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seeyal8r · 3 months

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L8rboy (often stylized as L8RBOY!) made their debut on March 21st, 2017 under Hidden Entertainment with members Hana, Heather, Poupette, Mae, and Lo. Their debut single, See ya!, didn't receive the warm welcome they had hoped for. The debut was met with a wave of criticism from netizens for various reasons, including the fact that one of the members, Hana, was the daughter of the company's CEO. Hana was also criticized for her perceived lack of professionalism and inadequate preparation, particularly her subpar rap skills. Additionally, the group faced backlash because their leader, Mae, was not of Asian descent.

Although the girls started the promotion of their single with high spirits, their enthusiasm waned over time, leading to the cancellation of some of their final scheduled interviews. After several months of absence from social media, the group came back with their first mini-album, SHOUT OUT, featuring the single ICY. The same day of its release, #TheyKeepTalkinIKeepWalkin became trending topic on Twitter. This particular line resonated with the girls and fans alike, as it directly addressed the unjust hate the group had received during their debut. The hashtag quickly gained traction, symbolizing the group's resilience and determination to succeed despite the criticism they had faced.

With the initial controversy having died down, SHOUT OUT was warmly received by the few fans they had garnered during their debut as well as attracted new ones, allowing them to stabling a modest but dedicated mostly local fanbase.

After two years and three comebacks, L8RBOY silently disbanded following the release of their mini album STRAWBERRIES & CREAM, with CAKE being the last title track released under Hidden Entertainment. The disbandment was never officially announced, but it became evident as the members remained inactive for nearly a year. This period of silence ended with the announcement that INFERNO MUSIK had acquired L8RBOY's contract.

INFERNO MUSIK rebranded the group, shifting their image from a cute concept to a more mature, girl crush aesthetic. The lineup also saw changes, with members Lo and Hana staying behind at Hidden Entertainment and being replaced by two trainees from INFERNO: Achara and Silv, the latter of whom gained fame from her participation in the survival show The Bird Box, hosted by INFERNO.

L8RBOY re-debuted on 2020 with the mini album Killing Your Darlings, and its title track LOVES!CK GIRLS broke into the music charts, marking a turning point for the group. For the first time, L8RBOY was experiencing the success they had longed for, and their future seemed brighter than ever. Over the next two years, they solidified their place in the industry, enjoying a level of popularity they had previously only dreamed of.

However, in 2023, they came back with their first full album with only four members. Mae was noticeably absent from the promotions, and no official explanation was provided. Mae has not promoted with the group since then, leaving fans uncertain about her future with L8RBOY.

Despite a rocky start in the industry, L8RBOY has emerged as one of the most iconic and influential girl groups of their generation. Their journey from a troubled debut to chart-topping success is a testament to their resilience and talent, securing their place in the records of K-pop history.

THE BASICS

COMPANY: former Hidden Entertainment, current INFERNO MUSIK

OFFICIAL COLOR: strawberry red

FANDOM: lovebirds

GREETING: you should’ve seen it coming! Hello, we’re L8RBOY!

PAST MEMBERS: Hana & Lo

ACTIVE MEMBERS: Heather, Achara, Poupette & Silv

INACTIVE MEMBERS: Mae

GET TO KNOW THE MEMBERS! ★

★﹐୨🍓୧﹒ BORN TO BE A BRODWAY STAR, FORCED TO BE MISTREATED IN THE KPOP INDUSTRY ﹒ ₊˚﹒

THE BASICS

STAGE NAME: Heather

BIRTH NAME: Heather Lee

KOREAN NAME: Lee Hayun

BIRTHDAY: September 5th, 2000

BIRTHPLACE: Chicago, USA

HOMETOWN: Chicago, Illinois

ETHNICITY: Dutch-Korean

NATIONALITY: American

THE CAREER

PROFESSION: idol

COMPANY: former Hidden Entertainment, current INFERNO MUSIK

GROUP: L8RBOY!

POSITION: lead vocalist, lead dancer, face of the group, maknae

YEARS ACTIVE: 2017-2019, 2020-present

YEARS TRAINED: 4 years

THE CLAIMS

FACECLAIM: Jeon Somi

VOICECLAIM: DeVita & Eva Noblezada

THE BACKSTORY

Heather Lee was born in Chicago to a loving family as their only child. Her parents had struggled for years with infertility, finally giving up hope of ever having a child. Then, by a stroke of luck, her mother became pregnant with Heather, and they felt it was nothing short of a miracle. From that moment, Heather became the light of their lives, and they devoted themselves to providing her with the best life they could.

From an early age, Heather showed a keen interest in theater, especially musicals. She eagerly joined every theater group that got on her way, taking on roles such as Karen Smith in Mean Girls and Fiona in Shrek. During her teenage years, she tirelessly auditioned for various Broadway musicals, yet each time, she faced rejection. Despite her mounting desperation and growing sense of defeat, she never gave up on her dream.

The one day a member of Hidden Entertainment’s staff saw her perform as Cinderella in her high school’s production of Into the Woods. Impressed by her talent, he offered her a trainee position at the company. Heather seized the opportunity without hesitation, believing that if Broadway wasn’t her destiny, perhaps the K-pop industry was where she truly belonged.

After a relatively short training period, Heather debuted as the lead vocalist of L8RBOY. Her genuine personality and astonishing vocals quickly made her the second most popular member of the group. Following the silent disbandment of L8RBOY and the subsequent acquisition of the group’s contract by INFERNO MUSIK, Heather was the first to sign on among the three members who survived the lineup changes.

In the group's re-debut under INFERNO, Heather kept her position and saw her career flourish. She eventually became the face of L8RBOY. Her solo success also led to her debut as a solo artist and landed her a summer contract to play Eurydice in the Broadway musical Hadestown.

★﹐୨🍓୧﹒ THE SWEETEST GIRL IN TOWN! SHE HAS DONE NOTHING WRONG IN HER WHOLE LIFE﹒ ₊˚﹒

THE BASICS

STAGE NAME: Achara

BIRTH NAME: Achara ‘Tara’ Rhitthirong

BIRTHDAY: October 21st, 1998

BIRTHPLACE: Ayutthaya, Thailand

HOMETOWN: Bangkok, Thailand

ETHNICITY: Thai

NATIONALITY: Thai

THE CAREER

PROFESSION: idol, coreographer

COMPANY: former YG Entertainment, current INFERNO MUSIK

GROUP: Blackpink L8RBOY!

POSITION: main dancer, main rapper, center

YEARS ACTIVE: 2020-present

YEARS TRAINED: 6 years (3 years at YG, 3 at INFERNO)

THE CLAIMS

FACECLAIM: Nicha Yontararak ‘Minnie’

VOICECLAIM: LE

THE BACKSTORY

Achara ‘Tara’ Rhitthirong was born in Ayutthaya, where she spent her early years. As the youngest of six children, she didn’t receive much attention from her parents during her childhood. Initially puzzled by their lack of time for her, young Tara eventually came to terms with being invisible, even finding a certain comfort in it. Her siblings didn’t receive much attention either, so Tara found solace in her own pursuits. She spent the time that most kids would spend with their families in dance classes, a passion she discovered after attending one of her older sister’s ballet recitals.

Although she danced purely for enjoyment without any professional aspirations, her instructors saw her potential and encouraged her to compete at a national level. She performed exceptionally well, securing several national titles. It was at one of these competitions that she caught the eye of YG Entertainment, who offered her a trainee position and a fully covered move to South Korea. One benefit of having inattentive parents is that they don’t seem to mind you moving alone to a completely different country at the age of 13.

Tara trained at YG for three years and was even considered for debut in BLACKPINK. However, she was ultimately replaced in the lineup by Lisa. Disheartened but determined, Tara stayed with YG for a few more months before her contract was acquired by INFERNO MUSIK.

After an additional three years of rigorous training, she debuted as Achara in L8RBOY. She quickly earned a reputation as one of the best dancers in the industry, praised for her professionalism and passion. Tara is also well known for her easygoing, bubbly personality.

★﹐୨🍓୧﹒ SHE WORKED HER ASS OFF TO BE HERE. WAS IT WORTH IT? ﹒ ₊˚﹒

THE BASICS

STAGE NAME: Mae

BIRTH NAME: Daisy-Mae Pérez

BIRTHDAY: June 11th, 2000

BIRTHPLACE: New Jersey, New York, USA

HOMETOWN: New Jersey, New York, USA

ETHNICITY: Hispanic

NATIONALITY: American

THE CAREER

PROFESSION: idol

COMPANY: former Hiddent Entertainment, current INFERNO MUSIK

GROUP: L8RBOY!

POSITION: lead rapper, lead dancer, vocalist

YEARS ACTIVE: 2017-2019, 2020-present

YEARS TRAINED: 5 years

THE CLAIMS

FACECLAIM: Bebe Wood

VOICECLAIM: Jennie Kim

THE BACKSTORY

Daisy-Mae Pérez was born into a modest family in New Jersey. From a young age, she showed a profound interest in the performing arts. She spent her days dancing around the house, singing in the church choir, or rehearsing for her school plays. Her parents, despite their limited financial resources, were captivated by their daughter’s passion and talent. They did everything they could to support her dream, even postponing their divorce to ensure their limited funds went toward Daisy-Mae rather than legal fees.

They enrolled Daisy-Mae in dance classes, the most they could afford. It was there that she was introduced to K-pop by a friend. From that moment, debuting in the Korean industry became her ultimate goal, and she dedicated herself entirely to achieving it. She spent every moment outside of school practicing and honing her skills.

A few years later, Daisy-Mae passed the international auditions for Hidden Entertainment. After an emotional farewell with her parents, she boarded a plane to Seoul and began her training. Her hardworking and determined nature quickly set her apart, making her the top trainee of her cohort and earning her a debut spot with L8RBOY.

Being chosen as the group’s leader was the culmination of all her efforts, and for some time, Daisy-Mae was incredibly happy. She felt fulfilled and extremely fortunate for the opportunities life had given her. However, things took a turn for the worse when INFERNO acquired L8RBOY's contract. Despite surviving the lineup changes, Daisy-Mae lost her position as leader. She was heartbroken and couldn’t understand the reason why, but she continued to persevere, driven by her dedication and the support of her fans.

However, something must have happened behind the scenes, as one day, Daisy-Mae was placed on an indefinite hiatus, and nothing more was heard from her.

★﹐୨🍓୧﹒ EVERYONE KNOWS HER, BUT DOES EVERYONE LOVE HER? ﹒ ₊˚﹒

THE BASICS

STAGE NAME: Poupette

BIRTH NAME: Zhao Jiayi

FRENCH NAME: Juliette Zhao

BIRTHDAY: July 30th, 1999

BIRTHPLACE: Shenzhen, China

HOMETOWN: Marseille, France

ETHNICITY: Chinese

NATIONALITY: French

THE CAREER

PROFESSION: idol

COMPANY: former Hidden Entertainment, current INFERNO MUSIK

GROUP: L8RBOY!

POSITION: leader, main vocalist, visual

YEARS ACTIVE: 2017-2019, 2020-present

YEARS TRAINED: 5 years

THE CLAIMS

FACECLAIM: Song Yuqi

VOICECLAIM: Jung Wheein

THE BACKSTORY

Juliette Zhao, born Zhao Jiayi, was born in Shenzhen, China. However, she only spent her first year there before her family relocated to Marseille, France, due to her mother's business. Her mother, the owner of a prestigious luxury hotel chain, decided to move to Marseille to personally manage one of her hotels that was underperforming.

Juliette began singing in her school choir, where her exceptional vocal talent quickly stood out. Her teacher urged her mother to enroll her in private lessons, believing Juliette had the potential to build a career in music. Initially, her mother viewed the arts as a frivolous pursuit and not a stable career path. However, after persistent pleading from Jiayi, her mother finally agreed and payed for her lessons.

Continuing with the choir, Juliette also participated in various talent shows throughout her childhood. At the age of 12, she participated in the national contest to select France's representative for Junior Eurovision. Juliette not only won the national contest but also secured victory in the final competition. Following her victory, her mother received numerous offers from both Chinese and Korean music companies.

After considering their options, Jiayi and her mother chose to sign with Hidden Entertainment, whose CEO was an old classmate of her mother. Upon completing her training period, Jiayi debuted in L8RBOY as Poupette, taking on the role of the main vocalist. Despite the initial controversies surrounding the group's debut, Poupette was praised by netizens for her outstanding vocals and doll-like visage. She became the first member to cultivate a substantial solo fanbase.

With L8RBOY’s re-debut under INFERNO, Poupette not only retained her position as main vocalist but also took on the role of leader, a title previously held by Mae.

★﹐୨🍓୧﹒ YOUR TRUSTY COMEDIC RELIEF SIDE CHARACTER, SAD ISN’T IT? ﹒ ₊˚﹒

THE BASICS

STAGE NAME: Silv

BIRTH NAME: Silvia Kang

KOREAN NAME: Kang Siah

BIRTHDAY: February 24th, 1998

BIRTHPLACE: Daegu, South Korea

HOMETOWN: Sevilla, Spain

ETHNICITY: Korean

NATIONALITY: Korean-Spanish

THE CAREER

PROFESSION: idol, songwriter

COMPANY: INFERNO MUSIK

GROUP: BIRDS OF PREY L8RBOY!

POSITION: vocalist, ocassional rapper

SURVIVAL SHOWS: The Bird Box (ranked 5th)

YEARS ACTIVE: 2020-present

YEARS TRAINED: 6 years

THE CLAIMS

FACECLAIM: Jung Jinsol

VOICECLAIM: Na Goeun

THE BACKSTORY

Silvia Kang, born Kang Siah, came into the world on a winter's day in Seville, Spain. Despite her Korean heritage and annual family trips to Daegu, her parents' hometown, Silvia always felt more Spanish than Korean. Growing up in a city as culturally rich as Sevilla, it was hard not to be influenced by its beauty, vibrant people, and unique customs.

Silvia's first encounter with the world of music began when her mother enrolled her in the conservatory to learn to play Spanish guitar. Initially, she saw it as a chore that took away time from playing with her school friends. However, Silvia soon fell in love with music. She began singing at the conservatory, and although she wasn’t the most outstanding vocalist, she enjoyed it immensely. She began performing mini-concerts at home for her parents and family friends.

By the age of 12, Silvia had written five songs, which she recorded with her guitar and uploaded to YouTube. It was through these videos that she was discovered by INFERNO MUSIK, who offered her a spot on their renowned international survival show, The Bird Box. Although Silvia was initially hesitant to accept the offer, knowing little about K-pop or its industry, her mother was thrilled that such a prestigious company like INFERNO had shown interest in her daughter. She convinced Silvia to participate, promising it would be a truly unforgettable once-in-a-lifetime experience.

Silvia's time on The Bird Box was nothing short of remarkable. She managed to avoid elimination in every challenge until the final, where she was ultimately cut from debuting and finished in fifth place. Despite the glamour, not everything was as fantastic as it seemed. Silvia’s mother was right in saying it would be unforgettable, as whatever happened behind the scenes has led Silvia to never speak about her participation in The Bird Box.

After the show concluded, INFERNO offered Silvia a trainee contract with the promise of debuting within a few years. Following much internal debate, she decided to accept and give the K-pop industry a second chance. INFERNO kept its promise, and Silvia debuted as Silv with L8RBOY. Silv writes most of the group’s songs. Her talent extends beyond her group, as she frequently appears in the credits for songs by other top groups in the industry.

formatting insp. by the lovely myah! @venusvity

#🍓 ˖ ࣪ see ya! ࣪ ★ ₊˚﹒⤻ development #fictional idol community #fictional idol group #fictional idol oc #kpop #kpop fanfic

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sevault-canyon · 2 years

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ms appleton was nowhere close to having total control over soy sauce: perspectives on food and postwar japan

there's a popular post going around this month by @inneskeeper about how a single person changed japanese soy sauce forever. i've made my own post showing why this the story is incomplete and based on some factual inaccuracies, but i will be honest in saying that i would not be so engaged in responding to this post if it were not wrapped in a shockingly reductive narrative. i'll use this quote from op as a summary of the general idea they're trying to convey:

[...] I think that it is incredibly important that more people in the world are aware that leading into the Cold War, Japan was forcibly coerced into giving total power over a significant cultural touchstone/ingredient/way of life to a single foreigner who had a complete lack of respect for what shoyu is, even going so far as to say "I want to change Japan's taste preferences". I cannot imagine a more direct and blunt parallel to settler-colonialism mindset. I truly cannot. [link]

i will attempt give a larger view of that era and convey why this singular view is at best oversimplifying and at worst an incorrect projection of other trends upon what is an almost unique event in history.

note: i am not an academic historian; i will do my best to provide sources, but they will mostly be secondary.

i will use the three i's presented by prof. ian shapiro of yale, interests, institutions, and ideals, as lenses through which i will provide a more holistic view of the events at hand:

tl;dr:

the united states did not have uniform interests entering the cold war and the occupiers had a varying set of visions for japanese society and economy.

both the japanese public, the american occupation, and the japanese civil government had a more important goal: preventing hunger. japan was not coerced into handing over a tradition; it was suffering the consequences of its own colonial empire-building.

both countries were interested in building a healthy consumer economy, and ultimately the tastes of the public held most sway.

the idea of "a guy" being in charge of things has been a common theme in american foreign policy, but the idea that "the guy" was singularly responsible for massive change belies american perspectives and biases that often misrepresent the truth abroad.

i - ideals

i think this lens is maybe the most sympathetic to @inneskeeper's narrative: it makes sense that a settler-colonial nation with a deep root of anglo-protestant self-righteousness and evangelical tendencies would want to impose its vision of society upon a defeated foe. that said, it is not the only ideology at play in this situation, from both japan and the usa.

let's talk about main value the united states likes to impose upon foreign societies: democracy capitalism. i think what is interesting here is that this single word can have multiple interpretations in practice, and we can use this soy sauce story to look at the diversity in opinion of what capitalism means.

first, a capitalism tied to liberal ideals: a free and open market without monopolies as a promoter of egalitarianism. this concept was brought to japan by many of the administrators in the american occupation that have previously observed or enacted roosevelt's new deal in the aftermath of the great depression. [1, p.57-58; 2, p.98] we see a focus on trust-busting and a strong aversion to any significantly concentrated capital. pre-war japan was dominated by structures known as 財閥 zaibatsu, vertically integrated groups that are helmed by a family-controlled holding company owning a set of subsidiaries in banking and industry with interlocking stock ownership and directorship. the zaibatsu structures, emerging since the late edo and early meiji periods, have become inextricably linked to building the japanese imperial war machine (though somewhat forcibly). [3] on the american side, as a result, certain american elements viewed trust-busting as a way to democratize japan through the economy. [2, p.34; 4, p.19; 5, IV-2b] this included maj. gen. marquat, ms. appleton's boss at the ghq/scap economic and scientific section (ess). [4, p.31] japan's first postwar prime minister, shigeru yoshida, and his ministry of foreign affairs, seemed to agree with the deconcentration of capital. [4, p.20] this is not to say that the americans were particularly sympathetic, as gen. macarthur and others were quite convinced of the japanese population's inability to shed its feudal tendencies; rather, the americans found an opportunity to build a new liberal, democratic society to their liking. and yes, there was some punitive intent; the united states and allies did just finish fighting an 8-year-long war against an expanding empire. [4, p.30]

opposite the liberal view is the conservative, if not pragmatic, ideal of capitalism: as a bulwark against communism. japan was an industrialized nation with a developed economy, and as far as the looming cold war is involved, the united states wants both a healthy consumer economy and one that is integrated in the new world economy (i.e. one with american interests as stakeholders). [4, p.31-32, 44] if "deconcentration" of capital, as it was called by the occupiers, were to run its course, some americans (and lobbyists linked to japanese industry) feared that japanese society would be thrown into chaos, or worse, the rapprochement with the soviets under a socialist economy. [4, p.22, 32] the victors did initially break up many of the tightly-woven zaibatsu, but the overall health of the economy was eventually prioritized as a bulwark against communism, thus the number of zaibatsu slated for dismantling was reduced, and the main deconcentration proposal (FEC-230) was disavowed. [4, p. 32]

all this debate within the american occupation, plus some interjections from the japanese business community, about the nature of the rebuilding japanese market and economy was held from 1946 to 1948. this culminated in the "reverse course," in which cold war objectives won out in occupation policy, though the free market as a liberalizing principle was not discarded. [4, p.44-46] in the same space, there existed both a punitive drive to disperse the old japanese economic engine and a desire to build a new, genuinely local, consumer society as a protection against communism.

“Nothing will serve better to win the Japanese people over to a peaceful, democratic way of life than the discovery that it brings rewards in the way of better living and increasing economic security.” - col. r.m. cheseldine, u.s. war department [4, p.44]

it is important to distinguish this from the colonialist drive, which is to capture markets and resources for the sole benefit of the homeland.

in the context of soy sauce, the release by ghq/scap of american soybeans to japan was announced in 1948, after the reverse course has taken hold. [6, p.157] in addition, kikkoman was not even a zaibatsu, it was a company with roots in family ownership, vertically-integrated structures, and eventually found to engage in monopolistic practices, but was not of a large enough scale or diversification to qualify. [7, ch.3] the list of zaibatsu is actually quite limited. [wiki] all this meant that the anti-trust case brought against noda shōyu k.k. (kikkoman's predecessor) in 1954 in the tokyo high court is an entirely domestic affair (scap handed over power in 1949 and the position was abolished in 1952). [8, p.53] that said, the 1957 ruling against noda in noda shōyu k.k. v. japan fair trade commission (jftc) was the result of an aberrant and unfavourable reading of the act on prohibition of private monopolization and maintenance of fair trade, article 3; the act was passed in 1947, when scap was in power. [8, p.53] since article 3 is quite short ("an enterprise must not effect private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade."), it was open to wide interpretation, leading to the argument by the jftc that price-fixing as a leading player in an industry constituted monopolistic behaviour. [9] in that sense, we can see echoes of the debate around monopolies from the occupation era.

through the lens of ideals, we can see that in the periphery of this story, there is a friction between competing visions of capitalism in practice. in that sense, while it agrees that the usa had some desire to reshape a foreign country to its own ideals, it also shows how @inneskeeper's narrative unduly reduces the american occupation to a singular actor with singular motives, and one that is akin to colonial empires in other parts of history.

research questions:

did american attitudes towards monopolies affect the free distribution of semichemical fermentation methods? [6, p.160]

what direct links can we make between occupation-era attitudes towards monopolization and japanese governance regarding the food industry?

ii - institutions

from the point of view of institutions (i use the term loosely), it's a lot more apparent how the situation has a lot more factors flowing in many directions. i will largely focus on three structures: the japanese food industry, the allied victors, and the japanese civil government.

when discussing the food industry, it's important to note that this is what sustains the inhabitants of a place; while condiments are a trivial part of sustenance, the way it is made and its ebbs and flows and shed a lot of light onto the needs of people. japan, since the early 20th century, had been a country that could not sustain itself off the resources of its home islands. as a colonial empire, it relied on food imports from korea and taiwan, and in the 20s and 30s pursued the low-lying plains of manchuria (northeastern china). this reflects in its soybean consumption as well: japan consumed about 1 million tons of soy each year in the 1930s, and at least two-thirds of it was imported from the colonies or manchukuo (the puppet régime ruling machuria). [10] within what we now call the "home islands" of japan, hokkaido, the one remaining settler-colony of japan to this day, produces the most out of all regions. [11, p.4]

(time for some math: [10] states that about 949 000 tons of soy sauce was consumed in japan per year in the mid-1930s. a quick look at soy sauce recipes reveals that 1kg of soy produces about 4 litres (and assuming about 4kg due to density of water) of sauce. with the 4:1 ratio, we can therefore estimate that about 237 000 tons of soy was used per year to make sauce immediately before the war.)

the end of the japanese empire meant losing direct access to those production areas: manchuria was returned to china, and korea and taiwan were placed under various allied (usa, china, ussr) administrations. with japan needing to supply its troops over an ever-growing front line, caloric intake by the average japanese already dropped well below necessary levels for an adult by 1944. [12] by 1946, the defeated nation was at the brink of starvation. american analysis towards the end of wwii determined that soybean production in the home islands could not rise beyond its pre-war levels without sacrificing other land use. [11, p.5] in order to survive, the soy industry needed to replace about 70% of its sources in short order without encroaching upon other agricultural sectors necessary to sustain life. there was immense pressure.

regarding the allies: the japanese empire was largely carved up by three victors, china, the ussr, and the usa. the ussr, having been the least active in the defeat of japan, with its most important contribution being the verbal threat of invasion, was not actively threatening aside from the spectre of spreading communism (as mentioned in part i). china, on the other hand, regained the lands that produced much of the food japan was consuming. while the republic of china (ruled by the kmt) was still in power, it was able to continue supplying food to neighbouring nations. [14] however, civil war broke out between the kmt government and the communists almost immediately after the end of wwii. [13] 1948 saw active fighting in northern china, thus hampering any exports of food; the kmt régime collapsed and fled to taiwan in 1949, and the communist government stopped all trade with the western bloc at the outbreak of the korean war in 1950. [14] with china being unable to supply japan, there is only one remaining option for food imports: the usa. soybean imports in the usa was generally coordinated by the garioa program and through private trade. american exports of soybean to japan skyrocketed from 6000 tons in 1946 and 34600 tons in 1947 to 119500 tons (about 12% of pre-war consumption) in 1948, 152500 tons in 1949 (almost all imports to japan that year), and 305000 tons in 1950. [15, p.67, 69] japan itself likely produced between 300 000 and 450 000 tons of soybeans each year, which meant that in 1947-48 japan was consuming definitively less than two-thirds of its pre-war consumption. the soy industry as a whole, and certainly the soy sauce industry, was in a desperate state.

unlike the collapsed german and italian régimes, the japanese government retained a functioning structure after the rapid end to hostilities in the pacific theatre. [16, p.194] this meant that instead of being tasked with the groundwork of running a country, the allied powers had an existing civil government to administer directives and policies; the u.s. eighth army served as an enforcement and reporting arm of scap. [16, p.195-197] during the war, from 1939 to 1942, the imperial government instituted various food control laws that collected and distributed food from producers under a quota system. [17, p.221] such quotas, as as well as rationing, persisted in the immediate months after allied victory. however, with the surrender of japan, public confidence in the government plummeted, significantly hampering its ability to administer food. the average caloric value of rations in tokyo could only fulfill about a third of an adult's needs; hungry city-dwellers increasingly opted to buy on the black market (which had poached imperial military stock) or physically go to the countryside to acquire food directly from farmers outside of government rationing. [18, p.30-31; 19, p.835, 843] scap policy directed the japanese government to "reinstate" agricultural quotas, and in 1946, it issued the emergency imperial food ordinance which empowered government expropriation of food for the production quota and enforcement of such policies; the u.s. eighth army participated in enforcing the policy within the civil administration. [17; 18] the yoshida government,the first democratically elected administration in the new state of japan, was keenly aware of the necessity of food in rehabilitating japan, as well as the importance of competing against the black market in order to once again establish the rule of law. [18] as such, the tight government control of domestic food production lasted much longer than in other industries, causing pressure for "non-essential" segments like the seasoning industry.

(as an aside, in line with certain ideas discussed in part i, scap directed land reform which redistributed much of the arable land in japan, increasing productivity of land and eliminating the interest of large landowners thought to be threatening to democracy. [18])

as discussed in my previous post, chemical alternatives to fermented soy sauce have been developed since the early 20th century. [6] during the war, substitute methods (especially amino acid-based ones, e.g. hvp or mixed hvp-honjozo) replaced fermented honjozo* methods as resources became more scarce. [20]

*honjōzō (本醸造) means "genuinely fermented".

in early 1948, it was announced that 20 000 tons of soybean meal would be made available by the eroa fund for the purpose of making seasonings, to be allocated by ms appleton at ghq/scap. [14; 6, p.159] this amount is only about 10% of the soybean consumption of soy sauce manufacturers before the war. on the surface, for an industry marginalized by the need to stave off starvation and maintain social stability, securing the imported soybean meal can be seen as a life-or-death situation. however, given the wartime state of sauce production, the struggle to acquire the soybean meal is more akin to an attempt to return to fully soy-based fermentation methods. the invention of the semichemical #2 method which increased soy usage productivity and secured most of the soybean meal for the soy sauce industry can be seen as a faster intermediate step to return to traditional fermented methods used before the war. it's also important to note that over 80% of soy sauce in japan has returned to traditional honjozo production, and that large companies such as kikkoman and yamasa have attempted to return to honjozo methods as early as the late 1950s. [20]

from this point of view, it does not seem particularly apparent that a single administrator had the power to change an industry, but rather her decisions were the impetus for developments to happen within the domestic industry. ultimately, japan's soy sauce industry was suffering the consequences of its industrialization and the failure of its colonial experiment. in a wider view, we can see this as a detail in the friction between two imperial projects. (consider this: out of the major parties involved, japan, china, usa, ussr, and other minor players in the pacific war, gb, netherlands, france, all of them entered the 20th century with imperial projects.)

research questions:

are there japanese sources that can verify production and imports during the 1940s?

there was a soy sauce control corporation formed by the imperial government in 1942 (全国醤油統制株式会社) that dictated resource allocation and quotas for the soy sauce industry. it seemed to have only been dissolved in 1948. what was its role after the war and what relationship did it have with scap?

iii - interests

as for interests, i will limit its scope to answering "who materially benefits." the groups at play are generally the same as the previous part, so i will be brief in elaboration.

the most obvious interest is that of the japanese public: their main material benefit in the late 1940s is to be nourished enough to stay alive (see part ii). while soy sauce is an important part of japanese cuisine, as a condiment, it is a nutritionally trivial part of its diet. it is then understandable, that japanese society and scap would be willing to temporarily sacrifice an immediate return to traditional production in favour of methods that would leave more food for direct consumption.

the next interest to discuss is that of the soy sauce industry, and its desire to return to honjozo (traditionally fermented) production after a period of scarcity during and after the war. it is important to note that regarding the 20 000 tons of soybean meal to be allocated by scap in 1948, the competitor to the soy sauce industry for those resources is the amino acid industry (msg, etc.). [6, p.159] with soybeans hard to come by, the soy sauce industry would have been under immense pressure to aquire the soybean meal distributed as aid. with kikkoman's development of semichemical #2 method, the scap decisionmakers reconsidered an earlier uneven distribution of soybean meal in favour of the amino acid producers. [6, p.160] what resulted next was talk between representatives of the two competing industries, facilitated by the americans. [6, p.160] it is important that taste trials were conducted, with wide support for the new semi-chemical method by the polled public. [6, p.160] at every step of the decision-making process, japanese interests were consulted by scap.

it is also important to mention the "japan lobby" in washington a set of interest groups and lobbyists representing japanese business as to illustrate the bidirectionality of influence in postwar japan. [21] this group arose from the aftermath of the first zaibatsu dissolutions. some key achievements of their advocacy activities include the disavowal of the fec-230 policy proposal from the allied powers (against gen. macarthur's wishes!), and adding revisions to scap's economic deconcentration program. it is plausible that this lobbying set had influence with scap and washington regarding soy sauce, given the tight-knit nature of the japanese business class. that said, the direct link between the japan lobby and soy sauce, should it exist, necessitates further research.

i think it is necessary to analyze from the lens of interests @inneskeeper's claim of the united states occupation forcibly seizing and making changes to a traditional food industry. it is known that the united states seeks to build a strong consumer economy that is open to american investment and imports of american products. [18, p.40] given that the soybean meal managed by scap in 1948 was aid, it would've been in the american interest to support either industry, since they would both eventually rely on american imports once the period of scarcity ends (china would soon cease ot be a reliable exporter of food). there is nothing related to soy sauce that would've been against american interests, business or political, whereas food scarcity has been a real problem facing the japanese and allied administration. in this case, the chief american interest is to stabilize japan as a society against two perceived social enemies: communism on the left and a renewed militarism borne of resentment on the right. with the task of placating a hungry and defeated populace, producing large amounts of soy sauce that is palatable to the public using minimal aid material would be an interest in and of itself for the americans. i think it could be argued whether comments made by americans about how easily japanese tastes can be swayed are insensitive and out of line, but it is also true that the public had much more pressing needs than condiment purity.

@inneskeeper also mentioned the yakuza in some of their posts as a possible interest group involved. the informal economy grew to encompass all strata near the end of the war and immediately afterwards; most urbanites were forced to use the black market to stave off hunger. [19] the yakuza, mafia-like organizations that would operate somewhat openly in the decades before the war, entered the fray as groups that managed informal vendors. [22, p.632] racketeering became rampant in the years immediately after japanese surrender due to shortages and irregular flows of necessities such as food, but as the economy recovered entering the 1950s, the yakuza moved to more conventional underworld enterprises such as as gambling, prostitution, and nightlife. [22, 23] it also moved towards the underbelly of political life, becoming an actor in anti-left politics. [22] we know that the changes to soy sauce production happened in the small window between the end of the war and the earnest start of economic recovery, so it is possible that parties involved would have to deal with the yakuza as a necessary source of material. however, since their sights are set on the industries traditionally associated with the underworld, it would be a stretch to say that they had any real say in the proceedings of this development beyond being one additional obstacle to the soy sauce industry in acquiring ingredients. that said, using a singular product can be very useful as a window into how the yakuza may have coerced informal food distribution channels.

research questions:

what specific outcomes were agreed upon at the "shoda-ouchi conference" between the soy sauce and amino acid manufacturing industries? [6, p.160]

how did the japan lobby affect or facilitate changes in the soy sauce industry?

how did the yakuza affect the informal food economy?

iv - individuals

one thing that made the original story by @inneskeeper so appealing to the tumblr public is the proposition that a single person may have changed japanese soy sauce forever.

it bears repeating that major industrial changes (and i would challenge the categorization of this soy sauce happening as "major" in comparison to the general state of japan in the 1940s) are often the culmination of many small decisions from a wide set of actors. what is interesting about the idea of a singular "manipulator" is that it mirrors a common trope in american foreign policy: the idea of "our guy" (e.g. "our guy in afghanistan" [24, p.277], "our guy in panama" [25], etc.), that is, a singular handler for american interests in a foreign theatre of operations. in this case, since the country at hand is managed by an american occupation, "our guy" in the japanese soy sauce industry is an american, ms. blanche appleton. while american policy sometimes prefers to use this paradigm, it does not necessarily mean it works, not is the wishful american imagination correct when it comes to situations on the ground (see citations above). this trope may also possibly be borne of the oft-cited concept of "american individualism," a value that is as much a contradiction (how can a single person be free to change the world as they see fit, while also live in a world free from the will of others?) as it is a real part of american culture.

in the faulty narrative of ms. appleton, we also see a similar contradiction: how can a foreign woman who is allegedly willingly unfamiliar (as it turns out, probably not true [6, p.160]) with the native culture be in total control of an entire element of its cuisine? what is the meaning of "total power": did she personally decide taste profile of the condiment to her tastes, coerce various native parties to the will of the americans (what will?), or facilitate the solution to a complex resource distribution problem? in any case (except the fancifully implausible first case), what is the singular role of ms appleton? did power flow from her, or through her? perhaps a more interesting way to look at this problem is to ask what would have happened if someone else were in ms. appleton's place. would their personal influence be significant enough as to change the outcome? if so, what would have been the extent of the changes? (we can maybe look at the facilitation of the "shoda-ouchi conference" as one point. [6, p.160]) conversely, what would have remained the same as the various parties involved influenced the situation?

a more helpful view is to see the balance between the ideas, institutions, and interests behind each decision that would paint a more complete picture of this historical era. perhaps it is not as flashy to break down a chapter in culinary history as the convergence of multiple influences, but it is the one that does history most justice.

discussion questions

this is for the test

how significant was the dearth of food in late 1940s japan to this situation, and what similar adaptations of food cultures occurred in other post-wwii nations?

what factors from imperial japan, whether before the sino-japanese war or during the war, influenced this situation?

is there any part of this development that forshadows the economic rehabilitation and subsequent growth of japan in the latter half of the 20th century? if so, how?

what american attitudes were at play in this situation, and what japanese attitudes (if you're familiar) were involved as well?

what influence did china, as the originator of soy sauce, a major source of food in east asia, and a significant allied power, have on postwar japan and how did it influence the development of the japanese variants of soy sauce?

what was the influence of the japanese public's tastes?

bibliography:

apologies for the weird mix of ieee inline and mla bibliography formats, ieee works best with hypertext but doesnt make much sense for non-stem subjects.

Allinson, G. D. Japan's postwar history, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. [link]

Moore, R. A., & D. L. Robinson. Partners for Democracy : Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2002. [avail. at libraries]

Okazaki, T. “The Japanese Firm Under the Wartime Planned Economy,” in The Japanese Firm: Sources of Competitive Strength, edited by M. Aoki and R. Dore, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1994. [link, requires academic access]

Sugita, Y. Pitfall or panacea : the irony of US power in occupied Japan 1945-1952, New York: Routledge, 2003. [avail. at libraries]

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC150/4), 1945. [link]

Oguri, T. "醤油製造技術の系統化調査 Development of Soy sauce Manufacturing Technologies" in 国立科学博物館技術の系統化調査報告, Tokyo: National Museum of Nature and Science, 2008. [link; translation of excerpts in an earlier post]

Fruin, W. M. The Japanese Enterprise System: Competitive Strategies and Cooperative Structures, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1994. [link]

Haley, J. O. "Marketing and Antitrust in Japan" in Hastings Int'l & Comp.L. Rev. 51 Vol. 2 No. 1, San Francisco: UC Hastings Law, 1979. [link]

Japan, National Diet. Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade (Act No. 54 of April 14, 1947), Tokyo: National Diet, 14 Apr. 1947 [link]

Nakamura, H. "The Japanese Soybean Market" in Illinois Agricultural Economics Vol. 1, No. 2, Milwaukee, WI: Agricultural & Applied Economics Association, 1961. [link]

United States of America, Tariff Commission. Japanese trade studies : special industry analysis no. 13, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1944-45. [link]

United States of America, Strategic Bombing Survey. Summary Report (Pacific War), Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1946. [link]

Crisis, Time, 1944. [link]

Hirano, M. "Using American Soybeans in the Japanese Economy" in The Soybean Digest Vol. 12 Iss. 11, Cleveland, OH: Penton, 1952. [link]

United States of America, Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service. United States Farm Products In Foreign Trade, Statistical Bulletin No. 112, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1953. [link]

General Staff of Gen. D. MacArthur. Reports of General MacArthur - MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase Volume I Supplement, Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1966, reprinted 1994. [link]

Smith, H.F. (Chief, Food Branch, Price and Distribution Division, ESS, SCAP) "Food Controls in Occupied Japan" in Agricultural History Vol. 23, No. 3, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1949 [link]

Fuchs, S. J. "Feeding the Japanese: Food policy, land reform, and Japan’s economic recovery" in Democracy in Occupied Japan: The U.S. Occupation and Japanese Politics and Society, edited by M. E. Caprio and Y. Sugita, New York: Routledge, 2007. [link]

Griffiths, O. "Need, Greed, and Protest in Japan's Black Market, 1938-1949" in Journal of Social History Vol. 35, No. 4, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2002. [link]

Oya, Y. "みそ製造業の構造変化とその要因" in 食品経済研究第30号 (Bulletin of the Department of Food Economics, Nihon University), Tokyo: Nihon University, 2002. [link]

Schonberger, H. "The Japan Lobby in American Diplomacy, 1947-1952" in Pacific Historical Review Vol. 46, No. 3, Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1977. [link]

Siniawer, E. M. "Befitting Bedfellows: Yakuza and the State in Modern Japan" in Journal of Social History Vol. 45, No. 3, The Hidden History of Crime, Corruption, and States, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2012. [link]

Hill, P. B. E. The Japanese Mafia: Yakuza, Law, and the State, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2003. [link]

Blaxland, J., M. Fielding, and T. Gellerfy, Niche Wars: Australia in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001–2014, Canberra: ANU Press, 2020. [link]

Kornheiser, T. "Noriega Our Bountiful Nation" The Washington Post, Dec. 22, 1989. [link]

#the mysterious appearance of miss appleton #voice of the canyon

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