#President Bashar al-Assad

[xtruss]

The Secret Life and Anonymous Death of the Most Prolific War-Crimes Investigator in History

When Mustafa Died, in the Earthquakes in Türkiye, his Work in Syria had Assisted in the Prosecutions of Numerous Figures in Bashar al-Assad’s Regime.

— By Ben Taub | September 14, 2023

Photo Illustration By Cristiana Couceiro; Source Photograph From Getty Images

It Was 4:17 A.M. on February 6th in Antakya, an Ancient Turkish City Near the Syrian Border, when the earth tore open and people’s beds began to shake. On the third floor of an apartment in the Ekinci neighborhood, Anwar Saadeddin, a former brigadier general in the Syrian Army, awoke to the sounds of glass breaking, cupboard doors banging, and jars of tahini and cured eggplant spilling onto the floor. He climbed out of bed, but, for almost thirty seconds, he was unable to keep his footing; the building was moving side to side. When the earthquake subsided, he tried to call his daughter Rula, who lived down the road, but the cellular network was down.

Thirty seconds after the first quake, the building started moving again, this time up and down, with such violence that an exterior wall sheared open, and rain started pouring in. The noise was tremendous—concrete splitting, rebar bending, plates shattering, neighbors screaming. When the shaking stopped, about a minute later, Saadeddin, who is in his late sixties, and his wife walked down three flights of stairs, dressed in pajamas and sandals, and went out into the cold.

“All of Antakya was black—there was no electricity anywhere,” Saadeddin recalled. Thousands of the city’s buildings had collapsed. Survivors spilled into the streets, crowding rubble-strewn alleyways and searching for open ground, as minarets toppled and glass shards fluttered down from tower blocks. The general and his wife set off in the direction of the building where Rula lived, with her husband, Mustafa, and their four children.

A third quake shook the ground. When Saadeddin made it to his daughter’s apartment block, flashes of lighting illuminated what was now a fourteen-story grave. The building—which had been completed less than two years earlier—had twisted as it toppled over, crushing many of the residents. Saadeddin felt his body drained of all emotion, almost as if it didn’t belong to him.

Saadeddin was not the only person searching for Rula and her family. For the past decade, her husband, Mustafa, had quietly served as the deputy chief of Syria investigations for the Commission for International Justice and Accountability, a group that has captured more than a million pages of documents from Syrian military and intelligence facilities. Using these files, lawyers at the cija have prepared some of the most comprehensive war-crimes cases since the Nuremberg trials, targeting senior Syrian regime officers—including the President, Bashar al-Assad. After the earthquake, the group directed its investigative focus into a search-and-rescue operation for members of its own Syrian team, many of whom had been displaced to southern Turkey after more than a decade of war. By the end of the third day, nearly everyone was accounted for. Two investigators had lost children; one of them had also lost his wife. But Mustafa was still missing.

For as long as Mustafa had been working for the cija, the group had kept his identity secret—even after it captured a Syrian intelligence document that showed that the regime knew about his investigative work and was actively hunting him down. “He was probably my best investigator,” Mustafa’s supervisor, an Australian who goes by Mick, told me, during a recent visit to the Turkish-Syrian border. Documents that Mustafa obtained, and witness interviews that he conducted, have assisted judicial proceedings in the United States, France, Belgium, Germany, and several other European jurisdictions. According to a cija estimate, Mustafa “either directly obtained or supported in the acquisition” of more than two hundred thousand pages of internal Syrian regime documents, likely making him—by sheer volume of evidence collected—the most prolific war-crimes investigator in history.

Twelve years into the Syrian war, at least half the population has been displaced, often multiple times, under varied circumstances of individual tragedy. No one knows the actual death toll—not even to the nearest hundred thousand. And yet the Syrian regime’s crimes continue apace. “The prisons are full,” Bill Wiley, the cija’s founder and executive director, told me. “All the offenses that started being carried out at scale in 2011 are still being perpetrated. Unlawful detention, physical abuse amounting to torture, extrajudicial killing, sexual offenses—all of that continues. War crimes on the battlefield, particularly in the context of aerial operations. There are still chemical attacks. It all continues. But, as long as there’s the drip, drip, drip of Western prosecutions, pursuant to universal jurisdiction, it’s really difficult to envision the normalization of the regime.”

Before the Syrian Revolution, Mustafa was a trial lawyer, living and working in Al-Rastan, a suburb of the central city of Homs. He and his wife, Rula, had three small children, and Rula was pregnant with the fourth. In early 2011, when Syrians took to the streets to protest against the regime—which had ruled for almost half a century—Assad declared that anyone who did not contribute to “burying sedition” was “a part of it.” Suddenly Mustafa was caught in a delicate position, since many of Rula’s male relatives were military officers.

Her father and her uncles had joined the Syrian armed forces as young men, and served Assad’s father for many years before they served him. In the mid-nineties, Assad’s older brother died in a car crash, and he was called back from his studies in London and sent to a military academy in Homs. Eventually, he joined a staff officers’ course, where Anwar Saadeddin—then a colonel and a military engineer—says he spent a year and a half in his class.

Assad became President in 2000, after his father died, and for the next decade Saadeddin carried on with his duties without complaint. In 2003, Saadeddin was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. At the outset of the revolution, his younger son was a lieutenant, and he was two years from retirement.

Mustafa and Rula’s fourth child was born on April 5, 2011. Three days later, security forces shot a number of protesters in the Baba Amr neighborhood of Homs, including a disabled man, who was unable to run away. They dragged him from the site and returned his mutilated corpse to his family the following evening. From then on, Homs was the site of some of the largest anti-regime protests—and the most violent crackdown.

On April 19th, thousands of people gathered for a sit-in beneath a clock tower. At about midnight, officers warned that anyone who didn’t leave voluntarily would be removed by force. A couple of hours passed; a thousand people remained. At dawn, the people of Homs awoke to traces of a massacre. A witness later reported that religious leaders who had stayed to treat the wounded and to tend to the dead were summarily executed. Several others recalled that the bodies were removed with dump trucks, and that the blood of the dead and wounded was washed away with hoses.

The day after the massacre, according to documents that were later captured from Assad’s highest-level security committee, the regime decided to embark on a “new phase” in the crackdown, to “demonstrate the power and capacity of the state.” Nine days later, regime forces killed at least nineteen protesters in Al-Rastan, where Mustafa and Rula lived. Mustafa wasn’t involved in politics or human-rights work, beyond discussions of basic democratic reforms, but he was appalled by the overtly criminal manner in which security forces and associated militias carried out their campaign with impunity. Locals formed neighborhood-protection units, and soon took up arms against the state.

A few months later, Mustafa briefly sneaked out of Syria to attend a training session in Turkey, led by Bill Wiley, a Canadian war-crimes investigator who had previously worked for various tribunals and the International Criminal Court. Wiley, and others in his world, had noticed a jurisdictional gap in accountability for Syria and had begun casting about for Syrian lawyers who might be up for a perilous, but worthy, task. Although there was no tribunal set up for Syria, and Russia and China had blocked efforts to refer Syria to the I.C.C., Wiley and his associates had reasoned that the process of collecting evidence is purely a matter of risk tolerance and logistics. The work of criminal investigators is different from that of human-rights N.G.O.s: groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch produce and disseminate reports on horrific violations and abuse, but Wiley trained Mustafa and the other Syrians in attendance to collect the kind of evidence that could allow prosecutors to assign individual criminal responsibility to senior military and intelligence officers. A video showing tanks firing on unarmed protesters might influence public opinion, but a pile of military communications that proved which commanders were in charge of the operation could one day land someone in jail.

“The first task was to ferret out primary-source material—documents, in particular, generated by the regime,” Wiley told me. “We were looking for prima-facie evidence, not intelligence product or information to inform the public.”

Mustafa instantly grasped the urgency of the project. By day, he carried on with his law practice. But, in secret, he started building up sources within the armed opposition. As they captured new territory, he would go into security and intelligence facilities, box up documents, and move them to secret locations, like farmhouses or caves, farther from the confrontation lines.

“By 2012, we had already started to get some structure,” Wiley recalled. He secured funding from Western governments, and eventually the group settled on a name: the Commission for International Justice and Accountability. “We had our guys in Raqqa, Idlib, Aleppo, and so forth—at least one guy in all the key areas,” he said. From there, the cija built out each team—between two and four individuals, working under the head of each provincial cell. “And Mustafa was our core guy in Homs.”

Anwar Saadeddin soon found himself wielding his position in order to rescue relatives who were caught up in the conflict. His younger son, an Army lieutenant, was detained by military operatives on the outskirts of Damascus, after another officer in his brigade reported him for watching Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera. According to an internal military communication, which was later captured by the cija, Assad believed that foreign reporting on Syria amounted to “psychological warfare aimed at creating a state of internal chaos.”

When Saadeddin’s son was detained, he recalled, “I interfered just to decrease the detention period to thirty days.” Soon afterward, he learned that Mustafa was a target of military intelligence in Homs, where the local facility, Branch 261, was headed by one of Saadeddin’s friends: Mohammed Zamrini.

Mustafa wasn’t calling for an armed rebellion, and, at the time, neither the regime nor his father-in-law knew of his connection to Wiley and the cija. But rebel factions were active in Al-Rastan, and Mustafa was known to have urged them not to destroy any public establishments. To hard-liners in the regime, such interaction was considered tantamount to collaboration. “So I went with Mustafa to the branch,” Saadeddin told me. Zamrini agreed to detain him as a formality—for about twelve hours, with light interrogations and no torture or abuse—so that he could essentially cross Mustafa off the list.

In the next few months, the security situation rapidly deteriorated. The Army encircled rebellious neighborhoods near Homs and shelled them to the ground. Saadeddin’s son, who was serving near Damascus, was arrested a second time, and in order to get him released Saadeddin had to supplicate himself in the office of Assef Shawkat, Assad’s brother-in-law and the deputy minister of defense. In Homs, Saadeddin started driving Mustafa to and from work in his light-blue Kia; as a brigadier general, he could move passengers through checkpoints without them being searched or arrested.

But Saadeddin was beginning to find his position untenable. He sensed that the regime’s policy of total violence would lead to the destruction of the country. That spring, he began to share his fears and frustrations with close colleagues and friends, including the commander of his son’s brigade. But it was a perilous game: Assad’s highest-level security committee had instructed the heads of regional security branches to hunt down “security agents who are irresolute or unenthusiastic” in carrying out their duties. According to a U.N. inquiry, some officers were detained and tortured for having “attempted to spare civilians” on whom they had been ordered to fire.

That spring, Saadeddin’s car was stopped at one of the checkpoints that ordinarily waved him through. It was the first time that his position served not as protection against interrogation but as a reason to question his loyalty. The regime was quickly losing territory, and as the conflict spiralled out of control many senior officers found themselves approaching the limits of their willingness to go along. He and his brothers had “reached a point where we would either stand by the regime and have to take part in atrocities, or we would have to defect,” he told me.

That July, Saadeddin gathered his brothers, his sons, two nephews, and several other military officers in front of a small camera, somewhere near the Turkish-Syrian border. Dressed in his uniform, he announced that the army to which he had pledged his allegiance some four decades earlier had “deviated from its mission” and turned on its citizens instead. To honor the Syrian public’s “steadfastness in the face of barbaric assaults by Assad’s bloody gangs, we have decided to defect from the Army,” he said. It was one of the largest mass defections of Syrian officers, and his plan was to take a leading role in the rebellion—to fight for freedom “until martyrdom or victory.” In response, Saadeddin told me, their former colleagues sent troops to destroy their houses and those of their family members. They expropriated their land and killed several of their relatives.

By now, the regime had ceded swaths of Syria’s border with Turkey to various rebel forces. Saadeddin moved his family across the border and into a refugee camp that the Turkish government had set up for military and intelligence officers who defected. Then he went back to Syria, to try to bring some order and unity to the rebel factions that were battling his former colleagues.

But Mustafa and his family stayed behind in Al-Rastan, which was now firmly in rebel hands. The regime’s loss of control at the Turkish border meant that the cija could start moving its captured documents out of the country.

“It was complicated, reaching the border, because the confrontation lines were so fluid,” Wiley recalled. “And there were multiple bodies who were overtly hostile to cija”—not only the regime but also a growing number of extremist groups who were suspicious of anyone working for a Western N.G.O. During the first document extraction, a courier was shot and injured. During the next, another courier vanished with a suitcase full of documents. “Just fucking disappeared,” Wiley said. “Probably thought he could sell them.” Mustafa recruited a cousin to transport some files to Turkey. But, after the delivery, on the way back to Al-Rastan, the cousin took a minibus, and the vehicle was ambushed by regime troops. “He was shot, but it was unclear if he was wounded or dead when they took him away,” another Syrian cija investigator, whom I’ll call Omar, told me. For the next several weeks, regime agents blackmailed Mustafa, saying that for twenty thousand dollars they would release his cousin from custody. But, when Mustafa asked for proof of life, they failed to provide it—suggesting that the cousin had already died in custody.

By now, Wiley had issued new orders for the extraction process. “I said, ‘O.K., there needs to be a plan, and I need to know what the plan is,’ ” he recalled. “ ‘How are you getting from A to B? What risks are there between point A and point B? And how are you going to ameliorate those risks?’ As opposed to just throwing the shit in the car and going, ‘Well, God decides.’ ”

Saadeddin Spent Much of the next eighteen months trying to organize disparate rebel groups into a unified command. He travelled all over northern Syria, as rebels took new ground, and met with all manner of revolutionaries—from secular defectors to hard-line field commanders. By the summer of 2013, the regime had ceded control of most of northern Syria. But there was little cohesion between the rebel factions, and isis and Al Qaeda had come to exploit the power vacuum in rebel territory. At some point, Saadeddin recalled, he scolded a Tunisian isis commander for arousing sectarian and ethnic tensions, and imposing extremism onto local communities. “He responded that I was an apostate, and suggested that I should be killed,” Saadeddin told me.

In Al-Rastan, a regime shell penetrated the walls of Mustafa’s house, but it didn’t explode. At that point, Rula and the children moved to Reyhanli, a small Turkish village that is so close to the border that you can eat at a kebab shop there while watching sheep graze in Syria. It was also a short drive from the defected officers’ camp, where Rula’s mother and several other relatives were living. But Mustafa stayed behind, to carry out his investigative work for the cija.

“When new areas were liberated, the security branches were raided, and many people took files,” Omar recalled. Some of them didn’t grasp the significance of the files; at least one soldier burned them for warmth. “But most people knew the documents would be useful, someday—they just didn’t know what to do with them. So they just kept them. And the challenge was in identifying who had what, where.”

But, before long, Omar continued, “Mustafa built a wide network of contacts in rebel territory. Word got out that he was collecting documents, and so eventually people would refer others who had taken documents to him.” Sometimes he encountered a reluctance to turn over the originals, until he shared with them the outlines of the cija’s objective and paths to accountability. “At that point, they would usually relent, understanding that his use for them was the best use.”

As his profile in rebel territory grew, Mustafa remained highly secretive. But, from time to time, he asked his father-in-law for introductions to other defected military and intelligence officers. By now, Saadeddin recalled, “I knew the nature of his work, but I didn’t discuss it with him.” There was an understanding that it was best to compartmentalize any sensitive information, for the sake of the family. “Sometimes my wife didn’t even know what I was doing,” Saadeddin said. “But I do know that, at a certain point, through his interviews, Mustafa came to know these defected officers even better than I did.”

In 2014, Wiley restructured the cija’s Syrian team; as deputy chief of investigations, Mustafa now presided over all the group’s provincial cells. “He was very good at finding documents, and he understood evidence and law,” Wiley said. “But he was also respected by his peers. And he had a natural empathy, which translated into him being a very good interviewer” of victims and perpetrators alike. According to Omar, Mustafa often cut short his appearances at social gatherings, citing family or work. “I know it’s a cliché, but he really was a family guy,” Wiley told me. “But where he excelled in our view—because we don’t need a bunch of good family guys, to be blunt—is that he could execute.”

That July, Assad’s General Intelligence Directorate apparently learned of the cija’s activities, long before the group had been named in the press. In a document that was sent to at least ten intelligence branches—and which was later captured by the cija—the directorate identified Mustafa as “vice-chairman” of the group, and also listed the names of the leading investigators within each of the cija’s governorate cells. At the bottom of the document, the head of the directorate handwrote orders to “arrest them along with their collaborators.”

By now, Western governments, which had pledged to support secular opposition groups, found the situation in northern Syria unpalatable; there was no way to guarantee that weapons given to a secular armed faction would not end up in jihadi hands. Saadeddin had begun to lose hope in the revolution—a sentiment that grew only stronger when Assad’s forces killed more than a thousand civilians with sarin gas, and the Obama Administration backed away from its “red-line” warning of retaliation. “At that point, I lost all faith in the international community,” Saadeddin told me. “I felt that they didn’t want Syria to become liberated—they wanted Syria to stay as it was.” He moved into the defected officers’ camp in southern Turkey, where he remained—feeling “rotten,” consumed by a sense of impotence and frustration—for most of the next decade.

I First Came Into Contact with the cija late in the summer of 2015. By that point, the group had smuggled more than six hundred thousand documents out of Syria, and had prepared a legal brief that assigned individual criminal responsibility for the torture and murder of thousands of people in detention centers to senior members of the Syrian security-intelligence apparatus—including Assad himself. In the following years, the cija expanded its operations to Iraq, Myanmar, Libya, and Ukraine. But Syria was always at the core.

“In terms of the opposition overrunning regime territory—that effectively ceased in September, 2015, when the Russians came in,” Wiley recalled. In the following years, Russian fighter jets pummelled areas under rebel control, while fighters from Russian mercenary groups, Iranian militias, and Hezbollah reinforced Assad’s troops on the ground. In time, the confrontation lines settled, with the country effectively carved into areas under regime, opposition, Turkish, and Kurdish control. But Mustafa and other investigators continued to identify troves of documents, scattered among various hidden sites. “We’d acquire them from different places, and then concentrate them,” Wiley said. Omar told me that it was best to keep files as close to the border as possible, to limit the chance of their being destroyed in the event that the regime took back ground. “Mustafa would sometimes spend a week or more prepping for document extractions,” Omar said. “He would sleep in tents,” in camps filled with other displaced civilians, “while he waited for the right moment to move the files closer to the border.”

At the cija’s headquarters, in Western Europe, the organization built cases against senior intelligence officers, like the double agent Khaled al-Halabi, and provided evidence to European prosecutors who were investigating lesser targets all over the continent. In recent years, Western prosecutors and police agencies have sent hundreds of requests for investigative assistance to the cija headquarters; when the answers can’t be found in the existing files, analysts refer the inquiries, via Mick, the Australian in southern Turkey, to the Syrians on the ground. “We wouldn’t tell them who’s asking, or who the suspects are,” Wiley said. “We’d just say, ‘O.K., we’re interested in witnesses to a particular crime base’—a security-intelligence facility, a static killing, an execution, that kind of thing. And then they would identify witnesses and do a screening interview.” When requests came through, Mick told me, “Mustafa was usually the first team member that I went to, because his networks were so good.”

During the peak years of the pandemic, Mustafa identified and collected witness statements against a trio of Syrian isis members who had been active in a remote village in the deserts of central Syria and were now scattered across Western Europe. All three men were arrested after his death.

Perhaps Mustafa’s most enduring contribution to the cija’s casework is found in one of the group’s most comprehensive, confidential investigative briefs, which I read at the headquarters this spring. It’s a three-hundred-page document, with almost thirteen hundred footnotes, establishing individual criminal responsibility for war crimes carried out during the regime’s 2012 siege of Baba Amr, a neighborhood in the southern part of Mustafa’s home city, Homs. Other cases have centered on torture in detention facilities; this is the first Syrian war-crimes brief that focusses on the conduct of hostilities, and it spells out, in astonishing and historic detail, a litany of crimes, ranging from indiscriminate shelling to mass executions of civilians who were rounded up and killed in warehouses and factories as regime forces swept through. The Homs Brief—for which Mustafa collected much of the underlying evidence—also assigns criminal responsibility to individual commanders within the Syrian Army’s 18th Tank Division, which carried out the assault.

“He thought he was contributing to a better Syria,” Wiley said. “When—and what it would look like—was unsure. But he believed in what he was doing. He could have fucked off years ago. We probably could have gotten him to Canada. We talked about it, because one of his daughters had a congenital heart issue.” Nevertheless, he stayed.

Last year, Mustafa bought an apartment on the eleventh floor of a new tower block in Antakya. Rula’s aunt moved into the same building, a couple of stories below. Her parents left the defected officers’ camp and moved into another apartment block, a short walk up the road. A few months later, Mick recalled, “Mustafa said to me, ‘When I’m at home with my family, it doesn’t matter what’s happening outside—it doesn’t matter if there’s a war. When I’m at home, I’m at peace.’ ”

Last December, Mick was visiting Mustafa’s apartment when the floor began to shake. “It spooked me—it was my first time feeling this kind of tremor,” Mick recalled. Mustafa laughed and said that they happen “all the time.” Then he went to check on Rula and the children, who reported that they hadn’t even felt it.

A couple of months later, Mick awoke to news of the catastrophic earthquake and tried to call members of his Syrian team. But the cellular networks were down in Antakya, and it was impossible for him to travel there, because the local airport’s runway had buckled, along with many local roads.

Saadeddin’s sister was dug out of the complex alive; her husband survived as well, but died in a hospital soon afterward, without anyone in the family knowing where he was. On the fourth day of search-and-rescue operations, Mustafa’s passport was found in the rubble. Then his laptop, then his wife’s handbag. “When they found the bodies,” Omar said, “Mustafa was hugging his daughter, his wife was hugging their son, and the other two children were hugging each other.”

Omar spent the next several days sleeping in his car, along with his wife and six children. Thousands of aftershocks shook the region, and, by the time I met with him, a few hundred metres from the Syrian border, he was so rattled that he reacted to everyday sounds as if they might signal a building’s collapse. His breath was short and his eyes welled with tears; Mustafa had been one of his best friends, and he had also lost eleven relatives to the quake, all of whom had been displaced from the same village in northern Syria. Then his young son walked into the room, and he turned his head. “We try to hide from our children our fear and our grief, so that they don’t feel as if we are weak,” he said.

A few weeks after the earthquake, there was an empty seat at a prestigious international-criminal-investigations course, in the Hague. Mustafa had been scheduled to attend. “We can mitigate the effects of war, except bad luck, but we didn’t factor an earthquake into the plan, institutionally,” Wiley told me. Mick coördinated humanitarian assistance for displaced investigators, and, as Wiley put it, “the operational posture came back really quickly.” Omar has now taken over Mustafa’s leadership duties. “Keep in mind how resilient this cadre is,” Wiley continued. “They’re already all refugees, perhaps with the rare exception. They had already lost their homes, lost all their stuff.”

It was the middle of April, more than two months after the quake. Much of Antakya had been completely flattened, and what still stood was cracked and broken, completely abandoned, and poised to collapse. Mick and I made our way through the old city on foot; the alleys were too narrow for digging equipment to go through, and so we found ourselves climbing over rubble, as if the buildings had fallen the day before. The pets of those entombed in the collapsed buildings followed us, still wearing their collars—bewildered, brand-new strays. ♦

[worldnewsspot]

Assad’s 2nd Diplomatic Trip in Days Speeds Easing of Isolation

President Bashar al-Assad of Syria traveled to the United Arab Emirates on Sunday for an official visit accompanied by his wife, a sign of the growing momentum with which he is returning to the international stage after a decade-long isolation. He was received by a delegation that included the Emirati ruler, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, and the two discussed the “brotherly relations” between their…

[workersolidarity]

🇹🇷🇸🇾 🚨

ERDOGAN REACHES OUT TO ASSAD, TURKIYE AND SYRIA TO CAUTIOUSLY RE-ESTABLISH TIES, VLADIMIR PUTIN TO MEDIATE

In a tectonic shift in Euroasian geopolitics beginning on Friday, July 5th, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced after returning from a trip to Kazakhstan, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the possiblity Turkiye would extend an inventation to hold talks with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, with Vladimir Putin acting as a mediator between the two leaders.

Erdogan described the move as representing "the beginning of a new phase of Turkish-Syrian rapprochement."

Erdogan signaled a new diplomatic peace initiative, as it is being described by semi-official Anadolu News Agency, and "suggesting a potential invitation to Syria's Bashar al-Assad."

"We, together with Russian President Vladimir Putin, may have an invitation to Bashar al-Assad," Erdogan is quoted as telling a group of journalists on his return flight from the Kazakhstani capital Asana, where he spent two days attending Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit.

“If Mr. Putin can visit Türkiye, this could be the beginning of a new process," Erdogan continued, adding that "The passing years in Syria have clearly shown everyone the need for establishing a permanent solution,” the Turkish leader is quoted as saying, referring to the 2011 Arab Spring attempted coups which led to brutal civil war in Syria, largely instigated by Western capitals, with the help of three-letter agencies, and during which, Erdogan lent support to Western narratives which aimed to depose the Syrian President.

Erdogan is quoted as saying "We are talking about mediation here, so why don't we communicate directly with our neighbor?"

Erdogan went on to tell reporters that Turkiye has "always extended and will continue to extend a hand of friendship to our neighbor Syria. We would stand by a prosperous, unified Syria based on a fair, honorable, and inclusive new social contract. All we ask is that Syria initiates this great embrace and achieves recovery in every aspect."

#source

@WorkerSolidarityNews

[kirstythejetblackgoldfish]

Syed Gaddaf al-Dam's funeral was held today in Cairo (20 March 2023)

Of course Syed's rather famous brother Ahmed attended, and Gamal Mubarak attended too

[mostlykind]

my sister is doing a hunger games movie marathon and I joined her for mockingjay part 1 and I was literally crying watching it cos most of it fully went over my head as a kid and now I’m older and I just see so much of our reality in it. it was never too far fetched

[rausule]

Die klopjag op Aleppo

Die "Aleppino" lughawe het beide 'n logistieke en 'n simboliese belang. Die lughawe is eintlik fundamenteel vir die brose Siriese ekonomie, wat worstel met 'n nimmereindigende konflik en met Westerse sanksies. Die belangrikste ambagte van die land gaan hier deur, met inagneming van die funksie van Aleppo as die "ekonomiese hoofstad" van Sirië. Maar die lughawe is ook 'n simbool van die weerstand van die Damaskus-weermag teen Islamitiese en opposisiegroepe wat vir vier jaar, van 2012 tot 2016, het hulle die stad met lojaliste betwis. Inderdaad, die struktuur is altyd in die hande van die weermag gebly, wat dus voortdurend kon ontvang voorrade selfs tydens die mees kritieke fases van die geveg wat in Desember 2016 geëindig het.

Daarom, vir die regering van president Bashar Al Assad, om klopjagte binne die lughawe te ondergaan

verteenwoordig 'n groot slag op baie fronte. Volgens die jongste inligting ten minste twee bomme

hulle het op die aanloopbane neergestort en dit het die Aleppo-lughawestelsel in 'n stilstand gebring. Daar

struktuur is gesluit en daarom kan die vliegtuie nie opstyg of land nie. Van Damaskus

militêre bronne het gespesifiseer dat werk gedoen word om op die laatste 'n heropening te verseker

Binnekort. Die owerhede se hoofdoelwit is om ekonomiese en logistieke ontwrigting tot die minimum te beperk

perseel, maar met die spook van verdere klopjagte in die volgende paar dae.

Die 28 Augusti 2023

Ad populandum Aleppo

Aeroportus "Aleppino" habet momentum logisticum et symbolicum. Aeroportus est re vera fundamentalis ad fragilem oeconomiam Syriacam, luctationis cum conflictu inexhausto et cum Occidentis sanctionibus. Praecipuae patriae negotiationes huc transeunt, considerantes munus Aleppi sicut "capitis oeconomicus" Syriae. Sed elit etiam symbolum de resistentiis exercitus Damasceni contra islamistam et adversas factiones quae for quattuor annis ab MMXII ad 2016 urbem cum bonis certaverunt. Immo structura est semper penes exercitum, quod inde recipere poterat, semper manebat supplet etiam in discrimine gravissimorum incrementa pugnae quae mense Decembri 2016 finivit. Ideo ad regimen Praesidis Bashar Al Assad, ut excursiones intra aeroportus patiantur ictum majus in multis frontibus repraesentat. Secundum notitias recentissimas in duobus saltem bombs in cunis crepuerunt et hoc systema aeriportum Aleppo in tailspin misit. Ibi compages clausa est, ideoque plana nec auferre nec terra possunt. Damascen fontes militares denominaverunt opus esse factum ut ad novissimum recluderetur Mox. Disruptionem oeconomicam et logisticam obscuratis principale propositum est auctoritatum praemittit, sed spectris ulteriorum incursionibus insequentibusque diebus.

[paulthepoke]

This Week in Prophecy: Gaza Strip, Israel's 75th, Magog's Gang, Pacific Theater

This Week in Prophecy: Gaza Strip, Israel's 75th, Magog's Gang, Pacific Theater

Zephaniah 2:4-5 For Gaza shall be deserted, and Ashkelon shall become a desolation; Ashdod’s people shall be driven out at noon, and Ekron shall be uprooted. Woe to you inhabitants of the seacoast, you nation of the Cherethites! The word of the LORD is against you, O Canaan, land of the Philistines; and I will destroy you until no inhabitant is left. As usual, the rocket exchange between the…

[sylvia-on-the-run]

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Appreciates the Syrian Foreign Ministry’s Decision to Cancel the Visa Requirement for Palestinians

"The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine highly values the decision by the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to cancel the requirement for Palestinians to obtain a visa to enter Syrian territory, allowing them entry with no conditions other than presenting their travel document or passport.

The PFLP extends its greetings and gratitude to President Dr. Bashar Al-Assad and the brotherly Syrian people, affirming that this decision will help alleviate the burdens faced by our Palestinian people."

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Central Media Department August 18, 2024

[afloweroutofstone]

I recently learned that in March 2011, the same month as the large-scale protests against Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad which eventually turned into the Syrian Civil War, Assad paid US public relations agents to get his wife a puff piece in Vogue about how she's a genius girlboss with great fashion sense and a heart of gold

Asma al-Assad is glamorous, young, and very chic—the freshest and most magnetic of first ladies. Her style is not the couture-and-bling dazzle of Middle Eastern power but a deliberate lack of adornment. She’s a rare combination: a thin, long-limbed beauty with a trained analytic mind who dresses with cunning understatement. Paris Match calls her “the element of light in a country full of shadow zones.” She is the first lady of Syria.

Syria is known as the safest country in the Middle East, possibly because, as the State Department’s Web site says, “the Syrian government conducts intense physical and electronic surveillance of both Syrian citizens and foreign visitors.” It’s a secular country where women earn as much as men and the Muslim veil is forbidden in universities, a place without bombings, unrest, or kidnappings, but its shadow zones are deep and dark. Asma’s husband, Bashar al-Assad, was elected president in 2000, after the death of his father, Hafez al-Assad, with a startling 97 percent of the vote. In Syria, power is hereditary. The country’s alliances are murky. How close are they to Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah? There are souvenir Hezbollah ashtrays in the souk, and you can spot the Hamas leadership racing through the bar of the Four Seasons. Its number-one enmity is clear: Israel. But that might not always be the case. The United States has just posted its first ambassador there since 2005, Robert Ford...

The 35-year-old first lady’s central mission is to change the mind-set of six million Syrians under eighteen, encourage them to engage in what she calls “active citizenship.” “It’s about everyone taking shared responsibility in moving this country forward, about empowerment in a civil society. We all have a stake in this country; it will be what we make it.”

In 2005 she founded Massar, built around a series of discovery centers where children and young adults from five to 21 engage in creative, informal approaches to civic responsibility. Massar’s mobile Green Team has touched 200,000 kids across Syria since 2005. The organization is privately funded through donations. The Syria Trust for Development, formed in 2007, oversees Massar as well as her first NGO, the rural micro-credit association FIRDOS, and SHABAB, which exists to give young people business skills they need for the future.

[nimrochan]

No disrespect, and I want to say that jewish people should absolutely be safe and feel welcome and happy everywhere in the world. But how can you talk positively about moving to Israel, paying taxes to a government, that has been confirmed to have killed 13.000 children? Do you not see an issue with moving to a state that has been determined by the ICJ to be committing a genocide right now?

Thank you for your question. I’ll do my best to answer this as an Israeli-American with a more inside perspective than most people who haven’t been in the area.

Incoming novel.

First off, I encourage you to read my pinned post.

Second, I believe Israel is a tiny country that as being held to an impossible standard. The situation there is very unique and I ask you to not compare it to others.

(I promise I’m going somewhere with this) in the past ten years, half a million Syrians and half a million Yemenis died in civil war in what I think are actual genocides. Millions more are refugees. China forcibly puts its Muslim citizens in “re-education” camps, another form of cruelty and cultural genocide. There are other genocides actually happening in Congo and Darfur and other places. There are humanitarian crises in Arab countries regarding the horrific treatments of women. And in North Korea, the situation has always been dire - it contains a concentration camp the size of Rhodes island.

This leads me to ask- why is the hate for Israel so widespread and deep? I’ve never seen protests addressing these aforementioned issues so passionately. I almost NEVER see them addressed on social media. I have never seen Russian, Chinese, Afghani people etc in places OUTSIDE of their countries being harassed to the extent that Jews and Israelites are. Jews outside of Israel have been harassed and attacked, some have even been murdered. Our synagogues and graveyards have been vandalized. Thousands, maybe tens of thousands of people openly march for our deaths rather than to condemn terrorism or condemn far more horrible governments. I can only come to the conclusion that it’s antisemitism. It’s not a coincidence that the only Jewish country in the world a) has such a microscope over it, b) is one of the most terrorized countries in the world, and c) has so much widely-accepted misinformation regarding it. Including the whole “white colonizer” narrative - most Israelis are brown.

The UN has a history of not accepting Israel as a country and disregarding the years of constant terrorism against it. It has not acknowledged 10/07. The voters of the ICJ include Bashar Al Assad who is the president of Syria. Yes that same Syria that kills its own people. Another voter is from China. Same China with countless human rights violations. Another voter whose name escapes me now made motions to deny humanitarian crises in other Arab countries. So between the UN and the ICJ voters, the parties are extremely biased and ignore far worse issues. So I am not going to take them seriously. I hope you ask yourself what else may have skewed your perspective on the war, if such big international organizations are demonstrably biased.

Genocide is done with intent. In the last 50 years, the Palestinian population has grown FASTER than the world’s Jewish population. I can tell you first hand, as someone with many family members who have served in the IDF, and who knows how strong the Israeli military is - genocide is not, has never been, and will never be the intention of Israel. If it WANTED to commit genocide, I guarantee you that absolutely far more Palestinians would have been slaughtered and I would tear up my passport in that case.

When the LEADERS of a county cross a border into ANOTHER country, unprovoked, and personally slaughter and rape thousands of civilians, that is genocide and that is declaring war. It’s a very small scale genocide, but technically it is. If you read the charter of Gaza, it actually states the goal of killing all Jews. Hamas killed the maximum number of Israelis that was in their power at the time. Including people that my own family were close to.

Growing up in Israel, among some Arabs, I can tell you that no one EVER taught me to hate Arabs. In fact they taught us Arabic in school along with English. All street signs are in English, Hebrew, and Arabic. Meanwhile across the border, their government put guns in kids’ hands and teach them that Jews are pigs. And I don’t think they’re considerate enough to put any of their public signs in Hebrew.

You can see pictures online of Hamas dressing up their kids as child soldiers.

I don’t know if you ever saw the footage of Hamas driving around Gaza with dead bodies after the 10/07 attack and many Gazan civilians celebrating and dancing with their kids and handing out candies, mutilating the bodies further. Look up Shani Louk.

While a handful of Israelis are openly racist (just like there are racists everywhere else on the planet), you will NEVER see something this horrific on Israeli streets. NEVER.

Obviously, not all Gazan civilians are this heinous and nobody should be punished for where they were born (and anti-Israelis are lost on the irony of calling all Israelis kid-murdering genocide-lovers who deserved what happened to them including rape and infantacide). But I want you to ask yourself, If this was My country, how would they respond? I don’t think Israel is responding WORSE than America or other strong countries would. Again that leads me to ask why the hate is out of proportion even for their strong response.

The Ministry of Health in Gaza reports that about 30-40K casualties by Israel. Now that organization is run by… Hamas. But okay, I’m willing to believe that number. I’m willing to believe that that number is double. And I’m extremely saddened by innocent Gazans suffering because of the carelessness and evil of their leaders. But let’s look at the number for now.

Israel reports that about 17,000 of the people killed in Gaza are Hamas militants. That leaves a civilian-combatant ratio of 1:1.2 - 1:2. That’s… average for war. For a dense urban area like Gaza? That is LOW. That does not fit the definition of genocide. It is war, and it sucks, but it’s not genocide.

As for children dying - We do not yet know exactly the number of children who are militants. A baby is counted as a child, but so are the 15-17 year old child soldiers that Hamas recruits. So now the line is blurring.

Not to mention, Hamas has been caught altering birth dates on records of dead Gazans to bring their ages down. Some 18-year-olds are falsely reported as being 17 at death to falsely increase the numbers of killed children on paper.

To go a little off topic, Al Jazeera has also been caught numerous times censoring Gazans criticizing Hamas and reporting biased news. Heck they even reported the rape and murder of my people as “a necessary step.” Look up Howidy Hamza, a Palestinian reporter who talks about Hamas. Hamas is unbelievably cruel to their own people. Yet protests in the US and around the world praise them.

Let’s go back to Israel being the most terrorized country in the world behind Somalia. Do you know what’s going on in Somalia? Of course probably not - another crisis largely ignored by the world because it’s not as exciting or interesting.

Again I grew up in Israel. In the 90’s there was a rash of suicide bombings on buses by the PLO, so I remember avoiding buses as a child out of fear. I also remember waiting in line with my family to get free gas masks because Saddam Hussein once threatened biological warfare on us. Fun times.

I went back to visit in 2015 - this time, a trend of Palestinian civilians in Israel randomly stabbing Jews or running over them or throwing rocks at them. Some Palestinian teens threw rocks into traffic and killed a 2-year old.

And in the past 20 years at least, Hamas and OTHER parties have been sending rockets into Israel. Into civilian areas. Do you think that’s normal? Do you think it’s normal to have apps to alert you to rockets and to have so many bomb shelters? Have you ever spoken to a relative overseas and heard rockets in the background while on the phone with them?

Do you know how many hundreds of thousands of us would be dead if it weren’t for the iron dome?

EDITED TO ADD: Israel responds to rocket fire to destroy the source, because the iron dome is not perfect and CONTINUED firing eventually harms Israeli civilians. Yes, Hamas makes sure to fire rockets from Gazan civilian areas. Another note I want to bring up - I don’t know how many Gazans are displaced currently, I have a hard time finding a nonbiased source, but I would guess around 750K - 1.2 million. If they are displaced RATHER then killed, that’s another contradiction to calling this war a genocide.

Do you know why Gaza has received billions of dollars in aid over the years - enough to turn it into a living paradise - only for Hamas to use it to build underground tunnels and rockets for the purpose of attacking a country that has NEVER in its history attacked first or started any wars? (Yes, believe it or not, Israel has never STARTED a war since its inception).

The other problem with Gaza is Hamas intentionally having military targets under densely populated areas. When Israel warns civilians to leave, via leaflets or alerts, many times Hamas threatens them to stay and become martyrs. On top of it, they dress as civilians and recruit children, and fire rockets from refugee camps and apartment buildings and schools and hospitals. This is neither legal nor ethical warfare.

Israel does not, has never put military targets near civilian, nor does the IDF recruit children or dress as civilians. That’s a bare minimum.

I won’t deny that members of the IDF have done shitty things, just like the American army and other armies around the world have probably done, but if I had to choose between the country with the military that wants me dead and Israel… yeah. At least rape and other torture are ILLEGAL for the IDF. Meanwhile Hamas continues to freely rape hostages as I type this. Because they make the laws there.

Yes Israel cares more about its own citizens than foreign citizens like Gaza, but again, that’s no more evil than other normal countries.

To address another stereotype about Israel being a racist and apartheid state - there are two million Arab Israelis living peacefully there. There are Arab countries who hold peace treaties with Israel.

So you tell me in your ask, Jews should be safe and welcomed around the world. The sentiment is appreciated, but this is not the case with reality, sadly. There is NO population of 2 million Jews in any other middle eastern country. Many of us left for Israel due to severe oppression. There are no more Jews in Yemen for example. My grandfather left for Israel from his home in Lebanon because some officials wanted him dead. Why? For committing the crime of smuggling Jews through Lebanon to escape the Holocaust.

My grandparents on my mother’s side escaped post-war Poland because of violent lingering antisemitism.

They would have had NOWHERE to go without Israel.

And we are NOT safe outside of Israel or even in Israel because of the intense hatred. We have been scapegoats for society’s problems for thousands of years and I don’t see it improving any time soon.

How can I talk positively about Israel? It’s the most liberal and progressive country in the Middle East. It’s the only country where it’s legal and safe to be openly gay for example, and it’s the only country there that holds annual pride.

It’s a middle eastern country where I, as a secular woman, can dress how I want, marry who I want, get abortions if I needed, own property, own money, have a prestigious job, and *checks notes* drive.

It’s also the only Jewish country in the world. It’s the place I’ve felt the safest and happiest, surrounded by my own people and family and sometimes I wish my parents and I never left, because I am personally feeling the antisemitism when I march peacefully and get nasty comments, or when I lose long time close friends left and right for being a “genocidal Zionist”, or when I see antisemitic graffiti and signs everywhere I walk.

My taxes in Israel would pay for hospitals that treat people from all around the world including Palestinian children for free. It would pay for the iron dome that keeps my family safe.

My taxes in America have been used to oppress women, and for horrific military actions, etc. and America itself is LITERALLY built on colonial genocide and the backs of slaves. Slightly related, most of North Africa was colonized by Arabs who ran a larger slave trade than the US. I’ve never learned that in school! I’ve never seen anyone talk about that! I’ve never seen Americans or Arabs in other countries get attacked for these things (to be fair, I’m very aware of the racism Arabs and Muslims did feel in the US after 9/11 and I absolutely condemn it).

This same America also lifted sanctions on Iran, allowing it to spare money to give to Hamas to buy weapons and slaughter my people to start this fucking war.

So you ask why I’m saving money to eventually move to Israel from America? I hope I’ve answered as thoroughly as I can. You can go ahead and fact check me through non- biased media. And go ahead and look up “list of terrorist attacks on Israel” while you’re at it too. I’d rather face rockets than continue to live in a country that lets antisemitism (and mass shootings for that matter) run rampant.

[zvaigzdelasas]

[BBC is UK State Media]

“Finding work has become extremely difficult," he says. He is a member of Turkish-backed opposition forces that have been fighting President Bashar al-Assad for more than a decade.

The faction he works for pays him less than $50 (£40) a month, so when Turkish recruiters appeared offering $1,500 (£1,160) a month to work in Niger, he decided it was the best way to earn more money.

He says Syrian faction leaders help facilitate the process and after “faction taxes and agents” he would still be left with at least two-thirds of the money. “And if I die in battle [in Niger], my family will receive compensation of $50,000 (£40,000)," he adds.

Violence in West Africa's Sahel region has worsened in recent years as a result of conflict with jihadist groups. Niger, along with neighbours Mali and Burkina Faso have all been affected - and all three countries have experienced military coups in the past few years, partly as a result of the instability.[...]

Ali (not his real name), who lives in a tent in rural Idlib joined Syria’s opposition forces 10 years ago when he was 15. He says he is paid less than $50 (£40) a month too, which lasts him five days. He has had to borrow to support his family and sees Niger as the only way to pay off his debts. "I want to leave the military profession entirely and start my own business," he says.

And for Raed (not his real name), another 22-year-old opposition fighter, going to Niger feels like the only way to build up enough money to “achieve my dream of marriage and starting a family".

Since December 2023, more than 1,000 Syrian fighters have travelled to Niger via Turkey, according to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), which monitors the conflict in Syria through a network of sources on the ground. They tend to sign up for six months, but some have now extended the contract to a year.[...]

The SOHR and friends of mercenaries who have already worked in Niger told the BBC that Syrians have ended up under Russian command fighting militant jihadist groups in the border triangle between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.[...]

The recruits we spoke to claim their faction leaders have told them that a Turkish company called SADAT would look after them once the contracts are signed and would be involved in arranging their travel and logistics.

About five years ago, Abu Mohamad went to Libya where he worked as a mercenary for six months and claims that was also arranged by SADAT.

The SOHR also claims that, based on information from other mercenaries who have already been to Niger, SADAT is involved in the process.[...]

This is not the first time the Turkish government has been accused of sending Syrian fighters abroad. Several reports, including one by the US Department of Defence have documented Turkish-backed Syrian fighters in Libya - Turkey previously acknowledged that Syrian fighters were present there but did not admit recruiting them. It has also denied that it recruited and deployed Syrian mercenaries to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in the Caucasus.

15 Jul 24

[mariacallous]

Six years ago, the Syrian regime conquered the southern province of Daraa, popularly known by millions of Syrians as the “cradle of the revolution.” That military victory represented a pivotal moment for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. After all, it was the last time the regime captured a sizable swath of opposition territory, and in doing so in July 2018, its impunity was laid bare for all the world to see. On paper, Daraa had been designated a “de-escalation zone” after months of intensive international diplomacy in which the United States had played a central role.

Despite that protected status, regime forces with heavy Russian military assistance proceeded to besiege Daraa; shell it to rubble; and after weeks of brutal violence, coerce it into surrendering. Washington’s most reliable umbrella of opposition allies, the Southern Front, was abandoned—advised to surrender by U.S. officials. Since then, the regime’s status has never been in question, as international actors have methodically backed away, fatigued and disinterested. Since that decisive moment, as far as many were concerned, Assad had won and Syria’s crisis was over, its effects contained.

In truth, Assad never “won,” —he merely survived, thanks to the consistently strong support of Russia and Iran, but also to that international disengagement. In the years since, the world’s interest in working to resolve Syria’s debilitating crisis has completely evaporated. In Washington today, the mere suggestion of doing anything more on Syria in policymaking circles draws exasperated gasps and sarcastic laughs, not attention.

And yet, in many ways, the situation in Syria is worse than it’s ever been. There are clear and sustained signs of an Islamic State recovery; a multibillion-dollar regime-linked international drugs trade; and ongoing geopolitical hostilities involving Israel, Iran, Turkey, Russia, and the United States. The regime’s grip over areas under its control has never looked more frail and unconvincing.

Southern Syria offers a notable example. Six years after bombing the cradle of the revolution into submission, Assad’s rule in the south is fraying at the seams.

While Assad and his Russian sponsor intended for the south to embody a stabilized Syria that was “cleansed” of opponents, the region has been the most consistently unstable anywhere in Syria since 2018. As documented by Syria Weekly, at least 47 people have been killed in Daraa and Suwayda provinces between mid-June and mid-July alone, in a torrent of daily assassinations, ambushes, raids, and kidnappings and hostage executions. Daraa in particular is the embodiment of lawlessness and chaos.

Beyond the crippling disorder, former opposition fighters and other local armed factions in the regime-held southern provinces of Daraa and Suwayda have grown increasingly bold in challenging the regime’s abuses in recent weeks. From mid-June to mid-July, armed fighters—most of them former opposition—have kidnapped at least 25 Syrian military officers in retaliation for the regime’s arbitrary arrest of civilians from their areas. The hostages have then been successfully used as leverage to force the regime into releasing the civilian detainees. Never before has the regime been so consistently challenged and forced to submit.

Local armed factions that on paper are considered “reconciled” have now also taken to launching direct attacks on the Assad regime’s military checkpoints and buildings in retaliation for abuses. For example, when a Syrian woman from the Daraa town of Inkhil was detained while trying to renew her passport in Damascus on July 10, former opposition fighters in Inkhil launched coordinated attacks on three regime checkpoints and the local intelligence headquarters. When regime forces fired back, including with mortars and artillery, local fighters ambushed a regime armored vehicle arriving as reinforcement, destroying it with rocket-propelled grenades. Later that day, the woman was released.

Next door in the province of Suwayda, where locals have now held more than 330 days of consecutive protests demanding Assad’s downfall, regime forces unexpectedly established a new security checkpoint at the main entrance to the provincial capital on June 23. Within hours, at least six local armed factions had mobilized and launched attacks on regime positions, engaging in 48 hours of heavy fighting that drew in regime reinforcements from Damascus.

By June 25, the regime had been forced to back down, reverting the heavily fortified checkpoint into a post with no local authority. Such a direct challenge to regime security policy was remarkable, particularly for a province that never fell under opposition control.

That incident generated considerable regional attention, highlighting the regime’s capitulation. This may explain why one of the most prominent anti-regime armed group leaders in Suwayda, who had commanded many of the above-mentioned attacks, was assassinated in his home at dawn on July 17. Murhaj Jarmani, who went popularly by Abu Ghaith, was shot in the head through his living room window by a hit man equipped with a silencer. His wife had been in their home, but never even heard the shot.

During the same month-long time period, local armed groups in southern Syria have also kidnapped four regime intelligence operatives accused of a variety of abuses, including murder, torture, and organized crime. All four were themselves tortured, forced to confess to their crimes on camera, and then executed—their confession videos then disseminated locally and on social media. On top of that, the right-hand man of Daraa’s infamous military intelligence chief Luay al-Ali was assassinated in the heart of the provincial capital on July 13. The target, known commonly as Abu Luqman, had reportedly overseen nearly a decade of torture in Daraa’s largest detainee holding and interrogation facility.

Insights like these offer a glimpse into the true reality of regime rule in the 14th year of Syria’s crisis. Far from consolidating control, Assad’s authority appears to be crumbling. Meanwhile, the regime continues to fail in its intermittent effort to challenge a resurgent Islamic State. In the past month alone, at least 69 regime security force personnel have been killed in near-daily Islamic State attacks across Syria’s central desert. And that’s amid a month-long regime “clearance operation” against the jihadi group. Meanwhile, Assad’s senior advisor Luna al-Shibl died on June 3 in a mysterious car crash that some believe was an inside job, while a core backbone of the regime economy, Mohammad Bara Qaterji, was killed in an Israeli airstrike on June 15. And so much more.

Despite facing a regime so notorious for stopping short of nothing to eradicate opposition, the people of southern Syria appear to have had enough. From Suwayda’s nearly year-long popular uprising to the recent trend for local fighters to directly challenge regime abuses and security policy, this does not look anything like a resolved crisis, but rather an evolving and potentially escalating one, once again.

[colonna-durruti]

Carlo Rovelli

In 1999, NATO bombed Belgrade for 78 days with the goal of breaking Serbia apart and giving rise to an independent Kosovo, now home to a major NATO base in the Balkans.

In 2001, the US invaded Afghanistan, leading to 200,000 people killed, a country devastated and no political result whatsoever.

In 2002, the US unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty over Russia’s strenuous objections, dramatically increasing the nuclear risk.

In 2003, the US and NATO allies repudiated the UN Security Council by going to war in Iraq on false pretenses. Iraq is now devastated, no real political pacification has been achieved and the elected parliament has a pro-Iran majority.

In 2004, betraying engagements, the US continued with NATO enlargement, this time to the Baltic States and countries in the Black Sea region (Bulgaria and Romania) and the Balkans.

In 2008, over Russia’s urgent and strenuous objections, the US pledged to expand NATO to Georgia and Ukraine. �

In 2011, the US tasked the CIA to overthrow Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, an ally of Russia. Syria is devastated by war. No political gain achieved for the US.

In 2011, NATO bombed Libya in order to overthrow Moammar Qaddafi. The country, that was prosperous, peaceful, and stable, is now devastated, in civil war, in ruin.

In 2014, the US conspired with Ukrainian nationalist forces to overthrow Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych. The country is now in a bitter war.

In 2015, the US began to place Aegis anti-ballistic missiles in Eastern Europe (Romania), a short distance from Russia.

In 2016-2020, the US supported Ukraine in undermining the Minsk II agreement, despite its unanimous backing by the UN Security Council. The country is now in a bitter war.

In 2021, the new Biden Administration refused to negotiate with Russia over the question of NATO enlargement to Ukraine, prompting the invasion.

In April 2022, the US called on Ukraine to withdraw from peace negotiations with Russia. The result is the useless prolongation of war, with more territory gained by Russia.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the US sought and until today is seeking, without succeeding, and constantly failing, a unipolar world led by a hegemonic US, in which Russia, China, Iran and other great nations have to be subservient.

In this US-led world order (this is the phrase commonly used in the US), the US and the US alone has determine the utilization of the dollar-based banking system, the placement of overseas US military bases, the extent of NATO membership, and the deployment of US missile systems, without any veto or say by other countries.

This arrogant foreign policy has led to constant war, countries devastated, millions killed, a widening rupture of relations between the US-led bloc of nations -a small minority in the planet and now not even anymore economically dominating- and the rest of the world, a global skyrocketing of military expenses, and is slowly leading us towards WWIII.

The wise, decade-long, European effort to engage Russia and China into a strategical economical and political collaboration, enthusiastically supported by the Russian and Chinese leadership, has been shattered by the ferocious US opposition, worried that this could have undermined the US dominance.

Is this the world we want?

[the-garbanzo-annex-jr]

by Joseph Epstein

Since war broke out between Israel and Hamas, the anti-Israel trope of "settler-colonialism"—or foreign Jews displacing indigenous Palestinians has reemerged.

In the case of Israel, this term is no more accurate than such demonization of the Jewish state as an "apartheid" regime or saying that it is committing "genocide." The refutation of a Jewish connection to the land of their ancestors or the denial of a permanent Jewish presence in Israel stems either from ignorance or malevolence.

These countries have intentionally altered the demographics in war-torn Syria and Iraq to strengthen their geopolitical positions.

The worst offender is Iran, which has manipulated sectarian strife to form a Shia corridor from its borders to Lebanon to supply its main proxy, Hezbollah.

In Syria, Iran has settled Shia families from Iraq and Lebanon in strategic Sunni areas between Damascus and the Lebanese border. Tehran has found a partner in the Alawite Islamic sect, which dominates the Syrian regime. President Bashar Al-Assad and other members of the Alawite minority oppress the Sunni-majority that was largely behind the Arab Spring revolution in 2011. As a result, Syria has helped facilitate the export of Iran's Twelver Shia Islam—a branch practiced by the Iranian regime—to areas under Damascus's control. Assad has allowed Twelver foreign clerics to occupy senior religious positions and relaxed visa restrictions for Iranians and Iraqis, leading to an influx of Shiites.

A similar story has taken place in Iraq. Following the U.S. removal of Saddam Hussein, Iraq fell into religious sectarianism, allowing Iran to quickly become the patron of the much of the ruling Shia majority. Under the pretext of war against terrorism and the Islamic State, Tehran began systemically changing the demographics to solidify its corridor to Lebanon. Iranian-backed militias were at the forefront of sectarian cleansing of Sunnis in areas like Tel Afar, Mosul and Fallujah.

Iran often uses the pretext of Shia shrines to justify the presence of its militia proxies. Following battles in areas around the "Sunni Triangle" city Samara—home to the Al-Hadi and Al-Askari shrines—thousands of hectares of agricultural land owned by Sunnis was confiscated and its residents were not allowed to return to their homes. In Syria, protecting Shia shrines in the capital of Damascus and its suburbs gave Iranian proxies, including Hezbollah, an excuse to fortify its presence.

[darkmaga-retard]

by Keith Knight | Aug 8, 2024

So often, critics of the regime are called conspiracy theorists. Those same people calling us conspiracy theorists also tell us that every foreign politician is a dictator of unsound mind who can’t be reasoned with (Kaiser Wilhelm, Adolf Hitler, Ho Chi Minh, the Taliban, Saddam Hussein, David Koresh, Bashar al-Assad, Osama bin Laden, Muammar Gaddafi, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, etc.). The formula is nearly always enemy X has a plot to take over the world, only a mass murder campaign of conscripts and civilians can save us. 

Consider the destruction of Japan in the Second World War. 

The fire-bombing of Tokyo, otherwise known as Operation Meetinghouse, took place on March 9-10, 1945 at the direction of U.S. Air Force General Curtis LeMay. Roughly 100,000 human beings were slaughtered and another million were left homeless.

In Hiroshima, on August 6, 1945, a single bomb weighing 9,700 pounds killed approximately 70,000 human beings. 

Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1st Supreme Allied Commander of Europe and 34th President of the United States, commented on the bombing of Hiroshima in his 1963 book Mandate for Change, 1953-1956: The White House Years:

[I]n 1945… Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act… During this recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of “face.” 

Three days later, in Nagasaki, 40,000 human beings were murdered with a single bomb and 60,000 more were injured. 

[kirstythejetblackgoldfish]

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, Russia, yesterday, 24 July 2024