#iOS encryption

[marithlizard]

Oh _lovely_. Everyone go turn this off:

Enhanced Visual Search in Photos allows you to search for photos using landmarks or points of interest. Your device privately matches places in your photos to a global index Apple maintains on our servers. We apply homomorphic encryption and differential privacy, and use an OHTTP relay that hides [your] IP address. This prevents Apple from learning about the information in your photos. You can turn off Enhanced Visual Search at any time on your iOS or iPadOS device by going to Settings > Apps > Photos. On Mac, open Photos and go to Settings > General.

[mattdobbins]

iMessage and Secure Communication

In the process of updating my blog to align with Fediverse standards and protocols, I realized that iMessage could be a great option for secure communication. I wasn’t aware that you can prompt a link to open a new iMessage chat. By creating a disposable iMessage alias and disabling unknown FaceTime calls, you can keep your contact information accessible while maintaining clear boundaries.

[jcmarchi]

5 Important Areas to Focus On While Creating a Mobile App - Technology Org

New Post has been published on https://thedigitalinsider.com/5-important-areas-to-focus-on-while-creating-a-mobile-app-technology-org/

5 Important Areas to Focus On While Creating a Mobile App - Technology Org

The demand for mobile apps continues to increase with every passing day. Even though there are thousands and millions of different mobile apps available, the need for new mobile apps is still there. Developing a mobile app is not an easy process, as it requires taking care of certain things before the app is fully functional. Although there are many things that an app developer has to take care of before launching the app, here are 5 important areas to focus on while creating a mobile app.

Using a smartphone – artistic impression. Image credit: Mike Jones via Pexels, free license

Clear Goals and the Target Audience

While you are starting the process of app development, it is important that you lay out goals that you want to achieve, establish precise objectives, and determine the target market. Most people are able to establish the app’s goal and what problems it intends to solve in society, but they overlook the importance of the intended audience. Since you are creating an application for users, you should keep your intended audience in mind and build your app accordingly.

Having clarity regarding the target audience can shape your development process and ensure that you are developing your app according to the needs and preferences of the target audience, which will ultimately make the app a success.

Platform

Before you start developing your app, one very important thing that you need to focus on and clarify is which platform your app is intended for. Whether it will be a download for android only app or will it be available for iOS and Android both. Every mobile platform has its own unique requirements, specifications, and guidelines that must be fulfilled. Similarly, the developers of Android and iOS are quite different from each other, as both platforms have different app development requirements.

So while you have a groundbreaking idea that can take over the market by storm, it is important that you tune the app perfectly for the selected platform(s) in terms of performance, responsiveness, design, and compatibility.

App Design

Design is one of the most important aspects of any mobile application because it plays a huge role in selling the application to the audience. The design of your mobile app depends upon your target market, the platform which you will develop the app for, the features that the app will have, and the pricing of the app. Having an appealing design, especially one that is appealing to your target audience, can make a huge difference in determining the success of the app. 

Nowadays, whether an app is paid or free, it must be well-designed and can catch the attraction of modern-day tech-savvy users. Most users prefer simple yet sleek designs that are easy to navigate and sticking to such a design can make a huge difference in determining the success of the app. Dream11 is a mobile app that has gained a lot of attention because of its modern sleek design. You can download Dream11 for free from the Play Store and App Store.

Security and Privacy

Mobile users share all sorts of their data with mobile apps and sometimes, this data can include sensitive information like banking information or credit card information. App developers must be mindful of this and focus on the security and privacy of the mobile app right from the developmental phase of the app. Prioritize the security and privacy of the mobile and implement strong security measures like secure authentication and robust encryption techniques that can keep the user data secure. Plus, follow the specific data protection laws and comply with the regulations to ensure the safety of user information.

App Store Guidelines and Submission Criteria

Most people make the mistake of developing an app without considering the app store guidelines and submission criteria. After you have finalized the platform for which you will be developing the app, learn about the submission criteria and guidelines for the specific app stores such as Apple App Store for iOS and Google Play Store for Android. Your app will only be published on these app stores if it follows the specific guidelines and submission requirements. Therefore, ensure that it is something that you take care of from the start and your app complies with these requirements and criteria.

[esourceful]

Why choose RelyPass Premium?

RelyPass Premium offers a seamless and secure backup solution, ensuring all your passwords are safely stored in the cloud. Upgrade to the Premium plan today!

Download the App

[nyancrimew]

Thoughts on Snikket? End to end encrypted XMPP server/client kinda like signal, but decentralized and self hosted with OMEMO encryption instead of signals deal (though apparently OMEMO is based on Signal or something?) and the only E2EE xmpp client with iOS support that I’ve seen

Also doesn’t use a phone number (since it’s self hosted they don’t need to protect against signup abuse and let server admins manage invites) which seems to be the only thing the government can use to know you were using it with all of signals warrants for phone numbers, though I guess it doesn’t matter much since they can’t see your messages either way

ironically the advantage signal has over most other (usually more decentralized) solutions including xmpp is that signal requires (and thus stores) significantly less metadata due to being centralized, a federated system requires metadata for servers to talk to each other and given usually servers only have a small number of users on them each simple traffic analysis between servers can reveal a lot about who might be talking to whom which can be all you need to know. matrix kind of suffers from similar issues where privacy is only really guaranteed if you run a small server that does not federate and only communicate within this same server.

[mostlysignssomeportents]

Apple's encryption capitulation

I'm on a 20+ city book tour for my new novel PICKS AND SHOVELS. Catch me in NYC on TOMORROW (26 Feb) with JOHN HODGMAN and at PENN STATE THURSDAY (Feb 27). More tour dates here. Mail-order signed copies from LA's Diesel Books.

The UK government has just ordered Apple to secretly compromise its security for every iOS user in the world. Instead, Apple announced it will disable a vital security feature for every UK user. This is a terrible outcome, but it just might be the best one, given the circumstances:

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgj54eq4vejo

So let's talk about those circumstances. In 2016, Theresa May's Conservative government passed a law called the "Investigative Powers Act," better known as the "Snooper's Charter":

https://www.snooperscharter.co.uk/

This was a hugely controversial law for many reasons, but most prominent was that it allowed British spy agencies to order tech companies to secretly modify their software to facilitate surveillance. This is alarming in several ways. First, it's hard enough to implement an encryption system without making subtle errors that adversaries can exploit.

Tiny mistakes in encryption systems are leveraged by criminals, foreign spies, griefers, and other bad actors to steal money, lock up our businesses and governments with ransomware, take our data, our intimate images, our health records and worse. The world is already awash in cyberweapons that terrible governments and corporations use to target their adversaries, such as the NSO Group malware that the Saudis used to hack Whatsapp, which let them lure Jamal Khashoggi to his death. The stakes couldn't be higher:

https://pluralistic.net/2025/02/04/citizen-lab/#nso-group

Encryption protects everything from the software updates for pacemakers and anti-lock braking to population-scale financial transactions and patient records. Deliberately introducing bugs into these systems to allow spies and cops to "break" encryption when they need to is impossible, which doesn't stop governments from demanding it. Notoriously, when former Australian PM Malcolm Turnbull was told that the laws of mathematics decreed that there is no way to make encryption that only stops bad guys but lets in good guys, he replied "The laws of mathematics are very commendable but the only law that applies in Australia is the law of Australia":

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/07/australian-pm-calls-end-end-encryption-ban-says-laws-mathematics-dont-apply-down

The risks don't stop with bad actors leveraging new bugs introduced when the "lawful interception" back-doors are inserted. The keys that open these back-doors inevitably circulate widely within spy and police agencies, and eventually – inevitably – they leak. This is called the "keys under doormats" problem: if the police order tech companies to hide the keys to access billions of peoples' data under their doormats, eventually, bad guys will find them there:

https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/1/1/69/2367066

Again, this isn't a theoretical risk. In 1994, Bill Clinton signed a US law called CALEA that required FBI back-doors for data switches. Most network switches in use today have CALEA back-doors and they have been widely exploited by various bad guys. Most recently, the Chinese military used CALEA backdoors to hack Verizon, AT&T and Lumen:

https://pluralistic.net/2024/10/07/foreseeable-outcomes/#calea

This is the backdrop against which the Snooper's Charter was passed. Parliament stuck its fingers in its ears, covered its eyes, and voted for the damned thing, swearing that it would never result in any of the eminently foreseeable harms they'd been warned of.

Which brings us to today. Two weeks ago, the Washington Post's Joseph Menn broke the story that Apple had received a secret order from the British government, demanding that they install a back-door in the encryption system that protects cloud backups of iOS devices:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2025/02/07/apple-encryption-backdoor-uk/

Virtually every iOS device in the world regularly backs itself up to Apple's cloud backup service. This is very useful: if your phone or tablet is lost, stolen or damaged, you can recover your backup to a new device in a matter of minutes and get on with your day. It's also very lucrative for Apple, which charges every iOS user a few dollars every month for backup services. The dollar amount here is small, but that sum is multiplied by the very large number of Apple devices, and it rolls in every single month.

Since 2022, Apple has offered its users a feature called "Advanced Data Protection" that employs "end-to-end" encryption (E2EE) for these backups. End-to-end encryption keeps data encrypted between the sender and the receiver, so that the service provider can't see what they're saying to each other. In the case of iCloud backups, this means that while an Apple customer can decrypt their backup data when they access it in the cloud, Apple itself cannot. All Apple can see is that there is an impenetrable blob of user data on one of its servers.

2022 was very late for Apple to have added E2EE to its cloud backups. After all, in 2014, Apple customers suffered a massive iCloud breach when hackers broke into the iCloud backups of hundreds of celebrities, leaking nude photos and other private data, in a breach colloquially called "Celebgate" or "The Fappening":

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_celebrity_nude_photo_leak

Apple almost rolled out E2EE for iCloud in 2018, but scrapped the plans after Donald Trump's FBI leaned on them:

https://www.reuters.com/article/world/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sour-idUSKBN1ZK1CO/

Better late than never. For three years, Apple customers' backups have been encrypted, at rest, on Apple's servers, their contents fully opaque to everyone except the devices' owners. Enter His Majesty's Government, clutching the Snooper's Charter. As the eminent cryptographer Matthew Green writes, a secret order to compromise the cloud backups of British users is necessarily a secret order to compromise all users' encrypted backups:

https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2025/02/23/three-questions-about-apple-encryption-and-the-u-k/

There's no way to roll out a compromised system in the UK that differs from non-British backups without the legion of reverse-engineers and security analysts noticing that something new is happening in Britain and correctly inferring that Apple has been served with a secret "Technical Capability Notice" under the Snooper's Charter:

Even if you imagine that Apple is only being asked only to target users in the U.K., the company would either need to build this capability globally, or it would need to deploy a new version or “zone”1 for U.K. users that would work differently from the version for, say, U.S. users. From a technical perspective, this would be tantamount to admitting that the U.K.’s version is somehow operationally distinct from the U.S. version. That would invite reverse-engineers to ask very pointed questions and the secret would almost certainly be out.

For Apple, the only winning move was not to play. Rather than breaking the security for its iCloud backups worldwide, it simply promised to turn off all security for backups in the UK. If they go through with it, every British iOS user – doctors, lawyers, small and large business, and individuals – will be exposed to incalculable risk from spies and criminals, both organized and petty.

For Green, this is Apple making the best of an impossible conundrum. Apple does have a long and proud history of standing up to governmental demands to compromise its users. Most notably, the FBI ordered Apple to push an encryption-removing update to its phones in 2016, to help it gain access to a device recovered from the bodies of the San Bernardino shooters:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/eff-support-apple-encryption-battle

But it's worth zooming out here for a moment and considering all the things that led up to Apple facing this demand. By design, Apple's iOS platform blocks users from installing software unless Apple approves it and lists it in the App Store. Apple uses legal protections (such as Section 1201 of the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Article 6 of the EUCD, which the UK adopted in 2003 through the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations) to make it a jailable offense to reverse-engineer and bypass these blocks. They also devote substantial technical effort to preventing third parties from reverse-engineering its software and hardware locks. Installing software forbidden by Apple on your own iPhone is thus both illegal and very, very hard.

This means that if Apple removes an app from its App Store, its customers can no longer get that app. When Apple launched this system, they were warned – by the same cohort of experts who warned the UK government about the risks of the Snooper's Charter – that it would turn into an attractive nuisance. If a corporation has the power to compromise billions of users' devices, governments will inevitably order that corporation to do so.

Which is exactly what happened. Apple has already removed all working privacy tools for its Chinese users, purging the Chinese App Store of secure VPN apps, compromising its Chinese cloud backups, and downgrading its Airdrop file-transfer software to help the Chinese state crack down on protesters:

https://pluralistic.net/2022/11/11/foreseeable-consequences/#airdropped

These are the absolutely foreseeable – and foreseen – outcomes of Apple arrogating total remote control over its customers' devices to itself. If we're going to fault Theresa May's Conservatives for refusing to heed the warnings of the risks introduced by the Snooper's Charter, we should be every bit as critical of Apple for chasing profits at the expense of billions of its customers in the face of warnings that its "curated computing" model would inevitably give rise to the Snooper's Charter and laws like it.

As Pavel Chekov famously wrote: "a phaser on the bridge in act one will always go off by act three." Apple set itself up with the power to override its customers' decisions about the devices it sells them, and then that power was abused in a hundred ways, large and small:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/09/22/vin-locking/#thought-differently

Of course, there are plenty of third-party apps in the App Store that allow you to make an end-to-end encrypted backup to non-Apple cloud servers, and Apple's onerous App Store payment policies mean that they get to cream off 30% of every dollar you spend with its rivals:

https://www.reddit.com/r/privacy/comments/1iv072y/endtoend_encrypted_alternative_to_icloud_drive/

It's entirely possible to find an end-to-end encrypted backup provider that has no presence in the UK and can tell the UK government to fuck off with its ridiculous back-door demands. For example, Signal has repeatedly promised to pull its personnel and assets out of the UK before it would compromise its encryption:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/03/05/theyre-still-trying-to-ban-cryptography/

But even if the company that provides your backup is impervious to pressure from HMG, Apple isn't. Apple has the absolute, unchallenged power to decide which apps are in its App Store. Apple has a long history of nuking privacy-preserving and privacy-enhancing apps from its App Store in response to complaints, even petty ones from rival companies like Meta:

https://www.theverge.com/2022/9/29/23378541/the-og-app-instagram-clone-pulled-from-app-store

If they're going to cave into Zuck's demand to facilitate spying on Instagram users, do we really think they'll resist Kier Starmer's demands to remove Signal – and any other app that stands up to the Snooper's Charter – from the App Store?

It goes without saying that the "bad guys" the UK government claims it wants to target will be able to communicate in secret no matter what Apple does here. They can just use an Android phone and sideload a secure messaging app, or register an iPhone in Ireland or any other country and bring it to the UK. The only people who will be harmed by the combination of the British government's reckless disregard for security, and Apple's designs that trade the security of its users for the security of its shareholders are millions of law-abiding Britons, whose most sensitive data will be up for grabs by anyone who hacks their accounts.

If you'd like an essay-formatted version of this post to read or share, here's a link to it on pluralistic.net, my surveillance-free, ad-free, tracker-free blog:

https://pluralistic.net/2025/02/25/sneak-and-peek/#pavel-chekov

Image: Mitch Barrie (modified) https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Daytona_Skeleton_AR-15_completed_rifle_%2817551907724%29.jpg

CC BY-SA 2.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/deed.en

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Kambanji https://www.flickr.com/photos/kambanji/4135216486/

CC BY 2.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/

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Rawpixel https://www.rawpixel.com/image/12438797/png-white-background

[deathworlders-of-e24]

ZZZZZ//ENCRYPTED SIGNAL//ZZZZZ

<CLEARANCE DENIED>

<ERROR>

<ERROR>

<ERROROOROROROROROR>>><<<<><>\\\\\\\[]{]}

…

<CLEARANCE ACCEPTED>

<Recipient: MONS

<From: [][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][]

•The mis[]io[] is s[]ill g[]in[] ah[]ad as pla[]ne[]. Th[]re w[]s a min[]r set ba[]k, but no one []board t[]e NO[]H sus[]ect[] a[]yth[]ng. We wil[] be []ictorious as we h[]ve alw[]ys be[]n. Pro[]ee[] with t[]e s[]cond pha[]e as sc[]edule[]•

<SEND>

[aro-culture-is]

Aro culture is, when forced to buy a Google phone cuz that's all you can afford, trying your damnest to use the invasive advert tracking to your advantage.

i.e. periodically typing in "I'm aromantic" to the chrome search bar & loudly saying it into the phone speaker in the hopes you'll stop getting jump-scared by an influx of dating app ads when forced to watch them in mobile games

,,, please. i beg of you. do not. for one, google doesn't recognize that as a metric, at best it places you into a queer category and targets you with ads that are promoted to queer people. They do not bother with granularity, because the advertisers are who are paying for categories or lack thereof. they also probably categorize you as single when you do that stuff, which again, defeats your goal. if you want to tell advertisers to get out here's actually a pretty simple thing to look for:

from there, consider:

install the firefox app (free), and use the uBlock Origin extension (best adblocker, free... and still works on youtube and twitch if you use the firefox app to load them)

i also recommend the breezewiki extension (free), because fandom wiki sucks on an ethics level, and this directs you to an identical, but ad-less page so they don't get money from you.

anyways my solution is stop seeing ads lol

related: install bitwarden as a password manager. it's free, well-established and credible, and you can use it on both android apps and firefox (as an extension) (also on any device in general). you only ever have to remember one password, preferably new, ever again. it's got the rest for you, stupidly well encrypted, and you can store data like security question answers, secure notes, and more!)

[warningsine]

what is the best way to get safer/more anonymous online

Ok, security and anonymity are not the same thing, but when you combine them you can enhance your online privacy.

My question is: how tech literate are you and what is your aim? As in do you live in a country where your government would benefit from monitoring private (political) conversations or do you just want to degoogle? Because the latter is much easier for the average user.

Some general advice:

Leave Windows and Mac operating systems and switch to Linux distributions like Fedora and Ubuntu (both very user friendly). Switch from Microsoft Office or Pages/Numbers/Keynote (Mac) to LibreOffice.

You want to go more hardcore with a very privacy-focused operating system? There are Whonix and Tails (portable operating system).

Try to replace all your closed source apps with open source ones.

Now, when it comes to browsers, leave Chrome behind. Switch to Firefox (or Firefox Focus if you're on mobile). Want to go a step further? Use LibreWolf (a modified version of Firefox that increases protection against tracking), Brave (good for beginners but it has its controversies), DuckDuckGo or Bromite. You like ecofriendly alternatives? Check Ecosia out.

Are you, like, a journalist or political activist? Then you probably know Tor and other anonymous networks like i2p, freenet, Lokinet, Retroshare, IPFS and GNUnet.

For whistleblowers there are tools like SecureDrop (requires Tor), GlobaLeaks (alternative to SecureDrop), Haven (Android) and OnionShare.

Search engines?

There are Startpage (obtains Google's results but with more privacy), MetaGer (open source), DuckDuckGo (partially open source), Searx (open source). You can see the comparisons here.

Check libRedirect out. It redirects requests from popular socmed websites to privacy friendly frontends.

Alternatives to YouTube that value your privacy? Odysee, PeerTube and DTube.

Decentralized apps and social media? Mastodon (Twitter alternative), Friendica (Facebook alternative), diaspora* (Google+ RIP), PixelFed (Insta alternative), Aether (Reddit alternative).

Messaging?

I know we all use shit like Viber, Messenger, Telegram, Whatsup, Discord etc. but there are:

Signal (feels like Whatsup but it's secure and has end-to-end encryption)

Session (doesn't even require a phone or e-mail address to sign up)

Status (no phone or e-mail address again)

Threema (for mobile)

Delta Chat (you can chat with people if you know their e-mail without them having to use the app)

Team chatting?

Open source options:

Element (an alternative to Discord)

Rocket.chat (good for companies)

Revolt.chat (good for gamers and a good alternative to Discord)

Video/voice messaging?

Brave Talk (the one who creates the talk needs to use the browser but the others can join from any browser)

Jami

Linphone

Jitsi (no account required, video conferencing)

Then for Tor there are various options like Briar (good for activists), Speek! and Cwtch (user friendly).

Georestrictions? You don't want your Internet Provider to see what exactly what you're doing online?

As long as it's legal in your country, then you need to hide your IP with a VPN (authoritarian regimes tend to make them illegal for a reason), preferably one that has a no log policy, RAM servers, does not operate in one of the 14 eyes, supports OpenVPN (protocol), accepts cash payment and uses a strong encryption.

NordVPN (based in Panama)

ProtonVPN (Switzerland)

Cyberghost

Mullvad (Sweden)

Surfshark (Netherlands)

Private e-mails?

ProtonMail

StartMail

Tutamail

Mailbox (ecofriendly option)

Want to hide your real e-mail address to avoid spam etc.? SimpleLogin (open source)

E-mail clients?

Thunderbird

Canary Mail (for Android and iOS)

K-9 Mail (Android)

Too many complex passwords that you can't remember?

NordPass

BitWarden

LessPass

KeePassXC

Two Factor Authenticators?

2FAS

ente Authenticator

Aegis Authenticator

andOTP

Tofu (for iOS)

Want to encrypt your files? VeraCrypt (for your disk), GNU Privacy Guard (for your e-mail), Hat.sh (encryption in your browser), Picocrypt (Desktop encryption).

Want to encrypt your Dropbox, Google Drive etc.? Cryptomator.

Encrypted cloud storage?

NordLocker

MEGA

Proton Drive

Nextcloud

Filen

Encrypted photography storage?

ente

Cryptee

Piwigo

Want to remove metadata from your images and videos? ExifCleaner. For Android? ExifEraser. For iOS? Metapho.

Cloak your images to counter facial recognition? Fawkes.

Encrypted file sharing? Send.

Do you menstruate? Do you want an app that tracks your menstrual cycle but doesn't collect your data? drip.

What about your sexual health? Euki.

Want a fitness tracker without a closed source app and the need to transmit your personal data to the company's servers? Gadgetbridge.

[saturniasxenos]

Cyber / Virtual ID Pack

Inside this pack, you will find: Pronouns, Titles, Names, and Genders that relate to Virtuality, Cybernetic, Robots, and anything alike!

This features a LOOOONG list of pronouns and dystopian-ish names!

Pronouns:

Cy/Cyb/Cyber/Cybers/Cyberself

Vir/Virt/Virtual/Virtuals/Virtualself

Ne/Net/Network/Networks/Networkself

Ne/Net/Nets/Nets/Netself

In/Inter/Internet/Internets/Internetself

Co/Comp/Computer/Computers/Computerself

In/Inpu/Input/Inputs/Inputself

Ou/Out/Output/Outputs/Outputself

Vi/Viru/Virus/Viruses/Virusself

Anti/Antivir/Antivirus/Antiviruses/Antivirusself

Er/Erro/Error/Errors/Errorself

Sys/Syste/System/Systems/Systemself

Pro/Proce/Processor/Processors/Processorself

Di/Digi/Digital/Digitals/Digitalself

Do/Down/Download/Downloads/Downloadself

Up/Uplo/Upload/Uploads/Uploadself

Cor/Corru/Corrupt/Corrupts/Corruptself

Mal/Malwa/Malware/Malwares/Malwareself

Se/Secur/Security/Securitys/Securityself

Cry/Crypt/Crypto/Cryptos/Cryptoself

We/Web/Webs/Webs/Webself

Web/Webs/Website/Websites/Websiteself

Fu/Futu/Future/Futures/Futureself

Ro/Rob/Robot/Robots/Robotself

Rob/Robo/Robotic/Robotics/Roboticself

By/Byt/Byte/Bytes/Byteself

Fi/Fil/File/Files/Fileself

Ra/Ram/Rams/Rams/Ramself

Scr/Scre/Screen/Screens/Screenself

Te/Tech/Techs/Techs/Techself

Te/Tech/Techno/Technos/Technoself

Tec/Techno/Technology/Technologys/Technologyself

Ma/Mach/Machine/Machines/Machineself

Wi/Wir/Wire/Wires/Wireself

Na/Nan/Nano/Nanos/Nanoself

Da/Dat/Data/Datas/Dataself

Plu/Plug/Plugs/Plugs/Plugself

Ele/Elect/Electric/Electrics/Electricself

Ke/Key/Keys/Keys/Keyself

Pa/Pass/Password/Passwords/Passwordself

Ter/Term/Terminal/Terminals/Terminalself

Cy/Cybo/Cyborg/Cyborgs/Cyborgself

Ty/Typ/Type/Types/Typeself

Fi/Firm/Firmware/Firmwares/Firmwareself

Ha/Hard/Hardware/Hardwares/Hardwareself

So/Soft/Software/Softwares/Softwareself

Ha/Hack/Hacks/Hacks/Hackself

Ha/Hack/Hacker/Hackers/Hackerself

Si/Sig/Signal/Signals/Signalself

Clo/Clou/Cloud/Clouds/Cloudself

On/Onli/Online/Onlines/Onlineself

In/Insta/Install/Installs/Installself

Co/Cod/Code/Codes/Codeself

Ad/Admi/Admin/Admins/Adminself

Gra/Graph/Graphic/Graphs/Graphself

Sy/Syn/Synth/Synths/Synthself

Phi/Phis/Phish/Phishs/Phishself

Phi/Phish/Phishing/Phishings/Phishingself

Do/Dox/Doxs/Doxs/Doxself

Si/Sit/Site/Sites/Siteself

Bo/Bot/Bots/Bots/Botself

Pho/Phon/Phone/Phones/Phoneself

Key/Keyboa/Keyboard/Keyboards/Keyboardself

Mo/Mou/Mouse/Mouses/Mouseself

Chi/Chip/Chips/Chips/Chipself

Moth/Mother/Motherboard/Motherboards/Motherboardself

Co/Com/Compute/Computes/Computeself

Pi/Pira/Piracy/Piracys/Piracyself

En/Encry/Encrypt/Encrypts/Encryptself

PDA/PDAs

CPU/CPUs

URL/URLs

404/404s

📱/📱's

💻/💻's

⌨️/⌨️'s

🖥/🖥's

🖱/🖱's

💿/💿's

🎙/🎙's

Titles:

The Cyborg

(X) Whos Wired

Made of Nanotech

(X) Who Uses Nanotech

Scholar of Machines

The Cyber Security

(X) Who Has Cyber Wings

Connected Online

Offline

Unable to Connect

The Administrator

Synthesizer

The Hacker

Nanohacker

The Antivirus

Reconnecting...

ERROR: Unable to Connect

ERROR 404

ERROR: Malware Detected

Names:

Since names don't usually have "techy" meanings, I picked one's that sounded the most cybernetic, cyberpunkish, dystopian, virtualish, etc!

Fem: Althea, Ameris, Astoria, Arcadia, Astra, Beretta, Cyra, Crystal, Crosselle, Eve, Io, Jinx, Kit, Lilith, Meridian, Morrian, Nebula, Nova, Neve, Noxia, North, Octavia, Odette, Odile, Prota, Pistol, Rey, Rue, Rain, Raine, Stormy, Seraphina, Sona, Skye, Thundra, Tempest, Vega, Viva, Vinette, Venus, Xenia, Xya, Xena, Xiomara, Xenara, Xanthe, Zephyria, Zyla, Zadie, Zia,

Masc: Alaric, Aksel, Arden, Antares, Apollo, Ace, Asher, Cole, Cyrus, Code, Draven, Drift, Ender, Flynn, Hawk, Isaac, Jericho, Kip, Kai, Koios, Knox, Nox, Neo, Nero, Octavian, Orionis, Oghma, Paine, Rocket, Ray, Rai, Silas, Slader, Sebastian, Seth, Seraphim, Thalax, Theo, Thatch, Vox, Vector, Wyatt, Xyon, Xane, Xylan, Xerxes, Xayden, Xavier, Xander, Zander, Zayden, Zenith, Zev, Zale, Zane, Zaire, Zeke,

Neu: Andras, Axe, Axiom, Alloy, Allele, Ash, Arrow, Beetle, Chrom, Corvus, Dakota, Dell, Eos, Echo, Eden, Fox, Ghost, Glöckner, Hydrae, Ion, Jesper, Jett, Kursk, Lesath, Locklyn, Lyrae, Maddox, Nemo, Orca, Onyx, Oxygen, Panther, Rikko, Robin, Rune, Scorpion, Scorpius, Saturn, Sparrow, Sonar, Tore, Tauri, Techne, Techno, Ursae, Vesper, Volt, West, Wolf, Xen, Xenon, Zephyr, Zodiac, Zenon, Zeru, Zero, Zen

Genders:

Futuracityc: A gender related to futuristic cities

Futurafashic: A gender related to futuristic fashion

Futurahousic: A gender related to futuristic houses

Digigender: A digital gender. Rangeable from any digital thing or file; virus, malware, .txt, .mp3, antivirus, trojan, email, etc.

Cybergender: A gender or form of gender expression where ones gender or expression is deeply tied into Cyberpunk lore, culture, fashion or media.

CYBERWEAPONIC - a gender that feels like a digital or robotic weapon. this gender may also have ties to sentient AI used as a weapon, but not necessarily.

BIOAMOROBOTIC - a gender connected to being a robot who loves humanity and the world and finds joy all around them!

RobAnatomic - a gender under the anatomic system(link) related to robots, anatomy, robotic anatomy, the anatomy of robots, robots made to teach/study anatomy, anatomy based/related robots of some kind, the anatomy/biology of someone or something being robotic, having robotic anatomy, being a robot with an interest in anatomy and more.

Robogender - for people who’s gender identity aligns with machines/robots/androids/mechs/AIs.

Cyborwebic - a gender related to webcore, evil scientist aesthetics, artificial beings such as androids/cyborgs etc, turtleneck sweaters and old computer monitors

AI flag - this can be used for nonhuman, otherkin, gender, delusion.

Gendervirtual / Genderdigital - a gendersystem in which your gender is related to virtual ) digital themes and x , such as being a virtual ) digital x , a x who loves virtual ) digital themes , a virtual ) digital being who loves x themes , etc.

[mariacallous]

The eye-popping scandal surrounding the Trump cabinet’s accidental invitation to The Atlantic’s editor in chief to join a text-message group secretly planning a bombing in Yemen has rolled into its third day, and that controversy now has a name: SignalGate, a reference to the fact that the conversation took place on the end-to-end encrypted free messaging tool Signal.

As that name becomes a shorthand for the biggest public blunder of the second Trump administration to date, however, security and privacy experts who have promoted Signal as the best encrypted messaging tool available to the public want to be clear about one thing: SignalGate is not about Signal.

Since The Atlantic’s editor, Jeffrey Goldberg, revealed Monday that he was mistakenly included in a Signal group chat earlier this month created to plan US airstrikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen, the reaction from the Trump cabinet’s critics and even the administration itself has in some cases seemed to cast blame on Signal for the security breach. Some commentators have pointed to reports last month of Signal-targeted phishing by Russian spies. National security adviser Michael Waltz, who reportedly invited Goldberg to the Signal group chat, has even suggested that Goldberg may have hacked into it.

On Wednesday afternoon, even President Donald Trump suggested Signal was somehow responsible for the group chat fiasco. “I don't know that Signal works,” Trump told reporters at the White House. “I think Signal could be defective, to be honest with you.”

The real lesson is much simpler, says Kenn White, a security and cryptography researcher who has conducted audits on widely used encryption tools in the past as the director of the Open Crypto Audit Project: Don’t invite untrusted contacts into your Signal group chat. And if you’re a government official working with highly sensitive or classified information, use the encrypted communication tools that run on restricted, often air-gapped devices intended for a top-secret setting rather than the unauthorized devices that can run publicly available apps like Signal.

“Unequivocally, no blame in this falls on Signal,” says White. “Signal is a communication tool designed for confidential conversations. If someone's brought into a conversation who’s not meant to be part of it, that's not a technology problem. That's an operator issue.”

Cryptographer Matt Green, a professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University, puts it more simply. “Signal is a tool. If you misuse a tool, bad things are going to happen,” says Green. “If you hit yourself in the face with a hammer, it’s not the hammer’s fault. It’s really on you to make sure you know who you’re talking to.”

The only sense in which SignalGate is a Signal-related scandal, White adds, is that the use of Signal suggests that the cabinet-level officials involved in the Houthi bombing plans, including secretary of defense Pete Hegseth and director of national intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, were conducting the conversation on internet-connected devices—possibly even including personal ones—since Signal wouldn’t typically be allowed on the official, highly restricted machines intended for such conversations. “In past administrations, at least, that would be absolutely forbidden, especially for classified communications,” says White.

Indeed, using Signal on internet-connected commercial devices doesn’t just leave communications open to anyone who can somehow exploit a hackable vulnerability in Signal, but anyone who can hack the iOS, Android, Windows, or Mac devices that might be running the Signal mobile or desktop apps.

This is why US agencies in general, and the Department of Defense in particular, conduct business on specially managed federal devices that are specially provisioned to control what software is installed and which features are available. Whether the cabinet members had conducted the discussion on Signal or another consumer platform, the core issue was communicating about incredibly high-stakes, secret military operations using inappropriate devices or software.

One of the most straightforward reasons that communication apps like Signal and WhatsApp are not suitable for classified government work is that they offer “disappearing message” features—mechanisms to automatically delete messages after a preset amount of time—that are incompatible with federal record retention laws. This issue was on full display in the principals’ chat about the impending strike on Yemen, which was originally set for one-week auto-delete before the Michael Waltz account changed the timer to four-week auto-delete, according to screenshots of the chat published by The Atlantic on Wednesday. Had The Atlantic’s Goldberg not been mistakenly included in the chat, its contents might not have been preserved in accordance with long-standing government requirements.

In congressional testimony on Wednesday, US director of national intelligence Tulsi Gabbard said that Signal can come preinstalled on government devices. Multiple sources tell WIRED that this is not the norm, though, and noted specifically that downloading consumer apps like Signal to Defense Department devices is highly restricted and often banned. The fact that Hegseth, the defense secretary, participated in the chat indicates that he either obtained an extremely unusual waiver to install Signal on a department device, bypassed the standard process for seeking such a waiver, or was using a non-DOD device for the chat. According to political consultant and podcaster Fred Wellman, DOD “political appointees” demanded that Signal be installed on their government devices last month.

Core to the Trump administration’s defense of the behavior is the claim that no classified material was discussed in the Signal chat. In particular, Gabbard and others have noted that Hegseth himself is the classification authority for the information. Multiple sources tell WIRED, though, that this authority does not make a consumer application the right forum for such a discussion.

“The way this was being communicated, the conversation had no formal designation like 'for official use only' or something. But whether it should have been classified or not, whatever it was, it was obviously sensitive operational information that no soldier or officer would be expected to release to the public—but they had added a member of the media into the chat,” says Andy Jabbour, a US Army veteran and founder of the domestic security risk-management firm Gate 15.

Jabbour adds that military personnel undergo annual information awareness and security training to reinforce operating procedures for handling all levels of nonpublic information. Multiple sources emphasize to WIRED that while the information in the Yemen strike chat appears to meet the standard for classification, even nonclassified material can be extremely sensitive and is typically carefully protected.

“Putting aside for a moment that classified information should never be discussed over an unclassified system, it’s also just mind-boggling to me that all of these senior folks who were on this line and nobody bothered to even check, security hygiene 101, who are all the names? Who are they?” US senator Mark Warner, a Virginia Democrat, said during Tuesday’s Senate Intelligence Committee hearing.

According to The Atlantic, 12 Trump administration officials were in the Signal group chat, including vice president JD Vance, secretary of state Marco Rubio, and Trump adviser Susie Wiles. Jabbour adds that even with ​​decisionmaking authorities present and participating in a communication, establishing an information designation or declassifying information happens through an established, proactive process. As he puts it, “If you spill milk on the floor, you can’t just say, ‘That’s actually not spilled milk, because I intended to spill it.’”

All of which is to say, SignalGate raises plenty of security, privacy, and legal issues. But the security of Signal itself is not one of them. Despite that, in the wake of The Atlantic’s story on Monday, some have sought tenuous connections between the Trump cabinet’s security breach and Signal vulnerabilities. On Tuesday, for example, a Pentagon adviser echoed a report from Google’s security researchers, who alerted Signal earlier this year to a phishing technique that Russian military intelligence used to target the app’s users in Ukraine. But Signal pushed out an update to make that tactic—which tricks users into adding a hacker as a secondary device on their account—far harder to pull off, and the same tactic also targeted some accounts on the messaging services WhatsApp and Telegram.

“Phishing attacks against people using popular applications and websites are a fact of life on the internet,” Signal spokesperson Jun Harada tells WIRED. “Once we learned that Signal users were being targeted, and how they were being targeted, we introduced additional safeguards and in-app warnings to help protect people from falling victim to phishing attacks. This work was completed months ago."

In fact, says White, the cryptography researcher, if the Trump administration is going to put secret communications at risk by discussing war plans on unapproved commercial devices and freely available messaging apps, they could have done much worse than to choose Signal for those conversations, given its reputation and track record among security experts.

“Signal is the consensus recommendation for highly at-risk communities—human rights activists, attorneys, and confidential sources for journalists,” says White. Just not, as this week has made clear, executive branch officials planning airstrikes.

[jcmarchi]

What Is Hotspot 2.0 and How Will It Solve Present-Day Wi-Fi Problems? - Technology Org

New Post has been published on https://thedigitalinsider.com/what-is-hotspot-2-0-and-how-will-it-solve-present-day-wi-fi-problems-technology-org/

What Is Hotspot 2.0 and How Will It Solve Present-Day Wi-Fi Problems? - Technology Org

In the wireless world, staying connected to the internet has become more critical. As of 2022, WiFi service providers deployed about 550 million free Wi-Fi hotspots worldwide, which is only increasing. 

Newer technologies, like Hotspot 2.0, aim to improve Wi-Fi quality by leveraging IoT (Internet of Things) and enhanced security measures. In this article, we’ll discuss what is Hotspot 2.0 and how it can solve some of the common Wi-Fi problems we face today.

WiFi symbol on a smartphone screen – artistic impression. Image credit: Franck via Unsplash, free license

What is Hotspot 2.0?

Hotspot 2.0 is a set of protocols and standards devised for public Wi-Fi access and to enhance the overall public connectivity experience. Also known as the Passpoint protocol, the technology allows users to connect from one network to the other on the move without the need for login or authentication. Many operating systems now support Hotspot 2.0, including Windows, Android, and IOS 7.

Revolutionizing Wi-Fi

Nowadays, we rely on the Internet for almost everything, and that’s making the limitations of traditional Wi-Fi networks more evident every day. Public and Free Wi-Fi connections can be unreliable, there are log-in and security issues, and users must often switch between networks. That’s where Hotspot 2.0 technology comes to the rescue. Here are some of the ways Hotspot 2.0 improves public Wi-Fi access: 

Automatic Authentication

One of the biggest problems of traditional Wi-Fi networks is that you need to manually log in and authenticate when connecting to a free public or private Wi-Fi network. Hotspot 2.0 eliminates this by introducing automatic authentication. 

Using the Passpoint standard, Hotspot 2.0 enables your device to connect to public Wi-Fi networks without manual intervention. It uses advanced authentication tools to ensure user information is not exposed over the network while allowing it to connect automatically whenever Wi-Fi is available. That improves the user experience significantly, particularly in high-density areas like stadiums, airports, etc. 

Seamless Roaming

Another problem you might face is constantly switching Wi-Fi networks in a public place to get an adequate signal. Hotspot 2.0 technology solves this issue by enabling seamless roaming between compatible networks. Your device can automatically switch to another network if a better signal is available without interrupting your internet connection. 

Enhanced Security and Carrier Aggregation

Security is another concern when it comes to public Wi-Fi connectivity. Hotspot 2.0 uses WPA3 encryption protocols and an Online Sign Up (OSU) framework to protect your data when transmitted over a network. That reduces the data privacy risks associated with traditional open Wi-Fi networks. 

Hotspot 2.0 also introduces carrier aggregation, which means your device can connect to multiple Wi-Fi networks simultaneously for increased bandwidth and better internet connection.  That can also make your internet connection more reliable and stable than traditional open-access connections. 

Endnote

Hotspot 2.0 is altering the way Wi-Fi works with its ingenious features. With automatic authentication, seamless roaming, enhanced security, and carrier aggregation, this technology can make your internet connection more secure, stable, and reliable. That means you will now have a hassle-free user experience when accessing public networks with high user density. With upcoming advancements, this technology will reduce data breach risks over public, open-access networks and make public free Wi-Fi much more efficient. 

[esourceful]

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[sandinthepipes]

In these shitty times I remind you to DITCH CHROME AND GOOGLE and use a reliable browser who won't sell you and your mom.

TL;DR. DuckDuckGo both search engine and browser is a good option for everybody and everyday purpose

I'd think duckduckgo both browser and search engine is a good

If you use iPhones and Mac Safari isn't the worst.

Tor is the best in terms of privacy, but it's run by volunteers so it's better if you don't use it to watch YouTube and download stuff, it's also very slow for socials.

Brave browser is slightly better then duckduckgo, but for average use it's almost the same. Also it has had a couple of controversies overtime.

I've recently found out that duckduckgo has it's own browser as well!!!!! AND it's available on both pc and android and I believe even ios and Mac.

Duckduckgo is (mainly) a search engine that doesn't try to sell you stuff like Google, gives you what you search for unfiltered, doesn't collect your data's, AND datas are filtered and bounced around multiple times to encrypt them better.

I know ecosia is appealing because of the trees, you can still use it, but be aware that there's basically no difference between that and Google. It's not secure nor you're guaranteed the results aren't filtered according to whatever strikes them at the moment

[mostlysignssomeportents]

The antitrust case against Apple

I'm on tour with my new, nationally bestselling novel The Bezzle! Catch me TONIGHT (Mar 22) in TORONTO, then SUNDAY (Mar 24) with LAURA POITRAS in NYC, then Anaheim, and beyond!

The foundational tenet of "the Cult of Mac" is that buying products from a $3t company makes you a member of an oppressed ethnic minority and therefore every criticism of that corporation is an ethnic slur:

https://pluralistic.net/2024/01/12/youre-holding-it-wrong/#if-dishwashers-were-iphones

Call it "Apple exceptionalism" – the idea that Apple, alone among the Big Tech firms, is virtuous, and therefore its conduct should be interpreted through that lens of virtue. The wellspring of this virtue is conveniently nebulous, which allows for endless goal-post shifting by members of the Cult of Mac when Apple's sins are made manifest.

Take the claim that Apple is "privacy respecting," which is attributed to Apple's business model of financing its services though cash transactions, rather than by selling it customers to advertisers. This is the (widely misunderstood) crux of the "surveillance capitalism" hypothesis: that capitalism is just fine, but once surveillance is in the mix, capitalism fails.

Apple, then, is said to be a virtuous company because its behavior is disciplined by market forces, unlike its spying rivals, whose ability to "hack our dopamine loops" immobilizes the market's invisible hand with "behavior-shaping" shackles:

http://pluralistic.net/HowToDestroySurveillanceCapitalism

Apple makes a big deal out of its privacy-respecting ethos, and not without some justification. After all, Apple went to the mattresses to fight the FBI when they tried to force Apple to introduced defects into its encryption systems:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/fbi-could-have-gotten-san-bernardino-shooters-iphone-leadership-didnt-say

And Apple gave Ios users the power to opt out of Facebook spying with a single click; 96% of its customers took them up on this offer, costing Facebook $10b (one fifth of the pricetag of the metaverse boondoggle!) in a single year (you love to see it):

https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2021/02/facebook-makes-the-case-for-activity-tracking-to-ios-14-users-in-new-pop-ups/

Bruce Schneier has a name for this practice: "feudal security." That's when you cede control over your device to a Big Tech warlord whose "walled garden" becomes a fortress that defends you against external threats:

https://pluralistic.net/2021/06/08/leona-helmsley-was-a-pioneer/#manorialism

The keyword here is external threats. When Apple itself threatens your privacy, the fortress becomes a prison. The fact that you can't install unapproved apps on your Ios device means that when Apple decides to harm you, you have nowhere to turn. The first Apple customers to discover this were in China. When the Chinese government ordered Apple to remove all working privacy tools from its App Store, the company obliged, rather than risk losing access to its ultra-cheap manufacturing base (Tim Cook's signal accomplishment, the one that vaulted him into the CEO's seat, was figuring out how to offshore Apple manufacturing to China) and hundreds of millions of middle-class consumers:

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-apple-vpn/apple-says-it-is-removing-vpn-services-from-china-app-store-idUSKBN1AE0BQ

Killing VPNs and other privacy tools was just for openers. After Apple caved to Beijing, the demands kept coming. Next, Apple willingly backdoored all its Chinese cloud services, so that the Chinese state could plunder its customers' data at will:

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/technology/apple-china-censorship-data.html

This was the completely foreseeable consequence of Apple's "curated computing" model: once the company arrogated to itself the power to decide which software you could run on your own computer, it was inevitable that powerful actors – like the Chinese Communist Party – would lean on Apple to exercise that power in service to its goals.

Unsurprisingly, the Chinese state's appetite for deputizing Apple to help with its spying and oppression was not sated by backdooring iCloud and kicking VPNs out of the App Store. As recently as 2022, Apple continued to neuter its tools at the behest of the Chinese state, breaking Airdrop to make it useless for organizing protests in China:

https://pluralistic.net/2022/11/11/foreseeable-consequences/#airdropped

But the threat of Apple turning on its customers isn't limited to China. While the company has been unwilling to spy on its users on behalf of the US government, it's proven more than willing to compromise its worldwide users' privacy to pad its own profits. Remember when Apple let its users opt out of Facebook surveillance with one click? At the very same time, Apple was spinning up its own commercial surveillance program, spying on Ios customers, gathering the very same data as Facebook, and for the very same purpose: to target ads. When it came to its own surveillance, Apple completely ignored its customers' explicit refusal to consent to spying, spied on them anyway, and lied about it:

https://pluralistic.net/2022/11/14/luxury-surveillance/#liar-liar

Here's the thing: even if you believe that Apple has a "corporate personality" that makes it want to do the right thing, that desire to be virtuous is dependent on the constraints Apple faces. The fact that Apple has complete legal and technical control over the hardware it sells – the power to decide who can make software that runs on that hardware, the power to decide who can fix that hardware, the power to decide who can sell parts for that hardware – represents an irresistible temptation to enshittify Apple products.

"Constraints" are the crux of the enshittification hypothesis. The contagion that spread enshittification to every corner of our technological world isn't a newfound sadism or indifference among tech bosses. Those bosses are the same people they've always been – the difference is that today, they are unconstrained.

Having bought, merged or formed a cartel with all their rivals, they don't fear competition (Apple buys 90+ companies per year, and Google pays it an annual $26.3b bribe for default search on its operating systems and programs).

Having captured their regulators, they don't fear fines or other penalties for cheating their customers, workers or suppliers (Apple led the coalition that defeated dozens of Right to Repair bills, year after year, in the late 2010s).

Having wrapped themselves in IP law, they don't fear rivals who make alternative clients, mods, privacy tools or other "adversarial interoperability" tools that disenshittify their products (Apple uses the DMCA, trademark, and other exotic rules to block third-party software, repair, and clients).

True virtue rests not merely in resisting temptation to be wicked, but in recognizing your own weakness and avoiding temptation. As I wrote when Apple embarked on its "curated computing" path, the company would eventually – inevitably – use its power to veto its customers' choices to harm those customers:

https://memex.craphound.com/2010/04/01/why-i-wont-buy-an-ipad-and-think-you-shouldnt-either/

Which is where we're at today. Apple – uniquely among electronics companies – shreds every device that is traded in by its customers, to block third parties from harvesting working components and using them for independent repair:

https://www.vice.com/en/article/yp73jw/apple-recycling-iphones-macbooks

Apple engraves microscopic Apple logos on those parts and uses these as the basis for trademark complaints to US customs, to block the re-importation of parts that escape its shredders:

https://repair.eu/news/apple-uses-trademark-law-to-strengthen-its-monopoly-on-repair/

Apple entered into an illegal price-fixing conspiracy with Amazon to prevent used and refurbished devices from being sold in the "world's biggest marketplace":

https://pluralistic.net/2022/11/10/you-had-one-job/#thats-just-the-as

Why is Apple so opposed to independent repair? Well, they say it's to keep users safe from unscrupulous or incompetent repair technicians (feudal security). But when Tim Cook speaks to his investors, he tells a different story, warning them that the company's profits are threatened by customers who choose to repair (rather than replace) their slippery, fragile glass $1,000 pocket computers (the fortress becomes a prison):

https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2019/01/letter-from-tim-cook-to-apple-investors/

All this adds up to a growing mountain of immortal e-waste, festooned with miniature Apple logos, that our descendants will be dealing with for the next 1,000 years. In the face of this unspeakable crime, Apple engaged in a string of dishonest maneuvers, claiming that it would support independent repair. In 2022, Apple announced a home repair program that turned out to be a laughably absurd con:

https://pluralistic.net/2022/05/22/apples-cement-overshoes/

Then in 2023, Apple announced a fresh "pro-repair" initiative that, once again, actually blocked repair:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/09/22/vin-locking/#thought-differently

Let's pause here a moment and remember that Apple once stood for independent repair, and celebrated the independent repair technicians that kept its customers' beloved Macs running:

https://pluralistic.net/2021/10/29/norwegian-potato-flour-enchiladas/#r2r

Whatever virtue lurks in Apple's corporate personhood, it is no match for the temptation that comes from running a locked-down platform designed to capture IP rights so that it can prevent normal competitive activities, like fixing phones, processing payments, or offering apps.

When Apple rolled out the App Store, Steve Jobs promised that it would save journalism and other forms of "content creation" by finally giving users a way to pay rightsholders. A decade later, that promise has been shattered by the app tax – a 30% rake on every in-app transaction that can't be avoided because Apple will kick your app out of the App Store if you even mention that your customers can pay you via the web in order to avoid giving a third of their content dollars to a hardware manufacturer that contributed nothing to the production of that material:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/06/save-news-we-must-open-app-stores

Among the apps that Apple also refuses to allow on Ios is third-party browsers. Every Iphone browser is just a reskinned version of Apple's Safari, running on the same antiquated, insecure Webkit browser engine. The fact that Webkit is incomplete and outdated is a feature, not a bug, because it lets Apple block web apps – apps delivered via browsers, rather than app stores:

https://pluralistic.net/2022/12/13/kitbashed/#app-store-tax

Last month, the EU took aim at Apple's veto over its users' and software vendors' ability to transact with one another. The newly in-effect Digital Markets Act requires Apple to open up both third-party payment processing and third-party app stores. Apple's response to this is the very definition of malicious compliance, a snake's nest of junk-fees, onerous terms of service, and petty punitive measures that all add up to a great, big "Go fuck yourself":

https://pluralistic.net/2024/02/06/spoil-the-bunch/#dma

But Apple's bullying, privacy invasion, price-gouging and environmental crimes are global, and the EU isn't the only government seeking to end them. They're in the firing line in Japan:

https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Technology/Japan-to-crack-down-on-Apple-and-Google-app-store-monopolies

And in the UK:

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-wins-appeal-in-apple-case

And now, famously, the US Department of Justice is coming for Apple, with a bold antitrust complaint that strikes at the heart of Apple exceptionalism, the idea that monopoly is safer for users than technological self-determination:

https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1344546/dl?inline

There's passages in the complaint that read like I wrote them:

Apple wraps itself in a cloak of privacy, security, and consumer preferences to justify its anticompetitive conduct. Indeed, it spends billions on marketing and branding to promote the self-serving premise that only Apple can safeguard consumers’ privacy and security interests. Apple selectively compromises privacy and security interests when doing so is in Apple’s own financial interest—such as degrading the security of text messages, offering governments and certain companies the chance to access more private and secure versions of app stores, or accepting billions of dollars each year for choosing Google as its default search engine when more private options are available. In the end, Apple deploys privacy and security justifications as an elastic shield that can stretch or contract to serve Apple’s financial and business interests.

After all, Apple punishes its customers for communicating with Android users by forcing them to do so without any encryption. When Beeper Mini rolled out an Imessage-compatible Android app that fixed this, giving Iphone owners the privacy Apple says they deserve but denies to them, Apple destroyed Beeper Mini:

https://blog.beeper.com/p/beeper-moving-forward

Tim Cook is on record about this: if you want to securely communicate with an Android user, you must "buy them an Iphone":

https://www.theverge.com/2022/9/7/23342243/tim-cook-apple-rcs-imessage-android-iphone-compatibility

If your friend, family member or customer declines to change mobile operating systems, Tim Cook insists that you must communicate without any privacy or security.

Even where Apple tries for security, it sometimes fails ("security is a process, not a product" -B. Schneier). To be secure in a benevolent dictatorship, it must also be an infallible dictatorship. Apple's far from infallible: Eight generations of Iphones have unpatchable hardware defects:

https://checkm8.info/

And Apple's latest custom chips have secret-leaking, unpatchable vulnerabilities:

https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/03/hackers-can-extract-secret-encryption-keys-from-apples-mac-chips/

Apple's far from infallible – but they're also far from benevolent. Despite Apple's claims, its hardware, operating system and apps are riddled with deliberate privacy defects, introduce to protect Apple's shareholders at the expense of its customers:

https://proton.me/blog/iphone-privacy

Now, antitrust suits are notoriously hard to make, especially after 40 years of bad-precedent-setting, monopoly-friendly antitrust malpractice. Much of the time, these suits fail because they can't prove that tech bosses intentionally built their monopolies. However, tech is a written culture, one that leaves abundant, indelible records of corporate deliberations. What's more, tech bosses are notoriously prone to bragging about their nefarious intentions, committing them to writing:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/09/03/big-tech-cant-stop-telling-on-itself/

Apple is no exception – there's an abundance of written records that establish that Apple deliberately, illegally set out to create and maintain a monopoly:

https://www.wired.com/story/4-internal-apple-emails-helped-doj-build-antitrust-case/

Apple claims that its monopoly is beneficent, used to protect its users, making its products more "elegant" and safe. But when Apple's interests conflict with its customers' safety and privacy – and pocketbooks – Apple always puts itself first, just like every other corporation. In other words: Apple is unexceptional.

The Cult of Mac denies this. They say that no one wants to use a third-party app store, no one wants third-party payments, no one wants third-party repair. This is obviously wrong and trivially disproved: if no Apple customer wanted these things, Apple wouldn't have to go to enormous lengths to prevent them. The only phones that an independent Iphone repair shop fixes are Iphones: which means Iphone owners want independent repair.

The rejoinder from the Cult of Mac is that those Iphone owners shouldn't own Iphones: if they wanted to exercise property rights over their phones, they shouldn't have bought a phone from Apple. This is the "No True Scotsman" fallacy for distraction-rectangles, and moreover, it's impossible to square with Tim Cook's insistence that if you want private communications, you must buy an Iphone.

Apple is unexceptional. It's just another Big Tech monopolist. Rounded corners don't preserve virtue any better than square ones. Any company that is freed from constraints – of competition, regulation and interoperability – will always enshittify. Apple – being unexceptional – is no exception.

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If you'd like an essay-formatted version of this post to read or share, here's a link to it on pluralistic.net, my surveillance-free, ad-free, tracker-free blog:

https://pluralistic.net/2024/03/22/reality-distortion-field/#three-trillion-here-three-trillion-there-pretty-soon-youre-talking-real-money