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dontmeantobepoliticalbut · 1 year

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It’s been nearly eight months since Russian President Vladimir Putin sent troops and tanks over the border into Ukraine, and a lot has changed in that time. Ukraine has shown itself to be a far more robust military force than pretty much anyone predicted. Talk has changed from wondering how long Ukraine could hold out to how much territory it can retake — and to when and how the war will end.

But it’s still hard to imagine how Putin’s war on Ukraine will conclude. Does Putin even have an endgame? If he really wants to control Ukrainian territory, why does he seem so bent on destroying it?

To get insights into these questions, I reached out to Fiona Hill, one of America’s most clear-eyed observers of Russia and Putin, who served as an adviser to former President Donald Trump and gained fame for her testimony in his first impeachment trial. In the early days of Russia’s war on Ukraine, Hill warned in an interview with POLITICO that what Putin was trying to do was not only seize Ukraine but destroy the current world order. And she recognized from the start that Putin would use the threat of nuclear conflict to try to get his way.

Now, despite the setbacks Russia has suffered on the battlefield, Hill thinks Putin is undaunted. She sees him adapting to new conditions, not giving up. And she sees him trying to get the West to accede to his aims by using messengers like billionaire Elon Musk to propose arrangements that would end the conflict on his terms.

“Putin plays the egos of big men, gives them a sense that they can play a role. But in reality, they’re just direct transmitters of messages from Vladimir Putin,” Hill says.

But while Putin appears to be doubling down in Ukraine, the conflict poses some real dangers to his leadership. He has identified himself quite directly with the war, Hill notes, and he can’t afford to look like a loser. If he begins to lose support from Russian elites, his hold on power could slip.

The West has come a long way since February in understanding the stakes in Ukraine, Hill says, but the world still hasn’t totally grasped the full challenge Putin is posing. Putin must be contained, Hill says, but that won’t happen unless and until international institutions established in the wake of World War II evolve so they can contain him. And that conversation is only just beginning.

“This is a great power conflict, the third great power conflict in the European space in a little over a century,” Hill says. “It’s the end of the existing world order. Our world is not going to be the same as it was before.”

This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

REYNOLDS: The war clearly hasn’t gone as Putin originally intended. How has Putin reacted to his setbacks and how do you think his mindset is evolving?

HILL: Whenever he has a setback, Putin figures he can get out of it, that he can turn things around. That’s partly because of his training as a KGB operative. In the past, when asked about the success of operations, he’s pooh-poohed the idea that operations always go as planned, that everything is always perfect. He says there are always problems in an operation, there are always setbacks. Sometimes they’re absolute disasters. The key is adaptation.

Another hallmark of Putin is that he doubles down. He always takes the more extreme step in his range of options, the one that actually cuts off other alternatives. Putin has often related an experience he had as a kid, when he trapped a rat in a corner in the apartment building he lived in, in Leningrad, and the rat shocked him by jumping out and fighting back. He tells this story as if it’s a story about himself, that if he’s ever cornered, he will always fight back.

But he’s also the person who puts himself in the corner. We know that the Russians have had very high casualties and that they’ve been running out of manpower and equipment in Ukraine. The casualty rate on the Russian side keeps mounting. A few months ago, estimates were 50,000. Now the suggestions are 90,000 killed or severely injured. This is a real blow given the 170,000 Russia troops deployed to the Ukrainian border when the invasion began.

So, what does Putin do? He sends even more troops in by launching a full-on mobilization. He still hasn’t said this is a war. It remains a “special military operation,” but he calls up 300,000 people. Then, he goes several steps further and announces the annexation of the territories that Russia has been fighting over for the last several months, not just Donetsk and Luhansk, but also the territories of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.

Putin gives himself no way out except to pursue the original goals he had when he went in, which is the dismemberment of Ukraine and Russia annexing its territory. And he’s still trying to adapt his responses to setbacks on the battlefield.

REYNOLDS: At this point, if he’s so adaptive, do you think he has an endgame?

HILL: In his mind, I think Putin still thinks he’s got more game to play. His endgame is to go out of this war on his terms. What we’re seeing right now, with the annexations and the big speech that he made on September 30th is very clear. He sees this conflict as a full-on war with the West, and he still is adamant on removing Ukraine from the map and from global affairs.

It’s also clear that he has no intention whatsoever of giving up Donetsk and Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, as well as Crimea, which he’s already taken and already declared as part of Russia for time immemorial.

REYNOLDS: Why does Putin want all that territory? Does he want the symbolism of having restored an important part of the Russian Empire, reestablishing this mythological Novorossiya, taking back lands that Russia seized from the Ottoman Empire? Or does he really want to rule this part of modern-day Ukraine in concrete, practical ways?

HILL: It’s actually both of those things. They are inextricably linked. You mentioned this idea of Novorossiya, “New Russia.” I think most people have forgotten that he used this term in 2014. Back then, the Kremlin triggered the war in Donbas as part of an effort to regain control of the territories of Novorossiya that were first annexed from the Ottoman Empire by Catherine the Great back in the late 18th century.

There wasn’t really a lot of settlement there then, and that’s how we got Potemkin villages — Prince Grigory Potemkin took Catherine on a carriage ride through her new dominion and they created fake villages, with peasants brought in to wave at the empress as she went by.

We have this same issue now — what and who is Putin presiding over? Even Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s press secretary, recently admitted that Russia hasn’t quite worked out the borders of the annexed areas yet, because the Ukrainians have been pushing back. The question of what Russia actually controls beyond all the symbolism of annexation is still a major question.

REYNOLDS: If Putin wants Ukrainian territory so badly, why is he raining down such destruction on civilian areas and committing so many human rights abuses in occupied areas?

HILL: This is punishment, but also perverse redevelopment. You cow people into submission, destroy what they had and all their links to their past and their old lives, and then make them into something new and, thus, yours. Destroy Ukraine and Ukrainians. Build New Russia and create Russians. Its brutal but also a hallmark of imperial conquest.

REYNOLDS: And it’s how they did it in the 18th century.

HILL: Exactly. Putin would love to control the territory. But control involves actually having people on your side. And that is really a big question. We’ve seen in all of these territories, Russia shipping people out or detaining them, from entire families and children to teachers, administrators and local police, and then proxy citizens sent in from Russia itself.

Putin’s initial goal when he launched the invasion was the collapse of central Ukrainian authority, the imposition of a puppet government in Kyiv, and all local governments swearing allegiance to Moscow, probably with some political commissar-type proxy leaders put in place around the country — the kind of thing that we saw happening in 2014 in the Russian-occupied territories of Donetsk and Lugansk and Crimea. But of course, that didn’t happen. So the problem that Putin has is controlling people in these territories rather than playing his own version of Potemkin villages.

REYNOLDS: We’ve recently had Elon Musk step into this conflict trying to promote discussion of peace settlements. What do you make of the role that he’s playing?

HILL: It’s very clear that Elon Musk is transmitting a message for Putin. There was a conference in Aspen in late September when Musk offered a version of what was in his tweet — including the recognition of Crimea as Russian because it’s been mostly Russian since the 1780s — and the suggestion that the Ukrainian regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia should be up for negotiation, because there should be guaranteed water supplies to Crimea. He made this suggestion before Putin’s annexation of those two territories on September 30. It was a very specific reference. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia essentially control all the water supplies to Crimea. Crimea is a dry peninsula. It has aquifers, but it doesn’t have rivers. It’s dependent on water from the Dnipro River that flows through a canal from Kherson. It’s unlikely Elon Musk knows about this himself. The reference to water is so specific that this clearly is a message from Putin.

Now, there are several reasons why Musk’s intervention is interesting and significant. First of all, Putin does this frequently. He uses prominent people as intermediaries to feel out the general political environment, to basically test how people are going to react to ideas. Henry Kissinger, for example, has had interactions with Putin directly and relayed messages. Putin often uses various trusted intermediaries including all kinds of businesspeople. I had intermediaries sent to discuss things with me while I was in government.

This is a classic Putin play. It’s just fascinating, of course, that it’s Elon Musk in this instance, because obviously Elon Musk has a huge Twitter following. He’s got a longstanding reputation in Russia through Tesla, the SpaceX space programs and also through Starlink. He’s one of the most popular men in opinion polls in Russia. At the same time, he’s played a very important part in supporting Ukraine by providing Starlink internet systems to Ukraine, and kept telecommunications going in Ukraine, paid for in part by the U.S. government. Elon Musk has enormous leverage as well as incredible prominence. Putin plays the egos of big men, gives them a sense that they can play a role. But in reality, they’re just direct transmitters of messages from Vladimir Putin.

REYNOLDS: Putin is very comfortable dealing with billionaires and oligarchs. That’s a world that he knows well. But by using Musk this way, he goes right over the heads of [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian government.

HILL: He is basically short-circuiting the diplomatic process. He wants to lay out his terms and see how many people are going to pick them up. All of this is an effort to get Americans to take themselves out of the war and hand over Ukraine and Ukrainian territory to Russia.

REYNOLDS: You have compared Putin’s invasion of Ukraine to Hitler’s invasions of other countries in World War II, of Czechoslovakia, of Poland. Do you still see it that way? Do you think that Putin has become Hitler-like in how he thinks of himself and how he seeks territory?

HILL: Yes, but also like Kaiser Wilhelm in World War I as well. Look, exactly 100 years before Putin annexed Crimea in 2014, in 1914, the Germans invaded Belgium and France and World War I was fought as a Great Power conflict to eject Germany from Belgium and France. And World War II in Europe, of course, was a refighting territorially of many of the outcomes of World War I.

Part of the problem is that conceptually, people have a hard time with the idea of a world war. It brings all kinds of horrors to mind — the Holocaust and the detonation of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the dawning of the nuclear age. But if you think about it, a world war is a great power conflict over territory which overturns the existing international order and where other states find themselves on different sides of the conflict. It involves economic warfare, information warfare, as well as kinetic war.

We’re in the same situation. Again, Putin invaded Ukraine in 2014, exactly 100 years after Germany invaded Belgium and France — and just in the same way that Hitler seized the Sudetenland, annexed Austria and invaded Poland. We’re having a hard time coming to terms with what we’re dealing with here. This is a great power conflict, the third great power conflict in the European space in a little over a century. It’s the end of the existing world order. Our world is not going to be the same as it was before.

People worry about this being dangerous hyperbole. But we have to really accept what the situation is to be able to respond appropriately. Each war has been fought differently. Modern wars involve information space and cyberspace, and we’ve seen all of these at play here. And, in the 21st century, these are economic and financial wars. We’re all-in on the financial and economic side of things.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has turned global energy and food security on its head because of the way Russia is leveraging gas and oil and the blockade Putin has imposed in the Black Sea against Ukrainian grain exports. Russia has not just targeted Ukrainian agricultural production, as well as port facilities for exporting grain, but caused a global food crisis. These are global effects of what is very clearly not just a regional war.

Keep in mind that Putin himself has used the language of both world wars. He’s talked about the fact that Ukraine did not exist as a state until after World War I, after the dissolution of the Russian Empire and the creation of the Soviet Union. He has blamed the early Soviets for the formation of what he calls an artificial state. Right from the very beginning, Putin himself has said that he is refighting World War II. So, the hyperbole has come from Vladimir Putin, who has said that he’s reversing all of the outcomes territorially from World War I and also, in effect, World War II and the Cold War. He’s not accepting the territorial configuration of Europe as it currently is.

What we have to figure out now is, how are we going to contend with this?

REYNOLDS: China and India, Xi Jinping, Narendra Modi, and other world leaders who have not exactly been with West on this — how do you think their views of what Russia is doing is changing?

HILL: This is another global dimension. Just before the invasion, at the Beijing Olympics, we had Xi Jinping and Putin standing in seeming solidarity, talking about a limitless partnership, and Xi Jinping being very explicit in terms of Chinese opposition to the expansion of NATO and the role of NATO in the world. Clearly, at that point, Xi and China didn’t expect that Vladimir Putin’s special military operation would turn into the largest military action in Europe since World War II. Now, Xi Jinping is leery about showing any kind of diminution of his support for Vladimir Putin and Russia, since that would suggest he made a major miscalculation in lending Putin support. We haven’t seen Xi repudiating Putin and Russia directly. But we’ve certainly seen some signs of concern. At a meeting in Central Asia around the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Putin himself acknowledged that China had concerns. We’re pretty sure at this point that the Chinese also don’t like Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber rattling in the context of the war in Ukraine, because that destabilizes the larger strategic balance globally, not just in Europe.

For India, this has been a nightmare, frankly, and they’ve been trying to straddle the fence and figure out a balance. They don’t want to get on the wrong side of the United States or Ukraine, or Russia, and they just don’t really know quite what to do. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Modi has said explicitly to Putin, look, this is a time for peace, not war. And being much more outspoken on the issue of the conflict than perhaps some might have anticipated. That’s not insignificant.

Once we get past the party Congress in China, we should watch how the Chinese-Russian relationship plays out. China would be instrumental in signaling to Putin how far he can go in terms of pursuing his endgame.

REYNOLDS: Let’s talk about the situation inside Russia. Do you think Putin was surprised by the wave of protests that followed his announcement of what he called a partial mobilization? Or was he expecting that?

HILL: Yes, he was expecting pushback which is why he called it partial when it’s really a stealth full mobilization. The goal is to try to get the military up to full strength and get everybody he possibly can. The problem is that all these new forces are not battle ready. Many have had minimal military training. It’s very clear that most of them are going to be used as cannon fodder.

Putin’s responding not just to the setbacks on the battlefield, but to setbacks in the information war in the domestic arena. He’s getting pushback from the party of war. We have to remember there were nationalists since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s who wanted to retake Ukraine, not just Crimea, and reabsorb all the Russian-speaking territories. People in the cohort around Putin have pushed the invasion of Ukraine for some considerable period of time, and he has to keep them on his side. They are not satisfied. They want Ukraine dismembered.

The shock, perhaps, is how many Russians have fled the mobilization. Although Russian authorities have been going to the borders to forcibly conscript people lining up to leave, they still haven’t taken the step of closing all the borders off. Putin and the Kremlin are aware that they would get a massive backlash if they did. We’ve already seen violence in Dagestan and other places where ethnic minorities have borne the brunt of recruitment. I think they are very, very aware that they’ve got to leave a safety valve open because otherwise there might be more protests, and more violence in response to the mobilization.

REYNOLDS: If there are more protests and more violence, does that pose a threat to Putin as leader? How weak or vulnerable is Putin’s position right now?

HILL: Back to the Soviet period, there were tens of thousands of violent protests across the Soviet Union over the years. This didn’t lead to the disintegration of the Soviet Union because of severe repression. It was something messy they had to deal with. They decapitated the opposition, and that’s what Putin’s done. Russia is back to the USSR. Opposition leader Alexei Navalny is in isolation in a penal colony. The repressive capacity of the government is pretty significant. They’ve been taking thousands of people off the streets and putting them in jail. I think Putin feels he can decapitate any organized opposition. He has to just be careful to control the sheer number of opposition protests, which is, again, why they’re keeping the safety valves open.

Putin knows Russian history. World War I did lead to mass protests. The defeat in the Russo-Japanese War earlier in the 1900s also led to mass protests that got out of hand and discredited the czarist system. All of this could discredit him. So, there is some real risk. What he’s making sure of is that there’s no one who could lead these protests and make them coalesce.

If you think back to when Navalny was poisoned in 2020, he was out in the Urals region and Siberia, pulling together opposition groups at a time when there were many protests going on in Russia. He was poisoned because he was getting some traction.

Nonetheless, the mobilization chips away at Putin’s popularity because people feel that they’ve got no hope. They’re no longer able to watch the war on their TV screens and switch it off and forget it’s happening. They’re forced to confront it. Support for the war was already fairly passive, but active support for the war is declining and support for Putin himself will decline as well. And he’s got to keep placating the hardliners. So, he’s got to take extreme actions.

You’re going to start hearing more and more stories of people who’ve gone to the front completely unprepared and got killed. That will reduce tolerance for the special military operation. If that happens, it could impact Putin’s standing among the elite. He’s been pretty much unassailable as long as he’s been the only really truly popular politician in Russia. But if he starts to look like a loser, then he no longer seems infallible. He’s no longer the strongman and arbiter of the system. Although elites are invested in him and his system, there may eventually come a point where people start saying, “maybe somebody else, Vladimir Vladimirovich, maybe somebody else might handle the system better.” It could start with the hardliners trying to push themselves forward.

That’s why, again, we see him doubling down. He’s got himself in a corner in the war and in a corner domestically at home. He has made himself the face of this war in Ukraine. His September 30th speech basically said it’s his war, his annexation, his Russia. And so, everything will fall on him if it falls apart.

REYNOLDS: In the autocratic system that Putin has built, he has to stand for election every so often even though it’s mostly window dressing. But it periodically renews his legitimacy. One of those years is 2024. Is he facing a deadline? Does he need to look like he’s won this war by 2024?

HILL: One would think so. In 2024, the reelection has to be in the early part of the year. So, we’ve got a year and a few months in the Russian political calculations to start to prepare for this and ensure that it all goes smoothly. That was why Putin wanted to get the quick victory in Ukraine well out of the way. Ukraine started in February and March of 2022, because February and March of 2024 will be election time.

I’m sure Putin thought he would have been unassailable with a quick, victorious war. Ukraine would be back in the fold and then probably after that, Belarus. Moldova as well, perhaps. There would have been a reframing of the next phase of Putin as the great czar of a reconstituted “Russkiy mir” or “Russian world.”

If Putin had succeeded at that, maybe he could have found himself in a position where he could have begun to delegate some power to others.

Just this past week, on October 7th, Putin turned 70. He’s in that age when people are asking, does he die in office? There are lots of questions about succession. 2024 is very much an inflection point for the system.

REYNOLDS: Do you feel like Ukraine is on course for a military victory and what would that mean to the Russian side?

HILL: Ukraine has already had a great moral, political and military victory. Russia has not achieved the aims of its special military operation. But I think Putin is obviously hoping that now, with all of the nuclear saber-rattling, threats of nuclear Armageddon, deploying Elon Musk and others to convey his messages, that basically he can take the territory that he’s got and get recognition of that. And then he hopes that he will be able to put pressure back on Ukraine. He’d still like to see the Ukrainian political system crumble away. He’d like to get somebody as leader of Ukraine who is personally loyal to him. Putin hopes that he’ll still prevail, that he’ll find other ways of getting what he wanted when he went across the border in February.

REYNOLDS: So to some extent, the biggest thing that Putin wants right now is to get Zelenskyy out. He wants somebody more pliant.

HILL: That’s exactly what he wants. And I’m sure he feels that he might still get that. I mean, everything that he’s doing is an effort to discredit Ukraine and Ukrainians and Zelenskyy.

Ukraine has the right to choose their own leadership. But Putin will try to manipulate this whichever way he can. He’ll keep trying to soften the battlefield beyond Ukraine, keep on trying to poison attitudes internationally against Ukraine.

REYNOLDS: Along those lines, what do you make of the fact that some Americans, primarily in the Trump wing of the Republican Party and some Fox News personalities, are expressing doubts about how much support the United States should direct to Ukraine? Is there something about this conflict that you don’t think they understand?

HILL: This goes back to the point I tried to make when I testified at the first impeachment trial against President Trump. There’s a direct line between that episode and now. Putin has managed to seed hostile sentiment toward Ukraine. Even if people think they are criticizing Ukraine for their own domestic political purposes, because they want to claim that the Biden administration is giving too much support for Ukraine instead of giving more support to Americans, etc. — they’re replaying the targeted messaging that Vladimir Putin has very carefully fed into our political arena. People may think that they’re acting independently, but they are echoing the Kremlin’s propaganda.

REYNOLDS: What do you think is the right response from the West if Putin does detonate some sort of nuclear weapon, either as a demonstration or something else?

HILL: What Putin is trying to do is to get us to talk about the threat of nuclear war instead of what he is doing in Ukraine. He wants the U.S. and Europe to contemplate, as he says, the risks that we faced during the Cuban Missile Crisis or the Euromissile crisis. He wants us to face the prospect of a great superpower war. His solution is to have secret diplomacy, as we did during Cuban Missile Crisis, and have a direct compromise between the United States and Russia.

But there’s no strategic standoff here. This is pure nuclear blackmail. There can’t be a compromise based on him not setting off a nuclear weapon if we hand over Ukraine. Putin is behaving like a rogue state because, well, he is a rogue state at this point. And he’s being explicit about what he wants. We have to pull all the diplomatic stops out. We have to ensure that he’s not going to have the effect that he wants with this nuclear brinkmanship.

Putin is also making it very clear that to get what you want in the world, you have to have a nuclear weapon and to protect yourself, you also have to have a nuclear weapon. So this is an absolute mess. Global nuclear stability is on a knife edge.

But again, this is not about strategic issues. This is not an issue of strategic stability. This is Vladimir Putin pissed off because he hasn’t got what he wanted in a war that he started. It’s another attempt to adapt to the battlefield.

REYNOLDS: Can this war end in a way that would be satisfying for the West and with Putin remaining as Russian leader? Or is this the beginning of a revolution that’s going to be very messy and dangerous?

HILL: It’s unlikely this ends in any satisfying way. You need every side willing to compromise, and Putin doesn’t want to compromise his goals.

Any compromise is, in any case, always at Ukraine’s expense because Putin has taken Ukrainian territory. If we think about World War I, World War II or the settlements in many other conflicts, they always involved some kind territorial disposition that left one side very unhappy.

There is not going to be a happy or satisfying ending for anybody, and it’s also not going to be happy or satisfying for Vladimir Putin either, honestly.

REYNOLDS: It is striking to me that of all the conflicts that Russia has been engaged in since Putin became president, that none of them have been resolved with any kind of a peace settlement. They just have been fought to stalemate.

HILL: There’s not any good outcome I can see come out of this. What’s incumbent upon us is to figure out is how to constrain Russia’s ability to put Ukraine under pressure again in the future or invade again. If there’s any interim freezing of battle lines, make sure that they’re not recognized as official. Maybe we can contemplate some international receivership. We’ve had many of these different formulations in the past for disputed territory. We have to ensure, again, that Ukraine can always defend itself and make it impossible for Putin to break out of constraints and do this again.

But that still leaves you with lots of questions about the future relationship with Russia, the future configuration of any European security institutions. How do we reconfigure ourselves internationally to deal with this? The United Nations has proven to be in dire need of an overhaul. The United Nations has been a major player in this conflict. The secretary-general has been heavily involved investigating war crimes and pressing resolutions. But the United Nations has shown itself inadequate because of the configuration of the Security Council and the veto. Everybody’s talking about how to address this.

REYNOLDS: It occurs to me that there’s a kind of reckoning coming for NATO. With Finland joining, that adds a long direct border between NATO and Russia. With the new union between Belarus and Russia, there’s going to be another NATO border between Poland and Belarus. Considering the fact that NATO’s already getting a line across Europe that it’s going to have to defend, should NATO consider membership for Ukraine?

HILL: This is also going to be a big issue, right? There are so many people out there who still look at Ukraine as a proxy war. Many of the people trying to push Ukraine to surrender are basically those who believe that the United States or NATO is somehow using Ukraine in a proxy war with Russia.

We’re not in a proxy war with Russia, just like we weren’t in a proxy war with Germany during World War I when we were trying to get German forces out of France and Belgium. It wasn’t a proxy war either when we were trying to get Germany out of Poland and all the other places that it invaded in Europe during World War II. We are trying to help Ukraine liberate itself, having been invaded by Russia.

This whole proxy war debate deprives Ukraine of agency. But, if we talk about Ukraine being part of NATO at this particular moment, it will simply feed into this flawed discussion. It will detract from the essence of what this war is, which is Russia trying to seize Ukrainian territory.

Russia believes NATO is simply a cover for the United States in Europe. I think it should be very clear right now with Finland and Sweden wanting to join that this is not the case at all. Finland and Sweden did not apply to NATO before, they have now because NATO is focused on ensuring common collective security and defense, and Russia has put all of Europe at risk.

I see current NATO expansion as a kind of an interim step, a way station to thinking more broadly about how we configure ourselves after Ukraine.

You know, there’s also talk about making Ukraine a “giant Israel,” making Ukraine completely self-sufficient for its own security, as, frankly, Finland was before. I think we have to have an open discussion about all of this and not be fixated on one aspect or another.

REYNOLDS: In other words, even if Ukraine wins the war for its territory, even if Putin is somehow constrained or deposed, we’re still at the very beginning of a rethinking of the international order that those outcomes are not going to solve.

HILL: Yes. We’ve also had the impacts of COVID. We’ve got a climate crisis, which should be evident to everybody by now. There are so many things that we need to contend with, and we’ve only got the skeleton of an international system.

Putin is holding the whole world hostage. We’ve got so many things that we have to deal with. I understand why the Global South is so frustrated with all of this: “While you’re fighting this war in Ukraine over the same kind of territorial disputes you guys have been having for a hundred years now, we’re dying here from disease and climate change. Our countries have flooded. We’re starving and you guys are expecting us to help you solve this?” The United Nations system is breaking down, as [António] Guterres, the secretary-general, has said over and over again. All the alarm bells are going off. And Vladimir Putin is behaving as if it’s the 1780s all over again.

REYNOLDS: So we need a new or a revamped global order to address the whole problem?

HILL: That’s obvious. So how do we do it? A lot of people don’t find the idea of a revamped United Nations very popular. I can just imagine some of my former colleagues groaning loudly. We definitely need a slimmed-down version.

But we do need international institutions to deal with the magnitude of the problems that we’re facing. It’s ironic that Elon Musk, the man who has been talking about getting us to Mars should be Putin’s messenger for the war in Ukraine, when we’re having a really hard time getting our act together on this planet. But it’s glaringly obvious to ordinary people that we need to do so. Time is not on our side.

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hollywoodfamerp · 1 year

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Cate Blanchett and Julianna Margulies

Chace Crawford and Kaia Gerber

Chittaphon Leechaiyapornkul (Ten) and Jackson Wang

Choi Minho and Kim Ahyoung (Yura)

Choi San and Jeon Junkook

Chris Evans and Jade Chynoweth

Christian Yu and Kim Jisoo

Christopher Bang (Bang Chan) and Hwang Hyunjin

Cindy Kimberly and Niall Horan

Colby Lopez (Seth Rollins) and Rebecca Quin (Becky Lynch)

Crystal Reed and Valentina Zenere

Damiano David and Olivia DeJonge

Diamante Quiava Valentin Harper (Saweetie) and Kim Hongjoong

Dove Cameron and Noah Cyrus

Dua Lipa and Jonathan Good (Jon Moxley)

Dylan O’Brien and Maika Monroe

Dylan Sprouse and Madelyn Cline

Eduardo Franco and Peyton Meyer

Emilia Clarke and Jake Gyllenhaal

Emily Osment and Meryl Streep

Emma Mackey and Nick Jonas

Emma Stone and Maura Higgins

Florence Welch and Gigi Hadid

George MacKay and Saoirse Ronan

Grace Van Dien and Harry Kane

Grace Van Patten and Lily Collins

Hailey Baldwin and Joey King

Huh Yunjin and Jerome Flynn

Jamie Campbell Bower and Zendaya Coleman

Jesse Lingard and Ryan Gosling

Jessica Chastain and Robert Pattinson

Jessica Lange and Sarah Paulson

Joe Keery and Maya Hawke

Joseph Quinn and Riley Keough

Jung Yoonoh (Jaehyun) and Lee Taeyong

Kang Seulgi and Karlie Kloss

Kathryn Hahn and Liam Hemsworth

Kehlani Parrish and Selena Gomez

Kim Jongin and Lee Taemin

Kim Jungwoo and Lucas Wong

Kim Namjoon and Min Yoongi

Kim Taehyung and Jung Wooyoung

Lee Donghyuck (Haechan) and Mark Lee

Lee Felix and Lee Know (Minho)

Lili Reinhart and Zoe Kravitz

Louis Tomlinson and Ross Lynch

Lupita Nyong’o and Tessa Thompson

Madelaine Petsch and Otto Wood

Maia Mitchell and Mike Faist

Margot Robbie and Sebastian Stan

Mason Mount and Taylor Hill

Mazz Murray and Shay Mitchell

Megan Jovon Ruth Pete (Megan Thee Stallion) and Park Seonghwa

Meghann Fahy and Victoria De Angelis

Mercedes Varnado (Sasha Banks) and Pamela Martinez (Bayley)

Natalia Dyer and Tom Holland

Perrie Edwards and Sabrina Carpenter

Shawn Mendes and Sydney Sweeney

Vanessa Hudgens and Zac Efron

Xiao Dejun (Xiajun) and Yoo Jimin (Karina)

Lauren Jauregui and Elizabeth Olsen

Zoey Deutch and Park Jinyoung

Alycia Debnam Carey and Hailee Steinfeld

Pedro Pascal and Sadie Sink

Avril Lavigne and Olivia Rodrigo

Sarah Hyland and Jenna Ortega

Jade Thirlwall and Kathryn Newton

#hollywoodfameevent #hfrpmaldives

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marcusbrutus · 2 months

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I think Dennis Reynolds might be the scariest character on television. Aside from Maura from pen15

#who would win: actual sociopath or 12 year old girl bully #Maura would rip him to shreds tho she’d pinpoint his every insecurity #and Dennis is SO sensitive like you tell him he’s a little pale and he worries about it all day #pen15 #always sunny

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kp777 · 2 years

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By Maura Reynolds

Politico

Oct. 17, 2022

“Putin plays the egos of big men, gives them a sense that they can play a role. But in reality, they’re just direct transmitters of messages from Vladimir Putin,” Hill says.

This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Reynolds: The war clearly hasn’t gone as Putin originally intended. How has Putin reacted to his setbacks and how do you think his mindset is evolving?

Hill: Whenever he has a setback, Putin figures he can get out of it, that he can turn things around. That’s partly because of his training as a KGB operative. In the past, when asked about the success of operations, he’s pooh-poohed the idea that operations always go as planned, that everything is always perfect. He says there are always problems in an operation, there are always setbacks. Sometimes they’re absolute disasters. The key is adaptation.

See also: NF actors

#mbti #mbtiact #mbtiindex

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papapiusxiii · 5 years

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50 Great Thrillers by Women, as recommended by 10 of the UK’s female crime writers

Sophie Hannah:

Summertime by Liz Rigbey. Follows a woman who loses her baby and whose father unexpectedly drowns. When her husband and sister close ranks against her, she begins to suspect they are lying to her.

The Spider’s House by Sarah Diamond. Also published as In the Spider’s House. When Anna Howell discovers that a 1960s child murderess was the previous resident of her old cottage, her marriage, sanity and life come under threat.

Hidden by Katy Gardner. When a young mother’s seven-year-old daughter disappears, she finds herself questioning everything in her life. Then a police officer starts asking about the murder of a woman 14 months earlier …

A Shred of Evidence by Jill McGown. DI Judy Hill and DCI Lloyd investigate the murder of a 15-year-old girl on a patch of open parkland in the centre of town.

Searching for Shona by Margaret Jean Anderson

The wealthy Marjorie Malcolm-Scott trades suitcases, destinations and identities with orphan Shona McInnes, as children are evacuated from Edinburgh at the start of the second world war.

Val McDermid:

The Franchise Affair by Josephine Tey. A teenage war orphan accuses two women of kidnap and abuse, but something about her story doesn’t add up.

Rubbernecker by Belinda Bauer. The Booker-longlisted author of Snap follows it up with the tale of a medical student with Asperger’s who attempts to solve a murder.

The Field of Blood by Denise Mina. The first in the Paddy Meehan series sees the reporter looking into the disappearance of a child from his Glasgow home, with evidence pointing the police towards two young boys.

A Fatal Inversion by Barbara Vine. Writing under her pen name, Ruth Rendell tells of the discovery of a woman and child in the animal cemetery at Wyvis Hall, 10 years after a group of young people spent the summer there.

When Will There Be Good News? by Kate Atkinson. In the third Jackson Brodie book, a man is released from prison 30 years after he butchered the mother and siblings of a six-year-old girl in the Devon countryside.

Ann Cleeves:

Little Deaths by Emma Flint. Inspired by the real case of Alice Crimmins, this tells of a woman whose two children go missing from her apartment in Queens.

The Dry by Jane Harper. During Australia’s worst drought in a century, three members of one family in a small country town are murdered, with the father believed to have killed his wife and son before committing suicide.

Devices and Desires by PD James. Adam Dalgliesh takes on a serial killer terrorising a remote Norfolk community.

The End of the Wasp Season by Denise Mina. Heavily pregnant DS Alex Morrow investigates the violent death of a wealthy woman in Glasgow.

Fire Sale by Sara Paretsky. The inimitable VI Warshawski takes over coaching duties of the girls’ basketball team at her former high school, and investigates the explosion of the flag manufacturing plant where one of the girl’s mothers works.

Sharon Bolton:

Gone by Mo Hayder. In Hayder’s fifth thriller featuring Bristol DI Jack Caffrey, he goes after a car-jacker who is taking vehicles with children in them.

Gentlemen and Players by Joanne Harris. A murderous revenge is being plotted against the boys’ grammar school in the north of England where eccentric Latin master Roy Straitley is contemplating retirement.

The Shining Girls by Lauren Beukes. A time-travelling, murderous war veteran steps through the decades to murder extraordinary women – his “shining girls” – in Chicago, in this high-concept thriller.

The Wicked Girls by Alex Marwood. Two women who were sentenced for murdering a six-year-old when they were children meet again as adults, when one discovers the body of a teenager.

Apple Tree Yard by Louise Doughty. Married scientist Yvonne, who is drawn into a passionate affair with a stranger, is on trial for murder.

Sarah Ward:

A Place of Execution by Val McDermid. Journalist Catherine Heathcote investigates the disappearance of a 13-year-old girl in the Peak District village of Scarsdale in 1963.

The Crossing Places by Elly Griffiths. Forensic archaeologist Dr Ruth Galloway investigates the discovery of a child’s bones near the site of a prehistoric henge on the north Norfolk salt marshes.

The Ice House by Minette Walters. A decade after Phoebe Maybury’s husband inexplicably vanished, a corpse is found and the police become determined to charge her with murder.

The Liar’s Girl by Catherine Ryan Howard. When a body is found in Dublin’s Grand Canal, police turn to the notorious Canal Killer for help. But the imprisoned murderer will only talk to the woman he was dating when he committed his crimes.

This Night’s Foul Work by Fred Vargas (translated by Sian Reynolds). Commissaire Adamsberg investigates whether there is a connection between the escape of a murderous 75-year-old nurse from prison, and the discovery of two men with their throats cut on the outskirts of Paris.

Elly Griffiths:

R in the Month by Nancy Spain. Sadly out of print, this is an atmospheric story set in a down-at-heel hotel in a postwar seaside town. The period detail is perfect and jokes and murders abound. This is the fourth book featuring the fantastic Miriam Birdseye, actress and rather slapdash sleuth.

The Daughter of Time by Josephine Tey. A gripping crime novel in which the detective never gets out of bed and the murder happened over 500 years ago. Griffith says: “I read this book as a child and was hooked – on Tey, crime fiction and Richard the Third.”

The Detective’s Daughter by Lesley Thomson. Cleaner Stella Darnell finds herself tidying up her detective father’s final, unfinished case, after he dies. It is the first in a series featuring Stella and her sidekick Jack, an underground train driver who can sense murder.

A Place of Execution by Val McDermid. Griffiths says: “I could have chosen any of Val’s novels, but this book, about a journalist revisiting a shocking 1960s murder, is probably my favourite because of its wonderful sense of time and place. It’s also pitch perfect about journalism, police investigation and life in a small community.”

He Said, She Said by Erin Kelly. An account of a rape trial at which nothing is quite as it seems. Griffiths says: “The story centres around a lunar eclipse, which also works wonderfully as a metaphor and image.”

Dreda Say Mitchell:

Sharp Objects by Gillian Flynn. The Gone Girl author’s debut follows journalist Camille’s investigation into the abduction and murder of two girls in her Missouri home town.

Dangerous Lady by Martina Cole. Cole’s first novel sees 17-year-old Maura Ryan taking on the men of London’s gangland.

The Mermaids Singing by Val McDermid. Clinical psychologist Dr Tony Hill is asked to profile a serial killer when four men are found mutilated and tortured.

Indemnity Only by Sara Paretsky. A client tells VI Warshawski he is a prominent banker looking for his son’s missing girlfriend. But VI soon discovers he’s lying, and that the real banker’s son is dead.

The St Cyr series by CS Harris. Mitchell has nominated the whole of this historical mystery series about Sebastian St Cyr, Viscount Devlin – master of disguises, heir to an earldom, and disillusioned army officer. It’s a bit of a cheat but we’ll let her have it.

Erin Kelly:

No Night Is Too Long by Barbara Vine. Tim Cornish thinks he has gotten away with killing his lover in Alaska. But then the letters start to arrive …

Broken Harbour by Tana French. The fourth in French’s sublime Dublin Murder Squad series, this takes place in a ghost estate outside Dublin, where a father and his two children have been found dead, with the mother on her way to intensive care.

Chosen by Lesley Glaister. When Dodie’s mother hangs herself, she has to leave her baby at home and go to bring her brother Jake back from the mysterious Soul Life Centre in New York.

A Savage Hunger by Claire McGowan. Forensic psychologist Paula Maguire investigates the disappearance of a girl, and a holy relic, from a remote religious shrine in the fictional Irish town of Ballyterrin.

The Cry by Helen Fitzgerald. Parents Joanna and Alistair start to turn against each other after their baby goes missing from a remote roadside in Australia.

Sarah Hilary:

The Hours Before Dawn by Celia Fremlin. A sleep-deprived young mother tries to stay sane while her fears grow about the family’s new lodger, in this 1950s lost classic.

Cruel Acts by Jane Casey. Leo Stone, sentenced to life in prison for the murder of two women, is now free and claims he is innocent. DS Maeve Kerrigan and DI Josh Derwen want to put him back in jail, but Maeve begins doubting his guilt – until another woman disappears.

Sex Crimes by Jenefer Shute. A lawyer’s New Year’s Eve pick-up spirals into an erotic obsession which leads to graphic cruelty.

Skin Deep by Liz Nugent. Nugent, whom Ian Rankin has compared to Patricia Highsmith, tells the story of a woman who has been passing herself off as an English socialite on the Riviera for 25 years – until the arrival of someone who knows her from her former life prompts an act of violence.

Cuckoo by Julia Crouch. Rose’s home and family start to fall apart when her best friend Polly comes to stay.

Louise Candlish:

The Murder of Roger Ackroyd by Agatha Christie. Christie’s classic – with a legendary twist. The best Hercule Poirot?

The Two Faces of January by Patricia Highsmith. A conman on the run with his wife meets a young American who becomes drawn into the crime they commit.

Alias Grace by Margaret Atwood. The author of The Handmaid’s Tale imagines the life of the real 19th-century Canadian killer Grace Marks.

Little Face by Sophie Hannah. Hannah’s thriller debut is about a young mother who becomes convinced that, after spending two hours away from her baby, the infant is not hers.

Alys, Always by Harriet Lane. Newspaper subeditor Frances is drawn into the lives of the Kyte family when she hears the last words of the victim of a car crash, Alys Kyte.

#reference

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ao3feed-trc · 5 years

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Things Always Find a Way to go to Hell With These People

read it on the AO3 at https://ift.tt/2IBfPg8

by Jaromo99

Adam attends Palmetto State University and somehow drags the Foxes into the newest magical bullshit.

Words: 1709, Chapters: 1/?, Language: English

Fandoms: Raven Cycle - Maggie Stiefvater, All For The Game - Nora Sakavic

Rating: Not Rated

Warnings: No Archive Warnings Apply

Categories: F/F, F/M, M/M, Multi

Characters: Ronan Lynch, Adam Parrish, Declan Lynch, Matthew Lynch, Henry Cheng, Blue Sargent, Richard Gansey III, Matt Boyd, Danielle "Dan" Wilds, Aaron Minyard, Andrew Minyard, Neil Josten, Kevin Day, Allison Reynolds, Renee Walker (All For The Game), Nicky Hemmick, Mr. Gray | Dean Allen, David Wymack

Relationships: Ronan Lynch/Adam Parrish, Henry Cheng/Richard Gansey III/Blue Sargent, Matt Boyd/Danielle "Dan" Wilds, Katelyn/Aaron Minyard, Neil Josten/Andrew Minyard, Mr. Gray | Dean Allen/Maura Sargent

Additional Tags: College, Tutoring, Palmetto State University, Post-The Raven King, Post-The King's Men

read it on the AO3 at https://ift.tt/2IBfPg8

#ao3feed #fanfic #the raven cycle #trc

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mentalnahigijena · 2 years

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'Da, on bi': Fiona Hill o Putinu i Nukleus Putin pokušava da sruši cijeli svjetski poredak, rekao je veteran koji posmatra Rusiju u intervjuu. Ali postoje načini na koji čak i obični Amerikanci mogu uzvratiti.

Zato sam kontaktirao Fionu Hill, jednog od američkih najjasnijih stručnjaka za Rusiju, nekoga ko je proučavao Putina decenijama, radio i u republikanskoj i u demokratskoj administraciji i ima reputaciju da govori istinu, stečenu kada je svjedočila na saslušanjima za opoziv za njenog bivšeg šefa, predsjednika Donalda Trampa.

Želio sam da znam o čemu je razmišljala dok je gledala izvanredne snimke ruskih tenkova koji prelaze međunarodne granice, šta ona misli da Putin ima na umu i kakve uvide ona može da ponudi u njegove motive i ciljeve.

Hill je provela mnogo godina proučavajući istoriju, a u našem razgovoru je u više navrata pratila koliko dugi lukovi i trendovi evropske istorije sada spajaju Ukrajinu. Već smo, rekla je, usred trećeg svjetskog rata, bez obzira da li smo to u potpunosti shvatili ili ne.

„Nažalost, mi se vraćamo kroz stare istorijske obrasce za koje smo rekli da nikada nećemo dozvoliti da se ponove,“ rekao mi je Hill.

Ti stari istorijski obrasci uključuju zapadnjačke kompanije koje ne vide kako pomažu u izgradnji ratnog sanduka tiranina, obožavatelje koji su zaljubljeni u “snagu” autokrata i sklonost političara da upiru prstom unutra radi političke dobiti umjesto da zajedno rade za sigurnost svoje nacije.

Ali u isto vrijeme, Hill kaže da još nije kasno vratiti Putina, i da je to posao ne samo za Ukrajince ili za NATO – to je posao kojem obični zapadnjaci i kompanije mogu pomoći na važne načine kada shvate šta je u pitanju.

"Ukrajina je postala prva linija borbe, ne samo između demokratija i autokratija, već i u borbi za održavanje sistema zasnovanog na pravilima u kojem se stvari koje zemlje žele ne uzimaju silom", rekao je Hill. “Svaka zemlja na svijetu bi trebala obratiti veliku pažnju na ovo.”

Pred nama je mnogo opasnosti, upozorila je. Putin sve više djeluje emotivno i vjerovatno će upotrijebiti svo oružje koje mu je na raspolaganju, uključujući i nuklearno. Važno je ne gajiti iluzije — ali jednako je važno ne gubiti nadu. „Svaki put kada pomislite, 'Ne, ne bi, zar ne?' Pa, da, htio bi”, rekla je Hill. “I želi da to znamo, naravno. Nije da se trebamo plašiti i plašiti... Moramo se pripremiti za te nepredviđene situacije i shvatiti šta ćemo učiniti da ih spriječimo.”

Sljedeći transkript je uređen radi dužine i jasnoće.

Maura Reynolds: Dugo ste posmatrali Putina i napisali ste jednu od najboljih Putinovih biografija. Kada ste ga posmatrali protekle nedelje, šta ste vidjeli da bi drugi ljudi mogli da nedostaju?

Fiona Hill: Putin je obično ciničniji i proračunatiji nego što je naišao u svojim posljednjim govorima. Očigledna je visceralna emocija u stvarima koje je rekao u proteklih nekoliko sedmica opravdavajući rat u Ukrajini. Izgovor je potpuno slab i gotovo besmislen za svakoga ko nije u eho komori ili balonu propagande u samoj Rusiji. Mislim, zahtijevati od ukrajinske vojske da u suštini sruše vlastitu vladu ili polože oružje i predaju se jer njima komanduje gomila nacifašista ovisnih o drogama ? To jednostavno nema smisla. To traži maštu.

„Svaki put kada pomislite, 'Ne, ne bi, zar ne?' Pa, da, htio bi. I želi da to znamo, naravno.”

Čini se da Putin čak i ne pokušava da iznese ubedljivu tezu. Videli smo istu stvar u ruskom odgovoru u Ujedinjenim nacijama. Opravdanje je u suštini bilo „šta-o-izam“: „Vi momci invazirate Irak, Avganistan. Nemojte mi reći da ne mogu učiniti isto u Ukrajini.” Ova visceralna emocija je nezdrava i izuzetno opasna jer postoji malo kočnica i ravnoteža oko Putina. On je to istakao tokom nastupa na sednici Saveta za nacionalnu bezbednost, gde je postalo jasno da je to njegova odluka. On je na neki način preuzimao punu odgovornost za rat, a čak su i šefovi njegovih sigurnosnih i obavještajnih službi izgledali kao da su zatečeni brzinom stvari.

Reynolds: Dakle, Putina trenutno vode emocije, a ne neka vrsta logičnog plana?

Hill: Mislim da je postojao logičan, metodički plan koji seže veoma dalek put, barem do 2007. godine kada je stavio na znanje svijet, a svakako Evropu da Moskva neće prihvatiti dalje širenje NATO-a . A onda je u roku od godinu dana 2008. NATO otvorio vrata Gruziji i Ukrajini. Apsolutno se vraća na taj trenutak.

Tada sam bio nacionalni obavještajac, a Nacionalni obavještajni savjet je analizirao šta će Rusija vjerovatno učiniti kao odgovor na deklaraciju o otvorenim vratima NATO-a . Jedna od naših procjena je bila da postoji stvarni, istinski rizik od neke vrste preventivne ruske vojne akcije, ne samo ograničene na aneksiju Krima, već neke mnogo veće akcije poduzete protiv Ukrajine zajedno s Gruzijom. I naravno, četiri mjeseca nakon NATO samita u Bukureštu, došlo je do invazije na Gruziju. Tada nije bilo invazije na Ukrajinu jer se ukrajinska vlada povukla od traženja članstva u NATO-u. Ali trebali smo se ozbiljno pozabaviti time kako ćemo se nositi sa ovim potencijalnim ishodom i našim odnosima sa Rusijom.

Reynolds: Mislite li da je Putinov trenutni cilj rekonstituisanje Sovjetskog Saveza, Ruskog carstva ili nešto drugo?

Hill: To je ponovno uspostavljanje ruske dominacije nad onim što Rusija vidi kao ruski “Imperium”. Ovo govorim vrlo konkretno jer zemlje Sovjetskog Saveza nisu pokrivale sve teritorije koje su nekada bile dio Ruskog Carstva. Tako da bi to trebalo da nas zastane.

Putin je artikulisao ideju da postoji „ Ruski mir “ ili „Ruski svet“. U nedavnom eseju koji je objavio o Ukrajini i Rusiji navodi se da su ukrajinski i ruski narod „jedan narod“, „jedinstveni narod“. Kaže da su Ukrajinci i Rusi jedno te isto. Ova ideja o ruskom svijetu znači ponovno okupljanje svih onih koji govore ruski na različitim mjestima koja su u nekom trenutku pripadala ruskom carstvu.

Malo sam se šalila o ovome, ali se takođe brinem o tome potpuno ozbiljno – da je Putin bio dole u arhivama Kremlja tokom Covida, pregledavajući stare mape i sporazume i sve različite granice koje je Rusija imala tokom vekova. Više puta je govorio da su se ruske i evropske granice mnogo puta mijenjale. I u svojim govorima, on je išao za raznim bivšim ruskim i sovjetskim liderima, išao je za Lenjinom i išao je za komunistima, jer su po njegovom mišljenju razbili Rusko carstvo, izgubili su ruske zemlje u revoluciji, i da, Staljin je doneo neke od njih se ponovo vraćaju u okrilje poput baltičkih država i nekih zemalja Ukrajine koje su bile podijeljene tokom Drugog svjetskog rata, ali su ponovo izgubljene raspadom SSSR-a. Putinov stav je da se granice menjaju,

Reynolds: Dominacija na koji način?

Hill: To ne znači da će ih sve anektirati i učiniti ih dijelom Ruske Federacije kao što su to učinili sa Krimom. Možete uspostaviti dominaciju tako što ćete marginalizirati regionalne zemlje, tako što ćete osigurati da njihovi lideri potpuno zavise od Moskve, bilo tako što će ih Moskva praktično postaviti putem namještenih izbora ili osigurati da su vezani za ruske ekonomske i političke i sigurnosne mreže. To sada možete vidjeti širom bivšeg sovjetskog prostora.

Videli smo da se vrši pritisak na Kazahstan da se preorijentiše nazad ka Rusiji, umesto da balansira između Rusije i Kine i Zapada. A samo nekoliko dana prije invazije na Ukrajinu u malo zapaženom činu, Azerbejdžan je potpisao bilateralni vojni sporazum sa Rusijom . Ovo je značajno jer se lider Azerbejdžana tome odupirao decenijama. Takođe možemo vidjeti da je Rusija sama sebe postavila za konačnog arbitra budućih odnosa između Jermenije i Azerbejdžana. Gruzija je takođe marginalizovana nakon što je decenijama bila trn u oku Rusiji. A Bjelorusija je sada potpuno potčinjena Moskvi.

Ali usred svega ovoga, Ukrajina je bila zemlja koja je pobjegla. A ono što Putin sada govori je da Ukrajina ne pripada Ukrajincima. To pripada njemu i prošlosti. On će zbrisati Ukrajinu sa mape, bukvalno, jer joj nije mjesto na njegovoj mapi „ruskog sveta“. On nam je to u suštini rekao. Mogao bi iza sebe ostaviti neke krnje države. Kada pogledamo stare mape Evrope — vjerojatno karte koje je on gledao — naći ćete razne vrste čudnih entiteta, poput novopazarskog sandžaka.na Balkanu. Mislio sam, šta je to dođavola? Sve su to mala mjesta koja ovise o većoj sili i stvorena su da spriječe formiranje većih održivih država u spornim regijama. U suštini, ako Vladimir Putin ima svoj put, Ukrajina neće postojati kao moderna Ukrajina u posljednjih 30 godina.

Reynolds: Koliko daleko u Ukrajinu mislite da će Putin ići?

Hill: U ovom trenutku, ako može, ići će do kraja. Prije ove prošle sedmice, imao je više različitih opcija za odabir. Dao je sebi opciju da može da uđe u punoj snazi kao što sada čini, ali je takođe mogao da se fokusira na ponovno zauzimanje ostatka administrativnih teritorija Donjecka i Luganska. Mogao je zauzeti Azovsko more, što će vjerovatno ipak učiniti, a zatim spojiti oblasti Donjecka i Luganska sa Krimom, kao i zemlje između i sve do Odese. U stvari, Putin je to prvo pokušao 2014. — da stvori „ Novorosiju “ ili „Novu Rusiju“, ali to nije uspelo kada se lokalna podrška pridruživanju Rusiji nije materijalizovala.

Sada, ako može, zauzet će cijelu državu. Moramo se suočiti s ovom činjenicom. Iako još nismo vidjeli punu rusku invazijsku snagu koja je raspoređena, on sigurno ima trupe da se presele u cijelu zemlju.

Reynolds: Kažete da ima adekvatan broj trupa za ulazak, ali da li ima dovoljno da okupira cijelu zemlju?

Hill: Ako postoji ozbiljan otpor, možda neće imati dovoljno snage da zauzme zemlju na duži period. Može biti i da on ne želi da okupira cijelu državu, da je želi razbiti, možda pripojiti neke njene dijelove, možda ostaviti nešto kao krnju državu ili veću krnju Ukrajinu negdje, možda oko Lavova. Ne kažem da znam tačno šta se dešava u njegovoj glavi. I čak može predložiti da susedne zemlje apsorbuju druge delove Ukrajine.

Ministar vanjskih poslova Sergej Lavrov bio je 2015. na Minhenskoj sigurnosnoj konferenciji nakon aneksije Krima i rata u Donbasu. I govorio je o tome da Ukrajina nije država , ističući da u Ukrajini ima mnogo manjinskih grupa — ima Poljaka i ima Rumuna, ima Mađara i Rusa. I nastavlja u suštini skoro pozivajući ostatak Evrope da podijeli Ukrajinu.

Dakle, ono što Putin želi nije nužno da okupira cijelu zemlju, već da je podijeli. Pogledao je Avganistan, Irak, Libiju i druga mjesta gdje postoji podjela zemlje između službeno sankcionisanih snaga s jedne strane i pobunjeničkih snaga s druge strane. To je nešto sa čime bi Putin definitivno mogao da živi — razbijena, razbijena Ukrajina sa različitim delovima koji su u različitim statusima.

Reynolds: Dakle, korak po korak, na načine koje nismo uvijek cijenili na Zapadu, Putin je vratio mnoge od ovih zemalja koje su bile nezavisne nakon raspada Sovjetskog Saveza pod svojim kišobranom. Jedina zemlja koja je do sada izmicala Putinovom stisku je Ukrajina.

Hill: Ukrajina, tačno. Zato što je veći i zbog svoje strateške lokacije. To je ono što Rusija želi da osigura, ili Putin želi da osigura, da Ukrajina, kao i druge zemlje, nema drugu opciju osim potčinjavanja Rusiji.

Reynolds: Koliko je od onoga što sada vidimo vezano za Putinov izborni raspored? On je zauzeo Krim 2014. i to je pomoglo da podigne svoj rejting i osigura njegov budući reizbor. Predstoje mu još jedan izbori 2024. Je li išta od ovoga povezano s tim?

Hill: Mislim da jeste. Putin je 2020. godine izmijenio ruski Ustav kako bi mogao ostati do 2036. godine, još jedan set od dva šestogodišnja mandata. Tada će imati 84 godine. Ali 2024. mora se ponovo legitimirati kandidiranjem na izborima. Jedini pravi kandidat je mogao biti Aleksej Navaljni, a stavili su ga u kaznenu koloniju. Putin je zamotao svu potencijalnu opoziciju i otpor, pa bi se moglo pomisliti da će to za njega 2024. godine biti prava šetnja. Ali način na koji to funkcioniše sa ruskim izborima, on zapravo mora da napravi ubedljivu emisiju koja pokazuje da je izuzetno popularan i on ima afirmaciju čitave populacije.

Iza kulisa je prilično jasno da postoji velika apatija u sistemu, da mnogi ljudi podržavaju Putina jer nema nikog drugog. Ljudi koji ga uopšte ne podržavaju vjerovatno neće izaći na izbore. Zadnji put kada je njegov brend zastario, bilo je to prije aneksije Krima. To ga je vratilo na vrh ljestvica u pogledu njegovih rejtinga.

To možda nije samo predsjednički kalendar, izborni kalendar. U oktobru će napuniti 70 godina. A 70, znate, u široj shemi stvari, nije tako staro. Postoji mnogo političara koji imaju više od 70 godina.

Reynolds: Ali to je staro za Ruse.

Hill: To je staro za Ruse. A Putin ne izgleda tako sjajno, bio je prilično natečen. Znamo da se žalio na probleme sa leđima. Čak i ako nije nešto gore od toga, može biti da uzima velike doze steroida, ili možda postoji nešto drugo. Čini se da postoji hitnost za ovo što može biti vođeno i ličnim faktorima.

Možda ima osjećaj da vrijeme napreduje – ipak su to 22 godine, a vjerovatnoća nakon tog vremena da ruski lider ode dobrovoljno ili putem izbora je prilično mala. Većina lidera odlazi ili kao što je bjeloruski predsjednik Aleksandar Lukašenko mislio da bi mogao otići, kao rezultat masovnih protesta, ili će umrijeti na funkciji.

Jedina druga osoba koja je bila ruski lider u modernim vremenima duže od Putina je Staljin, a Staljin je umro na funkciji.

Reynolds: Putin je došao na vlast nakon niza operacija koje su mnogi vidjeli kao neku vrstu lažne zastave - bombardovanja zgrada širom Rusije u kojima su ubijeni ruski građani, stotine njih, nakon čega je uslijedio rat u Čečeniji. To je dovelo do toga da je Putin došao na vlast kao ratni predsednik. Aneksija Krima 2014. takođe je došla u teškom trenutku za Putina. Sada vidimo još jednu veliku vojnu operaciju manje od dvije godine prije nego što se ponovo mora kandidirati na izborima. Da li grešim što vidim taj obrazac?

Hill: Ne, mislim da nisi. Ovdje definitivno postoji obrazac. Dio Putinove ličnosti kao predsjednika je to što je on nemilosrdan čvrst momak, snažan čovjek koji je šampion i zaštitnik Rusije. I zato je on potreban Rusiji. Da je sve bilo mirno i tiho, zašto bi vam trebao Vladimir Putin? Ako pomislite na druge ratne vođe – na pamet vam padne Winston Churchill – u mirnodopskim vremenima, Winston Churchill je izglasan s dužnosti.

Reynolds: Govoreći o Čečeniji, razmišljao sam da je ovo najveća kopnena vojna operacija koju je Rusija vodila od Čečenije. Šta smo tada naučili o ruskoj vojsci a sada je relevantno?

Hill: Vrlo je važno da iznesete ovu tačku jer ljudi kažu da je Ukrajina najveća vojna operacija u Evropi od Drugog svjetskog rata. Prva najveća vojna akcija u Evropi od Drugog svetskog rata zapravo je bila u Čečeniji, jer je Čečenija deo Rusije. Ovo je bio razarajući sukob koji se vukao godinama, sa dva kruga rata nakon kratkog primirja i desetinama hiljada vojnih i civilnih žrtava. Regionalni glavni grad Grozni je sravnjen sa zemljom. Žrtve su uglavnom bili etnički Rusi i oni koji govore ruski. Čečeni su uzvratili, a ovo je postalo vojni debakl na ruskom tlu. Analitičari su to nazvali „ najnižim slojem ruske vojske.” Nakon intervencije NATO-a u balkanskim ratovima u istom vremenskom okviru 1990-ih, Moskva je čak bila zabrinuta da bi NATO mogao intervenisati.

Reynolds: Šta smo naučili o NATO-u u posljednja dva mjeseca?

Hill: U mnogim aspektima, u početku nisu dobre stvari. Iako sada vidimo značajno okupljanje političkih i diplomatskih snaga, ozbiljne konsultacije i podstrek na akciju kao odgovor na jačanje vojne odbrane NATO-a.

Ali o tome takođe moramo razmišljati na ovaj način. Imali smo dugoročni politički neuspjeh koji seže do kraja Hladnog rata u smislu razmišljanja o tome kako upravljati odnosima NATO-a sa Rusijom kako bi se rizik sveo na minimum. NATO je kao masivni osiguravač, zaštitnik nacionalne sigurnosti Evrope i Sjedinjenih Država. Nakon završetka Hladnog rata, i dalje smo mislili da imamo najbolje osiguranje za opasnosti s kojima se možemo suočiti — poplave, požar itd. — ali za sniženu premiju. Nismo poduzeli adekvatne korake za rješavanje i smanjenje različitih rizika. Sada vidimo da nismo izvršili dužnu pažnju i u potpunosti razmotrili sve moguće nepredviđene situacije, uključujući i način na koji bismo ublažili negativan odgovor Rusije na uzastopna proširenja. Razmislite o Swiss Re ili AIG ili Lloyds of London — kada je opasnost bila velika, kao tokom uragana Katrina ili globalne finansijske krize 2008. godine, te osiguravajuće kompanije su ušle u velike probleme. Oni i njihovi klijenti našli su se pod vodom. I to je ono što članice NATO-a sada uče.

Reynolds: A tu je i nuklearni element. Mnogi ljudi su mislili da nikada nećemo vidjeti veliki kopneni rat u Evropi ili direktnu konfrontaciju između NATO-a i Rusije, jer bi to moglo brzo eskalirati u nuklearni sukob. Koliko smo blizu tome?

Hill: Pa, tu smo. U suštini, ono što je predsednik Putin prilično eksplicitno rekao poslednjih dana jeste da će, ako se bilo ko umeša u Ukrajinu, dočekati odgovor koji „ nikada nije imao u [svojoj] istoriji “. I stavio je ruske nuklearne snage u stanje visoke pripravnosti . Dakle, on vrlo jasno daje do znanja da je nuklearna energija na stolu.

Putin je pokušao da upozori Trampa na ovo, ali mislim da Tramp nije shvatio šta govori. Na jednom od poslednjih sastanaka Putina i Trampa kada sam ja bio tamo, Putin je rekao: „Pa znaš, Donalde, imamo ove hipersonične rakete .” A Tramp je govorio: "Pa, i mi ćemo ih dobiti." Putin je govorio: "Pa, da, na kraju ćete ih dobiti , ali mi ih imamo prvi." U ovoj razmjeni je postojala prijetnja. Putin nas je upozorio da će nuklearna opcija biti na stolu, ako dođe do pritiska da se ugura u neko okruženje konfrontacije.

Reynolds: Da li stvarno mislite da će upotrijebiti nuklearno oružje?

Hill: Stvar u vezi sa Putinom je da ako ima instrument, on želi da ga koristi. Zašto ga imati ako ne možeš? On je već koristio nuklearno oružje u nekim aspektima. Ruski operativci otrovali su Aleksandra Litvinenka radioaktivnim polonijumom i pretvorili ga u ljudsku prljavu bombu, a polonij se raširio po Londonu na svakom mestu koje je jadnik posetio. Kao rezultat toga, umro je strašnom smrću.

Rusi su već koristili nervni agens za oružje, Novichok . Koristili su ga možda nekoliko puta, ali sigurno dva puta. Jednom u Solsberiju, u Engleskoj, gde je njome protrljana kvaka Sergeja Skripalja i njegove ćerke Julije, koji zapravo nisu umrli; ali nervni agens je kontaminirao grad Salisbury i bilo ko drugi koji je došao u kontakt s njim se razbolio. Novichok je ubio britansku državljanku, Dawn Sturgess, jer su ga atentatori pohranili u bočicu parfema koja je bačena u kutiju za dobrotvorne priloge gdje su je pronašli Sturgess i njen partner. U toj boci bilo je dovoljno nervnog agensa da ubije nekoliko hiljada ljudi. Drugi put je bio u gaćama Aleksandra Navaljnog.

Pa ako neko misli da Putin ne bi iskoristio nešto što ima što je neobično i okrutno, razmisli ponovo. Svaki put kada pomislite: "Ne, ne bi, zar ne?" Pa, da, htio bi. I želi da to znamo, naravno.

Nije da se trebamo plašiti i plašiti. To je upravo ono što on želi da budemo. Moramo se pripremiti za te nepredviđene situacije i shvatiti šta ćemo učiniti da ih spriječimo.

Reynolds: Pa kako da se nosimo s tim? Da li su sankcije dovoljne?

Hill: Pa, ne možemo se sami nositi s tim kao Sjedinjene Države. Prije svega, ovo mora biti međunarodni odgovor.

Reynolds: Veći od NATO-a?

Hill: Mora biti veći od NATO-a. Ne kažem da to znači međunarodni vojni odgovor koji je veći od NATO-a, ali potiskivanje mora biti međunarodno.

Prvo moramo razmisliti o tome šta je Vladimir Putin uradio i o prirodi onoga s čime se suočavamo. Ljudi ne žele da pričaju o Adolfu Hitleru i Drugom svetskom ratu, ali ja ću o tome. Očigledno je glavni element kada govorimo o Drugom svjetskom ratu, koji je nadmoćan, holokaust i apsolutno desetkovanje jevrejske populacije Evrope, kao i naroda Roma-Sinti.

Ali hajde da se fokusiramo ovde na teritorijalni ekspanzionizam Nemačke, ono što je Nemačka uradila pod Hitlerom u tom periodu: zauzimanje Sudeta i Anšlus ili aneksija Austrije, sve na osnovu toga što su oni govorili nemački. Invazija Poljske. Ugovor sa Sovjetskim Savezom, pakt Molotov-Ribbentrop, koji je također omogućio Sovjetskom Savezu da zauzme dijelove Poljske, ali je potom postao uvod u operaciju Barbarossa, njemačku invaziju na Sovjetski Savez. Invazije na Francusku i sve zemlje koje okružuju Njemačku, uključujući Dansku i dalje do Norveške. Njemačka se na kraju upustila u nalet masovne teritorijalne ekspanzije i okupacije. Na kraju je Sovjetski Savez uzvratio. Porodica Vladimira Putina stradala je tokom opsade Lenjingrada, a ipak evo Vladimira Putina koji radi potpuno istu stvar.

Reynolds: Dakle, slično Hitleru, on koristi osjećaj masovne historijske tuge u kombinaciji s izgledom zaštite Rusa i odbacivanjem prava manjina i drugih nacija da imaju nezavisne zemlje kako bi podstakao teritorijalne ambicije?

Hill: Tačno. I okrivljuje druge za zašto se to dogodilo, a nas tjera da krivimo sebe.

Ako se ljudi osvrnu na istoriju Drugog svetskog rata, bilo je užasno mnogo ljudi širom Evrope koji su postali simpatizeri nacističke Nemačke pre invazije na Poljsku. U Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu , postojao je čitav niz britanskih političara koji su se divili Hitlerovoj snazi i njegovoj moći, jer su radile ono što rade velike sile, prije nego što su užasi Blica i Holokausta konačno prodrli.

Reynolds: I vidite ovo sada.

Hill: Potpuno vidite. Nažalost, imamo političare i javne ličnosti u Sjedinjenim Državama i širom Evrope koji su prihvatili ideju da je NATO naneo nepravdu Rusiji i da je Putin snažan, moćan čovek i da ima pravo da radi ono što radi: Jer Ukrajina nekako nije dostojan nezavisnosti, jer ili su to ruske istorijske zemlje ili su Ukrajinci Rusi, ili su ukrajinski lideri — to je ono što Putin kaže — „narkomani, fašistički nacisti“ ili kakve god etikete on želi ovdje primijeniti.

Tako nažalost, koračamo unazad kroz stare istorijske obrasce za koje smo rekli da nikada nećemo dozvoliti da se ponove. Druga stvar o kojoj treba razmišljati u ovom širem istorijskom kontekstu je koliko je njemačka poslovna zajednica pomogla da se olakša Hitlerov uspon. Upravo su svi koji su poslovali u Rusiji ili kupovali ruski gas i naftu dali svoj doprinos Putinovim ratnim prsima. Naše investicije nisu samo povećanje poslovne dobiti, niti ruskih državnih fondova i dugoročnog razvoja. Oni su sada bukvalno gorivo za rusku invaziju na Ukrajinu.

Baš kao što ljudi nisu želeli da se njihov novac uloži u Južnoj Africi tokom aparthejda, da li zaista želite da se vaš novac uloži u Rusiju tokom ruske brutalne invazije i pokoravanja i cepanja Ukrajine?

Reynolds: Shvatio sam da mislite da su sankcije koje je uvela vlada neadekvatne za rješavanje ove mnogo veće prijetnje?

Hill: Apsolutno. Sankcije neće biti dovoljne. Morate imati veliki međunarodni odgovor, gdje vlade samostalno odlučuju da ne mogu poslovati s Rusijom neko vrijeme dok se to ne riješi. Potrebna nam je privremena obustava poslovanja sa Rusijom. Kao što ne bismo vodili potpune diplomatske pregovore ni o čemu osim o prekidu vatre i povlačenju dok je Ukrajina još uvijek aktivno napadnuta, tako je ista stvar i sa biznisom. Upravo sada podstičete invaziju na Ukrajinu. Dakle, ono što nam je potrebno je suspenzija poslovnih aktivnosti sa Rusijom dok Moskva ne prekine neprijateljstva i ne povuče svoje trupe.

Reynolds: Dakle, obične kompanije…

Hill: Obične kompanije treba da donesu odluku. Ovo je oličenje „ESG-a“ za koji kompanije kažu da im je trenutno prioritet — pridržavanje standarda dobrog upravljanja životnom sredinom, društvom i korporativnim upravljanjem. Baš kao što ljudi nisu želeli da se njihov novac uloži u Južnoj Africi tokom aparthejda, da li zaista želite da se vaš novac uloži u Rusiju tokom ruske brutalne invazije i pokoravanja i cepanja Ukrajine?

Ako se zapadne kompanije, njihovi penzioni planovi ili zajednički fondovi, ulažu u Rusiju, trebalo bi da se povuku. Svi ljudi koji sjede u odborima velikih ruskih kompanija trebali bi odmah dati ostavke. Nije svaka ruska kompanija vezana za Kremlj, ali mnoge velike ruske kompanije apsolutno jesu, i svi to znaju. Ako se osvrnemo na Njemačku uoči Drugog svjetskog rata, to su bila najveća njemačka preduzeća koja su korištena kao podrška ratu. I sada vidimo potpuno istu stvar. Rusija ne bi mogla priuštiti ovaj rat da nije činjenica da cijene nafte i gasa rastu. Za sada imaju dovoljno u ratnom sanduku. Ali dugoročno, ovo neće biti održivo bez ulaganja koja dolaze u Rusiju i sve ruske robe, ne samo naftu i gas, koji se kupuju na svetskim tržištima. A naši međunarodni saveznici, poput Saudijske Arabije, trebali bi povećati proizvodnju nafte upravo sada kao privremenu kompenzaciju. Trenutno, oni također indirektno finansiraju rat u Ukrajini držeći visoke cijene nafte.

Ovo mora biti međunarodni odgovor koji će potaknuti Rusiju da zaustavi svoju vojnu akciju. Indija je bila uzdržana u Ujedinjenim nacijama, a možete vidjeti da se druge zemlje osjećaju nelagodno i nadaju se da bi to moglo nestati. Ovo neće nestati, a mogao bi biti "vi sljedeći" - jer Putin postavlja presedan da se zemlje vrate ponašanju koje je izazvalo dva velika rata koja su bila slobodna za sve teritorije. Putin kaže: „Kroz istoriju granice su se menjale. Koga briga?"

Reynolds: I ne mislite da će se on nužno zaustaviti na Ukrajini?

Hill: Naravno da neće. Ukrajina je postala prva linija u borbi, ne samo za to koje zemlje mogu ili ne mogu biti u NATO-u, ili između demokratija i autokratija, već u borbi za održavanje sistema zasnovanog na pravilima u kojem stvari koje zemlje žele ne preuzimaju sila. Svaka država na svijetu treba da obrati veliku pažnju na to. Da, možda postoje zemlje poput Kine i drugih koje bi mogle misliti da je to dozvoljeno, ali sveukupno, većina zemalja je imala koristi od trenutnog međunarodnog sistema u smislu trgovine i ekonomskog rasta, investicija i međuzavisnog globalizovanog svijeta. Ovo je skoro kraj ovoga. To je ono što je Rusija uradila.

Reynolds: On je razneo međunarodni poredak zasnovan na pravilima.

Hill: Upravo tako. Ono što mnoge ljude sprečava da se čak i privremeno povuku iz Rusije je, oni će reći: „Pa, Kinezi će samo uskočiti“. To mi svaki investitor uvijek govori. “Ako ja izađem, uselit će se neko drugi.” Nisam siguran da ruski biznismeni žele da se jednog jutra probude i saznaju da su jedini investitori u rusku ekonomiju Kinezi, jer tada Rusija postaje periferija Kine, kinesko zaleđe, a ne još jedna velika sila koja posluje u tandemu sa Kina.

Reynolds: Što više pričamo, više koristimo analogije iz Drugog svjetskog rata. Ima ljudi koji govore da smo na ivici Trećeg svetskog rata.

Hill: Već smo u tome. Bili smo već neko vrijeme. Stalno razmišljamo o Prvom svjetskom ratu, o Drugom svjetskom ratu kao o ovim ogromnim velikim scenografijama, ali Drugi svjetski rat je bio posljedica Prvog svjetskog rata. I mi smo imali međuratni period između njih. I na neki način smo to ponovo imali nakon Hladnog rata. Mnoge stvari o kojima ovdje govorimo imaju svoje korijene u rascjepanju Austro-Ugarske i Ruske imperije na kraju Prvog svjetskog rata. Na kraju Drugog svjetskog rata imali smo još jednu rekonfiguraciju i neke pitanja kojima smo se nedavno bavili sežu u ono neposredno poslijeratno razdoblje. Imali smo rat u Siriji, koji je dijelom posljedica kolapsa Otomanskog carstva, kao i Irak i Kuvajt.

Svi sukobi koje vidimo imaju korijene u tim ranijim sukobima. Već smo u vrućem ratu oko Ukrajine, koji je počeo 2014. Ljudi ne treba da se zavaravaju misleći da smo samo na ivici nečega. Dobro smo i zaista u tome već dosta dugo vremena.

Ali ovo je takođe informativni rat punog spektra, a ono što se dešava u ruskom ratu „svega društva“, vi omekšavate neprijatelja. Dobijate Tucker Carlsonove i Donalda Trumparadeći vaš posao za vas. Činjenica da je Putin uspeo da ubedi Trampa da Ukrajina pripada Rusiji i da bi Tramp bio spreman da se odrekne Ukrajine bez ikakve borbe, to je veliki uspeh Putinovog informacionog rata. Mislim, on ima dijelove Republikanske stranke — i to ne samo njih, neke na lijevoj, kao i na desnoj strani — mase američke javnosti koje govore, „Bravo na tebi, Vladimire Putine“, ili okrivljuju NATO, ili okrivljuju SAD za ovaj ishod. Upravo na to je usmjeren ruski informacioni rat i psihološka operacija. Pažljivo je zasijavao i ovaj teren. Mi smo u ratu, jako dugo. To govorim godinama.

Reynolds: Dakle, kao što svijet nije vidio Hitlerova dolaska, mi nismo vidjeli dolazak Putina?

Hill: Nismo trebali. On postoji već 22 godine, a na ovu tačku dolazi od 2008. Ne mislim da je on u početku krenuo da uradi sve ovo, inače, nego stavovi prema Ukrajini i osećanja koje cela Ukrajina pripada Rusiji, osećaj gubitka, svi su bili tamo i gradili se.

Ono što Rusija radi je tvrdnja da „možda čini dobro“. Naravno, da, napravili smo i strašne greške. Ali niko nikada nema pravo da potpuno uništi drugu zemlju — Putin je otvorio vrata u Evropi za koja smo mislili da smo ih zatvorili nakon Drugog svetskog rata.

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