#BRICS International Trade

[haqiqaglobalbusiness]

Ethiopia Participating in BRICS Population Matters Meeting

This is a meeting of officials and experts from the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) to discuss and cooperate on population-related issues of mutual concern. Ethiopia is participating in this meeting as an observer, along with other new members of BRICS.The meeting is taking place in Durban, South Africa, from September 12 to 15, 2023. The purpose of the meeting is…

[mapsontheweb]

This month Brics will decide about expanding the group accepting new members or not. It will also talk about a new international currency for trade as an alternative for US dollar. If they expand it and create the currency, this could change international relations in our century.

[zvaigzdelasas]

“Possibly, in this meeting, we can already consensually decide which new countries can join BRICS,” Lula told international journalists in the capital, Brasilia. “I am of the opinion that as many countries want to enter, if they are in compliance with the rules we are establishing, we will accept the countries’ entrance.”

Lula’s comments came hours after Reuters reported that Brazil has resisted expanding the group’s membership. It quoted unidentified Brazilian diplomats as voicing concern that adding more nations could lessen the influence of the existing members.[...]

He has rejected the U.S. and EU’s shared position of supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s invasion, refusing to provide arms to Ukranian forces and pushing for peace talks to bring the war to an end. He has called for an end to the dominance of the U.S. dollar in international trade and supported a common currency for commerce within the South American bloc Mercosur and for trade among BRICS nations. He has also taken swipes at the International Monetary Fund. Lula repeated those positions Wednesday. “Why does Brazil need the dollar to trade with China or Agentina? We can trade in our currency,” he said.

He went on to hail the prospects of the Chinese-backed New Development Bank, commonly known as the BRICS bank, which is funding infrastructure projects in Brazil and elsewhere in the developing world.

“The BRICS bank must be effective and more generous than the IMF. Which is to say, the bank exists to help save countries and not to help sink countries, which is what the IMF does many times,” he said.

Lula also criticized the U.N. Security Council, saying its members have been responsible for starting wars despite the body’s stated mission of maintaining peace and security. Brazil has been seeking a permanent seat on the council for decades.

2 Aug 23

[sataniccapitalist]

World trade is fragmenting into opposing blocks, warns the IMF.

The BRICS and their allies are distancing themselves from the West.

BRICS are attempting to de-dollarize and replace SWIFT to circumvent the threat of sanctions.

[allthebrazilianpolitics]

Brazil’s Lula calls for end to dollar trade dominance

Leftist president lends his voice to Beijing’s efforts to boost renminbi’s role in global commerce

Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has called on developing countries to work towards replacing the US dollar with their own currencies in international trade, lending his voice to Beijing’s efforts to end the greenback’s dominance of global commerce.

Kicking off his first state visit to China since taking office in January, Lula called for the countries of the so-called Brics group of nations — which in addition to Brazil and China includes Russia, India and South Africa — to come up with their own alternative currency for use in trade.

“Every night I ask myself why all countries have to base their trade on the dollar,” Lula said in an impassioned speech at the New Development Bank in Shanghai, known as the “Brics bank”.

“Why can’t we do trade based on our own currencies?” he added, drawing loud applause from the audience of Brazilian and Chinese dignitaries. “Who was it that decided that the dollar was the currency after the disappearance of the gold standard?”

Continue reading.

[mariacallous]

Meduza: Dmitry Trenin is feeling good about Russia’s future

In an essay published in the Russian state propaganda outlet RT this week, pro-war analyst and former Carnegie Moscow Center head Dmitry Trenin makes the case that the changes Russia has made to its foreign policy in response to the West’s efforts to isolate it over the last two years have turned it into a “revolutionary power” for the first time in over a century.

Trenin’s argument hinges on the Russian party line that Vladimir Putin’s “military operation” in Ukraine began as a limited measure to ensure Russia’s national security, and that the West’s “drastic” response led to unwarranted escalation. The “demonization” of Russia by Ukraine’s Western partners, he contends, left Moscow with no choice but to rethink its entire approach to international relations. This shift culminated in Putin’s foreign policy concept published in March 2023, which defined Russia as a “distinct civilization” and lowered Western Europe and the U.S. to “just above the Antarctic” on the Kremlin’s list of priorities for diplomacy.

Trenin casts Russia’s efforts to offset Western sanctions by ramping up trade with Asian countries as evidence that the country is coming into its own and realizing its true identity, having finally wised up and ended its “tiresome efforts to adapt to the US-led world order.” Contrasting Russia with China, which is still working to “improve its position in the existing world order,” he says Moscow is “seeking to prepare for a new alternative [global] arrangement.”

After listing various international organizations that Moscow has purportedly made good-faith attempts to work within over the years, only to be met with undue hostility from Western countries, Trenin suggests that Russia has, in fact, emerged from these years of rejection even stronger. He says the situation has led Russia to embrace non-Western-oriented institutions like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which may well serve as “elements of the future inclusive world order which Moscow [will promote].”

At the same time, Trenin argues that Russia’s foreign policy changes are “minor” compared to the “transformation” happening inside the country. The six-year “mandate” that Putin supposedly won in the March 2024 election, the analyst says, will allow him to carry out even bigger changes, as well as to pave the way for his successors to continue his legacy. Putin’s policies, the “Ukraine crisis,” and the West’s “anti-Russia” policies, Trenin asserts, have combined to allow Russia to “find itself again” and become more “self-sufficient and pioneering.”

[argumate]

This willingness to let capital flow freely and to absorb the savings and demand imbalances of the rest of the world is what underpins the dominant role of the U.S. dollar. No other country before the United States has played this role to nearly the same extent, which is why no other currency has dominated international trade and capital flows the way the dollar does today. What is more, no other country or group of countries—not China, Japan, the BRICS, or the European Union—is willing to play this role or would be able to without dramatically overhauling its financial system, redistributing domestic income, eliminating capital controls, and undermining exports—all of which would likely be highly disruptive.

For all these reasons, no other currency can replace the U.S. dollar. When the dollar’s reign eventually ends, so will the current global trade and capital regime. Once the United States (and the other Anglophone economies that play similar roles) stops absorbing up to 80 percent of the excess production and excess savings of surplus countries such as Brazil, China, Germany, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, these countries will no longer be able to run surpluses. And without surpluses, they will be forced to cut domestic production so that it no longer exceeds weak domestic demand. In other words, only the dollar’s widespread use has permitted the huge imbalances that have characterized the global economy of the past 50 years.

[workersolidarity]

🇪🇬🇦🇪 🚨

BRICS SIGNS DEVELOPMENT DEAL BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE UNITED ARAB EMERATES

A new development deal has been signed between the United Arab Emirates and Egypt in a partnership which will see Egypt inject $35 Billion for the UAE to develop the Egyptian town of Ras el-Hekma on the country's northern Mediterranean coast.

BRICS countries have been forging several new partnerships, with the latest deal expected to see Egypt shelling out $15 Billion in next week, and another $20 Billion over the next two months, to see the UAE develop the Egyptian town of Ras el-Hekma to International standards equivalent to what the UAE has used to develop several cities in its own territory.

BRICS supporters are hailing the new deal as a sea-change, expected to usher in a new era of bilateral trade and development projects using local currencies, which they say could see the US Dollar's trade dominance and status as the world's reserve currency to diminish in the coming years.

The new development project will see the UAE develop Egypt's coastal town of Ras el-Hekma to the same standards the UAE has used on its own cities, which is expected to change the way the town looks and operates under over the coming years.

#source

@WorkerSolidarityNews

[xtruss]

Analysis: The China-Russia Axis Takes Shape

The bond has been decades in the making, but Russia’s war in Ukraine has tightened their embrace.

— September 11, 2023 | By Bonny Lin | Foreign Policy

Alex Nabaum Illustration For Foreign Policy

In July, nearly a dozen Chinese and Russian warships conducted 20 combat exercises in the Sea of Japan before beginning a 2,300-nautical-mile joint patrol, including into the waters near Alaska. These two operations, according to the Chinese defense ministry, “reflect the level of the strategic mutual trust” between the two countries and their militaries.

The increasingly close relationship between China and Russia has been decades in the making, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has tightened their embrace. Both countries made a clear strategic choice to prioritize relations with each other, given what they perceive as a common threat from the U.S.-led West. The deepening of bilateral ties is accompanied by a joint push for global realignment as the two countries use non-Western multilateral institutions—such as the BRICS forum and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)—to expand their influence in the developing world. Although neither Beijing nor Moscow currently has plans to establish a formal military alliance, major shocks, such as a Sino-U.S. conflict over Taiwan, could yet bring it about.

The cover of Foreign Policy's fall 2023 print magazine shows a jack made up of joined hands lifting up the world. Cover text reads: The Alliances That Matter Now: Multilateralism is at a dead end, but powerful blocs are getting things done."

China and Russia’s push for better relations began after the end of the Cold War. Moscow became frustrated with its loss of influence and status, and Beijing saw itself as the victim of Western sanctions after its forceful crackdown of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. In the 1990s and 2000s, the two countries upgraded relations, settled their disputed borders, and deepened their arms sales. Russia became the dominant supplier of advanced weapons to China.

When Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, China was already Russia’s largest trading partner, and the two countries regularly engaged in military exercises. They advocated for each other in international forums; in parallel, they founded the SCO and BRICS grouping to deepen cooperation with neighbors and major developing countries.

When the two countries upgraded their relations again in 2019, the strategic drivers for much closer relations were already present. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 damaged its relations with the West and led to a first set of economic sanctions. Similarly, Washington identified Beijing as its most important long-term challenge, redirected military resources to the Pacific, and launched a trade war against Chinese companies. Moscow and Beijing were deeply suspicious of what they saw as Western support for the color revolutions in various countries and worried that they might be targets as well. Just as China refused to condemn Russian military actions in Chechnya, Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine, Russia fully backed Chinese positions on Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang. The Kremlin also demonstrated tacit support for Chinese territorial claims against its neighbors in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

Since launching its war in Ukraine, Russia has become China’s fastest-growing trading partner. Visiting Moscow in March, Xi declared that deepening ties to Russia was a “strategic choice” that China had made. Even the mutiny in June by Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin that took his mercenary army almost to the gates of Moscow did not change China’s overall position toward Russia, though Beijing has embraced tactical adjustments to “de-risk” its dependency on Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Building on their strong relationship, Xi and Putin released a joint statement in February 2022 announcing a “No Limits” strategic partnership between the two countries. The statement expressed a litany of grievances against the United States, while Chinese state media hailed a “new era” of international relations not defined by Washington. Coming only a few weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, enhanced relations were likely calculated by Moscow to strengthen its overall geopolitical position before the attack.

It’s not clear how much prior detailed knowledge Xi had about Putin’s plans to launch a full-scale war, but their relationship endured the test. If anything, the Western response to Russia’s war reinforced China’s worst fears, further pushing it to align with Russia. Beijing viewed Russian security concerns about NATO expansion as legitimate and expected the West to address them as it sought a way to prevent or stop the war. Instead, the United States, the European Union, and their partners armed Ukraine and tried to paralyze Russia with unprecedented sanctions. Naturally, this has amplified concerns in Beijing that Washington and its allies could be similarly unaccommodating toward Chinese designs on Taiwan.

Against the background of increased mutual threat perceptions, both sides are boosting ties with like-minded countries. On one side, this includes a reenergized, expanded NATO and its growing linkages to the Indo-Pacific, as well as an invigoration of Washington’s bilateral, trilateral, and minilateral arrangements in Asia. Developed Western democracies—with the G-7 in the lead—are also exploring how their experience deterring and sanctioning Russia could be leveraged against China in potential future contingencies.

On the other side, Xi envisions the China-Russia partnership as the foundation for shaping “the global landscape and the future of humanity.” Both countries recognize that while the leading democracies are relatively united, many countries in the global south remain reluctant to align with either the West or China and Russia. In Xi and Putin’s view, winning support in the global south is key to pushing back against what they consider U.S. hegemony.

Alex Nabaum Illustration For Foreign Policy

In the global multilateral institutions, China and Russia are coordinating with each other to block the United States from advancing agendas that do not align with their interests. The U.N. Security Council is often paralyzed by their veto powers, while other institutions have turned into battlegrounds for seeking influence. Beijing and Moscow view the G-20, where their joint weight is relatively greater, as a key forum for cooperation.

But the most promising venues are BRICS and the SCO, established to exclude the developed West and anchor joint Chinese-Russian efforts to reshape the international system. Both are set up for expansion—in terms of scope, membership, and other partnerships. They are the primary means for China and Russia to create a web of influence that increasingly ties strategically important countries to both powers.

The BRICS grouping—initially made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—is at the heart of Moscow and Beijing’s efforts to build a bloc of economically powerful countries to resist what they call Western “Unilateralism.” In late August, another six states, including Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, were invited to join the group. With their growing economic power, the BRICS countries are pushing for cooperation on a range of issues, including ways to reduce the dominance of the U.S. dollar and stabilize global supply chains against Western calls for “Decoupling” and “De-risking.” Dozens of other countries have expressed interest in joining BRICS.

The SCO, in contrast, is a Eurasian grouping of Russia, China, and their friends. With the exception of India, all are members of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The accession of Iran in July and Belarus’s membership application put the SCO on course to bring China’s and Russia’s closest and strongest military partners under one umbrella. If the SCO substantially deepens security cooperation, it could grow into a counterweight against U.S.-led Coalitions.

Both BRICS and the SCO, however, operate by consensus, and it will take time to transform both groups into cohesive, powerful geopolitical actors that can function like the G-7 or NATO. The presence of India in both groups will make it difficult for China and Russia to turn either into a staunchly anti-Western outfit. The diversity of members—which include democracies and autocracies with vastly different cultures—means that China and Russia will have to work hard to ensure significant influence over each organization and its individual members.

What’s next? Continued Sino-Russian convergence is the most likely course. But that is not set in stone—and progress can be accelerated, slowed, or reversed. Absent external shocks, Beijing and Moscow may not need to significantly upgrade their relationship from its current trajectory. Xi and Putin share similar views of a hostile West and recognize the strategic advantages of closer alignment. But they remain wary of each other, with neither wanting to be responsible for or subordinate to the other.

Major changes or shocks, however, could drive them closer at a faster pace. Should Russia suffer a devastating military setback in Ukraine that risks the collapse of Putin’s regime, China might reconsider the question of substantial military aid. If China, in turn, finds itself in a major Taiwan crisis or conflict against the United States, Beijing could lean more on Moscow. During a conflict over Taiwan, Russia could also engage in opportunistic aggression elsewhere that would tie China and Russia together in the eyes of the international community, even if Moscow’s actions were not coordinated with Beijing.

A change in the trajectory toward ever closer Chinese-Russian ties may also be possible, though it is far less likely. Some Chinese experts worry that Russia will always prioritize its own interests over any consideration of bilateral ties. If, for instance, former U.S. President Donald Trump wins another term, he could decrease U.S. support for Ukraine and offer Putin improved relations. This, in turn, could dim the Kremlin’s willingness to support China against the United States. It’s not clear if this worry is shared by top Chinese or Russian leaders, but mutual distrust and skepticism of the other remain in both countries.

— This article appears in the Fall 2023 issue of Foreign Policy. | Bonny Lin, the Director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

[theculturedmarxist]

The West’s attempt to recruit large swaths of the global community to enlist for the sanctions war has decidedly failed, notes ‘The American Conservative’. Outside of the U.S., E.U., and a few close allies (i.e., economic dependents and military protectorates) such as Canada and Japan, practically no other countries have joined in, preempting any economic dogpile sought by the self-proclaimed defenders of democracy. Increasingly, transatlantic policy seems to be having the exact opposite effect.

As of June 9, Pakistan is the latest country to begin accepting large shipments of discounted crude oil from Russia, as much as 100,000 barrels a day. “This is the first ever Russian oil cargo to Pakistan and the beginning of a new relationship between Pakistan and Russian Federation [sic],” announced Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.

In the present geopolitical landscape, such a move is perceived to be in direct defiance of Western efforts to obstruct Moscow’s revenues. The motive behind Islamabad’s shifted political and economic calculations is not difficult to decipher. Nor is it exceptional.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) reported that Moscow is now sending out 8.1 million barrels of oil a day, the highest number going back to April 2020. In January 2023, almost half of those shipments were destined for China and India, which have respectively increased as a proportion of Russia’s oil exports from 21 percent to 29 percent and 1 percent to 20 percent since January 2022.

Chinese oil imports alone jumped in May to the third highest level ever recorded. Beijing also recently issued a crude oil import quota of a whopping 62.28 million tons of allotments. This makes the total import quota amount issued by Chinese leadership 20 percent higher than that of the same time last year. At the same time, Beijing’s natural gas purchases continue to push upward, increasing 3.3 percent year-on-year in Quarter 1, with a 10.3 percent year-on-year increase in April of liquefied natural gas (LNG).

Just as important, if not more so, as the massive shifts in quantity and direction of the energy trade, however, are the size and scope of the joint initiatives—usually under the leadership of Moscow and Beijing — that continue to proliferate in opposition to Western-led international organizations.

The recent St. Petersburg International Economic Forum saw representatives of various economic groupings and cooperation organizations outside the Atlantic orbit meet to discuss greater interconnectivity, development collaboration, transportation corridors, as well as investment options for funding various cross border initiatives.

One of these groups is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which continues to focus on greater cooperation and integration with ASEAN nations. This year’s meeting included a notable presentation on the creation of a SCO investment bank to provide the capital necessary to facilitate such collaborative projects.

The BRICS organization featured prominently at the St. Petersburg forum as well. It also includes an important investment bank — the New Development Bank — that provides ready access to liquidity for its members, funds infrastructure projects, and facilitates increased industrial manufacturing. BRICS continues to grow in both clout and size.

A number of new countries applied for membership last year, including Iran and Argentina. 2023 has also seen membership bids from nineteen additional nations before an upcoming summit in Johannesburg this August. One of the most recent applications came from Egypt on June 14. Potential bids from important players in the energy market such as Venezuela (with direct support from Brazil’s President Lula) and the United Arab Emirates are also being discussed.

UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan traveled directly to the St. Petersburg forum in order to meet with Putin on June 16, where the two discussed their desire to build a closer relationship between the countries.

Gulf neighbor — and traditional U.S. ally — Saudi Arabia has to some degree also hedged its geopolitical bets. After refusing Biden’s phone calls in March of 2022 and denying his request to increase oil production to help lower international prices, Riyadh’s friendship with Washington has somewhat soured as of late. (Saudi Arabia also joined the SCO in March 2023, and is a potential candidate for BRICS membership.) In another move that will likely meet with the displeasure of its Western allies, Saudi Arabia additionally decided to move forward with further production cuts of 1 million barrels per day beginning in July.

Consider that, as discussed earlier, China alone has increased its trade with Russia by about 40 percent, and is set to reach a record $200 billion this year. Perhaps most importantly though, more than 70 percent of that trade has been settled in either yuan or the ruble, with the Russian central bank currently holding 40 percent of its reserves in yuan.

Pakistan has reportedly also paid for its new shipments of Moscow’s crude with Chinese yuan. Earlier in 2022, Saudi Arabia suggested the possibility of denominating its oil transactions with Beijing in the currency.

The present geopolitical system with all of its accompanying features is only made possible by the dollar reigning supreme as the world’s reserve currency. Champions of the present order faithfully hold that this system will be maintained indefinitely, guaranteed on the back of U.S. military might and Western economic dominance.

But the international environment is beginning to shift, as much due to the burgeoning economic alliances outside the confines of Western-backed international agencies as because of the policy decisions of those latter agencies and their U.S. patron. No recent move has acted as a greater accelerant to this shift than Washington’s decision to freeze and then seize the foreign currency reserves of the Russian Federation at the outset of the Ukraine war.

The weaponization of financial reserves has increased distrust in the present system to new heights. The end of dollar dominance may not be nigh, but it is a much more likely possibility than many in the West care to admit.

Russia has demonstrated that having an economy based on commodities and heavy industrial production matters more in today’s international environment than a narrow set of economic indicators such as annual GDP growth or per capita income. Should dollar dominance ever come to an end, this fact will be made painfully clear.

The United States and other Western countries have adopted an increasingly ideological perspective regarding the future course of economic development. Leaders choose to accept only information that aligns with their dogmatic beliefs.

A failure to remove its ideological blinders and comprehend political and economic conditions as they objectively exist will spell disaster for the Western bloc.

[haqiqaglobalbusiness]

BRICS: Achievements, Challenges, and Future Prospects

BRICS is a group of five major emerging economies that have come together to form a powerful economic bloc. Over the years, the group has made significant progress in promoting economic cooperation and development among its members.

The BRICS group is a coalition of five emerging economies that have been cooperating and coordinating on various issues of global importance. The group consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The acronym BRICS was coined in 2001 by Jim O’Neill, a former Goldman Sachs economist, who predicted that these countries would become the dominant economic forces in the 21st…

[newstfionline]

Wednesday, September 20, 2023

What to Expect When You’re Expecting the U.N. General Assembly (Foreign Policy) As world leaders descend on the United Nations headquarters in New York City, the international body is fighting to maintain its relevance in a world it wasn’t built for when it was established nearly 80 years ago. Global powers are increasingly circumventing the unwieldy U.N. system to conduct multilateral diplomacy, such as through the G-7, G-20, and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) blocs. Eight years ago, the U.N. outlined an ambitious batch of goals to tackle global poverty, gender equality, climate change, and other pressing global issues by 2030. But so far, the world is way off target in meeting those goals. The war in Ukraine has frontally challenged one of the U.N.’s most fundamental purposes, enshrined in its foundational charter, of averting major wars. The Western world’s laser focus on the conflict in Ukraine, meanwhile, has frustrated other countries in the global south as other dire humanitarian catastrophes—conflict in Sudan, coups across Africa, the migration crisis in Central America, and a lot of climate-related disasters—struggle for resources and high-level attention.

Canada’s surging food prices (Reuters) Canada’s plan to bring down food prices by tightening regulation could backfire and fail, raising the cost of doing business in the country without providing relief to consumers, lawyers and economists said. Canada’s weak competition law has been long blamed for allowing a few players to dominate industries ranging from banks to telecoms and groceries. Last week, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau promised to amend the Competition Act to help bring down prices. Trudeau’s move comes as many Canadians reel under an affordability crisis with food prices jumping 25% since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. At the same time, the central bank’s efforts to bring down inflation by raising interest rates to a 22-year-high have pushed up mortgage costs for homeowners and made buying a home unaffordable for others.

U.S. National Debt Tops $33 Trillion for First Time (NYT) America’s gross national debt exceeded $33 trillion for the first time on Monday, providing a stark reminder of the country’s shaky fiscal trajectory at a moment when Washington faces the prospect of a government shutdown this month amid another fight over federal spending. It came as Congress appeared to be faltering in its efforts to fund the government ahead of a Sept. 30 deadline. Unless Congress can pass a dozen appropriations bills or agree to a short-term extension of federal funding at existing levels, the United States will face its first government shutdown since 2019. The debt is on track to top $50 trillion by the end of the decade, as interest on the debt mounts and the cost of the nation’s social safety net programs keeps growing.

Brazil’s Lula pitches his nation—and himself—as fresh leader for Global South (AP) “Brazil is back.” That has been Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s refrain for the better part of the last year, with the president deploying the snappy slogan to cast Brazil—and himself—as a leader of the Global South no longer content to abide the world’s outdated workings. During Lula’s travels, he has pushed for global governance that gives greater heft to the Global South and advocating diminishing the dollar’s dominance in trade. He has made clear that Brazil has no intention of siding with the United States or China, the world’s two largest economies and Brazil’s two biggest trading partners. And he has refused to join Washington and Western Europe in backing Ukraine’s fight against Russia’s invasion, instead calling for a club of nations to mediate peace talks. After the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s arrest, Lula said he would review Brazil’s membership in the court.

Germany’s economy struggles (AP) For most of this century, Germany racked up one economic success after another, dominating global markets for high-end products like luxury cars and industrial machinery, selling so much to the rest of the world that half the economy ran on exports. Jobs were plentiful, the government’s financial coffers grew as other European countries drowned in debt, and books were written about what other countries could learn from Germany. No longer. Now, Germany is the world’s worst-performing major developed economy, with both the International Monetary Fund and European Union expecting it to shrink this year. It follows Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the loss of Moscow’s cheap natural gas—an unprecedented shock to Germany’s energy-intensive industries, long the manufacturing powerhouse of Europe. Germany risks “deindustrialization” as high energy costs and government inaction on other chronic problems threaten to send new factories and high-paying jobs elsewhere, said Christian Kullmann, CEO of major German chemical company Evonik Industries AG.

Evidence Suggests Ukrainian Missile Caused Market Tragedy (NYT) The Sept. 6 missile strike on Kostiantynivka in eastern Ukraine was one of the deadliest in the country in months, killing at least 15 civilians and injuring more than 30 others. The weapon’s payload of metal fragments struck a market, piercing windows and walls and wounding some victims beyond recognition. Less than two hours later, President Volodymyr Zelensky blamed Russian “terrorists” for the attack, and many media outlets followed suit. Throughout its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has repeatedly and systematically attacked civilians and struck schools, markets and residences as a deliberate tactic to instill fear in the populace. But evidence collected and analyzed by The New York Times, including missile fragments, satellite imagery, witness accounts and social media posts, strongly suggests the catastrophic strike was the result of an errant Ukrainian air defense missile fired by a Buk launch system. Air defense experts say missiles like the one that hit the market can go off course for a variety of reasons.

In Moscow, the War Is Background Noise, but Ever-Present (NYT) Metro trains are running smoothly in Moscow, as usual, but getting around the city center by car has become more complicated, and annoying, because anti-drone radar interferes with navigation apps. Almost 19 months after Russia invaded Ukraine, Muscovites are experiencing dual realities: The war has faded into background noise, causing few major disruptions, and yet it remains ever-present in their daily lives. There is little anxiety among residents over the drone strikes that have hit Moscow this summer. No alarm sirens to warn of a possible attack. The city continues to grow. Cranes dot the skyline, and there are high-rise buildings going up all over town. But for some, the effects of war are landing harder. Nina, 79, a pensioner who was shopping at an Auchan supermarket in northwestern Moscow, said that she had stopped buying red meat entirely, and that she could almost never afford to buy a whole fish. Nina said that sanctions and ubiquitous construction projects were some reasons for higher prices, but the main reason, she said, was “because a lot is spent on war.”

India, Canada expel diplomats over accusations Delhi killed Sikh separatist (Washington Post) India expelled a Canadian diplomat on Tuesday in a tit-for-tat move after Canadian officials accused Indian government operatives of gunning down a Sikh separatist leader, Hardeep Singh Nijjar, in British Columbia and threw out an Indian diplomat they identified as an intelligence officer. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s allegation of assassination, made during an explosive speech before Parliament on Monday, sent relations between the two nations tumbling toward their lowest point but also held broader ramifications for ties between the U.S.-led alliance and India, which the Biden administration has assiduously courted as a strategic counterweight to China. The Indian government issued a statement Tuesday rejecting Trudeau’s accusation as “absurd and motivated.” India’s Foreign Ministry went on to say that the allegations “seek to shift the focus from Khalistani terrorists and extremists, who have been provided shelter in Canada and continue to threaten India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The inaction of the Canadian Government on this matter has been a long-standing and continuing concern.” (BBC) India has been increasing the pressure on countries with significant Sikh communities, like Canada, Australia and the UK, saying they are failing to tackle what it calls "Sikh extremism." Mr. Nijjar is the third prominent Sikh figure to have died unexpectedly in recent months.

Libya’s flood turmoil (Worldcrunch) Hundreds of protesters rallied in Libya’s Derna on Monday, setting fire to the house of the man who was the city’s mayor at the time of the flood, to demand accountability one week after a flood that killed thousands of residents. Meanwhile, the UN has warned that a disease outbreak could create “a second devastating crisis” as people are falling ill from contaminated water.

Crisis and Bailout: The Tortuous Cycle Stalking Nations in Debt (NYT) Emmanuel Cherry, the chief executive of an association of Ghanaian construction companies, sat in a cafe at the edge of Accra Children’s Park, near the derelict Ferris wheel and kiddie train, as he tallied up how much money government entities owe thousands of contractors. Before interest, he said, the back payments add up to 15 billion cedis, roughly $1.3 billion. “Most of the contractors are home,” Mr. Cherry said. Their workers have been laid off. Like many others in this West African country, the contractors have to wait in line for their money. Teacher trainees complain they are owed two months of back pay. Independent power producers that have warned of major blackouts are owed $1.58 billion. The government is essentially bankrupt. After defaulting on billions of dollars owed to foreign lenders in December, the administration of President Nana Akufo-Addo had no choice but to agree to a $3 billion loan from the lender of last resort, the International Monetary Fund. It was the 17th time Ghana has been compelled to turn to the fund since it gained independence in 1957. The tortuous cycle of crisis and bailout has plagued dozens of poor and middle-income countries throughout Africa, Latin America and Asia for decades.

Many of today’s unhealthy foods were brought to you by Big Tobacco (Washington Post) For decades, tobacco companies hooked people on cigarettes by making their products more addictive. Now, a new study suggests that tobacco companies may have used a similar strategy to hook people on processed foods. In the 1980s, tobacco giants Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds acquired the major food companies Kraft, General Foods and Nabisco, allowing tobacco firms to dominate America’s food supply and reap billions in sales from popular brands such as Oreo cookies, Kraft Macaroni & Cheese and Lunchables. By the 2000s, the tobacco giants spun off their food companies and largely exited the food industry—but not before leaving a lasting legacy on the foods that we eat. The new research, published in the journal Addiction, focuses on the rise of “hyper-palatable” foods, which contain potent combinations of fat, sodium, sugar and other additives that can drive people to crave and overeat them. The Addiction study found that in the decades when the tobacco giants owned the world’s leading food companies, the foods that they sold were far more likely to be hyper-palatable than similar foods not owned by tobacco companies. In the past 30 years, hyper-palatable foods have spread rapidly into the food supply, coinciding with a surge in obesity and diet-related diseases. In America, the steepest increase in the prevalence of hyper-palatable foods occurred between 1988 and 2001—the era when Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds owned the world’s leading food companies.

Danish artist told to repay museum €67,000 after turning in blank canvasses (BBC) A Danish artist has been ordered to return nearly 500,000 kroner ($72,000; £58,000) to a museum after giving it two blank canvasses for a project he named Take the Money and Run. The Kunsten Museum in Aalborg had intended for Jens Haaning to embed the banknotes in two pieces of art in 2021. Instead, he gave it blank canvasses and then told Danish media: "The work is that I have taken their money." A court has now ordered him to return the cash, minus 8% for expenses.

[kneedeepincynade]

Putin, not our favourite politician, not even our favourite Russian but still a valuable ally and while his speech are not the best he is still a friend of the multipolar world

The post is machine translated

Translation is at the bottom

The collective is on telegram

⚠️ VLADIMIR PUTIN A WANG YI: "LA COOPERAZIONE CON LA CINA È MOLTO IMPORTANTE PER LA RUSSIA" ⚠️

🇨🇳 Oggi, 22 febbraio, Wang Yi - Direttore dell'Ufficio Generale della Commissione Centrale per gli Affari Esteri del Partito Comunista Cinese - ha incontrato a Mosca, oltre a Patrušev e Lavrov, anche Vladimir Putin, Presidente della Federazione Russa 🇷🇺

🇷🇺 Il Presidente Russo ha affermato che le Relazioni Internazionali, ad oggi, sono complicate, e che le tensioni globali si sono acuite dopo il crollo del Sistema Bipolare. Pertanto, a questo proposito, la Cooperazione con la Cina è molto importante per la Russia 💕

🥰 Vladimir Putin ha colto l'occasione dell'incontro con Wang Yi per "trasmettere i migliori auguri al nostro amico, al mio amico, il Presidente della Repubblica Popolare Cinese, il Compagno Xi Jinping" ⭐️

😘 Le relazioni con la Repubblica Popolare Cinese sono un fattore molto importante per la stabilizzazione della situazione internazionale, ha affermato il Presidente Russo 🇷🇺

🇷🇺 Vladimir Putin ha dichiarato che la Cooperazione con la Cina copre ogni sfera e settore, non solo in ambito nazionale, ma anche in ambito internazionale, vedasi le Nazioni Unite, i BRICS e l'Organizzazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai ⭐️

📊 L'obiettivo congiunto tra Russia e Cina di raggiungere un fatturato commerciale pari a 200 miliardi di dollari entro il 2024 potrebbe diventare già realtà a breve, ha affermato il Presidente Russo:

💬 "Abbiamo fissato l'obiettivo di raggiungere un fatturato di 200 miliardi di dollari nel 2024, l'anno scorso valeva già 185 miliardi di dollari, e ci sono tutti i presupposti per credere che raggiungeremo i nostri obiettivi anche prima del previsto" 📈

🥰 Infine, Putin ha affermato che aspetta il Presidente Xi Jinping in Russia, una visita di cui si parla da tempo, che dovrebbe avvenire in primavera, forse già a marzo. Il Presidente Russo ha dichiarato che un incontro personale con il Compagno Xi Jinping darà un ulteriore impulso allo sviluppo delle Relazioni tra Cina e Russia 🥰

🔍 Per chi volesse approfondire il Tema della Cooperazione Sino-Russa, può rifarsi a:

🔺Master-Post del Collettivo Shaoshan sui Rapporti tra Cina e Russia ❤️

🌸 Iscriviti 👉 @collettivoshaoshan

⚠️ VLADIMIR PUTIN TO WANG YI: "COOPERATION WITH CHINA IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR RUSSIA" ⚠️

🇨🇳 Today, February 22, Wang Yi - Director of the General Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Communist Party of China - met in Moscow, in addition to Patrushev and Lavrov, also Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation 🇷🇺

🇷🇺 The Russian President said that International Relations are complicated to date, and that global tensions have escalated after the collapse of the Bipolar System. Therefore, Cooperation with China is very important for Russia in this regard 💕

🥰 Vladimir Putin took the opportunity of meeting Wang Yi to "send best wishes to our friend, my friend, the President of the People's Republic of China, Comrade Xi Jinping" ⭐️

😘 Relations with the People's Republic of China are a very important factor in stabilizing the international situation, said the Russian President 🇷🇺

🇷🇺 Vladimir Putin stated that Cooperation with China covers every sphere and sector, not only nationally, but also internationally, see the United Nations, the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization ⭐️

📊 The joint goal between Russia and China to reach a trade turnover of 200 billion dollars by 2024 could already become a reality soon, said the Russian President:

💬 "We have set a goal of reaching $200 billion in revenue in 2024, last year it was already worth $185 billion, and there is every reason to believe that we will reach our goals even sooner than expected" 📈

🥰 Finally, Putin said that he is waiting for President Xi Jinping to come to Russia, a visit that has been talked about for some time, which should take place in the spring, perhaps as early as March. Russian President said a personal meeting with Comrade Xi Jinping will give further impetus to the development of relations between China and Russia 🥰

🔍 For those wishing to learn more about the Sino-Russian Cooperation theme, they can refer to:

🔺Master-Post of the Shaoshan Collective on Relations between China and Russia ❤️

🌸 Subscribe 👉 @collettivoshaoshan

[allthebrazilianpolitics]

Biden Should Let Lula Enjoy His Chinese Bromance

The US has good reason not to overreact to the effort by Brazil, a potentially valuable partner in the hemisphere, to cozy up to China. And Brazil has good reason not to overplay its hand.

As Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva left Washington in February, closing only his second trip abroad since assuming the Brazilian presidency the month before, his countryfolk couldn’t hide their disappointment with the lackluster US support for their president’s most critical priority: $50 million to help stop deforestation in the Amazon. The amount was so small, noted the Brazilian press, that “it was not cited in the joint statement” of Lula’s visit to the White House.

Apparently all it took was some chummery with President Xi Jinping in Beijing, with a side of Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Brasilia, to focus Washington’s mind on the Brazilian’s wishlist. Following a trip to China in which Lula said Washington and Kiev shared responsibility for the war in Ukraine, complained about the dollar’s dominance and gushed over the prospect of doing more business with Beijing, the Biden administration responded on Thursday with an offer of $500 million for the Amazon Fund, set up by Lula in 2008 during his second term in office to draw international support for his environmental agenda.

Only Norway, which has oodles of petrodollars to finance environmental efforts around the world, has given more. Brazil “is grateful for the trust and the American contribution to the fund,” the Brazilian Presidency said in a statement to Bloomberg News. It has much to be thankful for. It didn’t just land a promise of cash. It figured out a killer strategy to build support for Brazil’s development: Just exploit Washington’s boundless fear of Beijing.

Irked as it might be by Lula’s diss of the dollar or the red carpet rolled out for Lavrov in the Brazilian capital, the Biden administration is right to play nice and accommodate Lula’s strategy. Brazil is a potentially vital partner that could help address the many crises popping up across the hemisphere, from Venezuela and Haiti to the river of migrants fleeing various other national dumpster fires throughout the region.

Moreover, the competition with China is for real. Over two decades in which the US set off to war in the Middle East, pivoted to Asia and re-pivoted to help fight another war in Europe, China became South America’s biggest trading partner and prominent financier. If the US is to maintain its influence, it must invest more resources and attention in its neighborhood. Brazil is not a bad place to start.

But just as it would be a mistake for the Biden administration to let Lula’s musings about reconfiguring world power around the BRICS hang like a cloud over the relationship, Lula should also take care not to overplay his hand. China’s embrace could easily get too tight for comfort.

Continue reading.

[mariacallous]

The global south seemed to be top of mind for policymakers and diplomats this year, from the halls of the United Nations to leaders’ podiums. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has called his country the “voice of the global south,” hosting a virtual summit by that name to start the year that elevated the perspectives of dozens of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In Vietnam in September, U.S. President Joe Biden exchanged the Cold War-era phrase “Third World” for “global south” as he spoke.

For some commentators, the new politics of the global south recalls the heyday of the Non-Aligned Movement, first convened in Indonesia in 1955. The comparison may seem particularly apt when it comes to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Since February 2022, many countries in the global south have avoided criticizing Moscow, including by abstaining from or voting against U.N. resolutions to condemn aggression against Kyiv—and continuing to import Russian oil and gas despite Western sanctions.

In September, more than 18 months after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky returned to the U.N. General Assembly, in large part seeking to bolster wider international support for his cause. At the time, FP’s Howard W. French wrote that many developing countries simply had other priorities: “Increasingly, the poor are saying to the rich that your priorities won’t mean more to us until ours mean much more to you.”

Two major meetings underscored the shifting role of the global south in world politics this year: the BRICS summit held in August in Johannesburg, South Africa, and the G-20 leaders’ summit hosted by New Delhi in September. In Johannesburg, the bloc—comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—announced it would add six new members, giving it a bigger share of the world’s GDP than the G-7 in terms of purchasing power parity. Whether the BRICS expansion will lead to more power or less cohesion remains to be seen, but the bloc has at least succeeded in making de-dollarization a talking point.

Meanwhile, Modi used the G-20 summit—and India’s leadership of the group this year—to expand the agenda to include issues of significance to the global south, such as trade, climate change, and migration. He touted the event and the resulting consensus declaration as a success for New Delhi, scoring increased World Bank funding aimed countries in the global south. But tensions and differences within the group were apparent, especially on Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The war in Gaza that began in October marked another shift, as countries in the global south pointed to Western support for Israel’s collective punishment of the Gaza Strip after the Hamas attacks on Oct. 7 as hypocritical—particularly considering the West’s insistence on a so-called rules-based global order. In November, Julien Barnes-Dacey and Jeremy Shapiro of the European Council on Foreign Relations argued that the United States and its allies are bound to lose such a “battle of narratives.”

With the global south now commanding the world’s attention, the fluidity and the imprecision of the term—once relegated to academia—have also become more clear. Even as analysts question the very concept, what is certain is that the global south will remain a central figure in diplomacy and summitry in 2024.

Below are some of Foreign Policy’s top pieces on global south politics and debates this year.

1. The World Isn’t Slipping Away From the West

By Comfort Ero, March 8

More than a year after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Comfort Ero, the president and CEO of the International Crisis Group, reflected on an increasingly common question: Why have so many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America sat this one out, offering limited support to Kyiv?

It’s tempting to say that the West is losing the global south. But that is too simplistic, Ero argues, writing that Western countries should look to recent history to better understand what motivates countries with different perspectives: “It’s no wonder that many officials from countries in the global south feel that the West is demanding their loyalty over Ukraine—after not showing them much solidarity in their own hours of need.”

“[N]early all the officials I’ve spoken with seek to define their national policies on their own terms—reflecting their own sovereign interests—rather than framing them as part of a West-Russia contest,” Ero writes.

2. 6 Swing States Will Decide the Future of Geopolitics

By Cliff Kupchan, June 6

In May, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky courted the support of Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia—so-called middle powers that, along with other leaders of the global south, including South Africa and Turkey, “have more power today than ever before,” Eurasia Group Chairman Cliff Kupchan writes.

These six “swing states” have already shaped optics around Russia’s war in Ukraine, namely by refusing to fall in line with Western plans for military aid to Kyiv and sanctions against Moscow. The United States needs to “up its game” with regard to these six powers and the global south more broadly, Kupchan writes. “We now have more drivers on every geopolitical issue. That makes predictions of geopolitical outcomes, already a fraught endeavor, even harder.”

3. Can the G-20 Be a Champion for the Global South?

By Darren Walker, Sept. 8

The Group of 20 includes many countries from the global south, but its wealthiest members long wielded the most influence at the table. As India hosted the annual G-20 leaders’ summit in September, Ford Foundation President Darren Walker argued that the group was now “poised to usher in an unprecedented era of not only influence, but also economic justice, for the global south.”

Walker writes that India used its year-long G-20 presidency to highlight issues that disproportionately affect countries in the global south, particularly sovereign debt, and to amplify voices from this global majority. Significant divisions remain among the G-20, but India’s leadership is part of the “establishment of a new standard” led by developing countries, he argues.

“With their upcoming G-20 presidencies, Brazil and South Africa have the chance to build on the momentum created by their predecessors,” Walker writes.

4. Why the Global South Is Accusing America of Hypocrisy

By Oliver Stuenkel, Nov. 2

The war in Gaza exposed a new challenge to the West from the countries of the global south: accusations of hypocrisy. “Many in the developing world have long seen a double standard in the West condemning an illegal occupation in Ukraine while also standing staunchly behind Israel, which has occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip since 1967,” Oliver Stuenkel, an international relations professor in São Paulo, writes.

Stuenkel argues that this perceived inconsistency could damage Western claims of a so-called rules-based global order, especially as civilian casualties rise and calls for a cease-fire grow. “The longer the Israel-Hamas war goes on, the greater the risk to Western credibility in the global south becomes,” he writes.

5. Is There Such a Thing as a Global South?

By C. Raja Mohan, Dec. 9

As the term “global south” has gone mainstream, so to speak, FP’s C. Raja Mohan writes that it has become a “convenient shorthand” in debates over issues as diverse as climate policy and Russia’s war in Ukraine—putting the global majority in a “single category with supposedly similar interests.” But Mohan raises a pointed question: Is there even such a thing as a global south?

Mohan points out several analytical flaws with the concept, which he calls “old wine in a new bottle.” He explains that countries of the global south have divergent economic interests and development paths, and that the group itself has much too fluid boundaries. Given these issues, is “global southism” worthwhile as an explanatory framework? Mohan doesn’t think so, but he acknowledges that it may be here to stay.

“Despite my and others’ calls to retire the category global south, it is unlikely to disappear from the international relations vocabulary anytime soon,” Mohan writes. “For many in the West, it is a way of othering the rest; for the chattering classes in the rest, it is a way of channeling deep reservoirs of resentment against continuing Western dominance.”

[posttexasstressdisorder]

The US has accused South Africa of supplying arms to Russia in a covert naval operation, escalating a foreign policy crisis for President Cyril Ramaphosa over the country’s ties to the Kremlin and position on the Ukraine war.

 Reuben Brigety, US ambassador to South Africa, told local media on Thursday that the US believed weapons and ammunition were loaded on to the Lady R, a Russian vessel under sanctions that docked at Simon’s Town naval dockyard near Cape Town in December.

“Among the things we noted was the docking of the cargo ship . . . which we are confident uploaded weapons and ammunition on to that vessel in Simon’s Town as it made its way back to Russia,” he said, in comments reported by South Africa’s News24. Brigety also said that senior US officials had “profound concerns” about the incident, which “does not suggest to us the actions of a non-aligned country”.

The state department said the US had raised the issue directly with South African officials. Spokesman Vedant Patel said: “The US has serious concerns about the docking of a sanctioned Russian cargo vessel at a South African naval port in December of last year.”

“We have been quite clear and have not parsed words about any country taking steps to support Russia’s illegal and brutal war in Ukraine,” he added, “and we will continue to engage with partners and countries on this topic.”

Ramaphosa’s office responded by saying an independent inquiry would be set up under a retired judge to look into the allegations. It also said talks had been held between South African and US officials over the vessel and an agreement to allow investigations to continue. “It is therefore disappointing that the US ambassador has adopted a counter-productive public position that undermines the understanding reached on the matter and the very positive and constructive engagements between the two delegations,”

Ramaphosa’s office said in a statement. US anger highlights the mounting tensions between the west and countries that have refused to condemn Russia over the war or join sanctions efforts. Like South Africa, India has continued to regard Russia as a friendly nation and western diplomats have struggled to convince developing nations across Africa and Asia to back Ukraine.

Brigety also criticised a resolution from the ruling African National Congress, which said “the US provoked the war with Russia over Ukraine”. John Steenhuisen, leader of South Africa’s main opposition Democratic Alliance, called for an urgent parliamentary debate on South Africa’s involvement with Russia, and said that the US claim “brings into question the transparency” of the ANC.

The rand dropped 2 per cent to R19.20 to the US dollar after Brigety’s comments, its weakest level since April 2020. South Africa has said it is non-aligned in the war, but Ramaphosa’s government is under pressure over signs it is favouring Russia, for example by holding joint naval exercises this year.

Ramaphosa has also extended an invitation for Russian president Vladimir Putin to attend a Brics leaders’ summit in Johannesburg in August — a move that has backfired on Pretoria after the International Criminal Court indicted Putin for war crimes. South Africa, a member of the ICC, would be legally obliged to arrest Putin if he travels there. Recommended News in-depthSouth Africa

Ramaphosa’s ICC gaffe underscores S African quandary over Putin invite Vladimir Putin and Cyril Ramaphosa Sydney Mufamadi, Ramaphosa’s national security adviser, recently visited the US to explain South Africa’s stance and to try to preserve trade links. The scandal over the Lady R is likely to overshadow these efforts. The Lady R, which is owned by Transmorflot, a company placed under sanctions by the US last year, appeared to switch off its transponder as it made the stop in Cape Town after a voyage down the west coast of Africa.

South Africa’s defence minister said that, after the ship left port, it had delivered a consignment for the country’s defence forces, but provided no details on what the vessel may have picked up in Cape Town.

The South African government in January officially denied it had approved any arms sales from South Africa to Russia since Moscow began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Additional reporting by Mary McDougall in London