#eternalism

[omegaphilosophia]

Theories of The Philosophy of Time

The philosophy of time is the study of the nature of time, including the ontological status of time, the relationship between time and causation, and the various ways in which time is experienced and represented. It involves questions such as whether time is an objective or subjective feature of the world, whether time has a direction or is symmetrical, and whether time is a continuous or discrete phenomenon. The philosophy of time is closely related to other areas of philosophy, such as metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of science.

There are various theories and debates within the philosophy of time, some of which include:

The block universe theory: This theory suggests that all of time exists as a block, with each moment in time equally real and determined. This means that past, present, and future are all equally real and exist simultaneously. The theory suggests that everything that ever happened, is happening, or will happen already exists and is fixed.

B-theory of time: This theory is related to the block universe theory, which holds that time is tenseless and that all moments in time are equally real. This means that there is no objective difference between past, present, and future - they all exist equally. According to this theory, time is similar to space, and just as we can move around in space, we can also move around in time.

Relativity theory of time: A scientific theory developed by Albert Einstein that suggests that time is relative to the observer and dependent on the observer's relative motion and position. According to this theory, time passes more slowly for objects that are moving relative to an observer than for objects that are stationary. This effect is known as time dilation. The theory also suggests that time and space are not separate entities but are intertwined, forming a four-dimensional spacetime continuum.

Perdurantism: This theory posits that objects are four-dimensional entities that exist across time and persist by having different temporal parts at different times. This view is sometimes called "four-dimensionalism" or "eternalism". According to this theory, an object is not a single entity that stays the same over time, but rather a collection of temporal parts that come together at different times to form a complete object. For example, a person is not just a single entity that exists at a particular moment in time, but rather a collection of temporal parts (e.g. cells, organs, memories) that exist at different times and come together to form a complete person.

Endurantism: This theory posits that objects are three-dimensional entities that persist over time by having the same parts at different times. According to this view, an object is a single entity that stays the same over time, and it has the same parts at every moment of its existence. For example, a person is a single entity that exists at a particular moment in time, and it has the same physical and psychological parts at every moment of its existence.

The Growing Block Theory: This theory posits that only the past and present exist, with the future being continually created as time moves forward. In other words, the present is constantly expanding, and the future is not yet determined.

The Presentism Theory: According to this theory, only the present moment exists. The past is no longer real, and the future is yet to come into existence. This view holds that the present is privileged and that the past and future are merely conceptual constructs.

The Eternalism Theory: This theory views time as a fourth dimension, similar to space, and asserts that all moments in time exist simultaneously. This means that the past, present, and future all exist at the same time, and our experience of time is just an illusion. This theory has some similarities to the block universe theory but rejects the idea of a fixed future.

Four-dimensionalism: This theory claims that objects persist in time by having different temporal parts at different times. According to this view, time is considered to be a dimension, similar to space. Just as an object can have different spatial parts, it can also have different temporal parts. In this way, an object is not considered to exist at any particular moment in time, but rather it exists across a whole span of time. This view is sometimes associated with the theory of special relativity in physics.

The causal theory of time: This theory posits that time is defined by causation. On this view, events are ordered in time by their causal relationships. An event is considered to be earlier than another event if it is causally prior to that event, and later if it is causally subsequent to that event. The causal theory of time is often associated with the work of the philosopher David Lewis.

The tensed theory of time: The theory that time is fundamentally characterized by a distinction between past, present, and future. According to this view, the present moment is privileged, and the past and future are real but in different ways. The past is considered to be fixed and unalterable, while the future is open and uncertain. This view is often associated with the philosopher J.M.E. McTaggart, who famously argued that time is an illusion because the A-series of past, present, and future is contradictory.

Overall, the philosophy of time involves complex and often contradictory theories, which continue to be the subject of ongoing debate and investigation.

[evergreen-collections]

I feel like a lot of my struggling and emotions in general all ties back to time. my attempts to fully understand it, and how I percieve it.

[ferallore-hound]

How does Eternalism Exist in Warframe?

!NEW WAR SPOILERS!

This isn't an analysis, but more of a question. We already know that eternalism exists in Warframe, but I'm kind of confused. I know what eternalism is, and generally how it functions. I also know that the void defies perceived logic.

From what we've seen in The New War, It's understood that the Operator shakes the Man in the Wall's hand. It's then shown that other versions seem to reel back in pain, then fall to the ground. This could be a physically-expressed metaphor for the other versions simply "falling into place", so the Man in the Wall can seal the deal. In contradiction, I heard someone else say that the other timeline versions are actually dead/dying in that scene, which could also make sense...

But here's my question: If Man in the Wall is manipulating everything to go his way, in what appears to be only two timelines, (Drifter and Operator) then are there other timelines that are the exact same, but can be changed? If there's always just two, and only two timelines, that interact with each other, that are separate from ALL different universes? Are each two timelines (Drifter/Operator) consistently being killed, only for MitW to diverge another, exactly similar timeline, where the main character(s) survives?

Basically, what I'm asking is, can a widely different timeline exist outside of the Warframe universe we know?

I want to know you're thoughts! I like to think so, since that's basically kind of what eternalism is, anyway. It's the idea that anything that CAN happen HAS happened, and will continue to happen. So, especially any timeline/AU that someone makes is possible.

[philosohoney]

Metaphysics series: "Eternalism and Presentism: The Here and Now of Material Objects"

Space, time, time travel, and us.

Although I should know better by now, I cannot help thinking that it is the notion of change, rather than permanence, that is an illusion. However, it is the idea of permanence that is quickly shattered by a cursory glance at an old film strip. Who is that infant? Is that me? When did I change and how did I get here… to this point in time? Although the simple realization that things now are not how they once were may seem trivial, it is in fact a helpful guide into the nature of objects and time. Though, admittedly, the relationship between contemporary physics in regards to space and time and the philosophical inquiry of material objects might be a better place to start.

        Einstein’s theory of special relativity pushed forth the idea that there is no such thing as objective simultaneity— various events are not in fact objective to reality, and, therefore, it can be said that time itself is relative. With this in mind, a recontextualized “now” is to be considered as a kind of “here”, in which physical objects acquire temporal parts. However, despite this theory’s notable absorption into the post-2010-wine-mom aesthetic (“it’s wine o’clock somewhere”), there remains debate on what can be said about the nature of reality and its existing objects. The debate is led by two views: Eternalism and Presentism.

        Eternalism is the view which holds that past, present, and future objects exist all at once, and that these objects are real objects. For example, the Eiffel Tower in 2010, Mary Shelley in 1818, a glass cup at 10 am this morning and myself at this moment in time, exist together. Under Eternalism the totality of reality is four-dimensional. Fourth-Dimensionalism states that any physical object that is located at different times has a different temporal part for each moment at which it is located. A common description of fourth-dimensionalism and its temporal parts is to think of a film strip that depicts an individual running up a hill. The film strip is made of many frames, each of which depict the individual at a moment in time. If one where to cut the frames, stack them on top of another and turn the stack sideways so that the images were right side up, each image would represent a temporal part of the individual, in a specific position in space and moment in time. And so the individual, under this view, is a collection of each of these temporal parts. A common way of understanding the concept of being in this way is as a “spacetime worm” that exists fourth-dimensionally through spacetime, or as David Lewis describes it, “a streak through the manifold of spacetime”. This solves the problem of Stachy and Lumpy, claiming that, fourth-dimensionally, both are different parts of the same worm; there is only one fourth-dimensional object. This can be applied to Theseus’s ship and Tib/Tibbles as well, as an Eternalist observes the spacetime worm in their cases as well. As you have probably already noticed, one of the most important arguments in favor of Eternalism is the very fact that it fits with Einstein’s theory of relativity, but Einstein alone does not render Eternalism immune to Presentist criticism.

In contrast to the Eternalist view, Presentism is the view that all existing objects are, in fact, presently existing objects: “necessarily, it is always the case that, present things exist.” As a result, it is said that there are neither past nor future objects, as they are not presently existing. For example, consider the following sentence D, “There used to be dinosaurs.” A presentist believes this to be true due the fact that it is in the past tense; any mention of a dinosaur’s current existence would not pass the presentists’ requirements. Furthermore, a key difference can be seen through the following sentences:

M— Mary Shelly is the daughter of Mary Wollstonecraft.

N— Nat King Cole admired Ella Fitzgerald.

Under Eternalism these sentences are true because of the fact that Mary Wollstonecraft and Ella Fitzgerald exist! In contrast, presentists, like Ned Markosian, argue for a form of fictionalism in which sentences M and N are not strictly true, but rather for all practical purpose true (FAPP-TRUE). In this case, these sentences are not true, but are close to ideas of truth which are called “nearby truths.” The nearby truths for sentences M and N would be as follows:

M— Mary Wollstonecraft had a baby, and that baby was Mary Shelly.

N— Nat King Cole admires certain properties that Ella Fitzgerald has.

Therefore, relevant sentences about the past are FAPP-TRUE because the following counterfactual is literally true: if Eternalism had been true, then it would have been the case that x. In regards to the special bond of relativity theory and Eternalism, presentists often respond by stating that there is no good scientific evidence to prefer the standard theory of special relativity (STR) to, say, a version of standard theory of relativity with a caveat that states that there is an empirically undiscoverable privilege frame of refence (STR+; i.e., an undiscoverable fact about which objects are really, for example, motionless.)

            At this time, we might direct our attention to Eli Hirsch’s suggestion of mere-verbalism, which requires that a) the debating parties agree about the relevant worldly facts, and b) the debating parties subsequently assign different truth values to sentences only because they mean different things by their words. Initially, it seems that mere-verbalism simply claims that the two parties just need to set up their terms so they can progress, but one wonders just how many decades it will take before the real debates can begin in earnest. Hirsch seems to be in a nearby truth of his own, however, as, unless the presentist denies a fourth dimension, an eternalist and a presentist might be arguing past each other, from different scopes: in the case of a spacetime worm-farm in a fourth dimension, it might be observed that only those worms which are present could be included in a list of things that exist. One might suggest that the presentist state their stance on dimensions before proceeding any further— upon learning the presentist is also a three-dimensionalist, it will become necessary to establish the terms and parameters of the debate.

            Suppose that the debate establishes its parties as follows: the Fourth-Dimensional Presentist (eternalist) in one corner, the Three-Dimensional Presentist (Sider’s Temporal Actualist) in the other. It becomes immediately apparent that this is not merely a verbal dispute; this is an ontological debate. Suppose, then, that we consider Lewis’ claim of the existence of the plurality of worlds, if only to extract his distinction of a relational, indexical “actuality” (as opposed to “actuality” as an intrinsic quality of something); conceding, for the sake of discussion which resists bloviation, at least a modicum of simple determinism (an effect has a cause or causes); and, perhaps most important of all, suppose we require a rendering of a FAPP-TRUE ruling, a nearby truth (as opposed to an absolutist strawman). What might result?

            Under such constraints, the Three-Dimensional Presentist/Temporal Actualist (TDP) might initially find herself vulnerable to criticism on the grounds of simple determinism. If only the present exists, there would appear to be a lack of causality, so TDP might fortify her position and insist that while only present things exist, the present can change. And while this is apparently a common mode of fortification, one might wonder that if the present is capable of change, could it not then be argued that the present exists as a temporal location, a not insignificant quality of which recognizes a past and a future? And if this is the case, would that not serve to weaken TDP’s denial of the existence of past and future objects, simply recontextualizing the scope in which such objects are recognized? It would be tempting, then, to seek to quantify this recontextualized scope to more fully grasp what the TDP holds to be ontologically acceptable to her position— returning to the film strip, the TDP might claim the present as the lowest possible frame-rate wherein action can be recognized. Within this scope of the present, it might then be argued that instances of the past and future are FAPP-TRUE. A non-static present might then be represented as the currently extant mini-worm, elected to Lewisian Actuality as a consequence of a perception which can observe causality even as it is bound in a seemingly linearly progressing consciousness.

            Finally: Einstein; time travel; relativity. The TDP might perk up and wield Lewisian Actuality in a kind of temporal equivalent of Fermi’s Paradox: “If it were true that a person could travel through time, why haven’t we seen the evidence already? If it isn’t occurring in the present, it doesn’t exist.” This question as a means of support for TDP’s case presupposes quite a lot, and we are limited by our established parameters and by TDP’s rejection of a fourth dimension. However, in a causal, three-dimensional universe, in which only the present is actual, one might imagine that any disruption caused by a time-traveler would not exist. If there are ripples through time, they are ripples in non-actual time, and if TDP’s model is correct, the currently extant mini-worms would be more-or-less unaffected by the nature of their size and frequency of propagation. As Lewisian Actuality functions similarly to Berkeleyan Idealism which holds that “to be is to be perceived”, the past would be made real to the time-traveler; it would become her present. With these considerations in mind, one might imagine the act of traveling into the past as one of those old morbid experiments where they would pass electricity through a dead frog to make its legs move— a lively motion, true, but not alive. It seems, then, that TDP must reject time travel, because, due to the most generous ruling on the matter being the claim that it is merely conceptual and as the success of a journey derived from such a concept is likely unknowable, time travel is FAPP-NOT TRUE. Instances in actuality which support, or seem to support, STR+, seem to potentially concede a fourth-dimension or the simulacrum of a fourth-dimension by way of the so-called “empirically undiscoverable privileged frame of reference”, yet, even if this is the case, it should be considered FAPP-NOT TRUE, as such a reference point is inaccessible in actuality.

            While the FDP’s argument might not exist free from critique, it seems the TDP’s argument makes enough concessions in favor of Eternalism to at least fail in debunking it, wholesale.

So where does that leave us?

It seems that the best that one should really hope for in the pursuit of most metaphysical inquiries is the chance to observe patterns that appear to maintain a kind of consistency, while avoiding making absolutist claims about them whenever possible. Perhaps we have not left the TDP’s actual present; perhaps there can be no confirmation of time-travel; perhaps Here and Now is the only place we will ever go.

But then again, perhaps the FDP might suggest that we remain worms, growing, wriggling, who are currently haggling over size.

-Aleksi

[officecyborg]

My wife: Are you making a list of fonts?

Me: No, worse. I'm replicating the titles of video games but it's the fonts that they're in

My wife: What does that mean

Me: This

[naritatowa]

What is the inner blackhole?

[hunter-rodrigez]

Fuck Unity (The game engine, not the concept)

They want up to TWENTY CENTS per game install, once you reach a certain number of installs.

TWENTY CENTS

Just imagine, 100 people install your game and you suddenly owe Unity 20 fucking dollars. Chances are, you haven't even made that much in profits from 100 sales.

It's time for unity to fucking die. How fucking dare they demand royalties from game devs for an engine THAT ISN'T EVEN FREE?

In case you don't know, here's a list of a few bigger games that use the Unity engine:

Hollow Knight

Rimworld

Subnautica

Pokemon Go

Cities: Skylines

Rust

Hearthstone

Pillars Of Eternity

Cuphead

[blinkpen]

what if i decided i'm straight up not posting any new art publicly until that family's GFM in my pinned is at least Halfway to its goal

(even half my followers donating 5 bucks each would do that btw)

[palefrogs]

RPG Elves by Dungeon Meshi's Ryoko Kui

[savaralyn2]

Ryoko Kui - RPG Elves

[killjo-q]

Felt like drawing her today

[lazylittledragon]

he's nothing if not determined

[rubydubydoo122]

I saw someone say a while ago that Jason attacking Tim at Titans Tower was just Tim hallucinating bc he was feeling guilty about being Robin even though Jason's not dead. Which is great, amazing, I think the whole Titans Tower thing is Bonkers, but I think it would be so much funnier if Jason tried to Gaslight Tim into believing the Titans Tower incident never happened, not because he's like evil, he's just super embarassed about it. like Or Tim did actually hallucinate Jason at TT but thinks it was real, so when he tells Jason about it, Jason's so fucking confused, and Tim thinks Jason's Gaslighting him

Tim: Remember that time when you broke into Titans Tower and beat me half to death while wearing a Robin costume from party city

Jason: What? Tim, I know i'm crazy, but I'm not...Insane.

Tim, pulling down his collar: I literally have the scar to prove it

Jason: Bruce told me that was from Clayface pretending to be me, which, might I just say rude. Tim... are you ok? Did you hallucinate me attacking you? like, I know I've done that before, but...

Tim, frowning: I don't think I hallucinating. I was benched for a while after because I had to recover-

Jason: well, you were benched around the time I was dropping hints that I knew who Bruce was outside of Batman, he probably just benched you to keep you safe. You probably were working too many cases with too little sleep and your imagination started to run wild.

Tim: Are you gaslighting me?

Jason: Are you gaslighting me?

[389]

Eternal Love, Frank Kunert Photography

[colinprovolone]

the low quality children