#statutory provisions

[techminsolutions]

Legal Precision Unveiled: Unraveling the Intricacies of Input Tax Credit Quandaries

Delving deeper into the intricate tapestry of Goods and Services Tax (GST) implications, the saga of Input Tax Credit (ITC) assumes greater complexity, offering a nuanced perspective on the petitioner-assessee’s odyssey. Embedded within the labyrinth of statutory constructs, the petitioner’s invocation of Input Tax Credit (ITC) rights under section 16 of the CGST Act unfolds against the backdrop…

[listen-to-the-inner-walrus]

hello and welcome to the uk is a fucking hell country, part 284829494

[alt text:]

Anti-monarchists receive ‘intimidatory’ Home Office letter on new protest laws

Home Office claims timing of new powers, taking effect days before king’s coronation, is coincidental

Ben Quinn, Rajeev Syal and Vikram Dodd

Official warning letters have been sent to anti-monarchists planning peaceful protests at King Charles III’s coronation saying that new criminal offences to prevent disruption have been rushed into law.

Using tactics described by lawyers as “intimidatory”, the Home Office’s Police Powers Unit wrote to the campaign group Republic saying new powers had been brought forward to prevent “disruption at major sporting and cultural events”.

The new law, given royal assent by Charles on Tuesday, means that from Wednesday:

Protesters who block roads, airports and railways could face 12 months behind bars.

Anyone locking on to others, objects or buildings could go to prison for six months and face an unlimited fine.

Police will be able to head off disruption by stopping and searching protesters if they suspect they are setting out to cause chaos.

Jun Pang, a policy and campaigns officer at Liberty, said: “Key measures in the bill will come into force just days before the coronation of King Charles – a significant event in our country’s history that is bound to inspire a wider national conversation and public protests. At the same time, the government are using a statutory instrument to bring draconian measures that the House of Lords threw out of the bill back from the dead, once again evading scrutiny and accountability.

“It’s worrying to see the police handed so many new powers to restrict protest, especially before a major national event. When the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act came into force, the police repeatedly misused them – in part because they simply did not understand them. Similarly, when Queen Elizabeth died, we saw police acting in inappropriate and heavy-handed ways towards protesters that violated their rights.”

Shami Chakrabarti, the former shadow attorney general, said: “During the passage of this illiberal and headline-grabbing legislation, ministers admitted that the new offence of ‘locking on’ is so broad as to catch peaceful protesters who link arms in public.

“Suspicionless stop and search is notorious for racial disparity and it is staggering that more of these provisions have brought into force so soon after Louise Casey’s devastating report [on the Met police]. The home secretary can blast ‘ecowarriors’ but this legislation may be used against anti-poverty and Ukraine solidarity protesters too.”

A statement from the home secretary, Suella Braverman, said: “This legislation is the latest step the government has taken against protesters who use highly disruptive tactics to deliberately delay members of the public, often preventing them from getting to work and hospital, as well as missing loved ones’ funerals.

“The range of new offences and penalties match the seriousness of the threat guerrilla tactics pose to our infrastructure, taxpayers’ money and police time.”

full article here

so just to sum this up, peaceful protesting can now land you in prison for a year and you might face an unlimited fine which i believe is up to £5000, and police can now stop and search you if they believe youre "setting out to cause chaos"

its specifically being put in place right before charles' coronation, but these are now considered criminal offenses so theyre not exclusive to it.

you know, a country where you can be put in prison for a year for peaceful protesting really doesnt sound like a fucking democracy to me.

[soolegal]

The Maharashtra State Electricity Transmission Company Ltd. (MahaTransco) told the Bombay High Court that there is no constitutional, statutory provision, or government decision mandating transgender job reservation.

For further information, refer to this News Report SoOLEGAL.

[ukrfeminism]

2 minute read

JK Rowling is founding and personally funding a new service for women survivors of sexual violence. Launched days before Nicola Sturgeon’s controversial Gender Recognition Reform Bill is expected to pass through the Scottish parliament, the Edinburgh-based centre, Beira’s Place, will be female-only.

The author, who has written about the sexual and domestic abuse she suffered in her twenties, believes there is an “unmet need” for Scottish women who want “women-centred and women-delivered care at such a vulnerable time”. She hopes Beira’s Place, which will employ professional staff to provide free one-to-one and group counselling, “will enable more women to process and recover from their trauma”.

Rowling’s board of directors are all vocal opponents of the Gender Recognition Reform Bill, which will permit anyone to change the legal sex on their birth certificate by making a simple statutory declaration, a process known as self-identification. Feminists, including Reem Alsalem, UN special rapporteur on violence against women and girls, have raised grave concerns it will open up women’s services and private spaces to abuse by male predators.

Beira’s board comprises Rhona Hotchkiss, a former prison governor, who has opposed the Scottish government’s policy of moving trans-identified male sex offenders to women’s jails; Johann Lamont, a former leader of the Scottish Labour Party and a lawyer; Dr Margaret McCartney, an academic, broadcaster and Glasgow GP; and Susan Smith, director of For Women Scotland, a grassroots feminist group founded to fight the gender reform bill. Beira’s chief executive is Isabelle Kerr, a former manager of Glasgow Rape Crisis who received an MBE in 2020 for her work supporting British citizens who had been raped overseas.

The provision of single-sex services has been a key battleground of the gender reform bill. Already in Scotland, most domestic violence refuges and rape support services are “trans inclusive” and accept referrals from both sexes. In recent years councils have removed grants from women-only refuges in favour of generic organisations. Monklands Women’s Aid in North Lanarkshire, which was set up more than 40 years ago, had its council funding withdrawn in favour of a social justice charity which also helps men.

Most controversial is Edinburgh Rape Crisis Centre whose chief executive, Mridul Wadhwa, a trans woman, told the Guilty Feminist podcast that women sexual assault victims who request female-only care will be “challenged on your prejudices” and told to “reframe your trauma”.

Yet in her recent book Defending Women’s Spaces, veteran campaigner Karen Ingala Smith, the chief executive of Nia, a domestic abuse charity in London, describes how women traumatised by male violence fare better and feel safer in female therapeutic spaces.

Beira’s Place is legally permitted to exclude males under the exemptions of the 2010 Equality Act, which allows single-sex services if they are “a proportionate means to achieve a legitimate end”.

It is named after Beira, the Scottish goddess of winter. JK Rowling said: “Beira rules over the dark part of the year, handing over to her sister, Bride, when summer comes again. Beira represents female wisdom, power, and regeneration. Hers is a strength that endures during the difficult times, but her myth contains the promise that they will not last for ever.”

The service is not a charity, but privately funded by Rowling, a noted philanthropist. The amount she will donate to set up and run Beira’s Place has not been disclosed.

[ltwilliammowett]

The Articles of War

The Articles of War are a series of regulations intended to govern the behaviour of a country's military and naval forces. The first known use of the term can be found in Robert Monro's work His expedition with the worthy Scot's regiment called Mac-keyes regiment etc. from 1637 (in the form "Articles of warres") and can be used for military law in general. In Swedish, the corresponding term Krigsartiklar is first mentioned in 1556, but the term is usually used more specifically and with the modern spelling and capitalisation to refer to the British regulations drawn up in the wake of the Glorious Revolution, as well as the regulations of the United States, which were later based on them.

England's first Articles of War were written for the Royal Navy. They formed the statutory provisions regulating and governing the behaviour of members of the Royal Navy. They were prominently displayed in all naval ships, and set out a list of criminal provisions which applied to members of the Royal Navy and others to whom the Act applied, in addition to the criminal law of England and Wales and any local criminal law.

The naval Articles of War were originally issued by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty in 1653 as fighting instructions after defeat at the Battle of Dungeness. Soon after the Restoration, they were converted into an Act of Parliament. After another defeat at the Battle of Toulon, Parliament amended the Articles in 1749, further tightening discipline. These Articles resulted in the execution of Admiral John Byng, despite a clear sentiment in the navy and in Parliament that he should be given a lower punishment. In response, the 1779 amendment was the start of a gradual process of easing the more draconian punishments. The naval Articles were retained in the Naval Discipline Act 1957 but then replaced by the provisions of the tri-service Armed Forces Act 2006.

The 34 Articles of War were read aloud to the crew - many of whom were illiterate - usually once a month, usually on a Sunday. Some captains preferred to do this every Sunday.

There were at least seven crimes for which the death sentence was mandatory: Communicating with the enemy Failure to fight Failure to pursue the enemy sedition or mutiny Burning of ships, boats or magazines Murder Fornication or sodomy against men or animals

The articles list a further 13 offences for which the death penalty may be imposed, but which may be replaced by a punishment deemed appropriate by a court martial. The remaining offences, such as refusing to work, rudeness to officers, uncleanliness, etc., could be punished by the captain or lieutenant. The lesser offences could still be punished on the spot, such as extra work or grog withdrawal. While the more serious offences, such as refusing to work, were carried out on Sunday in front of all crew members and could be punished with flogging.

[corviiids]

genuinely so sorry to slide into your dm's like this, not sure that this is proper tumblr etiquette, etc., but i just got so excited when i read in your sayu-gets-the-death-note ask that you've been trying to talk yourself out of doing an entire statutory interpretation of the manga death note rules because i've been trying to talk myself out doing an entire metaphysical interpretation of the manga death note rules, so... if you, like me, simply cannot talk yourself out of a stupid idea once it sinks its claws in your brain and would at some point like to share notes about I THINK one of the sexiest and most broken parts of this series, i'd be delighted.

oh my god dont apologise im just excited a single person on earth besides me is interested in a pseudo-legal (very pseudo) perspective on the death note rules. high fives you. for the most part im just incredibly impressed that they manage to retain so much internal consistency especially since so many of them have the vibe of, like, random amendments which were included just for funsies. it's incredible they don't overtly contradict each other. ive been obsessed with them since i first saw them and have already spent way too much time reading over them but yeah i'd honestly love to dig into them more. HTR13 does organise them into something closer to Parts or Divisions which makes the structure a little more coherent. it drives me nuts that sometimes a numbered rule will have sub-provisions that have absolutely nothing to do with each other. drafting that gives me a stress migraine

[belongstolove]

[mariacallous]

Last month, US president Joe Biden signed a surveillance bill enhancing the National Security Agency’s power to compel US businesses to wiretap communications going in and out of the country. The changes to the law have left legal experts largely in the dark as to the true limits of this new authority, chiefly when it comes to the types of companies that could be affected. The American Civil Liberties Union and organizations like it say the bill has rendered the statutory language governing the limits of a powerful wiretap tool overly vague, potentially subjecting large swaths of corporate America to warrantless and secretive surveillance practices.

In April, Congress rushed to extend the US intelligence system’s “crown jewel,” Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The spy program allows the NSA to wiretap calls and messages between Americans and foreigners abroad—so long as the foreigner is the individual being “targeted” and the intercept serves a significant “foreign intelligence” purpose. Since 2008, the program has been limited to a subset of businesses that the law calls “electronic communications service providers,” or ECSPs—corporations such as Microsoft and Google, which provide email services, and phone companies like Sprint and AT&T.

In recent years, the government has worked quietly to redefine what it means to be an ECSP in an attempt to extend the NSA’s reach, first unilaterally and now with Congress’ backing. The issue remains that the bill Biden signed last month contains murky language that attempts to redefine the scope of a critical surveillance program. In response, a coalition of digital rights organizations, including the Brennan Center for Justice to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, is pressing the US attorney general, Merrick Garland, and the nation’s top spy, Avril Haines, to declassify details about a relevant court case that could, they say, shed much-needed light on the situation.

In a letter to the top officials, more than 20 such organizations say they believe the new definition of an ECSP adopted by Congress might “permit the NSA to compel almost any US business to assist” the agency, noting that all companies today provide some sort of “service” and have access to equipment on which “communications” are stored.

“Deliberately writing overbroad surveillance authorities and trusting that future administrations will decide not to exploit them is a recipe for abuse,” the letter says. “And it is entirely unnecessary, as the administration can—and should—declassify the fact that the provision is intended to reach data centers.”

The Justice Department confirmed receipt of the letter on Tuesday but referred WIRED to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which has primary purview over declassification decisions. The ODNI has not responded to a request for comment.

It is widely believed—and has been reported—that data centers are the intended target of this textual change. Matt Olsen, the assistant US attorney general for national security, appeared on an April 17 episode of the Lawfare podcast to say that, while unable to confirm or deny any specifics, data centers today store a significant amount of communications data and are an “example” of why the government viewed the change as necessary.

A DOJ spokesperson pointed WIRED to an April 18 letter by Garland that claims the new ECSP definition is “narrowly tailored.” The letter includes written reflections on the provision by the assistant attorney general, Carlos Uriarte, who writes that the “fix” is meant to address a “critical intelligence gap” resulting from changes in technology over the past 15 years. According to Uriarte, the DOJ has committed to applying the new definition internally “to cover the type of service provider at issue” before the court.

Ostensibly this means the government is promising to limit future surveillance directives to data centers (in addition to the companies traditionally defined as ECSPs).

The surveillance court that oversees FISA and the appeals court that reviews its decisions sided two years ago with an unidentified company that fought back after being served an NSA order. Both courts ruled that it did not, in fact, appear to meet the criteria for being considered an ECSP, as only part of its function was storing communications data. Finding the government’s interpretation of the statute overly broad, the court reminded the government that only Congress has the “competence and constitutional authority” to rewrite the law.

Digital rights groups argue that declassifying additional information about this FISA case may help the public understand which types of businesses are actually subject to NSA directives. Practically speaking, they say, that information is no longer a secret anyway. “Declassifying this information would cause little if any national security harm,” the letter says. “The New York Times has already revealed that the relevant FISC case addressed data centers for cloud computing.”

In the aftermath of the FISA court’s ruling, the NSA and other spy agencies began lobbying the House and Senate intelligence committees to aid the administration in redefining what it means to be an ECSP. Members of both committees have subsequently portrayed the court’s ruling as a “directive” that Congress needs to expand the NSA’s reach. In a floor speech last month, Mark Warner, the chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said, “So what happened was, the FISA Court said to Congress: You guys need to close this loophole; you need to close this and change this definition.”

But in fact what the court asserted was that the government had exceeded its authority and that it was Congress’ job, not the Justice Department’s, to revise the law. “Any unintended gap in coverage revealed by our interpretation is, of course, open to reconsideration by the branches of government whose competence and constitutional authority extend to statutory revision,” the court said.

This would culminate in new language being proposed that quickly alarmed legal experts, including top civil liberties attorneys who’ve appeared before the secret court in the past. The surveillance fears quickly spread to Silicon Valley. The Information Technology Industry Council, one of the tech industry's top lobbying arms, warned that companies like Facebook and IBM were interpreting the bill as having “vastly expanded the US government’s warrantless surveillance capabilities.”

This expansion, the firm added, would also hinder the “competitiveness of US technology companies” and arguably imperil the “continued global free flow of data between the US and its allies.” Customers internationally, it argued, would likely begin taking their business elsewhere should the US government turn data centers into surveillance watering holes.

Concerns about the new ECSP definition have been circulating since December. While largely dismissing them, members of the House and Senate intelligence committees made a few adjustments in February, exempting a handful of business types. This came in response to popular concerns that Starbucks employees and hotel IT staff might be secretly conscripted by the NSA. FISA experts such as Marc Zwillinger—a private attorney who has appeared twice before the FISA Court of Review—noted in response to those adjustments that Congress’ rush to exempt a handful of businesses only served to demonstrate that the text was inherently too broad.

Intelligence committee members kept the pressure on lawmakers to reauthorize the Section 702 program with the sought-after language, going as far as to suggest that another 9/11-style attack might occur if they failed. The power of the committees was on full display, as while neither actually have primary jurisdiction over FISA, a majority of the Section 702 bill that passed was authored by intelligence committee staff.

Even while supporting the new framework and dismissing the intensity of civil society’s concerns, Warner did eventually step forward to acknowledge the new ECSF definition needed additional tweaking. First, on the Senate floor in April, he said that Garland shared his “view” that the language “could have been drafted better.” Later, in response to questions from reporters, he added: “I’m absolutely committed to getting that fixed.”

That appears unlikely to happen soon. According to The Record, Warner indicated that the best time to update the language again would be in the “next intelligence bill,” presumably referring to legislation this fall broadly reauthorizing the intelligence community’s work.

In the meantime, however, more than half of Congress is running for election, and the next US president will have greater surveillance powers than any other before. No one can say for sure who that president will be or how they’ll make use of that authority.

[morlock-holmes]

Starting to get really pissed off about the way people talk about Biden's student loan forgiveness plan. Here's the authority he relied on, the Heroes Act, 20 U.S. Code § 1098bb:

"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, unless enacted with specific reference to this section, the Secretary of Education (referred to in this part as the “Secretary”) may waive or modify any statutory or regulatory provision applicable to the student financial assistance programs under title IV of the Act [20 U.S.C. 1070 et seq.] as the Secretary deems necessary in connection with a war or other military operation or national emergency to provide the waivers or modifications authorized by paragraph (2)."

This is the same authority Betsy DeVos relied on to pause loan payments during the pandemic.

I don't want to hear another person pontificate about this ever again without being able to tell me:

Why they think the statute does not straightforwardly allow the loan forgiveness program;

Why the Supreme Court felt that the statute didn't allow the loan forgiveness program;

Why Biden should have known the court would rule the way it did;

Whether you think Biden had an alternative authority to enact a loan forgiveness program and if so what that authority is.

The fact that most people can't seem to do any of these things but still confidently talk about how obvious it is that Biden never wanted student loan forgiveness in the first place makes me want to throw a chair through a window.

[dontmeantobepoliticalbut]

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas ruled yesterday that portions of Texas Senate Bill 1, adopted in September 2021, violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court found that parts of S.B. 1 require officials to reject mail-in ballot applications and mail-in ballots based on errors or omissions that are not material in determining whether voters are qualified under Texas law to vote or cast a mail ballot.

“The District Court’s decision affirms what the Justice Department has argued for nearly two years: these provisions of Texas Senate Bill 1 unlawfully restrict the ability of eligible Texas voters to vote by mail and to have that vote counted,” said Attorney General Merrick B. Garland. “The Justice Department will continue to defend against unlawful efforts that undermine the right to vote and restrict participation in our democracy.”

“In requiring rejection of mail ballots and mail ballot applications from eligible voters based on minor paperwork errors or omissions, Texas Senate Bill 1 violates the Civil Rights Act,” said Assistant Attorney General Kristen Clarke of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. “This ruling sends a clear message that states may not impose unlawful and unnecessary requirements that disenfranchise eligible voters seeking to participate in our democracy. The Justice Department will continue to use every available tool to protect all Americans’ right to vote and to ensure that their voices are heard.”

“The right to vote is one of the fundamental rights in our democracy,” said U.S. Attorney Jaime Esparza for the Western District of Texas. “This important ruling protects the rights of eligible Texas voters to cast a vote and have it counted consistent with federal law.”

The court issued a preliminary ruling yesterday in favor of the United States’ motion for summary judgment, which asserts that two provisions of S.B. 1 violate Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act by requiring rejection of mail ballots and mail ballot request forms because of paperwork errors that are not material to establishing a voter’s eligibility to cast a ballot. The first provision requires that early voting clerks “shall reject” mail ballot applications that do not include a Texas driver’s license or ID number that identifies “the same voter identified on the applicant’s application for voter registration.” The second provision provides that a mail ballot “may be accepted only if” the ID numbers on the carrier envelope or signature sheet identifies “the same voter identified on the applicant’s application for voter registration.”

Section 5.07 requires that early voting clerks “shall reject” mail ballot applications that do not include a Department of Public Safety (DPS) number or the last four digits of a Social Security Number (SSN) that identifies “the same voter identified on the applicant’s application for voter registration.” Section 5.13 provides that a mail ballot “may be accepted only if” the DPS number or last four digits of an SSN on the carrier envelope or signature sheet identifies “the same voter identified on the applicant’s application for voter registration.”

The United States presented evidence to the court that S.B. 1 has resulted in Texas election officials rejecting tens of thousands of mail ballot applications and mail ballots cast in elections since the bill was enacted in 2021. The Department asserts that these rejections violate federal law, denying Texas voters the statutory right to vote protected by Section 101.

Yesterday’s preliminary ruling from the court grants the Justice Department’s motion for summary judgment, which the Department filed in May 2023, in its entirety. The decision addresses the Justice Department’s sole pending claim in La Unión del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott, No. 5:21-cv-844 (WDTX), a case in which the United States and several private parties are challenging various aspects of S.B. 1. The court noted that the ruling will be followed in the coming weeks by a final written opinion and order. A group of private plaintiffs will be going to trial on the remaining claims in the case, which have not yet been resolved. That trial is scheduled to begin on Sept. 11.

Complaints about discriminatory practices may be reported to the Civil Rights Division through its internet reporting portal at www.civilrights.justice.gov or by calling (800) 253-3931.

Additional information about the Civil Rights Division’s work to uphold and protect the voting rights of all Americans is available on the Justice Department’s website at www.justice.gov/crt/voting-section.

[schraubd]

A Statutory "Green Book" After 303 Creative

In 303 Creative, the Supreme Court held that at least in some circumstances a business's free speech interest in avoiding producing expression it disagrees with constitutionally must trump the application of anti-discrimination law in areas of public accommodation, notwithstanding the admittedly "compelling state interest" the latter type of law protects.

It was not so long ago that minorities in America had booklets they carried to let them know which businesses it was safe for them to patronize, knowing that in certain places and communities they could not simply assume that a hotel, restaurant, or shop open to the general public would be open to them. The Jewish Vacation Guide was one example, the Negro Motorist Green Book was another. In circumstances where discrimination was lawful, these resources served several important needs. 

First, of course, they let their readers know where certain services simply would be unavailable. One does not want to travel through or move into a town where the only hotel or restaurant will refuse to serve you. 

Second, and almost as importantly, they enabled readers to avoid shops which would refuse to grant them service. This is distinct from the first injury, because there is a severe dignitary harm in being refused service on account of one's identity even if a competing business across the street that will happily take one's dollars. One feature of public accommodations law is precisely that one doesn't have to "run the risk" that in entering a storefront on Main Street you'll endure the indignity of being asked to leave because you're the wrong skin color, religion, or sexual orientation. Absent that guarantee being fully enshrined into law, resources like the Green Book enabled travelers to know in advance which storefronts to avoid so they wouldn't have to face that sort of humiliation.

In keeping with that tradition, I wonder if one way of balancing 303 Creative's First Amendment protections with the again conceded-to-be-compelling interest in robust antidiscrimination protections is via the time-tested policy of disclosure. States can pass laws which require any business that wishes to claim a First Amendment exemption from all or part of an anti-discrimination statute to publicly announce and display that choice; and the state can likewise maintain a list of businesses which make such claims. The law would be a sort of statutory Green Book, letting patrons know what businesses are at least claiming an ability to discriminate (and by extension assuring them that businesses not on the list remain safe to patronize).

Here's my very rough crack at some model legislative language:

Sec. XXX -- Exemptions

(a) Registration. Any business which seeks to claim a First Amendment exemption from all or part of the [this state's anti-discrimination law] ("a business seeking an exemption") must, at least thirty days prior to asserting any claim for such an exemption,

(1) Register with the Secretary of State their intent to claim an exemption, including specifying which portions of the law they assert they will not comply with.

(2) The Secretary shall publish the names and addresses of all businesses who register their intent to claim an exemption under this subsection on a publicly available website, including which provisions of the law they claim exemption from. 

(b) Public display. Within thirty days of receiving a filing under Sec. (a)(1), the Secretary shall issue a notification to the business seeking an exemption stating that "WARNING: THIS BUSINESS HAS FILED FOR A FIRST AMENDMENT EXEMPTION FROM THIS STATE'S ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS", including specifying which portions of the law the business claims exemption from. Unless otherwise inapplicable, the text of this notification shall be conspicuously displayed in

(1) The front window or doorway space of any physical location of the business that is open to the general public or the businesses' regular customers; and

(2) The front page of any webpage or social media account controlled by the businesses and through which it advertises its business to the general public;

(3) Notwithstanding any other portion of this subsection, if a business claiming an exemption has neither a physical storefront under subsection (b)(1) or a webpage under subsection (b)(2), the text of the notification shall be displayed in any reasonable location where it will be conspicuous for the average customer considering patronizing the business.

(c) Presumption of sincerity. Any business which complies with the provisions in this section shall be deemed to have established, as a rebuttal presumption, the sincerity of their belief that compliance with [this state's antidiscrimination] conflicts with their own expressive beliefs.

(d) No entitlement to, or expansion of the scope of, exemption. Except as detailed in subsection(c), compliance with the provisions of this Section shall not entitle the business seeking an exemption from antidiscrimination law to any relief from the requirements of antidiscrimination provisions beyond that which is constitutionally required under the First Amendment; nor does it immunize the business seeking an exemption from any public or private proceeding seeking to enforce anti-discrimination provisions that would not otherwise violate the First Amendment.

The basic idea of this provision is simple: if you want to claim a First Amendment right to discriminate, you have to claim it publicly, in advance, so that people who would be denied service can plan accordingly. By creating a master list of discriminators, and by requiring businesses who seek to assert a right to discriminate to prominently display their intent on their storefront, it is far less likely that customers who would end up being excluded will on accident patronize the business.

The law would have some other salutary effects as well. By creating a reasonably comprehensive list of businesses asserting a right to discriminate, the state can learn of the existence of any "dead zones" where members of certain marginalized groups may be severely restricted or entirely unable to obtain services -- data that could be very useful for future legislative action. As reflected in subsection (c), the law also I think would aid in dividing the actual true believers from the opportunists -- I assume that only those who really, truly believe in their discriminatory impulses will be willing to announce in advance to the world "I am a discriminator" (as the 303 Creative plaintiff, to her "credit", was willing to do).

What are some potential drawbacks? One possibility is that it will be assumed that a law like this will enable more businesses to discriminate than otherwise would be licensed to do so by 303 Creative; I wrote subsection(d) to try and forestall that risk. Under this statute, registering a claim for an exemption is just that -- a claim, and the claim does not guarantee success. A business that registered but whose activities were not protected under 303 Creative's umbrella would still be liable, notwithstanding their registration.

Another possible problem is the argument that a law like this itself constitutes compelled speech. On face, the requirement that the business post the "WARNING" placard in its store to me doesn't seem any different than requiring a restaurant to display the health inspection notice. But there might be something different here insofar as the broader thrust of the statute would be to force businesses to "go public" with their intention to discriminate. While there's something instinctively odd about claiming a free expression right to avoid expressing one's deeply-held beliefs, there are circumstances where such a claim makes sense -- NAACP v. Alabama is the obvious template here. Alabama in the 1950s sought to require that the NAACP disclose the names and addresses of its members; the NAACP, unsurprisingly, did not wish to make this information public and claimed a First Amendment right to keep their membership data private. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the NAACP (incidentally, NAACP was perhaps unsurprisingly a key precedent relied upon by the Griswold Court regarding the existence of a right to privacy). The NAACP had obviously reasonable fears that disclosure of their membership would render them vulnerable to harassment and violence; the discriminating businesses might claim fears of a similar vulnerability.

NAACP is clearly distinct, however, for a simple reason: the NAACP did not simultaneously seek to keep its "expression" quiet and claim that its expressive activity entitled it to a governmental benefit  (I've always found the Little Sisters of the Poor style claim -- wanting an exemption, but also being outraged at being forced to actually ask for the exemption -- to be utterly ridiculous). With regards to its membership information, the NAACP truly wanted nothing more than to be "let alone"; there was never a circumstance where the organization would wield its membership data as a sword against the state. By contrast, by stipulation the discriminators do wish to go public regarding their beliefs when they tell the state "you can't enforce your anti-discrimination law against me because I believe X". At most, what they want is to be able to hide their beliefs until the last minute. But that's a far less pressing claim -- at some point, the business seeking the right to discriminate will have to go public with its claim, and so it does not seem unreasonable to insist that the pivotal moment occur before an unwitting customer is humiliated and denied service.

And on the subject of harassment: certainly, violence and vandalism are never justified. But often in this context, "harassment" means nothing more than a consumer counter-boycott -- the company refuses to do business with certain groups because of its beliefs; many other consumers decide accordingly that they will no longer patronize the business in protest of that discrimination (ex: the Jewish community members who no longer are purchasing from a Kosher bakery that decided it couldn't bake "pride" treats). That is not harassment, that's counter-speech. And in that register, I'd argue that under 303 Creative's logic enabling customers to know "this business asserts a right to discriminate" is free speech facilitative, not chilling.

One of the virtues of public accommodations law is that it dissipates, under normal circumstances, the inference that basic business transactions are expressive. I very much prefer a world where the bakery that bakes a cupcake for a client isn't seen as sending some sort of message of approval towards the client and the client that eats the baker's treat isn't sending a message of approval toward the baker (beyond "this cupcake is delicious"). That, to me, seems a far more pleasant space to live in than one where every turnip and widget we buy or sell can be taken as some sort of sweeping moral approval for our business partners.

But the Supreme Court did not agree. And once we open the door to saying that ordinary business transactions should be perceived as expressive, then customers as well as businesses have a strong interest in knowing the political and social views of who they're transacting with so they can assure themselves that values align, and can redirect their dollars where they do not. This is one reason I think a consequence of 303 Creative will be to supercharge "cancel culture" -- the more businesses are allowed to say "we don't serve your kind", the more customers must be allowed to say in return "well then we don't buy from your kind". The only thing worse than cancel culture is unidirectional cancel culture. If businesses can "cancel" customers for supporting gay rights, then customers should be equally empowered to cancel businesses for asserting a right to discriminate.

Again, the model language I've written above is rough. But I'm curious what First Amendment scholars and other interested parties think of the idea. We may have to tolerate certain businesses asserting a constitutionally-protected right to discriminate. But customers have rights too. One of those rights is to have confidence that one can walk into a storefront and be served as an equal. Another right is to be able to avoid patronizing businesses who insist they have a deeply held commitment to discriminating against you, your family, or your loved ones. This statute, it seems, can help bring these clashing interests into balance.

via The Debate Link https://ift.tt/9X0UOKh

[news4dzhozhar]

Leahy Law Fact Sheet - United States Department of State

Leahy Law Fact Sheet - United States Department of State

1. What is the Leahy law?

The term “Leahy law” refers to two statutory provisions prohibiting the U.S. Government from using funds for assistance to units of foreign security forces where there is credible information implicating that unit in the commission of gross violations of human rights (GVHR). One statutory provision applies to the State Department and the other applies to the Department of Defense. The State Department Leahy law was made permanent under section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. 2378d. The U.S. government considers torture, extrajudicial killing, enforced disappearance, and rape under color of law as GVHRs when implementing the Leahy law. Incidents are examined on a fact-specific basis. The State Department Leahy law includes an exception permitting resumption of assistance to a unit if the Secretary of State determines and reports to Congress that the government of the country is taking effective steps to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.

The DoD Leahy law is similar to the State Leahy law. Since 1999, Congress included the DoD Leahy law in its annual appropriations act. The DoD Leahy law is now permanent in Section 362 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code. It requires that DoD-appropriated funds may not be used for any training, equipment, or other assistance for a foreign security force unit if the Secretary of Defense has credible information that such unit has committed a GVHR. The law allows for two exceptions to this restriction. The first in cases where the Secretary of Defense (after consultation with the Secretary of State) determines that the government of that country has taken all necessary corrective steps. This first exception is also known as “remediation.” A second exception exists if U.S. equipment or other assistance is necessary to assist in disaster relief operations or other humanitarian or national security emergencies.

2. How is the law implemented?

In cases where an entire unit is designated to receive assistance, the Department of State vets the unit and the unit’s commander. When an individual security force member is nominated for U.S. assistance, the Department vets that individual as well as his or her unit. Vetting begins in the unit’s home country, where the U.S. embassy conducts consular, political, and other security and human rights checks. Most often, an additional review is conducted by analysts at the Department of State in Washington, D.C. The State Department evaluates and assesses available information about the human rights records of the unit and the individual, reviewing a full spectrum of open source and classified records.

When assessing whether information is credible, the following factors should be considered weighing both the credibility of a source and the veracity of an allegation:

Past accuracy and reliability of the reporting source as well as original source, if known;

How the source obtained the information (e.g., personal knowledge obtained by a witness, witness interviews collected by a non-governmental organization (NGO), descriptions collected from government records, etc.);

Known political agenda of a source (both reporting source and/or original source, if known) which might lead to bias in reporting;

Corroborative information to confirm part or all of the allegation;

Information that contradicts part or all of the allegation;

History of unit and known patterns of abuse/professional behavior;

Level of detail of the GVHR allegation, including detail in identification of the GVHR, perpetrator (or link to an operational unit), and victim.

3. Can assistance be reinstated to units previously found ineligible for assistance?

Yes. Consistent with the exception under both Leahy laws, the Departments of State and Defense have adopted a joint policy on remediation that outlines a process for resuming DoD- and State-funded assistance to foreign security force units that are ineligible for assistance under the Leahy laws. This can occur when the Secretaries of Defense and State determine that the government of that country has taken, or is taking, effective measures to bring those responsible to justice. Such measures may include impartial and thorough investigations; credible judicial or administrative adjudications; and appropriate and proportional sentencing.

[religion-is-a-mental-illness]

By: Jeff Brumley

Published: Sep 18, 2023

A U.S. agency has added 11 nations to its list of countries willing to use fines, imprisonment or the death penalty to punish those accused of insulting religious beliefs or institutions.

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Liberty increased its list of the number of countries with blasphemy laws from 84 in 2020 to 95 this year, a 13% increase. The list includes democracies, theocracies and several traditional American allies spanning the globe.

The commission’s newly released report defines blasphemy as any “act of insulting or showing contempt or lack of reverence for God or sacred things,” while laws criminalizing the behavior typically seek to “punish expressions or acts deemed blasphemous, defamatory of religions, or contemptuous of religion or religious symbols, figures or feelings.”

But whether the ordinances call for fines, imprisonment or capital punishment, such measures violate basic human rights standards established by the United Nations General Assembly, USCIRF said. “Under international human rights law, freedom of religion or belief includes the right to express a full range of thoughts and beliefs, including those that others might find blasphemous.”

While proponents of blasphemy rules and practices claim they promote social harmony, “in practice, blasphemy laws empower government officials to punish individuals who express minority viewpoints. In Bangladesh, a tribunal recently sentenced a Hindu man to seven years in prison for allegedly insulting Islam in a Facebook post,” the report said. “In Russia, blasphemy charges are often, though not exclusively, used to target individuals who are perceived to have insulted the Russian Orthodox Church.”

Yet nearly half the world’s nations have adopted blasphemy laws, often claiming the provisions promote internal security and social and religious cohesion, the agency said. “Blasphemy laws can be contained in a variety of legal instruments, including constitutions and statutory laws, and are often part of national penal codes.”

The countries USCIRF added to its 2023 blasphemy fact sheet are the Bahamas, Barbados, El Salvador, Guatemala, Cambodia, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Monaco, Portugal and Cape Verde.

Language from the Bahamian constitution and penal code, which USCIRF provides for the nations listed, declares itself a Christian nation where the sale of “any blasphemous book, writing or representation shall be liable to imprisonment for two years.”

In newly added Monaco, where Catholicism is the state religion, anyone “who has, by word or gesture, desecrated the objects of worship, either in the places intended or currently used for its exercise … or even outraged the ministers of religion in their functions” can face one to six months imprisonment and a fine.

A nation’s addition to the list does not necessarily mean its anti-blasphemy practices are new. The same holds for countries whose maximum sanction designations have changed. Saudi Arabia, for example, was listed with “no sanction specified” in 2020, but now has joined Brunei, Iran, Mauritania and Pakistan as those open to the death penalty in blasphemy cases.

And a country’s absence from a maximum punishment designation may not preclude it from using those sentences. Afghanistan is currently described as having no specific sanction for blasphemy, but the Taliban has stated a reliance on a form of Islamic jurisprudence that designates blasphemy as a capital offense, USCIRF explained.

Italy is included with Columbia, Spain, Switzerland, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan as countries that levy fines for blasphemy. Its criminal code includes a provision for up to a year in prison for anyone who “insults the state religion,” which is Catholicism.

Eighty nations include imprisonment for blasphemy violations, USCIRF said. In addition to the Bahamas, they include Austria, Brazil, Germany, Finland, Burma, Cambodia, Egypt, India, Israel, Ukraine and Yemen.

Countries in all categories span the globe, with 13 in the Americas, 28 in the Asia Pacific region, 16 in Europe, 18 in the Middle East and North Africa and 20 in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Such laws, however light the punishment called for, foster discrimination and intolerance against religious minorities, USCIRF added. “While it is legitimate for individuals to speak out against blasphemy, legislation criminalizing blasphemy violates the right to freedom of religion or belief and the right to freedom of opinion and expression. International human rights law protects the rights of individuals; it does not protect religious feelings, figures or symbols from behavior or speech considered blasphemous.”

Another danger of blasphemy laws is that they open the door to persecution and mob justice, the report explains. “Individuals accused of blasphemy risk retribution from individuals and non-state actors in addition to government officials. In February 2023, a crowd in Pakistan stormed a police station and killed a man being held on suspicion of blasphemy. … In May 2023, Sri Lankan authorities arrested stand-up comedian Jayani Natasha Edirisooriya for allegedly ‘defaming Buddhism’ during a comedy show.”

Blasphemy statutes also can be manipulated by individuals to settle personal or business disputes, USCIRF said. “In January 2023, the colleague of a Christian woman working with Pakistan’s Civil Aviation Authority threatened to accuse her of blasphemy following a workplace dispute. In July 2022, a Pakistani court reportedly sentenced Ashfaq Masih to death for blasphemy. The blasphemy allegation emerged following a dispute Masih, a bicycle mechanic, had with a customer.”

==

We're going backwards.

There are some actions which are unnecessary to do—until someone tells you that you can’t do them. And then you must do them, if only to retain your right to make your own decisions on the matter. It is not really important, for example, whether you sit at the front or the back of a bus—until someone tells you that you can’t sit at the front. It’s not worth risking your life to eat at a lunch counter or to cross a bridge—until some thug tells you that you can’t cross it. And then you must. -- Robert Tracinski

When believers demand that even those who don't subscribe to an ideology must obey it, we have to keep blaspheming, insulting their religious ideas, and desecrating their religious symbols.

Simply to oppose the demand.

[ukrfeminism]

Ministers have been accused of watering down guidance around new buffer zones outside abortion clinics in England and Wales, after it emerged campaigners could still be allowed to conduct silent prayers and approach women attending clinics to discuss the issue.

New draft guidance published by the Home Office has caused alarm among people who campaigned for the 150-metre safe zones, due to be introduced in the spring.

MPs last year voted in an amendment to the Public Order Act to introduce buffer zones to stop women being harassed with leaflets, shown pictures of foetuses, or having to pass by vigils as they enter abortion clinics.

But the draft guidance, first reported by the i newspaper, still appears to leave room for some approaches to be made within the safe zones to women attending clinics. .

It says: “The term ‘influence’ is not defined in the statute and therefore takes its ordinary dictionary meaning. The government would expect ‘influence’ to require more than mere mention of abortion or the provision of information. As such, informing, discussing, or offering help, does not necessarily amount to ‘influence’.”

The guidance adds: “Prayer within a safe access zone should not automatically be seen as unlawful. Prayer has long received legal protection in the United Kingdom and these protections have not changed.

“Silent prayer, being the engagement of the mind and thought in prayer towards God, is protected as an absolute right under the Human Rights Act 1998 and should not, on its own, be considered to be an offence under any circumstances. However, where an individual is praying, but their conduct is also intrusive, this is likely to be an offence under [the amendment].”

Asked about the guidance, the prime minister’s official spokesperson said: “The government’s position is that no one should be subjected to harassment or intimidation. Police and local authorities have the powers to restrict harmful protests. Obviously, parliament expressed its will to introduce the safe abortion zone, making sure women visiting abortion services are not harassed. We’re consulting on that guidance, on how to implement this policy, making sure it achieves its aims without impacting fundamental human rights.”

However, those who campaigned for the legislation said the guidance was disappointing.

Stella Creasy, the Labour MP, said on X: “This government are hypocrites. They are using ECHR [European convention on human rights] to block bringing in abortion buffer zones this parliament voted for, whilst also trying to stop it being used to protect refugees from torture. Human rights are universal, not a shield for Sunak to be junked at will.”

Its aim with the Human Rights Act was to incorporate into UK law the rights contained in the ECHR.

Rupa Huq, the Labour MP, told the i newspaper: “It seems totally contrary to all logic that after MPs from all parties voted overwhelmingly to introduce robust legislation to stop women being impeded from exercising their right to use abortion clinics, based on successful existing ‘safe access zones’ in Australia and Canada, the statutory draft guidance put out for consultation seeks to undo all this.”

A Home Office spokesperson said: “We are consulting publicly on the non-statutory guidance on abortion clinic safe access zones. All responses will be considered ahead of the Home Office publishing the final version of the guidance.”

[thoughtlessarse]

A judge in Northern Ireland has ruled that the law allowing the UK Government to detain and remove asylum seekers it deems to have arrived illegally should be disapplied there. In a judgment delivered at Belfast High Court today, Mr Justice Humphreys said the UK’s Illegal Migration Act undermines human rights protections guaranteed in the region under post-Brexit arrangements. The Illegal Migration Act provides new powers for the UK Government to detain and remove asylum seekers it deems to have arrived illegally in the UK. Central to the new laws is the scheme to send asylum seekers to Rwanda. The court today ruled on two challenges against the Act that focused on human rights protections guaranteed by the Windsor Framework and compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The post-Brexit Windsor Framework jointly agreed by the UK and EU includes a stipulation that there can be no diminution of the rights provisions contained within Northern Ireland’s Good Friday peace agreement of 1998. Mr Justice Humphreys found that several elements of the Act cause a “significant” diminution of the rights enjoyed by asylum seekers residing in Northern Ireland under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. “I have found that there is a relevant diminution of right in each of the areas relied upon by the applicants,” he said. He added: “The applicants’ primary submission therefore succeeds. Each of the statutory provisions under consideration infringes the protection afforded to RSE (Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity) in the Good Friday Agreement.” The judge ruled that the sections of the Act that were the subject of the legal challenges should be “disapplied” in Northern Ireland. He also declared aspects of the Act incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.

continue reading

[jacksgreysays]

Generalia specialibus non derogant (Shikako and Shikamaru)

Generalia specialibus non derogant => general provisions enacted in later legislation do not detract from specific provisions enacted in earlier legislation ==> A principle of statutory interpretation: If a matter falls under a specific provision in a statute enacted before a general provision enacted in a later statute, it is to be presumed that the legislature did not intend that the earlier specific provision be repealed, and the matter is governed by the earlier specific provision, not the more recent general one.

So for example… since the specific earlier rule still holds true over the vague later rule, that could mean…

—

We don’t really talk anymore, because whenever we talk we just seem to fight. We don’t celebrate our birthday together, which really ought to be the one thing we can share without any problems (literally the one thing we’ve shared our entire lives). We both still live at home, but with how often we’re out on missions (and I so often sleep in the ANBU dorms just to save time) we don’t see each other much—and I already moved out of my childhood bedroom for Kino so that’s not the same.

So what do we still have? Different teams, different specialties, different missions, different priorities. Dad’s already taught us what he could of shadow jutsu, unless he develops something new, but even that doesn’t take too long to learn. It’s up to us to individually seek out Kasuga-jii for more in depth training, and if Shikamaru’s gone I wouldn’t know. I have so many other things to learn that I don’t have the time to specialize any further into shadow jutsu.

So then what do we still have? Matching names which don’t even connect us to each other so much as to a long line of Nara clan heads. A shared childhood that we sprint further and further away from. A shared clan who I’ve already been burned by and which he is sworn to protect above all else. Our parents who love us but won’t interfere because it’s not their place to do so and our issues have nothing to do with them. A little brother who has seen Shikamaru more than me, and who would have different relationships with each of us even if that weren’t the case.

So what do we still have?

We love each other. Of course we do. That’s part of the problem. Or, no, it’s what is making the problem so persistent and tedious and awful.

We’re at cross purposes because I need him to be safe in this world that has already almost killed him and that means I need to get stronger as soon as possible, even if that means putting myself in danger. And if it drags the rest of my friends along—pushes them further and faster—then I can only try my best to make sure they don’t die in the process.

We’re at cross purposes because he wants me to be safe in this world that has already (probably?) killed me and that means he wants me coddled and caged in the village where he thinks nothing bad can happen but only because he has his eyes closed so much, watching clouds instead of the threats around us. As if the majority of the problems in the Elemental Nations didn’t originate from Konoha. As if the strongest S-ranked missing nin weren’t born and bred Leaf. As if an entire clan hadn’t been massacred within our walls, within our lifetime. As if Sai’s mere existence weren’t a screaming, flashing warning sign of how dangerous Konoha is.

We love each other. Great.

If we didn’t love each other, we wouldn’t worry so much. We could properly walk away from each other instead of circling each other, passive aggressively sniping and snubbing each other in turns. Tethered inexorably by all those things we share, but our sharp edges only scratch at each other instead of making us stronger. And now we’re stuck in this purgatory where we love and rage and hurt and sulk and brood and regret and reminisce. Then start the cycle all over again.

The problem is that we haven’t fully cut each other out of our lives. The problem is that we do still actually talk to each other even if that leaves openings for us to fight. A festering wound that we keep picking and poking and prodding at instead of leaving it alone, letting it scar over, skin hardened and discolored and less sensitive to things like misunderstandings and snide comments.

I want to fix things between us but I don’t know where to start, I don’t know how. I want to fix things between us but I don’t have the time or energy. I want to fix things between us, but it can’t just be me trying, putting in the effort, meeting him halfway.

And why should I meet him halfway? He’s the one being unreasonable.

How does he think it’s going to work? I stay in the village and grow stagnant and weak? Revert into that shy little girl, hiding behind her brother because one of the other kids said something slightly mean? But we can’t go back in time, we can only go forward.

I can’t save his life while being weighed down by his irrational expectations.

I’ll fix things after everything is done.

—

A/N: Dona!! <3<3<3 Thanks for the prompt! I’ll be honest, it did take me a while to understand what this particular phrase meant. And then a while longer to abstract it into a metaphor. And even then what I wrote above started as more of a stream of conscious for trying to figure out what either the “specific earlier rule” and the “vague later rule” would be—that it is in a Shikako!POV is a little bit of a surprise to me since I don’t usually do first person POV. But Shikako has always been an exception to that lol

I don’t think I clarified what either of the two rules are? So I guess it only sort of meets the brief. I think I was originally trying to pinpoint a specific “if we go to this particular hill we cloud watch/read and have nice quiet bonding time” versus the vague “we are currently fighting” but that didn’t really work out… If I had to pull a proper answer out of nowhere I’d say the specific earlier rule is “make sure Shikamaru makes it through the dangers of this world” which is more important than the vague “be a good sister.”

Also, I may have channeled some of my own sibling issues into this, whoops.

Ask Box Advent Calendar 2022!