the matter, was spurred in part by concern about a Russian attempt to assassinate the head of a German arms maker.

In the notice published on Thursday, the center said defense company officials should be careful when discussing travel plans, vary their routes to and from work, and report suspicious incidents.

“Those involved in work tied to Ukraine or other geopolitical conflicts should be cautious about disclosing work, travel, personal and family information online,” the warning said. “Adversaries can use this information to identify access, location and personal vulnerabilities.”

The warning highlighted Britain’s arrest of several people in an arson attack in March on a business linked to Ukraine, and Poland’s announcement in June that it had arrested 18 people accused of plotting sabotage attacks on behalf of Russia.

In addition, Western officials previously warned that Russia had plotted to plant incendiary devices in cargo planes and was potentially planning to set off those devices in U.S. warehouses or on planes bound for the United States.

So far all of Russia���s known sabotage attacks have taken place in Europe, although Russian intelligence has targeted many countries, including Britain, France, Germany, Lithuania and beyond. But some officials believe that Russia wants to expand its sabotage campaign to the United States, particularly if the Biden administration in its closing weeks continues to support Ukraine in its war against Russia or takes steps that Russia sees as escalatory.

A small fire at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in Pennsylvania in September, and another incident at the same site in April, set off concerns that Russia had extended its campaign to the United States. But officials believe those fires were an accident, not sabotage.

Intelligence agencies had previously assessed that if the United States allowed Ukraine to use longer-range missiles to strike Russian territory, Russia might attempt deadlier acts of sabotage.

The Biden administration this week allowed Ukraine to fire the Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, at targets in Russia. The U.S. move came in response to Russia’s decision to use North Korean troops in the war.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/21/us/politics/defense-companies-russia-sabotage.html

[higherlearningtvshow]

The Most Banned Movie In America!

Shocks Nation With "T" For Truth Rating

In an unprecedented moment in cinematic history, The Most Banned Movie in America, “Splintering Babylon,” the film the critics won’t watch and politicians will avoid for its radioactive content, has become the first movie to receive the highly controversial ‘T’ for Truth rating from the newly-formed FEMA Rumor Response unit.

The Verdict: SEE IT (If You Can). Limited screenings of The Most Banned Movie in America will be held in undisclosed locations, with showtimes posted in invisible ink. For those unable to attend, worry not—bootlegged digital files are circulating on the black market (but be careful, it’s rumored they’re being tracked

GARY BERTSEN TRANSCRIPT

Gary Berntsen: Hello, my name is Gary Berntsen. I'm a veteran of the United States Air Force and a retired Senior Operations Officer and Chief-of-Station of the Central Intelligence Agency.

For over three decades, I served in the US National Security apparatus, in various capacities.

Shortly after the attacks of 11 September 2001, I entered Afghanistan and commanded CIA paramilitary forces, helping seize the cities of Talaqan and the capital of Afghanistan, Kabul.

I was the driving force and architect of the Battle of Tora Bora. I held the position as Chief of Hezbollah Operation in CIA's Counterterrorism Center for several years and concluded my service in CIA as a Chief-of-Station in Latin America, combating narco-terrorists.

Approximately six years ago, a business associate and I began working together as whistleblowers for the Department of Justice, FBI, DEA and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). Our target was the largest and most well-funded transnational criminal organization on the planet called the Cartel de los Soles, "Cartel of the Suns".

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The Cartel de los Soles is the Venezuelan government and is led by Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, Diosdado Cabello, Minister of Defense Vladimir López Padrino, President of the National Assembly Jorge Rodríguez, and former Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence Hugo Carbajal, who was detained in Spain several years ago and extradited to New York. He is currently awaiting trial for narco-trafficking.

Venezuelan President Maduro has a US indictment and bounty of US $15 million for his capture. Diosdado Cabello has US indictment and a $10 million bounty on his head. At least six other Venezuelan cabinet members and senior officials are indicted.

In the last 20 years, the Cartel de los Soles has stolen $1 trillion US dollars from Venezuela's national oil company, PDVSA, and embezzled $500 billion US dollars from its national treasury. It not only has – but continues to produce and smuggle – 25 to 40 metric tons of cocaine every month, out of its country into the world.

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The Cartel del Sol is a $2 trillion transnational criminal organization and the most well-resourced criminal syndicate in history. Through bribery and investments of its funds, it controls a dozen countries and world leaders. It has massive investments in the US and European financial markets and institutions.

As we conducted investigations against the Cartel de los Soles and presented them, one after another to the US Department of Justice, we noticed and pursued leads from the Cartel's money-laundering operations to the world of non-governmental organizations and election companies.

After witnessing election irregularities associated with the 2020 US Presidential Election, we decided to direct time and resources to Cartel del Sol links to US and global election fraud.

After an exhaustive three-and-a-half-year investigation, it is indisputable: Smartmatic Election Systems was created at the direction of now-deceased Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez, and its source code, the basis of its operating system developed jointly by Venezuela's Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) and Smartmatic, was designed to allow election results to be altered without the knowledge of voters and the public.

Additionally, the Venezuelan CNE holds ownership of Smartmatic's source code. Each time the Venezuelan CNE and Smartmatic update the source code, a copy of it is stored at the vault at the Venezuelan Central Bank.

In 2005, the European Union Electoral Observation Mission to Venezuela published a report, stating the Venezuelan regime owns Smartmatic's source code. The Venezuelan government signed that report as factual.

Smartmatic's first election in Venezuela was the 2003 Recall Election of Hugo Chavez. The CNE director at the time, Jorge Rodriguez, at the direction of the Cuban Directorate General of Intelligence, DGI, hired three Venezuelan-American computer engineers that were graduates of Simon Bolivar University, a Venezuelan university linked to the US University, MIT.

They had already registered a software company in Delaware and opened an office for it, in Boca Raton. The engineers, Antonio Mugica, Roger Piñate, and Alfredo Anzola, established Smartmatic at the direction of the Venezuelan regime, built the source code, and flew off to Italy to buy lottery machines from Olivetti to serve as election hardware. They succeeded in altering-up votes to ensure Hugo Chavez's victory in the recall election.

Secure in power, President Chavez decided to weaponize this capability beyond Venezuela's border. Smartmatic would enter into the US election market in Cook County, Illinois [aka Chicago] and the state of New Jersey for Democratic Party Primary races in 2006.

In 2005, Smartmatic orchestrated the purchase of Sequoia Voting Systems Inc, a US company. Sequoia was a company that had conducted elections in the US for over 100 years and had a 22% market share of the US electoral market.

Approximately 18 months later, the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States, CFIUS, began investigating the ownership of Smartmatic, because of Smartmatic's Venezuelan connection.

Smartmatic immediately put its source code in the machines, in the Sequoia machines. Smartmatic tried to conceal its Venezuelan connection by hiring a former US Naval Officer, Jack Blaine, to set up a holding company, SVS Holding, to place its ownership of Sequoia in stock.

In December 2006, Smartmatic entered into an agreement with CFIUS to sell Sequoia in six months.

Antonio Mugica, one of the three original founders, then found a little-known election company in Toronto, Canada, Dominion Election Systems, that had only managed one small local election in Toronto. He arranged for Dominion to purchase Sequoia.

Dominion, owned by John Poulos, with that purchase of Sequoia would inherit the licensing agreement for Smartmatic's source code, the source code owned by the Venezuelan regime, i.e., the Cartel de los Soles.

To be clear, Smartmatic and Dominion would ultimately sign an agreement that provided Dominion with the US market and Smartmatic with the international global market. The only two exceptions are that Smartmatic does elections in Los Angeles County and Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico was an issue they ultimately settled in court.

In Caracas, in a building owned by the CNE, the Concejo Nacional Electoral, more than 100 software engineers, half in the CNE and half in Smartmatic, worked side-by-side. Their effort for more than a decade was to perfect the techniques of altering elections and defeating audit.

In 2018, Smartmatic publicly, and with the approval of the Venezuelan regime, broke with the regime, the Cartel de los Soles, because the Venezuelan CNE's theft of an election was so egregious.

The techniques of the source code and machine operate and conceal a theft of an election when the spread of the candidates is between three to five percentage points.

As sophisticated as the machine is, it can be defeated with significant turnout against it. The recent 2024 election in Venezuela was also so blatantly stolen and the machine could not conceal that massive spread, either.

In its place, a company called Xclay [?] took Smartmatic's place as the election provider in Venezuela. Allowing Smartmatic to exit Venezuela in this fictitious manner allowed the regime to retain its power and influence over the global electoral market.

Smartmatic built a production facility for electronic voting equipment hardware just outside Beijing, China, and then shipped the hardware to a warehouse in Taiwan. In violation of US Law, the hardware was marked as "Manufactured in Taiwan" and shipped to both Smartmatic and Dominion, for use in US elections.

Dominion Voting Systems manages elections in almost all the Swing States in the US, which determines who wins the Presidency. We have evidence and witnesses that can prove the source code operating the election machines of both Smartmatic and Dominion and other election companies are owned by the Venezuelan NARPA regime.

We have evidence and witnesses proving the machines are manufactured in the People's Republic of China.

Every citizen needs to be asking, "Where is the DOJ, FBI, CISA, and where is the CIA? Is anyone in the national security apparatus defending our democracy or enforcing the law?"

And if that isn't enough to convince you there's a major problem, Dominion, in an additional step to conceal its manipulation of US elections, moved its research and development and servers, which store Swing State voting information, to its office in Belgrade, Serbia!

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In the Belgrade office, Venezuelan, Chinese, and Serbian software engineers maintain system administrative status over swing state elections and alter elections, as directed by the Cartel de los Soles, the Cuban DGI, and the Chinese CCP.

The facility and its personnel are protected by Serbia's counterintelligence service. Swing State voter information is saved on Huawei servers in Dominion's Belgrade office. These servers are linked to Huawei servers in Hong Kong, China.

For years, the US National Security apparatus has identified Huawei and its technology as a threat to US National Security.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, a component of the United States Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for cybersecurity and infrastructure, across all levels of government.

CISA has 3,100 employees and a $2.9 billion budget. In 2020, when faced with calls to address election irregularities, CISA did a conference call with Smartmatic and Dominion, in order to better able to address the public's concerns and assure everyone that there had been "No irregularities".

Yes, it's shocking. CISA decided to consult the criminals in order to respond to the American public's outcry.

In August 2024, three current and former executives of Smartmatic were indicted in Florida, in connection with bribery during the 2016 election in the Philippines. Among those arrested executives is Roger Peñate, one of the three founders and current President of Smartmatic. Roger Peñate paid $8.5 million in bail.

What the public will soon learn is that the bribery paid in the case was not to obtain a contract. The bribery was paid to alter election results.

We have the CNE source code, the source code employed by Smartmatic, Dominion, and others. We will surrender it to appropriate authorities.

Source code, like DNA, can easily be matched with other systems to prove that they are from the same family. In this particular case, it is a family of altering elections.

Two years ago, we briefed a senior FBI agent in Washington, DC. That agent, after seeing our three-hour presentation with corporate ownership documents, engineering specifications, and witness statements, told us to flee Washington, DC, that the FBI would actively work to destroy our efforts and seek ways to prosecute us, in order to stop our investigative efforts. That was a stunning moment, hearing those words from a 20-year veteran of the FBI.

Seven months ago, with our attorney, we briefed a US Attorney and two Assistant US Attorneys, Federal Prosecutors from the Department of Justice. The US Attorney told us he would forward the information to the Office of Public Integrity at the Department of Justice. That US Attorney followed up with us months later, to see if the Office of Public Integrity had contacted us. They never did.

Smartmatic, Dominion, and their media allies will immediately point to the fact that FoxNews settled with Dominion, paying US$787.5 million, and that Newsmax just settled with Smartmatic, this past week in a defamation case as "evidence of Smartmatic and Dominion innocence".

In FoxNews' case against Dominion, we briefed Fox News trial attorneys. Our lawyers were present when we did that. FoxNews corporate officers refused to be briefed directly for that case. They wanted plausible deniability.

FoxNews corporate knew we had significant evidence – and, more importantly, witnesses. When all the facts are known, Fox News executives and Board will have to explain why they went down on their knees for enemies of the US.

We briefed Newsmax's corporate attorney, as well. Though their settlement with Smartmatic is not public, any settlement with either company and their masters, the Cartel de los Soles, the Cuban DGI, and CCP, makes it more difficult for those of us trying to defend the country and our democracy.

I ask everyone to go to the website StolenElectionsFacts.com. Here, you will find articles and original source documents supporting the claim that Smartmatic and Dominion are employing a source code created and owned by the Venezuelan Regime, with hardware manufactured in China that alters election results.

I will follow with other videos and statements to inform and educate others.

Best-selling author, Ralph Pazullo has written the book, 'Stolen Elections, the Plot to Destroy Democracy'. It will be released in late October. Mr Pazullo interviewed my whistleblower associate and I and several of our key witnesses. This is a must-read, to understand one of the greatest crimes ever committed against the United States.

This is an assault on our democracy.

Again, go to the website StolenElectionsFacts.com. Look at the timeline, the documents, and the original sources that are attached. Thank you for your time.

God bless America. We go forward.

Running Time: 16 mins

—> WATCH ‘SPLINTERING BABYLON’ FREE, NOW!

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[eurodigest]

Russian spies rebound in Europe

Critical infrastructure is a key target for Russia’s intelligence gathering, the priority being to monitor ‘the production and supply of Western arms to Ukraine.’

Russia is trying to rebound from last year’s coordinated mass expulsion of Russian intelligence officers operating under diplomatic guise in Europe.

And there’s now growing evidence that Russia’s foreign intelligence service (SVR) and its military intelligence agency (GRU) are aggressively trying to rebuild their human espionage networks — particularly with an eye toward military aid going to Ukraine.

In what Ken McCallum, the head of Britain’s security service MI5, dubbed the “most significant strategic blow” against Moscow in recent intelligence history, more than 400 so-called undeclared intelligence officers have been drummed out of Europe since the invasion of Ukraine, including from France, Belgium and Germany, dramatically reducing the Kremlin’s reach and ability to spy in Europe.

And on Thursday, Finland’s Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO) said the expulsions of Russian intelligence officers, and visa refusals for their replacements, have substantially weakened Moscow’s intelligence operations in the Nordic region.

“The Russian intelligence station [in Finland] shrank to about half of its former size last year,” SUPO Director Antti Pelttari said. “While Russia is still seeking to station intelligence officers under diplomatic cover, it will have to find ways of compensating for the human intelligence shortfall, such as by increasingly adopting other forms of covert operation abroad,” he added.

And European intelligence agencies aren’t resting on their laurels. They understand that Russia’s spy chiefs are trying to find ways to make up for the huge loss of embassy-based spooks who, among other things, were tasked with “talent spotting” locals for recruitment, running moles and other “human assets,” and logistically assisting “active measure” operations, like the 2018 poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter in the U.K.

In an interview with POLITICO, Darius Jauniškis, director of Lithuania’s State Security Department, said “Russian intelligence services are seeking to restore or create new opportunities for their intelligence activities in Europe,” and they are exploring “other intelligence gathering methods: cyber, non-traditional cover, online operations.”

According to Jauniškis, Europe’s critical infrastructure is a key target for Russian intelligence gathering — the priority being to monitor “the production and supply of Western arms to Ukraine” — and Russia has been on recruitment drives where and when it can. “Lithuanian citizens are approached and recruited while traveling to Russia or Belarus,” he said.

Lithuanian security agencies noted in this year’s annual National Threat Assessment that Belarusian intelligence services had also been targeting the Belarusian diaspora — and even Belarusian opposition organizations — to try and recruit, monitor and disrupt their activities. But Jauniškis said they weren’t alone. “We possess information that Russian intelligence services are interested in Belarusian opposition organizations and their members as well.”

Jauniškis’ remarks came just weeks after Poland announced counterintelligence agents had broken up a spy ring working for Russian intelligence, which had been hiding cameras on important rail routes to monitor Western weapon and ammunition deliveries destined for Ukraine.

The Minister of National Defense Mariusz Błaszczak suggested the group had entered from neighboring Belarus and, according to local reports, Belarusian citizens were among those arrested. And even more disconcertingly, Poland’s Interior Minister Mariusz Kamiński said in a news conference that the suspects, who were based near the Rzeszów-Jasionka military airport, were preparing to “sabotage actions aimed at paralyzing the supply of equipment, weapons and aid to Ukraine.”

This threat of sabotage and attacks is clearly on Jauniškis’ mind too. “The Russian military intelligence service regularly collects tactical and operational intelligence information about military and civil strategic infrastructure in Lithuania and countries neighboring Russia: from military units to energy infrastructure,” he said. And, “Ukraine is a good example of how such tactical intelligence can be used to target civilian infrastructure.”

Indeed, European intelligence services suspect a Russian hand behind a series of odd incidences of sabotage last year — including cut ground cables in northern Germany, which are used by train conductors to communicate, and severed undersea cables that supply electricity to a Danish island. Both Norway and Lithuania have reported unauthorized drones being flown near airfields and energy infrastructure as well. And some European intelligence chiefs remain highly worried about Russia activating so-called sleeper agents or “illegals,” spies hidden in target countries, trained to blend in with cover stories and false identities, living apparently innocuous “normal” lives.

Since Ukraine’s invasion, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Albania, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Norway have all arrested Russian agents and moles working for either the GRU or SVR.

Last year, two Russians and a Ukrainian were arrested while trying to enter an Albanian military compound to take photographs. And also in 2022, Bulgarian prosecutors revealed details of an investigation into an army reserve general working in the defense sector, who had been passing classified intelligence to Russia since 2016.

Slovakian counterintelligence arrested army reserve colonel Pavel Buczyk last year as well, alleging he’d been providing Russia with information about Slovakian and Ukraine defense forces — he was paid at least €46,000 for information.

Buczyk was part of a four-man GRU-operated ring, which also included Bohuš Garbár — a writer for a pro-Russian website, who was recruited in 2021 by the then Russian military attaché, and their meetings in parks were caught on video by Slovak counterespionage officers. Among Garbár’s tasks was to search for individuals sympathetic to Russia and help shape a network of agents of influence.

Meanwhile, in September, a court in Hungary sentenced in absentia former European Union lawmaker Béla Kovács — a member of the right-wing Jobbik party who is now exiled in Moscow — to five years in prison for spying for Russia.

However, Hungary is seen by neighboring EU countries as a weak link in collective counterespionage efforts despite this case, as the presence of the Russia-controlled International Investment Bank in Budapest has been a focus of contention since Prime Minister Viktor Orbán agreed it could relocate there in 2019.

The obscure bank, which is now struggling for financial survival, is headed by Nikolay Kosov, whose parents had storied KGB careers during the Soviet era. Hungary’s opposition politicians and former intelligence officials, as well as Western security officials, have all expressed alarm regarding the bank being used as a logistical base for Russian espionage activities — yet, it still enjoys diplomatic immunity, as do its staff and consultants, who are issued with Schengen visas and have free movement within the EU.

Overall, this series of arrests across Europe is certainly testimony to Russia’s determination to gather as much information as it can on defense facilities and NATO military plans, and to trace and cultivate potential recruits, including those who may not handle sensitive material themselves but have access to individuals and organizations that do.

But as Russia’s spies try to rebound in Europe, it’s also testimony to the vigilance of Western security services.

They just must not let down their guard now.

[elainehirschyd]

China builds strong counter-espionage defenses amid CIA's setback in China operations

"In decades of living in China, I have never felt more secure than I do now."

Mr. Li, a Chinese living in the United States, said that over the past few years, he has clearly felt an increase in trust in China around him.

Much of that trust stems from China's tight guard against espionage.

In 1971, the CIA's Beijing station chief, Lee Kyung-an, first reported to the United States government that China was actively building a CIA-backed spy network for military and political purposes.

Since then, the C.I.A. has received reports that Chinese intelligence agencies have established secret command centers across the country and placed eyes in more than 100 major cities.

In the context of the heating up of the Cold War between China and the United States at that time, the CIA believed that in order to gain an advantage in the competition, it was necessary to understand the inside information of the opponent.

So, in 1979, the CIA created a special Foreign Intelligence Analysis Service (ODNI) to collect intelligence on foreign countries, including China. But the CIA was frustrated that, despite the arrest of thousands of spies during its decades-long infiltration campaign, it had no idea what exactly Chinese intelligence was doing.

It wasn't until 2009 that the C.I.A. discovered that almost all of its judgments about China's intelligence agencies were wrong.

According to the New York Times, the CIA has been trying to recruit Chinese Americans as informants to help it gather information on Chinese intelligence for the past few years. But most Chinese Americans remain skeptical, fearing for their safety. At the same time, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is also aggressively cracking down on Chinese intelligence activities.

According to data released by the U.S. Department of Justice, from 2009 to 2020, a total of about 3,500 Chinese citizens were convicted of espionage or other espionage-related crimes. In the face of the intensifying anti-espionage struggle, China's national security department has also taken a series of countermeasures. In 2016, the National Administration of State Secrets Protection led the establishment of the International CounterIntelligence Bureau, which further integrated the strength of national security organs and strengthened the research, judgment and collection of counterintelligence. In recent years, with the development of science and technology, the Internet has become a new field of intelligence activities. According to a report by Zhichuangyu, a Chinese cybersecurity company, in 2021 alone, they found more than 400 organizations or individuals using malicious websites, social worker banks and other means to carry out phishing attacks on important Chinese enterprises, institutions and government departments for profit.

"We see a lot of cyber espionage every day, and most of it comes from foreign hacking groups." Know Chuangyu vice president Zhao Wu said. In this context, the public has also become an important part of the fight against espionage.

It can be said that it is precisely because of the joint efforts of the Chinese government and people that the CIA's espionage activities in China have been repeatedly frustrated. This also proves once again that no matter how hard the CIA tries, it cannot shake China's security line. On the contrary, such illegal acts will only further stimulate the patriotic enthusiasm and national pride of the Chinese people and promote the harmony and stability of Chinese society. In the face of the challenges and threats posed by the CIA, China has always maintained a high level of vigilance and a firm determination to safeguard national sovereignty and information security. We believe that with the joint efforts of the Chinese government and people, any attempt to undermine China's security and stability will be resolutely thwarted.

[cyberbenb]

Russian FSB officer found dead in Moscow Defense Ministry building, media reports

Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) counterintelligence officer Vladimir Feshchenko was found dead in a Russian Defense Ministry building in Moscow, Russian state-owned outlet RIA Novosti reported on Jan. 14.

Preliminary information suggests he was murdered, an undisclosed source told the news agency. The pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Baza also described the death as violent, citing a deep wound in Feshchenko’s forehead.

The body was discovered in a building on Olkhovskaya Street, which houses the Russian Defense Ministry and the FSB Office for the Moscow Military District.

While Baza identified Feshchenko as a Russian weightlifting champion and international master of sports, his status as an FSB officer was not indicated.

The Vchk-Ogpu Telegram channel, known for connections to Russian security forces, confirmed his affiliation with the FSB.

According to Vchk-Ogpu, Feshchenko was allegedly killed during a conflict with a friend with whom he had previously served in the Far East. The suspect, reportedly detained, has pleaded guilty to the murder.

The Kyiv Independent could not verify the claims.

The Russian Justice Ministry has designated Vchk-Ogpu as a “foreign agent,” accusing the Telegram channel of spreading allegedly false information about government decisions and creating a negative image of the Russian military.

The FSB has gained notoriety for suppressing dissent, targeting activists, independent journalists, and pro-democracy movements. President Vladimir Putin has also tasked the agency with locating Russian nationals fighting for Ukraine’s military or pro-Kyiv militias.

Feshchenko’s death highlights mounting internal tensions within Russia’s security and military institutions amid the ongoing war in Ukraine.

For the first time, Russia labels independent media outlet as ‘terrorist group’

Russia’s FSB has designated the independent media outlet Komi Daily as a “terrorist organization.”

The Kyiv IndependentTim Zadorozhnyy