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jjmcquade-misc · 2 months ago

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How Obama Transformed the U.S. Intelligence System into an Untouchable Force

The sprawling U.S. intelligence apparatus wasn’t Barack Obama’s invention, it emerged in the wake of 9/11 under George W. Bush, who laid the groundwork with the Patriot Act and a retooled security state. But Obama didn’t just inherit this system; he refined it, expanded it, and entrenched it so deeply into the fabric of American governance that it became nearly impossible for anyone, even a president, to rein it in. His tenure marked a pivotal shift, normalizing a decentralized, privatized, and largely unaccountable intelligence leviathan. Here’s how it unfolded.

The story begins in the early 2000s, when the Bush administration responded to the September 11 attacks with sweeping surveillance powers and a new security architecture. The Patriot Act of 2001 granted agencies like the NSA and FBI unprecedented authority to monitor communications, often sidestepping traditional oversight. By the time Obama took office in 2009, this framework was already in place, but it was still raw, controversial, and subject to scrutiny. Obama’s task wasn’t to build it from scratch; it was to polish it, protect it, and make it permanent.

One of his earliest moves came in 2011, when he signed a renewal of the Patriot Act with a Democratic-controlled Congress. Rather than scaling back Bush-era policies, he leaned into them, signaling that the post-9/11 security state wasn’t a temporary overreach but a new baseline. That same year, he authorized the drone strike that killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen, without judicial review—a decision rooted in a secretive “Disposition Matrix,” a kill-list system driven by CIA intelligence and insulated from external oversight. Over his presidency, Obama would greenlight over 500 drone strikes, far surpassing Bush’s tally, establishing a precedent for extrajudicial action that relied heavily on intelligence feeds.

Surveillance took a leap forward under Executive Order 12333, which Obama expanded to allow warrantless collection and sharing of raw signals intelligence (SIGINT) across federal agencies. What had once been concentrated in the NSA and FBI now seeped into every corner of the government, from the Department of Homeland Security to the Treasury. This decentralization diluted accountability, as data flowed freely between departments with little public scrutiny.

The 2013 Snowden leaks threw a spotlight on this system. Edward Snowden, a contractor for Booz Allen Hamilton working with the NSA, exposed illegal mass surveillance programs like PRISM and bulk metadata collection, revealing how deeply the government had tapped into private tech giants, Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple. Obama’s response was telling: he defended the programs, prosecuted whistleblowers like Snowden, and declined to hold the architects accountable. PRISM became a blueprint for a public-private surveillance partnership, unregulated by Congress, immune to FOIA requests, and beyond democratic reach. Meanwhile, the reliance on contractors like Booz Allen ballooned, by the end of his tenure, 70–80% of the intelligence budget flowed through private firms, funneling billions into an opaque ecosystem.

Obama also shielded the intelligence community from legal consequences. In 2014, the Senate’s Torture Report laid bare CIA abuses, black sites, waterboarding, and even spying on the Senate investigators themselves. Yet Obama refused to prosecute, famously urging the nation to “look forward, not backward.” This stance didn’t just protect individuals; it cemented a culture of impunity, signaling that the intelligence apparatus operated above the law.

Beyond surveillance and legal protections, Obama supercharged the bureaucracy. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), created under Bush, gained sweeping coordination powers under his watch, but rather than centralizing control, it added layers of insulation between the president and field operations. He also empowered hybrid units like Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and CIA task forces, which blended military and intelligence functions. These shadowy outfits operated in dozens of countries with lethal authority, secretive chains of command, and minimal oversight from Congress or even their own headquarters.

By 2017, as his presidency wound down, Obama made a final play: he authorized a rule change allowing the NSA to share raw, unfiltered data with 16 other intelligence agencies, stripping away privacy safeguards. This move ensured that the system he’d built could hum along without presidential intervention, its reach embedded in local “fusion centers,” secret courts, and corporate data pipelines.

The outcome was staggering. By the time Obama left office, the intelligence network spanned 17 agencies, leaned heavily on unaccountable contractors, and fused with private tech infrastructure. It wasn’t just bigger, it was untouchable, legalized through executive loopholes and shielded from reform. Obama became the first president to weave intelligence into every layer of government, from foreign policy to law enforcement, but in doing so, he relinquished control. The republic did too. No future leader would easily dismantle this machine, not because it was too strong, but because it had become too diffuse, too ingrained, too essential to the modern state. Obama's Intelligence Policy

#obama #democrats #nsa #surveillance #Snowden #cia #republicans #donald trump #jd vance #robert kennedy jr #tulsi gabbard #maga #joe biden

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soup-mother · 3 months ago

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aaah no you see you though you were signing up for SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) but you actually got a job at SIGINT (Signal Interrupt). your job is to press Control+C to interrupt computer programs

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unbossed · 4 months ago

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"Those Freedom Fighters in TurkDuckistan could go to a big box store, like Walmart, and pay cash for a phone. Remember security is end to end. Walmart has cameras on the parking lot. Remember, they have a lot of internal cameras as well. Wear a hat, don’t look up. Cover up any tattoos. Think about your clothing from the perspective of the guy who wants to kick your door in at 2 a.m. Do wear generic clothing, preferably throw away stuff you just bought at a thrift store. Don’t wear clothing with work logo’s, I.D. badges, anything that is specific to you! So you just bought your burners right? DO NOT just walk in the parking lot and turn them on. If those oppressive state security types are looking for our Freedom Fighters, they are looking for anomalies in the cell phone data. Like maybe multiple cell phones being activated at the exact same time and location. ..."

#OPSEC #comms

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darkmaga-returns · 21 days ago

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Ever since Donald Trump’s return to the White House, mainstream speculation has ever-intensified that his second term in office could spell the end of Five Eyes, the international signals intelligence (SIGINT) spying network. Through this connivance, Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the US train an unblinking eye on the public and private communications of the world’s entire population. While few average citizens would mourn the passing of Five Eyes, fear of its demise are pronounced in certain quarters - first and foremost, London.

In February, the Financial Times reported key Trump aide Peter Navarro was pushing for Canada to be excluded from Five Eyes, and the proposal was “being discussed” by senior US officials. While denied by Navarro, the suggestion sparked anxieties among Western intelligence veterans, think tank pundits, and journalists that Ottawa’s removal could precipitate the network’s outright collapse. In March, The Economist enquired, “Could Donald Trump imperil the Five Eyes spy pact?” In April, Politico pondered, “Can Britain live without American intelligence?”

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cybershadow · 1 year ago

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There are three steps to a solo extraction, maybe four if you plan on leaving experimentation wounded.

First step: intelligence gathering. Cyber and Spades had done that ever since they learned Lithium is alive. Tracking spies, wrangling them to the ground, prying information from them as easy as cutting paper with a newly sharpened knife. Same went for the exterminators, tackling them and taking them by surprise. Spades is especially good at that part, knowing them all by name and changing their mask like the flick of a light switch.

Cyber, meanwhile, pries into the signals intelligence like she always has but with a bit more force. Seeing the error for overheating from the databases is one of her favourite sights on the blue screen, leaving her grinning with a crooked smile as she writes down the SIGINT in her small notebook. Sleep is a thought saved for slower days, when patrols pause or change shift.

With enough gathered, they move onto step two. Entrance. Both ditch their colours and replace them with solid black, familiar for Spades yet an uncomfortable reminder of a forgotten past for Cyber. When was the last time she wore this getup for a mission like this? It's tighter around her shoulder and arms than it used to be, but there's no time for adjustments. Such a small window of opportunity, forcing them to jump into action like the drop of a bullet shell. Spades sits in the driver's seat in silence, mask and goggles already pulled into position, hair curtaining their eyes and face as they stretch their neck. Cyber slides into the passenger's seat and double checks her artillery as they drive towards their entrance.

To the new entrance for extermination, through the Lobby.

@lithiumghostkilljoy

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ari0921 · 1 year ago

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江崎道朗氏と茂田忠良氏が共著した新刊『シギント

- 最強のインテリジェンス -』

シギント（SIGINT: signals intelligence）

通信、電磁波、信号等など傍受を利用した諜報・諜

報活動を意味する言葉。

国際情勢を理解するには、シギントの知識が欠かせ

ません！

そしていま、わが国初のシギント入門書が登場しま

した！

この本では、通信、電磁波、信号などを利用した諜

報活動に迫ります。

今現在も展開中の盗聴、ハッキング、国益をかけた

戦い（インテリジェンス・ウォー）の実態が明らか

になります。

これはフィクションではありません！

繰り返す、これは架空【フィクション】ではない！

〈救国シンクタンク「国家防衛分析プロジェクト」

企画〉

ヒューミント、シギント、イミントの三分野を現場

で体験した元警察官僚、元内閣衛星情報センター次

長　茂田忠良。

麗澤大学客員教授。情報史学研究家。2023年フジサ

ンケイグループ第39回正論大賞受賞　江崎道朗。

このふたりが、いまのわが国に一番欠けているイン

テリジェンス能力について徹底討論しました。

◆スノーデン漏洩資料の徹底分析！見習うべきはア

メリカのシステム

◆インテリジェンス能力がなければまともな反撃な

ど不可能

◆「世界最強のシギント機構」UKUSA（ファイブ・ア

イズ）

◆インテリジェンスの世界で「専守防衛」は通用し

ない

◆まともに戦えるようになるために日本版CSSも創設

すべき

◆シギント機関の関与なくして“本当のサイバー・

セキュリティ”はできない

◆「シギントを進めるヒューミント、ヒューミント

を進めるシギント」

◆ 「シギント・フレンドリー」なホテルなら部屋の

中の会話も筒抜け？

◆ いずれ日本もNSAのような組織の必要性に気付く

◆ アメリカは外国人のメールを見放題◆

◆インテリジェンスの世界で「専守防衛」は通用し

ない

◆イギリスの首相は「生」のインテリジェンス情報

に触れている？

◆シギントはもはや「インテリジェンスの皇帝」

◆法律になくても対外諜報は「やるのが当たり前」

◆今こそ国家シギント機関創設に向けた第一歩を

『シギント - 最強のインテリジェンス -』

江崎道朗 , 茂田忠良（著）

定価： 1,700 円＋税

ページ数：384ページ

発行日：2024/4/1　

発行：ワニブックス

こんにちは、エンリケです。

江崎道朗氏と茂田忠良氏が共著した新刊『シギント

- 最強のインテリジェンス -』は、わが国のインテ

リジェンス体制とその課題にスポットを当て、国家

の安全保障に興味を持つ読者に向けて情報を提供し

ています。

この本は、おふたりの専門知識と経験に基づいており、

アメリカやイギリスの成功事例を参考にしながら、

わが国が国家シギント機関の設立やイ��テリジェン

スの強化にどのような取り組みをすべきかを提案し

ています。読者はこの本を通じて、専門的な情報を

理解し、国家の安全保障に関するアイデアや提言を

得ることができます。

わがインテリジェンスや国防の現状に不満や懸念を

抱き、インテリジェンスや安全保障への理解を深め

たいと考え、わがインテリジェンス体制に興味を持

つ読者を対象としています。そのニーズに応えるた

めに、著者の専門知識と経験に基づいて情報を提供

している本です。

この本の特徴は以下の通りです。

著者の専門知識と経験：江崎道朗氏はいまインテリ

ジェンスに関心ある方なら誰もが知っているであろ

う情報史学研究家です。「チャンネルくらら」でも

おなじみですね。茂田忠良氏は元警察官僚、元内閣

衛星情報センター次長として活動された方です。彼

らの専門知識と経験が、この書籍の信頼性と専門性

を支えています。

アメリカやイギリスの事例の解説：本書では、アメ

リカやイギリスのインテリジェンス体制や活動につ

いても詳細に解説されています。これにより、わが

国が他国の成功事例を参考にすることができます。

わが国の現状と課題の指摘：著者たちは、わが国の

インテリジェンス体制の現状や課題を指摘し、改善

のための提言を行っています。これにより、読者は

わがインテリジェンス体制への理解を深めることが

できます。

専門的な情報の提供：インテリジェンスに関する専

門的な情報を提供しています。読者は、著者の専門

知識を通じて、幅広いトピックについて学ぶことが

できます。

なぜアメリカは、ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻を半

年近くも前に予見することができたのか。

　なぜ欧米や日本は、ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻

後ただちにプーチン大統領とその関係者の資産凍結

を実施できたのか。

　なぜアメリカは、日本の外務省や防衛省の情報が

中国に漏れていることを把握できたのか。

　なぜアメリカは、中国製の通信機器などを政府調

達から外そうとしたのか。

　言い換えれば、なぜ日本は産業スパイを十分に取

り締まることができないのか。

　なぜ日本は、スパイ天国だと揶揄されてしまうの

か。

　アメリカと日本との違いはどこにあるのか。

　アメリカには、いわゆるスパイ防止法（Espion

age Act of 1917、現在は合衆国法典第18編第37章に

統合）があるが、日本にはそうした法律がないから

だという人がいる。

　たしかにアメリカのような包括的なスパイ防止法

はないが、日本にも不正競争防止法、外為法、そし

て特定秘密保護法などがあり、国家機密や営業秘密

を盗んだりするスパイ行為などを処罰できるように

なっている。

いま日本に必要なのは、スパイ、違法行為を効

率よく見つける捜査手法を「解禁」することなのだ。

　その捜査手法とは、シギント（信号諜報）を活用

することだ。

アメリカを含む外国、言い換えれば日本を除く大

半の国では、国家シギント機関とセキュリティ・サ

ービスが、安全保障の観点から国内だけでなく国外

でも電話、インターネットなどの通信、クレジット

カードの取引情報など（シギント）を傍受・分析し、

1年365日24時間、自国（と同盟国、同志国）に対

する敵対的な活動を監視している。

　ところが日本だけは、こうした行政通信傍受は許

されておらず、国家シギント機関も存在しない。　

日本は現行憲法9条のもとで正規の国防軍を持たない

「異質な国」だが、実はサイバー空間でも、内外の

スパイ活動を監視・追跡する国家シギント機関とセ

キュリティ・サービスを持たない「異質な国」なの

だ。(「まえがき」より一部抜粋)

―----------------------------------------------

いかがでしょうか？

つぎはもくじです。

―--------------------------------------------

■もくじ

まえがき（江崎道朗）

まえがき（茂田忠良）

※用語について

第１章　インテリジェンスなくして「反撃」なし

　ヒューミント、シギント、イミントの三分野を現

場で体験

　反撃能力に必要なインテリジェンスの視点が欠け

ている安保三文書

　アメリカに何周も遅れている日本の衛星探知シス

テム

　どうやってアメリカとギブ＆テイクの関係を作る

かが最大の課題

　インテリジェンス能力がなければまともな反撃な

ど不可能

　シギントなら「近未来の情報」も取れる

　ターゲティングに必要なのは「目の前の情報」で

はなく「多層の情報」

　「反撃」に必要なデータはまだ集まっていない？

　日本は本当に「自前でやる」覚悟があるのか

第２章　アメリカのインテリジェンスに学べ

　CIAの「特別工作」とは

　「セキュリティ」は「安全保障」ではなく「シギント」

　ジオイントでターゲットの全ての行動が筒抜け

　ミサイル発射を探知して種類まで特定

　日本のインテリジェンス体制をどう強化していく

べきか？

　政府の要望にも軍の要望にも応えられるインテリ

ジェンス体制

　日本は政府も自衛隊もインテリジェンス軽視

　専門家集団を作り、官邸と直結させるべき

　紆余曲折を経て発展してきたアメリカのインテリ

ジェンス

　日本はイギリスの真似をした方がいい？

第３章　「世界最強のインテリジェンス機構」ファ

イブ・アイズとNSA

　最強のインテリジェンス「シギント」

　日本人が知らない「トラフィック・アナリシス」

　レーダー波から兵器体系までも特定する「エリント」

　ミサイルの性能分析にも使える「フィシント」

　「世界最強のシギント機構」UKUSA（ファイブ・アイズ）

　もはやイギリスはアメリカと険悪な関係にはなれない

　まさに「桁違い」のアメリカのインテリジェンス体制

　「アメリカ並み」とそれなりのヒトとカネと法整備を

　いずれ日本もNSAのような組織の必要性に気づく

　NSAが発展できた理由は「シビリアンの専門家」の

活用と人事権の独立

　日本も避けては通れないデータフォーマットの統一

　アメリカのインテリジェンス発展史から日本の目

指すべき方向がわかる

　日本はまず政治がインテリジェンスの理解を深め

なければならない

第４章　NSAの恐るべき情報収集能力

　世界を覆う、NSAの情報収集体制

　日本も世界に情報収集拠点を

　NSAの情報収集の協力組織は世界各地に存在している

　スノーデン資料に出てこないほどの秘密の活動も

　「少ない費用で効果は抜群」のプリズム計画

　組織間の協力体制の欠如が北朝鮮による拉致被害

を拡大させた

　アメリカは外国人のメールを見放題

　企業や他国とも協力して行う、通信基幹回線によ

る情報収集

　２０世紀から活躍し続けるシギントの主要プラッ

トフォーム

　外交施設を最大限に活用

　「シギントを進めるヒューミント、ヒューミント

を進めるシギント」

　シギント衛星であらゆる位置情報を把握

　情報の収集・分析・統合がリアルタイムで行われ

る”強み”

第５章　「何でもあり」のインテリジェンスの世界

　NSAのハッカー集団TAO

　国内外を切り分けるのがインテリジェンスの常識

　秘匿の作戦でサイバー攻撃も？

　インターネットを介さない物理的な侵入にも対応

　マルウェアを開発し、製品カタログまで作成

　単なるハッカー集団ではなく「大規模装置産業」

　アメリカの真似をしない日本の異常性

　政府機関に民間と同じ技術力があるアメリカ

　「いつでも、どこでも、どんな手段を使っても」

　偽サイトにおびき寄せてマルウェア注入

　問題はどうやって誘い込むか

　物理的侵入ではFBIやCIAの協力も

　TAOが集めた情報は日本企業の監視にも活用？

　生産性が高い「配送経路介入」

　供給網工作は「世界標準」の情報収集手法

　自分がやれば相手も同じことをやってくる

　日本の大使館も対象にしている外国公館工作

　インテリジェンスの世界で「専守防衛」は通用し

ない

第６章　既に到来、シギントの黄金時代

　NSAの重要分析ツール「エクス・キースコア」

　毎日１０億単位のデータを新規に登録

　NSAのデータベース構造

　エクス・キースコアの優れた検索機能は「NSA版グ

ーグル」

　NSA版のグーグルマップ「宝地図」

　NSAは世界中のシステム管理者の端末情報を知りた

がっている

　標的のシギント情報の分析に活かされるターゲッ

ト・ナレッジ・データベース

　金融制裁が可能なのは資金の流れを掴んでいるから

　２０１３年の時点で暗号通貨対策に取り組んでい

たNSA

　日本でも取り組み��めたフォロー・ザ・マネー

　通信メタデータを分析できていれば９・１１同時

多発テロを防げた？

　メタデータで人物像を丸裸にする「人物分析」

　スパイ映画の世界が現実に

　携帯電話の使い方でテロリストやスパイを発見

　NSAの手法が民間の商用サービスに

　今はまさに「シギントの黄金時代」

第７章　「インテリジェンスの本家」イギリスの底力

　イギリスこそインテリジェンスの本家

　標的の祝は后のホテルでインテリジェンスを仕掛

ける

　政府高官が宿泊できるようなホテルは限られている

　「シギント・フレンドリー」なホテルなら部屋の

中の会話も筒抜け？

　人間は移動中の車内で本音を漏らす

　イギリスの首相は「生」のインテリジェンス情報

に触れている？

　G20で「画期的な諜報能力」を発揮したGCHQ

　通信記録から会議のキーマンをあぶり出す

　アメリカは国際捕鯨委員会の代表団までインテリ

ジェンスで支援

　サイバー空間でも行われるようになった積極工作

　インテリジェンスのためならニュースメディアも

利用

　アノニマスにもサイバー攻撃を仕掛ける

　オンライン秘匿活動としての「ハニートラップ」

　「不和の種」をまいて組織を内部から切り崩す

　偽の「秘密情報」を相手に掴ませる

　外国のジャーナリストにネタを提供

　オンライン・ヒューミントで外交上の立場を有利に

　サイバー空間の犯罪捜査にシギント機関が協力

　無自覚で認知戦の”駒”になっている人たちがいる

第８章　サイバーセキュリティ最前線

　UKUSA諸国はシギント機関がサイバーセキュリティ

の中核

　「餅は餅屋」じゃないと本当のサイバーセキュリ

ティはできない

　NSAもついに表舞台へ

　シギント機関の関与なくして”本当のサイバーセ

キュリティ”はできない

　中国からのサイバー攻撃にカウンターを喰らわせる

　対北朝鮮のC-CNEでNSAの韓国への関心が高まった？

　サイバーセキュリティの情報提供や教育もシギン

ト機関が中心

　民間企業を守ることこそが国益に繋がる

　シギント機関によるアトリビューション支援

　CーCNEにエクス・キースコアも活用

　攻撃者の探知・特定にはシギント・インフラが不可欠

　アクティブ・サイバー・ディフェンスとは

　民間ハッカーの”自慢”を情報収集に活用

　ネットワークに侵入される前に対抗措置

　ドイツも欲しがったアメリカのトゥーテリジ・シ

ステム

　既にアメリカは「ディフェンド・フォワード」の

ステージへ

　NSA長官とサイバー軍司令官の兼任体制は今後も続く？

　「シギント」の視点がない日本の議論

第９章　日本のインテリジェンス強化のための提言

　シギントはもはや「インテリジェンスの皇帝」

　日本には国家シギント機関がない

　犯罪捜査に通信傍受を使うメリット

　軍もインテリジェンスも世界基準に達していない

日本

　見習うべきはアメリカのシステム

　国家シギント機関に必要な要件とは？

　まともに戦えるようになるために日本版CSSも創設

すべき

　国家シギント機関は絶対に「ナショナル・インテ

リジェンス」

　内閣情報官を警察官僚が務める理由とは

　法律になくても対外諜報は「やるのが当たり前」

　今こそ国家シギント機関創設に向けた第一歩を

あとがき（茂田忠良）

※アメリカの行政通信傍受の法的根拠（茂田忠良）

※外国諜報機関との関係ギブ＆テイクそして標的

（茂田忠良）

#シギント #江崎道郎

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thetruearchmagos · 1 year ago

Text

New OC(s) Idea(s)

Heads up, @theprissythumbelina , GRR Martin's at it again.

So, I was having my dinner and watching the latest Drachinifel, when suddenly he mentioned something that caught my eye; namely, signals intelligence.

Being an absolute fucking nerd, I've had and exercised far more interest in signals / military intelligence than is probably happy, but as topics go it's a hard one to apply in any writing. Worldbuilding-wise, though, I've had a lot of fun with it.

Anyhow, as usual, my answer to the question of how to show off some niche worldbuilding topic is to create an entirely new character and supporting cast around it. In this case, without even being certain which of my WIP's I'd like it them to exist in. [Though I am leaning towards Terror Immortal, or perhaps The Commonwealth Calls.]

The idea is, interspersed between 'normal' scenes / POVs covering the rest of the conflict, I'll cut to scenes lasting a few paragraphs at most which will feature our 'SIGINT POV' character going over some brief, message, piece of intel., etc., and explaining its significance. Importantly, whatever they're going over's going to have some relevance to the specific events I'm developing in the 'fighting' text, and in some cases a keen reader will recognise their intelligence feeding into the higher-up decisions which eventually trickle down to affect the lives and battles of the members of the cast doing the fighting and dying.

Over the course of the WIP / Narrative in question, it's my hope that the reader will gain a sort of trust in SIGINT guy and his observations, and indeed I hope gradual and drawn own exposition on his character and personality might even make them like him. All this serves as a lead up to a big ol' Plot Twist.tm that I'm thinking will play out towards the end of whatever specific 'Book' this character will debut in. Basically, they'll get it wrong. In some small way, in some crucial way, this most skilled analyst of intelligence will make the wrong call at the wrong time, and decisions will be made off of this evidence, and without even knowing it someone, somewhere will die because of this singular slip up.

Can you tell how much I like this guy already?

#worldbuilding #writeblr #writing #my writing #writeblr stuff #my wips #original writing #cackles manically #well I had to get my intelligence analyst quota done somehow to earn my techno thriller card #and this feels like a unique way of doing it.

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emsee22 · 1 year ago

Text

PPP possible meaning

"Power Projection Platforms (PPPs) are defined as military installations that strategically deploy one or more high-priority active component brigade and/or mobilize and deploy high-priority reserve component units."

Power Projections are "Strategic Power Projection encompasses the U.S. Army’s ability to move troops and equipment, and includes the ports, roads, airfields, railheads and Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) which enable the Army to rapidly deploy. Army installations are power projection platforms supporting the Total Army to mobilize and generate the forces required, and project those forces anywhere in the world at any time." https://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2020/01/17/ I found Fort Gordon through the Wiki page for the meaning of Echelon "ECHELON, originally a secret government code name, is a surveillance program (signals intelligence/SIGINT collection and analysis network) operated by the five signatory states to the UKUSA Security Agreement:[1] Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, also known as the Five Eyes.[2][3][4]" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECHELON#Intercept_stations Fort Eisenhower was listed as an intercept station in the ECHELON with was located in Georgia (I focused on that one just because Georgia is the original setting of the show). Fort Eisenhauer is the name change for what was formerly Fort Gordon. I typed in PPP Fort Gordon and found that meaning there.

The CRM keeps surveillance on what seems to be many other camps/settlements in TWD world, so I don't think it is too far off that the meaning is possibly related to this. The whiteboard in the promo says Reclamation -> PPP Exception. To be re"claimed" is to act of reforming something for use. I think the PPP exception must be some quality that prevent a settlement or person from being reclaimed.

Whatever it winds up being, I can't wait for this Sunday!

#team delusional #team defiance #beth is alive

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timestampedjesus · 2 years ago

Text

This is the Beechcraft RC-12X Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft. It's based on the civilian model Beechcraft Super King Air series utility aircraft.

In simple terms, the Guardrail is a flying eavesdropper. It's used by the US Army to intercept and listen in on enemy radio and cellular communications, and to use the information gathered to tactical advantage. The aircraft looks rather ungainly thanks to the fact that it's festooned with various antennae which feeds it's signal interception equipment from facebook page 'battle machines post by ~clorox'

#us #sigint #aircraft #opsec

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mariacallous · 2 years ago

Text

The trauma that Israel suffered on Oct. 7 is both unprecedented and unthinkable by any Israeli historical measure. Never before has Israel experienced such a calamity in its 75-year history. Even Hamas never expected such operational success. Indeed, actors across the region, notably Hezbollah and Iran, were stunned by the success of the Hamas offensive.

One striking finding that only became known in recent days highlights the enormity of the Israeli intelligence blunder: Israeli military planners never considered such an attack, even in their worst-case scenarios. Indeed, the worst-case scenario conceived was a simultaneous attack on five to seven civilian settlements. Hamas’s offensive targeted nearly five times as many—and a music festival.

Surprises of this magnitude nurture the environment in which major strategic miscalculations could—and, indeed, are likely—to happen. Given the ongoing hostilities, it is important to understand the internal dynamics within Israel’s security establishment that led to the intelligence failure and the risks of unintended escalation, keeping in mind that Israel is an undeclared nuclear weapons state.

Israel’s two prime intelligence organizations tasked with providing a strategic warning alert as well as forestalling specific terrorist acts from Gaza are the General Security Service (known as Shabak or Shin Bet in Hebrew), which is in charge of human intelligence (HUMINT) but uses technological means, mainly signal intelligence (SIGINT) as well, and the Military Intelligence Directorate (known as Aman in Hebrew) of the Israel Defense Force (IDF), which uses mainly technical means of collection.

Israel’s warning system against either small- or large-scale terrorist attacks from Gaza relied on three main defense layers. The first, consisting mainly of the Shin Bet’s HUMINT sources, aimed to provide a warning that Hamas leadership had decided to plan, prepare, and execute a major offensive. The second layer, based on Aman’s SIGINT collection capabilities (units 8200 and 81) and imagery intelligence (Unit 9900), involved collecting evidence about Hamas’s actual preparations for the attack.

The third layer was the big ground barrier along the border with Gaza, which integrated physical obstacles, electronic sensors, and other visual means aimed at providing a last line of defense against any attempt to break into Israel. All three layers collapsed on the morning of Oct. 7. They did not provide any strategic warning on the nature and magnitude of the impending offensive.

At the root of this blunder appear to be two fundamental failures. The first is conceptual, as was famously the case in 1973: A false but steady and solid joint estimate from the Shin Bet and Aman that consisted of two elements: First, Israeli military and intelligence superiority would deter Hamas from initiating any major military act; and second, if Hamas launched such an attack, the Shin Bet and Aman would provide a timely warning.

Hamas’s relative restraint in recent years and its apparent interest in continuing the flow of cash from Qatar and increasing the number of Gaza residents allowed to work in Israel enhanced this concept in the collective psyche of Israel’s political, military, and intelligence leaders.

The adherence to the calming concept led senior officers to ignore warning indicators prior to the attack. Over the past several years, civilian amateurs near the border have monitored Hamas’s wireless communications in which troops organized and conducted endless training exercises in occupying Israeli settlements. In recent weeks, these officers received reports on irregular activities such as disguised farmers taking photos of the border fence and Hamas troops with maps observing military strongholds and settlements on the Israeli side, but disregarded them.

There was even an eleventh-hour chance to deter or minimize the attack: During the night of Oct. 6, Israeli intelligence detected some warning indicators that generated a series of late-night high-ranking consultations, but the flawed concept prevailed and no significant increase in the state of alert along the border was taken; the Shin Bet sent a few additional agents to the south, but Aman’s director, Maj. Gen. Aharon Halive, continued his vacation in Eilat and no major deployments were made.

The second and even more astonishing failure is that of collection. It appears that the Shin Bet failed in its fundamental mission and provided no significant warning regarding Hamas’s intention to launch a major attack. Its director, Ronen Bar, on Oct. 16 took responsibility for this failure, and his colleague in Aman followed suit shortly after.

The excellent record of the Shin Bet, as well as the fact that the number of Hamas operatives aware of the secret operation must have been rather large, compounds the failure. Despite the well-known difficulties of recruiting human sources in Islamist fundamentalist groups, the lack of any advance information from intelligence assets in Gaza is damning.

Other explanations have more to do with specific traits of the Shin Bet. Most important among them is its organizational culture, which emphasizes operations and the need to ward off concrete and isolated threats rather than provide abstract warnings against an all-out attack.

One of the outcomes of this culture, according to several retired Shin Bet operatives we spoke with, was to assign a large-scale attempt by Hamas to occupy Israeli settlements near the border a low rank in the service’s order of priorities. Another was the degeneration of the Shin Bet’s research capabilities.

A large research department was established in the late 1980s in order to provide strategic assessments. Due to organizational preferences, it lost its effectiveness in recent years. In addition, in contrast to its longtime tradition, the Shin Bet has tended in recent years to provide intelligence to please. Its estimates supported Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policy aimed at nurturing Hamas rule in Gaza and diminishing the power and influence of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

Less is known about Aman’s contribution to the failure, but it seems that it suffered from the well-known weakness of not connecting the dots, primarily by having too many analysts and insufficient integration. It is obvious that the Hamas trainings to occupy Israeli settlements—as shown, for example, by CNN—were well observed by Israeli drones and other means of collection.

Nevertheless, Aman’s analysts failed to recognize their true meaning, regarding them instead as show-off exercises. According to some reports, Hamas misled and deceived Israel’s SIGINT means of collection by talking in calls monitored by Unit 8200—and possibly Unit 81 and Shin Bet SIGINT—about avoiding a new war, thus revealing a far higher level of sophistication than previously realized.

The last line of defense, the 40-mile barrier along the border, provided the Israelis with a false sense of confidence. When the IDF unveiled this $1.1 billion project upon its completion in December 2021, it gave the impression that no terrorist would be able to cross it. Its main element was a huge subterranean anti-tunnel barrier, with enough cement to “build a road from Gaza to Bulgaria,” as the IDF put it. This underground part of the barrier proved to be effective on Oct. 7.

In addition to the cement underground, the project planners invested effort in providing effective cyberprotection to the electronic collection system on the fence. But they did not consider a scenario in which Hamas would use explosives to break it and drones to drop explosives on the sophisticated observation posts that transmitted visual intelligence to the screens of trained soldiers who serve in underground shelters (some of these off-duty soldiers, many of them women, were killed while they slept after Hamas breached the border and attacked the base).

The drones knocked out an estimated 100 remotely-operated machine gun towers as well. One can hardly understand this oversight considering the many war clips from Ukraine that show how Ukrainians have used drones to drop grenades on Russian tanks and soldiers.

The IDF also used three large observation balloons as a second-line platform to surveil Gaza in its southern, central, and northern sectors. In the weeks before the attack, the three balloons were taken out of service due to their activation under unsuitable weather conditions, but the army neglected to return them to service.

Though insufficient high-quality warning intelligence was the main cause of Israeli complacency, one should not ignore the role of lack of imagination, which was highlighted in the United States context by the 9/11 Commission Report.

Obviously, given Hamas’s capabilities and the close proximity of the Israeli settlements to the border, this was not such an unimaginable scenario as was the case with the 9/11 al Qaeda attack using hijacked planes. In this respect, lack of imagination contributed to the collection failure, and insufficient collection strengthened the belief that an all-out Hamas offensive was highly unlikely, thus creating a classic case of systemic failure.

Given the enormity of Hamas’s massacre, the Israeli government and the public are determined to achieve nothing less than the full eradication of Hamas’s military and civic power. It is also recognized, inside and outside the Israeli government, that a commitment to the full annihilation of Hamas as an organization is unprecedented, and as former Prime Minister Ehud Barak and others pointed out, it is probably unachievable.

Such a commitment creates extraordinary risks. As of this writing, Israel is waging war only along the 40-mile frontier that separates Gaza from Israel. But Israel also faces a two-pronged frontier in the north—about 80 miles with Hezbollah along the Lebanese border, and more than 40 miles along the Golan Heights with Syria. For now, the northern frontier only simmers, but it could escalate very quickly into a full-scale war.

Hezbollah, as Israel’s Minister of Defense stated on Oct. 18, is 10 times stronger than Hamas. It claims to command 100,000 fighters, and it possesses tens of thousands of rockets and missiles, some highly precise, that could target Israel’s entire territory and do severe damage to major cities and military facilities. There is also the looming specter of Iran, Hezbollah’s patron. On Oct. 14, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian warned Israel while visiting Beirut to stop its Gaza bombardment or face a “huge earthquake.”

Nobody knows whether Hezbollah—and possibly Iran—would stay on the sidelines during a prolonged, devastating Israeli attack on Gaza to eradicate Hamas. At the same time, shocked by their failure to detect the incoming Hamas attack, Israel’s intelligence organizations are now hypersensitive to any signal of a similar threat, leading to a series of false alarms in recent days.

This was the case after their 1973 blunder, when they issued a number of alarms of a coming Egyptian or Syrian offensive, as was described in the Hebrew memoirs of Maj. Gen. Motta Gur, the head of the Northern Command after the war. One thing is clear, though: All-out intentional or unintentional escalation between Israel and Hezbollah, with or without Iran, could generate war scenarios of a kind of ferocity and savagery that the region has never seen before.

It is this significant and uncertain risk that highlights the prominence of the American factor in the current equation. Here is a reminder: Fifty years ago, on Oct. 7, the second and worst day of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan asked Prime Minister Golda Meir to mobilize the readiness of Israeli nuclear weapons (presumably to assemble the weapons) for a demonstration. It is also alleged by some (including Seymour Hersh in his book The Samson Option) that U.S. President Richard Nixon’s decision on Oct. 12, 1973, to start an immediate airlift to Israel was taken due to an Israeli nuclear alert.

U.S. President Joe Biden recognized the unprecedented nature of the situation and immediately ordered the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group to sail toward Israeli shores, while also initiating an airlift of military supplies to Israel. By now, more than a week later, a second carrier strike group, the USS Eisenhower, is on its way to the eastern Mediterranean.

Never in any past Israeli wars has the U.S. government acted so decisively and swiftly as it has acted this week. Biden’s support of Israel is without doubt unprecedented, and it is a unique combination of both values and interest, sentiments and strategic requirements. On the strategic side, the purpose is quite evident—deterrence—telling Hezbollah and Iran, as Biden himself put it: “Don’t, don’t, don’t, don’t.”

But there may be another strategic concern in play. Although Washington rarely mentions it, Israel is a nuclear weapons state, but of a special kind, never having formally declared or overtly tested its arsenal. For more than half a century, Israel has built and maintained a unique, opaque nuclear posture, effectively creating a regional nuclear monopoly aimed at deterring existential threats. All past Israeli leaders treated this strategic asset as sacred, while the United States, since Nixon, tacitly accepted Israel’s unique nuclear status as long as it was nurtured in a responsible manner.

Over the last 10 months, however, Netanyahu has treated this legacy with disregard, even irresponsibility. He appointed the politician David Amsalem, an unqualified loyalist, as the day-to-day minister in charge of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission.

Recently, against the advice of his nuclear experts, Netanyahu considered a Saudi independent enrichment capability—which, as in any country, carries the risk of weaponization—in exchange for normalization with Israel. This comes against the backdrop of past incidents, including in the late 1990s, in which Netanyahu left his nuclear guardians with the impression that he lacks the qualities to control Israel’s nuclear keys.

At a time when Israel is at war in Gaza, there is a real risk that Hezbollah might unleash tens of thousands of missiles on Israeli cities. That, in turn, could generate situations in which reckless and inexperienced ministers go astray in their reactions. Indeed, just days ago, one Israeli far-right Likud lawmaker, Tally Gotliv, publicly urged the government to use “everything in its arsenal,” including “doomsday” weapons, against Hamas.

In such a moment, one cannot forget Israel’s unique nuclear status. Perhaps more than past American leaders, Biden (due to the Ukraine war) recognizes the solemnity and fragility of the global nuclear taboo. One wonders whether another tacit reason for Biden’s unprecedented involvement—including his naval deployments and high-profile visit to Israel on Oct. 18—is to make sure that taboo is not shattered.

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pcbdesignbrisbane · 6 days ago

Text

Understanding Electronic Warfare: The Future of Modern Combat

In today’s increasingly digital battlefield, the term electronic warfare has gained strategic importance across militaries and defence sectors worldwide. As nations seek to gain an edge without deploying conventional firepower, electronic warfare (EW) has emerged as a critical force multiplier. It is not only reshaping how wars are fought but also redefining how threats are detected, disrupted, and defeated.

In this blog, we’ll explore what electronic warfare is, how it works, its various types, and its growing role in modern defence and national security. Whether you’re in defence tech, cybersecurity, or strategic planning, understanding the impact of EW is essential.

What Is Electronic Warfare?

Electronic warfare refers to the use of the electromagnetic spectrum—radio frequencies, radar signals, and infrared emissions—to gain a tactical advantage over adversaries. This can involve disrupting enemy communications, deceiving radar systems, or protecting friendly assets from electronic threats.

The core objective of EW is simple: to deny the enemy use of the spectrum while ensuring uninterrupted access for friendly forces.

The Three Pillars of Electronic Warfare

Electronic warfare is typically divided into three main categories:

1. Electronic Attack (EA)

Electronic Attack involves the use of electromagnetic energy to degrade, disrupt, or destroy enemy equipment and capabilities. This includes:

Jamming enemy communications or radar systems

Directed energy weapons such as high-powered microwaves

Anti-radiation missiles targeting enemy radar

EA is often the most aggressive form of EW and is designed to neutralise enemy capabilities without physical confrontation.

2. Electronic Protection (EP)

Electronic Protection focuses on defending against enemy EW actions. It ensures that friendly communications, radar, and sensors are safeguarded from interference, jamming, or spoofing. EP includes:

Frequency hopping to avoid jamming

Shielding sensitive equipment

Secure encryption protocols

This is crucial for mission integrity in contested environments.

3. Electronic Support (ES)

Electronic Support involves detecting, intercepting, and identifying electromagnetic emissions from enemy sources. It provides real-time intelligence for decision-making and can help locate threats before they strike. ES systems include:

Signal intelligence (SIGINT) platforms

Radar warning receivers

Spectrum analysis tools

Together, these capabilities form a comprehensive electronic warfare strategy that integrates seamlessly with cyber, air, land, and sea operations.

The Strategic Importance of Electronic Warfare

The battlefield of the 21st century is as much digital as it is physical. Electronic warfare enables militaries to:

Disrupt enemy command and control systems without kinetic weapons

Gain early warning of attacks by monitoring enemy radar and communications

Protect key assets, such as aircraft and naval vessels, from missile targeting

Support cyber operations by enabling denial-of-service or information deception

Enhance situational awareness, reducing the risk of friendly fire or miscommunication

In modern hybrid warfare, where information and perception can be as decisive as firepower, EW plays a crucial role in shaping outcomes.

Electronic Warfare and Cybersecurity: A Powerful Alliance

As military and critical infrastructure systems become more digitised, the lines between electronic warfare and cybersecurity are blurring. Attacks on GPS networks, satellite communications, and data links can be executed using both cyber tools and electronic interference.

For example, spoofing a GPS signal through electronic means can redirect drones or missiles. Similarly, jamming satellite communication can isolate forces in the field. Thus, electronic warfare must work hand-in-hand with cyber defence to ensure holistic protection.

The Future of Electronic Warfare

Technological advancements such as artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, and quantum computing are set to revolutionise EW capabilities. Key trends shaping the future of electronic warfare include:

AI-powered signal recognition for faster threat identification

Cognitive EW systems that adapt to new threats autonomously

Space-based electronic surveillance for enhanced global coverage

Miniaturised EW payloads for drones and unmanned platforms

With great power comes the need for responsible use. As EW systems become more sophisticated, international law and ethical considerations will play a growing role in their deployment.

Final Thoughts

Electronic warfare is no longer a niche capability—it is a cornerstone of modern military strategy. Whether used for attack, defence, or surveillance, EW offers powerful, non-lethal options for dominating the battlespace. As global tensions rise and technology evolves, the demand for robust electronic warfare capabilities will only increase.

If you are in defence contracting, military strategy, or technology innovation, now is the time to explore how electronic warfare can be integrated into your operations and strategic planning.

#electronic warfare

0 notes

firmwaredevelopment · 6 days ago

Text

Understanding Electronic Warfare: The Future of Modern Combat

What Is Electronic Warfare?

The core objective of EW is simple: to deny the enemy use of the spectrum while ensuring uninterrupted access for friendly forces.

The Three Pillars of Electronic Warfare

Electronic warfare is typically divided into three main categories:

1. Electronic Attack (EA)

Electronic Attack involves the use of electromagnetic energy to degrade, disrupt, or destroy enemy equipment and capabilities. This includes:

Jamming enemy communications or radar systems

Directed energy weapons such as high-powered microwaves

Anti-radiation missiles targeting enemy radar

EA is often the most aggressive form of EW and is designed to neutralise enemy capabilities without physical confrontation.

2. Electronic Protection (EP)

Electronic Protection focuses on defending against enemy EW actions. It ensures that friendly communications, radar, and sensors are safeguarded from interference, jamming, or spoofing. EP includes:

Frequency hopping to avoid jamming

Shielding sensitive equipment

Secure encryption protocols

This is crucial for mission integrity in contested environments.

3. Electronic Support (ES)

Signal intelligence (SIGINT) platforms

Radar warning receivers

Spectrum analysis tools

Together, these capabilities form a comprehensive electronic warfare strategy that integrates seamlessly with cyber, air, land, and sea operations.

The Strategic Importance of Electronic Warfare

The battlefield of the 21st century is as much digital as it is physical. Electronic warfare enables militaries to:

Disrupt enemy command and control systems without kinetic weapons

Gain early warning of attacks by monitoring enemy radar and communications

Protect key assets, such as aircraft and naval vessels, from missile targeting

Support cyber operations by enabling denial-of-service or information deception

Enhance situational awareness, reducing the risk of friendly fire or miscommunication

In modern hybrid warfare, where information and perception can be as decisive as firepower, EW plays a crucial role in shaping outcomes.

Electronic Warfare and Cybersecurity: A Powerful Alliance

The Future of Electronic Warfare

AI-powered signal recognition for faster threat identification

Cognitive EW systems that adapt to new threats autonomously

Space-based electronic surveillance for enhanced global coverage

Miniaturised EW payloads for drones and unmanned platforms

With great power comes the need for responsible use. As EW systems become more sophisticated, international law and ethical considerations will play a growing role in their deployment.

Final Thoughts

If you are in defence contracting, military strategy, or technology innovation, now is the time to explore how electronic warfare can be integrated into your operations and strategic planning.

#electronic warfare

0 notes