#close to Imran Khan

[thelocalreport8]

Pakistan: Former Foreign Minister Qureshi, close to Imran Khan, in custody for 15 days

Islamabad. Before the general elections in Pakistan, Imran Khan’s close aide and former Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi was sent to Adiala jail for 15 days custody on Tuesday. Went. A day before this, the Supreme Court had granted him bail in another case. According to a report, Rawalpindi Deputy Commissioner issued the directive saying that the release of Qureshi, vice president of Imran…

[zvaigzdelasas]

[VoiceOfAmerica is US State Media]

Hameed's name was widely featured in local media for his alleged involvement in national politics and influence on journalists during his tenure as the ISI chief.

The general gained global attention when journalists captured his presence on camera in the lobby of a Kabul hotel shortly after the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in August 2021 as the U.S.-led Western forces withdrew following nearly two decades of involvement in the Afghan war.

During their presence in Afghanistan, Washington and allied nations had persistently accused the ISI of providing sanctuaries and covertly enabling Taliban leaders to orchestrate insurgent attacks from Pakistan against international forces on the Afghan side of the border.

Hameed was believed to be close to former Prime Minister Imran Khan, who appointed him to lead the ISI when he was prime minister.[...]

In the run-up to the vote [to depose Khan], the deposed prime minister’s aides reported that he developed disputes with the military over whether Hameed should be retained as the ISI chief, as Khan desired.

12 Aug 24

[mariacallous]

Afghan refugees who fled their country to escape from decades of war and terrorism have become the unwitting pawns in a cruel and crude political tussle between Pakistan’s government and the extremist Taliban as their once-close relationship disintegrates amid mutual recrimination.

On Oct. 3, Pakistan’s government announced that mass deportations of illegal immigrants, mostly Afghans, would start on Nov. 1. So far, at least 300,000 Afghans have already been ejected, and more than a million others face the same fate as the expulsions continue.

The bilateral fight appears to center on Kabul’s support for extremists who have wreaked havoc and killed hundreds in Pakistan over the last two years—or at least that is how Islamabad sees it, arguing that it is simply applying its own laws. The Taliban deny accusations that they are behind the uptick of terrorism in Pakistan by affiliates that they protect, train, arm, and direct.

Mass deportations are a sign that Pakistan is “putting its house in order,” said Pakistan’s caretaker minister of interior, Sarfraz Bugti. “Pakistan is the only country hosting four million refugees for the last 40 years and still hosting them,” he said via text. “Whoever wanted to stay in our country must stay legally.” Of the 300,000 Afghans already ejected, none have faced any problems upon returning, he told Foreign Policy. As the Taliban are claiming that Afghanistan is now peaceful, he said, “they should help their countrymen to settle themselves.”

“We are not a cruel state,” he said, adding: “Pakistanis are more important.”

The Taliban—who, since returning to power in August 2021, have been responsible for U.N.-documented arbitrary detentions and killings, as well forcing women and girls out of work and education—have called Pakistan’s deportations “inhumane” and “rushed.” Taliban figures have said that the billions of dollars of international aid they still receive are insufficient to deal with the country’s prior economic and humanitarian crises, let alone a mass influx of penniless refugees.

The expulsions come after earlier efforts by Pakistan, such as trade restrictions, to exert pressure on Kabul to rein in the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban, whose attacks on military and police present a severe security challenge to the Pakistani state. Acting Prime Minister Anwar ul-Haq Kakar said earlier this month that TTP attacks have risen by 60 percent since the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan, with 2,267 people killed.

The irony is that Pakistan bankrolled the Taliban throughout their 20-year insurgency following their ouster from power during the U.S.-led invasion in 2001. Taliban leaders found sanctuary and funding from Pakistan’s military and intelligence services. When the Taliban retook control of Afghanistan in 2021, then-Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan congratulated them, as did groups such as al Qaeda and Hamas. But rather than continuing as Islamabad’s proxy, the Taliban have reversed roles, providing safe haven for terrorist and jihadi groups, including the TTP.

“While it’s still too early to draw any conclusions on policy shifts in Islamabad, it appears that the initial excitement about the Taliban’s return to power has now turned into frustration,” said Abdullah Khenjani, a former deputy minister of peace in the previous Afghan government. “Consequently, these traditional [Pakistani state] allies of the Taliban are systematically reassessing their leverage to be prepared for potentially worse scenarios.”

Since the Taliban’s return, around 600,000 Afghans made their way into Pakistan, swelling the number of Afghan refugees in the country to an estimated 3.7 million, with 1.32 million registered with the U.N. High Commission on Refugees. Many face destitution, unable to find work or even send their children to local schools. The situation may be even worse after the deportations: Pakistan is reportedly confiscating most of the refugees’ money on the way out, leaving them in a precarious situation in a country already struggling to create jobs for its people or deal with its own humanitarian crises.

Border crossings between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been clogged in recent weeks, as many Afghan refugees preempted the police round-up and began making their way back. Media have reported that some of the undocumented Afghans were born in Pakistan, their parents having fled the uninterrupted conflict at home since the former Soviet Union invaded in 1979. Many of the births were not registered.

Meanwhile, some groups among those being expelled are especially vulnerable. Hundreds of Afghans could face retribution from the Taliban they left the country to escape. Journalists, women, civil and human rights activists, LGBTQ+ advocates, judges, police, former military and government personnel, and Shiite Hazaras have all been targeted by the Taliban, and many escaped to Pakistan, with and without official documents.

Some efforts have been made to help Afghans regarded as vulnerable to Taliban excess if they are returned. Qamar Yousafzai set up the Pakistan-Afghanistan International Federation of Journalists at the National Press Club of Pakistan, in Islamabad, to verify the identities of hundreds of Afghan journalists, issue them with ID cards, and help with housing and health care. He has also interceded for journalists detained by police for a lack of papers. Yet that might not be enough to prevent their deportation.

Amnesty International called for a “halt [to] the continued detentions, deportations, and widespread harassment of Afghan refugees.” If not, it said, “it will be denying thousands of at-risk Afghans, especially women and girls, access to safety, education and livelihood.” The UNHCR and International Organization for Migration, the U.N.’s migration agency, said the forced repatriations had “the potential to result in severe human rights violations, including the separation of families and deportation of minors.”

Once back in Afghanistan, returnees have found the going tough, arriving in a country they hardly know, without resources to restart their lives, many facing a harsh Himalayan winter in camps set up by a Taliban administration ill-equipped to provide for them.

Fariba Faizi, 29, is from the southwestern Afghanistan city of Farah, where she was a journalist with a private radio station. Her mother, Shirin, was a prosecutor for the Farah provincial attorney general’s office, specializing in domestic violence cases. Once the Taliban returned to power, they were both out of their jobs, since women are not permitted to work in the new Afghanistan. They also faced the possibility of detention, beating, rape, and killing.

Along with her family of 10 (parents, siblings, husband, and toddler), Faizi, now eight months pregnant with her second child, moved to Islamabad in April 2022, hoping they’d be safe enough. Once the government announced the deportations, landlords who had been renting to Afghans began to evict them; Faizi’s landlord said he wanted the house back for himself. Her family is now living with friends of Yousafzai, who also arranged charitable support to cover their living costs for six months, she said.

With no work in either Pakistan or Afghanistan, Faizi said, they faced a similar economic situation on either side of the border. In Pakistan, however, the women in the family could at least look for work, she said; their preference would be to stay in Pakistan. As it is, they remain in hiding, afraid of being detained by police and forced over the border once their visas expire.

[straight-from-gaza]

Al Jazeera English Senior Correspondent Imran Khan recorded the last report from occupied Jerusalem, preempting the Israeli government's decision to close Al Jazeera in Israel over its coverage of the Israeli war in Gaza.

[james-stark-the-writer]

a foundational text in the James lore. romcoms PEAKED and the genre has never reached these heights since and i doubt it will ever come this close again. makes me love love and life just as much as Mamma Mia! (2008) does, ig there's just something about 2008 musical romcoms that speaks to my soul like nothing else. both these movies love love, and ooze charm and charisma and empathy, and have like. some of the best women put to screen in their respective industries, it's honestly kinda crazy. some of this is deeply 2008, it's very much a time capsule, but there is so much love and empathy and nuance under the surface that you would never expect. nothing else in the world comes even close to making me feel like this does. you want me to be normal about romance? you want someone who grew up on Imran Khan romcoms to be normal about romance? this is the romcom medicine for the romcom and love cynic. this is also the most "hanging out and goofing around with friends" vibe ever created, i think? and nothing else even remotely comes close for me. i know all these people, i have been (almost) all these people.

My ★★★★★ review of Jaane Tu... Ya Jaane Na on Letterboxd

[libertariantaoist]

News Roundup 2/12/2024 | The Libertarian Institute

News Roundup 2/12/2024

by Kyle Anzalone

Ukraine

Sweden closes Nord Stream investigation, hands it off to Germany RS

Ukraine Facing Troop Shortage on Frontline WashPo

US Rejects Putin’s Latest Offer for Negotiations on Ukraine AWC

Senate Takes Another Step Toward Passing $95 Billion Foreign Military Aid Bill AWC

Pakistan

‘Head-Spinning Upset’ as Imran Khan’s PTI Wins Most Seats in Pakistani Election AWC

Israel

Largest Functional Medical Facility in Gaza Facing a Major ‘Humanitarian Catastrophe’ MEE

Biden Admin Admits to ‘Missteps’ in Handling Gaza Genocide But Will Not Alter Policy AWC

House Bill Would Downgrade US-South Africa Ties Over Pretoria’s Genocide Suit Against Israel The Institute

Netanyahu Doubles Down on Plans to Attack Rafah Despite Growing Criticism AWC

Lebanon

Israeli Drone Strike Kills Two Near Key Lebanon Port of Sidon AWC

Iraq

Iraq Says It Resumed Talks With US on Future US Withdrawal AWC

Yemen

Houthis Hold Funeral for 17 Killed in Recent US and British Strikes AWC

Read More

[defloraisonn]

Me and the pieces of me

My memories are the mark of the people I have loved.

I remember he likes the colour blue and lasagna

I remember how he picked up saying 'besharam' from me even though he was European

I remember how he picks apart my appearance to tell me how beautiful he thinks I am

I remember how he started calling me rajkumari because he wanted to nickname me something that made me feel close to my culture

I remember how she whole heartedly binge watched jab we met and multiple Imran Khan movies with me because she just enjoys spending time with me

I remember how he let me bite his jacket because I was nervous

I remember

Is it a gift or a curse to?

[warningsine]

Violent clashes have broken out in Pakistan between security forces and supporters of former prime minister Imran Khan after he was arrested on Tuesday.

Protests are erupting nationwide, and at least one person has been killed in the city of Quetta.

The United States and UK have called for adherence to the "rule of law".

Mr Khan was arrested by security forces at the High Court in the capital, Islamabad.

Dramatic footage showed dozens of officers arriving and detaining the 70-year-old, who was bundled into a vehicle and driven away.

He was appearing in court on charges of corruption, which he says are politically motivated.

Mobile data services in the country were suspended on the instructions of the interior ministry on Friday as protests grew, many of them taking place in front of army compounds.

Pakistan's army plays a prominent role in politics, sometimes seizing power in military coups, and, on other occasions, pulling levers behind the scenes.

Many analysts believe Mr Khan's election win in 2018 happened with the help of the military. Now in opposition, he is one of its most vocal critics, and analysts say the army's popularity has fallen.

Footage from Lahore posted on Twitter appeared to show a crowd breaking into the military corps commander's house destroying furniture and belongings inside.

Speaking from Washington, the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said he wanted to make sure that "whatever happens in Pakistan is consistent with the rule of law, with the constitution".

UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly, speaking alongside Blinken, noted that Britain enjoyed "a longstanding and close relationship" with Commonwealth member Pakistan, and wanted to "see the rule of law adhered to".

On Tuesday evening, supporters of Imran Khan gathered outside the Pakistan High Commission in London to protest against his arrest.

'Chaos and anarchy'

Mr Khan was ousted as PM in April last year and has been campaigning for early elections since then.

General elections are due to be held later this year.

Speaking to the BBC's Newshour, Mr Khan's spokesman, Raoof Hasan, said he expected "the worst" and that the arrest could plunge the country "into chaos and anarchy".

"We're facing multiple crises. There is an economic crisis, there is a political crisis, there is a cost of livelihood crisis and consequently this occasion will be a catharsis for them to step out and I fear a fair amount of violence is going to be back," he said.

A member of Mr Khan's legal team, Raja Mateen, said undue force had been used against him at the court.

"Mr Khan went into the biometric office for the biometrics. The rangers went there, they broke the windows, they hit Mr Khan on the head with a baton," said Mr Mateen.

Mr Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party called on its supporters to protest. In the hours after he was detained, violence was reported from cities including Lahore, Karachi and Peshawar.

On the streets of Islamabad, hundreds of protesters blocked one of the main highways in and out of the capital.

People pulled down street signs and parts of overpasses, lit fires and threw stones. During the hour or so that the BBC was there, no police or authorities were visible.

Protesters said they were angry about Imran Khan's arrest.

"This is absolutely the last straw," said Farida Roedad.

"Let there be anarchy, let there be chaos. If there is no Imran, there's nothing left in Pakistan. No one is there to take over."

Writing on social media, police in Islamabad said five police officers had been injured and 43 protesters arrested.

It said at least 10 people, including six police officers, had been injured in the south-western city of Quetta in clashes between Mr Khan's supporters and security forces - with one protester killed.

A statement from the inspector general of Punjab police said the arrest of Mr Khan had been ordered because he was accused of "corruption and corrupt practices".

The case involves allegations over the allotment of land in the so-called Al-Qadir Trust, which is owned by Mr Khan and his wife, Dawn newspaper reported.

Mr Khan, who is being held at an undisclosed location, denies breaking any law.

In a video message filmed as he travelled to Islamabad - and released by the PTI before his arrest - Mr Khan said he was ready for what lay ahead.

"Come to me with warrants, my lawyers will be there," he said. "If you want to send me to jail, I am prepared for it."

Security was tight in the centre of the capital for the former PM's court appearance.

Dozens of cases have been brought against Mr Khan since he was ousted from power.

The security forces have tried to detain him on a number of previous occasions at his Lahore residence, but were blocked by his supporters, resulting in fierce clashes.

On Tuesday, police had blocked roads into Islamabad, so the number of supporters with Imran Khan was not as high as on previous occasions, making it easier to arrest him.

He was elected prime minister in 2018, but fell out with Pakistan's powerful army. After a series of defections, he lost his majority in parliament. He was ousted after he lost a confidence vote in April 2022, four years into his tenure.

Since then, he has been a vocal critic of the government and the country's army.

In October, he was disqualified from holding public office, accused of incorrectly declaring details of presents from foreign dignitaries and proceeds from their alleged sale.

The next month, he survived a gun attack on his convoy while holding a protest march.

On Monday, the military warned him against making "baseless allegations" after he again accused a senior officer of plotting to kill him.

[xtruss]

Exclusive: Imran Khan on His Plan to Return to Power

— By Charlie Campbell | April 3, 2023 | Time Magazine

Former Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan sits for a portrait in his Lahore residence on March 28. Next to Khan are tear gas canisters he says were thrown at his house. Umar Nadeem for Time Magazine

Political leaders often boast of inner steel. Imran Khan can point to three bullets dug out of his right leg. It was in November that a lone gunman opened fire on Khan during a rally, wounding the 70-year-old as well as several supporters, one fatally. “One bullet damaged a nerve so my foot is still recovering,” says the former Pakistani Prime Minister and onetime cricket icon. “I have a problem walking for too long.”

If the wound has slowed Khan, he doesn’t show it in a late-March Zoom interview. There is the same bushy mane, the easy laugh, prayer beads wrapped nonchalantly around his left wrist. But in the five years since our last conversation, something has changed. Power—or perhaps its forfeiture—has left its imprint. Following his ouster in a parliamentary no-confidence vote in April 2022, Khan has mobilized his diehard support base in a “jihad,” as he puts it, to demand snap elections, claiming he was unfairly toppled by a U.S.-sponsored plot. ​​(The State Department has denied the allegations.)

The actual intrigue is purely Pakistani. Khan lost the backing of the country’s all-powerful military after he refused to endorse its choice to lead Pakistan’s intelligence services, known as ISI, because of his close relationship with the incumbent. When Khan belatedly greenlighted the new chief, the opposition sensed weakness and pounced with the no-confidence vote. Khan then took his outrage to the streets, with rallies crisscrossing the nation for months.

Photograph by Umar Nadeem for Time Magazine

“Imran Khan can communicate with all strata of society on their level,” says Shaheena Bhatti, 63, a professor of literature in Rawalpindi. “The other politicians are … not going to do anything for the country because they’re only in it for themselves.”

The November attack on Khan’s life only intensified the burning sense of injustice in members of his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party, or PTI, who have since clashed with police in escalating street battles involving slingshots and tear gas. Although an avowed religious fanatic was arrested for the shooting, Khan continues to accuse an assortment of rival politicians of pulling the strings: incumbent Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif—brother of Khan’s longtime nemesis, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif—as well as Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah and Major General Faisal Naseer. (All have denied the accusation.)

In addition to bullets, Khan has also been hit by charges—143 over the past 11 months, by his count, including corruption, sedition, blasphemy, and terrorism—which he claims have been concocted in an attempt to disqualify him from politics. After Sharif’s cabinet declared on March 20 that the PTI was “a gang of militants” whose “enmity against the state” could not be tolerated, police arrested hundreds of Khan supporters in raids.

“Either Imran Khan exists or we do,” Interior Minister Sanaullah said on March 26.

Pakistan sometimes seems to reside on a precipice. Its current political instability comes amid devastating floods, runaway inflation, and resurgent cross-border terrorist attacks from neighboring Afghanistan that together threaten the fabric of the nation of 230 million. It’s a country where rape and corruption are rife, and the economy hinges on unlocking a stalled IMF bailout, Pakistan’s 22nd since independence in 1947. Inflation soared in March to 47% year-over-year; the prices of staples such as onions rose by 228%, wheat by 120%, and cooking gas by 108%. Over the same period, the rupee has plummeted by 54%.

“Ten years ago, I earned 10,000 rupees a month [$100] and I wasn’t distressed,” says Muhammad Ghazanfer, a groundsman and gardener in Rawalpindi. “With this present wave of inflation, even though I now earn 25,000 [$90 today] I can’t make ends meet.” The world’s fifth most populous country has only $4.6 billion in foreign reserves—$20 per citizen. “If they default, and they can’t get oil, companies go bust, and people don’t have jobs, you would say this is a country ripe for a Bolshevik revolution,” says Cameron Munter, a former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan.

Police fired teargas to disperse the supporters of the former Prime Minister as they tried to arrest Khan in Lahore, Pakistan, on March 14. Hundreds of Tehrik-e-Insaf supporters clashed with riot police as they reached Khan's residence. Rahat Dar—EPA-EFE/Shutterstock

“Our economy has gone into a tailspin,” says Khan. “We now have the worst economic indicators in our history.” The situation threatens to send the nuclear-armed country deeper into China’s orbit. Yet sympathy is slim in a West put off by Khan’s years of anti-American bluster and cozying up to autocrats and extremists, including the Taliban. He calls autocratic Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan “my brother” and visited Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on the eve of the Ukraine invasion, remarking on “so much excitement.” Khan can both repeatedly declare Osama bin Laden a “martyr” and praise Beijing’s confinement of China’s Uighur Muslim minority. He has obsessed on Joe Biden’s failure to call him after entering the White House. “He’s someone that is imbued with this incredibly strong sense of grievance,” says Michael Kugelman, the deputy director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center.

Yet Khan can legitimately claim to have democracy on his side, with poll numbers suggesting he is a shoo-in to return to power if the elections he demands happen. “His popularity has skyrocketed,” says Samina Yasmeen, director of the Centre for Muslim States and Societies at the University of Western Australia. “No matter what he says, even if it’s irrational, the reality is that people are angry and taken by his message.”

“Imran Khan is the best bet we have right now,” says Osama Rehman, 50, a telecommunications engineer in Islamabad. “If [he] is arrested or disqualified, people will come out onto the street.”

The state appears to flirt with the idea. Police raids on Khan’s home in the Punjab province capital of Lahore in early March left him choking on tear gas, he says, as supporters brandishing sticks battled police in riot gear before makeshift barricades of sandbags and iron rods. “This sort of crackdown has never taken place in Pakistan,” says Khan. “I don’t know even if it was as bad under martial law.”

After Khan left his compound to appear in court on March 18, traveling in an armored SUV strewn with flower petals and flanked by bodyguards, the police swooped in while his wife was home, he says, beating up servants and hauling the family cook off to jail. He claims another assassination attempt awaited inside the Islamabad Judicial Complex, which was “taken over by the intelligence agencies and paramilitary.”

Police arrested 61 supporters of former Prime Minister Imran Khan during a search operation near Khan’s residence, in Lahore, Pakistan, on March 18, 2023. K.M. Chaudary—AP

The confrontation could remain in the streets indefinitely. Prime Minister Sharif has rejected Khan’s demand for a snap election, saying polls would be held as scheduled in the fall. But “every narrative is being built up [for the government] to justify postponing the elections,” says Yasmeen. On March 22, Pakistan’s Election Commission delayed local balloting in Punjab, the country’s most populous province, from April 30 until Oct. 8.

“Political stability in Pakistan comes through elections,” Khan points out. “That is the starting point for economic recovery.” From the U.S. perspective, he may be far from the ideal choice to helm an impoverished, insurgency-racked Islamic state. But is he the only person that can hold the country together?

“Never has one man scared the establishment … as much as right now,” says Khan. “They worry about how to keep me out; the people how to get me back in.”

It’s indicative of Pakistan’s malaise that its most popular politician in decades sits barricaded at home. But the nation has always been beyond comparison—a wedge of South Asia that begins in the shimmering Arabian Gulf and ascends to its Himalayan heights. It’s the world’s largest Islamic state, though governed for half its history by men in olive-green uniforms, who continue to act as ultimate arbiters of power.

The only boy of five children, Khan was born Oct. 5, 1952 to an affluent Pashtun family in Lahore. He studied politics, philosophy, and economics at Oxford University, and it was in the U.K. that he first played cricket for Pakistan, at age 18. Britain’s sodden terrain also provided the backdrop to his political awakening.

“When I arrived in England our country had been ruled by a military dictator for 10 years; the powerful had one law, the others were basically not free human beings,” he says. “Rule of law actually liberates human beings, liberates potential. This was what I discovered.”

Khan in his Lahore residence on March 28. Umar Nadeem for Time Magazine

On the cricket pitch, Khan was a talisman who knitted together mercurial talents and journeymen into a cohesive whole, a team that overcame extraordinary odds to famously lift the Cricket World Cup in 1992. There were glimpses of these qualities when Khan rose to become Prime Minister: running on an anti-graft ticket, he fused a disparate band of students and workers, Islamic hard-liners, and the nation’s powerful military to derail the Sharif political juggernaut. His crowning achievement remains the Shaukat Khanum Cancer Hospital in Lahore, which he opened in 1994 in memory of his mother, who succumbed to the disease. It is the largest cancer hospital serving Pakistan’s impoverished, boosting Khan’s administrative credentials.

Khan spent 22 years in the political wilderness before his 2018 election triumph. But once in power, the self-styled bold reformer turned unnervingly divisive. Opposition is easier than government, and Khan found himself bereft of ideas and besieged by unsavory partners, even kowtowing to the now-banned far-right party Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan despite its support for the extrajudicial killing of alleged blasphemers. There were some successes: Pakistan received praise for its handling of the pandemic, with deaths per capita just a third that of neighboring India. His “Ten Billion Tree Tsunami” reforestation drive was popular, as was the 2019 return of international test cricket, the most prestigious form of the game, following a terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan team and a decade-long hiatus.

Khan’s private life has rarely been out of the headlines. His first wife was British journalist and society heiress Jemima Khan, née Goldsmith, a close friend of Diana, Princess of Wales. She converted to Islam for their wedding, though the pair divorced in 2004 after nine years of marriage, and her family’s Jewish heritage was political dynamite. (The couple’s two sons live in London.) Khan’s second marriage to British-Pakistani journalist Reham Khan lasted nine months. According to a 1997 California court ruling, Khan also has one child, a daughter, born out of wedlock, and he’s struggled to quash gossip of several more. In 2018, six months before he took office, he married his current wife, Bushra Bibi Khan, a religious conservative who is believed to be the only Pakistan First Lady to wear the full-face niqab shawl in public.

Khan, left, lifts elder son Suleman while his ex-wife Jemima carries younger son Qasim during a march towards the U.N. offices in Islamabad in 1999. The Khans led some 100 demonstrators in an anti-Russian rally protesting against attacks in Chechnya. Reuters

It all fed Khan’s legend: the debonair playboy who grew devout; the privileged son who rails against the corrupt; the humanist who stands with the bloodthirsty. His youth was spent carousing with supermodels in London’s trendiest nightspots. But his politics has hardened as his handsome features have lined and leathered. He provoked outrage when in August 2021 he said the Taliban had “broken the shackles of slavery” by taking back power (he insists to TIME he was “taken out of context”) and has made various comments criticized as misogynistic. When asked about the drivers of sexual violence in Pakistan, he said, “If a woman is wearing very few clothes, it will have an impact on the men, unless they’re robots.” Khan has refused to condemn Putin’s invasion, insisting, like China, on remaining “neutral” and deflecting uncomfortable questions onto supposed double standards regarding India’s inroads into disputed Kashmir. “Morality in foreign policy is reserved for powerful countries,” he says with a shrug.

Khan in the 1992 Cricket World Cup. Pakistan won under Khan's captaincy this year. Fairfax Media

At the same time, Khan’s ideological flexibility has not stretched to compromises with opponents. He claims it was the military’s unwillingness to go after Pakistan’s influential “two families”—those of Sharif and the Bhutto clan of former Prime Ministers Zulfikar and Benazir—for alleged corruption that caused his relationship with the generals to fray. “If the ruling elite plunders your country and siphons off money, and you cannot hold them accountable, then that means there is no rule of law,” he says.

Yet analysts say that it was Khan’s relentless taunting of the U.S. that torpedoed his relationship with the military, which remains much more interested in retaining good relations with Washington. To journalists and supporters, he has accused the U.S. of imposing a “master-slave” relationship on Pakistan and of using it like “tissue paper.” To TIME, he insists that “criticizing U.S. foreign policy does not make you anti-American.” Still, by 2022, the generals no longer had his back. The common perception among Pakistan watchers is that Khan’s fleeting political success was owed to a Faustian pact with the nation’s military and extremist groups that shepherded his election victory and he is now reaping the whirlwind.

Cricket captain turned politician Imran Khan shakes hands with supporters during a rally in October 2002 in Shadi Khal, Pakistan. Paula Bronstein—Getty Images

He appears to relish in the perceived injustice, the walls closing in. On March 25, Khan addressed thousands of supporters in central Lahore from a bulletproof box above a green-and-red flag with the initials of his PTI emblazoned on a cricket bat—once Khan’s weapon of choice, though now he wields words with similar potency.

“I know you have decided you wouldn’t allow Imran Khan back in power,” he said. “That’s fine with me. But do you have a plan or know how to get the country out of the current crisis?”

If Pakistan’s economic woes are reaching a new nadir, the trajectory was established during Khan’s term. A revolving door of Finance Ministers was compounded by bowing to hardliners. (After appointing renowned Princeton economist Atif Mian as an adviser, Khan fired him just days later owing to a backlash from Islamists because Mian is an Ahmadi, a sect of Islam they consider heretics.) In 2018, Khan pledged not to follow previous administrations’ “begging bowl” tactics of foreign borrowing, in order to end Pakistan’s cycle of debt. But less than a year later, he struck a deal with the IMF to cut social and development spending while raising taxes in exchange for a $6 billion loan. Mismanagement exacerbated global headwinds from the pandemic and soaring oil prices.

Meanwhile, little was done to address Pakistan’s fundamental structural issues: few people pay tax, least of all the feudal landowners who control traditional low-added-value industries like sugar farms, textile mills, and agricultural interests while wielding huge political-patronage networks stemming from their workers’ votes. In 2021, only 2.5 million Pakistanis filed tax returns—less than 1% of the adult population. “People don’t pay tax, especially the rich elite,” says Khan. “They just siphon out money and launder it abroad.”

Instead, Pakistan has relied on foreign money to balance a budget and provide government services. The U.S. funneled nearly $78.3 billion to Pakistan from 1948 to 2016. But in 2018, President Trump ended the $300 million security assistance that the U.S. provided annually. Now Pakistan must shop around for new benefactors—chiefly Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China. When Khan visited Putin last February, it was to arrange cheap oil and wheat imports and discuss the $2.5 billion Pakistan Stream gas pipeline, which Moscow wants to build between Karachi and Kasur. More recently, China has stepped in. In early March, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China approved a $1.3 billion loan rollover—a fiscal bandaid for a gaping wound.

Khan in his Lahore residence on March 28. Umar Nadeem for Time Magazine

But if Khan recognized the problem, he did little to solve it. After his election in 2018, he was in an uncommonly strong position with the backing of the military and progressives, as well as the tolerance of the Islamists. Now, with all the bad blood and open warfare among these factions, even if he claws his way back, “he’ll be in a weaker position to actually effect any reforms,” says Munter, the former U.S. ambassador, “if he had any reforms to begin with.”

When asked for his step-by-step plan to get Pakistan back on track, Khan is light on details. After elections, he says that a “completely new social contract” is required to enshrine power in political institutions, rather than the military. If the army chief “didn’t think corruption was that big a deal, then nothing happened,” Khan complains. “I was helpless.” But the path to this utopia remains murky. Asked how he plans to turn his much trumpeted Islamic Welfare State ideal into a reality, Khan talks about Medina under the Prophet and the social conscience of Northern Europeans. “Scandinavia is probably far closer to the Islamic ideal than any of the Muslim countries.”

But the military looms large in Pakistan partly because national security is a perennial issue. Many assumed that the newly returned Taliban would stamp out all cross-border attacks from Afghanistan. But Pakistan recorded the second largest increase in terrorism-related deaths worldwide in 2022, up 120% year-over-year. “It was Khan who was pushing for talks with [the Taliban] at all costs,” says Kugelman, of the Woodrow Wilson Center. “That embrace is now experiencing significant levels of blowback.”

That Pakistan is moving away from the U.S. and closer to Russia and China is a moot point; the bigger question is who actually wins from embracing Pakistan. The $65 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was supposed to be the crown jewel in President Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative, linking China via roads, rail and pipeline to the Arabian Sea. But Gwadar Port is rusting and suicide bombers are taking aim at buses filled with Chinese workers. Loans are more regularly defaulted than paid. Today, even Iran looks like a more stable partner.

Ultimately, competition with Beijing defines American foreign policy today, meaning Washington prioritizes relations with Pakistan’s archnemesis India, which is a key partner in the Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy to contain China. Toward that imperative, the White House turns a blind eye even to New Delhi’s continued close relationship with Putin. The U.S. kinship with India may mean Pakistan was always destined to move closer to China. But after the U.S. pulled out of Afghanistan, Pakistan is not the strategic lynchpin it once claimed to be—and memories are hardly fond; Pakistan secretly invested heavily in the Taliban. “Lots of Americans in Washington say we lost the war in Afghanistan because the Pakistanis stabbed us in the back,” says Munter.

What happens next? Many in Khan’s PTI suspect the current government may declare their party a terrorist organization or otherwise ban it from politics. Others believe that Pakistan’s escalating economic, political, and security turmoil may be used as grounds to postpone October’s general election. Ultimately, all sides are using the tools at their disposal to prevent their own demise: Khan wields popular protest and the banner of democracy; the government has the courts and security apparatus. Caught between the two, the people flounder. “There are no heroes here,” says Kugelman. “The entire political class and the military are to blame for the very troubled state the country finds itself in now.”

It’s a crisis that Khan still claims can be solved by elections, despite his broken relationship with the military. “The same people who tried to kill me are still sitting in power,” he says. “And they are petrified that if I got back [in] they would be held accountable. So they’re more dangerous.”

—With reporting by Hasan Ali/Islamabad

[drmaqazi]

WHAT DOES IMRAN KHAN MEAN WHEN HE SAYS?

Iyyāka Na‘budu wa Iyyāka Nasta’īn

{إِيَّاكَ نَعْبُدُ وَإِيَّاكَ نَسْتَعِينُ}

Thee Alone do we worship and Thee Alone do we implore for help.

Critical explanation or interpretation of a text):

From the verses الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ al-Hamdu lillahi [verse number 2] to مَالِكِ يَوْمِ الدِّينِ Maliki Yawmid-Din [verse number 4], it appears that God Almighty is hidden from the servant’s sight and he is praising God. However, all of a sudden, in the present verse إِيَّاكَ نَعْبُدُ, God Almighty is addressed directly. Some ignorant people have raised the objection that this is contrary to the dictates of eloquent speech even though this is not the case. On the contrary, this is a sublime example of eloquence; for the Being of Allah Almighty is a hidden treasure which is transcendent and not visible to the servant. The servant recognizes Him through His attributes, and by remembering Him, he becomes so close to Him that he sees Him with the eyes of his heart. This subtle point of man’s spiritual journey is mentioned in those verses and it explains that when man ponders over the four divine attributes of:

 رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ (Lord of all the Worlds)

 الرَّحْمَنِ (The Gracious)

 الرَّحِيمِ (The Ever-Merciful)

  مَالِكِ يَوْمِ الدِّينِ (Master of the Time of Judgement)

His eyes are opened and an intense love for Allah the Almighty is sparked in his heart. It is then that, having been honored with spiritually beholding Him and being overwhelmed with His love, he spontaneously cries out, ‘O. Lord! You alone do I worship and You alone do I implore for help.’ Therefore, changing the pronouns [from third person to second person], indicates that when man reflects on Allah the Almighty’s attributes in the Holy Qur’an, he secures a meeting with Him and His Being emerges before him.

In the hadith [oral traditions of the Holy Prophet (SallAllahu 

Alaihi wa Sallam), it is reported by Hazrat Abu Hurairah (RadiyAllahu 'anhu) that that he heard the Holy Prophet (SallAllahu Alaihi wa Sallam) say, ‘Allah Almighty says: “I have divided Sūrah al-Fātiḥah between me and my servant. Thus, one half of it is for me and the other half is for my servant. And I shall grant whatever my servant asks of me (by means of it).” When a servant says:

 الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ

[All praise belongs to Allah, Lord of all the Worlds]

Allah the Exalted replies: “My servant has praised Me”.

And when His servant says,

الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

[The Gracious, the Ever-Merciful]

Allah Almighty replies, “My servant has glorified Me.”

And when His servant supplicates مَالِكِ يَوْمِ الدِّينِ 

[Master of the Time of Judgment], 

Allah Almighty states, “My servant has declared My nobility.”’

Al-Bukharī, Kitābul Janā’iz, Bābu mā qīla fī awlādil-mushrikīn.

___Exegesis of Iyyāka Na‘budu wa Iyyāka Nasta’īn

[harryforvogue]

u know it’s time to close tiktok when your feed shows you an imran khan edit

[mariacallous]

MIRAN SHAH, Pakistan—Mohsin Dawar’s campaign for re-election to Pakistan’s parliament was almost cut short before it began in early January when his convoy was ambushed in a village just a few minutes’ drive from his home in Miran Shah in Pakistan’s North Waziristan district, near the lawless borderlands with Afghanistan. As his car came under attack from militants armed with automatic weapons, sniper rifles, and rocket-propelled grenades, he and his team were lured into a compound by residents who promised them safety.

It was a trap. Once the gates closed behind Dawar, the attack intensified. For almost an hour, he said, they were pinned down. Police and Pakistan Army backup finally arrived but not before two of Dawar’s team had been shot and injured. The vehicle took more than 80 bullets, and the windows show just how accurate the attackers’ aim was: Either one of the shots to the windshield or passenger window would have struck and likely killed him if he hadn’t been protected by bulletproof glass.

The Jan. 3 attack on a popular, outspoken, liberal leader in one of the most vulnerable regions of a country fighting a growing insurgency by extremist militants hardly registered in Pakistan, where most believe the military attempted—and failed—to manipulate the Feb. 8 election in an effort to install Nawaz Sharif as prime minister for a fourth time and where media operate under tight government control.

The election wasn’t quite the foregone conclusion that had been expected, with candidates aligned with the jailed cricket star-turned-populist leader Imran Khan winning more votes than each of the major parties—the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan Peoples Party—forcing them into a coalition to get the majority needed to form a government. PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif nominated his brother, Shehbaz Sharif, to become prime minister and his daughter Maryam Nawaz as chief minister of Punjab province, ensuring the dynastic line continues.

Candidates across the country, not only those loyal to Khan, alleged that the results had been rigged against them and in favor of military-backed candidates. Two days after the election, with his seat still undeclared amid growing concerns nationwide about vote rigging, Dawar and about a dozen of his supporters were injured when security forces opened fire on them as they gathered outside the official counting room.

At least three people died of their injuries; What Dawar had believed was an unassailable lead, according to polling by his secular National Democratic Movement party, had disappeared. In the count that was listed as final by Pakistan’s Election Commission, the seat went to Misbah Uddin of the Taliban-aligned Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam-Fazl party. Dawar is still recovering from a serious leg wound.

Dawar’s hometown is, once again, the battleground of what he calls “Project Taliban”—a war against the Pakistani state.

The Taliban’s transnational ambitions are threatening security beyond the borders of Afghanistan, and nowhere is this more evident than in Pakistan’s northwest, where the militant presence has been growing since the terrorist-led group came back to power in August 2021. Attacks on civilians, soldiers, and police have soared. The region bristles with checkpoints and hilltop outposts and is heavily patrolled on the ground and in the air by the Pakistan Army and armed border police. That’s during daylight hours, Dawar told Foreign Policy. Once night falls, it’s a different story.

“The Army checkposts you will only see during the daytime. Before sunset, they go to their barracks, and the people of Waziristan are at the disposal of the militants. Everyone has to secure himself or herself for their own protection,” he said. “It is militarized, and I believe it is a continuation of a proxy war that was started long ago. ‘Project Taliban’ is still continuing.”

The roots of militancy and terrorism in Waziristan go back to colonial times, when the mostly Pashtun people here were characterized as fearless fighters and pressed into service for the British. The stereotype stuck; the region became a center of recruitment and training for young men to fight the Soviets after Moscow’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.

After the United States led an invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 in retaliation for the 9/11 attacks, leaders of the Taliban and al Qaeda moved over the border and for the following 20 years enjoyed the protection of the Pakistani military’s intelligence wing, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency.

The ISI wanted a tame Taliban-led Afghanistan to thwart the ambitions of archrival India to become the dominant regional power. The Taliban had different ideas. The group’s return to power has inspired affiliated and like-minded groups worldwide, as the extremist regime provides safe haven for dozens of militant groups, according to the U.N. Security Council. They now openly use Afghanistan as a base to train fighters seeking to overthrow governments from China and Tajikistan to Iran and Israel. Among them is Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which, Afrasiab Khattak, a former Pakistani lawmaker and now a political analyst, said, is “just Taliban, there is no difference.”

Earlier this month, the Taliban reiterated the group’s stance on the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan when the acting foreign minister, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, said the government doesn’t recognize the Durand Line that has delineated the two countries since 1893. The line runs through the tribal regions, dividing ethnic Pashtun and Baloch tribespeople. Recent bilateral tensions have often focused on the border, with tit-for-tat closures impacting cross-border trade.

In comments that Pakistan’s foreign ministry later called “fanciful” and “self-serving”—and which underlined the simmering hostility between Pakistan and the Taliban it helped put in power—Stanikzai said: “We have never recognized Durand and will never recognize it; today half of Afghanistan is separated and is on the other side of the Durand Line. Durand is the line which was drawn by the English on the heart of Afghans.”

The Security Council said in 2022 that the TTP had up to 5,500 fighters in Afghanistan. That number has likely risen, Dawar said, as neither country, mired in economic mismanagement and crisis, can offer its youthful population an alternative livelihood. Victory brought strength, Dawar said, and the Taliban “can attract the youth because money and power is what attracts youth the most.”

The simmering conflict threatens to return Pakistan’s northwest to the wasteland of less than decade ago, when the TTP controlled the region: Dissenters were routinely killed. Terrorists turned the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), now part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province after an administrative merger in 2018, into a death zone. Millions of people were displaced as those who could leave fled to peace and safety.

Those who stayed lived in fear and poverty until the Army finally took action in 2016 and ended the TTP’s 10-year reign by simply killing them, often in attacks that also killed civilians, or pushing them over the porous border into Afghanistan, where they joined Taliban forces fighting the U.S.-supported republic until it collapsed in 2021.

The TTP wants an independent state in these border regions. It broke a cease-fire with the government in November 2022 and has demanded that the merger of the FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa be reversed. Attacks on the military and police have escalated alarmingly, presenting what a senior government official, who spoke anonymously, called “not only an existential threat to the state but also to the common man”—a recognition that what Dawar calls “Project Taliban” not only threatens to engulf the northwest but, if not contained, poses a potential threat to a fragile and barely stable state.

Caretaker Prime Minister Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar disagreed, telling reporters before the Feb. 8 vote that the military had the upper hand in the region, by virtue of numbers alone. “I don’t see that they pose an existential threat to the state of Pakistan,” he said, while nevertheless conceding it was a “big challenge” that could take years to dislodge.

He could be right. After the failure of peace talks, ironically brokered by the Taliban’s acting interior minister, U.N.-listed terrorist Sirajuddin Haqqani, Pakistan stepped up pressure on the TTP. Asfandyar Mir, an expert on South Asian political and security issues, said this appeared to have made a “marginal” difference.

“For instance, we haven’t seen a complex or suicide bombing attack by the TTP or one of its fronts for a couple of months now,” he said. “In that sense, it appears the Taliban is sensitive to pressure,” though “smaller-scale attacks and the erosion of Pakistani state authority in parts of the northwest continue.” Things could change, he said, once a new government is installed and, perhaps, brings some stability to the political landscape.

For the people of Waziristan, struggling to survive unemployment, a lack of development, and government neglect of basic services such as roads, electricity, clean water, and education—coupled with a downturn in vital cross-border trade with Afghanistan—priorities have again switched to peace. “The local people have learned through their own bitter experience of devastating war” what a Taliban resurgence means, said Khattak, the political analyst. The security establishment is playing a dangerous game, indulging the TTP so that “local people become so desperate they want the military to come in and help them,” he said.

Hundreds of thousands of people have marched through the streets and bazaars of North and South Waziristan over the past year, demanding action against terrorism and an end to state violence. Yet it continues. “No one is safe. Everyone is a target,” said a man in his 30s as he rolled off a list of potential victims: politicians, business people, teachers, doctors, journalists, civic activists, women’s rights advocates, anyone deemed “un-Islamic.” Even barbers are not immune from extremists who ban men from shaving: The day before the Jan. 3 attack on Dawar’s convoy, the bodies of six young hairdressers were found in the nearby town of Mir Ali.

Another local resident pointed to a “Taliban checkpoint” on the road between Miran Shah and the bustling town of Bannu. The long-haired, kohl-eyed, gun-toting youths in sequined caps stand outside their roadside hut in the shadow of an Army post on the hill above. Around the clock, the resident said, they randomly stop vehicles to shake down the drivers. “It’s just for money,” he said. “Money and power.”

But it’s killing, too, “on a daily basis,” said a government worker who left Miran Shah with his family at the height of the TTP terror and visited in early February from Peshawar so he and his wife could vote for Dawar. The aim, he said, is “to create an atmosphere of fear so that people leave and what is here is theirs.”

Dawar said the turning of the Taliban tables on Pakistan “was predictable.” The Taliban “are now a threat to Central Asia. They are now a threat to Iran, to Pakistan, and to even China. All of them thought we will control the Taliban after the takeover. The problem is it didn’t happen,” he said.

In 2011, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned Pakistan’s leaders that they couldn’t keep “snakes,” as she called the Taliban, in their own backyard and “expect them only to bite your neighbors.”

“There used to be a time when people were sent from here to Afghanistan. Now they are coming around, they are biting,” Dawar said.

[drmaqazi]

WHAT DOES IMRAN KHAN MEAN WHEN HE SAYS

Iyyāka Na‘budu wa Iyyāka Nasta’īn

{إِيَّاكَ نَعْبُدُ وَإِيَّاكَ نَسْتَعِينُ}

Thee Alone do we worship and Thee Alone do we implore for help.

Critical explanation or interpretation of a text):

From the verses الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ al-Hamdu lillahi [verse number 2] to مَالِكِ يَوْمِ الدِّينِ Maliki Yawmid-Din [verse number 4], it appears that God Almighty is hidden from the servant’s sight and he is praising God. However, all of a sudden, in the present verse إِيَّاكَ نَعْبُدُ, God Almighty is addressed directly. Some ignorant people have raised the objection that this is contrary to the dictates of eloquent speech even though this is not the case. On the contrary, this is a sublime example of eloquence; for the Being of Allah Almighty is a hidden treasure which is transcendent and not visible to the servant. The servant recognizes Him through His attributes, and by remembering Him, he becomes so close to Him that he sees Him with the eyes of his heart. This subtle point of man’s spiritual journey is mentioned in those verses and it explains that when man ponders over the four divine attributes of:

 رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ (Lord of all the Worlds)

 الرَّحْمَنِ (The Gracious)

 الرَّحِيمِ (The Ever-Merciful)

  مَالِكِ يَوْمِ الدِّينِ (Master of the Time of Judgement)

His eyes are opened and an intense love for Allah the Almighty is sparked in his heart. It is then that, having been honored with spiritually beholding Him and being overwhelmed with His love, he spontaneously cries out, ‘O. Lord! You alone do I worship and You alone do I implore for help.’ Therefore, changing the pronouns [from third person to second person], indicates that when man reflects on Allah the Almighty’s attributes in the Holy Qur’an, he secures a meeting with Him and His Being emerges before him.

In the hadith [oral traditions of the Holy Prophet (SallAllahu 

Alaihi wa Sallam), it is reported by Hazrat Abu Hurairah (RadiyAllahu 'anhu) that that he heard the Holy Prophet (SallAllahu Alaihi wa Sallam) say, ‘Allah Almighty says: “I have divided Sūrah al-Fātiḥah between me and my servant. Thus, one half of it is for me and the other half is for my servant. And I shall grant whatever my servant asks of me (by means of it).” When a servant says:

 الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ

[All praise belongs to Allah, Lord of all the Worlds]

Allah the Exalted replies: “My servant has praised Me”.

And when His servant says:

الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

[The Gracious, the Ever-Merciful]

Allah Almighty replies, “My servant has glorified Me.”

And when His servant supplicates 

مَالِكِ يَوْمِ الدِّينِ 

[Master of the Time of Judgment], 

Allah Almighty states, “My servant has declared My nobility.”’

Al-Bukharī, Kitābul Janā’iz, Bābu mā qīla fī awlādil-mushrikīn.

___Exegesis of Iyyāka Na‘budu wa Iyyāka Nasta’īn

{إِيَّاكَ نَعْبُدُ وَإِيَّاكَ نَسْتَعِينُ}

Thee Alone do we worship and Thee Alone do we implore for help.

Exegesis (Critical explanation or interpretation of a text):

From the verses الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ al-Hamdu lillahi [verse number 2] to مَالِكِ يَوْمِ الدِّينِ Maliki Yawmid-Din [verse number 4], it appears that God Almighty is hidden from the servant’s sight and he is praising God. However, all of a sudden, in the present verse إِيَّاكَ نَعْبُدُ, God Almighty is addressed directly. Some ignorant people have raised the objection that this is contrary to the dictates of eloquent speech even though this is not the case. On the contrary, this is a sublime example of eloquence; for the Being of Allah Almighty is a hidden treasure which is transcendent and not visible to the servant. The servant recognizes Him through His attributes, and by remembering Him, he becomes so close to Him that he sees Him with the eyes of his heart. This subtle point of man’s spiritual journey is mentioned in those verses and it explains that when man ponders over the four divine attributes of:

 رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ (Lord of all the Worlds)

 الرَّحْمَنِ (The Gracious)

 الرَّحِيمِ (The Ever-Merciful)

  مَالِكِ يَوْمِ الدِّينِ (Master of the Time of Judgement)

His eyes are opened and an intense love for Allah the Almighty is sparked in his heart. It is then that, having been honored with spiritually beholding Him and being overwhelmed with His love, he spontaneously cries out, ‘O. Lord! You alone do I worship and You alone do I implore for help.’ Therefore, changing the pronouns [from third person to second person], indicates that when man reflects on Allah the Almighty’s attributes in the Holy Qur’an, he secures a meeting with Him and His Being emerges before him.

In the hadith [oral traditions of the Holy Prophet (SallAllahu 

Alaihi wa Sallam), it is reported by Hazrat Abu Hurairah (RadiyAllahu 'anhu) that that he heard the Holy Prophet (SallAllahu Alaihi wa Sallam) say, ‘Allah Almighty says: “I have divided Sūrah al-Fātiḥah between me and my servant. Thus, one half of it is for me and the other half is for my servant. And I shall grant whatever my servant asks of me (by means of it).” When a servant says:

 الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ

[All praise belongs to Allah, Lord of all the Worlds]

Allah the Exalted replies: “My servant has praised Me”.

And when His servant says:

الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

[The Gracious, the Ever-Merciful]

Allah Almighty replies, “My servant has glorified Me.”

And when His servant supplicates:

مَالِكِ يَوْمِ الدِّينِ 

[Master of the Time of Judgment], 

Allah Almighty states, “My servant has declared My nobility.”’

Al-Bukharī, Kitābul Janā’iz, Bābu mā qīla fī awlādil-mushrikīn.

[xtruss]

The 2024 University of Oxford election for the position of Chancellor became necessary upon the resignation of the incumbent Chancellor, Chris Patten. Online voting will take place during the third week of the Michaelmas term of 2024. The electorate consists of approximately 250,000 eligible voters, comprising alumni and staff of the University of Oxford. [1] Applications for the role closed on 18 August 2024; candidates reported to have applied were Lady Elish Angiolini, William Hague, Imran Khan and Peter Mandelson.

[abcexpresspk]

It will take time to close the gap between Imran Khan and Maulana, Abdul Ghafoor Haidari Maula - ...

[mariacallous]

Pakistani politics have always revolved around the country’s military. Civilian politicians compete for support while criticizing—or seeking covert help from—a ubiquitous security establishment. Since his ouster as prime minister last April, cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan has become the latest to challenge this system. But Khan’s polarizing rhetoric is only adding to Pakistan’s chaos—not marking the advent of a revolution.

The government elected after Khan’s removal via a no-confidence vote initially tolerated the former prime minister’s attacks on generals, judges, and political rivals in addition to his conspiracy theories about his ouster being the result of a U.S.-backed plot. Unlike previous civilian leaders who fell afoul of the military, Khan was not immediately arrested, charged with corruption, or disqualified from future elections by judicial fiat. But now, Khan and his close aides are beginning to face the wrath of the state apparatus. Both the security establishment and the civilian government seem to have realized that Khan’s populist influence will not diminish without prosecuting him and his associates.

On Oct. 12, Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency charged Khan with violating laws barring foreign funding for political parties. Since Khan first ran for public office in 1997, he has raised funds for his Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party from foreigners and overseas Pakistanis, many of whom had donated to charities he started after retiring from cricket in 1992. Although some of this fundraising has likely always violated Pakistani law, prosecutors long held off disciplining Khan or his party because they enjoyed the establishment’s blessings.

Khan’s support base comprises middle-class urban Pakistanis disenchanted with the country’s two traditional political parties, the center-right Pakistan Muslim League (PML)—dominated since the 1980s by the family of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and current Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif—and the center-left Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), led by members of the family of late Prime Ministers Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto.

Prime ministers from both the PML and PPP have been ousted from office multiple times by the Pakistani military, which routinely influences Pakistan’s superior judiciary. Supreme Court judges then often provide legal cover for otherwise undemocratic and unconstitutional actions initiated by generals. The Supreme Court endorsed Pakistan’s four military coups in 1958, 1969, 1977, and 1999, as well as accepted the generals’ right to suspend the constitution under its so-called doctrine of necessity. On other occasions, the military orchestrated palace coups in 1990, 1993, and 1996, resulting in dismissal of elected prime ministers by the president and with the support of the Supreme Court. In 2012 and 2017, prime ministers were removed from office at the behest of the military through direct intervention by the Supreme Court. Together, the Pakistani military and judiciary have never allowed a PML or PPP prime minister to stay in office for the full five-year term of parliament.

Khan presented himself as the military-backed alternative to the PML and PPP’s perceived corrupt, dynastic politics. His populist rhetoric appealed to young middle-class Pakistanis as well as those who had been more comfortable during the country’s past periods of military rule than under its civilian democrats.

Khan at first failed to get traction as a politician, losing all seats his party contested in the 1997 parliamentary elections. He managed to enter parliament in 2002 in elections organized by the military regime of Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Only in 2013 did Khan’s party win a significant number of seats in parliament for the first time. In 2018, he finally translated his celebrity status into high political office with direct help from Pakistan’s intelligence services and the military. In that year’s elections, the PTI emerged as the single-largest party in the lower house of parliament, but it could not form a government without the support of smaller parties. The military overcame this last hurdle by advising three such groups to form a coalition with the PTI.

Khan’s ascent to the office of prime minister became possible because of a controversial Supreme Court ruling that disqualified Nawaz Sharif without trial as well as a spate of corruption cases hobbling most of Khan’s other opponents in the PML and PPP. To get to this point, the military had ensured favorable media coverage for Khan and his party, helped prosecute his opponents, and directed locally influential candidates to join the PTI. Opponents and foreign observers also alleged selective rigging on election day.

Those corruption cases against PML and PPP leaders failed to make much headway in trial courts and are currently being thrown out for lack of evidence. But Khan continued to rail against his opponents, telling his supporters that Pakistan was destined for greatness under his leadership. Like most populist leaders, however, he had no answers for Pakistan’s problems and governed poorly. Khan often addressed the nation on television and rallied his supporters with a mix of Islamist and nationalist grandiloquence. The military gradually lost faith in the former prime minister as Pakistan’s economy took a nosedive and its foreign relations suffered.

The value of the Pakistani rupee eroded after Khan reinstated fuel subsidies that had been eliminated as part of the country’s commitments under an International Monetary Fund program. Khan had managed to antagonize the leaders of China, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates so much so that these traditionally friendly countries would not help Pakistan service its $126 billion in foreign debt. His open support for the Taliban and criticism of U.S. leaders and policy, meanwhile, left Pakistan with little support in the United States.

Ever the narcissist, Khan ran a one-man show­—shuffling his cabinet often and skipping sessions of parliament. He also displayed little respect for lawmakers or the generals who helped bring him to office. Meanwhile, Khan’s opponents peeled off support from his coalition and—once the military withdrew its backing by publicly declaring itself politically neutral—ousted him in the April no-confidence vote. Khan’s effort to nullify the vote by claiming that it was U.S.-backed regime change did not survive legal challenges.

Out of office, Khan has turned on his former benefactor, the military high command, claiming that Pakistan’s army chief ousted him to bring “traitors” back to power at the behest of the United States. Khan feels no need to offer evidence of his conspiracy-mongering because his followers have become a personality cult, willing to follow him to the gates of hell. But despite Khan’s vaunted popular support and vast social media presence, his promises to mobilize a revolution will most likely remain unfulfilled.

Pakistan has had popular leaders who challenged the military’s dominance on politics and policy before. They did not succeed in weakening this stranglehold—and Khan’s chances are no better. In railing against the military leadership, Khan is simply doing what Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif did before him. All three of them rose to power with the help of the military and then turned around to confront it.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif attracted huge crowds at rallies, yet their parties survived only through compromises with the Pakistan Army. However, unlike them, Khan’s opposition to the military’s role in Pakistani politics is not rooted in conviction. Bhutto and Sharif, as well as their supporters, firmly believed in democracy and civilian supremacy over the military rooted in Pakistan’s constitution; their collaboration with the military was strategic and did not reflect ideology. Khan and his supporters, by contrast, hope that the Islamist, anti-American elements of the military will intervene to help Khan return to power.

That is unlikely to happen. Pakistan’s military is not prone to factional divisions and remains unified despite Khan’s provocations. The former prime minister’s cult followers might believe he is the only patriotic and honest political leader in Pakistan, but the military seems to have moved on.

Unlike Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, or many other Pakistani politicians, Khan has never faced adversity in his career—so far. He has never faced criminal cases or gone to prison. Nor has he been banned from holding public office, appearing on television, or traveling—restrictions that others daring to take on Pakistan’s establishment have faced in the past. Khan may have a political future if he gets through the hardships that await him. He remains popular with his base and was recently able to win back most—though not all—of the parliamentary seats in recent by-elections on seats vacated by the PTI.

As Khan and others nurtured by Pakistan’s military establishment turn against it, some might be tempted to write the obituary of military dominance in the country’s politics. As someone who has advocated and fought for the supremacy of civilian rule and constitutional democracy in Pakistan for decades, I am not sure Khan’s agitation will truly change how Pakistan functions. The country is likely to witness some more chaos—rallies and media noise by Khan’s supporters, political disputes playing out in court, the specter of debt defaults, continuing inflation and erosion of the value of the Pakistani rupee, threats of violence by the Pakistani Taliban, and extreme political polarization—before the military steps in again, most likely indirectly, to restore order.