#Oslo Process

[plitnick]

We didn’t need hindsight to see Oslo as a failure

30 years ago today, Yasir Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin shook hands in front of Bill Clinton on the White House lawn. Imaginations got fired up about a post-Cold War world that even saw peace in the Middle East. Obviously, that didn’t happen. But we didn’t need the benefit of hindsight to see that the Oslo Accords could never do what it was meant to do. We didn’t even need to be as smart and…

[fidgetspringer]

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[xtruss]

Analysis: Why the Oslo Peace Process Failed! And What It Means For Future Negotiators.

— September 13, 2023 | By Aaron David Miller | Foreign Policy

U.S. President Bill Clinton stands between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (left) and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat as they shake hands after signing the historic Oslo Accords at the White House in Washington, D.C., on Sept. 13, 1993. J. David Ake/AFP Via Getty Images

Sitting on the South Lawn of the White House on Sept. 13, 1993, I couldn’t believe what I was seeing. Under a brilliant, cloudless sky, an uncomfortable Israeli prime minister and a beaming Palestinian leader clasped hands in pursuit of peace as an exuberant U.S. president embraced the duo, smiling like a proud parent.

The occasion was the signing of the first agreement of what came to be known as the Oslo Accords, which established an interim framework that, if implemented successfully, might actually lead to final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Even with all the challenges that lay ahead, I was convinced that the Arab-Israeli peace process was now irreversible.

Efraim Halevy, who in just a few years would become the head of Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, would later write to me questioning my faith in that irreversibility and fearing the confrontation that could follow. Halevy’s analysis proved all too prescient. Today, 30 years after that historic day, what remains of the spirit and much of the substance of the Oslo agreement lies bloodied, buried, and betrayed across an Israeli-Palestinian landscape that seems to leave little room for hope and none for illusions.

The most right-wing and fundamentalist government in Israel’s history sits in Jerusalem, committed to the annexation of the West Bank in everything but name only, as well as expanding settlements and enabling settler terror and violence against Palestinians. The Palestinian national movement is deeply divided, resembling a kind of Noah’s Ark where there are two of everything—constitutions, governments, security services, patrons, and even visions of Palestine. In Gaza, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad plan and encourage terror attacks against Israelis, while in Ramallah, a weak and discredited Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority is unable or unwilling to control terror emanating from the northern West Bank.

Yet the lessons of Oslo still have some relevance, whatever the future holds for Israelis and Palestinians. Having had a ringside seat during those fateful years, four key takeaways stand out for me personally.

Muslim worshippers are silhouetted while celebrating in front of the Dome of the Rock mosque in Old Jerusalem on May 13, 2021, before the morning Eid al-Fitr prayer, which marks the end of the holy fasting month of Ramadan. Ahmad Gharabli/AFP Via Getty Images

1. Interim Can’t Be Final.

On paper, the Oslo Accords seemed logical and compelling. Territory would be transferred gradually to the Palestinian Authority in exchange for its assumption of security responsibilities. As we’ll see, the perverse dance between the occupier and the occupied would doom this approach. But it might have survived had the two sides been willing to make it clear from the outset what final outcome the interim period was supposed to produce, and then taken mutually reciprocal actions on the ground to prepare for it.

For Palestinians, that final outcome was an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital. For Israelis, it was TBD—to be determined. Driven by domestic politics and their own doubts about the Palestinians’ capacity for statehood and what it might mean for Israeli security, neither Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin nor his successor Shimon Peres were prepared to commit to any agreed outcome—even as an aspirational vision. You can look long and hard for the term “Palestinian state” in the Oslo documents, but you won’t find it. It would take another half-dozen years before the idea of statehood worked its way into Israel’s negotiating assumptions. Not until 2001, as U.S. President Bill Clinton left office, did the United States formally and publicly articulate support for a two-state solution.

With no clear end goal to work toward, the process floundered. By 1999, not a single Oslo deadline had been met. Negotiations on permanent status had begun three times but produced nothing, and neither Israelis nor Palestinians could see where things were headed. But both had grown weary and wary of a seemingly never-ending interim process punctuated by Palestinian terrorist attacks and Israeli settlement expansion.

The result was the situation we have now: a strategic cul-de-sac in which the two sides are stuck and the gaps on issues such as borders and Jerusalem are as wide as the Grand Canyon, with no shared vision and no faith that one will ever materialize.

Rabin (right), Arafat (center), and then-Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres confer during a meeting at the Erez checkpoint near Gaza on Jan. 19, 1995. Reuters

2. Leaders—and Not Just Their Negotiators—Have to be Willing to Yield.

It seems like another world now given the state of relations between Israelis and Palestinians today, but back then, the negotiators for both sides actually worked hard together to solve problems and manage the ones they couldn’t. It was less so for the leaders who had to deal with the politics of the negotiating process and defend what they could—and punt and parry the issues they couldn’t.

In the early Oslo years before Rabin’s murder in November 1995, the Israelis and Palestinians doing the negotiating laughed, yelled, and cried together against the backdrop of a roller coaster environment that included agreements, missed deadlines, Palestinian and Israeli terror attacks, and continuing frustrations and suspicions. They became friends. I saw security officials from both sides—hard men with blood on their hands—engage with one another with respect and even affection. At one negotiating session at the Laromme Hotel in Jerusalem, an exhausted West Bank security chief Jabril Rajoub laid down in the same bed with Israel Defense Forces’ central commander Shaul Mofaz, jokingly pretending to take a nap.

For the negotiators, Oslo was not about zero-sum advantage but mutual benefit. That view was best embodied by Oslo’s two lead negotiators, Uri Savir and Abu Ala (both of whom have since died), who would become fast friends. Interviewing them both in 2013 on the 25th anniversary of Oslo, that sense of partnership was front and center. Abu Ala, also known as Ahmed Qureia, opined about the promise Oslo held: After decades of bitter struggle, during which both saw each other only through a barrel of a gun, they realized that it is possible to overcome hatred, misgivings, denial, and their own red lines. Neither man was a dreamer, but both saw the opportunity that Oslo offered to better understand the needs of the other and to humanize the adversary.

I sometimes thought that, had the decision-making been left to Abu Ala and Savir, Oslo would have had a better chance of delivering. But in the hard and cruel world of Israeli and Palestinian politics, leaders had their own personal and political constraints with which to reckon.

For Rabin, dealing with the Palestinian issue was never his first choice. It is true that as defense minister during the First Intifada, Rabin began to understand that the conflict had no military solution, and by the spring of 1993, he had reached the conclusion that no one—not Jordan, not West Bankers, not Gazans—could replace the PLO as an interlocutor. But peace with Syria was his preference because of its strategic character and its avoidance of hot-button issues such as Jerusalem. Then, in August 1993, with the U.S.-mediated Israeli-Syrian channel making progress but with little chance of a dramatic breakthrough, the secret Oslo channel delivered—and suddenly, Rabin was thrust into dealing with the Palestinian issue head on.

In the Oslo Accords, Rabin made a historic decision with respect to the Palestinians. But translating that to an Israeli bureaucracy and security establishment that held the key to making life better for Palestinians on the ground proved much harder. By 1993, the policies of the Israeli occupation had become deeply entrenched in Israeli politics and day-to-day relations with Palestinians.

Rabin had also locked himself into a public commitment not to dismantle any settlements during the interim period, and to do so only as part of a permanent status negotiations. He would later regret that decision when, in the wake of an Israeli settler massacring 29 Palestinians in Hebron, he resisted pressures from within his own government to remove the 400 settlers living there who required a large Israeli military presence to protect them. Rabin was fearful of reaction from the right-wing opposition and worried that Yasser Arafat, then the chairman of the PLO, would exploit the crisis to push for an international presence in the West Bank. Yet Rabin’s unwillingness or inability to limit, let alone halt, settlement expansion diminished Palestinian willingness to implement their own commitments under Oslo.

As for Arafat, I was never really sure of his motives for accepting the Oslo Accords. They compelled him, at least for the moment, to recognize Israel without achieving any of the Palestinians’ demands—not self-determination, not statehood, not East Jerusalem as a Palestinian capital, not the right of return for Palestinian refugees. My best guess is that for Arafat, Oslo represented Israel’s, the United States’, and the international community’s validation of himself and the PLO as the only legitimate avenue for dealing with the Palestinians. Arafat put up with the interim process because, in essence, the entire world recognized him as the exclusive address for all matters Palestinian. It was the triumph of personal ego over national interest.

But Oslo proved to be the first and last concession that Arafat was prepared to make. In March 2002, during a mission with the George W. Bush administration’s special envoy, Anthony Zinni, we saw Arafat at his headquarters surrounded by Israeli forces. Entrances barricaded, windows blacked out, candles on the table lighting an otherwise darkened conference room, there was Arafat with his black machine gun on the conference table, talking about martyrdom for the cause of Palestine.

He had come a long way, but could never quite make the transition from the mentality of a revolutionary leader committed to armed struggle and the use of violence against Israel to the world of compromise and diplomacy that would have been required, together with a foresighted Israeli leader, to bring about the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Left: Construction on the Jewish settlement of Maale Adumim in the West Bank in May 1996. Esaias Baitel/Gamma-Rapho Via Getty Images Right: A young Palestinian boy from East Jerusalem, wearing a Hamas headband, points a toy gun at an Israeli border police officer on Dec. 10, 1994, as the police tell the boy’s father to leave the street outside Jerusalem’s Old City walls. Swen Nackstrand/AFP Via Getty Images

3. The Occupier and the Occupied Aren’t Equals in Negotiations.

The good news about Oslo was that Israelis and Palestinians had managed to hammer out a substantive and complex agreement between themselves directly, face-to-face. It’s like that old adage: In the history of the world, nobody has ever washed a rental car. Why? Because folks only care about what they own. Oslo was an example of authentic ownership. Agreement was reached because the parties themselves had a sense of urgency and a need for their own interests to come together without external pressure.

But the Israeli and Palestinian dual act was also bad news because of the power imbalance between the two parties: one the occupier, Israel, and one the occupied, the Palestinians. Given this reality, it was remarkable that anything got done at all in terms of territorial transfer, economic and security cooperation, and building Palestinian institutions.

The asymmetry of power was clear: As the occupier, Israel wielded the power of the strong—the capacity to impose its will on the Palestinians. This took the form of everything from settlement construction, land confiscation, and housing demolitions to closures of the West Bank cities and towns (preventing travel), and targeted killings. Settlement construction was especially egregious, with 115,700 Israeli settlers residing in the West Bank and Gaza at the end of 1993; by mid-1999, that number had risen to 176,973.

Palestinians, on the other hand, wielded the power of the weak: terrorism. As the weaker party in the negotiations, Palestinian leaders rationalized the use of terror and violence and the armed struggle against Israel as an acceptable instrument to fight back against Israeli occupation and the ongoing settlement expansion. Even though most of the terrorist attacks in the early Oslo years were carried out by Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad outside of the Palestinian Authority’s control, Arafat—who never abandoned the use violence as potential tool—could or would not do more to prevent terrorist attacks or arrest the perpetrators.

From Israel’s perspective, land was transferred to the Palestinians, yet the terrorism continued, raising questions about the PLO’s reliability. From the Palestinian perspective, Israel had put Palestinians on probation. Israel was appropriating land that Palestinians believed to be theirs, and any confidence-building measures were only offered in return for Palestinian performance and good behavior. These mindsets produced a barrier that, in the absence of a third party that could help balance the power asymmetry and press each side to implement their commitments, proved insurmountable.

U.S. President Bill Clinton is escorted to his plane by Rabin at the Ben Gurion Airport on Oct. 28, 1994, as he wraps up a short visit to Israel. Luke Frazza/AFP Via Getty Images

4. A Mediator Must Be Present—and Credible.

In many respects, the early years of Oslo were a U.S. negotiator’s dream. Israelis and Palestinians had finally done what we had been encouraging them to do for years: get together and work through their own problems themselves. Rabin briefed U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher on the outlines of the Oslo breakthrough in July, minus the mutual recognition package. But neither Rabin nor Arafat wanted Americans in on the substance—Rabin wanted the United States involved only to pressure the Palestinians but was wary that the Americans might adopt a pro-Palestinian position, and Arafat was concerned they’d side with the Israelis.

And so, in the early years until Rabin’s murder in late 1995, Washington’s role was limited to hosting signing ceremonies, rallying donors, and playing firefighter at critical points when negotiations reached a crisis—such as when a terrorist attack occurred, or when Israeli settlement expansion or other unilateral acts threatened the process. What the United States didn’t—and couldn’t—do, largely because of Israel’s objections, was create the one thing that might have actually given the Oslo process durability: a monitoring mechanism to hold each side to the commitments they had made and, if necessary, impose costs for a breach.

Doing so was a bridge too far. This was partly because of the United States’ traditional special relationship with Israel, which made getting tough with the Israelis, especially on settlement expansion, off limits; partly because of the Clinton administration’s determination to improve relations with Israel after the stormy years of former President George H.W. Bush; and partly because, when it came to Oslo violations, terrorist attacks were understandably viewed as more lethal than settlement expansion and pushed the United States to side with Israel.

From Oslo on, with Rabin’s pro-peace successor Peres and especially with Ehud Barak at the Camp David summit, Clinton didn’t want to jam up Israeli prime ministers. Far too often, Americans—myself included—essentially acted as Israel’s lawyer. What this meant in practice was a disposition favoring Israel on process, substance, tight coordination, and no surprises.

Protesters gather during a Palestinian counter-demonstration along the border with Israel east of Gaza City on May 18. Mohammed Abed/AFP Via Getty Images

I’ll never forget: On the fourth day of the summit, I saw the late Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat on one of the walking paths. He stopped and asked when the Palestinians were going to receive the draft of a paper that we were preparing on the core issues. I said it was taking more time to prepare than we thought. Smiling, Saeb replied, “Aaron, you’ve given it to the Israelis first, haven’t you?” I smiled back and kept on walking.

In the wake of Rabin’s murder, the United States tried to take a more active role. From 1995 to 2000, working with Arafat and two Israeli prime ministers—Benjamin Netanyahu and Barak—Americans were able to keep the process alive, broker three interim accords, and strengthen Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, with the CIA working directly with the Palestinians. But the same structural factors that made Oslo a long shot even in the heady days of the fall 1993—the absence of an agreed political vision, the perverse dance between the occupier and the occupied, and terrorism and settlements—were simply too much to overcome.

And what proved to be an ill-advised and ill-conceived summit in July 2000 at Camp David, however well intentioned, could not redeem what had already been lost.

In the 30 years since the Oslo Accords, Israeli-Palestinian peace turned out to be anything but inevitable. Looking back, Oslo represented a moment when Israelis and Palestinians came together in hopes of securing a better future.

Paradoxically, talk of potential Israeli-Saudi normalization has revived a key concept of the Oslo process focusing on the so-called Area C, which constitutes 60 percent of the West Bank and is where most of Israel’s settlements are located. There are credible reports of various proposals made by the Palestinian Authority, the United States, and Saudi Arabia arguing that Israel should agree to transfer a significant portion of Area C to Palestinian control as part an agreement between Riyadh and Jerusalem to normalize relations.

Such a proposal will almost certainly be resisted by extremist ministers in Netanyahu’s government, and it’s unclear how flexible Netanyahu—who is desperate for a deal with the Saudis—will be. Still, it would be quite extraordinary if the presumed dead and buried architecture of the Oslo process was resurrected to try to redeem the fast-fading hopes of progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track.

But even with this potential opening, there’s still no clear pathway to end the conflict, and no organizing principle around which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians can rally. Without giving up hope—and we cannot—we also should not succumb to facile illusions and assumptions about silver bullets that can redeem a peaceful future for both peoples. If Oslo demonstrated anything, it’s that even with leadership and partnership, the journey is long, hard, and strewn, more often than not, with failure.

None of this means that the past is inexorably prologue. None of us can see around corners, and abandoning the search for an equitable and durable Israeli-Palestinian peace is neither morally nor ethically responsible—and it’s not in U.S. interests. We need leaders who see peace as critical to their own people and who are prepared to understand and work to accommodate the needs of the other side; a mediator who’s prepared to be reassuring, patient, and tough on both sides when necessary; and an end state that recognizes that a durable and equitable solution depends on a balance of interests, not an asymmetry of power.

None of these things is available now. Yet the United States may someday have another opportunity to pursue Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, and we should do so without illusion and without believing we can do it alone or abandoning that pursuit if we run into serious challenges. And with right-thinking and courageous Israelis and Palestinians, support from the Arab world and beyond, and a fair amount of luck, one day—who knows—we might just get there.

— By Aaron David Miller, a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

[saddayfordemocracy]

How the Watermelon Became a Symbol of Palestinian Solidarity

The use of the watermelon as a Palestinian symbol is not new. It first emerged after the Six-day War in 1967, when Israel seized control of the West Bank and Gaza, and annexed East Jerusalem. At the time, the Israeli government made public displays of the Palestinian flag a criminal offense in Gaza and the West Bank. 

To circumvent the ban, Palestinians began using the watermelon because, when cut open, the fruit bears the national colors of the Palestinian flag—red, black, white, and green.  

The Israeli government didn't just crack down on the flag. Artist Sliman Mansour told The National in 2021 that Israeli officials in 1980 shut down an exhibition at 79 Gallery in Ramallah featuring his work and others, including Nabil Anani and Issam Badrl. “They told us that painting the Palestinian flag was forbidden, but also the colors were forbidden. So Issam said, ‘What if I were to make a flower of red, green, black and white?’, to which the officer replied angrily, ‘It will be confiscated. Even if you paint a watermelon, it will be confiscated,’” Mansour told the outlet.

Israel lifted the ban on the Palestinian flag in 1993, as part of the Oslo Accords, which entailed mutual recognition by Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization and were the first formal agreements to try to resolve the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The flag was accepted as representing the Palestinian Authority, which would administer Gaza and the West Bank.

In the wake of the accords, the New York Times nodded to the role of watermelon as a stand-in symbol during the flag ban. “In the Gaza Strip, where young men were once arrested for carrying sliced watermelons—thus displaying the red, black and green Palestinian colors—soldiers stand by, blasé, as processions march by waving the once-banned flag,” wrote Times journalist John Kifner.

In 2007, just after the Second Intifada, artist Khaled Hourani created The Story of the Watermelon for a book entitled Subjective Atlas of Palestine. In 2013, he isolated one print and named it The Colours of the Palestinian Flag, which has since been seen by people across the globe.

The use of the watermelon as a symbol resurged in 2021, following an Israeli court ruling that Palestinian families based in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem would be evicted from their homes to make way for settlers.

The watermelon symbol today:

In January, Israel’s National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir gave police the power to confiscate Palestinian flags. This was later followed by a June vote on a bill to ban people from displaying the flag at state-funded institutions, including universities. (The bill passed preliminary approval but the government later collapsed.)

In June, Zazim, an Arab-Israeli community organization, launched a campaign to protest against the ensuing arrests and confiscation of flags. Images of watermelons were plastered on to 16 taxis operating in Tel Aviv, with the accompanying text reading, “This is not a Palestinian flag.”

“Our message to the government is clear: we will always find a way to circumvent any absurd ban and we will not stop fighting for freedom of expression and democracy,” said Zazim director Raluca Ganea. 

Amal Saad, a Palestinian from Haifa who worked on the Zazim campaign, told Al-Jazeera they had a clear message: “If you want to stop us, we’ll find another way to express ourselves.”

Words courtesy of BY ARMANI SYED / TIME

[fairuzfan]

AMAZING article about what it means to participate in anti-Zionism work both online and in person.

If your anti-zionism does not in any way acknowledge that it is a way of thought and practice led by and for Palestinians, then you need to reevaluate your "anti-zionism" label.

Some passages that felt especially relevant to tumblr:

If we accept, as those with even the most rudimentary understanding of history do, that zionism is an ongoing process of settler-colonialism, then the undoing of zionism requires anti-zionism, which should be understood as a process of decolonisation. Anti-zionism as a decolonial ideology then becomes rightly situated as an indigenous liberation movement. The resulting implication is two-fold. First, decolonial organising requires that we extract ourselves from the limitations of existing structures of power and knowledge and imagine a new, just world. Second, this understanding clarifies that the caretakers of anti-zionist thought are indigenous communities resisting colonial erasure, and it is from this analysis that the strategies, modes, and goals of decolonial praxis should flow. In simpler terms: Palestinians committed to decolonisation, not Western-based NGOs, are the primary authors of anti-zionist thought. We write this as a Palestinian and a Palestinian-American who live and work in Palestine, and have seen the impact of so-called ‘Western values’ and how the centring of the ‘human rights’ paradigm disrupts real decolonial efforts in Palestine and abroad. This is carried out in favour of maintaining the status quo and gaining proximity to power, using our slogans emptied of Palestinian historical analysis.

Anti-zionist organising is not a new notion, but until now the use of the term in organising circles has been mired with misunderstandings, vague definitions, or minimised outright. Some have incorrectly described anti-zionism as amounting to activities or thought limited to critiques of the present Israeli government – this is a dangerous misrepresentation. Understanding anti-zionism as decolonisation requires the articulation of a political movement with material, articulated goals: the restitution of ancestral territories and upholding the inviolable principle of indigenous repatriation and through the right of return, coupled with the deconstruction of zionist structures and the reconstitution of governing frameworks that are conceived, directed, and implemented by Palestinians.  Anti-zionism illuminates the necessity to return power to the indigenous community and the need for frameworks of justice and accountability for the settler communities that have waged a bloody, unrelenting hundred-year war on the people of Palestine. It means that anti-zionism is much more than a slogan. 

[...]

While our collective imaginations have not fully articulated what a liberated and decolonised Palestine looks like, the rough contours have been laid out repeatedly. Ask any Palestinian refugee displaced from Haifa, the lands of Sheikh Muwannis, or Deir Yassin – they will tell that a decolonised Palestine is, at a minimum, the right of Palestinians’ return to an autonomous political unit from the river to the sea. When self-proclaimed ‘anti-zionists’ use rhetoric like ‘Israel-Palestine’ – or worse, ‘Palestine-Israel’ – we wonder: where do you think ‘Israel’ exists? On which land does it lay, if not Palestine? This is nothing more than an attempt to legitimise a colonial state; the name you are looking for is Palestine – no hyphen required. At a minimum, anti-zionist formations should cut out language that forces upon Palestinians and non-Palestinian allies the violence of colonial theft. 

[...]

The common choice to centre the Oslo Accords, international humanitarian law, and the human rights paradigm over socio-historical Palestinian realities not only limits our analysis and political interventions; it restricts our imagination of what kind of future Palestinians deserve, sidelining questions of decolonization to convince us that it is the new, bad settlers in the West Bank who are the source of violence. Legitimate settlers, who reside within the bounds of Palestinian geographies stolen in 1948 like Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem, are different within this narrative. Like Breaking the Silence, they can be enlightened by learning the error of colonial violence carried out in service of the bad settlers. They can supposedly even be our solidarity partners – all without having to sacrifice a crumb of colonial privilege or denounce pre-1967 zionist violence in any of its cruel manifestations. As a result of this course of thought, solidarity organisations often showcase particular Israelis – those who renounce state violence in service of the bad settlers and their ongoing colonisation of the West Bank – in roles as professionals and peacemakers, positioning them on an equal intellectual, moral, or class footing with Palestinians. There is no recognition of the inherent imbalance of power between these Israelis and the Palestinians they purport to be in solidarity with – stripping away their settler status. The settler is taken out of the historical-political context which afforded them privileged status on stolen land, and is given the power to delineate the Palestinian experience. This is part of the historical occlusion of the zionist narrative, overlooking the context of settler-colonialism to read the settler as an individual, and omitting their class status as a settler. 

It is essential to note that Palestinians have never rejected Jewish indigeneity in Palestine. However, the liberation movement has differentiated between zionist settlers and Jewish natives. Palestinians have established a clear and rational framework for this distinction, like in the Thawabet, the National Charter of Palestine from 1968. Article 6 states, ‘The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians.’ When individuals misread ‘decolonisation’ as ‘the mass killing or expulsion of Jews,’ it is often a reflection of their own entanglement in colonialism or a result of zionist propaganda. Perpetuating this rhetoric is a deliberate misinterpretation of Palestinian thought, which has maintained this position over a century of indigenous organising.  Even after 100 years of enduring ethnic cleansing, whole communities bombed and entire family lines erased, Palestinians have never, as a collective, called for the mass killing of Jews or Israelis. Anti-zionism cannot shy away from employing the historical-political definitions of ‘settler’ and ‘indigenous’ in their discourse to confront ahistorical readings of Palestinian decolonial thought and zionist propaganda. 

[...]

In the context of the United States, the most threatening zionist institutions are the entrenched political parties which function to maintain the status quo of the American empire, not Hillel groups on university campuses or even Christian zionist churches. While the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) engage in forms of violence that suppress Palestinian liberation and must not be minimised, it is crucial to recognise that the most consequential institutions in the context of settler-colonialism are not exclusively Jewish in their orientation or representation: the Republican and Democratic Party in the United States do arguably more to manufacture public consent for the slaughtering of Palestinians than the ADL and AIPAC combined. Even the Progressive Caucus and the majority of ‘The Squad’ are guilty of this.

Leila Shomali and Lara Kilani

[zvaigzdelasas]

China’s massive rollout of renewable energy is accelerating, its investments in the sector growing so large that international climate watchdogs now expect the country’s greenhouse-gas emissions to peak years earlier than anticipated—possibly as soon as this year[!!!].

China installed 217 gigawatts worth of solar power last year alone, a 55% increase, according to new government data. That is more than 500 million solar panels and well above the total installed solar capacity of the U.S. [...]

Wind-energy installation additions were 76 gigawatts last year, more than the rest of the world combined. That amounted to more than 20,000 new turbines across the country, including the world’s largest, [...]

The low-carbon capacity additions, which also included hydropower and nuclear, were for the first time large enough that their power output could cover the entire annual increase in Chinese electricity demand [!!!!], analysts say. The dynamic suggests that coal-fired generation—which accounts for 70% of overall emissions for the world’s biggest polluter—is set to decline in the years to come, according to the Paris-based International Energy Agency and Lauri Myllyvirta, the Helsinki-based lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air.[...]

Its rapid emissions growth long provided fodder for critics who said Beijing wasn’t committed to fighting climate change or supporting the Paris accord, the landmark climate agreement that calls for governments to attempt to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius over preindustrial temperatures. Now, analysts and officials say Beijing’s efforts are lending momentum to the Paris process, which requires governments to draft new emissions plans every five years.

“An early peak would have a lot of symbolic value and send a signal to the world that we’ve turned a corner," said Jan Ivar Korsbakken, a senior researcher at the Oslo-based Center for International Climate and Environmental Research.

In 2020, Chinese leader Xi Jinping pledged that the country’s emissions would begin falling before 2030 and hit net zero before 2060, part of its plan prepared under the Paris accord. He also said China would have 1,200 gigawatts of total solar- and wind-power capacity by the end of this decade. The country is six years ahead of schedule: China reached 1,050 gigawatts of wind and solar capacity at the end of 2023, and the China Electricity Council forecast last month that capacity would top 1,300 gigawatts by the end of this year.[...]

Transition Zero, a U.K.-based nonprofit that uses satellite images to monitor industrial activity and emissions in China, says the official data are “broadly aligned and consistent" with theirs.[...]

[M]oving China’s timeline for an overall emissions peak forward could shave off around 0.3 to 0.4 degrees Celsius of projected global warming if emissions started to decline next decade, analysts say.[...]

The most certain variable in the equation is the breakneck pace of China’s renewable-energy rollout, which analysts expect will continue to add 200 to 300 gigawatts of new wind and solar capacity a year. The investments in renewable energy have become a major driver of the Chinese economy. The country’s clean-energy spending totaled $890 billion last year, up 40%. [...]

The adoption of electric vehicles is happening so rapidly that analysts say peak gasoline demand in China was already reached last year[!!!].

10 Feb 24

[sayruq]

Ireland and Norway are both moving closer to recognising Palestinian statehood, leaders of the two countries expressed separately after meetings with Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, who also champions the move. Ireland wants to recognise Palestine soon, but in a coordinated action with Spain and more European nations, the country’s Prime Minister Simon Harris said after meeting Sanchez in Dublin on Friday.Earlier in the day, Sanchez travelled to Oslo, where Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store said his country also “stands ready” to recognise Palestine together with “like-minded countries”. Sanchez said Spain wants to recognise Palestine “as soon as possible”, leveraging the move as a way to gain momentum for a definitive peace process. The current efforts come as the mounting deaths, starvation and infrastructure damage in the besieged Gaza Strip due to Israel’s war have resulted in growing international criticism.

[7amaspayrollmanager]

I think the funniest thing is when an Israeli gets an anon telling them they don't know how bad life is under occupation and then they're so insecure they write the most dramatic response about "well you don't know what it's like to have missiles over your head" forgetting that there are much more powerful missiles killing thousands of palestinians in Gaza now and that's the reason missiles are flying over their head. But where is this audacity coming from like your life is not perpetually disrupted. The trauma of going to a bomb shelter is not the trauma of being in a refugee tent and the threat of dying in that tent equally possible from a missile from tank shelling from disease from starvation. In the WB, the occupation is so bad that israeli surveillance is able to extrajudicially drone palestinians in jenin. That sure is not something that could happen to you and completely missing the point that they are a citizen of a state that is holding an occupation over other people and as a result you live a life that is only possible because of palestinian repression. So this occupation means you. Are. The. Ones holding the strings. You hold the power you can't blame palestinian "terror attacks," preventing the end of occupation when your governance can end the occupation At Any Moment and intentionally keeps the occupation to facilitate land grabs and keep palestinians repressed on purpose which disrupts the "peace process." Your infinite access to water? That's because post Oslo the so called water distribution fell completely under the authority of israelis and we get less than 20%. Again you can touch any topic and you can find out the power dynamics very quickly like why act stupid

In 1995, under the Oslo II Accord, division of water sources was designated as an issue for “final status negotiations” – a device used by Israel to continue illegal appropriation of Palestinian water resources from 1995 until the present (the “final status negotiations” of Oslo have never been reached). A Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) was set up, but Israel maintained control of the total flow and volume of water to the OPT (Occupied Palestinian Territories While the PWA has no ability to manage water resources and just allocates the limited supply made available by Israel, the PWA, rather than the Occupation, is blamed for water scarcity. Moreover, the Oslo II agreement does not call for redistribution of existing water sources nor require any reduction in water extraction or consumption by Israelis or settlers.”

- Palestine Water Fact Sheet #1 - Center for Economic and Social Rights

[matan4il]

To the Nonnie who asked me about the countries which recently recognized a state of Palestine...

First, allow me to make it clear why it's an anti-peace move.

Since (at the very least) 1990 and the Madrid Conference, the concept of negotiations for peace in this conflict was that Israel will give the Palestinians land to have their own state, the world will recognize said state, and the Palestinians will give Israel peace.

I'll put aside all the issues with this concept, since there still isn't any other model. Since 2010, Mahmoud Abbas has refused to so much as negotiate for peace with Israel, let alone make compromises to achieve that peace.

The model only offers two incentives for the Palestinians, one is land and self-rule, the other is global recognition as an independent state. Israel already gave them quite a bit of land (areas A, B and Gaza) and self-rule. That's never been taken back, no matter how many times Palestinians turned to violence since the Oslo accords, instead of giving Israelis peace. The only other incentive was international recognition as an independent state. That was supposed to be a prize they get at the end of the peace process, when everything is resolved, no side has any claims for the other, both have a state, and both can live side by side in peace.

What does it mean, when countries are giving Palestinians "for free" that which they were supposed to compromise for? It means the Palestinians don't have as much of an incentive to do that, to reach a final resolution to this conflict, and peace. THAT is why this is an anti-peace move.

Now let me try to respond to the other parts of your excellent ask.

but what does that even mean? Palestine doesn't have a singular, let alone functional government. Gaza and the west bank are not controlled by the same people. How can they recognize a country that doesn't have concrete boarders?

You're absolutely right. Areas A and B are controlled by the Palestinian Authority (headed by Fatah), while Gaza is ruled by Hamas. The latter is an all out genocidal, antisemitic, Islamist terrorist organization. The former developed from a secular, nationalist terrorist organization, and has never completely abandoned its roots, it just compartmentalized its terrorism ties, so it can maintain global recognition and legitimacy. But the Palestinian Authority still pays terrorists imprisoned by Israel based on how long they're serving (which means, based on how many people they've killed, known as the "Pay for Slay" program), it trains kids and youth to be anti-Israel terrorists, and Fatah also has "military wings" which carry out terrorist attacks for it.

So what does it mean when countries are willing to recognize regimes directly invested in terrorism?

But let's put that aside for a second, even if we pretended either Palestinian regime is uninvolved in terrorism, how do you recognize one Palestinian state, when the Palestinian-ruled territories are divided into two, due to their own doing... In 2006 the Palestinians had democratic elections, Hamas defeated Fatah, both agreed on joint rule, then in 2007, Hamas slaughtered Fatah's people in Gaza and took over. Which means, not only do you have two unrelated regimes, these two are actually hostile and even violent with each other. Why were the 2021 Palestinian elections canceled? Because Fatah is terrified of Hamas winning again, and then slaughtering Fatah's people in areas A and B, just as they did in Gaza. How do you look at this and recognize it as one state?

But let's put that aside. Let's go with the idea that these countries are only recognizing the Palestinian Authority's rule, not Hamas'... That raises so many questions. If Hamas' rule isn't recognized, does that mean Gaza, which is controlled by it, isn't a part of the state of Palestine? Does it means it's all a part of it, but Gaza is occupied... not by Israel, but instead by Hamas? If that's the case, why isn't the world protesting Hamas' occupation of Gaza? And why would Israel owe anything to the Gazans, water, electricity, food, medical care, connectivity (for calls and internet), anything at all, if Gaza is either not a part of Palestine, or is currently occupied by Hamas (which means Hamas, as the occupiers, must provide for it all of the above)?

And even with the parts ruled by the Palestinian Authority... Like you said, what are the borders? Gaza's borders are pretty clear, since Israel withdrew from them in 2005, and that was recognized (even applauded) internationally back then. But what happens in the areas historically known as Judea and Samaria, which the Jordanians occupied between 1948 and 1967, re-named them 'the west bank' (to emphasize Jordan's claim on them, as the holder of 'the east bank' of the Jordan River), and then gave up any claim to in 1988? What ARE the exact borders of the state of Palestine there? Will Palestinians coming from those areas to work or tour Israel have to pay taxes for those privileges, as workers and tourists from other countries do (and just how I, as an Israeli, would have to pay a tax if I wanted to visit Jordan, and did pay one when I visited Egypt)? Will the Palestinian Authority renounce any claims to area C, since they are now recognized as a state, but only in the confines of areas A and B? And if it is an independent state, what about all the terrorist attacks on Israelis launched from within those areas, will the Palestinian Authority finally be held responsible for not stopping them, for supporting them financially, for launching some of them? After all, if they're an independent state, they also can't hide behind the immoral excuse that resistance is justified when people are occupied. Because they're not occupied, right? They're an independent state and have been since the mid 1990's, when they got self-rule!

Let's not get into how, if they are an independent state, they should be providing water, electricity, medical care (remember that time Covid hit, and the Palestinian Authority demanded Israel pays for and administers vaccines to the Palestinians living under PA rule? That's not what independent states do) for their own people instead of demanding to be provided for by Israel (claiming they'll pay Israel back for stuff like water and electricity, but never doing so, because they know Israel can't stop supplying them or else it will be accused of causing a humanitarian disaster in areas A and B as "the occupying force"). Basically, the Palestinians juggle between demanding to be recognized as an independent state, and shrugging off many of the responsibilities that come with that, instead relying on Israel's "duty" to provide for them as "the occupier." Which is it, is Palestine an independent state or an occupied one? It can't be both!

If Palestine is a country, does that mean Palestinians lose their refugee status?

Not only they would, it would also mean they have lost it (and might owe back a great deal of money) since the 1990's already... If the PA rules areas A and B, and Hamas rules Gaza, why have refugee camps in these territories never been dissolved, and their residents settled as regular Palestinian citizens?

And let's not even get into what Palestine being an independent state means for the crimes against peace, the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by Palestinians, including ones in power, especially during Oct 7, but also since the 1990's in general...

Let's be honest here. If Palestine was an independent state and had to act like one, it would actually really fuck them over. They don't want to be one. They just want the perks and international political and diplomatic rights and power that comes from being recognized as one. That doesn't help the regular Palestinians who just want a normal life. It does help the anti-Israel terrorist regimes that rule over the Palestinians.

So these countries recognizing Palestine as a state now, before there's any resolution to the conflict? It's anti-peace, and it also only rewards the terrorists in power. But more than that, due to the timing, it's a specifically pro-Hamas move. This recognition is a middle finger to Israel as "punishment" for waging a war in Gaza. But Hamas started the war. This recognition is therefore a result of and reward for Hamas' massacre of innocent Israeli civilians, and it's literally how Hamas take it.

That's what this step means for the average person in the conflict, too. No matter on which side...

These European countries are rewarding an Islamist and antisemitic, genocidal terrorist organization for having launched the greatest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust.

Let that sink in.

(also, yes to your footnote about the hypocrisy of Spain, which hasn't been as generous with its recognition of independence for the people living under its own rule, but having no problem rewarding antisemitic terrorists with exactly that)

(for all of my updates and ask replies regarding Israel, click here)

[avi-on-jumblr]

Feel free to reblog for a greater sample size!

[gothhabiba]

[...] [A]side from strengthening ties with the Zionist settler-colony of Israel, which became a major US ally during the Nixon and Ford years, Kissinger armed Israel to the teeth during the 1973 war in order “to prevent an Arab victory”. His emergency military help to Israel during the war reversed the early victories of the Egyptian and Syrian armies and ensured that Israel won the war. He also ensured that no US relations could be established with the Palestine Liberation Organisation. 

In September 1975, Kissinger signed a “memorandum of understanding” with the Israelis committing the US not to recognise or negotiate with the PLO unless it recognised Israel’s “right to exist” as a racist, Jewish-supremacist state. Former PLO chairman Yasser Arafat would finally do so in 1988 in Geneva, and again in 1993 with the signing of Oslo.

In effect, Kissinger ensured the perpetuation of Israeli colonisation of Palestinian lands for decades to come. He was the architect of former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s surrender to Israel and selling out of Palestinian rights at Camp David, and designed the so-called American-sponsored “peace process”, which has defined US policy towards Palestinians and Israel and has since brought about the ongoing calamities in much of the Arab world.

–Joseph Massad, "The murderous legacy of Henry Kissinger." Middle East Eye, 30 November 2023.

[plitnick]

The question of violence

The question of violence

After years of the United States, Israel and the Palestinian Authority making it clear to the Palestinian people that diplomacy will not secure the realization of Palestinian rights–especially given the massive power imbalance–the use of armed resistance to Israeli apartheid is growing among Palestinians. People have asked, “where is the Palestinian Mandela?” Well, when South African Apartheid…

[probablyasocialecologist]

Back in 2005, shortly after Arafat’s death, the situation appeared more open. The PA agreed, in coordination with the governments of Israel and the United States, to hold new elections for its presidency and its parliament (both of which have tightly limited powers under Oslo). This time around, Hamas’s leaders agreed to take part in the parliamentary election. It was the first time Hamas showed a willingness to work within the Oslo framework, the clear goal of which was always understood by the PLO and all other Palestinian and Arab leaders to be the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. When those elections were held in January 2006, Hamas won them handily, taking 74 of the council’s 132 seats. The victory stunned the traditional Fatah leaders of the PA and their backers in Washington and Tel Aviv. In a reporting trip to the region soon thereafter, I found that Hamas’s success reflected a combination of skills: a history of having provided helpful community services to different grassroots constituencies; a reputation for generally “clean hands” (unlike Fatah); effective organizing through women’s networks, with several Hamas women leaders getting elected to the parliament; and good electoral discipline, not running more candidates than there were seats in multi-seat constituencies, as Fatah and its allies did in several places. The elections gave the PLO and its U.S. and Israeli allies a great opportunity to work to find a way to draw Hamas into the political process. Hamas was willing, too, initially making inroads to form a “government of national unity” with Fatah. But the reaction from Israel and Washington was harsh. They threatened to kill any of the newly elected legislators who would agree to join such a government—which I know because I was the conduit for conveying one such threat. Later, Washington and Israel persuaded Fatah to start plotting to overthrow the newly elected leaders of the PA’s parliament and premiership. In 2007 Fatah tried to launch a violent coup against Hamas, but Hamas leaders in Gaza rebuffed the attempt. Afterwards, Hamas set about institutionalizing their position in Gaza while Fatah retreated, with their generous U.S. funding, to Ramallah in the West Bank. All the while, Hamas and its allies retained significant support in the West Bank and throughout the widespread Palestinian diaspora—and remained the democratically elected government in Gaza, although new elections have not been held since. Though by 2005 Israel had withdrawn all its civilian settlers from Gaza, it has always maintained very tight control over all the crossings through which people or goods could pass in or out of the Strip—until October 7, that is. The United Nations continues to deem Israel as the “occupying power” there, with all the responsibilities that status entails under international law. And since 2007, several Israeli governments have undertaken punishment raids into Gaza—actions that some Israeli commentators have cynically dubbed “mowing the lawn.” The raids of late 2008 and summer 2014 were particularly destructive, with thousands of Palestinians killed in total. Successive U.S. presidents have generally seemed happy to allow these incursions. And the United States’ position in the global political order has meant that its word is law.

[contemplatingoutlander]

Young Americans are more pro-Palestinian than their elders. Why?

Originally posted 12/23/23; updated 12/24/23

This is a thought provoking article about how different U.S. generations perceive the current conflict between Israel and Hamas. To encourage people to read the entire article, this is a gift 🎁link so that anyone can read the article, even if they do not subscribe to The Washington Post.

Although I am from an older U.S. generation, I condemn the Netanyahu administration's decision to pursue Hamas at the unconscionable expense of tens of thousands Palestinian civilians, including many children.

However, reading this article helped me to also understand why, being born in the decade after the Holocaust, I don't absolve Hamas of their terrifying behavior on Oct. 7th--unlike many younger people seem to have done. Although I strongly oppose the apartheid Israel has imposed on the Palestinians (and I do believe that Palestine should have been a free separate state long ago), I still don't think there is any justification for such a terrorist act against Israeli civilians.

I encourage you to read the entire article, but here are a few excerpts:

Across more than two months of war between Israel and Hamas, public opinion on the conflict has continuously shifted. But there has been a constant: a divide between the views of older and younger Americans that has shown up both during the war and in the years leading up to it. [...] Each age group has a different “generational memory” of Israel, Dov Waxman,director of the UCLA Younes and Soraya Nazarian Center for Israel Studies, said. Beliefs about the world tend to form in our late teens and early 20s and often don’t change, he said. Older generations, with a more visceral sense of the Holocaust, tend to see Israel as a vital refuge for the Jews, he said, and see its story as one of a people returning to safety in their homeland after living for 2,000 years as a scattered diaspora facing persistent persecution. In the decades after its founding, Israel was a relatively lower-income and vulnerable country. [...] But by the time millennials began forming their understanding of global events, the violence of the second Intifada had concluded in the mid-2000s with enhanced walls and barriers constructed between Israel and the West Bank, and then Gaza. This generation formed its idea of Israel from reports of Palestinians denied access to water, freedom of movement and fair trials, under the military control of what was by then a relatively rich, nuclear-armed power. “When I was in college it was the Oslo peace process, and I still remember that Israel — pursuing peace with the Palestinians and the hopes that came along with that,” Waxman said, of the ’90s. “Younger Americans have no memory of that.”

[See more excerpts from the article under the cut. Those excerpts are worth reading because they are quite thought provoking.]

A racial justice lens Joey Ayoub, a Palestinian-Lebanese writer, podcaster and academic, says young Americans are more likely to conceptualize the Palestinian cause as a sister issue to U.S. efforts for racial justice. There is a “visual parallel,” he said: of an armed soldier or police officer dominating a space inhabited by a populace with limited power, whether in a town in the occupied West Bank or a majority-Black neighborhood in the United States. [...] Eitan Hersh, a political science professor at Tufts University, said conflict between Israel and Palestinians seems to be seen by the young left, especially on college campuses, as “a people of color — that is, the Palestinians — rising up against a white oppressor,” though a significant portion of Israel’s Jewish population is of a non-European background. (Some are the descendants of about 850,000 Jews who were expelled from Arab countries and Iran after Israel was founded.) “It’s a bit of a curiosity,” he said. “One could tell an oppressor-oppressed story where the Jews, and Israel, is a story of the oppressed: kicked out of all these countries, going back to their homeland, surrounded by a broad set of dominant countries in the region that wants to destroy it.” Shifting demographics One explanation for the generational divide, experts said, was that fewer Gen Zers and millennials identify as conservative or Christian — demographics more likely to sympathize with Israel — than older groups. [...] Another “major factor” in older generations’ feelings toward Israel is their greater religiosity, according to Waxman. More than three-quarters of Americans 60-64 are Christian — with increasingly higher numbers for older brackets — compared with about half of adults under 30. “It’s, I think, for many religious Christians, somehow a kind of atonement in supporting Israel and Zionism,” Waxman added. “Genuinely, a feeling of Israel as a consequence of this long history of Jewish persecution” by Christians. Some Christians, particularly among evangelicals who are especially likely to sympathize with Israel, believe that Israel was promised to the Jews by God, and that the return of the Jews to Israel fulfills a biblical prophecy of the events that will precede the second coming of Jesus Christ. But even outside of this belief, the idea of Israel as a sacred land for Judeo-Christians has an emotional resonance that is simply not present for the increasing number of secular young Americans. [...] Social vs traditional media Dana El Kurd, a nonresident fellow at the Middle East Institute, said different types of media consumption have probably played a role in how people have formed their views on the Middle East. Americans 45 and older are most likely to get their news from TV networks and their websites, and Americans younger than 45 are most likely to get their news through social media, according to 2022 YouGov polling. The regular use of TikTok in particular is correlated with criticism of Israel, a New York Times/Siena poll found this week. Ayoub, whose interview podcast “The Fire These Times” with Lebanese, Palestinian, Syrian, Jewish, and Armenian perspectives has mostly Gen Z and millennial listeners, said that new forms of media facilitated access between content creators and consumers without “having a gatekeeper.” This has downsides, including “a huge uptick in misinformation” online, he said, but also positives, including allowing traditionally underrepresented groups to reach an audience. [...] “I’ll give an anecdote,” El Kurd said. “My students, when the war broke out, said that they had gone onto TikTok and toggled between the different locations,” to see what kind of videos were popular in Israel compared with Gaza, the West Bank and other places. “It had never occurred to me before to do that.”

I encourage people to read the entire article.

I am strongly opposed to the apartheid that Israel imposed on the Palestinian population. But being from an older generation, I am also less likely to wholly embrace some of the (in my opinion) more simplistic generalizations that younger generations claim regarding Israel.

For instance, many younger people assume most Israelis are predominantly of white European ancestry, but there is evidence that about half the Israeli population is not of white European descent, including those who always lived in the region, those from Ethiopia and Northern Africa, and the descendants of the 20th century expulsion of 850,000 Jews from other nations in the Middle East.

There are also some estimates that only 20% of the general gene pool in Israel is white European. This in turn leads to questions about the assumption of many younger people that white European Jews engaged in a "settler colonialism" of Israel. Still, some form of colonization DID happen, even if it might not fit a strict definition of "settler colonialism."

But it is important to remember that most of the Jewish colonizers around the time of Israel's founding were refugees who had survived the Holocaust, or were running from Eastern European pogroms/oppression, or who were expelled from Iran and Arab nations. What is tragic is that many of these Jewish victims of persecution and oppression and/or their descendants ended up implementing or supporting oppressive practices towards the Palestinians in their attempts to create a Jewish state where they could finally feel safe.

In many ways, all the nations of the world who oppressed and persecuted Jews for centuries have some responsibility for this mess. But that does not absolve the Israeli leaders from their oppressive choices towards Palestinians (especially their current choices that have resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians)--just as Israeli oppressive behavior does not absolve Hamas leaders for their decisions to employ terrorist tactics against Israeli civilians on Oct. 7th.

Although I still support a two-state solution, I believe there are no easy fixes to this situation. The conflict, for both Israelis and Palestinians is an emotional powder keg fueled by thousands of years of transgenerational trauma (both within the region, and outside it in the case of the Jewish diaspora). This in turn affects the perceptions and responses of both Israelis and Palestinians. Sadly the current conflict has only added a new layer to the transgenerational trauma of both groups.

Anyway, after reading the above article, I realize that coming from an older generation, my perspective on the Israeli-Hamas conflict is different than the perspectives of some younger people. However, I still think there should be an immediate cease fire, and that the Biden administration should STOP supporting Israel, unless Israelis agree to end the fighting, fully support a rapid international humanitarian aid effort for the Palestinians in Gaza, come to the table to negotiate peace, and finally allow the creation of a free Palestinian state.

Originally posted 12/23/23; updated 12/24/23

[girlactionfigure]

When Hamas launched the October 7 attack, likely with backing and advise from several countries that host and back Hamas, it knew that there would be an Israeli response. It assumed if it took enough a hostages then it could somehow force talks to go on for years...while it benefited. 

It's important to understand that Hamas has been able to carry out massacres and attacks for three decades because each time it does it, it relies on the international community to quickly rush to make sure there is a ceasefire. So the process is:

1. Hamas attacks 2. Israel responds 3. Ceasefire. 4. Hamas attacks again. 

Hamas is the "tool" that was found by some in the international community in the late 1980s and early 1990s to prevent peace and it was always on hand to be picked up to attack Israel whenever there was any sign of peace. They reach for the "tool" each time, during the Oslo process, in the Second Intifada...after Disengagement etc.

It's so obvious because Disengagement was an opportunity to help Gaza thrive...but the international community and other backers of Hamas reached for their tool to have Hamas take over Gaza. No one reached for the tool of peace and moderation, which would have been easy to reach for. 

October 7 was planned as a major moment for Hamas, it would committ an unprecedented massacre, then hold hostages for years to bring in billions more for its tunnels in Gaza and then use the hostages to gain more influence in the West Bank. When Abbas passes, Hamas would swoop in...it would make itself a "tool" again to be picked up to take over Ramallah for its patrons and benefactors abroad.

It's important to understand also that Hamas believed on October 7 that there was a time limit to Israel's reaction...Israel would be allowed to "run wild" for a few weeks...and then there would be a ceasefire and deal and the war would stop so Hamas can replenish its thousands of rockets and start a new war the next year or two. 

This is the model for Hamas. Start a war, bring ruin on part of Gaza...use the rebuilding of Gaza to construct tunnels and arsenals...start a war, bring ruin, reconstruct tunnels... 

It's important to understand that Hamas did this because in past wars it didn't lose very many fighters. Usually 100 to 1,000 fighters and then it would replace them. All the destruction caused by Israeli bombs can be rebuilt and Hamas contractors make the money doing reconstruction and for each dollar that comes half of it or something like that goes to Hamas and tunnels. 

In fact each war was a "win" for Hamas because for each building hit by an IDF bomb, Hamas can then openly build a tunnel underneath as part of "reconstruction"....it doesn't even had to hide that it replaces whole ruined areas with new terror infrastructure, enhanced and embedded in new civilian homes. Fully integrated. As militaries say "5th gen"... 

And Hamas always benefits from war because when there are civilian casualties it can use this to bring the ceasefire faster and bring condemnation of Israel. Hamas has its connections abroad via its allies and partners who mobilize protests and activists. In the May 2021 conflict with Israel there was a dry run to mobilize attacks on Jewish communities abroad, for instance. 

So we have to understand how Hamas thought on October 6. It believed it would use the hostages to bring itself power in Ramallah. It believed that after a few weeks the war would end and it would thrive. 

Now, four months in, it knows that it has not been able to get Israel to do a ceasefire, but it watches the UN and it knows the votes are getting closer. It is being advised by its host country to hold out a little longer. Hold out in Rafah and then filtrate back to northern Gaza and return to power. 

Hamas also knows that quietly, behind the scenes many international organizations prefer its rule in Gaza. For instance they speak about Hamas police as "law and order" and if there aren't Hamas gunmen to guard the humanitarian aid they are displeased...they feel secure when Hamas is there. It's their partner. 

The idea that anyone but Hamas could or would control Gaza is worrisome to many international stakeholders there. Hamas has been their loyal partner for decades. Hamas police are the ones they work with. In areas without Hamas they call it "lawless"....in essence Hamas is the preferred authoritarian they want. 

Seth Frantzman

@sfrantzman

[mapsontheweb]

Israeli territory and Palestinian territories

« Atlas des frontières », Hugo Billard & Frédéric Encel, Autrement, 2021

by cartesdhistoire

At the Versailles Peace Conference (1919), the Zionist Organization presented its map of territorial claims: Palestine (or Eretz Israel) plus southern Lebanon, the east bank of the Jordan and the Golan Heights. On the Arab side, a great unified and sovereign Arab kingdom was demanded (Damascus Congress, 1919).

During the Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936), London proposed a division on a demographic basis: the northern coastal strip and the Galilee to the Jews, the West Bank, the southern coastal strip, the Negev desert and the Jordan valley to the Arabs. This Peel plan was finally abandoned in the face of refusal from the Palestinian High Committee and the Arab states. However, except for the Negev which returned to the Jewish State, it was nevertheless a fairly similar sharing plan that the UN adopted on November 29, 1947: two almost equal shares and a "corpus separatum" including Jerusalem and Bethlehem under international supervision. The Zionist Organization accepts, the Arabs reject it and start a war whose outcome, favorable to the young Hebrew State, allows it to expand and Jordan to annex most of the Arab State of Stillborn Palestine: the West Bank, or Judea-Samaria, and East Jerusalem. This new geopolitical reality will serve as a basis for negotiations in the Oslo (1993) and Camp David II (2000) peace processes.

Meanwhile, at the end of the Six Day War (1967), Israel will have conquered the strategic Golan Heights from Syria (annexed in 1981), the West Bank from Jordan (which Amman renounced in 1988), and East Jerusalem. (annexed in 1967), the Gaza Strip (returned to the Palestinian Authority in 2005 and controlled by Islamist Hamas since its 2007 putsch) and the Sinai (returned to Egypt via the 1978 Camp David peace accords ).

Finally, if the borders with Syria and Lebanon remain contested and often resemble reopened fronts (Hezbollah), those with Jordan and Egypt are recognized and pacified.