#starlink isp

[bcb-and-b-368-lindsay-road-40]

Thinking. {{{Insert spinning icon here}}}. Failed fossil fuel.

My salad days? Nahhhh. :-)

[mariacallous]

As the Trump administration's Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) continues to rampage through the United States federal government, essentially guided by Elon Musk, the group has also been upending traditional IT boundaries—evaluating digital systems and allegedly accessing personally identifiable information as well as data that has typically been off-limits to those without specific training. Last week, The New York Times reported that the White House is adding Musk-owned SpaceX’s Starlink Wi-Fi “to improve Wi-Fi connectivity on the complex,” according to a statement from White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt. The White House's Starlink internet service is reportedly being donated by the company.

Spotty internet is an annoying but highly solvable problem that WIRED has reported on extensively. Of course, the White House is a highly complex organization operating out of a historic building, but network security researchers, government contractors, and former intelligence analysts with years of experience in US federal government security all tell WIRED that adding Starlink Wi-Fi in a seemingly rushed and haphazard way is an inefficient and counterproductive approach to solving connectivity issues. And they emphasized that it could set problematic precedents across the US government: that new pieces of technology can simply be layered into an environment at will without adequate oversight and monitoring.

“This is shadow IT, creating a network to bypass existing controls,” alleges Nicholas Weaver, a member of the nonprofit International Computer Science Institute's network security team and a computer science lecturer at UC Davis. He adds that while secret and top secret information is typically (but not always) processed only on special, separate federal networks that have no wireless access, the security and uniformity of White House Wi-Fi is still extremely important to national security. “A network like the White House unclassified side is still going to be very sensitive,” he says.

“Just like the Biden Administration did on numerous occasions, the White House is working to improve WiFi connectivity on the complex,” White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt tells WIRED in a statement.

A White House source who asked not to be named supported the switch, arguing that in some areas of the campus, “the old Wi-Fi was trash.”

Researchers point out that while Starlink is a robust commercial ISP like any other, it is not clear that it is being implemented in compliance with White House Communication Agency requirements. If the controls on the White House Starlink Wi-Fi are more lax than on other White House Wi-Fi, it could introduce security exposures and blind spots in network monitoring for anomalous activity.

“The only reason they'd need Starlink would be to bypass existing security controls that are in place from WHCA,” claims former NSA hacker Jake Williams. “The biggest issues would be: First, if they don't have full monitoring of the Starlink connection. And second, if it allows remote management tools, so they could get remote access back into the White House networks. Obviously anyone could abuse that access.”

One baffling aspect of the arrangement is that Starlink and other satellite internet is designed to be used in places that have little or no access to terrestrial internet service—in other words, places where there are no reliable fiber lines or no wired infrastructure at all. Instead of a traditional ISP modem, Starlink customers get special panels that they install on a roof or other outdoor place to receive connectivity from orbiting satellites. The New York Times reported, though, that the White House Starlink panels are actually installed miles away at a White House data center that is routing the connectivity over existing fiber lines. Multiple sources emphasized to WIRED that this setup is bizarre.

“It is extra stupid to go satellite to fiber to actual site,” ICSI's Weaver says. “Starlink is inferior service anyplace where you have wire-line internet already available and, even in places which don't, inferior if you have reasonable line of sight to a cell tower.”

Weaver and others note that Starlink is a robust product and isn't inherently unreliable just because it is delivered via satellite. But in a location where fiber lines are highly available and, ultimately, the service is being delivered via those lines anyway, the setup is deeply inefficient.

While Starlink as a service is technically reliable, incorporating it in the White House could create a long-term federal dependence on an Elon Musk–controlled service, which could create future instabilities. After European officials raised concerns earlier this month on whether Starlink might stop serving Ukraine, Musk posted on social media: “To be extremely clear, no matter how much I disagree with the Ukraine policy, Starlink will never turn off its terminals … We would never do such a thing or use it as a bargaining chip.”

[the-sun-station]

god damn I fucking hate ISPs dude

there's an ISP in my line of work that's been peddling "100x100 fiber anywhere in North America" and someone in my company, somehow, fucked around, fell for this scam, and started ordering this for problem sites.

we're now in the finding out phase where it turns out they're just fucking cellular modem resellers like you'd get from those terrible T-Mobile home internet ads??? we've had at least a couple dozen sites all report issues with internet speeds in the 256kbps range making the store non-functional.

their solution if their shitty resold SIM cards don't work? fucking Starlink, baybee. which they still market as fiber service in their sales material lmfao

[nebra-sky-disk]

You can still hate him while using starlink, it's like hating your ISP for sucking shit

problem is this starlink shit is amazing. it always works and its FAST. when i first started working at sea you had shitty iridum VSAT internet and you could just about send a whatsapp message and you had like 50mb a week of data so you'd like send a bunch of whatsapps while ur phone was disconnected, connect to the wifi, let them all send n recieve some ones in reply, n disconnect again. if u left ur phone connected ud use all ur data n u couldnt contact home for a week. and all the computers onboard had no functional internet usage.

now i can video call home for hours if i want. some guys onboard stay away for like 6, 7, 8 months and starlink lets them call their wives n kids. plus being able to google answers to engineering questions is so valuable. life changing technology tbh. hard to hate on it when it has made my life at sea so much easier. ofc there are advantages to being disconnected but i can just turn my wifi off if i want that.

[allthebrazilianpolitics]

By showing Musk’s X the red card, has Brazil scored a goal for all democracies?

At 10 minutes past midnight on 31 August, Elon Musk’s X (nee Twitter) went dark in Brazil, a country of more than 200 million souls, many of them enthusiastic users of online services. The day before, a supreme court justice, Alexandre de Moraes, had done something hitherto unthinkable: ordered the country’s ISPs to block access to the platform, threatened a daily fine of 50,000 Brazilian reis (just under £6,800) for users who bypassed the ban by using virtual private networks (VPNs) and froze the finances of Elon Musk’s Starlink internet service provider in the country. The order would remain in force until the platform complied with the decisions of the supreme federal court, paid fines totalling 18.3m reis (nearly £2.5m) and appointed a representative in Brazil, a legal requirement for foreign companies operating there. Moraes had also instructed Apple and Google to remove the X app and VPN software from their stores, but later reversed that decision, citing concerns about potential “unnecessary” disruptions.

Cue shock, horror, incredulity, outrage and all the reactions in between. Musk – who has been sparring with Moraes for quite a while – tweeted: “Free speech is the bedrock of democracy and an unelected pseudo-judge in Brazil is destroying it for political purposes.” The animosity between the two goes back to 8 January 2023, after the defeat of Jair Bolsonaro in the 2022 Brazilian presidential election, when a mob of his supporters attacked federal government buildings in the capital, Brasília. The mob invaded and caused deliberate damage to the supreme federal court, the national congress and the Planalto presidential palace in an abortive attempt to overthrow the democratically elected president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

Justice Moraes is in the firing line because before the 2022 presidential election the country’s supreme court had given him expansive powers to crack down on online threats to democracy and he has been an enthusiastic deployer of that capability ever since. A New York Times report, for example, said that he “jailed five people without a trial for posts on social media that he said attacked Brazil’s institutions. He has also ordered social networks to remove thousands of posts and videos with little room for appeal.” And it is this last practice that brought him into collision with Musk, whose platform was one of the channels used by the 8 January insurgents.

Media coverage of this clash has predictably personalised it as ruthless enforcer versus tech titan. Who will blink first? Why on earth did Musk pick this fight? Has his fatuous obsession with free speech finally pushed him over the edge? After all, he could have complied with Moraes’s takedown orders, kept the office in Brasília and fought the issue through the Brazilian courts. Instead, he took his ball away, leaving more than 20 million Brazilian X users bereft. On the other hand, although Moraes turned out to be a pretty effective check on Bolsonaro – a cut-price Donald Trump who attacked the media, the courts and the country’s electoral system – some critics are beginning to wonder whether, in his mission to protect democracy, the judge may also wind up eroding it.

Who knows? But for now at least, one thing is clear: this is the first time a democratic state has shut down a main tech platform. Autocracies do this at will (for instance, China, Russia, Iran, Gulf states), but until now democracies have shied away from such an extreme measure. Listening to some of the chatter on the web about the Moraes order provides a clue to the timidity, for what you pick up is astonishment at the effrontery of a mere Brazilian who dares to take down a big American platform because it doesn’t obey the law of his particular land. Who does he think he is? Doesn’t he understand Silicon Valley’s “manifest destiny” to be the prime engine of human progress, leaving lesser breeds bobbing helplessly in its wake?

Continue reading.

[sesshy380]

Yay! The internet it back! No more having to sit next to the window for cell service! Huge shoutout to the service guy who had to drive 2 hours to our tower just to hit the manual reset button. I bet he doesn't mind simple service solutions where he gets paid to drive about 4 hours total round trip, press a button, and run a few diagnostics lol. And to think, my neighbors keep telling me to switch to Starlink. I think I'll stick my local ISP that knows who I am when I call. Might cost me almost 2k for a year of service, but worth it in my opinion.

While I waited, decided to watch the OG Fruits Basket (I have the newer version, but it just doesn't have the same vibe). Only watched the first 3 or 4 episodes before internet came back. Now I need watch the rest at some point (I love Momiji's song lol).

[queencryo]

one of my managers asked me to work on a ticket tofay and he was like 'okay this is tier1.5 shit but i trust you not to be a fuckup' and im like damn lets do it

Anyway, basically it was just applying some basic knowledge of NAT shit, but like. god this is seriously the first time I've actually applied that knowledge at work outside of setting up port forwarding

and DAMN. It turns out applying shit makes it way more meaningful and easy to understand. Who would have thought!!!!

Anyway most of whay i did was useless since 1: i wasnt actually doing anything it turns out t2 just wanted me to call the isp for info 2: the isp is fucking starlink, and we cant actually contact them because they dont have a phone # abd require acct info for support tickets

but still, between this and fucking around with packet tracer. its kinda wild how much easier im uneeretanding these concepts having actually interacted with them practically in any way

[techinsightnow]

Trump is forcing states to funnel grant money to Starlink, Senate Democrats say

Lutnick’s announcement of the BEAD overhaul also criticized what he called the program’s “woke mandates” and “burdensome regulations.” Republicans like Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) have criticized a requirement for ISPs that accept subsidies to offer low-cost Internet plans to people with low incomes, though the low-cost rule was originally imposed by Congress in the law that created the BEAD…

[thousandflowerscampaign]

Fragility of Internet

The fragility of internet infrastructure refers to its vulnerability to disruptions caused by technical failures, cyberattacks, natural disasters, and geopolitical conflicts. Despite being designed for resilience, the internet’s decentralized nature also introduces critical points of failure that can have widespread consequences.

Key Vulnerabilities in Internet Infrastructure

Undersea Cables

Over 95% of global internet traffic travels through undersea fiber-optic cables.

Vulnerable to ship anchors, earthquakes, and sabotage (e.g., 2022 Nord Stream pipeline-like attacks raise concerns).

Incidents like the 2008 Mediterranean cable cuts disrupted internet access in the Middle East and South Asia.

DNS & Routing Weaknesses

The Domain Name System (DNS) is a single point of failure—attacks (e.g., DDoS on Dyn in 2016) can take down major sites.

BGP hijacking (e.g., 2021 Russian ISP rerouted Western traffic) can cause outages or surveillance risks.

Cloud & CDN Centralization

A few providers (AWS, Google Cloud, Cloudflare) host a massive share of internet services.

Outages (e.g., AWS 2021, Fastly 2020) can cripple thousands of websites simultaneously.

Cyberattacks & State-Sponsored Threats

DDoS attacks (e.g., 2022 attacks on Ukrainian banks during war).

Ransomware targeting ISPs (e.g., 2021 Kaseya attack).

SolarWinds-style supply chain compromises threaten critical infrastructure.

Physical Infrastructure Risks

Data centers face risks from power outages, natural disasters (hurricanes, floods), and war (e.g., Ukraine’s internet resilience under Russian attacks).

Satellite internet (Starlink) is an alternative but has limited bandwidth and geopolitical dependencies.

Government & Corporate Control

Internet shutdowns (e.g., Iran, Myanmar) show how governments can cut access.

Tech monopolies controlling key services (e.g., Google, Meta) create systemic risks.

Recent Examples of Internet Fragility

2023: Red Sea Cable Sabotage – Houthi attacks on undersea cables disrupted regional connectivity.

2022: Russia’s Cyberwar in Ukraine – Attacks on Viasat satellites and Ukrainian ISPs.

2021: Facebook’s BGP Misconfiguration – Took down WhatsApp, Instagram, and Oculus for hours.

Possible Solutions for Resilience

✅ Decentralization – More mesh networks, peer-to-peer systems (e.g., IPFS).

✅ Better Redundancy – Diversified cloud providers, backup satellite links.

✅ Stronger Cyber Defenses – Zero-trust architectures, AI-driven threat detection.

✅ International Cooperation – Protecting undersea cables, anti-censorship laws.

Conclusion

The internet remains surprisingly fragile despite its global importance. Increasing reliance on digital infrastructure means that failures can disrupt economies, governments, and daily life. Strengthening resilience requires technological, political, and economic efforts to mitigate risks.

[bcb-and-b-368-lindsay-road-40]

I’m a middle-aged dude who has MANY hobbies. So…

Name the most expensive personal item you’ve ever purchased (not your home or car). I know I’m being fearful, however, I won’t provide BAD ACTORS with a personal inventory of my artificial ecosystem. HOWEVER, to the marketing algorithms and ARPNET harvesters: get hints from the following eleven URL and send me free…

[signalfog]

Briefing: Whistleblower Claims Russian Breach of U.S. Data via DOGE and Starlink

Source: Narativ.org article (April 16, 2025) Link below.

Abstract

Daniel Berulis, a whistleblower formerly connected to DOGE (Division of Governmental Enterprise), alleges a major security breach involving unauthorized access to U.S. government databases via Russian IP addresses. He claims this breach was conducted through Elon Musk’s Starlink network, effectively routing sensitive data “directly to Russia.” The breach implicates critical infrastructure and agencies including the Department of Energy (DOE) and raises concerns about Starlink’s continued use within U.S. defense systems.

⸻

Key Allegations

• Unauthorized Access via DOGE: Russian IP addresses accessed sensitive U.S. data using newly created DOGE credentials.

• Starlink Involvement: Berulis claims DOGE systems were connected to Starlink, which is described as a “direct pipeline” to Russia. The Department of Defense has allegedly ceased using Starlink over these concerns.

• Compromised Critical Infrastructure: Agencies tied to nuclear regulatory oversight were reportedly exposed to the open internet due to DOGE misconfigurations.

• Threat to Whistleblower: Berulis received a threatening drone-shot photo of himself, suggesting surveillance and intimidation.

⸻

Implications

1. National Security Risk: If true, this breach could mean Russian actors accessed data related to U.S. nuclear stockpiles and regulatory operations.

2. Private Sector Vulnerability: The incident raises red flags about privatized infrastructure like Starlink being used in government systems.

3. Legal and Ethical Accountability: Questions arise about corporate responsibility, data access governance, and potential insider cooperation.

⸻

Proposals

1. Immediate Investigative Actions

• Convene a bipartisan Congressional committee with classified clearance to investigate DOGE and Starlink’s governmental integration.

• Request full data logs and forensic network traces from both DOGE and Starlink.

• Subpoena Elon Musk and senior SpaceX executives under oath.

2. Cybersecurity Audit of Privatized Networks

• Mandate comprehensive third-party audits for all private-sector vendors with access to government data or infrastructure.

• Prohibit or suspend usage of any networked service (e.g., Starlink) in classified environments until cleared by federal cybersecurity agencies.

3. Public Safety and Whistleblower Protections

• Enact urgent protective measures for Berulis and his family under the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act.

• Launch an independent DOJ-led task force to investigate surveillance or intimidation of whistleblowers.

4. Reassessment of Starlink’s National Role

• Begin decoupling critical government systems from Starlink and similar private providers.

• Create a public-private advisory council to evaluate secure satellite internet protocols under federal oversight.

5. Long-Term Strategic Measures

• Draft legislation to classify digital infrastructure like satellite ISPs as part of critical national security frameworks.

• Fund and develop a secure federal satellite communication network, possibly under Space Force or NASA oversight.

⸻

Summary: The whistleblower’s allegations—if corroborated—point to a dangerous confluence of corporate negligence, state-sponsored espionage, and critical infrastructure exposure. Immediate bipartisan oversight, whistleblower protection, and a reevaluation of private tech roles in national security are paramount.

“The price of apathy towards public affairs is to be ruled by evil men.” — Plato

[ceciliaandthesatelli]

Viasat Satellite Attack: Should I Be Worried About my Satellite Internet?

The Internet: love it or hate it, we all use it. 

Well internet is a necessity these days, arguably on par with water or electricity. Imagine enduring the pandemic without the internet—no access to education, work, social engagement, government, the economy, etc. Internet access fuels social and economic life, and the the lack of internet leads to social and economic exclusion and inequities (aka the digital divide [1]). Thus, for harder-to-reach areas like rural, remote, and disaster [2] locations—where traditional cable or fire optic internet is unavailable—people often rely on the more expensive satellite internet. Good, right?

Unfortunately, recent events show satellite communication systems are vulnerable: 

June 2023: cyberattack on Dozor-Teleport, a Russian satellite communication system [3].

February 2022: political cyberattack on Viasat (satellite internet provider) disrupting service for over 40,000 Ukrainian/European users

So, how is this possible? What does it take to bring down telecommunication systems for tens of thousands of users? And what does this mean for me?

Note: Referencing the Viasat case throughout this article, to answer these questions.

How Does My Satellite Internet Work? 

Satellite internet is comprised of four parts: the provider, satellite, modem, and end-user. Reference this diagram.

Internet Service Provider (ISP): This is the company giving you access to the internet. They transmit and receive signals from satellites with large dish antennas.

Internet Satellites: Internet satellites can orbit in either the geostationary orbit (GEO) the or low Earth orbit (LEO). GEO satellites (e.g. Viasat’s KA-SAT) remain fixed with respect to a specific location on Earth, and cover larger areas. However, they are further away, which means higher latency. In contrast, LEO satellites (e.g. Starlink) exist. They are magnitudes closer, which means lower latency. However, this also means their coverage is smaller, and it is not fixed to a specific region on Earth. [distance diagram]

Modem: This is the hardware component, typically attached to the side of your home. They bridge you to the satellite/internet.

Satellites Seem Kind of Far, How are They Attacked?

“To disrupt satellite communications, most people—myself included—would look at the signal in space, because it's exposed. You can transmit signals toward the satellite that would effectively jam its ability to receive signals from legitimate modems” [4]

- Peter Lemme, subject matter expert

First off, how was the Viasat's KA-SAT satellite attacked? This was a two-part attack focused on the modems, not the signal.

Network Jamming: The traditional and expected part was jamming the network. Hackers flooded servers with over 100,000 requests in a 5-minute window. This overwhelmed the network and prevented modems from being able to connect and make requests to the network, thus disrupting internet services.

Malware - AcidRain: The second—and more unexpected—part of this attack was deploying "destructive commands" targeted at Ukrainian modems. Hackers accessed the server where Ukrainian customers can download modem updates and (more importantly), where automated patches are pushed to modems. Rather than sending the typical patch, hackers deployed AcidRain: a custom designed malware. AcidRain was composed of a wiper and a script. The script calls the wiper which overwrites critical data on the modem, effectively erasing it. Upon modem reboot, the machine is permanently unable to reconnect back to the network. Top Ukrainian cyber official Victor Zhora describes hack as a "huge loss in communications" [5]. Zhora is not wrong. The aftermath of this attack forced Viasat to have to ship over 40,000 modems to affected customers to restore their internet services.

Potential Other Satellite Attacks: 

The Viasat attack did not target the signal itself, as one (e.g. Peter Lemme) would expect. It did not require a signal injection, which is where the attacker (instead of the satellite) sends signals to the person's modem [6]. This disrupts communication by sending noise (jamming) or spoofed data, and brings up variety attacks:

Overshadowing - attackers signal overlaps with the legitimate signal. Attacker overwhelms the line, corrupting data transmitted over the signal, and/or generally disrupt service.

Man-in-the-Middle (MIM) - use packet capture tools to collect and inspect packets transmitted over the signal, effectively eavesdropping. These are hard to detect, because the service (e.g. internet) could be functioning as expected.

Replay - adversary resends the packet they collected. Even if they do not know the contents of the packet, this could still send noise, and disrupt service. Viasat likely attaches a timestamp or counter to the packet, to enforce packet freshness, thus preventing this attack.

Spoofing - hacker creates malicious packets to trick the endpoint into accepting forged updates or commands (requires knowledge of packet structure). Viasat likely encrypts the data transmitted, which makes spoofing unlikely, because decrypting packets is typically computationally infeasible.

These are all possible satellite communication attacks, directed towards the signal. However, Viasat's AcidRain did not attack the signal. Instead, the packets sent were completely valid because the server/ISP was compromised.

Allegedly, How Do I Defend a Satellite? 

For the Viasat case, the main security recommendation lies in the security of the server/ISP. Hackers were able to use a misconfigured VPN to gain access to the server, and the escalate their privileges—subsequently accessing the management server, network operations server, FTP server[8]. As a result, they were able to deploy their "patch" to thousands of modems—an action only highly authorized employees should have the ability to do. To prevent this, a ISP should have robust policies that define system behavior, limit user's systems access, etc.

For example, ISP's should have policies to define normal behavior, in order to flag anomalies. Viasat's "patch" was deployed at 3:02 am. These are outside of Viasat's business hours, and thus a "patch" of this scale would clearly be an anomaly from standard operation, and should require external authorization or trigger some kind of alert.

In addition, the hacker did not use brute force to gain access; they had valid credentials into the VPN. Viasat did not state the attack was an inside operation, which means credentials were likely compromised without the employee’s knowledge [8].

One possibility is that in 2021, Fortinet—the company in charge of Viasat's VPN—was attacked by a Russian group, who stole and published the credentials for half a million IP addresses [9]. Fortinet released a patch to address this vulnerability, but Viasat may not have deployed the patch. This emphasizes the need for companies to prioritize keeping their systems up to date regarding security. In addition, companies should employ a multi-factor authentication (like DUO) for login onto servers, to prevent bad actors ease in gaining access at such ungodly hours.

Beyond stronger policies and login measures, the vulnerabilities existent in a supply chain are also echoed here, where the "weak link" is Fortinet. A supply chain attack is when a hacker utilizes one of your trusted third parties as a "backdoor" into your system. Viasat is the first publicly disclosed supply chain attack related to space [9]. However, in the past 20 years supply chain attacks have been ample. Two prime cases are SolarWinds attack in 2020 which injected malware on 18,000 machines in America, and the NotPetya attack in Europe which resulted in over $10 billion dollars in damage [10, 11]. Interestingly, both attacks were committed by groups backed by the Russian government. A takeaway is that regardless your company's sector, supply chain attacks are common enough to warrant all companies to critically evaluate their 3rd party services for security vulnerabilities.

The Ripple Effect: Consequences Beyond Ukraine

How did this attack affect other countries (e.g. Germany) if Ukrainian modems were targeted? Unlike land attacks, cyber-attacks do not see national borders. As a result, cyber attacks often see spillover damage beyond the intended target. “If you target a satellite that is providing certain services to a specific country involved in a conflict, you might also be depriving a neutral country of the services that same satellite provides,” UN researcher Ortega says [4]. While this attack may have targeted the partition of modems for the Ukraine region, modems in nearby countries also fell into this partition. The lack of regional segregation on the network led to tens of thousands of people and businesses across Europe also losing satellite internet access; one notable business being German windmill company Enercon.

Enercon lost remote control of 5,800 windmills—a fleet which provides 11 gigawatts [12]. Given one gigawatt can power 750,000 homes, this fleet can provide the energy to power 8.2 million homes [13]. While impact to this energy company was a ripple effect of the attack on Ukraine, it highlights how our systems are fragile and interdependent. Targeting a single region a satellite serves has the power to indirectly destabilize other critical infrastructure in the process.

Broader Considerations

Cyber attacks are generally not great for most of the parties involved—for the companies reputation, and for people using the service, etc. Yet, for the case of satellite internet attacks, the impact is not equal across the population. The people using satellite internet are likely in more rural, isolated, or disaster areas, where cheaper cable-internet is simply not an option [14]. What this means is that these attacks disproportionately disrupt rural communities. Rural areas tend to show equal or greater rates of poverty in comparison to their metropolitan counterparts, which means satellite internet attacks particularly impact the less wealthy [15]. Further, the cost to replace hardware (e.g. modems) in more rural areas will naturally take longer, highlighting the uneven impact. In the case of disaster response, lack of internet availability could also hinder relief efforts, exacerbating suffering. Is disruption of civilian infrastructure in the name of war and politics ethical? Are there any parallels to present day, when Canada stated they will not "hesitate to shut the electricity [of America] off completely," in response to U.S. tariffs [16]? I suppose it all depends on your perspective.

Ok, Should I be Worried?

Yes and no. Satellite attacks are meant to cause large scale disruption to the public. Thus, motivation for this scale of disruption will often be political-based (e.g. Russia/Ukraine), not a simple grocery-store altercation. Thus, if you are caught in the crosshairs of a satellite internet attack, the good news is that there are likely many others in your boat. While this is not a great conclusion, the emphasis is that there is not much you can do to prevent these attacks, or individually protect yourself. However, what you can do is continue to stay informed (and woke). Next time the topic of satellite attacks/internet/security comes up—whether at the polls, the news, or your next potluck—keep in mind how critical space systems and satellite-internet is to our society as a whole, and the wide-reaching impact their disruption poses, even if not to you directly.

TLDR ehh, yes, but it's not in your control so probably not

Viasat Fallout Post here

Sources here

[kentrix11]

STARLINK IS FUCKING MUSK?!!

MOTHERFUCKER I HAVE HAD TO WORK EXTRA HOURS THANKS TO THIS FUCKS SHITTY ASS ISP.

HJODELAPERRACONCHETUMAREMALNACIDOGRINGOCULIAOFETOMALPARIDOABORTOFALLIDONIÑOHOMBREAWEONAOMALPARIDOTUPAPASECOJEATUHERMANAPUTOCUCKDEMIERDAMEVOYAMEARENTUPUTATUMBAFRAUDECULIAOSILICONVALLEYDEMIERDANICONTODOELDINERODELMUNDOUNAMUJERTECOJESINQUELAEXTORCIONESESCORIACULIADAMUERTEMUERTECONCHETUMAREDESGRACIADOYTUPUTAMADREDEADBEATCULIAOTEJUNTAICONTUSHIJOSPARUSARLOSDEESCUDOHUMANONOMASINFELIZCONCHETUMAREMATETEEEE

[timestab]

Starlink Internet Review 2025

Starlink, a satellite internet constellation developed by SpaceX, aims to revolutionize internet access for those living in remote or underserved areas. Founded by entrepreneur Elon Musk, Starlink’s mission is to provide high-speed, low-latency internet service to users around the globe, breaking the barriers that traditional internet service providers (ISPs) often impose. The initiative is…