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#International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
themassespress · 3 months
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FACAM Submission to the 141st Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council
By the Forum Against Corporatization and Militarization (FACAM) 5th July, 2024 The Forum Against Corporatization and Militarization, along with Foundation The London Story (Netherlands), International Solidarity for Academic Freedom in India, India Justice Project (Germany), and the London Mining Network (UK), has submitted in response to the call by the United Nations Human Rights Council,…
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What’s Wrong With Blasphemy Laws?
The End Blasphemy Laws campaign holds that “blasphemy”  and “insult” to religion laws are wrong in several ways:
They violate the human right to freedom of expression
They protect religious beliefs and practices, institutions and leaders, from legitimate and often necessary criticism
They are intrinsically bad, subjective, inconsistent laws; there is no “right way” to use them
They legitimize vigilantism, mob violence, and persecution of minorities
All these areas are discussed in detail below.
Violating freedom of expression
Freedom of expression is a fundamental right for individuals. It is also vital for all societies, to enable a plurality of opinions. It is protected by all major international human rights instruments (including Article 19 of both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICCPR)). The vast majority of countries are signed up to these conventions, and there is a strong claim even on the countries that are not signed up, namely that the right to speak freely is a basic moral right which states should uphold and protect.
Unlike freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief (Article 18 of the UDHR and ICCPR) which is absolute, freedom of expression can be limited under the international human rights framework. These limits vary from state to state but for example, they sometimes include libel and defamation against individuals, incitement to hatred, violence or discrimination against a person, a group or a community. (Such limits must respect strict legality and proportionality tests, as freedom of expression remains a human right, and its limitation must be the exception.) For this reason, some “blasphemy” laws may include — or be included in legislation which places — a ban on inciting hatred or violence. Such prohibitions against incitement to hatred or violence do not necessarily in themselves violate the right to freedom of expression.
However, by their nature laws against “blasphemy” and religious insult always go beyond a ban on incitement to hatred or violence. “Blasphemy” and religious insult laws always in practice prohibit, problematize or chill free expression when it comes to the asking of questions, the offering of criticism, and the expression of satire or ridicule, in relation religion.
These modes of discourse (questioning, criticising, satirising, ridiculing) belong firmly in the realm of freedom of expression. Therefore “blasphemy” and “insult to religion” laws, which criminalize such expression, contravene freedom of expression and are in violation of the international human rights framework.
While freedom of thought and belief, including religious belief, must be protected, it is equally important to guarantee an environment in which a critical discussion about religion can be held. There is no fundamental right not to be offended in one’s religious feelings. Religions per se do not hold rights. Churches and religious groups should be open to hearing criticism, just as every group in society. Intellectual and cultural advance rely on the free exchange of ideas.  Protecting any ideas from criticism does them no favour: it allows them to survive unchanged without being adapted and improved.
Protecting religion from insult and criticism
To some it may sound desirable to protect religion from “insult”. After all, insult may seen unnecessary and hurtful to the followers of a religion. However, in practice prohibiting “insult” means prohibiting all manner of enquiry and critique in relation to religion; as seen time and again in countries around the world, it is easy to claim “insult” in response to any critical discussion of religion. As one high profile example, Raif Badawi advocated secular reforms between religious and state authorities in Saudi Arabia; for this he was prosecuted for “insulting Islam” and sentenced to 10 years jail, a 10 year travel ban, and 1,000 lashes.
So criticism bleeds into “insult”. But why should criticism as such be protected free speech? — To some it may sound desirable to shield religion from any criticism, however politely it is offered!
But banning criticism not only means violating the freedom of expression of the critic, it means that criticism is deterred or prevented altogether on:
religious beliefs and practices or beliefs and practices that someone associates with religion, (for example, child “marriage”, slavery, genital mutilation, stoning and other corporal punishments that constitute torture, denial of citizenship, bans on “inter-religious” marriage, persecution of religion or belief minorities, discrimination against sexual minorities, and many other such practices, have all sometimes been defended — or their perpetrators have claimed immunity from investigation or exemption from human rights legislation — on the basis that they are ‘religious’ practices or that they are based on ‘religious’ beliefs)
religious institutions (for example it is widely recognised that taboos against appearing to question, criticise, or threaten the public perception or ‘greater good’ of the Catholic Church and other religious institutions deters people from reporting sexual abuse and other crimes)
religious leaders (such as clerics, who in some cases may escape charges of abuse or corruption because adherents of their religion, or others, feel unable to raise their voices against them)
Shielding religion from criticism cannot be regarded as a social good. Criticism which is false can be tested and met with legitimate counter-arguments, while criticism which is true should be heard for the sake of correcting errors. In some cases, criticism helps religious thinkers improve theology. In more substantive cases, criticism is essential to shedding light on immoral or unlawful practices carried out in the name of religion.
Intrinsically bad law
The violation of the right to freedom of expression is a matter of incompatibility with international human rights legislation, as well as most domestic human rights laws. But in addition, “blasphemy” and “insult to religion” laws also suffer from internal inconsistency and subjective applicability.
A law prohibiting “insult” or “offence” to religion, or for “hurting the sentiments” of religious persons, may itself be “insulting” or “offensive” or “hurtful” to religion or to religious persons, if it prevents them from expressing their religious views because others find their religion offensive.
A law against “blasphemy” depends on some standard of what counts as “blasphemy”, which assumes something like a correct, inviolable standard of religion which is being blasphemed against. But even when states try to found blasphemy laws on a single religious text, it is abundantly clear that different sectarian groups within a single religion interpret all mainstream scriptures in a variety of ways, with different groups deciding that some declarations or depictions are ‘blasphemous’ while others disagree, or find other declarations or depictions ‘blasphemous’.
It may be considered “blasphemous” by some Muslims to consider Jesus of Nazareth “the Son of God”, while some Christians may find it “blasphemous” to say that Jesus was merely a prophet or an ordinary human being. Many Islamic scholars consider deviations from their own sect (either Sunni or Shia) blasphemous, as well as sects such as Ahmadiyya which they do not recognise as “Islamic”, but which are frequently treated as “blasphemous” to Islam.
In some jurisdictions, such as Pakistan, it is frequently claimed by witnesses to alleged “blasphemy” cases that to repeat what the accused is supposed to have said or done would itself be “blasphemous” and therefore they are exempted from having to explain the accusation. Courts will therefore sometimes accept the testimony of a supposed witness to the blasphemy without hearing any of the details of the accusations.
Likewise, those who call for the reform or repeal of blasphemy laws, have sometimes been accused of “blasphemy” for questioning the blasphemy laws.
The confused and subjective nature of “blasphemy” and “insult to religion” laws makes them bad law. They are therefore hugely prone to abuse, being used to target a variety of supposed “blasphemy”, from actual criticism or satire of religion, to merely stating alternative religious views, stating atheism, or in some cases, the accusation is entirely malicious, based on rumours or planted evidence.
“Legitimizing” mob violence, vigilantism, and persecution of minorities
Countries which prosecute “blasphemy” and “insult to religion” tend to suffer disproportionately many incidents of:
intercommunal and mob violence (for example: the episodic burning of Christian properties and murder of Christians by mobs of Muslim men in Pakistan, such as this incident in 2009 that left 6 dead, which usually follow unlikely, malicious, unsourced rumours that someone has “desecrated” the Koran)
vigilantism against individuals (for example: violence against secularist Bangladeshi bloggers in the past few years, including the murder of Ahmed Rajib Haider and a potentially fatal machete attack on Asif Mohiuddin, both of which coincided with calls by Islamist groups to have “atheist bloggers” prosecuted for writing which supposedly insulted religion and criticised religious leaders)
the general silencing and persecution of minorities (for example: in several Islamic states, Ahmadiyya Muslims are often regarded, against their self-identity, as non-Muslims who are “blaspheming” Islam, while conversely Bahai’s are often regarded, against their selfi-identity, as wouldbe-Muslims who are “apostates” from Islam because they follow Baha’i teachings! Both groups are widely marginalised and persecuted in countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and numerous other states, and discrimination against them is bound up with claims of blasphemy, apostasy, or being kafir (infidels).
Criminalising “insult” to religion in the penal code, lends legitimacy to the social persecution of individuals and groups who are said to “offend” mainstream religious sensibilities, sometimes with their speech acts or writing, often just through their existence, or based on rumours spread with the intention of whipping up violence.
Moratoria and “dead letter” laws
The End Blasphemy Laws campaign recognises that in these cases, some laws may be considered for practical purposes to be unenforced, or unenforceable. Nevertheless even these “dead letter” laws remain of concern, and we want to see them repealed. There are several reasons for this:
even an apparently “dead letter” law can be reactivated. Some examples: In the weeks prior to the launch of the End Blasphemy Laws campaign (in January 2015) there were threats to file suits under the blasphemy laws in Ireland and in France in response to the publication of Charlie Hebdo. The “blasphemy” law the United Kingdom was declared by a peer in the House of Lords a “dead letter” law in 1949, but this status was unofficial and the law was used again; the last successful prosecution under the law came 28 years later, in 1977! In December 2014 the closely related death-for-apostasy law was reactivated after many years of disuse in Mauritania.
even unused or seemingly unenforceable laws can lend a legitimacy to people who argue that there is something inherently wrong with criticism of, or satire about, religion, or who advocate for the revival, use, or creation of new “blasphemy”-type laws
inactive, unused or less severe blasphemy laws in one country, still lend legitimacy to much more severe and actively-used blasphemy laws in other countries; for example the relatively recent creation of a blasphemy law in Ireland (despite there being no prosecutions under this law) has been used to justify the continued existence of Indonesia‘s blasphemy law (under which people have been sentenced to lengthy jail terms simply for posting about atheism on Facebook)
sometimes there is public desire, but no political will, to finally abolish “dead letter” laws; by listing and rating countries citing their blasphemy laws we hope to add to local pressure to repeal them.
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It's surprising which countries still have blasphemy laws, especially given how irreligious some of them are. Australia, Germany and the UK still have them, New Zealand, France and Canada have only recently repealed them.
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mariacallous · 1 year
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On the day Meta’s new app, Threads, launched, CEO Mark Zuckerberg explained that it would be “an open and friendly public space for conversation.” In a not-so-subtle dig at Twitter, he argued that keeping the platform “friendly” as it expands would be crucial to its success. Within days, however, Media Matters claimed that “Nazi supporters, anti-gay extremists, and white supremacists” were “flocking to Threads,” posting “slurs and other forms of hate speech.” The group argued that Meta did not have strict enough rules, and that Instagram, the platform that Threads is tied to, has a “long history of allowing hate speech and misinformation to prosper.”
Such concerns about hate speech on social media are not new. Last year, EU Commissioner for Internal Market Thierry Breton called efforts to pass the Digital Services Act “a historic step towards the end of the so-called ‘Wild West’ dominating our information space,” which he described as rife with “uncontrolled hate speech.” In January 2023, experts appointed by the United Nations Human Rights Council urged platforms to “address posts and activities that advocate hatred … in line with international standards for freedom of expression.” This panic has led to an explosion in laws that mandate platforms remove illegal or “harmful” content, including in the EU, Germany, Brazil, and India.
These concerns imply that social media is a lawless mayhem when it comes to hate speech. But this characterization is wrong. Most platforms have strict rules prohibiting hate speech, which have expanded significantly over the past several years. Many of these policies go far beyond both what’s required and permissible under international human rights law (IHRL).
We know this because the Future of Free Speech project at Vanderbilt University, which I direct, published a new report analyzing the hate speech policies of eight social media platforms—Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, Snapchat, TikTok, Tumblr, Twitter, and YouTube—from their founding until March 2023
While none of these platforms are formally bound by IHRL, all except Reddit and Tumblr have committed to respect international standards by signing on to the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Moreover, in 2018, the U.N. special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression proposed a framework for content moderation that “puts human rights at the very centre.” Accordingly, we compared the scope of each platform’s hate speech policy to Articles 19 and 20 of the U.N.’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Article 19 ensures “everyone … the right to freedom of expression,” including the rights “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers … through any … media of his choice.” However, this right can be subjected to restrictions that are “provided by law and are necessary” for compelling interests, such as “respect of the rights or reputations of others.” Article 20 mandates that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” Any restrictions on freedom of expression under Articles 19 and/or 20 must satisfy strict requirements of legality, legitimacy, and necessity. These requirements are meant to protect against overly vague and broad restrictions, which can be abused to prohibit political and religious dissent, and to safeguard speech that may be deeply offensive, but doesn’t reach the threshold of incitement.
So how do platform hate speech policies measure up to these standards? In some areas, they are aligned closely. A decade ago, more than half of the eight platforms did not have an explicit hate speech prohibition. In 2014, only 38 percent of the analyzed platforms prohibited “hate speech” or “hateful content.” By 2018, this percentage had risen to 88 percent—where it remains today. Similarly, a decade ago, only 25 percent of platforms banned incitement to or threats of violence on the basis of protected characteristics, but today, 88 percent of the platforms do. These changes generally align with the prohibition on incitement to hatred under IHRL.
In other ways, however, platforms’ hate speech restrictions have mushroomed beyond the human rights framework. In 2014, no platforms banned dehumanizing language, denial or mocking of historical atrocities, harmful stereotypes, or conspiracy theories in their hate speech policies—none of which are mentioned by Article 20. By 2023, 63 percent of the platforms banned dehumanization, 50 percent banned denial or mocking of historical atrocities, 38 percent banned harmful stereotypes, and 25 percent banned conspiracy theories. It is doubtful that these prohibitions satisfy Article 19’s requirements of legality and necessity.
Many platforms’ hate speech policies also cover identity-based characteristics that are not included in Article 20. The average number of protected characteristics covered by platform policies has gone from less than five before 2011 to 13 today. Several of the platforms prohibit hate speech targeting characteristics such as weight, pregnancy, age, veteran status, disease, or victimhood in a major event. Under IHRL, most of these characteristics do not enjoy the same protected status as race, religion, or nationality, which have frequently been used as the basis to incite discrimination and hostility against minorities, sometimes contributing to mass atrocities.
Our research cannot identify the exact causes of this scope creep, but platforms have clearly faced mounting financial, regulatory, and reputational pressure to police additional categories of objectionable content. In 2020, more than 1,200 business and civil society groups took part in the Stop Hate for Profit boycott, which leveraged financial levers to pressure Facebook into policing more hateful content. Such concerted pressure creates an incentive to take a “better safe than sorry” approach when it comes to moderation policies. The expansion in protected characteristics may reflect what University of California, Los Angeles, law professor Eugene Volokh calls “censorship envy,” where groups pressure platforms to afford them protection based on the inclusion of other groups, making it difficult for platforms to deny any without appearing biased.
Most platforms refuse to share raw data with researchers, so identifying any causal link between changes in policy scope and enforcement volume is difficult. However, studies in the United States and Denmark suggest that hate speech comprises a relatively small proportion of social media content. There are also numerous examples of hate speech policies causing collateral damage to political speech and dissent. In May 2021, Meta admitted that mistakes in its hate speech detection algorithms led to the inadvertent removal of millions of pro-Palestinian posts. In 2022, Facebook removed a post from a user in Latvia that cited atrocities committed by Russian soldiers in Ukraine, and quoted a poem including the words “kill the fascist,” a decision that the platform’s Oversight Board overturned partially based on IHRL.
he enforcement of hate speech policies can also lead to the erroneous removal of humor and political satire. Facebook’s own data suggests a massive drop in hate speech removals due to AI improvements that allowed it to identify posts that “could have been removed by mistake without appropriate cultural context,” such as “humorous terms of endearment used between friends.” In 2021, the U.S. columnist and humorist David Chartrand  described how it took Facebook all of three minutes to remove a post of his that read “Yes, Virginia, there are Stupid Americans,” for violating its hate speech policies.
Our research shows that the hate speech policies of many platforms currently don’t comply with the human rights standards they claim to respect. So perhaps the right analogy for social media is not a lawless Wild West—but rather a place where no one knows when or how the ever-changing rules will be enforced. If so, the right path forward is not to make these rules even more complex.
Instead, platforms should consider directly tying their hate speech rules to international human rights law. This approach would cultivate a more transparent and speech-protective environment, though it would not eliminate erroneous or inconsistent policy enforcement and would leave up a lot of offensive speech.
Alternatively, platforms could decentralize content moderation. This option would give users the ability to opt out of seeing content that is offensive to them or contrary to their values, but it would also protect expression and reduce platform power over speech. Meta seems to envisage steps in this direction by making Threads part of the so-called fediverse, meaning that it enables users to connect with users on platform protocols not controlled by Meta. Combining IHRL and decentralization is also possible. Content moderation and curation could be decentralized, with the requirement that third-party algorithms still respect international human rights law. None of these options will be perfect or satisfy everyone. But despite the very real challenges and trade-offs that they entail, they are preferable to the status quo.
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greatestrival · 1 year
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tag game!
tagged by @wdcmv1 !!
relationship status: single (thank god)
fav colour: blue and purple but most of my clothes are green lol (just did an inventory)
song stuck in my head: busy boy by chloe x halle
last song I listened to: master of puppets by metallica
3 fav foods: the ramen and gyoza combo (specifically kyushu style yum), chicken satay, and parfait
last google: iccpr lol (the international covenant on civil and political rights, was doing my thesis)
dream trip: anywhere beachy tbh i miss swimming in the ocean
anything I want right now: to finish my thesis and graduate 😭😭😭
not tagging any1 but feel free to do this ehe
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sarohag · 3 days
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Bail Hearing Appeal in Criminal Procedure
In criminal law, bail is a mechanism that allows an accused person to be temporarily released from custody, typically pending trial or the final resolution of a case, in exchange for specific conditions or monetary guarantees to ensure their return to court. Bail serves as a balancing tool in criminal justice systems worldwide, promoting the principle that individuals should not be held in pretrial detention without a legitimate reason. Bail hearings, which determine whether an individual should be granted or denied bail, are critical steps in this process. If bail is denied, the accused may seek to appeal that decision through a bail hearing appeal.
This essay examines the process of a bail hearing appeal in criminal procedure, exploring its purpose, legal framework, procedural requirements, and the considerations courts take into account.
Purpose of Bail Hearings
Bail hearings serve the dual purpose of balancing the rights of the accused with the need to protect public safety and ensure the integrity of the judicial process. The principle of "innocent until proven guilty" underpins the argument for bail, ensuring that individuals are not punished before their guilt is established. Bail allows defendants to continue their lives—whether it be work, education, or family responsibilities—while awaiting trial, preventing the unnecessary detention of individuals who are presumed innocent.
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However, in some cases, releasing an individual on bail may pose risks. For instance, there could be concerns that the accused will flee, fail to attend court proceedings, or pose a threat to public safety or witnesses. In such cases, courts can deny bail.
When bail is denied or set at conditions deemed unreasonable by the accused, the option to appeal the decision becomes crucial. The bail hearing appeal criminal procedure serves as a secondary review process that allows higher courts to reconsider the initial decision, ensuring that it was both lawful and reasonable.
Legal Framework Governing Bail and Bail Appeals
The legal framework governing bail and its appeal is typically derived from statutory provisions, constitutional guarantees, and case law, though it may differ from one jurisdiction to another.
In common law countries like the United States, the UK, Canada, and Australia, bail rights are often governed by both legislation (such as the Bail Act or Criminal Procedure Code) and constitutional provisions that ensure due process and personal liberty. For example, in the U.S., the Eighth Amendment protects individuals from excessive bail, ensuring that bail conditions should not be more onerous than necessary. Similarly, international conventions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), emphasize the right to liberty and protection against arbitrary detention.
Bail hearing appeals typically occur within a specific legal framework:
Initial Bail Decision: The trial court makes an initial decision on bail based on factors like the seriousness of the offense, flight risk, risk to public safety, and ties to the community.
Right to Appeal: If the defendant or prosecution disagrees with the decision, the next step is to file an appeal in a higher court. The right to appeal the bail decision is usually provided for in criminal procedure laws, and the appeal must be filed within specific timeframes.
Review Standard: The appellate court reviews the bail decision to ensure it was made correctly, based on the law and evidence. Courts may apply different standards of review, such as a "de novo" review (where the appellate court re-examines the facts and law as if it were the original decision-maker) or an "abuse of discretion" review (where the appellate court only overturns the decision if it was unreasonable or based on an error of law).
Procedural Requirements in Bail Appeals
The procedure for filing a bail appeal is typically straightforward but requires strict adherence to statutory rules. The following are common steps in the appeal process:
Notice of Appeal: The first step is for the defense or prosecution to file a notice of appeal. This document must be submitted within a prescribed time limit after the initial bail ruling and should indicate the grounds for the appeal.
Bail Application/Submission: Along with the notice, an application or legal submission outlining the arguments for why bail should be granted or modified is required. This application should include supporting evidence, such as character references, evidence of stable employment, or proof of residence, to demonstrate that the accused is not a flight risk or danger to the community.
Court Review: Once the notice and application are submitted, a higher court (such as a district court, appellate court, or supreme court) reviews the bail decision. This review could be based solely on the written submissions or involve an oral hearing where the defense and prosecution present their arguments.
Factors Considered in Appeals: The appellate court will examine various factors when deciding on the appeal. These include:
Flight Risk: Is the defendant likely to flee the jurisdiction and not return for trial?
Public Safety: Does the accused pose a threat to individuals, witnesses, or the public?
Severity of the Charges: More severe offenses, particularly those involving violence or large-scale fraud, may justify higher bail amounts or the denial of bail.
Prior Criminal History: A history of prior offenses, especially for the same or similar charges, can influence the court's decision.
Strength of the Evidence: If the evidence against the accused is overwhelming, this may lead to a decision to deny bail to ensure that justice is served.
Appeal Outcome: After reviewing the submissions and arguments, the appellate court can:
Affirm the lower court’s bail decision, leaving it unchanged.
Modify the bail conditions (for example, reducing the monetary amount or adjusting the restrictions imposed on the accused).
Considerations in Bail Appeals
When considering a bail appeal, courts strike a delicate balance between competing interests. On one hand, there is a need to protect the public and ensure that accused persons return to court for trial. On the other hand, personal liberty and the right to a fair trial are also significant constitutional rights that must be protected. Courts are cautious not to overstep constitutional protections, especially the presumption of innocence.
Judges typically rely on a set of guiding principles when deciding bail appeals:
Presumption of Innocence: The accused remains innocent until proven guilty, and detention without trial contradicts this fundamental principle. Therefore, bail is usually granted unless the prosecution can show compelling reasons why detention is necessary.
Proportionality: Bail conditions, including the monetary amount or restrictions, must be proportionate to the offense and the risks posed. Excessive or unreasonable bail conditions may amount to pretrial punishment, which is against constitutional guarantees.
Risk Management: Courts also consider whether the risks associated with releasing the accused can be managed through other means, such as electronic monitoring, house arrest, or travel restrictions.
Conclusion
Bail hearing appeals are critical in the criminal justice system because they provide a mechanism for reviewing decisions that may affect a defendant's fundamental right to liberty. By allowing higher courts to scrutinize bail decisions, appeals ensure that the rights of the accused are protected while balancing public safety concerns
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axelinformer · 1 month
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Human Rights for All: Building a Just World
Human rights are the universal entitlements that belong to every person simply by virtue of their humanity. They embody the principles of dignity, equality, and justice that underpin a just society. Despite significant progress over the years, many people around the world still face severe human rights violations, from systemic discrimination to outright abuse. To build a truly just world, it is imperative to ensure that human rights are upheld for all individuals, regardless of their race, gender, nationality, or socioeconomic status. This comprehensive discussion explores the importance of universal human rights, the challenges we face, and actionable strategies to foster a world where justice and equality are accessible to everyone.
The Foundations of Human Rights
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, serves as the cornerstone of modern human rights. It outlines fundamental freedoms and rights that are inalienable to all people, including the right to life, liberty, and security; freedom of expression; and the right to participate in government. The UDHR establishes a common standard of human rights that transcends national borders and cultural differences.
International Human Rights Instruments
Following the UDHR, a series of international treaties and conventions have further defined and expanded human rights protections. Key instruments include:
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): Focuses on protecting civil and political rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR): Addresses economic, social, and cultural rights, including the right to work, education, and an adequate standard of living.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW): Aims to eliminate discrimination against women and promote gender equality.
Regional Human Rights Systems
Regional human rights systems complement international frameworks by addressing specific regional issues and contexts. Examples include:
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR): Enforced by the European Court of Human , it provides a legal mechanism for individuals to seek redress for violations of their rights in Europe.
The Inter-American System: Includes the American Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human , which address human issues in the Americas
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR): Enforced by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, it protects a broad range of civil, political, economic, and cultural rights in Africa.
Challenges to Universal Human Rights
Systemic Inequality and Discrimination
Systemic inequalities based on race, gender, socioeconomic status, and other factors often result in widespread human rights violations. Discrimination in education, employment, and healthcare perpetuates these inequalities and limits opportunities for marginalized groups. Addressing systemic inequality requires comprehensive reforms to ensure equal access and opportunities for all individuals.
Authoritarianism and Repression
Authoritarian regimes and repressive governments frequently violate human rights by curtailing freedoms of expression, assembly, and press. Political dissent is often met with violence, imprisonment, or other forms of repression. The international community must work to hold these governments accountable and support efforts to promote democracy and human .
Conflict and Humanitarian Crises
Armed conflicts, forced displacement, and humanitarian crises have devastating effects on human rights. Civilians often face violence, displacement, and deprivation of essential services. Addressing these crises requires a coordinated international response, including humanitarian aid, conflict resolution, and long-term reconstruction efforts.
Climate Change and Environmental Justice
Climate change poses a significant threat to human rights, particularly for vulnerable communities. Rising temperatures, extreme weather events, and environmental degradation can exacerbate existing inequalities and undermine basic rights such as access to clean water, food, and shelter. Integrating human considerations into climate policies is crucial for protecting the most affected populations.
Digital Rights and Privacy
The rapid advancement of technology has introduced new challenges related to digital rights and privacy. Issues such as government surveillance, data breaches, and online harassment affect individuals' rights to privacy and freedom of expression. Addressing these challenges involves creating robust legal frameworks and technological solutions to safeguard digital rights.
Strategies for Building a Just World
Strengthening Human Rights Institutions
1.1 Support and Reform Institutions
Human rights institutions, including national human commissions and international bodies, play a vital role in promoting and protecting rights. Support efforts to strengthen these institutions and ensure they operate independently and effectively. Advocate for reforms that enhance their capacity to address human violations and provide justice.
1.2 Increase Funding and Resources
Adequate funding and resources are essential for human rights organizations and institutions to carry out their work. Advocate for increased investment in human initiatives, both from governmental and non-governmental sources. Support organizations that are working to advance human and provide assistance to those in need.
Promoting Human Rights Education
2.1 Educate at All Levels
Human rights education is crucial for fostering a culture of respect and understanding. Integrate human education into school curricula, community programs, and workplace training. Educate individuals about their rights and the importance of protecting them.
2.2 Raise Awareness and Advocacy
Use public campaigns, media, and social platforms to raise awareness about human rights issues and advocate for change. Highlight stories of individuals affected by human violations and promote campaigns that seek to address these issues. Engaging the public in advocacy efforts can drive support and action.
Advocating for Policy Change
3.1 Engage with Policymakers
Advocate for policies and legislation that protect and promote human rights. Engage with policymakers to push for reforms that address systemic issues and uphold human standards. Participate in public consultations, submit policy recommendations, and collaborate with advocacy groups to influence policy decisions.
3.2 Monitor and Report Violations
Monitor and report human rights violations to hold perpetrators accountable and prompt action. Support efforts to document abuses, gather evidence, and raise international awareness. Use legal and advocacy mechanisms to ensure that violations are addressed and justice is served.
Supporting Grassroots Movements
4.1 Empower Local Activists
Support grassroots movements and local activists who are working to address human rights issues in their communities. Provide resources, training, and platforms to amplify their efforts. Grassroots movements often have unique insights and solutions tailored to local contexts.
4.2 Foster Collaboration and Solidarity
Collaborate with other organizations, movements, and stakeholders to strengthen collective efforts. Building alliances and partnerships can enhance the impact of human rights initiatives and create a united front for change. Solidarity across movements and sectors is essential for achieving comprehensive human protection.
Leveraging Technology and Innovation
5.1 Utilize Technology for Advocacy
Leverage technology to advance human rights advocacy and address violations. Use digital tools for monitoring, reporting, and mobilizing support. Technology can enhance transparency, facilitate communication, and amplify voices in the fight for human .
5.2 Protect Digital Rights
Advocate for the protection of digital rights and privacy in the online environment. Support efforts to develop and enforce regulations that safeguard individuals' digital freedoms and ensure secure online spaces. Promote digital literacy and awareness to help individuals protect their rights in the digital age.
Case Studies: Building a Just World
The South African Anti-Apartheid Movement
The anti-apartheid movement in South Africa is a powerful example of how sustained advocacy and international solidarity can bring about significant change. Through protests, boycotts, and diplomatic pressure, activists and global supporters worked tirelessly to end apartheid and achieve racial equality. The transition to a democratic South Africa marked a milestone in the fight for human rights.
The Global Campaign for Universal Access to Education
The global campaign for universal access to education has made significant strides in improving educational opportunities for children worldwide. Initiatives such as the Global Partnership for Education have worked to eliminate barriers to education, particularly for girls and marginalized groups. These efforts highlight the importance of education in achieving human rights and social development.
The Fight for LGBTQ+ Rights
The global LGBTQ+ rights movement has achieved remarkable progress in recent decades. Legalizing same-sex marriage, enacting anti-discrimination laws, and increasing societal acceptance are examples of how advocacy and activism can advance human rights for LGBTQ+ individuals. The movement continues to address challenges related to discrimination and violence, demonstrating the ongoing need for vigilance and action.
Conclusion
Building a just world where human rights are protected for all requires collective action, sustained commitment, and collaboration across sectors. By strengthening institutions, promoting education, advocating for policy change, supporting grassroots movements, and leveraging technology, we can work towards a future where every person’s rights are upheld and respected. The journey towards justice and equality is ongoing, and each individual has a role to play in advancing human rights. Together, we can create a world where human dignity and rights are universally protected and celebrated.
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onenettvchannel · 2 months
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BALITANG LOKAL: PTFoMS promotes the Visayas Summit in Dumaguete City to empower Traditional and Online Journalists
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DUMAGUETE, NEGROS ORIENTAL -- Last Friday morning (July 26th, 2024 -- Dumaguete local time)… There are nearly 150 traditional & online journalists, multimedia broadcasters, mass communication students, and public information officers throughout the entire Negros Island Region (NIR) who were participated in the 2024 Visayas Media Summit, sponsored by the Presidential Task Force on Media Security (PTFoMS), in collaboration with The City Government of Dumaguete through Public Information Officer (PIO) named Katherine Therese N. Aguilar, and the Philippine Information Agency (PIA) held at the Sierra Hotel's Orchid Function Hall in Barangay Piapi, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental.
Undersecretary and Executive Director of PTFoMS named Mr. Paul M. Gutierrez emphasized that the agency's top priority is to protect the freedom of the press by adopting measures that protect the life, freedom and security of traditional and online media practitioners.
Dumaguete City Mayor 'Felipe Antonio Buscato Remollo' welcomed all the participants and expressed his gratitude to PTFoMS and PIA for conducting the event with the local government. In his speech, Mayor Remollo reiterated his constant and strong support for the freedom of the press, but he emphasized the need for media practitioners to always report the truth, which is fair, ethical and those in power are accountable to the Negrosanon people.
Meanwhile, House of Representatives' local speaker 'Atty. Felipe Claudio "Dio" Remollo' discusses cyber libel and the use of social networks to spread news and observes that there is an increase in the circulation of false information that aims to sway public opinion resulting in polarized communities and challenge to identify reliable information.
Finally, other speakers including 'Atty. Hue Jyro U. Go', Chief of Staff of PTFoMS on Freedom of Opinion and Expression; P/Lt. 'Stephen Jaynard Limbaga Polinar' discusses Media-PNP (Philippine National Police) relations while 'Aleli V. Dorado-Suguitan' of DWGT-TV 4's People's Television Network: Manila deals with Understanding and Improving Social Media Discourse.
Wrapping up this event in the open forum, the panel of speakers officials also fielded questions from participants before and roughly after the event ended.
We asked 'Atty. Go' on how risky when publishing fake and misleading news articles or reports as he spoke exclusively to OneNETnews, when it comes to traditional libel and cyber libel: "For the near fact that you posted something defamatory or libelous, anyone can file a case against you, as long as the defamatory against them. In Article 19, paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides, one of the exceptions of the rights with respect to the reputation to other people. So the near fact to this virtue reputation of the person as a media practitioner, you can be help lived", he said.
During the Visayas summit in a said hotel in Dumaguete City, factual and community-based reporting was touted highly. National and regional speaker officials shared how to engage with locals, understand their needs, and report on relevant issues that matter for their audience. It encouraged physical and online journalists to be proactive about stories that matters.
The next generation of aspiring journalists, be it traditional or online, needs to consider the future of fresh news headlines to be legitimate and accurate information. Not like fake news, with a lack of resources, won't risk being published to the public: "Being a journalist is not a right, its a privilege. Your job it comes with risks such as being a lawyer. Pero syempre, you have being defend one side to gather. In even journalists, you're exposing several risks, so you have to be very passionate with respect your job, and this is not the money-making business risked. This more about telling the truth and conveying what is actually about it", concluded Atty. Go in a local media interview.
Overall, in this writing, the 2024 VMS provided an arena where media practitioners and PIOs could dialogue, share knowledge and network with relevant stakeholders. Its objective was to provide empowerment to traditional and online journalists, further enhancing press freedom for the better world of Negros Island Region (NIR).
SPECIAL THANKS to Divina "DJ Tisay" M. Tindog of K5 News FM: Dumaguete and Lupad Dumaguete for contributing a news report.
PHOTO COURTESY: LUPAD Dumaguete via FB PHOTO BACKGROUND PROVIDED BY: Tegna
-- OneNETnews Online Publication Team
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smqazi · 3 months
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TO HONORABLE JUDGES AND LAWYERS OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE IN THE SO-CALLED ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN,
WHICH IS NEITHER ISLAMIC NOR REPUBLIC,
UNFORTUNATELY!
HOW LONG IS TOO LONG?
WHEN JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED!
As the saying goes, ‘ justice delayed is justice denied.’ Yet, across the world, court users complain that the courts take too long. For your regular court user facing endless talk from lawyers, reams of paper, and mounting legal bills, a court case can feel like it goes on…FOR….EV….ER.
But how long is too long? The question has arisen on each of my last four missions in as many months – from Kenya to Croatia to Serbia and back.
And it’s not a rhetorical question. Answers can assist client countries in analyzing their efficiency and devising reforms that improve both timeliness and user satisfaction. I
t also enables potential court users to better estimate how long it might take to resolve their dispute – allowing them to then adjust their expectations accordingly.
After all, better enabling people and businesses to resolve their disputes contributes to poverty reduction and shared prosperity.
In an attempt to respond beyond rhetoric, I dusted off this old report by European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ). It may be ‘old news,’ but perhaps it’s an ‘oldie but a goody,’ with the findings reaffirmed in more recent reports here and here.
The report analyzed a large number of decisions that had come before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and provided insights into what that the Court considers an ‘ unreasonable time’ to be. (The ECHR interprets Article 6 of its Convention, which requires all 47 Council of Europe States to ensure within their jurisdictions that ‘ everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time’.)
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) contains a similar provision which applies to all 168 of its states parties. This overlap means that the views of the ECHR provides a pertinent yardstick in ECA and beyond.
Despite what many people assume, there is no single international rule on how long cases should take. Each case must be considered on its own merits, but the following general ‘rules of thumb’ may be helpful.
In normal (not complex) cases, the ECHR generally considers two years to be reasonable. Beyond a duration of two years per court level, the European Court examines the case closely to see if the national authorities exercised due diligence in the process.
REFERENCES:
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panicinthestudio · 6 months
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"The Safeguarding National Security Ordinance covers treason; insurrection and seditious acts; theft of state secrets and espionage; sabotage; and external interference. Article 23 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s de facto constitution since the United Kingdom transferred its sovereignty of the city to China, stipulates that the Hong Kong government should enact a law that safeguards national security. Hong Kong people have consistently opposed such legislation since at least 2003, when half a million people marched against it. No genuine public consultation took place during the legislative process, Human Rights Watch said. After Beijing imposed the National Security Law on the city in June 2020, it dismantled the city’s pro-democracy movement by detaining and prosecuting elected representatives and thousands of peaceful protesters, eliminated civil society groups and independent labor unions, and shuttered its most popular pro-democracy newspaper, among other measures. In February, the Hong Kong government conducted a four-week “public consultation” on Article 23 legislation and claimed that 98.6 percent of the submissions supported the proposal. It dismissed submissions and statements from international human rights groups and overseas Hong Kong activists and groups – over 100,000 Hong Kongers have fled the city – as “deliberate smears." The new law already has had a chilling effect on free expression. Local media reported that US- funded news outlet, Radio Free Asia, planned to withdraw from Hong Kong by the end of March. The ordinance will further devastate human rights beyond those curtailed by the National Security Law. Its provisions contravene human rights guarantees enshrined in the Basic Law, and violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is incorporated into Hong Kong’s legal framework via the Basic Law and expressed in the Bill of Rights Ordinance. The Australian, UK, and US governments, the European Union, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights have all publicly expressed concerns about the law."
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prelawland · 1 year
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The Role of Soft Law in International Human Rights
By Summer Lee, University of Colorado Boulder Class of 2023
September 12, 2023
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Following the aftermath of World War II, the UN General Assembly presented the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on December 10, 1948, in an effort to protect and acknowledge the essential human rights of individuals, such as the free speech, autonomy, and right to life. After 1948, the United Nations General Assembly has established additional treaties to further protect and promote human rights, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, etc. From that point on, the UDHR and establishment of additional human rights treaties led to developments in international human rights law.
Although the UDHR has been supported by two legally binding documents such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the declaration by itself along with jurisdictions regarding international human rights law are non-legally binding. Due to this, many questions have been raised over how the non-legally binding nature of decisions regarding human rights impacts the willingness of countries to comply with international human rights law.
For full article please visit
The Implications of Soft Law for International Human Rights 
at
Colorado PreLaw Land
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jozigist · 1 year
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Uganda: IBAHRI condemns anti-LGBTQI+ bill that expands use of the death penalty
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Uganda: IBAHRI condemns anti-LGBTQI+ bill that expands use of the death penalty The International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) strongly condemns Uganda's Anti-Homosexuality Bill, which includes the death penalty for 'aggravated homosexuality'. The Ugandan Parliament passed the Bill overwhelmingly, with 389 votes to two, on 21 March 2023.
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Described as 'probably among the worst of its kind in the world' by United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, the draft Bill as proposed on 1 March 2023 included provisions criminalising identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or questioning, intersex, or any other sexual or gender identity beyond male and female (LGBTQI+) (Article 2(1)(d)); same-sex sexual acts (Article 2(1)(a)-(c)); and aiding and abetting homosexuality (Article 8). The final version of the Bill is yet to be officially published but these were some of the elements discussed in the Ugandan parliament ahead of it being passed. The version amended and adopted during the parliamentary session on 21 March 2023 includes life imprisonment for consensual same sex activities and the death penalty for the crime of 'aggravated homosexuality'. According to the draft Bill, the crime of 'aggravated homosexuality' is committed where the offender is living with HIV; is a parent, guardian, or has authority or control over the person against whom the offence is committed; is a serial offender; applies, administers, or causes any drug, matter or thing to be used with intent to stupefy or overpower the person against whom the offence is committed; or if the victim is under the age of 18 or has a disability (Article 3(1)). IBAHRI Co-Chair, and Immediate Past Secretary General of the Swedish Bar Association, Anne Ramberg Dr Jur hc, stated: 'The IBAHRI commends the courage and good conscience of MPs Fox Odoi-Oywelowo and Paul Kwizera Bucyana for voting against the Bill in the face of overwhelming opposition. We call on President Yoweri Museveni not to sign this Bill into law. The criminalisation of consensual same-sex sexual activities and the very act of identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or questioning, intersex and any other category, as well as the imposition of the death penalty for "aggravated homosexuality", violates Uganda's international law obligations. Members of the LGBTQI+ communities in Uganda have already been blackmailed and lured into mob attacks. This Bill, if signed into law, will further entrench discrimination and prejudice against an already vulnerable community.' Consensual adult relations should never be criminalised. Uganda is a State party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which upholds, inter alia, the prohibition of discrimination (Article 2(1)), the right to privacy (Article 17), and equality before the law and equal protection of the law (Article 26). While sexual orientation and gender identity are not expressly listed as prohibited grounds for discrimination, jurisprudence and authoritative interpretations by UN treaty bodies to which Uganda is a State party have established that the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of 'other status' includes discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. This is reiterated in Principle 2 of the Yogyakarta Principles on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity, which states: 'Everyone is entitled to enjoy all human rights without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Everyone is entitled to equality before the law and the equal protection of the law without any such discrimination whether or not the enjoyment of another human right is also affected. The law shall prohibit any such discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against any such discrimination.' Principle 33 of the Yogyakarta Principles (plus 10) on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity states: 'Everyone has the right to be free from criminalisation and any form of sanction arising directly or indirectly from that person's actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics.' The detention of LGBTQI+ persons on the basis of laws that criminalise same-sex sexual activity in private has been found to constitute a form of arbitrary detention by, inter alia, the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and the UN Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity have urged States to repeal such laws considering the clear causal link between the criminalisation of LGBTQI+ persons and their increased exposure to violence at the hands of law enforcement, prison staff and healthcare personnel. As highlighted by the UN Independent Expert, the combination of social prejudice and criminalisation has the effect of marginalising LGBTQI+ persons and excluding them from healthcare, education, employment, housing and access to justice. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has also noted that laws that criminalise homosexuality have the potential to engender violence against persons on grounds of their actual or imputed sexual orientation and has strongly urged states to enact and apply appropriate laws prohibiting and punishing violence targeting persons on the basis of their imputed or real sexual orientation or gender identity. Furthermore, under Article 6(2) of the ICCPR, the death penalty can only be imposed for 'the most serious crimes'. In its General Comment No 36 (2018), the UN Human Rights Committee stated that this must be read restrictively and appertain only to crimes of extreme gravity involving intentional killing. Furthermore, the death penalty cannot be imposed contrary to the provisions of the ICCPR. As highlighted by the Committee, 'under no circumstances can the death penalty ever be applied as a sanction against conduct the very criminalization of which violates the Covenant', including homosexuality. Retaining the death penalty for such offences violates State parties' obligations under Article 6, read alone and in conjunction with Article 2(2) of the ICCPR, as well as of other provisions of the Covenant. Finally, there is concern that the Bill will have a chilling effect on free speech and freedom of assembly and association, protected under Articles 19 and 21 - 22 of the ICCPR and Principles 19 and 20 of the Yogyakarta Principles, as, inter alia, media groups, journalists, publishers, and civil society organisations could face prosecution and imprisonment for the creation and distribution of any content that could be perceived as promoting sexuality. The UN Human Rights Committee has held that limitations to such rights on the basis of morals must be exceptional, 'understood in the light of universality of human rights and the principle of non-discrimination' and cannot be imposed because of opposition to expressions of sexual orientation or gender identify. IBAHRI Co-Chair Mark Stephens CBE commented: 'This Bill is an affront to the fundamental human rights of Ugandan LGBTQI+ persons and their communities. It leaves them vulnerable to blackmail and intimidation, and seriously impacts their ability to engage with civil society or seek medical attention. The Bill comes at a time when LGBTQI+ people in Uganda are already facing arrest, sexual violence, public stripping, and evictions on the basis of their sexuality. This is contrasted against the positive progress towards abolition in many other African States over the last couple of years, including Zambia, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, and Chad.' The 2023 Bill is based on the Anti-Homosexuality Act (2014), which was nullified by the Constitutional Court of Uganda because the Ugandan parliament passed it without the necessary quorum. In the months after its passage in December 2013, there was a notable increase in human rights abuses against LGBTQI+ persons in Uganda. Read the full article
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tennesseeprelawland · 2 years
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The Peruvian Crisis And The Rule Of Law
By Kalliope Clayton, Lipscomb University Class of 2024
January 21, 2023
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Many people across the globe are puzzled by current events transpiring in Peru. Pedro Castillo, impeached president of the nation, attempted to dissolve Congress to avoid impeachment after wanting to seize control of the courts and Congress. The Peruvian Congress in October 2021 passed Law 31355 which regulates motions of confidence and limits the power of the president. [7] The constitutional crisis that led to Castillo’s actions began in November 2022. Castillo moved for a vote of confidence twice over another bill that would have repealed Law 31355 and removed legislative barriers to Castillo’s power agenda. Congress and the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal upheld the law, not voting on Castillo’s motion. This use of power combined with six pending investigations against Castillo has led to his impeachment. Those members of Congress who voted for the impeachment said Castillo’s “permanent moral incapacity” rendered him incapable of continuing to hold office. [10] This “moral incapacity” led to Castillo’s efforts to supersede the rule of law in restructuring the courts and ultimately dissolving Congress. Castillo will be on trial for rebellion and conspiracy after serving an 18- month pre-trial detention, although other Latin American nations view his ousting and detainment as a violation of international human rights law. [9] Nongovernmental organizations, such as the International Commission of Jurists, view the situation in Peru as the disintegration of the rule of law by Castillo’s attempt to disband Congress, dismantle laws, and efforts to absorb more power. [9] Castillo was originally elected as a man of the people which is why many have taken to the streets against his arrest. Pedro Castillo won the 2021 election on a more socialist platform of working to decrease poverty and provide more opportunities for the poor. [2] There is a stark division between the indigenous poor and country’s elites in Peru. Law is shaped and made by the elites of the country and the people of Peru want more indigenous representation among those in power. Since December 7, 2022, the date of the impeachment, over sixty people have died in the conflict. This ongoing international human rights issue of protests with the excessive use of force and arbitrary detainment has only worsened in the last almost two months of the conflict. Peru passed a law in 2019 that granted police “special protections against criminal prosecution.” [5] Many believe that this law has engendered abuse by the police and protected some from facing the consequences of violating human rights. The abuse of force by law enforcement during protests is also viewed as an obstruction of the rule of law as individual rights are violated. [9] Now, the Peruvian government has declared a state of emergency under the new president, Dina Boularte. Likewise, the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 2001 published that deviating from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) during a state of emergency “must be of an exceptional and temporary nature.” [4] The Peruvian demonstrations are protected legally under the ICCPR, which charges the government to promote the protection of peaceful demonstrations and restrain from inordinate intervention.
Major economic inequality, as Peru experiences, is associated with negative human rights conditions, especially regarding discriminatory social outcomes. The arrest of leader Pedro Castillo was the catalyst for the international human rights problem we are seeing in Peru today. There is a bilateral legal dilemma: the issue of the repercussions the impeached president will face and simultaneously there is the conflict between the police and Peruvian protestors. Democracy best protects human rights and preserves peace through a check on leaders. Democracy and the rule of law are threatened when ‘fundamental rights' of conscience, expression, assembly, and association, and the political rights that belong to the people, are lost in the search for power in a nation. [1] What is next? How can the country caught deep in strife begin to function again? Alonso Gurmendi, a Peruvian international law professor, suggests an open dialogue between civil society and political and legal actors. To change the political and legal landscape of the country, the relationship between the people and government must shift as well. [6] Internationally, drafting a new constitution and new elections is the most proposed solution, but no action has been taken yet. [8]
______________________________________________________________
Kalliope Clayton is a junior at Lipscomb University studying International Affairs and Spanish, with a minor in French. Her passions for cross-cultural connection and international advocacy have led her to pursue a career in law after graduation. ______________________________________________________________
[1] Burnett, Robin. The Right of Peaceful Protest in International Law by Robin Burnett.
[2] Perona Calvete, Carlos. “Crisis in Peru.” The European Conservative, 16 Jan. 2023.
[3] “Comment by UN Human Rights Office Spokesperson Marta Hurtado on Peru.” OHCHR, 10 Jan. 2023.
[4] Scheinin, Martin, and Marta Achler. “International Standards Regarding the Handling of Demonstrations.” Just Security, 15 Mar. 2021.
[5] “Peru: Law Protects Abusive Policing.” Human Rights Watch, 28 Oct. 2020.
[6] Gurmendi, Alonso.“What Is Going on in Peru?” Opinio Juris, 13 Dec. 2022.
[7] “Peruvian Congress Will Debate the Third Vacancy Motion against President Castillo.” Peoples Dispatch, 2 Dec. 2022.
[8] Roy, Diana. “Why Was Peru's President Impeached?” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 19 Dec. 2022.
[9] Lumina, Mulesa. “Peru: Authorities Must Respect the Rule of Law amid the Political Crisis.” International Commission of Jurists, 9 Dec. 2022.
[10] Press, The Associated. “Peru Swears in a New President amid Constitutional Crisis.” NPR, NPR, 7 Dec. 2022.
[11] “Peru Police Use Tear Gas to Clear Protests after Machu Picchu Evacuated.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 5 Jan. 2023.
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premimtimes · 2 years
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Rights Violations: ECOWAS Court orders Nigerian government to amend cybercrime law
Rights Violations: ECOWAS Court orders Nigerian government to amend cybercrime law
The ECOWAS Court of Justice has ordered the Nigerian government to amend the controversial section 24 of its cybercrime law which is widely viewed as authorities’ weapon for muzzling citizens’ rights to freedom of expression. The court gave the decision on March 25, 2022 in Accra, Ghana, a statement by the court’s information unit stated on Monday. In the decision, the court ruled that the…
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thenuclearmallard · 2 years
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The Impact of the War in Ukraine on the Indigenous Small-numbered Peoples’ Rights in Russia
Ekaterina Zmyvalova
Umea University, Sweden
Abstract
This article discusses how the war in Ukraine, started by Russia, impacts the lives of Russian Indigenous small-numbered peoples. First, one can observe Russia’s growing disregard for its international legal obligations. Second, the Russian State is continuously introducing new sanctions against persons and organizations who do not support the Russian regime. Third, the pressure on Indigenous peoples’ representatives is increasing. Fourth, a significant number of members of Indigenous small-numbered peoples actively participate in the war due to, inter alia, socio-economic problems and lack of reliable and objective information about it. Fifth, there is a decline in international cooperation with the Indigenous small-numbered peoples of Russia. Finally, it is visible that the role of Indigenous peoples, including Russian Indigenous peoples, in international decision-making changes.
Keywords:Indigenous small-numbered peoples of Russia, war, Ukraine, human rights
Correspondence to: Ekaterina Zmyvalova, e-mail: [email protected]
The war in Ukraine, started by the Russian Federation (RF), has further complicated the fulfillment of the human rights of Russian citizens, inter aliathe rights of Indigenous small-numbered peoples of Russia. Among these various rights are the right to freedom of expression, guaranteed by Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the right to enjoy their culture, regulated in Article 27 of the ICCPR, and the right to life, liberty and security stipulated by Articles 2 and 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.1These same rights are also regulated by other international legal acts. Article 69 (1) of the Constitution of the RF guarantees the rights of Indigenous small-numbered peoples according to the universally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the RF. In addition to Russia’s international legal obligation to fulfill these rights, Russian federal legislation also provides for these rights.2
The war has triggered different reactions among the 47 Indigenous small-numbered peoples recognized as such by the Russian State.3State representatives supporting Indigenous peoples’ organizations have supported the war in Ukraine.4Some other representatives of Indigenous peoples have condemned the Russian Federation’s aggression.5,6
This review focuses on some of the significant impacts on the lives of Indigenous peoples in Russia caused by the war in Ukraine.7These impacts include: Russia’s growing disregard for its international legal obligations; the introduction of new sanctions against persons and organizations who do not support the Russian regime and increased pressure on Indigenous peoples’ representatives; the active participation of Indigenous small-numbered peoples in the war due to, inter alia, socio-economic problems and the lack of reliable and objective information about the war in Ukraine; and a decline in international cooperation with the Indigenous small-numbered peoples of Russia. In addition, I will address the issue of the changing role of Indigenous peoples, including Russian Indigenous peoples, in international decision-making.
Russia’s growing disregard for its international legal obligations
Article 15 of the Russian Constitution states that universally recognized principles and norms of international law as well as international agreements of the Russian Federation should be an integral part of its legal system. Nevertheless, a growing disregard by Russia for its international legal obligations and the prioritization of Russian law over international law has been observed. One example of this tendency (among others) is the relationship between the RF and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). A number of major amendments to the Russian Constitution were proposed in January 2020, approved through a national vote and took effect in July 2020, including an amendment to Article 79 concerning the decisions of the international bodies which are no longer subject to enforcement in the RF. The last sentence of the amended Article reflects this idea. The Article reads:
The RF can participate in international associations and delegate to them part of its powers in accordance with international treaties of the RF if this does not entail limitations on the rights and freedoms of man and citizen and does not contradict the foundations of the Constitutional structure of the RF. Decisions of the international bodies adopted on the basis of the provisions of international treaties of the RF and which in their interpretation contradict the Constitution of the RF, are not subject to enforcement in the RF.
Although the amendment does not concern Indigenous peoples directly, it is relevant to mention here because Article 79 concerns international bodies to which Indigenous small-numbered peoples of Russia could appeal to protect their human rights. One of these bodies is the ECHR.8,9
The war in Ukraine has negatively impacted relations between Russia and the ECHR. On February 25, 2022 the Committee of Ministers suspended Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe because of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.10On March 15, 2022 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe manifested its Opinion recommending that the Committee of Ministers “should request the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw from the Council of Europe”.11On March 16, 2022 the Committee of Ministers adopted the decision to immediately exclude Russia from the European Council.12On March 15, 2022 the RF “informed the Secretary General of its withdrawal from the Council of Europe in accordance with the Statute of the Council of Europe and of its intention to denounce the European Convention on Human Rights”.13In June 2022, the President of Russia signed the laws that ended ECHR’s jurisdiction in Russia.14According to these laws, ECHR judgments coming into force after March 15, 2022 are not subject to enforcement in the RF and shall not be grounds for revisions of criminal cases.
Russia’s withdrawal from the Council of Europe may prove drastic for the protection of human rights in Russia.15Among other groups, this concerns the protection Indigenous peoples’ rights. Previously it was possible to apply to the ECHR for the protection of human rights once national mechanisms had been exhausted. At present, this alternative seems to have disappeared.
The introduction of new sanctions and increased pressure on Indigenous peoples
It is worth mentioning that Russia is continuously introducing new sanctions against those persons and organizations who do not support the regime. Among these sanctions one can single out administrative measures (Article 20.3.3 of Code of Administrative Offences of the RF) and criminal responsibility (Article 280.3 of Criminal Code of the RF) for “public actions directed at discreditation of the use of the armed forces of the Russian Federation aimed at the protection of the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, maintenance of the international peace and safety or carrying out their function by the State bodies of the Russian Federation aiming at the above mentioned purposes”. Criminal responsibility “for public dissemination of deliberately false information about the use of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and carrying out their functions by the State bodies of the RF” (Article 207.3 of Criminal Code) results in different types of punishment, with fifteen years of deprivation of freedom being the maximum punishment. A new law “On the Control of the Activities of Persons under Foreign Influence” defines terms such as “foreign agent”, “foreign impact”, “foreign source” and “political actor”. Persons under foreign influence are forbidden to teach at State and municipal educational organizations, or to carry out any educational activity with minors.16Moreover, Article 275.1 has been added to the Criminal Code of the RF. This article “Confidential cooperation services of foreign States” mandates punishment in cases of cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies as well as common international or foreign organizations or its representatives.
Thus, in addition to the already existing punitive mechanisms, the State has introduced other legal sanctions to the Code of Administrative Offences and to the Criminal Code regarding those persons and organizations whose opinion about the war in Ukraine differ from the State’s position. This has certainly had a negative impact on human rights, including Indigenous peoples’ rights, in Russia. The introduction of these sanctions has resulted in a lack of freedom of expression, liberty, and security among the Indigenous populations in Russia. Consequently, fearing for their safety some Indigenous small-numbered people have been silenced or have chosen to leave their lands.
Russia’s policy of intimidation has also been observed in international organizations such as the United Nations. In July 2022 at the XV Session of the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Geneva, Yana Tannagasheva, a representative of Indigenous peoples of Russia who had reported on human rights violations in Russia, was aggressively confronted by a representative of the Russian state delegation. This confrontation raised critical public opinion. For example, Christoph Wiedmer, co-director of the Society for Threatened Peoples, was extremely shocked by this public intimidation of an Indigenous peoples’ representative by a representative of the Russian government. According to him, Russia has crossed a red line. In his opinion, the Russian government is actively intimidating civil society activists from Russia and communication with Russian Indigenous peoples has become almost impossible.17
Thus, in addition to newly introduced legal sanctions against those who disagree with the war in Ukraine, the Russian State is using intimidating measures against people and organizations, including Indigenous small-numbered peoples. The Tannagasheva case is one of many examples of this kind of State pressure.
Active participation of Indigenous small-numbered peoples in the war
As previously stated there are 47 Indigenous small-numbered peoples recognized in Russia. The Russian legal term ‘Indigenous small-numbered peoples’ differs from the international legal term ‘Indigenous peoples’ in that it entails a numerical constraint. The Indigenous small-numbered people’s group shall not include more than 50 000 persons. Some groups are substantially smaller in number, encompassing merely a few hundred members. It has been officially recognized that a large number of the Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine are from Indigenous peoples groups.18,19There are many reasons for Indigenous peoples participating in this war, among them economic reasons (poverty and the need for economic rewards for participation in the war) and a lack of reliable and objective information about the war in Ukraine.20The death of Indigenous peoples in the war is a tragedy, but this does not erase personal responsibility for participation in the war. According to human rights activist and former member of the United Nations Forum on Indigenous Issues, Oliver Loode, the Russian army mirrors the socio-economic problems of the State, especially where Indigenous small-numbered peoples reside. He observes that most of the army recruits come from peripheral regions where unemployment, drug addiction and criminality are rampant and thus recruitment to the army becomes the only possibility to survive.21Another activist, Sires Boliaen, has observed that the share of Indigenous peoples in the total number of deaths in the war is disproportionately high, based on Russian statistics and numbers provided by Russian scientists.22To conclude, the war in Ukraine has made Indigenous peoples even more vulnerable and further worsened their unprotected position.23
International cooperation of Indigenous peoples of Russia with their international partners
The war in Ukraine has impacted the cooperation of Indigenous peoples of Russia with their international partners. Currently it is hard for international organizations to trust Russian Indigenous people’s organizations because of their differing positions on the war.24One example of Indigenous peoples of Russia whose cooperation with international colleagues has been impacted by the war in Ukraine is the Sámi peoples. The Sámi are the Indigenous peoples of four countries, namely Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. Traditional Sámi lands are called Sápmi. The Sámi population resided in this territory before the establishment of State borders. The open support of the war in Ukraine by the Russian Sámi organization, namely Kola Sámi Association, has triggered negative reactions from the international Sámi community. For example, the Sámi Council, which is the body which brings representatives of all four Sámi countries together, has put cooperation with Russian member organizations on hold, until the next Sámi Council meeting.25For the Russian Sámi, membership in the Sámi Council has been crucial because they have received substantial support for their cultural projects from this organization. Their share of applications for financial support from the Council has always been the highest compared to the other members.26Thus, suspension of their membership in this organisation has had a significant negative impact on the protection of culture and language of the Russian Sámi.
Another important cooperation arena for the Indigenous peoples of Russia with international partners, is the Arctic Council. Six Indigenous organizations, including the Russian Association of Indigenous People of the North-RAIPON, are permanent members of the Arctic Council.27Due to the special status of Indigenous organizations within the Arctic Council, this is a forum where Indigenous peoples can make their voices heard. At present, the RF is serving as the chair of the Arctic Council until 2023. Due to the war in Ukraine, the Arctic Council has postponed all official meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies until further notice.28The decision to do so was made by the member states (except Russia) without consulting the Indigenous organizations who are also permanent participants of the Arctic Council.29This decision negates and undermines the special status Indigenous organizations have had in the Council, and may substantially affect the participation of Indigenous organizations in the international arena. Moreover, the suspension of the official activities of the Arctic Council has had a negative impact on the activities of the Indigenous peoples of the Russian Arctic.
The present review has cast a light on some of the impacts on Indigenous peoples of Russia caused by the war in Ukraine. Among these impacts are Russia’s disregard of international legal obligations, sanctions against opposing opinions, making the Russian Indigenous peoples even more vulnerable in addition to their unprotected position due to their participation in the war, as well as a substantial decrease in international cooperation, which has negatively impacted the development of languages, culture, and other aspects of life of the Indigenous small-numbered peoples of Russia.
NOTES
*  I would like to express my gratitude to the Sámi rights activist Andrei Danilov who found an opportunity to discuss the situation of Indigenous peoples’ rights in Russia with me in connection with this review.
1. Russia ratified ICCPR: Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium N 4812-VIII of September 18, 1973 ‘About the ratification of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Right’. Russia ratified European Convention on Human Rights: FL N 54-ФЗ of March 3, 1998 ‘On Ratifying the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Protocols Thereto’.
2. For example, among other acts, the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of expression (Article 29), cultural rights (Article 69 (2)), the right to life (Article 20), liberty and personal integrity (Article 22 (1)).
3. Regulation of the Government of the RF N 255 of March 24, 2000 ‘On the Unified List of the Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the Russian Federation’.
4. For the full list of Indigenous organizations supporting the war in Ukraine see: “Ассоциация КМНСС и ДВ РФ выступила в поддержку Президента нашей страны В. В. Путина” [“RAIPON supported President of our country V. V. Putin”], https://raipon.info/press-tsentr/novosti/assotsiatsiya-kmnss-i-dv-rf-vystupila-v-podderzhku-prezidenta-nashey-strany-v-v-putina-/(accessed July 11, 2022).
5. Dan Robert Larsen, “Russisk sameleder: – Vi er mot krigen i Ukraina,” https://www.nrk.no/sapmi/samisk-organisasjon-i-russland-erklaerer-motstand-mot-krigen-i-ukraina-1.15929090?fbclid=IwAR2mn72ZTqSpctQ7NTO01m-2vOUIGszAJ1PQ1xjtSdtOOWF5j6tz5iMPQak(accessed July 13, 2022).
6. Thomas Nilsen, “War protesting Sámi activist from Kola seeks asylum in Norway,” https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/life-and-public/2022/04/sami-activist-and-war-protester-kola-seeks-asylum-norway(accessed July 13, 2022).
7. Other opinions regarding the impact of the war in Ukraine on Indigenous small-numbered peoples of Russia can be found here: Dmitry Berezhkov, “How does the militarization of Russia’s internal politics, social life and economy affect indigenous peoples’ development in Russia?,” 15th session of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. July 4, 2022, Geneva, https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/22882(accessed July 14, 2022).
8. For example, the ECHR accepted for consideration a complaint from a Russian Indigenous people’s organization called Center for Support of Indigenous Peoples of the North. ECHR considered the complaint of the Center together with other complaints from non-governmental organizations and ruled regarding the “Foreign Agents” law in Russia. See: Judgment of the ECHR, Case of Ecodefence and Others v. Russia, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-217751(accessed July 21, 2022).
9. For more analysis see: Ekaterina Zmyvalova, “Human Rights of Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples in Russia: Recent Developments,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics11 (2020): 350–352.
10. Decision of the Committee of Ministers CM/Del/Dec(2022)1426ter/2.3 of February 25, 2022, ‘2.3 Situation in Ukraine – Measures to be taken, including under Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe,’ https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=0900001680a5a360(accessed July 18, 2022).
11. Parliamentary Assembly Opinion N 300 (2022), ‘Consequences of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine,’ https://pace.coe.int/en/files/29885/html(accessed July 18, 2022).
12. “The Russian Federation is excluded from the Council of Europe,” https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/full-news/-/asset_publisher/y5xQt7QdunzT/content/the-russian-federation-is-excluded-from-the-council-of-europe(accessed July 18, 2022).
13. Ibid.
14. “В законодательство внесены изменения в связи с признанием не подлежащими исполнению в России вступивших в силу после 15 марта 2022 года постановлений ЕСПЧ” [“Amendments due to recognition of the judgments of ECHR unenforceable in Russia after March 15, 2022 were introduced in the legislation”], http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/68648(accessed July 18, 2022).
15. The situation can get worse. While ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights Russia also signed and ratified Protocol N 6 of it in 1997. Due to this fact a moratorium on the death penalty was introduced in Russia. After Russia’s withdrawal from European Convention of Human Rights this punishment can be reinforced in the RF.
16. Федеральный закон N 255-ФЗ от 14 июля 2022 ‘О контроле за деятельностью лиц, находящихся под иностранным влиянием’ (FL N 255-ФЗ of July 14, 2022 ‘On the Control of the Activities of Persons Under Foreign Influence’).
17. Sarah Zeines, “Russian Indigenous Spokeswoman Faces Intimidation at the Human Rights Council,” https://us19.campaign-archive.com/?u=b3372615f7a316d6426d48fc4&id=7f77e87a90(accessed July 13, 2022).
18. By no means do I want to belittle the suffering of Indigenous peoples of Ukraine.
19. “Заявление в ООН: Москва уничтожает в мясорубке войны коренные народы” [“Statement in the UN: Moscow destroys indigenous peoples in the meat grinder of war”], https://idel-ural.org/archives/syres-bolyaen-prizval-oon-obratit-vnimanie-na-ispolzovanie-moskvoj-korennyh-narodov-v-vojne-protiv-ukrainy/?fbclid=IwAR2a5tkYDY6UyHKd8UGiJO4iL0DI5ZZ8F5dZoB_q5jMvEnVqo2s1lfaJ7Lk(accessed July 13, 2022).
20. The issue of misinformation deserves special attention. At present, strict censorship has been introduced in the RF regarding spreading information about the war in Ukraine. For example, on June 30, 2022 the deputies of the State Duma approved a law that allows the Public Prosecutors Office to close sources of mass media publishing ‘fake’ news or news ‘discrediting’ the use of the armed forces of the Russian Federation or ‘urge sanctions’. See: Федеральный закон N 277-ФЗ от 14 июля 2022 ‘О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации’ (FL N 277-ФЗ of July 14, 2022 ‘On Introducing Amedments into some Legal Acts of the Russian Federation’).
21. “Особое 9 мая. “Раньше Кремлю было достаточно воспевать славные подвиги предков, теперь — надо побеждать самим”’ [“Special 9th of May. ‘It was enough for the Kremlin to anthem the glorious deeds of ancestors, now- they have to win by themselves”], https://www.idelreal.org/a/31838711.html(accessed July 13, 2022).
22. “Заявление в ООН: Москва уничтожает в мясорубке войны коренные народы” [“Statement in the UN: Moscow destroys Indigenous peoples in the meat grinder of war”], https://idel-ural.org/archives/syres-bolyaen-prizval-oon-obratit-vnimanie-na-ispolzovanie-moskvoj-korennyh-narodov-v-vojne-protiv-ukrainy/?fbclid=IwAR2a5tkYDY6UyHKd8UGiJO4iL0DI5ZZ8F5dZoB_q5jMvEnVqo2s1lfaJ7Lk(accessed July 13, 2022).
23. Дмитрий Бережков, “Влияние войны на коренные народы России” [Dmitry Berezkov, “Impact of war on Indigenous peoples of Russia”], https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/22240(accessed July 13, 2022).
24. Ibid.
25. Christina Henriksen, “Cooperation with Russian side on hold,” https://www.saamicouncil.net/news-archive/cooperation-with-russian-side-on-hold(accessed July 11, 2022).
26. Personal communication with Andrei Danilov (March 15, 2022).
27. “About the Arctic Council,” https://www.arctic-council.org/about/(accessed July 15, 2022).
28. “Arctic Council,” https://www.arctic-council.org/(accessed July 13, 2022).
29. Barry Scott Zellen, “The Arctic Council Pause: The Importance of Indigenous Participation and the Ottawa Declaration,” https://www.arcticcircle.org/journal/the-importance-of-indigenous-participation-and-the-ottawa-declaration(accessed July 13, 2022).
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PUBLISHED
2022-08-18
ISSUE
Vol. 13 (2022)
SECTION
Debates on Arctic Law and Politics
KEYWORDS:
Indigenous small-numbered peoples of Russia, war, Ukraine, human rights
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chaotic-carnifex · 3 years
Text
A Small Selection of Human Rights
According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
1.       The right to life (Art. 3 UDHR, Art. 6 I ICCPR)
2.       The right to legal personhood (Art. 6 UDHR) and a nationality (Art. 15 UDHR, Art. 24 III ICCPR)
3.       The right to liberty (Art. 3 UDHR, Art. 9 ICCPR), including the right to be free from slavery and servitude (Art. 4 UDHR, Art. 8 ICCPR)
4.       The right to freedom from torture and from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (Art. 5 UDHR, Art. 7 ICCPR)
5.       The right to food (Art. 25 I UDHR, Art. 11 I ICESCR)
6.       The right to housing (Art. 25 I UDHR, Art. 11 I ICESCR)
7.       The right to medical care (Art. 25 I UDHR) / to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (Art. 12 I ICESPR)
8.       The right to clothes (Art. 25 I UDHR, Art. 11 I ICESCR)
9.       The right to necessary social services (Art. 25 I UDHR)
10.   The right to social security (Art. 22 UDHR, Art. 9 ICESCR) including social insurance (Art. 9 ICESCR) and to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood beyond one’s control (Art. 25 I UDHR)
11.   The right to work, just and favourable working conditions, protection against unemployment, equal pay for equal work, a remuneration that ensures for oneself and one’s family an existence worthy of human dignity and the right to form and join trade unions (Art. 23 UDHR, Art. 6, 7, 8 (a) ICESCR)
12.   The right to leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and paid holidays (Art. 24 UDHR, Art. 7 (d) ICESCR)
13.   The right to education (Art. 26 I UDHR, Art. 13 ICESCR)
14.   The right to a fair trial (Art. 10 UDHR, Art. 14 ICCPR) and to seek remedy for a violation of their rights before a court of law (Art. 8 UDHR, Art. 2 III ICCPR)
15.   The right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty (Art 11 I UDHR, Art. 14 II ICCPR)
16.   The right to freedom of movement (Art. 13 UDHR, Art. 12 I ICCPR)
17.   The right to own property (Art. 17 UDHR)
18.   The right to freedom of opinion and expression (Art. 19 UDHR, Art. 19 ICCPR)
19.   The right to freedom of religion (Art. 18 UDHR, Art. 18 ICCPR)
20.   The right of incarcerated people to be treated with dignity and respect (Art. 10 I ICCPR)
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smqazi · 3 months
Text
TO HONORABLE JUDGES AND LAWYERS OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE IN THE SO-CALLED ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN,
WHICH IS NEITHER ISLAMIC NOR REPUBLIC,
UNFORTUNATELY!
HOW LONG IS TOO LONG?
WHEN JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED!
As the saying goes, ‘ justice delayed is justice denied.’ Yet, across the world, court users complain that the courts take too long. For your regular court user facing endless talk from lawyers, reams of paper, and mounting legal bills, a court case can feel like it goes on…FOR….EV….ER.
But how long is too long? The question has arisen on each of my last four missions in as many months – from Kenya to Croatia to Serbia and back.
And it’s not a rhetorical question. Answers can assist client countries in analyzing their efficiency and devising reforms that improve both timeliness and user satisfaction. I
t also enables potential court users to better estimate how long it might take to resolve their dispute – allowing them to then adjust their expectations accordingly.
After all, better enabling people and businesses to resolve their disputes contributes to poverty reduction and shared prosperity.
In an attempt to respond beyond rhetoric, I dusted off this old report by European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ). It may be ‘old news,’ but perhaps it’s an ‘oldie but a goody,’ with the findings reaffirmed in more recent reports here and here.
The report analyzed a large number of decisions that had come before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and provided insights into what that the Court considers an ‘ unreasonable time’ to be. (The ECHR interprets Article 6 of its Convention, which requires all 47 Council of Europe States to ensure within their jurisdictions that ‘ everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time’.)
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) contains a similar provision which applies to all 168 of its states parties. This overlap means that the views of the ECHR provides a pertinent yardstick in ECA and beyond.
Despite what many people assume, there is no single international rule on how long cases should take. Each case must be considered on its own merits, but the following general ‘rules of thumb’ may be helpful.
In normal (not complex) cases, the ECHR generally considers two years to be reasonable. Beyond a duration of two years per court level, the European Court examines the case closely to see if the national authorities exercised due diligence in the process.
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