#Alexandre Koyré

[moriras-lejos]

De todos estos «espíritus» hay que distinguir cuidadosa­ mente aquellos que el hombre mismo, o mejor, su voluntad o su fe o —lo que más o menos viene a ser lo mismo— su imaginación ha creado y producido. En efecto, como ya sabemos, el alma es un centro de vida, de fuerza mágica (un fuego ardiente, dice Paracelso) Es también un centro de conciencia, de pensamiento y, sobre todo, de voluntad.

La voluntad del alma —que es una fuerza— actúa en pri­mer lugar sobre su propio cuerpo. Es ella quien lo crea y lo forma; es ella también quien lo dirige y mueve. Estudiemos un poco más cerca su modo de acción: veremos que hay un movimiento doble, determinado por la doble naturaleza del alma: fuerza y conciencia al mismo tiempo. En efecto, el alma es una fuente de fuerza que ella misma dirige en sí proponiendo con su imaginación un objetivo que cumplir. El alma piensa algo, se vincula a ese pensamiento, lo forma en imagen, lo desea, tiende a él, lo quiere y su fuerza plásti­ca y formadora se «introduce» ahí como en un molde, se im­forma ella misma, e imprime al cuerpo la imagen concebida por la imaginación. Cuando imaginamos un movimiento, el alma, imprimiendo esta imagen al cuerpo, la realiza de ese modo; de ese modo también cuando imaginamos un so­nido el cuerpo lo pronuncia y si tuviésemos una imagina­ción lo suficientemente fuerte, podríamos cambiar por completo el aspecto y la forma exterior de nuestro cuerpo, como cambiamos el aspecto y la expresión de nuestro rostro, que expresa la forma que el alma le imprime por la imaginación y la voluntad. Observemos que no debe confundirse imaginación y fantasía: esta última no tiene poder alguno, sus imágenes flotan en nuestro espíritu sin lazo profundo ni entre sí, ni entre ellas y nosotros. La fantasía carece de fun­damento en la naturaleza. Para resumir, es puramente in­telectual, un juego del pensamiento; si se tomasen en serio sus creaciones, daría lugar a errores; podría llevarnos incluso a la locura. Todo lo contrario ocurre con la imaginación: además, como el propio término lo indica, es la producción mágica de una imagen. O más exactamente es la expresión mediante una imagen de una tendencia de la voluntad; y si se presta atención, se verá que la imaginación es la fuerza mágica por excelencia; que nos ofrece el modelo esencial de la acción mágica. Ahora bien, toda acción es mágica. La acción creadora o productora sobre todo. La imagen que produce la imaginación, expresa una tendencia, una pode­rosa tensión de la voluntad; nace en nosotros, en nuestra al­ma, de una manera orgánica; es nosotros mismos, y somos nosotros mismos quienes nos expresamos en ella. La imagen es el cuerpo de nuestro pensamiento, de nuestro deseo. Se encarnan en ella.

- Alexandre Koyré

[anaxerneas]

"The theory of negation must be redone with reference to the phenomena of relevance..."

You will hardly have found time to read my French article. Koyré wrote from Paris that he has passed the article on to the Comité, and he raised an objection: Koyré claims that the sentence "The sum of the angles in a triangle is not equal to the color red" is a true sentence. This objection has made me very agitated, since on the basis of the concepts of truth which are accepted in contemporary logic it is completely justified. In my article I had called the sentence "The sum of the angles in a triangle is equal to the color red" meaningless [sinnlos], since there is no relation of relevance between the terms. After receiving the letter from Koyré I walked the streets of Cambridge for two hours and made the discovery that K.'s sentence is true in the sense that there is no relation of relevance between "red" and the sum of the angles. K.'s sentence is thus true in a completely different sense from, e.g., the following sentences: 1) "2 + 3 is not equal to 7"; 2) "Portugal is not on the Black Sea." In other words, the theory of negation has to be completely redone with reference to the phenomena of relevance, and the concept of truth must be refined in the same orientation. There is a paragraph on relevance and logic in my book. The French essay grew out of this paragraph. I shall resist the truly powerful temptation to rewrite this entire paragraph or to draw conclusions from it with respect to negation and truth. You can well imagine that I am very excited; for at least to some extent the validity of my theory of relevance depends on what is to be found in this newly-opened-up horizon. If only I weren't so isolated here!

Letter from Aron Gurwitsch to Alfred Schutz, December 17, 1950. Found in Philosophers in Exile

[notasfilosoficas]

“La verdadera felicidad se encuentra en dedicar nuestra vida a un propósito más grande que nosotros mismos”

Edith Stein

Fue una filósofa, mística religiosa, mártir y santa alemana de origen judío nacida en Breslavia imperio alemán hoy Polonia en octubre de 1891.

Nació en el seno de una familia judía, su padre era dueño de un aserradero y fue la séptima hija de un total de 11 hijos del matrimonio, y como tal vivió las raíces hebreas familiares y el nacionalismo prusiano.

Desde muy temprana edad mostró especial interés por la historia y la literatura alemanas y de las grandes figuras de la música como Bach, Mozart y Wagner.

A la edad de 15 años experimentó una etapa de ateísmo y crisis existencial, causada por el suicidio de dos de sus tíos y a la falta de respuesta de la religión al tema del más allá. Abandona el colegio y se traslada a Hamburgo para asistir a su hermana Elsa quien iba a tener un hijo.

En 1913, la lectura de “las investigaciones lógicas“ de Husserl le abrió una nueva perspectiva en vista a su orientación objetivista, por lo que decide trasladarse a Gotinga a terminar los cursos universitarios y por ejercer Husserl allí su magisterio.

En Friburgo, en 1917, aprobó con la calificación de summa cum laude su tesis doctoral titulada “Sobre el problema de la empatía”, tema que le sugirió Max Scheler, con el que inició sus obras filosóficas.

Como estudiante de filosofía, fue la primera mujer que presentó una tesis en esta disciplina en Alemania. 

Gracias a su amigo Georg Moskiewicz, Edith Stein fue aceptada en la sociedad de la filosofía de Gotinga, que reunía a los principales miembros de la fenomenología naciente como Edmund Husserl, Adolf Reinach y Max Scheler, y durante estos encuentros una correspondencia personal y profunda con el filósofo, ontólogo y teórico literario Roman Ingarden así como con el filósofo francés de origen ruso Alexandre Koyré.

Durante la primera guerra mundial Edith Stein decidió regresar a Breslau, tomó cursos de enfermería y trabajó en un hospital austriaco. Cuando el hospital fue cerrado, Edith regresó a reanudar sus estudios filosóficos con Husserl obteniendo un doctorado en la Universidad de Friburgo.

Una vez obtenido el doctorado, se enroló en la cruz roja en donde fue enviada a ocuparse de los enfermos de problemas infecciosos y trabajo en salas de operaciones, obtuvo una medalla por su dedicación y debido a lo precaria de su condición de salud fue enviada a su casa y no la llamaron mas.

Estas experiencias con los jovenes que morían a muy temprana edad de todas partes de Europa del Este, la marcaron profundamente, y poco a poco fue acercándose a la fé católica, la entereza con la que su amiga Ana Reinach, sobrellevó la muerte de su joven esposo, una vez que ambos fueron bautizados así como su acercamiento a los escritos de Santa Teresa de Jesús, y la entrada en una iglesia católica de Frankfurt en donde reparó la presencia del santísimo, hizo que se decidiera a ser bautizada en enero de 1922.

Durante esta época, dedica parte de su vida a la docencia con poco éxito para ofrecer cátedra en universidades, por lo que se dedica a dar clases particulares de fenomenología y ética en Breslau y en ocasiones pronuncia conferencias en congresos de pedagogía en Alemania, Austria y Suiza.

En octubre de 1933 ingresa al Carmelo de Colonia y rehusa marcharse a Iberoamérica para huir del nacional socialismo prefiriendo permanecer junto a los suyos, hasta que el 31 de diciembre de 1938, tras “la noche de los cristales” es trasladada al Carmelo holandés de Echt que para entonces era un país neutral, sin embargo esto no impide su deportación en 1940 junto con 244 judíos católicos mas tarde, y ser llevada a las cámaras de gas de Auschwitz-Birkenau en donde muere en compañía de su hermana Rosa.

Durante su estadía en Auschwitz cuida de los niños encerrados en ese campo, los acompaña con compasión hacia la muerte y les enseña el Evangelio a los detenidos. 

Fueron conmovedores relatos de sus últimos días dando ánimo a las demás profesas, haciendo que el papa Juan Pablo II la canonizara como Santa Teresa Benedicta de la Cruz en octubre de 1988.

Su sólida visión de personalista cristiana forjada entre la fenomenología, el tomismo y la mística, es fruto de una pasión que supo encauzar con audacia en medio de una vida singular, fruto de un arduo camino intelectual y vital que el hombre de la primera mitad del siglo XX se exponía con el materialismo, el nihilismo, el hedonismo, la xenofobia y el nazismo de su época.

Fuente: Wikipedia y philosophica.info, personalismo.org, vaticannews.va

[liberatingreality]

The mob believes everything it is told, provided only that it be repeated over and over. Provided too that its passions, hatreds, fears are catered to. One needn't try to stay within the limits of plausibility: on the contrary, the grosser, the bigger, the cruder the lie, the more readily it is believed and followed. There is no need to avoid contradictions: the mob never notices; needless to pretend to correlate what is said to some with what is said to others: each person or group believes only what he is told, not what anyone else is told; needless to strive for coherence: the mob has no memory; needless to pretend to any truth: the mob is radically incapable of perceiving it: the mob can never comprehend that its own interests are what is at stake.

Alexandre Koyré, Reflections on Deception

[gregor-samsung]

“ Nella Repubblica di Platone vi è un passo assai divertente sull'origine del mercato, che il mio allievo Jacques Brunschwig di recente mi ricordava: chi è che si limita al mercato? L'uomo che non è abbastanza forte per correre, e si siede dunque nella agorà, aspettando che i clienti vadano da lui. Comportarsi cosí va bene per chi non è capace di attività fisica. Ed è grande, in Platone, il disprezzo per l'economia delle persone sedute. Occorre tener conto di sentimenti piuttosto complessi, per comprendere la posizione di Socrate, nella quale, secondo Senofonte, si trovano due atteggiamenti che paiono contraddirsi. A un concittadino presso il quale erano venute a rifugiarsi, durante l'assedio di Atene, una gran quantità di cugine e di zie che abitavano al di là delle mura, bocche inutili ch'egli non sapeva come sfamare, Socrate consigliava di aprire bottega e farvi lavorare le donne, citando l'esempio di un certo numero di persone stimate che, per mantenere la famiglia, fanno chi tuniche, chi mantelli, chi pane. Socrate trova dunque cosa del tutto normale che si commercializzi un'attività domestica del genere, mentre si adombra quando vede che i sofisti, personaggi prestigiosi e itineranti come i grandi artigiani del passato, tentano di commercializzare un'attività spirituale con l'insegnamento retribuito. È questa una contrapposizione che è stata sottolineata di recente dal spio collega ed amico Raymond Ruyer * in un articolo dove mostra la differenza esistente fra quella ch'egli chiama la nutrizione fisica e la nutrizione psichica: i beni che riguardano la nutrizione fisica possono essere fatti oggetto di commercio, ma le idee sono gratuitamente prodotte, trasmesse e condivise, e considerate tali da non doversi fare oggetto di traffico. “

* La nutrition psychique et l'économie, in «Cahiers de l'Institut de science économique appliquée», 55, serie M, n. I, maggio-dicembre 1957, pp. 4-15.

---------

Brano tratto dall’articolo di Pierre-Maxime Schuhl Perché l’antichità classica non ha conosciuto il « macchinismo »? pubblicato nel 1962 sulla rivista «De Homine» (fasc. 2-3), quindi raccolto in appendice al saggio:

Alexandre Koyré, Dal mondo del pressappoco all'universo della precisione. Tecniche, strumenti e filosofia dal mondo classico alla rivoluzione scientifica, introduzione e traduzione di Paola Zambelli, Einaudi (collana Nuovo Politecnico n° 12), 1967.

[1ª Edizione originale: Parigi, 1961]

[nicklloydnow]

“But intellectual life is flourishing in the cafés, institutes and academies, as refugees forge community in exile. And at the École Pratique des Hautes Études, one of France’s most prestigious research universities, Alexandre Kojève has taken over Alexandre Koyré’s seminar on The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) by G W F Hegel. Between 1933 and 1939, Raymond Aron, Georges Bataille, André Breton, Gaston Fessard, Jacques Lacan, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Éric Weil, Hannah Arendt, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Frantz Fanon, Raymond Queneau, Emmanuel Levinas all come to hear his lectures. A collection of the most renowned thinkers of the day, who would come to lay the intellectual foundations for 20th-century philosophy, political thought, literature, criticism, psychology and history. It is said that Kojève’s lectures were so intricate, so deft, that Arendt accused him of plagiarising. Bataille fell asleep. Sartre couldn’t even remember being there.

(…)

The short answer is that Kojève made Hegel accessible by bringing to the surface one of the essential elements of his work: desire. Kojève did not deny he was providing a reading of Hegel that transformed the text. His interpretation has been described as ‘creative’, ‘outrageous’ and ‘violent’. The question Kojève placed at the centre of his lectures was: ‘What is the Hegelian person?’ And he answered this question through a discussion of human desire by centring a brief section in the Phenomenology titled ‘Independence and Dependence of Self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage’, which is popularly rendered as ‘the master/slave dialectic’. And by centring this nine-page section of a 640-page work, Kojève offered readers a way to grasp an otherwise elusive text.

Poetic in its opacity, perplexing in its terminology, Hegel’s work offers an understanding of the evolution of human consciousness where the finite mind can become a vehicle for the Absolute. But what does that mean? Kojève took the lofty prose of Hegel down from the heavens and placed it in human hands, offering a translation: this is a book about human desire and self-consciousness. Or, as the philosopher Robert Pippin writes:

Kojève, who basically inflates this chapter to a free-standing, full-blown philosophical anthropology, made this point by claiming that for Hegel the distinctness of human desire is that it can take as its object something no other animal desire does: another’s desire.

What was Kojève’s reading of the master/slave dialectic?

In Kojève’s reading, human beings are defined by their desire for recognition, and it is a desire that can be satisfied only by another person who is one’s equal. On this reading, Kojève unfolds a multi-step process: two people meet, there is a death-match, a contest of the wills between them, and whoever is willing to risk their life triumphs over the other, they become the master, the other becomes a slave, but the master is unable to satisfy his desire, because they’re recognised only by a slave, someone who is not their equal. And through the slave’s work to satisfy the master’s needs, coupled with the recognition of the master, ultimately the slave gains power.

What is essential for Kojève is that one risk their life for something that is not essential. The one who shrinks before the other in fear of death becomes the slave. The one willing to die – to face the inevitability of their own non-existence – becomes the master. In other words, desire is an exertion of the will over an other’s desire. Or, as the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan would come to say: ‘Desire is the desire of the Other’s desire.’ It is not an attempt to possess the other person physically, but to force the other person in that moment of contest to make the other give, to bend their will, in order to achieve superiority. And in this moment, Kojève writes: ‘Man will risk his biological life to satisfy his nonbiological Desire.’ In order to gain recognition in this sense, one must be willing to risk everything – including their life. It is a struggle for mastery of the self.

Instead of Hegel’s roundabout of self-consciousness that exists in itself and for itself but always and only in relation to another, Kojève gives us: self-consciousness is the I that desires, and desire implies and presupposes a self-consciousness. Thinking about the relation between the finite mind and Absolute knowledge is opaque, but desire is human. People know what it feels like to desire, to want, to crave to be seen, to feel understood. Desire is the hunger one feels to fill the absence inside themselves. Or, as Kojève put it: ‘Desire is the presence of absence.’

(…)

Perhaps most importantly, what Kojève understood was the extent to which we humans desire to exercise some control over how other people see us differently from the ways in which we see ourselves. However tenuous or certain our sense of self-identity may seem, it is our very sense of self that we must risk when we appear in the world before others – our identity, desire, fear and shame. There is no guarantee that we will be seen in the way we want to be seen, and feeling misrecognised hurts when it happens, because it wounds our sense of self. But this risk is vital – it is part of what makes us human, it is part of our humanity. And whereas Kojève’s reading drives toward an ideal of social equality that affirms one’s preexisting sense of self when confronted by an other, for Hegel, one must take the other’s perception of the self – whatever it may be – back into their own self-consciousness. In other words, whereas for Hegel freedom rested upon the ability to preserve difference, for Kojève it rested upon the ability to preserve one’s own identity at the expense of difference.

In bringing the lofty language of Hegel down from the heavens, Kojève offered readers a secular understanding of human action, which requires each and every individual to reckon with the inevitability of their own death, their own undoing. And in doing so he shifted the focus toward the individual as the locus of social change, where history unfolds toward an aristocratic society of equals, where all difference is destroyed. Influenced by Karl Marx’s account of class struggle as the engine of history, and Martin Heidegger’s understanding of being-toward-death, Kojève’s reading of the master/slave dialectic presents another form of contest between oppressor and oppressed, where mastery over another in order to master oneself becomes the means to equality, and ultimately justice within society. Kojève adopted the master/slave dialectic in order to develop what Michael Roth called ‘a schema for organising change over time’, to think about the movement of history. And the master/slave dialectic unfolds at the level of the individual and the level of society, where the self gains recognition as a desiring subject through the endless battle for recognition that is appearing in the world with others, and the level of society where all past historical movements will be judged within a framework of right, which is the end of history.

This has been in part the legacy of Kojève. Influenced by Kojève’s reading of the master/slave dialectic, Sartre argued in Being and Nothingness (1943) that man’s freedom is found in negation. In The Second Sex (1949), Beauvoir turned to Kojève to think about women’s oppression in relation to man and the need for intersubjective recognition. Lacan’s ‘mirror-stage’ follows Kojève’s reading of Hegel to understand the role of desire as a lack in the formation of human subjectivity. Bataille turned to Kojève to argue that one could experience full self-sovereignty only in a moment of pure negation. For Foucault, it led to the belief that there is no desire free from power-relations – his central theme. And for Fukuyama, this historical contest of wills evolving along a linear temporal plane toward an equal and just society has become the much-mocked ‘end of history’ thesis – the idea that Western liberal democracy has evolved as the final form of human government in the postwar world. The postwar world Kojève himself helped to shape, before his untimely death in 1968. Ultimately, Fukuyama’s thesis captures the difference between Hegel and Kojève’s Hegel: for Kojève, the ideal of universal equality won through an endless battle for recognition was always an individualist notion that required domination when confronted by otherness. But for Hegel, human freedom could be won only through collectivity by embracing the opacity of otherness that we are constantly confronted with in ourselves, and in the world with others. It is an acceptance of that fact that self-mastery will always remain an illusion.”

[stuartelden]

Koyré in Cairo

There are many things I find interesting in the life and work of Alexandre Koyré, and I’ve already published on one of these – his unsuccessful attempt to get elected to a chair at the Collège de France (open access in History of European Ideas). I have also been writing a piece on Georges Canguilhem and Koyré for a workshop, and that paper opens up a wider discussion of his situation within a…

[entomoblog]

Survivre (1970 – 1975) | Science & Société

... Le mouvement Survivre et la revue du même nom sont fondés à Montréal en juillet 1970, à l’occasion de l’intervention d’Alexandre Grothendieck dans un séminaire de mathématiques. Grothendieck est le premier et principal initiateur de cette histoire.

(...)

  Par Mathieu Quet

Science & Société

Portail de ressources, d’échanges et de réflexions

  Alexandre Grothendieck, “Comment je suis devenu militant”, Survivre, 6, janvier 1971, p.9. Survivre n°1 - Mouvement international pour la survie de l'espèce humaine - Fondé le 25 juillet 1970 à Montréal

  Pour en savoir plus :

  Céline Pessis, “Les années 1968 et la science. Survivre … et Vivre, des mathématiciens critiques à l’origine de l’écologisme”, Mémoire de MAster 2 en Sciences Sociales, Mention Histoire des sciences, technologies et sociétés, soutenu à l’EHESS-Centre A. Koyré en 2008-2009 (sous la direction de C. Bonneuil). http://science-societe.fr/celine-pessis/

  Le site de Leila Schneps présente des infos complémentaires : http://www.math.jussieu.fr/~leila/grothendieckcircle/recoltesetc.php

  Bernadette Cassel's insight:

  "Au sein du courant de critique des sciences du début des années 1970, la revue Survivre, et le groupe du même nom, occupent une place singulière. Initiatrice de nombreux thèmes de l'écologie militante en France, source d'inspiration pour des pionniers de l'écologie politique comme Pierre Fournier (lui-même fondateur de La Gueule Ouverte)"

[futbolpenceresi]

SERLOK HOLMES GIBI DUSUNMEK

ŞERLOK HOLMES GİBİ DÜŞÜNMEK https://www.kitapyurdu.com/kitap/mastermind-amp-sherlock-holmes-gibi-dusunmek/362799.htm

Hayal gücü bilgiden önemlidir. Albert Einstein

Hayal gücü gözlem ve deneyime ait olanı alır ve onları birleştirerek yeni bir şey ortaya çıkarır. S136

Fenyman bunun için şöyle bir deyim kullanıyor: ”Sımsıkı deli gömleğine kıstırılmış hayal gücü.” Deli gömleğinden kastı, fizik kanunları, Holmes’a göre bu esasında aynı şey, o ana kadar edindiğin bilgi ve gözlem tabanı. S138

Bilim tarihini ve bilim etkinliğinin başka yönlerinin olduğunu hesaba katmayan pozitivizmin aksine, Pierre Duhem, Émile Meyerson, Alexandre Koyré ve Thomas Kuhn gibi önemli bilim tarihçileri ve filozofları, bilim tarihindeki önemli keşif ve gelişmeleri pozitivist olmayan bir tutumla ele alırlar. Bu düşünürler, bilimsel etkinlik kuramsal bir etkinliktir; kuramsal etkinlik olguları belirler savlarıyla, kuram yüklü gözlem ve deneyi savunurlar ve kuramlara bir sözlük işlevi yüklerler. Hatta kuram sadece önce gelmekle kalmaz, gözlem ve deneyin yapısını da belirler. Şu halde, bilim yapılırken ilkin kendisine dayanılan bir ontoloji ya da evren tasarımı vardır; bundan dolayıdır ki, bilim tarihinde değişik dönemlerde başka başka bilim tasarımları olmuştur.

Her zaman en bariz olan çözümün peşinden gidilirse, doğru cevap asla bulunamayabilir. S150

İkinci dönem; olağan bilim dönemi olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bu dönemde kabul edilen paradigmayı destekleyen araştırmalar ve çalışmalar yapılır. Bu dönemde bilim kesintisiz ilerleme sürecindedir. Olağan bilim döneminde araştırmalar çoğalır, fakat bu arada çözülemeyen sorunlar, uyuşmazlıklar da ortaya çıkar.

Doğal zihin yapımız bizi geride tutuyor olabilir ama basit bir gizli tetikleyici, zihnimizi tamamen farklı bir yöne çekmek için yeterlidir. S.155

Yaratıcı düşünceyi teşvik etmenin, Lestrade’ın yaptığı gibi direkt kanıta bakarak bir sonuca varmamanın püf noktası her anlamda mesafedir. S.155

Aktivite değişikliği, söz konusu konuyla alakasız görünen bambaşka bir işle meşgul olmak, hayal gücünün devreye girmesi için gereken mesafeyi yaratmayı sağlayan en önemli şeydir. S. 161

Hatta bu aktiviteler içinde bir tanesi var ki, resmen bu iş için biçilmiş kaftan. Ve çok basit: Yürüyüş. S.163

İster fiziksel ister sinirsel düzeyde olsun, mekanlar anılarla birleştirilir. Bazı yerler orada nasıl bir aktivite gerçekleştiriyorsa direkt onunla ilişkilendirilir ve bu şablonu kırmak epey zordur…

Bütün gün aynı masada oturup çalışıyorsanız ve kafanız bir konuya takıldıysa o masadan kalkmadan meseleye taze bir bakış getirmeniz hayli güç olacaktır. S.170

Bakış açısı ve fiziksel konum değişimi, basit bir şekilde farkındalığı tetikler. Bizi, dünyayı yeniden değerlendirmeye, olaylara farklı bir açıdan bakmaya zorlar. S.173

Evet, bu, dışarıdan bakıldığında tam bir zaman kaybı gibi görünebilir. Ne de olsa yaptığınız şey hiç de faydalı bir işe benzemiyor. Ama kendi zihniyle baş başa kalarak harcadığı o dakikalar aslında Dalio’yu daha verimli, esnek, yaratıcı ve sezgili biri yapacak. Kısaca onun daha iyi bir karar alıcı olmasına yardım edecek. S. 178

Yapılan son derece önemli çalışmalardan birinde araştırmacılar, katılımcıların bir konsepti yalnızca o konsept doğru olduğu takdirde tutacak örneklere bakarak test ettiklerini ve konsepti geçersiz kılacak detayları bulmakta başarısız olduklarını gözlemlemişler. Sonuç ortada, bir varsayıma ait delilleri incelerken muhteşem bir dengesizlik sergiliyoruz: En çok doğrulayıcı, olumlu delillerin üstünde dururken, tezi yanlış çıkartan, olumsuz deliller üstünde hiç durmuyoruz neredeyse. S. 221

Ben, bu son alıntıdan bir süredir çalıştığım iş yerindeki Bilgi İşlem Merkezinde bir TEST GRUBU kurulması ve test uzmanlarının farklı bir zihin yapısına sahip olması gerektiği tezimin desteklendiği sonucunu çıkarıyorum. Test uzmanlarının, “Armudun Sapı, Üzümün Çöpü Vardır” düşüncesini içselleştirmiş, her şeyde bir “arıza” arayan zihniyet yapısına sahip çalışanlardan oluşması bu insanların “negatif” enerjisinin faydaya çevrilmesini sağlayacaktır.

Basit bir yürüyüşün ne kadar zihin açıcı olduğunu defalarca yaşayarak gördüm. Uzun süre düşündüğüm, bir türlü tatmin edici bir çözüm bulamadığım problemlere çıktığım yürüyüşlerde farklı çözümler buldum.

Bill Gates ve Microsoft için sözü edilen bir anektodta Bill Gates hatırlı kişilere şirketini gezdirmekte, bilgiler vermektedir. Bir odaya girdiklerinde oradaki çalışanın ellerini ensesinde kavuşturup, ayaklarını sehpaya uzatıp pencereden bahçeyi seyrettiğini görürler. Konuklardan biri bu çalışanın ne iş yaptığını sorar. Bill Gates, o “hayaller kurar, ona bunun için yüklü bir ücret ödüyoruz”, der.

Bir projenin, örgütün bir sürü dişlisi vardır.Ama bazıları büyük, bazıları küçük, bazıları hızlı, bazıları yavaştır. Bill Gates, şirketindeki 10 çalışanın, şirketin yarısından çoğuna bedel olduğunu söylemiştir. Liyakat sahibi şirket CEO’ları, örgüt liderleri, ülke liderleri de benzer ağırlığa sahiptirler.

Ülkelerin, şirketlerin gelişmesi, geri kalmasını belirleyen birçok faktör vardır. Ama bu faktörlerin içinde en önemlisi, ülke/şirket için anlamlı hedefler belirleyip ülkenin/şirketin potansiyelini bu hedef doğrultusunda güdüleyip işe koşan liderler (LİDER/DEVLET KAPASİTESİ) baş sırada yer alır. Bu liderler Daron Acemoğlu’nun önemini vurguladığı kapsayıcı kurumların kapsayıcılığını harekete geçirerek ülkenin/şirketin üretici güçlerinin tamamını işe koşar ve maksimum üretkenlikle üretime katılmalarını sağlar.

Akıllı liderler armudun sapı, üzümün çöpü ile uğraşmaz. Bilimin rehberliğinde, öncelikleri ve ağırlıkları gözeterek kontrolü altındaki üretici güçlerin potansiyelinin tamamının gerçekleşmesini sağlarlar. Ol hikayet budur.

[newtonian-tragedy]

"He's claimed a lot without actually doing anything. He writes as if he's hinted at everything, leaving only the hard work of calculations and observations for others, blaming his busy schedule. But, in reality, he probably just doesn't know how to do it. Isn't this ridiculous? So, the actual mathematicians who do the work and figure things out are just seen as basic number crunchers, while someone who does nothing but pretend and grasp at things gets all the credit—even going as far as claiming it from those who came both before and after him." 

Newton is certainly more than unjust in not recognizing the amazing fecundity of Hooke's restless mind. Hooke is not a mere "pretender" and "grasper"; if he was nicknamed "the universal claimant" because "there was scarcely a discovery made in his time which he did not conceive himself entitled to claim", it was because his mind was "so prolific" , that he had really some reason to claim a great number of these discoveries, or at least, the ideas on which they were based. Yet, it was this very restlessness, the inability of concentration, and therefore, of obtaining conclusive results, that made him un- acceptable to Newton. Newton, to speak with Professor Pelseneer, was a "classical" mind and must have shuddered when reading Hooke's "profession de foi" where he explained that: 

"Out of countless subjects one could focus on, writing a thorough and complete history on just one could take a lifetime. And even then, you'd need thousands of innovative ideas and observations to really accomplish it. On the other hand, no one can confidently say they've fully explored a particular topic. Most discoveries happen by chance, and creativity strikes unpredictably. It's like the wind: it comes and goes, and we often don't know where it originates or where it's headed. So, it's best to embrace the influences of Providence and be diligent in exploring whatever comes our way. For we shall soon see that the significant findings made this way far outnumber those made intentionally. Everyone has moments of insight or useful ideas related to their interests. Taking note and sharing these could help others expand on them even further."

—Alexandre Koyré, An Unpublished Letter of Robert Hooke to Isaac Newton  

[theohonohan]

The Sun is Lost

Looking at the celestial globes of the Venetian Coronelli (1650–1718) it is possible to appreciate the cosmos, as it was before modern science swept it away. My guide to star maps comments “The constellation figures are detailed, robust, and theatrical, in keeping with their Baroque style.”

The emphasis is on pictorial splendour, although the locations of stars are accurate. One of Coronelli’s clients was Louis XIV, the Sun King, and there is a strong feeling, for me, of the ancien regime about to be swept away by a deluge of abstraction and rationality. As early as 1611, John Donne had written 

And new philosophy calls all in doubt,

The element of fire is quite put out,

The sun is lost, and th'earth, and no man's wit Can well direct him where to look for it.

The world, as an orderly place made up of proximate living objects, was replaced by chaos, distance and coldness. A star map plays a particular trick of showing empty immensities overlaid with familiar corporeal things. The trick is called cosmography, and the scientific revolution of the seventeeth century brought it to an end. Alexandre Koyré summed it up as two events: “the destruction of the cosmos” and “the geometrization of space”:

As for myself, I have endeavored in my Galilean Studies to define the structural patterns of the old and the new world-views and to determine the changes brought forth by the revolution of the seventeenth century. They seemed to me to be reducible to two fundamental and closely connected actions that I characterised as the destruction of the cosmos and the geometrization of space, that is the substitution for the conception of the world as a finite and well-ordered whole, in which the spatial structure embodied a hierarchy of perfection and value, that of an indefinite or even infinite universe no longer united by natural subordination, but unified only by the identity of its ultimate and basic components and laws; and the replacement of the Aristotelian conception of space—a differentiated set of innerworldly places—by that of Euclidean geometry—an essentially infinite and homogenous extension—from now on considered as identical with the real space of the world.

The spiritual change that I describe did not occur, of course, in a sudden mutation. Revolutions, too, need time for their accomplishment; revolutions, too, have a history. Thus the heavenly spheres that encompassed the world and held it together did not disappear at once in a mighty explosion; the world-bubble grew and swelled before bursting and merging with the space that surrounded it.

From about 1800 onward, the illustrative constellation figures on star maps were progressively deleted. It happened over the course of the career of the mathematician and astronomer Gauss. Around 1800, he calculated the orbit of the asteroid Ceres, and a symbol was assigned to it–the sickle. By the time he died in 1855, asteroids were no longer being given symbols, but were numbered instead. Over the same period, star atlases evolved from the lavishly illustrated Uranographia of 1801 to the completely plain maps of the 1840s. The rectilinear boundaries of the constellations, defined in terms of celestial coordinates, were the only lines left on the charts. In science more generally, a Cartesian grid of rationalization had been laid over nature, facilitating abstraction and numerical measurement.

It is easy, in isolation, to mourn this move from the figurative and fanciful to the inhumanly precise and austere presentation of data. Many other changes took place in this period which cannot be boiled down to a simple transition from the poetic to the prosaic. But there is something compelling about about the loss of the powerfully visual, detailed constellation illustrations, and their replacement with mere geometry, a reductive set of measured points.

The fact is that when an astronomer goes into his observatory for his night's work he finds it usually convenient to leave all the ecstatic and most of the poetic portions of his constitution outside.—Robert Ball (1892) 

[moriras-lejos]

El amor, sin duda, suprime y trasciende la dualidad. Pero solo realiza esta unión De facto: aquellos que están unidos por el amor no lo saben. Su conciencia no se transforma por ella: ellos sienten -cuando están unidos-, separados o aislados. Son inconscientes de la victoria obtenida. Es Hegel, es el filósofo, quien lo sabe.

- Alexandre Koyre (Hegel en Jena, 1934. Fragmento)

[christ2525]

Contributions of the Scientific Revolution

The Logical Upheaval Political upheavals are not difficult to distinguish. They frequently go with unmistakable, life changing occasions. America's, for instance, highlighted the famous Boston Casual get-together and Washington's victorious triumph at Yorktown.

Social, social and scholarly upheavals are more earnestly to learn. They are frequently more slow; the progressions they encourage are less groundbreaking, however their effect on human culture might be far more prominent than any political disturbance. Thusly, the periodization and parts of scholarly insurgencies are frequently discussed and contended.

Such is the situation with the Logical Transformation in Western Europe. However antiquarians frequently differ on when the insurgency began, when it finished and which masterminds qualify as individuals, virtually all concur that its effect on the aggregate perspective and attitude of Europeans was not normal for anything Europe had at any point seen.

Definition The Logical Insurgency is a confounded and disconnected development upon whose periods and entertainers history specialists don't necessarily in every case concur. A few researchers of the period based on crafted by the individuals who preceded them. Others made their own commitment stringently from their own perceptions and now and again went against the proof and finishes of their counterparts. With that admonition made, numerous history specialists guarantee that it started with Copernicus and finished with Isaac Newton 150 years after the fact. However, we'll get to them later.

During 100 years and a portion of logical development, various accomplishments were made in science and cosmology. The cutting edge logical technique for perception, speculation, trial and error, examination and end was etched and refined in this period, and significant revelations were made concerning gravity, the skeletal and solid frameworks of the human body and the pivots of the planets.

Figures of the Logical Insurgency Galileo Galilei planned the primary law of movement called the "law of latency."

Among the primary figures who began the time of the Logical Upset, the accompanying masterminds and scientists stuck out, who were the trailblazers in proposing a better approach for grasping their general surroundings:

Nicolaus Copernicus (1473 - 1543). He was a Prussian cosmologist who figured out the heliocentric hypothesis of the Planetary group in which the Sun is the focal point of the universe and the planets spin around it. He went against the old geocentric hypothesis that the Earth was the focal point of the universe. Johannes Kepler (1571-1630). He was a German stargazer and mathematician who planned the laws of the movement of the planets on their circle around the Sun. Galileo Galilei (1564-1642). He was an Italian soothsayer, architect and physicist who made different commitments, for example, the improvement of the telescope, new galactic perceptions, the principal law of movement called the "law of idleness" and the logical technique. Isaac Newton (1643-1727). He was an English physicist, scholar, designer, and mathematician who portrayed the law of general attraction and laid out the laws of movement that framed the premise of mechanics.

For what reason is it called an insurgency? The term upheaval was begat in 1939 by the French history specialist Alexandre Koyré to allude to the period described by different outlook changes around the examination and perception of the real world.

These changes in outlook happened gradually and divided, yet it was a progressive period in the greatness of these novel insights .

Commitments of the Logical Unrest The course of normal organic advancement was one of the Contributions of the Scientific Revolution

Among the primary commitments of the Logical Upheaval, it stands apart that:

Bodies are comprised of particles and atoms and not of "components" like water, fire , earth, air . The light is a type of energy comprised of electromagnetic waves influencing items and everything around us. Those waves are reflected and permit the natural eye to distinguish shapes and sizes, among different attributes. The living creatures are the consequence of a course of organic development normal. The hypothesis planned by the English Charles Darwin lays out that development or plummet suggests that species can change after some time, which brings about new species. Religion and strange notion in light of conviction and fantasy were supplanted , to a limited extent, by irrefutable information in view of examination and reason. For instance, space science could make sense of different peculiarities up until recently considered as activities of the divine beings. New disclosures and developments, like the magnifying instrument , denoted the beginning of present day medication and it was feasible to grasp the circulatory framework , DNA, the genome and Mendelian regulations.

Foundation and Discussion The conventional perspective on the thousand years going before the Logical Unrest was that the period was mentally torpid after the fall of the Roman Realm. This is maybe best exemplified by the name which early history specialists gave the period from about 500 to 1500 A.D.: the Dim Ages.

As of late, this hypothesis has been discredited by the people who concentrate on the period. They 'illuminated' the Dim Ages - maybe - and featured the significant logical and numerical work of European scholars, like Roger Bacon, Robert Grosseteste and Nicole Oresme. Moreover, antiquarians of science significantly note that logical and numerical accomplishments kept on being made in the Muslim world during the Medieval times, remembering for an area that would become Spain.

No matter what this discussion, the explosion of logical and scholarly movement that occurred during the Logical Unrest is significant in light of the fact that it established the groundworks for the overwhelming majority of the advanced logical disciplines, and now and again radically changed our perspective on ourselves, the world and humankind's position known to mankind.

Scholars: Copernicus As referenced before, the one who apparently started this insurgency was the Clean cosmologist Nicolaus Copernicus. Brought into the world in Thistle in 1473, Copernicus concentrated on in Krakow, Bologna, Padua and Rome prior to getting back to Warmia, Poland to educate and read up until the end of his life.

Copernicus dealt with a heliocentric model - where the sun, and not the Earth, was the focal point of the planetary group - for almost his whole life. Dissimilar to past cosmologists and mathematicians who had utilized heliocentric models just to make their numerical estimations of the planet's circles more precise, Copernicus solidly trusted the sun to be at the focal point of the planetary group. Reasonable because of fears of possible reaction from chapel specialists, Copernicus held back to distribute his speculations and computations until right away before his demise.

At the point when he distributed at the command of one of his understudies, his 1543 work, On the Upheavals of Glorious Bodies, was one of the main logical works which set heliocentrism as reality as opposed to as a numerical gadget or psychological study. The framework Copernicus worked out was noticeably flawed nor really heliocentric; even the sun sat somewhat off the geographic focus of the nearby planet group. Copernicus considered this an 'equant point.' This was vital for Copernicus' perceptions and math to concur on the grounds that he demanded that the planets spun along entirely circular circles.

Notwithstanding mistakes and errors in his last hypothesis, Copernicus' most noteworthy accomplishment was the expulsion of the Earth from the focal point of the universe and nearby planet group.

Masterminds: Brahe and Kepler The heliocentric hypothesis Copernicus set expected refinement to address the universe precisely. The best advances of the sixteenth 100 years as far as observational and instrumental exactness were made by the Danish aristocrat, Tycho Brahe. Brought into the world in 1546, Brahe's perceptions about the fixed idea of the stars made him trust the Earth to be still and at the focal point of the planetary group.

No matter what his mistaken hypothesis, Brahe designed new instruments to notice the sky and furnished the cosmic local area with point by point and exact information concerning the developments of the planets, comets, and, surprisingly, a cosmic explosion which was apparent on Earth in 1572.

A contemporary - and rival - to Brahe in the later sixteenth century was the German stargazer, Johannes Kepler. Kepler really started his work as Brahe's aide, however the more youthful German was more skilled at making hypotheses than his Danish prevalent.

Kepler concurred with Copernicus that the sun was the focal point of the planetary group, and he utilized the accuracy of Brahe's estimations to develop the Copernican model. Kepler found that planetary circles were not entirely roundabout, yet curved, with the sun being one focal point of the oval and something almost identical to Copernicus' equant point being the other. Kepler was further ready to infer a numerical condition (referred to the present time as 'Kepler's Third Regulation') that could be utilized to decide orbital periods and speed.

Attributes of the Logical Unrest The Logical Upheaval upset the old conviction that the Earth was the focal point of the universe.

The Logical Upheaval was described by:

Propose better approaches for figuring out the real world, through reason, information and showing . Destroy old convictions ,, for example, that the Earth was the focal point of the universe . Propose the logical strategy for examination. Supplant the Aristotelian rationale around the universe with the information gained through perception and trial and error . Make organizations to help logical exploration . Foster significant advances in science that affected different disciplines, like physical science, cosmology and science. Propose worldview changes , like the thoughts of Nicolás Copernicus about the Sun as the focal point of the universe.

[oanthore]

En perdant le monde comme cosmos, un cosmos où il avait sa place fixée à l’avance de toute éternité, l’homme a dû refaire son lieu, il a été forcé de transformer et de remplacer, avec la révolution scientifique du XVIIe siècle, « les structures mêmes de sa pensée*  ». À quelle puissance l’homme moderne a-t-il confié la tâche de refaire son lieu ? Aux sciences nouvelles, celles de la nature d’abord, puis celles de la culture.

Serge Cantin  -  La mémoire en péril, L’inquiétude de Fernand Dumont

* Alexandre Koyré, Du monde clos à l’univers infini [1957], Paris, Gallimard, 1973.

[evoldir]

Fwd: Symposium: OxfordU_MNH.AlfredRusselWallace.Jan9

Begin forwarded message: > From: evoldir@evol.biology.mcmaster.ca > Subject: Symposium: OxfordU_MNH.AlfredRusselWallace.Jan9 > Date: 29 November 2022 at 06:34:53 GMT > To: rdmpage@gmail.com > > > > Dear Evoldir, > > This one-day symposium aims to celebrate the 200th anniversary of Alfred > Russel Wallace’s birth and discuss his contribution to science and > society. It will be held at the Oxford University Museum of Natural > History(Oxford, UK) in the Westwood Room on 9 January 2023both in > person and online. The event is free but registration is required for > all participants. > > Speakers include James Costa, George Beccaloni, Robert Whittaker, > Zoë Simmons, Victor Rafael Limeira-SaSilva, Jeb Bevers, Jon Abblett, > and Pïetro Corsi. > > To find the detailed program and registration form, follow this link : > > https://ift.tt/pFNPO42 > > We’re looking forward to meeting you in Oxford or online > > Organising team : Laurence Talairach, Christophe Thébaud and Pascal Marty > > With sponsorship from : Oxford University Museum of Natural History , > Maison des Français d’Oxford, Centre Alexandre Koyré, MSHS-Toulouse > > Christophe Thebaud